Studies on Collingwood, History and Civilization

Home , Historical method, Judgement, Manuscript, Perception

Jan van der Dussen

Studies on Collingwood,

History and Civilization Jan van der Dussen Heerlen , The Netherlands

ISBN 978-3-319-20671-4 ISBN 978-3-319-20672-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20672-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015951386

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Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www. springer.com) Acknowledgements

The following four essays are reproduced from their original publication. I would like to express my gratitude to the publishers for reprinting them here. ‘Introduction to Collingwood’s Philosophy of History’, with the title ‘The Case for Historical Imagination: Defending the Human Factor and Narrative’, in Nancy Partner and Sarah Foot eds., The Sage Handbook of Historical Theory (Los Angeles/ London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC, 2013: Sage), 41–66 ‘Collingwood’s Philosophy of History in the Year of his An Autobiography ’, in David Boucher and Teresa Smith eds., R.G. Collingwood : An Autobiography and Other Writings. With essays on Collingwood ’ s life and work (Oxford, 2013: Oxford University Press), 305–333 ‘Collingwood on the Ideas of Process, Progress, and Civilization’, in David Boucher, James Connelly and Tariq Modood eds., Philosophy , History and Civilization. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on R.G. Collingwood (Cardiff, 1995: University of Wales Press), 246–268 (with minor revisions) ‘Collingwood’s Claim that History is a Science’, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 13, nr. 2 (2007), 5–30 The following three essays are revised versions of articles that were originally published as follows: ‘Collingwood’s “Lost” Manuscript of The Principles of History ’, History and Theory 36 (1997), 32–62 ‘The Philosophical Context of Collingwood’s Re-enactment Theory’, International Studies in Philosophy 27, nr. 2 (1995), 81–99 ‘The Historian and his Evidence’, in W.J. van der Dussen and Lionel Rubinoff eds., Objectivity , Method and Point of View. Essays in the Philosophy of History (Leiden, 1991: E.J. Brill), 154–169 The following essays are revised versions of articles that originally appeared in Dutch, in Jan van der Dussen, Geschiedenis en Beschaving. Kritische Opstellen over Verleden , Heden en Toekomst (Hilversum, 2005: Verloren): ‘Herodotus as Pater Historiae’, ‘Toynbee and his Critics’, ‘Time in Perspective. In Search of Orientation in History’, ‘Sense of Crisis in Historical Perspective’, ‘Responsibility for Future Generations’, and ‘The Lasting Debate on Human Rights’. v vi Acknowledgements

Parts of ‘A Quest for the Real Past. Ankersmit on Historiography and (Sublime) Historical Experience’ are a revised version of ‘Frank Ankersmit over de sublieme historische ervaring’, Civis Mundi 47 (2008) 172–188. ‘The West and the Rest’ is a revised version of ‘Tekenen des Tijds’, valedictory speech at the Open University of the Netherlands (Heerlen, 2005). Contents

Part I Collingwood’s Philosophy of History 1 Introduction to Collingwood’s Philosophy of History ...... 3 1.1 Introduction ...... 3 1.2 Complexities in Interpreting Collingwood’s Philosophy of History ...... 4 1.3 The Concept of History and Its Philosophy ...... 6 1.4 The Historian and His/Her Object...... 8 1.5 Re-enactment of the Past: Collingwood’s Exposition ...... 10 1.6 History as the History of Thought ...... 11 1.7 The Reception of the Re-enactment Doctrine ...... 15 1.8 The Philosophical Dimension of the Re-enactment Doctrine ...... 16 1.9 Historical Methodology ...... 20 1.10 The Logic of Question and Answer ...... 20 1.11 Historical Method: The Importance of Evidence ...... 22 1.12 Empirical and Pure Methodology ...... 23 1.13 The Relevance of Archaeology for History ...... 25 1.14 The Interpretation of Evidence in The Principles of History ...... 26 1.15 History: From Scissors-and-Paste to Critical History ...... 27 1.16 Constructive History and Imagination ...... 29 1.17 The Historical Narrative ...... 30 1.18 Conclusion...... 33 2 Collingwood’s ‘Lost’ Manuscript of The Principles of History ...... 37 2.1 Introduction ...... 37 2.2 The Fate of the Manuscript of The Principles of History ...... 38 2.3 The Principles of History, Chapter 1: ‘Evidence’ ...... 43

vii viii Contents

2.4 The Principles of History, Chapter 2: ‘Action’ ...... 46 2.4.1 History a parte subjecti and a parte objecti ...... 46 2.4.2 Actions ...... 47 2.4.3 Evidence and Language...... 49 2.4.4 ‘Action and Event’, and ‘Nature has no History’ ...... 53 2.4.5 Thought and Emotions ...... 55 2.4.6 Biography ...... 58 2.5 The Principles of History, Chapter 3: ‘Nature and Action’ ...... 59 2.5.1 Introduction: The ‘Absence’ of the Re-enactment Doctrine...... 59 2.5.2 Historical Naturalism ...... 62 2.5.3 ‘The Science of Human Nature’, and ‘Nature as Environment’ ...... 63 2.5.4 Freedom ...... 66 2.5.5 Marx and Hegel ...... 67 2.6 Conclusion...... 70 3 Collingwood’s Philosophy of History in the Year of his An Autobiography ...... 73 3.1 Introduction ...... 73 3.2 Collingwood as a Philosopher, Archaeologist, and Historian ...... 74 3.3 The Logic of Question and Answer ...... 76 3.4 The Haverﬁ eld-Mommsen Link ...... 77 3.5 The Nature of Collingwood’s Laboratory of Knowledge ...... 79 3.6 Collingwood’s Elaboration of His Laboratory of Knowledge as a Theory of Inquiry and Historical Understanding ...... 82 3.7 The Re-enactment Doctrine ...... 84 3.8 The Principles of History ...... 86 3.8.1 Outline of The Principles of History ...... 87 3.9 The Absence of the Re-enactment Doctrine in The Principles of History ...... 90 3.10 The Presence of the Re-enactment Doctrine in The Principles of History ...... 92 4 The Philosophical Context of Collingwood’s Re-enactment Theory ...... 97 4.1 Introduction ...... 97 4.2 Gadamer on Collingwood ...... 98 4.3 Popper on Objective Mind and Collingwood ...... 100 4.4 The Relevance of Frege’s Theories for the Re-enactment Doctrine ...... 104 4.4.1 Frege on Sense, Reference, and Indirect Speech ...... 104 4.4.2 Frege and Collingwood on the Nature of Thought and Knowledge of It ...... 107 Contents ix

