On Kant's Transcendental Theory of Moral Judgement and Moral Worth
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On Kant’s Transcendental Theory of Moral Judgement and Moral Worth of Character, with Educational Implications* Abstract A longstanding absence from the critical scholarly literature on Kant’s writings on moral education is a comprehensive and systematic articulation of his views on moral education in light of his transcendental theory of moral reasoning and judgement. This theory primarily attempts to set out the a-priori requirements justifiable moral judgement and reasoning must satisfy when assessed by the Categorical Imperative (CI), primarily under its Universal Law formulation (FUL), and it offers an account of moral virtue as a character disposition to act in accordance with duty and from the motive of duty. While I occasionally make reference to other “equivalent” formulations of the CI offered by Kant, I argue that FUL rests at the core of Kant’s moral theory, defining the intrinsic worth of character dispositions for rational moral autonomy, serving as the necessary foundation for the other three equivalent formulations of the CI, and identifying what Kant maintains are our duties to others and ourselves as autonomous persons (ends in themselves). Despite recent appearances of a number of eminent scholarly studies of Kant’s views on moral education, we still lack a comprehensive and systematic account of the distinct nature of moral reasoning as governed by FUL, and the distinct virtue of character (“the good will”) that such reasoning and judgement displays. This paper offers an interpretation of the primary significance of the CI/FUL within Kant’s account of moral justification and moral worth of disposition (character). In articulating and illustrating the testing procedure the CI applies to maxims, I examine Kant’s famous example of the lying promise maxim, in an adapted version, and I explain two forms of validity that maxims in accordance with duty and acted on from duty must satisfy: objective universal validity and subjective universal validity. The paper concludes by articulating FUL’s significance for Kant’s conception of the fundamental aim of moral education as progress in the formation of the “purity of the good will,” understood as the rationally autonomous disposition/virtue for moral deliberation and judgement motivated “from duty”/respect for moral law. 1 =========================================================== [I am asked] what the cause might be that the teachings of virtue … accomplish so little. … [M]y answer is simply that the teachers themselves have not brought their concepts to purity … For the most ordinary observation shows that if we represent, on the one hand, an action of integrity done with steadfast soul, apart from every view to advantage of any kind in this world or another and even under the greatest temptations of need or allurement, it leaves far behind and eclipses any similar act that was affected in the least in like manner oneself. Even children of moderate age feel this impression, and one should never represent duties to them in any other way Immanuel Kant (G, 22-3) Introduction Kant’s moral theory maintains that while the development of technical skills, artistic talents and sound prudential judgement may all be admirable achievements, their distinct moral worth, should these possess any, is dependent not on the effects and consequences these skills, talents and dispositions are able to bring about in the world, but rather from the motive of a morally “good will.” Only the good will can set the morally worthy ends to which such skills, talents and dispositions ought to be directed. Kant writes that, as such, only a good will possesses absolute and unconditional moral worth, an intrinsic worth which shines forth with the lustre and brightness of a diamond, eclipsing all other ends, talents, achievements and virtues (G, 8, 42). It is towards the development of the good will in persons that genuine moral education must aim at. Moral learning for Kant can only be properly fostered by exposing the student to “the pure representation of virtue” (CPrR, 126.); “the pure moral motive must be brought to bear on the soul” (ibid. See also G, 22-3). Kant maintains that enabling the student to understand and assimilate this purity of motive is the surest “method of founding and cultivating genuine moral dispositions” (CPrR, 126 See also CPrR, 22-26, 28, 37, 56, 68, 72, 79, 91, 129; LE, 77; G, 58-9). This method seeks to shape “a disposition conformed with law from respect for law …” (CPrR, 107. See also CprR, 67-9). And this, as we shall see, is less a matter of explicit didactical instruction than of a Socratic “drawing out,” an “elicitation,” of what is implicitly already there (a priori) in the student’s heart and mind portending engagement in what Felicitas Munzel terms “the vocation of humanity.” 