HUME’S TREATISE AND THE THEORY OF IDEAS Emily Kelahan A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy. Chapel Hill 2011 Approved by: Alan Nelson (chair) Robert M. Adams C.D.C. Reeve Ram Neta Geoffrey Sayre-McCord © 2011 Emily Kelahan ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Emily Kelahan Hume’s Treatise and the Theory of Ideas (Under the direction of Alan Nelson) Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature has long been evaluated in terms of the skepticism-naturalism interpretive dichotomy. According to this interpretation, there are two distinct and often diametrically opposed Humes: a skeptic concerned to eradicate dubious metaphysical views and a naturalist concerned to develop a science of human nature. The skeptical Hume applies the theory of ideas developed in Book I of the Treatise to the phenomena he seeks to explain and nearly obliterates them. That leaves the science of human nature weak and without phenomena to explain in Books II and III. The naturalistic Hume, in contrast, is able to develop a robust science of human nature in Books II and III of the Treatise, but does so at the expense of completely abandoning the theory of ideas developed in Book I. In short, the familiar skepticism-naturalism interpretive dichotomy has it that Hume either successfully developed a science of human nature without the theory of ideas or else stubbornly held on to his theory of ideas at the cost of a robust science of human nature. This is a false dichotomy. There is one Hume, not two, who both adheres to the theory of ideas throughout the Treatise and develops a robust science of human nature. Hume accomplished much with little in his Treatise. Most importantly, he demolished extravagant metaphysical theories of various types and developed a robust science of human nature. Both feats were accomplished via his oft criticized, but little understood theory of iii ideas. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the theory of ideas stands not in opposition to Hume’s naturalistic project of developing a science of human nature, but rather is the foundation of that very project. I develop and defend an interpretation of Hume’s theory of ideas according to which it succeeds in eradicating dubious metaphysical views, but also supports, rather than undermines his science of human nature. iv For my family, the very best parents, brother, and husband I could hope to have v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to all of the wonderful teachers, colleagues, friends, and family members who contributed so much to my development and well-being over the past six years at UNC and who made it possible for me to complete this dissertation. First, I would like to thank Alan Nelson, my tireless advisor and dissertation director, who beyond being brilliant was always extraordinarily patient and extremely generous with his time. I owe him a huge debt of gratitude. I am also grateful to the other members of my dissertation advisory committee: Bob Adams, David Reeve, Ram Neta, and Geoff Sayre- McCord. They were always willing to read my work and supplied a huge amount of valuable feedback. I have footnoted many of their specific contributions to my work throughout this dissertation, but I know I could not possibly have captured all of their suggestions, guidance, and encouragement. I feel incredibly fortunate to have teamed up with five such spectacular advisors. I would also like to express my gratitude to the entire UNC Department of Philosophy. Chapel Hill is truly the best community in which to do philosophy in the world. Thank you to all of my teachers. Thank you to Jan Boxill, who has always been an advocate for graduate students in the Department and University. Thank you to Susan Wolf, who, in addition to being a great boss, gave me valuable feedback on my work, tremendous support on the job market, and inspired me in moments of low confidence. Thank you to Ram Neta, who was an outstanding placement director and who, in that role, read many drafts of many documents that now compose large portions of this dissertation. I am also especially grateful vi to Matt Kotzen and Geoff Sayre-McCord for the fantastic job they did leading the Dissertation Completion Seminars. Without those seminars and their valuable feedback, I could not have completed this dissertation. Finally, I am grateful to Theresa Stone, Kelly Finn, and Jennie Dickson for their administrative support. In addition to the faculty at UNC, my fellow graduate students make it a fantastic place to do philosophy. They have shaped my philosophical and personal development in ways I never anticipated. I am proud to consider many of them very good friends. Thank you especially to my classmates: Jamin Asay, Katie Elliot, Emily Given, Adam Cureton, and Felipe De Brigard. From Proto-seminar to the job market, they have challenged and supported me. Thank you also to the extraordinary women in my graduate student work group: Katie Elliot, Emily Given, Clair Morrissey, Elanor Taylor, and Kristen Bell. Their feedback, perspectives, and friendship have been absolutely vital to my success. