The Logic of Antisthenes. by C* M
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XXV. The Logic of Antisthenes. By C* M. Gillespie, Professor, University of Leeds. 1. Our primary authorities for the peculiar views of Antisthenes on predication are the following passages in Aristotle, to which I will refer as A B and C: A. Topics 104 b 21. &έοις όε εοτιν νπόληψις παράόοξος των γνωρίμων τινός κατά φιλοοοφίαν, οίον ότι ονκ εστίν άντιλέγειν, χα&άπερ εφη *Αντιϋ&ένης, η ότι πάντα κινείται êá&' Ηράκλει- το», ê. τ. ë. Â. Metaphysics 1024 b 27—34. λόγος όε ψενόής δ των μ? Όντων ?) ψενόής. όιο πάς λόγος ψενόής έτερον η ον εϋτιν άλη&ής, οίον δ τον κνκλον ψενόής τριγωνον. εκάΰτον όε λόγος %στι μεν ως εις, δ τον τι ην είναι, εΰτι ό' ως πολλοί, έπε é ταντό πως αντό êáé αντό πεπον&ός, οίον Σωκράτης êáé Σωκράτης μονΰικός. δ όε ψενόής λόγος ονόενός εοτιν απλώς λόγος, όιο Άντιο&ένης ωετο ενή&ως μηδέν αξιών λέγεϋ&αι πλην τω οικείω λόγo^ εν Ιφ* ενός ' εξ ων όννέβαινε μη είναι άντι- λέγεη?, Οχεόον όε μηόε ιρενόεΰ&αι. The Oxford translators/render thus: "A false conception is the conception of non-existent objects, so far as it is false. Hence every conception is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true, e. g. the conception of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. In a sense there is one conception of each thing, i. e. the conception of its essence, but in a sense there are many, since the thing itself and the thing itself modified in a certain way are somehow the same, e. g. Socrates and musical Socrates. The false conception is not the conception of anything, except in a qualified sense. Hence Antisthenes foolishly claimed that nothing could be Brought to you by | University of Illinois Urbana Champaign Authenticated | 130.126.32.13 Download Date | 7/18/13 9:04 PM 480 C. M. Gilleepie, described except by its own conception, — one predicate to one sub- ject; from which it followed that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could be no error." "Conception" is too psycho- logical a word for λόγος here; λόγος means a form of words or "formula", as it is rendered by the Oxford translators in book VII and elsewhere: as we shall see, Antisthenes did not distinguish between a conception and the language in which it is expressed and always thought of it in terms of the language. C. Metaphysics 1043 b 24. ώ'οτε η απορία, ην l Αντί- ϋ&έτειοι καΐ l όντως απαίδευτοι ήπόρονν, εχεϊ'τινά καιρόν, ότι ουκ εοτι το τι εοτιν δρίοαΰ&αι" τον ãáñ ορον λόγον είναι μακρόν * άλλα ποίον μεν τι εοτιν ένόέχέΟ&αι êáé όιόάξαι, ωοπερ αργνρον, τι μεν εοτιν, ον, ότι όε οίον καττίτερος. In the Oxford version: "Therefore the difficulty which was raised by the school of Antisthenes and other such uneducated people has a certain appropriateness. They stated that the "what" cannot be defined (for the definition so called is a "long formula"); but of what s o'rt a thing, e. g. silver, is, they thought it possible to explain, not saying what it is but that it is like tin/' χ) These passages establish: . (1) That the paradox ουκ εοτιν άντιλέγειν was specially associated with the name of Antisthenes. (2) An intimate connexion between this paradox and two others, viz: (a) that only its οικείος λόγος may be predicated of any object, a principle that can be described as the one-to-one relation of thing and λόγος (sign): (b) that ψενόεο&αι is impossible in some sense or another. (3) Passage (B) seems to point to triple distinction of formulae in respect of their truth and falsehood: (a) true as applied to the right object, (b) false as applied to the wrong object, (c) unmeaning as containing an inner contradiction. (4) (C) shows that Antisthenes interested himself in the logic of definition, and held distinctive views on the subject. x) The examples of tin and silver, homogeneous substances, seem to show, if we compare Theaetetus 202 A, that Antisthenes held all definition to be incomplete as ultimately employing indefinable terms. / ; Brought to you by | University of Illinois Urbana Champaign Authenticated | 130.126.32.13 Download Date | 7/18/13 9:04 PM The Logic of Antisthenes. 481 2. Similar doctrines are alluded to in various passages in the writings of Isocrates and Plato, which, following the majority of scholars, I believe to refer to Antisthenes, though he is no:t mentioned by name2). The full justification of this view falls outside the scope of this paper, as it would involve a complete statement of my reasons for dissenting from the principles recently laid down by Professors Burnet and Taylor for the interpretation of the Platonic dialogues. I will content myself, therefore, with pointing out the close inter- correspondence of the passages with each other and with the Aristo- telian authorities. Even if the reference to Antisthenes himself cannot be proved in every case, the intimate connexion of* the doctrines may serve to explain the position of Antisthenes as described by Aristotle. Isocrates, Helena (10. 