Epicurus and the Epicureans on Socrates and the Socratics

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chapter 8 Epicurus and the Epicureans on Socrates and the Socratics

F. Javier Campos-Daroca

1 Socrates vs. Epicurus: Ancients and Moderns

According to an ancient genre of philosophical historiography, Epicurus and Socrates belonged to distinct traditions or “successions” (diadochai) of philosophers. Diogenes Laertius schematizes this arrangement in the following way: Socrates is placed in the middle of the Ionian tradition, which starts with Thales and Anaximander and subsequently branches out into different schools of thought. The “Italian succession” initiated by Pherecydes and Pythagoras comes to an end with Epicurus.1 Modern views, on the other hand, stress the contrast between Socrates and Epicurus as one between two opposing “ideal types” of philosopher, especially in their ways of teaching and claims about the good life.2 Both ancients and moderns appear to agree on the convenience of keeping Socrates and Epicurus apart, this difference being considered a fundamental lineament of ancient philosophy. As for the ancients, however, we know that other arrangements of philosophical traditions, ones that allowed certain connections between Epicureanism and Socratism, circulated in Hellenistic times.3 Modern outlooks on the issue are also becoming more nuanced.

1 DL 1.13 (Dorandi 2013). An overview of ancient genres of philosophical history can be seen in Mansfeld 1999, 16–25. On Diogenes’ scheme of successions and other late antique versions of it, see Kienle 1961, 3–39. 2 According to Riley 1980, 56, “there was a fundamental difference of opinion concerning the role of the philosopher and his behavior towards his students.” In Riley’s view, “Epicurean criticism was concerned mainly with philosophical style,” not with doctrines (which would explain why Plato was not as heavily attacked as Socrates). Kleve 1983, 231, goes a step further: “The Epicurean philosopher is in every respect the reversal of Socrates” (my emphasis). 3 Gigante 1992, 11–20, was inclined to think that traditions linking Epicurus with Antisthenes were obliterated by the prevailing historiographical scheme, according to which Stoicism was tied to Socrates via Antisthenes and the Cynics. An alternative historiographical scheme distinguished ten (or nine) ethical sects (αἱρέσεις), the Epicureans among them (DL 1.13–21). Since Socrates was generally celebrated as the “inventor” of the ethical part of philosophy, Epicureans were given some sort of Socratic ascendance; see Giannantoni 1987, 203. See below n. 7.

There is, to be sure, a constant of bitter criticism against Socrates in the Epicurean school, probably starting with Epicurus himself, which tends to focus on specific features of Socrates’ demeanor. Yet the idea of a “fundamental difference” between both philosophers should be qualified. To begin with, Socrates was certainly not the main target of Epicurus, other philosophers and schools being more prominent as professional rivals. Furthermore, even when he was singled out by the heirs to Epicurus, the criticism leveled at him was actually meant to attack more serious philosophical opponents.4 As for philosophical styles, Michael Erler has recently shown that some of the most characteristic traits of Epicurus’ self-portrait as a philosopher bear comparison with those associated with Socrates. To be more precise, there is a Socratic twist in Epicurus’ claims to being an autodidactic and original thinker, as well as in his ways of freely adapting others’ doctrines, as long as coherence and consistency with one’s own are not thereby compromised.5 Finally, a close reading of the evidence reveals changes and subtleties in the Epicurean reception of Socrates that occasionally result in a more understanding or even positive view of him.6 In this chapter we will go through the textual evidence that attests explicitly to the reception of Socrates throughout the history of the Epicurean school, without much regard to the vexed question of the “historical Socrates” (and his more or less reliable sources), which haunts the studies of Socrates’ reception. Our position on this basically irresolvable issue consists in essaying an ancient way to get to grips with the fact, perfectly known to ancient writers, that Socrates gave rise to as many versions of his teaching as he had

4 Long 1988, 156, sees in the paradigmatic role of Socrates for Stoics and Academics the basis of Epicurean criticism of Socrates; see §3 below. Recent overviews of the reception of Socrates in the Hellenistic age can be found in Erler 2003; Ranocchia 2007, 116–33. 5 Erler 2013, 17 and 21–2 (see also §3 below). Gill 2006, 100–22, makes out a case for the Epicureans defending “a version of psychological and psycho-physiological holism combined with Socratic ideals.” On teaching techniques, see Glad 1995, 120–2: “The wise Epicurean is then not in every respect the reversal of Socrates” (my emphasis). Long 1988, 155, remarks that “the business of curing people’s souls” was common to both Socrates and Epicurus, and recently Tsouna 2009, 264, considers that the parrhesiastic exchanges characteristic of Epicurean therapeutic practices come “surprisingly close to the paradigm of engaging in dialogue”; see below n. 50 on philosophical frank speech. Concerning his account of happiness, Irwin 1983 argues that Socrates is closer to Epicurus than to his own disciples. 6 The necessity of a reassessment of the evidence and a more balanced reevaluation of the issue received forceful articulation by Acosta Méndez and Angeli 1992. Similar suggestions had already been made by Long 1988, 155. That many references to Socrates in Philodemus were not hostile was acknowledged by Riley 1980, 59 and n. 12, but he did not discuss them.