4.5 The Sameness of Thoughts ...... 109 4.6 Incapsulation of Past Thoughts ...... 112 4.7 Incapsulation of Past Thoughts and Indirect Speech ...... 114 5 Collingwood on the Ideas of Process, Progress, and Civilization ...... 119 5.1 Introduction ...... 119 5.2 Change, Development, and Process ...... 120 5.3 Progress ...... 122 5.4 The Idea of Progress Within a Variety of Contexts ...... 124 5.4.1 Progress as Dependent on Perspective or Being Meaningless ...... 125 5.4.2 Progress as Being Meaningful ...... 127 5.4.3 Progress as Being Necessary in Solving Problems ...... 129 5.5 Civilization ...... 132 6 Collingwood’s Claim that History is a Science ...... 137 6.1 Introduction ...... 137 6.2 Collingwood on Historical Inference ...... 138 6.3 Collingwood and Peirce ...... 141 6.3.1 Peirce’s Theory of Hypothetical Inference ...... 141 6.3.2 Collingwood and Hypothetical Inference: The Example of the Celtic Revival ...... 143 6.3.3 Peirce’s Theory of Inquiry ...... 144 6.3.4 Collingwood and Peirce’s Theory of Inquiry: The Examples of the Roman Wall and Julius Caesar ...... 145 6.4 Collingwood on the Interpretation of Evidence in The Principles of History ...... 147 6.5 Collingwood’s Exempliﬁ cation of Abductive Reasoning ...... 149 6.6 The Status of Abductive Reasoning ...... 150 6.7 The Interrogative Interpretation of Abductive Reasoning by Hintikka ...... 151 6.8 Conclusion...... 152

Part II The Study of History and Historiography 7 Herodotus as Pater Historiae ...... 155 7.1 Introduction ...... 155 7.2 Herodotus and Thucydides in Historical Perspective ...... 156 7.3 The Method of Questioning ...... 160 7.4 The Historical Method of Herodotus ...... 164 7.5 Conclusion...... 167 x Contents

8 Toynbee and his Critics ...... 169 8.1 Introduction ...... 169 8.2 Toynbee’s Life, and Background of A Study of History ...... 170 8.3 A Study of History: First Part ...... 172 8.4 A Study of History: Second Part ...... 177 8.5 Reception of A Study of History ...... 178 8.6 Criticisms ...... 180 8.7 Toynbee’s Career ...... 184 8.8 Conclusion: A Final Appraisal ...... 187 9 The Historian and his Evidence ...... 195 9.1 Introduction ...... 195 9.2 Relation Between Evidence and Historical Knowledge ...... 197 9.3 Goldstein on the Constitution of the Past ...... 198 9.4 Peirce on Abductive Inference ...... 200 9.5 McCullagh and Collingwood on Historical Arguments ...... 201 9.6 Fallacies of Afﬁ rming the Consequent and Denying the Antecedent ...... 204 9.7 The Hossbach Memorandum ...... 206 9.8 Conclusion...... 210 10 A Quest for the Real Past. Ankersmit on Historiography and (Sublime) Historical Experience ...... 213 10.1 Introduction ...... 213 10.2 The Notion of Historical Reality ...... 214 10.3 Ankersmit on the Reality of the Past ...... 215 10.4 History as Representation of the Past ...... 218 10.5 Ankersmit’s Notion of Experience ...... 222 10.6 The Philosophical Context of Ankersmit’s Notion of Experience ...... 224 10.7 The Nature of Historical Experience and Its Status ...... 228 10.8 Historical Experience with Huizinga and Burckhardt ...... 232 10.9 The Afﬁ liation of Burckhardt and Huizinga with Hegel’s Notion of the Spirit of the Time ...... 234 10.9.1 A Different Huizinga ...... 235 10.9.2 Other Historical Experiences...... 237 10.10 Sublime Historical Experience ...... 238 10.11 Sublime Historical Experience in Practice ...... 239 10.12 Hegel and the Sublime Historical Experience ...... 242 10.13 The Victims of History ...... 244 10.14 The Victorious Perspective and Its Victims ...... 245 10.15 Conclusion...... 248 Contents xi