2 My central aim in this paper is to lay out something of the core of Kant’s transcendental theory of morality as an explication of his understanding of the “purity” of moral disposition and judgement constituting the distinctive moral worth of dispositions (character) and the essential aim of moral education. I try to avoid as much as possible the use of Kant’s often technical vocabulary, and his pursuit of technical philosophical issues not directly germane to my project. The transcendental aspect of his views on moral education has consistently been neglected in the scholarly literature, despite the appearance of some excellent more general accounts. (Endnote 1). Such purity of disposition for Kant derives from apriori grounds which a rationally autonomous agent necessarily appeals to in moral deliberation, choice and judgement, even if initially only tacitly, in a pre- thematic, occurent manner. I address the learning and teaching involved, in accordance with Kant’s own writings, as a Socratic “drawing out” or “elicitation” of the student’s pre-objective understanding of the a priori presuppositions conditioning the rationality of moral judgement and the moral worth of practical agency. My account will focus on two inter-related epistemic conditions Kant held to be a priori to the justifiability of moral judgement: “objective universal validity” (OUV) and “subjective universal validity” (SUV). I explain how the “supreme moral principle,” the Categorical Imperative (CI), primarily in its Formula of Universal Law is understood by Kant to command us to satisfy the epistemic requirements these a priori conditions set for the maxims we will. This agenda will take us through a consideration of Kant’s test for the justifiability of judgement / the permissibility of maxims, as formulated by the CI/FUL. I will articulate and illustrate the test through an adaptation of Kant’s famous example of the lying promise. We will see that the procedure tests maxims for “the form of lawfulness,” or “the giving of lawfulness,” and that the test for universal validity/universalizability of maxims determines whether a maxim displays self-contradiction and free-riding (illegitimate self-exemption). Maxims displaying these features are morally impermissible, contrary to duty, and we have an obligation not to act on them. The disposition to act on such maxims constitutes moral unworthiness of character. As Kant writes: 3 That will is absolutely good which cannot be evil, hence, whose maxim, if made a universal law can never conflict with [contradict] itself (G, 44). I want to allay a particular concern at the outset. While the core of Kant’s moral theory is transcendental in that it seeks to identify a priori (universal and necessary) conditions of moral justification and worth of disposition, he remains very much alive to the fact that capabilities for the assessment of the universalizability of maxims, as well as for the constitution of moral character, requires empirical knowledge of human beings that can only be had through socialization (G, 23; CPrR, 7). Kant recognizes the essential role of acculturation into the cultural traditions and political institutions of a rationally ordered society for the development of moral competences of deliberation and virtues of character. Barbara Herman has contributed significantly in this respect by showing how Kant’s understanding of the fostering of moral dispositions in general, and the development of competence in the testing of maxims via the CI procedure in particular, clearly acknowledges the empirical necessity for an entire skein of background moral knowledge, intuitions and sensibilities, operative as “rules of moral salience,” that can be acquired only via acculturation into a reasonable cultural conception of the good/authentic life (PMJ, 77-93). [Endnote 3] I. Two Types of Universality: OUV & SUV Kant maintains that the intelligible and justifiable assertion of an empirical proposition or a moral judgement presupposes an understanding on the agent’s part that rational engagement within such an epistemic practice commits her to abide by the requirement of accordance with “the form of lawfulness” (CPrR, 23; 61). This general epistemic requirement, valid across both practical and theoretical reason, yields a specific moral requirement legislated to (by) us as universal moral law: “The moral law … requires only that the form of a maxim be universally lawgiving” (CPrR, 91. See also G, 15, G, 31, CPrR, 28). This general form of 4 universality or lawfulness possesses two dimensions: objective universal validity (OUV) and subjective universal validity (SUV). Kant’s thesis of the “unity of theoretical and practical reason,” in it’s immediate relevance to our discussion here, maintains that the a priori conditions of justifiable judgement hold across both our knowledge of the empirical world and our engagement in the moral world. Indeed, the former offers the latter a model, a “typic,” of rational judgement (CPrR, 58-62). Nature, for Kant, constitutes an example of intelligible order. It is intelligible to us only because “[e]verything in nature works in accordance with laws” (CPrR, 24). Objective knowledge of nature is possible because it presents itself to us not as a random, fleeting, series of events but rather as a law-governed cosmos.