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Unity of Mind, Temporal Awareness, and Personal Identity

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE THE LEGACY OF HUMEANISM: UNITY OF MIND, TEMPORAL AWARENESS, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY DISSERTATION submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Philosophy by Daniel R. Siakel Dissertation Committee: Professor David Woodruff Smith, Chair Professor Sven Bernecker Associate Professor Marcello Oreste Fiocco Associate Professor Clinton Tolley 2016 © 2016 Daniel R. Siakel DEDICATION To My mother, Anna My father, Jim Life’s original, enduring constellation. And My “doctor father,” David Who sees. “We think that we can prove ourselves to ourselves. The truth is that we cannot say that we are one entity, one existence. Our individuality is really a heap or pile of experiences. We are made out of experiences of achievement, disappointment, hope, fear, and millions and billions and trillions of other things. All these little fragments put together are what we call our self and our life. Our pride of self-existence or sense of being is by no means one entity. It is a heap, a pile of stuff. It has some similarities to a pile of garbage.” “It’s not that everything is one. Everything is zero.” Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche “Galaxies of Stars, Grains of Sand” “Rhinoceros and Parrot” ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v CURRICULUM VITAE vi ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION xii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I: Hume’s Appendix Problem and Associative Connections in the Treatise and Enquiry §1. General Introduction to Hume’s Science of Human Nature 6 §2. Introducing Hume’s Appendix Problem 8 §3. Contextualizing Hume’s Appendix Problem 15 §4. Perception, Discovery, Proof, and Truth 24 §5. Hume’s Letter to Lord Kames 30 §6. The Enquiry’s Evident Principles 37 §7. Objections 46 §8. Alternative Accounts of Hume’s Appendix Problem 49 §9. Transition via Hume’s Analysis of the Idea of Time 57 CHAPTER II: Hume’s Influence on Husserl’s Theory of Time-Consciousness §1. General Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology 63 §2. The Most Important Yet Most Difficult Phenomenological Problem 69 §3. The Schematic Model of Time-Apprehension 71 §4. From Immanent Time-Apprehension to Inner Time-Consciousness 78 §5. Evidence of Hume’s Influence 84 §6. The Seefeld Manuscripts on Individuation (1905) 91 §7. Manuscript of an “Introduction to Logic and Epistemology” (1906-7) 95 §8. Manuscript of an “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Cognition (1909) 99 §9. Murphy’s Alternative Account and “Radical Subjectivism” 103 §10. Conclusion 107 CHAPTER III: Whitehead’s Inheritance and Receptacle Theories of Personal Identity: A Critical Examination §1. General Introduction to Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism 109 §2. Whitehead’s Engagement with Hume 113 §3. The Problem of Personal Identity 118 §4. Substantial Particulars and Processes 121 §5. Whitehead’s Basic Categories 125 §6. Whitehead’s Speculative Methodology 128 §7. Novelty, Subjective Forms, and Diachronic Unity 130 iii §8. The Inheritance Model 133 §9. The Receptacle Model 136 §10. An Objection and Criticisms 143 §11. Inheritance Refined 146 §12. Modes and “Immortality” 150 §13. Alternative Accounts of Whitehead’s Theory of Personal Identity 155 §14. The Receptacle 162 §15. Conclusion 164 iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS David Woodruff Smith is a singular scholar and soul whose ethos consistently serves as a source of inspiration. I am immensely grateful for the wisdom that he has shared over the years. I have had the honor of engaging with an exceptional committee composed of Sven Bernecker, M. O. Fiocco, David Woodruff Smith, and Clinton Tolley. Clinton Tolley deserves special thanks, as his advice during a dire moment helped me see the forest for the trees (as far as I was able). Ermanno Bencivenga and Martin Schwab continue to contribute considerable richness to my (and others’) intellectual life in Irvine. John Cobb generously devoted time speaking to me about Whitehead’s philosophy and process philosophy more broadly. Carol Burke, James Herbert, and Rodrigo Lazo went considerable lengths to support me during my tenure as a Teaching Associate in the Humanities Core Course. I am elated to be able to continue our collaborations. Larisa Castillo graciously volunteered to read a draft of the dissertation and provided targeted, lucid advice. De Gallow and the Center for Engaged Instruction’s Pedagogical Fellowship Program helped me more effectively empower my students and more fully embrace a life devoted to teaching. The tireless support of Kirsten Alonso, Sara Connor, and Alice Decker facilitated me (and so many others) during difficult times and sensitive situations, including Kafkaesque nightmares of all-too-recent—immediate—memory. The