Part III Issues of Culture and Civilization from a Historical and Philosophical Perspective 11 Time in Perspective. In Search of Orientation in History ...... 257 11.1 Introduction ...... 257 11.2 The Nature of Time ...... 258 11.3 The Remembered and Historical Past ...... 260 11.4 The Historical and Practical Past ...... 262 11.5 Between Memory and History: Pierre Nora on the ‘Realms of Memory’ ...... 268 11.6 Rupture Between Present and Past ...... 272 11.7 The Dynamics of History and Changing Perspective of Time ...... 273 11.8 Musealization of Culture and Invention of Tradition ...... 275 11.9 Conclusion...... 276 12 Sense of Crisis in Historical Perspective ...... 279 12.1 Introduction: Sense of Crisis ...... 279 12.2 The Notion of Time ...... 281 12.3 Cyclical and Linear View of History ...... 284 12.4 Past, Present, and Future in a New Perspective...... 286 12.5 A Philosophical Perspective on History ...... 288 12.6 Alternative Position: Nationalism and Identity ...... 290 12.7 The Present Crisis ...... 292 12.8 The Idea of Progress...... 295 13 Responsibility for Future Generations ...... 299 13.1 Introduction ...... 299 13.2 Public Ethics...... 300 13.3 The Issue of Responsibility for Future Generations ...... 302 13.4 The Idea of Justice ...... 303 13.5 Relationship Between Past, Present, and Future ...... 305 13.6 The Nature of the Future ...... 306 13.7 Global Justice to the Present Generation as Against Future Generations ...... 308 13.8 Clariﬁ cation of the Dilemma ...... 309 13.9 Conclusion...... 311 14 The Lasting Debate on Human Rights ...... 315 14.1 Introduction ...... 315 14.2 Historical Background ...... 316 14.3 Some Observations on the Classic Civil Freedom Rights ...... 318 14.4 The Problem of Legitimation ...... 319 xii Contents

14.5 Status of Human Rights ...... 321 14.6 Universal Human Rights in Historical Perspective ...... 323 14.7 The Relationship Between Various Categories of Human Rights ...... 328 14.8 Philosophical Criticism on Human Rights ...... 334 14.9 Human Rights as an Essentially Contested Concept...... 337 15 The West and the Rest ...... 341 15.1 Introduction ...... 341 15.2 Edward Said on Orientalism ...... 342 15.3 Orientalism in Reverse and Occidentalism ...... 344 15.4 The West and the Rest Until the Nineteenth Century ...... 347 15.5 Hegel’s Philosophy of History ...... 348 15.6 The West and the Rest in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century ...... 351 15.7 Spengler and Toynbee ...... 352 15.8 The West and the Rest in a Changing Perspective ...... 357 15.9 The Present Situation ...... 358 15.9.1 Fukuyama ...... 359 15.9.2 Huntington ...... 362 15.9.3 Hegel at Present ...... 364

Bibliography ...... 367

Name Index ...... 375

Subject Index ...... 379 Introduc tion

The essays included in this volume were originally written over a period of more than 25 years for various purposes. It is not without reason that they start with R.G. Collingwood’s philosophy of history. For it has been for some decades that I have been involved in this subject. It dates back to 1969–1970 when I took a course on philosophy of history with Bill Dray at York University, Toronto. At the time, I was only acquainted with Collingwood through his The Idea of History and An Autobiography, and of course Dray’s pioneering book Laws and Explanation in History , in which Collingwood played a prominent part in his argument against the ‘covering law model’ of Hempel and Popper. Bill Dray was a most pleasant person and an inspiring professor and scholar. It goes without saying that Collingwood was more than once brought up in his course on philosophy of history, and with this the foundations were laid for a growing interest in Collingwood’s philosophy. This interest was enhanced by the circumstance that during my study of history at the University of Leiden, he was not more than a name, while I cannot remember that he was ever mentioned in a philosophy course. But when I suggested to Dray in 1970 to write a thesis on Collingwood’s philosophy of history, his reaction was rather reserved. With hindsight, this is understandable, since what new issues could be raised, after all, considering Dray’s contributions to the non-methodological interpretation of Collingwood’s re-enactment doctrine, the nature of that doctrine actually being the only subject of his philosophy of history that was discussed at the time. But when I said that I intended to pay special attention to Collingwood’s work in the ﬁ elds of history and archaeology, Dray’s reaction was more positive, saying that it might a good idea. When working on my thesis for some years, I learned in 1978 by accident that Collingwood’s manuscripts were recently deposited at the Bodleian Library in Oxford. It took a week just to catalogue the thousands of pages. The most startling discovery was a manuscript, dated April 1928, with the title ‘Outlines of a Philosophy of History’. For I realized that this was the manuscript Collingwood refers to on p. 107 of his An Autobiography , saying that his conception of history ‘had advanced another step forward … in 1928, when I spent a vacation at Le Martouret, that