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the early modern crew: Seth Bordner, Patrick Connelly, Cathay Liu, and Matt Priselac. Finally, thank you to all of the “big kids” who made UNC such a welcoming environment: Elizabeth Foreman, Bryce Huebner, Justin Jeffrey, Dave Landy, Clair Morrissey, Eric Mandlebaum, Mark Phelan, Francisca Reines, Dylan Sabo, Piers Turner, Meg Wallace (who was also a great neighbor and workout buddy), and Anabella Zagura. My journey to this point begins and ends at the same place: Illinois Wesleyan University. I am extraordinarily grateful to the philosophy faculty there: Ted Morris, Charlotte Brown, Mark Criley, and Lenny Clapp. As an undergraduate student there, they introduced me to the wonderful world of philosophy, nurtured my talent, and encouraged me to go to graduate school in philosophy. Now that I have nearly completed my graduate vii education, I am thrilled to be joining the Illinois Wesleyan University philosophy faculty myself. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my absolutely wonderful family. My husband, Carlo Robustelli, who I first met in Caldwell Hall, has seen the good, the bad, and the ugly that has gone into completing this dissertation. He is the only person who has had to see me at my very worst, and he loves me anyway. Without his patience, encouragement, flexibility, and understanding, I would not have made it to this point. My entire life, my parents have shared heartily in my joy, frustration, righteous indignation, and satisfaction. They have been there in good times and in bad, glowing over my successes and blaming my failures on some injustice (occasionally real, but mostly imaginary). They gave me opportunities they did not have. They encouraged me to pursue my dreams and took the value of those dreams for granted. Everyone should have parents like mine. Finally, I am grateful to my brother, Matthew, who taught me to keep my head up. I have always turned to him during my lowest moments, and he has always made me feel like winning the next round. I am fortunate to have him in my corner. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION…………………..………………………………………………………....1 CHAPTER ONE: REINTERPRETING HUME’S THEORY OF IDEAS………………..…..4 Section 1.1: Some Preliminary Remarks……………………………………………...4 Section 1.2: The Skepticism-Naturalism Dichotomy………………………………....5 Section 1.3: A Devastating Objection to the Theory………………………………...11 Section 1.4: Hume’s Theory of Ideas Reconsidered………………………………....14 CHAPTER TWO: THE MISSING SHADE OF BLUE…………………………………..…36 Section 2.1: The Counterexample……………………………………………………37 Section 2.2: Six Versions of the Missing Shade of Blue…………………………….38 Section 2.3: An Interpretive Dilemma…………………………………………….....46 The Missing Shade of Blue Is Not a Simple Idea……………………………48 Assume That the Missing Shade of Blue Is a Simple Idea……………..……51 The “Hard” Version of the Case of the Missing Shade……………………...55 Section 2.4: The Status of the Copy Principle…………………………………..…...61 CHAPTER THREE: BELIEF IN BODY……………………………………………………63 Section 3.1: A Preliminary Sketch of Treatise 1.4.2………………………..……….64 Section 3.2: What is the Object of Hume’s Explanation in Treatise 1.4.2?................67 Concepts and Conceptual Skepticism………………………………..………70 Section 3.3: What Faculty Is Responsible for the Attributions?..................................73 Sensation……………………………………………………………..………75 ix Reason……………………………………………………………………..…76 The Vulgar and the Philosophical Belief in Body………………………..….78 Imagination and How It Produces Belief in Body………..……….………....87 Section 3.4: Justifying the System…………………………………………..……….94 An Enduring Objection…………………………………..…….………...…101 CHAPTER FOUR: PERSONAL IDENTITY……………………………………..……….105 Section 4.1: The Apparent Trouble with Hume’s Account………………………...106 Hume’s Confession…………………………………………………………110 Some Hypotheses…………………………………………………………...111 Section 4.2: The Five Theory-Centric Hypotheses…………………………………115 Section 4.3: Treatise 1.4.6 Reconsidered………………………………………..….125 An Alternative Explanation………………………………………………...130 CHAPTER FIVE: HUME’S CONCLUSION……………………….……...…………..….138 What Treatise 1.4.7 Has to Do with Treatise 1.4.6………………………...150 Final Thoughts……………………………………………………………...151 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………..…153 x LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Illustration 1: Joe and Moe’s Mind…………………………………………………………119 xi INTRODUCTION The philosophy of David Hume, especially as it presents itself in his masterwork, A Treatise of Human Nature, is most often understood in terms of the longstanding skepticism- naturalism interpretive dichotomy.1 According to the skeptical interpretation, Hume is primarily a skeptical philosopher who developed and employed a version of the Theory of Ideas to eradicate dubious metaphysical views.2 This interpretation, the skeptical interpretation, has it that the Theory of Ideas leads directly and inevitably to skepticism, which undermines the project of developing a science of human nature.