Tristram Shandy and the Association of Ideas Author(S): CHINMOY BANER JEE Source: Texas Studies in Literature and Language, Vol
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Tristram Shandy and the Association of Ideas Author(s): CHINMOY BANER JEE Source: Texas Studies in Literature and Language, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Winter 1974), pp. 693-706 Published by: University of Texas Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40754290 Accessed: 22-04-2019 17:25 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40754290?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms University of Texas Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Texas Studies in Literature and Language This content downloaded from 103.57.87.241 on Mon, 22 Apr 2019 17:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHINMOY BANERJEE Tristram Shandy and the Association of Ideas WHETHER STERNE FOLLOWED LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE ASSOCIATION of ideas in Tristram Shandy has been an important question in the criti- cism of Sterne ever since Wilbur Cross suggested that the book was con- structed according to this theory.1 Basically three kinds of answers have been given to this question. A group of critics, mainly in the earlier half of the century, accepted Cross's, and later Read's, suggestions and ex- plored various ways in which Locke's Essay, and especially his theory of association, could illuminate the construction of Tristram Shandy.2 Two later groups of critics have rejected the earlier notion that Sterne fol- lowed Locke to the point of illustrating his ideas and have suggested more subtle relationship between Tristram Shandy and the Essay. But while one of these, whom we might call revised-Lockeans, still affirm that Sterne was following Locke, the other, or un-Lockean, group sug- gests that Sterne is best understood as a critic of Locke, or at least as a person with a critical attitude toward the philosopher's ideas.3 The posi- tion of the earlier critics has been largely abandoned over the years. The 1The Works and Life of Laurence Sterne (New York, 1904), II, xxvi; Life and Times of Laurence Sterne, 3d ed. (New Haven, 1939), p. 52. 2 Herbert Read, "Laurence Sterne/' TLS, May 26, 1927, pp. 361-362. Since it is impossible to give anything like an adequate list of studies that follow this line more or less, I will mention only Kenneth MacLean's John Locke and English Literature of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven, 1936), which, though early, is an epitome of this approach. While a very large number of scholars assume that Sterne was following Locke, MacLean's is the most thoroughgoing attempt to establish this assumption. 3 The most significant expressions of the "revised-Lockean" attitude are those of Arthur H. Cash, "The Lockean Psychology of Tristram Shandy" ELH, 22 (1955), 125-135; "The Sermon in Tristram Shandy" ELH, 31 (1964), 395-417; Sterne's Comedy of Moral Sentiments: The Ethical Dimension of the Journey (Pittsburgh, Penn., 1966) ; and those of Ernest Lee Tuveson, "Locke and the 'Dis- solution of the Ego,' " MP, 52 (1955), 159-174; The Imagination as a Means of Grace-. Locke and the Aesthetics of Romanticism (Berkeley, I960); "Locke and Sterne," Reason and the Imagination, Studies in the History of Ideas, 1660-1800, ed. J. A. Mazzeo et al. (New York, 1962). It is worth noticing that Cash and Tuveson differ radically in their interpretation of Locke. The chief "un-Lockean" positions are those of John Traugott, Tristram Shandy's World: Sterne's Philosophical Rhetoric (Berkeley, 1954); Ian Watt, "The Comic Syntax of Tristram Shandy" Studies in Criticism and Aesthetics, 1660-1800, ed. Howard Anderson and John S. Shea (Minneapolis, 1967); and Howard Ander- son, "Associationism and Wit in Tristram Shandy" PQ, 48 (1969), 27-41. Texas Studies in Literature and Language XV .4 (Winter 1974) This content downloaded from 103.57.87.241 on Mon, 22 Apr 2019 17:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 694 CHINMOY BANERJEE revised-Lockean approach still demands consideration, but finally per- haps the answer to the whole question of Sterne's relationship with Locke lies in the third approach, in its suggestion that Sterne is better illumi- nated in the context of the tradition of Renaissance learning and con- temporary thinking than in the light of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It seems fairly clear that the central aspect of Locke's psychology serves as a basis for his theory of knowledge by providing a hypothetical model of the mechanism of understanding