xiii xiv Introduction

pleasant country-house near Die … writing down as shortly as I could the lessons of my last nine years’ work in historical research and refl ection upon it’. This ‘new conception of history’, as Collingwood calls it hereafter, concerns the three elements of all history being the history of thought, that this thought is known in re- enacting it, and that the re-enacted thought is incapsulated in the context of present thoughts. All these elements are worked out in the manuscript written at Die, explained with examples from history and archaeology. When I read the manuscript, I realized that it corroborated Dray’s interpretation of the re-enactment doctrine. But it also endorsed my approach of considering Collingwood’s historical and archaeological work to be meaningful. But besides the Die manuscript, the collection of manuscripts at the Bodleian Library comprised an overwhelming amount of manuscripts, about 800 pages being about philosophy of history or related subjects. My thesis History as a Science. The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood appeared in 1981 and was reissued in 2012. It focuses on Collingwood’s philosophy of history, elaborating on the development of Collingwood’s thought on history, The Idea of History and its discussion, the manuscripts, Collingwood as an archaeologist and historian, and various topics relating to his philosophy of history. This brings me to the design of this book. It consists of three parts. In the fi rst six essays, particular aspects of Collingwood’s philosophy of history are discussed, which may be considered an elaboration of certain themes explored in History as a Science. The following four essays deal with various aspects relating to the study of history and historiography, whereas the last fi ve essays discuss subjects that concern particular issues, which relate to the Western civilization or concern issues of global relevance. With few exceptions, most essays are revised versions of the original ones. Though the three groups of themes incorporated in this book are of a different character, they are also interrelated. For Collingwood’s views are also brought up in the second group of essays dealing with the study of history and historiography, whereas his ideas more than once prove to be relevant for the subjects dealt with in the last group of essays as well. This is not without reason, since his exceptional broad scope of mind made his views on, among other things, the notions of civilization, human nature, the sublime, and the idea of progress relevant for the various subjects discussed in this book. The last three essays of the book – ‘Responsibility for Future Generations’, ‘The Lasting Debate on Human Rights’, and ‘The West and the Rest’ – correspond in having in common not only the approach of considering the themes involved from a historical point of view but also to adopt a global perspective. That is, they have as guiding principle that these issues are not dealt with from a merely Western perspective, which to date is still too much common practice, but from a viewpoint involving global relevance. The theory and philosophy of history traditionally focuses on epistemological, methodological, and narrative questions related to the study of history and historiography. Though this collection of essays extensively discusses issues within these fi elds – in particular as regards Collingwood’s philosophy of history – it also deals Introduction xv with other topics, involving history in a wider sense. For besides history as the study and narrative of the past, and as historical process, it has other ramifi cations as well: history as an essential feature of the human mind, society, culture, and civilization. Some of the essays examine various issues related to these dimensions of history. Examples are the defi ciency of historical consciousness and its repercussions, transformations in the perspective of time, but also the responsibility for future generations, it being an aspect of the present, that as part of the historical process is not only related to the past, but to the future as well. In the same vein, in ‘The Lasting Debate on Human Rights’ and ‘The West and the Rest’, the historical dimension and signifi cance of the antagonism between various cultures and civilizations are considered. Except for the essays on Collingwood’s philosophy of history, on each of the subjects dealt with in this collection of essays, a separate monograph could be written. Since this would hardly be feasible for one author, I have rather focused on a variety of subjects in the form of essays, making an effort to explain the essence of the issues concerned. Summing up the foregoing, this volume consists of three parts: (1) various themes of Collingwood’s philosophy of history (1–6), (2) issues relating to the study of history and historiography (7–10), and (3) particular issues concerning culture and civilization from a historical and philosophical perspective with respect to the West and globally (11–15).