patient, loving support of family and friends helped prevent the Profession from casting a shadow. My mother and father, Anna and James Siakel, were there, then, on so many occasions. Others were too, in so many ways—perhaps unbeknownst to them, yet with my profound appreciation. Gil Figueroa, Marilyn Moore, and other members of the Center for Living Peace and Orange County Shambhala Center helped a lover of wisdom find it embodied in them. Financial support was provided by the University of California, Irvine. v CURRICILUM VITAE DANIEL R. SIAKEL Department of Philosophy 16351 Sandalwood Street University of California, Irvine [UCI] Fountain Valley, CA 92708 [email protected] (847) 707-9200 AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION AREAS OF COMPETENCE Metaphysics History of Analytic Philosophy Philosophy of Mind History of Continental Philosophy History of 20th-Century Philosophy Philosophical Logic Early Modern Philosophy Value Theory EDUCATION Ph.D., University of California, Irvine, Department of Philosophy, September 2016 Dissertation: The Legacy of Humeanism: Unity of Mind, Temporal Awareness, and Personal Identity Committee: David Woodruff Smith (c), Sven Bernecker, M. Oreste Fiocco, Clinton Tolley M.A., University of California, Irvine, Department of Philosophy, June 2012 M.A., University of Chicago, Humanities with Specialization in Philosophy, June 2008 B.A. (with honors), University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, June 2005 PUBLICATIONS “The Dynamic Process of Being (a Person): Two Process-Ontological Theories of Personal Identity.” Process Studies 43, no. 2 (2014): 4-28. “Satan at the Center and Double Rhizomes: Discussing Spheres and Beyond with Peter Sloterdijk.” Coauthored with Peter Sloterdijk, Tom Boellstorff, et. al. Los Angeles Review of Books (2014): https://lareviewofbooks.org/interview/satan-center-double-rhizomes- discussing-spheres-beyond-peter-sloterdijk PAPERS PRESENTED “Locke and Parfit on Personal Identity.” Laguna Woods Philosophy Seminar, Laguna Woods, CA (July 2016) “Reassessing Whitehead’s Theory of Personal Identity: A New Interpretation and Critical Examination.” Claremont School of Theology, Claremont, CA (April 2016) vi “Reassessing Whitehead’s Theory of Personal Identity: A New Interpretation and Critical Examination.” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Francisco, CA (March 2016) “Descartes and Hume on Time and the Nature of the Self.” Laguna Woods Philosophy Seminar, Laguna Woods, CA (August 2015) “Hume and Husserl on Time and Temporal Awareness.” California Phenomenology Circle, Irvine, CA (December 2014) “Hume and Husserl on Time and Temporal Awareness.” Seminar in Phenomenology and the History of Philosophy, Denver, CO (September 2014) “God, Becoming, and Temporal Reality: Whitehead Ramified.” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Francisco, CA (March 2013) RESEARCH UNDER REVIEW/IN PROGRESS “Hume’s Appendix Problem and Associative Connections in the Treatise and Enquiry.” In progress. “Hume’s Influence on Husserl’s Theory of Time-Consciousness.” Under review. “Whitehead’s Inheritance and Receptacle Theories of Personal Identity: A Critical Examination.” In progress. FELLOWSHIPS, AWARDS, AND HONORS K. Patricia Cross Future Leaders Award; American Association of Colleges and Universities (2016) Most Promising Future Faculty Member Fellowship; Graduate Division, UCI (2015-16) Senior Pedagogical Fellowship; Center for Engaged Instruction, UCI (2015-6) Certificate for Mentoring Excellence; Graduate Resource Center, UCI (2015) Certificate for Advanced Course Design; Center for Engaged Instruction, UCI (2015) Certificate for Advanced Training in Undergraduate Pedagogy; Center for Engaged Instruction, UCI (2015) Pedagogical Fellowship; Center for Engaged Instruction, UCI (2014-15) Kavka Foundation Award for Excellence in Philosophical Research; Department of Philosophy, UCI (2014) Outstanding Graduate Student TA Award in the Humanities; Graduate Division, UCI (2013-14) First Prize; International Process Network Young Scholar Essay Competition (2011) Regents’ Fellowship; Board of Regents, UCI (2009-10) Phi Beta Kappa; Phi Beta Kappa Society (2005) vii TEACHING EXPERIENCE Lecturer, Humanities Core Course, UCI (Fall 2016 – Spring 2017) . Interdisciplinary program emphasizing undergraduate research and writing . Designed all section activities and materials, met weekly with program directors to coordinate program-wide learning outcomes, led discussion, mentored students and first- year instructors, supervised research projects, designed and led pedagogical workshops, participated in formal assessments, evaluated exceptional undergraduate research projects Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Chapman University, Orange, CA (Winter – Spring 2016) . Designed curriculum, delivered lectures, led discussion, mentored students . Course: “Symbolic Logic: Propositional and
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