while, incidental to this, a picture of the mind also emerges from Locke's analysis of mental processes as they are available to introspection and from his warnings against the ways in which the mind might stray from the path of reason and knowl- edge. The first, which Locke calls his "short and . true history,"4 seems to be of little interest to Sterne, who uses it only in his comic and parodie reference to the cause of obscurity in ideas.5 Tristram tells us all about it, as if to explain Uncle Toby's problems, and then informs us that the whole thing is irrelevant because Toby's problems are not with ideas at all but with words.6 Sterne is, however, rather more concerned with the incidental aspects of Locke's psychology, with his notion of the "train of ideas" and his theory of the association of ideas, and in recent years the former has been substituted for the latter as the basis of Sterne's method. The "train of ideas," it has been said, is fundamental to Locke's psychology, and it taught Sterne two important things: it taught him that the mind is continuous and led him to construct his book on this prin- ciple, and it taught him that the ego is fluid and led him to create his hero according to this model.7 Though it sounds extremely plausible, the problem with the "train- of -ideas" theory is that Locke actually says very little about this "train," except noticing that it exists. If we "look into ourselves," says Locke, "and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake or have any thought, passing in train, one going and another coming without intermission."8 Locke certainly repeats this ob- servation several times in the Essay,9 but it is somewhat misleading to 4 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D. Woozeley (Cleveland, 1964), II, xi, 15. The numerals refer to book, chapter, and section. 5 Essay, II, xxix, 3. « Tristram Shandy, ed. Ian Watt (Boston, 1965), II, 11, 66-67. It is very diffi- cult to see how Sterne could be constructing his entire novel on Locke's diagnosis of obscurity of ideas as Mary S. Wagoner suggests in "Satire of the Reader in Tristram S handy r TSLL, 8 (1966-67), 337-344. ? See Cash and Tuveson. 8 Essay, II, vii, 9. » Essay, II, 1, 10-11; 11, xiv, 3; il, xix, ó. This content downloaded from 103.57.87.241 on Mon, 22 Apr 2019 17:25:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Tristram Shandy and the Association of Ideas 695 suggest that he had a psychology based on this. For one thing his lim- ited and functional psychology of the mechanism of the understanding does not seem to be essentially dependent on the "train of ideas," and further, he neither gives a very thorough description of the "train" nor attempts to explain the way ideas come to follow one another. The "train of ideas" is epistemologically valuable as the source of the ideas of suc- cession and duration, and it has important forensic and metaphysical con- sequences regarding personal identity and the nature of the soul, but its psychological aspects are of little interest to Locke.10 The principle behind the succession of ideas in the mind had, how- ever, been a subject of concern since Aristotle, and as is well known, Locke contributed to this ancient branch of psychology little more than its key term.11 Locke's chapter on association in the fourth edition of the Essay is neither an attempt to explain the "train of ideas" nor an expres- sion of second thoughts regarding his view of the mind as an essentially rational consciousness.12 Rather than indicating any change of heart it fits in with his general intention of teaching people how to think straight. He had already pointed out several pitfalls in the way of truth and knowledge, and in the chapter on association he indicated yet another problem that affected even people who were otherwise sane and sensible. The discussion of association in the Essay is a part of Locke's diagnosis of the diseases of the understanding and not a revision of his older view or a new exploration of the mind. Some of our ideas, Locke says, have "a natural correspondence and connection one with another; it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their particular be- ings." But the mind sometimes makes a "wrong Connexion of ideas," "wholly owing to chance or custom" and ideas so connected often de- velop a compulsive power over the mind.13 This association of ideas con- 10 Since a discussion of Locke's concept of the ego does not quite belong in this context, I will merely indicate that I do not find Locke either basing his notion of identity on the fleeting train of ideas or dissolving the ego.