Part I: Collingwood’s Philosophy of History

The fi rst six essays explore various aspects of Collingwood’s philosophy of history, paying attention to issues not discussed before or considering views of Collingwood from a particular perspective. The fi rst essay gives an overall picture of Collingwood’s philosophy of history, focusing on its main features. Collingwood is known primarily as a philosopher of history, and in the English-speaking world, he is undoubtedly the most well-known and infl uential philosopher of the subject in the previous century. This was not the case, however, during his life, since he published only few articles on philosophy of history, which was hardly noticed at the time. This changed with the posthumous publication of The Idea of History in 1946, put together by his pupil and literary executor T.M. Knox from various sources. To date The Idea of History is the book Collingwood’s fame as a philosopher of history is primarily based upon. It has become increasingly clear over time, however, that this book does not suffi ce for a proper interpretation of Collingwood’s philosophy of history. In this connection, various circumstances are involved. In the fi rst place, it should be taken into account that Collingwood was not only a philosopher but also a historian and an accomplished archaeologist. On all three subjects, he has published extensively, and the way this has been done by him is sometimes relevant for a proper understanding of his philosophy of history. In the second place, since 1978 a large amount of manuscripts (some 4000 pages) has become available. Some important ones are on philosophy of history, three of them being published in xvi Introduction a revised edition of The Idea of History (1993). Apart from these, the manuscript of his unfi nished book The Principles of History , written in 1939, was discovered in 1995 and has been published in 1999 together with some additional manuscripts on philosophy of history. It is obvious that with so many new sources available, an interpretation of Collingwood’s philosophy of history only based on the original edition of The Idea of History is superseded and out of place. It is paradoxical that Collingwood’s repu- tation is based primarily on a subject, the philosophy of history, he has never written a book about. For The Idea of History would not have been published by him in its present form. This means there does not exist a complete publication, in which Collingwood develops his philosophy of history. It has accordingly to be recon- structed from bits and pieces from his philosophical, historical, and archaeological books, articles, and manuscripts. The same applies to Collingwood’s philosophy in general, for this as well encom- passes a wide range of subjects. When almost 50 years ago Louis Mink wrote a book on Collingwood’s philosophy, he observed that in spite of all the diffi culties involved, it is possible to show a ‘fi gure in the carpet’. This also applies to the subject of philosophy of history, of which it can be said, anyhow, that not only the carpet involved is larger but also the fi gure found in it more complex and complete than could be imagined formerly, when so many sources were not yet available, or not considered. In the fi rst essay, the contours of this subject are marked. The issues discussed are, among other things, the concept of history and its philosophy, history as the history of thought, the re-enactment doctrine and its reception, the logic of question and answer, the interpretation of evidence, constructive history and imagination, and the historical narrative. The second essay examines Collingwood’s manuscript of The Principles of History , written in February 1939 during a trip through the Dutch East Indies. He intended it to be his fi nal book on philosophy of history. The manuscript was considered ‘lost’ for a long period, but was discovered in 1995 in the archives of Oxford University Press, however, and was published in 1999. Collingwood’s planned book The Principles of History was never fi nished, however, and only 90 pages in manuscript have survived. Nevertheless, it contains much that is informative and clarify- ing for some much-debated issues of Collingwood’s philosophy of history. Subjects discussed by him concern, among other things, history being the history of thought as part of actions, the interpretation of evidence, thought and emotions, biography, the relation between nature and history, and the autonomy of historical thought. Besides these subjects, the essay also discusses the way Knox has dealt with the manuscript of The Principles of History . For as editor of the posthumous edition of The Idea of History , the manuscript was available to him. Parts of it Knox used for The Idea of History , namely, the paragraph on Hegel and Marx, and the chapters ‘Historical Evidence’ and ‘History and Freedom’ (122–126, 249–282, 315–320), they being out of the context, however, of Collingwood’s argument in The Principles of History . The last years of Collingwood’s life were his most productive, and his An Autobiography, written in 1938–1939, is the most informative and certainly the Introduction xvii most interesting as regards his philosophy of history. He wrote it ‘to put on record some brief account of the work I have not yet been able to publish, in case I am not able to publish it in full’. It is in his Autobiography that the relation between philosophy, archaeology, and history is most distinctively exposed, and concerning this aspect it is accordingly more informative about his philosophy of history than The Idea of History. In the third essay, this theme is explored with respect to both the logic of question and answer and the re-enactment doctrine. As regards the fi rst issue, it is explained how his logic of question and answer is the result of using his archaeological experience as a ‘laboratory of knowledge’, extending his archaeological practice of excavating with specifi c questions in mind to science in general. As regards Collingwood’s re-enactment doctrine, the issue is addressed that com- mentators have been puzzled by the fact that Collingwood does not discuss this doctrine in The Principles of History, though it is mentioned in the scheme he made for it. In this connection, it is argued that Collingwood’s theses of all history being the history of thought and history being the re-enactment of past thought should be conceived as being indissolubly related, the latter indicating how the fi rst is known. Since The Principles of History focuses on the topic of all history being the history of thought, the notion of re-enactment is simply taken for granted by Collingwood. In this, it differs from his discussion of the re-enactment doctrine in The Idea of History (282–302), where in its turn the idea of all history being the history of thought is taken for granted and accordingly left out. The fourth essay develops a particular interpretation of Collingwood’s re- enactment doctrine, unmistakably the most widely discussed aspect of his philosophy of history. Initially this doctrine has been interpreted methodologically, that is, as indicating a method for acquiring historical knowledge. K. Popper is a typical example when he discusses the notion of the re-enactment of past thoughts within the context of his theory of the three worlds of physical states, mental states, and intelligibles as ideas in the objective sense. In this connection, he considers Collingwood’s re-enactment doctrine as an example of ‘the second-world method of subjective understanding’. It is argued that this is an obvious misconception of Collingwood’s theory. It is therefore not without reason that this methodological and psychological interpretation of the re-enactment doctrine is defi nitely considered erroneous, at least by scholars who are familiar with Collingwood’s views. Nevertheless, the philosophical status of the re-enactment doctrine does not get the attention it deserves. In the essay it is argued that it should be seen within the context of Frege’s famed theory of indirect quotation (oratio obliqua ), but also of his exposition on the nature of thought. From these perspectives, Collingwood’s re- enactment doctrine proves to be on fi rm philosophical ground, being in line with prevailing theories of semantics. As part of his re-enactment doctrine, Collingwood’s theory of incapsulation of past thought in relation to his logic of question and answer is discussed as well, arguing that the way he dealt with this relation, diffi culties are involved as regards the relation between meaning and truth. In his Autobiography Collingwood maintains that philosophy of history not only concerns epistemological problems but also what he calls ‘metaphysical’ problems ‘concerned with the nature of the historian’s subject-matter’. As examples, he men- xviii Introduction tions, besides event, the elucidation of the terms process, progress, and civilization. The fi fth essay explores the way Collingwood has dealt with these concepts. It is pointed out that his views on the notions of process and progress on the one side should be seen within the context of those on change, development, and evolution and on the other of the distinction between nature and (human) history. As regards the idea of progress in history, Collingwood distinguishes four positions: it is dependent on a point of view; it is meaningless; it is meaningful; it is necessary. The idea of progress is in Collingwood’s view necessary in solving present problems, both theoretical and practical. In the latter case, it may be considered a guiding principle in practical life. The concept of civilization is not only dealt with in The New Leviathan but also in the manuscript ‘What “Civilization” Means’ written in prepa- ration for this book. In the latter, he explains that the notion of civilization embodies certain ideals, making a distinction between two orders of ideals: the factual level of ideals that have been realized in a society and a second order of ideals consisting of ideals that are recognized but not realized. The latter Collingwood describes as the elements of barbarism within a civilization. Advancement in civilization is feasible by detecting and eradicating the barbarous elements in one’s civilization, guided by the idea of progress. The sixth essay discusses Collingwood’s position that history is a science. This claim has hardly been taken seriously by Collingwood scholars, primarily because Collingwood has never worked it out properly. Collingwood’s claim concerning the scientifi c nature of history is based on his view that it is inferential, though in a specifi c way, that is, being neither inductive nor deductive. He has never explained the nature of the specifi c type of inference involved, however. It is argued that this third way of inference as conceived by Collingwood corresponds to the theory of abductive reasoning as developed by Charles Peirce, initially called by him hypothetical reasoning. Afterwards, Peirce changed the syllogistic form in which he initially framed his theory of hypothetical inference into a theory in which hypothesis, deduction, and induction are conceived as three stages in scientifi c inquiry, using the term ‘abduction’ instead of hypothetical inference. In his Autobiography Collingwood gives two examples of this type of reasoning, corresponding to Peirce’s conception of scientifi c reasoning. In The Principles of History , however, Collingwood develops a too limited conception of historical inference. The essay ends with considering the views of J. Hintikka on Peirce’s theory of abduction. He conceives this theory as exhibiting particular strategic rules, in which interrogation plays a prominent part. This view accords well with Collingwood’s logic of question and answer, Hintikka indeed referring to him. Considering the argument developed in this essay, Collingwood’s claim that history is a science is after all noticeably supported. Introduction xix

