Epicurus' Scientific Method
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Binghamton University The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB) The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 10-1976 Epicurus' Scientific Method Elizabeth Asmis University of Chicago, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Asmis, Elizabeth, "Epicurus' Scientific Method" (1976). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 157. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/157 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact [email protected]. \''J 7 G .···� Epicurus1 Scientific Method (1) 1 by Elizabeth Asmis (Octob er ,. 19/,6) I con cede right away that Epicurus was not interested in scientific discovery for its own sake. But I cl:�.im that he did have a method by which he developed his conclusions about nature and that this method qualifies as a scientific method. As I shall try to show, his method consists in deducing what is non-apparent (a6n>.ov) from the phenomena. This procedure was, I p:ropose� derived by Epicurus from the early atomists, who developed it in opposition to Parmenides' method of deducing what there is from ;1it is". I shall first.offer a brief summary of Epicurus 1 method of investigation and I shall then illustrate it by analyzing a.section of argument from the Letter to Herodotus� starting with Epicurus1 first deduction about what is non-apparent (that nothing comes to be from non-being) and ending with the deduction' that there is .• · void (Her. 38-40) Ep icurus proposes tv10 rules of investigation. These rules are stated in a short procedural note which is prefixed by Epicurus to the summary of his physical do ctrines in the Letter to Herodotus (37-38). The two rules state the two condi tions which must be satisfied if an investigation is to occur; they jointly form an answer to the problenn posed by Plato in the Meno. The first rule is the requirement fo r initial concepts; the second is the requirement for observation ·1.c.onducted in accordance with one's perceptions and feelings. Concepts are needed to serve as objects by reference to which proposals are judged. Observation is needed to provide evidence C1signsH) crnµe:ta) for what is not manifest. Diogenes Laertius (10.33) illustrates the first requirement by noting that we must have a concept of a horse (or an ox) to begin with in order to be able to judge, by proposing an answer� whether the thing in the distance is a hors e (or an ox). The second requirement may be (1) I am grateful to David Furley� Terence Irwin, John Rist� and Michael Stokes for criticisms of earlier versions of some of the ideas.presented here. I am especially indebted to Michael Stokes for his many valuable suggestions. 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ΏϏϔ +ΐzϔ εɲ3ɅʺÓϔ έ7ƾϔ ϔ + ʻɆ$ϔ *̳ϔ D-ɇ̞Pϔ $̙ϔ "̴ ʼ-Ɉ¦Cðϔ ĭy¥ɉ ʹɳςϐϔ =*$2H ͵54ϔ Ğ#/ ϔ w !ϔ U 'ɴϔ Śiϔ ƿζ˿4ǀƓϔ śϔ w σɊʽǺϔ =[ϔ ɵ0ϔ +gd̀Ͷ ϔ Ǻ ˢWRFÔϔ YǁYIɞŜɶϑϔ +vǂʾ ]¯ ɋʿÇϔ ǃ̅' ɿʀ τϔ ǟυϔ ˣu ˀñϔ įA=ϔ ;țϔ {(ϔ )Fϔ Ǚ ϔ ğX Α©'̵Ξϔ ?.#@H 5Zϔ ŝDŽϔ ƔoɌ"ϔ AH ˤďDž̚Eϔ ɍˁͷϒ.̛̂dž.ϔ $ϔ Ġ¤c6Β%òϔ @kϔ ̶ϔ ǻLJ©(Bϔ Ǽʔϔ ͺȜ ϔ 9Ɏų /'̷óƕɏƖϔ ?* #ǽ/ɐ:ϔ `&>Ljjϔ ɷɑ(aɸϔ Œ˂"ϔ Γ˃ljBŞBϔ ̃̄ sϓϔ ̸g ɹŴͻFǾϔ ͼ ¾ϔ Οή˄ϔ 3 or the 11clear view'; bypreference to the rest of perception as a standard of truth. This is� I think� quite mistaken. What has been termed the 11near;1 or "clear11 _perception is simply the appearanc e that matches an expectation� no matter what the expectation. A standard example used by the ancients.to illustrate Epicurusv method of verification for expectations .ie the round and square tower (Sextus Empiricus� adv. · math. 7 .. 20ch-9; .cf Lucretius 4.353-363� Diogenes Laertius 10.34). It appears round from a distance and square from closeby. Is the perception of a square tower true or reliablej and the perception of a round tower not true or reliable? Not at all� ?S Sextus carefully explains (see also Lucretius 4.379ff). If upon seeing a round tower I form the opinion that when I will be twenty yaards from the tower I will see a square tower; and subsequently at twenty yards away I see a square tower, my opinion is proved true. It has been confirmed by a near view� which has replaced a distant and. less distinct view� but the confirmation has nothing to do with the intrinsic properties of the appearance but is due entirely to the fact that the appearance matches the e�rpectation. If I had previously seen a dark object on the horizon and had ventured the opinion that upon coming a little closer I would see a round tower� and if I had then seen ·a round; tower, my opinion would have been equally true. As Lucretius explains in connection with sight, perception does not present the llnature ·of thingsii (4.3�:5). It makes no sense to demand from perception confirmation of whether the round tower is really a round tower; what is perceived as a round tower is a round tower� and if one would know t.he underlying .nature of what. is perceived, one must go to reason� - reason . relying to be sure entirely on perception. Perception can confirm only an expectation cif what will be perceived. Displaying exactly.what is presently experience� each pe rception is as clear$ as Plutarch says (adv� Colotem 112la), as another. The p Q'3ition of the Epicurean investigator is indeed similar to that of the prisoner in Plato's cave.