1) contains the following sentence: καταγεγηράκαοιν oi μεν ου φάοκοντες οίον r9 είναι φενόη λέγειν όνο' άντιλέγειν ονοε όνω λόγω περί των αντών πραγμάτων άντ ειπείν ê. τ. ë.: here we have the three paradoxes of (B) con- joined, viz: the denial of contradiction and of falsehood, and the one-to-one relation of λόγος and thing. The context shows that Isocrates is alluding to a contemporary; the Helena was an early work (Blass, Attische Beredsamkeit, II. 244); hence there is every reason to suppose that the reference is to Antisthenes. 'In four dialogues of Plato, C r a t y l u s (429 A ff.); E u t h y - d e m u s (283 E, 285 E), Th e a e t e t u s (201D ff.), S o p h i s t e s (251 A B), doctrines similar to those attributed by Aristotle to Anti- sthenes make their appearance in close connexion with the main themes of the dialogues. In Theaetetus they are reported by Socrates as the actual views of others; so also by the Eleatic stranger in S o p h i s t e s. In the other passages they are advanced by characters in the dialogues, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and Cra- tylus 3). 2) Natorp's article on Antisthenes in Pauly-Wissowa's Real-Encyclo- paedie contains a list of the Platonic passages which have been thought to refer to Antisthenes, with the names of the scholars who have written for and against the supposed references. 3) The question whether characters in the Platonic dialogues are "masks'* for contemporaries of Plato must be determined in connexion with the literary conventions of the time. If the dialogues are largely polemical, and if we Archiv f r Geschichte der Philosophie. XXVI. 4. 32 Brought to you by | University of Illinois Urbana Champaign Authenticated | 130.126.32.13 Download Date | 7/18/13 9:04 PM 482 C. Μ. Gillespie, a) S op hi s tos 251 Ë Â refers to the "old men late-learned" who will not allow many names to be applied to one and the same thing: you may call good good and man man, but you must not call man good. (1) This is the principle of "one thing, one name" with an obvious likeness to the principle of uone thing, one λόγος" of (B). A connexion between the two is found in C r a t y l u s 433 DE, where Socrates appeals to Cratylus to allow the application to things both of names and of λόγοι which do not strictly belong to them (μη προοήκοντα). The ground of the connexion appears in (C) and inTheaetetus 202 Â; in(C) the definition is a μακρός λόγος, i. e. a compound name: in T h e a e t e t u s 1. e. simple things can be named by their own names, compound things by their own λόγοι, which are merely compound names (ονομάτων ãáñ ΰυμπλοκήν είναι λόγου ουοίαν)· (2) There seem to be verbal reminiscences of Isocrates, Helena, certainly earlier than Sophistes:the word γέρουοι suggests the καταγεγηράκαοιν of the Isocratean passage, and the όφιμά-θ-εοΐι the τις εοτιν ούτως όψιμά&ης as not to know that such paradoxes are no new thing. (3) The Eleatic stranger points out in 252 C that the supporters of the paradox have to describe the separate things as separate by many words applicable to other things also, viz: είναι χωρίς των άλλων êá& αυτό; these \vords are patently quoted. A connexion is thus established with (I) the paradox ουκ εΰτι ψενόεΰ&αι of Euthydemus 283 E, where the same words occur (λέγει αυτό.... εν μην κάκεΐνό ã* εοτιν των όντων, χωρίς των άλλων): and (Ð) the theory of knowledge discussed in Theaetetus 201 E ff., which forbids the inclusion of words like this and that in the scientific proposition, on the ground that they are common to all things. (4) The passage occurs at the very end of a historical survey of the problem of Being in Greek thought; the views of the φυοικοϊ can suppose a convention not to introduce living opponents by name, the principle of the "mask*2 seems to follow at once. But its application to any given dialogue must depend on the form and purpose of the dialogue itself. If the work-is obviously polemical, and directed against contemporary views, as Euthydemus and Cratylus seem to be, it is reasonable to suppose that prominent contemporaries are concealed under the "mask22 of less im- portant persons.