Part II: The Study of History and Historiography

In the next two essays, two prominent historians are discussed, Herodotus and Toynbee, who, though divided by almost 2500 years, have certain likenesses. Both had a wide scope in dealing with history, though in the case of Herodotus it was of course geographically limited as compared with Toynbee. They are also similar in their focus on the nature of the various cultures and civilizations and their mutual contacts. Both historians have been controversial as well, Herodotus for the claim, attributed to him by Cicero, of being the ‘father of history’, and Toynbee for his theory of world history, explaining the origin, rise, development, and decline of civilizations. Essay seven, on Herodotus, starts with the discussion about the issue whether Herodotus or rather Thucydides should be considered the ‘father of history’. This discussion has been alive from antiquity to this very day. Traditionally, Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War was considered more accurate and reliable than Herodotus’ Histories . This position got a revival with the development of ‘scientifi c’ history since the nineteenth century. More recently, however, there is a remarkable change in appreciation of Herodotus. At present, he is generally valued as being a pioneer in cultural history and the method of oral history. In this essay, a description is given of the way Herodotus performed his inquiries and how he had to cope with problems he was the fi rst to be confronted with. A notable aspect of Herodotus’ approach is asking specifi c questions. This is exemplifi ed by the way he raises the question of the fl ooding of the Nile. As regards his use of oral history, an assessment is made based on the study by J. Vansina on the subject. Arnold Toynbee may be considered one of the most remarkable historians of the previous century, not only because of the impressive achievement of his work but also for the many, often heated, debates it aroused. The eighth essay deals with Toynbee’s A Study of History , a world history comprising no less than ten volumes (1934–1954). Toynbee differentiates 21 civilizations, of which fi ve still exist: the Western, Orthodox Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and Far Eastern. The essay gives a brief outline of the design of his study and its underlying theory, explaining the rise of civilizations from primitive societies, followed by the growth, breakdown, subse- quent disintegration, and fi nal collapse of civilizations. Attention is paid as well to the remarkable change in Toynbee’s position in his last volumes, conceiving civilizations as chrysalises for universal churches. In the fi rst two decades after World War II, Toynbee’s Study of History brought him fame with the general public, and initially it also attracted attention in the scholarly world. Eventually, however, his study did not convince his fellow historians. Toynbee was criticized on both matters of content and the theories involved in his study. The Dutch historian P. Geyl has been the most outspoken critic of Toynbee on both points. His arguments are discussed, making use, among other things, of his private notes. Notwithstanding the criticism levelled against Toynbee in the scholarly world, he remained for quite some time immensely popular with the general public. This discrepancy between a popular adulation on the one hand and a professional hostility on the other is remarkable. At present, the situation is different, however, since Toynbee has almost xx Introduction fallen into oblivion, both with the general public and the scholarly world. This is inopportune in the sense that Toynbee’s approach of envisaging history globally is currently of more topical interest than ever. The ninth essay discusses probably the most substantial epistemological issue of the study of history: how can we know the past, it being a reality that does not exist anymore? The past can only be known indirectly through evidence, the nature of the relation between evidence and historical knowledge accordingly being crucial. This relation is inferential, though of a specifi c kind, it being argued that it corresponds to what Charles Peirce calls hypothetical or abductive reasoning. The views of L.J. Goldstein and C.B. McCullagh on the nature of historical evidence are discussed as well. Besides the use of various kinds of evidence, historical knowledge relates to the kind of questions asked. Considering these conditions, it is noteworthy that in case the same questions are asked and the same evidence is used, it may nevertheless lead up to contradictory conclusions, because of particular assump- tions being made. As an example of this circumstance, the Hossbach Memorandum (a report on a meeting of Hitler in 1937), which has been used as evidence that Hitler had planned a war and accordingly should be held responsible for the out- break of World War II, is examined. The British historian A.J.P. Taylor contested this claim, however. This issue aroused a lively debate among historians. Following W. Dray’s discussion of the subject, it is argued that the reason that the contestants of the debate keep being in disagreement is that they apply different causal notions as regards the interpretation of the same evidence of the Hossbach Memorandum. Since in this case incommensurable causal paradigms are involved, it is actually not possible to come to a fi nal assessment of the interpretation of the concrete piece of evidence involved. This illustrates the signifi cance of the interpretative dimension in dealing with historical evidence and that even at the most concrete level, sometimes intricate problems may be involved. In the tenth essay, the subject under discussion is our relationship to the past, in particular as regards its supposed ‘reality’. Historians usually are not concerned about this issue, since it does not play a part in their studies, if only because their picture of the past cannot be compared with a supposedly ‘real’ past, the only real thing they get involved with being historical evidence. It is remarkable, therefore, that F.R. Ankersmit in his philosophy of history precisely makes this subject into a major issue. He has done this, from various perspectives, in his books Narrative Logic , Historical Representation , and Sublime Historical Experience . In the fi rst book Ankersmit makes a distinction in historiography between historical narratives, ‘narrative substances’ (meaning with this concepts like ‘Renaissance’ or ‘Cold War’), and individual statements. He argues that the fi rst two do not refer to historical reality but that the individual statements contained in them indeed do. In Historical Representation it is argued that, though historical narratives as such do not refer to past reality, through the metaphorically conceived notion of representation, they may be considered to be linked with the past. Sublime Historical Experience consists of two parts. In the fi rst, Ankersmit develops the unusual position that it is possible to experience the past itself directly. In the last chapter of the book, the notion of sublime historical experience is expounded. It is argued that Introduction xxi these experiences are involved when particular breaks in history occur, which make people aware of having lost a previous world for ever. In Ankersmit’s view, this painful experience brings about a trauma that cannot be repressed. It is, moreover, of a permanent nature, and there is no other option than to abide by it. In this essay, a critical assessment is made of the three books concerned.

Part III: Issues of Culture and Civilization from a Historical and Philosophical Perspective

The eleventh essay deals with the notion of time and its relevance for not only historiography but also for society in general, in particular focusing on the relation with the past. This subject is usually not discussed explicitly within these contexts, but this essay aims at explaining that implicitly it indeed plays a prominent part. It begins with considering the notion of time and the positions of various philosophers with respect to this issue. After this, the issue of our relation with the past is discussed, in this respect making, in the fi rst instance, a distinction between the remembered and historical past. M. Oakeshott distinguishes the historical past sharply from what he calls the ‘practical’ past, a position that is contested, however, by various historians and philosophers. Because in every society the relationship with its past plays a prominent part, it being constitutive for its identity, this relationship has traditionally been of a ‘practical’ nature. Since the inauguration of the scientifi c study of history in the nineteenth century, this relationship with the past was taken over by historical studies, however. In response to this, the French historian Pierre Nora has launched the ambitious project of the voluminous study Les Lieux de Mémoire (Realms of Memory ), aimed at retrieving all kinds of ‘collective memo- ries’. In the essay it is argued, however, that the real background of the rupture between the past and present is not so much the scientifi c approach to the past in historical studies but rather concerns the radical change occurring at the end of the eighteenth century as regards the way the relationship between the past, present, and future was conceived. For since that time orientation was aimed towards the future instead of the past, as had previously been the case. The notion of a possible progress was at this the guiding principle. Because of this, a rupture between the past and present occurred. The process of growing industrialization and modernization, coupled with the pace of transformations, enhances the disrupted relationship between the present and past. This circumstance has resulted in an increasing demand for conserving the past in various ways, implying a complex of phenomena which is sometimes referred to as the ‘musealization’ of culture. Essay twelve deals with the repercussions of the radical change that has taken place within the Western world as regards its perception of the past and its relation to the future. In this connection, the sense of living in a world of crises, which has been prominent in the Western world ever since 1914, is taken as starting point. It is argued that the basic background of the modern sense of crisis, coupled with feel- xxii Introduction ings of uneasiness, relates to the fact that an orientation on the past with an eye to the future has lost its relevance in dealing with present-day issues. In order to clarify the issue at stake, it is explained how an orientation in the present always implies a view on both the past and future, a viewpoint that has been put forward in an exem- plary way by Augustine. This circumstance holds true both at a personal and soci- etal level. Traditionally the past was seen as guidance for the future. Since the end of the eighteenth century, however, this viewpoint was no longer supported, since the idea developed that through human efforts, the future might be of a different nature, in this way making progress possible. This idea has ever since been part of Western civilization. The implication was, however, that because of this, the past and future were pulled apart, and a gap developed between what R. Koselleck calls the ‘space of experience’ of the past and the ‘horizon of anticipation’ of the future. In order to fi ll this gap, various philosophies of history were constructed to make the historical process intelligible by creating a meaningful relationship between the past and future. Apart from this, nationalism has been infl uential in relating the past and future in a meaningful way. At present, however, these theories and ideologies have considerably lost infl uence, with the consequence that it is actually impossible to accomplish a meaningful relationship between the past and future. Apart from this, the historical process exhibits transformations at an increasing pace, with the consequence of a rapidly growing apart of past and future; that is, the past incessantly disappears more quickly, accordingly becoming strange to us, while we encounter a future approaching ever faster. What remains is the idea of progress. Since a sub- stantive outlook on historical development is lacking, the current idea of progress has actually become vacuous, however. In his book After Progress, the British philosopher A. O’Hear examines the basic principles of the vacuity of the present notion of progress, of which he is highly critical. His main criticism is that our world controlled by science and technology no longer leaves room for normative questions. Collingwood has levelled similar criticism at the present condition of Western culture. If the current incapacity persists to relate in a meaningful way past and future, the sense of crisis and feelings of discomfort will remain part of Western culture in spite of growing affl uence. In the thirteenth essay, the issue is discussed in what sense the present generation may be considered responsible for the destiny of future generations. The ethics involved is of a public nature, in particular an ethic of responsibility, to be distin- guished from an ethic of principled conviction, as explained by Max Weber. It is argued that, in the fi rst instance, this responsibility should be based on the idea of justice. In his A Theory of Justice, however, John Rawls only considers the question of the responsibility for the next generations, confi ning himself to achieve ‘just sav- ings’ for the next. As regards future generations, problems that are more serious are involved, however, like environmental issues, climatic change, and the depletion of raw materials and natural resources. In this connection, with respect to future generations, the diffi culty arises that the notion of justice actually does not apply, since the conditions of reciprocity and equality that attach to this notion are by defi nition not involved. Apart from this, the urgent problem arises that global justice to the current generation is at variance with that to future generations. For on the one hand Introduction xxiii the idea of justice implies that the less prosperous nations of the present generation justifi ably strive for greater affl uence, while on the other hand the interests of future generations would not be served by this development, because of the serious repercussions being involved as regards, among other things, the environment and climatic change. It is obvious that this problem, which B. Barry calls the dilemma of intragenerational versus intergenerational justice, is of a global nature and can accordingly only be dealt with at that level. But here again one is confronted with a problem, viz. the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, it being a principle that to date is internationally subscribed to. The solution of the global problems involved is only conceivable when the conditions of equality and reciprocity implied by the idea of justice are fulfi lled as regards the current global generation. This condition, which formerly has been lacking, may be fulfi lled, however, by the substantial growth in affl uence in considerable parts of the world, it being accompanied by changes in the global balance of power. This makes it feasible that the problems concerned are not only dealt with on an equal footing but also in the awareness that shared issues and interests are involved. This not only concerns the present generation but also the interests of future generations. The fourteenth essay examines the subject of human rights from diverse perspectives. Over the previous decades, this issue has increasingly become the subject of debate and even controversy for various reasons. Though not mentioned explicitly, the idea of human rights dates back to the Declaration of Independence of the United States (1776) and the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen ( Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) (1789) of the French Revolution. Though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly, was to a certain degree inspired by the original American and French Declarations, it transcends their context, however, for various reasons. In particular, this holds true for the legitimation given to the original Declarations, and in the UDHR therefore rightly no reference is made to them. But the UDHR also differs from the previous Declarations in claiming universal validity. As regards content, however, there are certain similarities between the nature of the UDHR and the original American and French Declarations. Most prominently, both pre-eminently assume the so-called negative notion of freedom, implying certain rights as against the authorities. Another common characteristic concerns the rights of individuals being emphasized, those of collectivities getting less attention. In the non-Western world, these positions are challenged and at least considered one-sided. In this connection, it is particularly argued that social and economic rights, involving collectivities, should get more attention. This position implies a positive notion of freedom, that is, a freedom ‘to’, instead of a negative freedom ‘from’, as explained by Isaiah Berlin in a well-known article. These con- fl icting notions of freedom are relevant for the issue of human rights, since they refl ect the underlying philosophical principles involved in the controversy between the Western and non-Western world with respect to this issue. Another question relating to human rights concerns the claim to their universal validity. Some philosophers, like B. Croce and A. MacIntyre, have challenged this claim on principal. Apart from these viewpoints, it may be argued, anyhow, that it is no longer feasible xxiv Introduction to base the universality of human rights on defi nite conceptions like a divine order, natural law, or the idea of human nature. The only option left is to consider human history and, most importantly, to come to an agreement through consultations and judgement. The notion of human rights will remain, however, an essentially contested concept as explained by W.B. Gallie. He maintains that the discussions about this type of concept may advance if a commonly accepted tradition is involved. It is this aspect, however, that until now is insuffi ciently available with respect to the issue of human rights. It is argued that for this reason the challenge lying ahead concerns the construction of a commonly accepted tradition with respect to this issue, involving the global historical development of the previous decades, in this way giving a new historical dimension to the essentially contested concept of human rights. Since the eighteenth century the issue of the relation between the Western and non-Western world has become increasingly prominent. The fi fteenth essay elabo- rates on this issue, taking Edward Said’s book Orientalism and the discussion it has aroused as starting point. Whereas Said sees Orientalism as a monolithic entity, focusing on its manifestations without considering particular fundamental features of its background, the essay concentrates on the latter. The relation between the Western and non-Western world is philosophically epitomized in Hegel’s philosophy of history, which actually exhibits the Western position as regards its relation to the non-Western world in the nineteenth century until well into the twentieth century. Hegel conceives the historical process as unilinearly moving from East to West, exhibiting a progressive consciousness of freedom, coming to a climax in Western civilization. That is, the world was seen as including either primitive peoples or peoples that once had been civilized, but had fallen into decay. This viewpoint accorded well with the European colonial policy in the sense that it provided its ideology of having a ‘civilizing mission’ towards the non-Western world. In the previous century, this Eurocentric vision on world history implied by Hegel’s philosophy of history was rejected on principal by Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. Both consider Western civilization just one among various other civilizations, instead of allegedly being the fi nal stage of world history. Hegel’s philosophy of history got a remarkable revival with Francis Fukuyama’s book The End of History and The Last Man (1992). Fukuyama adopts Hegel’s philosophy of history without reserve, claiming that the fi nal stage of the historical process in Hegel’s philosophy of history – that is, the accomplishment of Western civilization – should be considered the end of history. It is argued, however, that this position is based on a highly dubious interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history. Like Fukuyama’s book, that of Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (1997), has attracted much attention. Huntington develops a position that contrasts sharply with that of Fukuyama. In his view, the current process of modernization in the non-Western world demonstrates that it does not proceed in accordance with the Western model of development. He even argues that in this case an increase of the pace of modernization is accompanied by a decline in the rate of westernization and a revival of the Introduction xxv indigenous culture instead. The way Huntington raises the issue of the relation between the Western and non-Western world differs signifi cantly from the ways it was done previously. For Huntington’s position is not based on theoretical consid- erations but is rather inspired by current global developments. That is, theory and ideology are surpassed by reality, it being accompanied by potential frictions, of which the title of Huntington’s book bears evidence. In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Ties Nijssen as editor of Springer for various reasons. In the fi rst place, for his positive response to my intention to have this collection of essays published. For I realize that this was a far from customary project, especially since quite a variety of subjects are involved. Since most of the essays were almost completely revised, the undertaking took much more time than anticipated. I am grateful for the patience shown by Ties to abide by this circumstance. Finally, I would like to thank Herman Simissen for his most valuable comments on various essays.