Humanitarian Assistance in Rwanda: Hard Choices, No Ex its

This evaluation assesses whether U.S. humanitarian assistance-primarily food aid-saved lives, provided a foundation for sustainable development, and prolonged or shortened conflict from 1996 through the spring of 1999.

The evaluation team assessed the U.S. government's humanitarian assistance to Rwanda, drawing on the findings and conclusions of other donors and implementing partners. The team looked at U. S. assistance provided multilaterally through international organizations, such as the nTHigh Commission for Refhgees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP). It considered cross-border operations, including feeding Rwandese refhgees in camps in neighboring countries.

The team found that food aid provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) definitely saved c;uuniless lives and reduced suffering in the refhgee camps along the borders and inside Rwanda. Absent comprehensive data, however, it is impossible to say how many lives were saved.

USAIDIRwanda, with policy and program support from USAID/Washington, undertook a high-risk strategy with a variety of innovative programs that integrated relief and development programs and resources. The Mission's early transition activities aided in laying a foundation for successfhl nationwide local elections, a comprehensive government program for recovery, and effective programs of implementing partners.

However, USAID'S food aid assistance to refhgee camps in the Democratic Republic of

Congo (until 1997, known as Zaire) and Tanzania from 1994-1996 was a colossal------.* policy called refugees used the camps as a staging ground for an insurgency in Northwest Rwanda in 1997, in an attempt to destabilize or overthrow the newly installed government. At the end of the day, food assistance prolonged that conflict, which brought ( more deaths and displacements. -

The team found the hardest lesson of all is communicating evaluation conclusions and recommendations in a way that will prompt change in institutions' policies and decision- making procedures. For example, few people were familiar with the analysis and recommendations of the 1996 Joint Multidonor Evaluation of Rwanda (although there were a number of apparently unopened volumes in Washington and the field). USAlD staff had only a limited knowledge of the GHAI Transitions paper. A Legacy of Division and Conflict

Rwanda has seen repeated mass killings since 1959, rooted in a polarization of ethnic groups since pre-colonial days. Under German colonial and Belgian trusteeship rule, the minority Tutsis became the privileged class; the Hutu majority the underprivileged. The Belgians and the Catholic Church then shifted their support to the majority Hutu, easing the way for a Hutu revolution in 1959-196 1.The country's refugee crisis began then, as tens of thousands of Tutsis fled to neighboring countries and the Tutsi-dominated monarchy was replaced by a Hutu-led independent republic.

The Tutsi refugees became increasingly militant and formed the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). As one high-level interviewee reminded us, the war for Rwanda began in 1990 when the RPF made its first incursion into Rwanda from its base in Uganda. Although unsuccessful, it set the stage for a second attempt in 1993. By mid- 1992, RPF attacks had displaced 200,000-300,000 people in the north. Another 900,000 were displaced after a February 1993 attack, although by yearend 60 percent had returned home. But following an attempted coup in October and ethnic violence in Burundi, 50,000 to 100,000 people were killed and 700,000 became refugees.

Peace talks leading to the Arusha Accords excluded Hutu extremists from the transitional government and marginalized them in the political process. Although President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu major general who took power after a 1973 coup, signed the accords, he did not get the support he needed to implement them from the radical power brokers. The accords called for a new constitution allowing for multiparty democracy, separation of powers, and presidential term limits. A number of agreements, including those that provided the Tutsi in Rwanda and those in Uganda who planned to return access to land and political power, were not being implemented.

Escalating Violence. Escalating conflict led up to genocide in 1994-a planned, deliberate effort to eliminate the Tutsi population. The genocide started when a plane carrying the Hutu presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down on April 6. From April through July that year, 500,000-800,000 Rwandese were killed (10 percent of the entire population and more than 25% of the population fled). Those fleeing across the border were primarily Hutus, but some Tutsis also fled seeking rehge from the killing. The genocide reactivated the RPFYsmilitary campaign. By July 1994, the RPF defeated the Rwandese Army (FAR, or Force Armee Rwandaise).

From April through December of that year, the international community poured $1.4 billion in aid into the Great Lakes region, which covers Burundi, Rwanda, Northwest Tanzania, Uganda, and Eastern Zaire. A third went to Rwanda; two-thirds to asylum countries. The emphasis was on saving lives by providing food, shelter, medical, and sanitation services. The bulk of the money went to the refugees, not the survivors of the genocide. The perpetrators of the genocide, now living in refugee camps, made incursions into the country, assassinating government officials throughout 1995 and 1996. Contributing hrther to the situation was the forced closure of the refugee camps and mass return of people back into Rwanda in mid 1996. As a result of those incursions and mass movement instability increased in the Northwest, major segments of the population in the country's Northwest began leaving by mid-1997. Donors and most probably the government did not fully grasp the scope of that humanitarian emergency until February 1998. By then, more than a third of the people in the region were displaced and required substantial food aid.

Some observers believe the war is not over yet. Others think its concluding phase began in early 1999, when the government took control of the Hutu-led insurgency in the Northwest and reestablished secure borders. Most Rwandese have now returned from exile or rehgee camps-for some, for the first time in generations.

Genocide and the Regional Context

In answering the three questions posed in the subject evaluation, it is important to understand the national and regional context in which both Rwandans and international relief and development agencies found themselves in early 1996. At the risk of being obvious, it is important to recall that there had been a renewal of war to end a specific instance of genocide carried out on a scale and intensity not seen since World War 11. As our team was reminded on numerous occasions, the extremely important events surrounding genocide have had -and continue to have- unrelenting influence on current events in and opinions about Rwanda.

It is also important to recall that the RPF expected to be in a power sharing role -but not having to form a new government, after the genocide and a campaign to end genocide that included the exodus of at least 25% of the population and the death of 10%. The country was in a state of tension and instability as there were assassinations through 1995 and ' 96, particularly as a result of incursions by the genocidaires across the lake from Ijwe Island and other neighboring countries. The RPA military and the country knew that no truce had been declared or post genocide peace agreement signed. Some observers do not believe the war is over yet; the war of genocide continues. This is difficult for outsiders or, for that matter, almost anyone to understand.

Rwanda's security is tied to events outside its borders. The recent rather htile bombings of Uvira and Goma in May 1999, the attack on Bwindi, allegations of training of Interhamwe and exFAR forces by Zimbabwe in DROC, and fighting with the alliance in Congo this year illustrate this point. Without some kind of international guarantees in the region, and with support from the international community, there will likely be continued incidents and pressures on Rwanda that will inhibit development and keep everyone's macro and micro planning tentative and tenuous.

Programming in a fragile peace. A military deputy camp commander with the Rwandese Patriotic Front told the evaluation team, "Rwanda was now, for the first time a country. And for now.. .at peace with itself and its borders secured." For peace to continue, however, the commander said within a generation Rwanda must transform its society so that it is no longer ethnically based, and create an equitable, credible government.

This will be a challenge in a country as fragile as Rwanda with a structural food deficit and poverty remaining extremely high -90% of the rural population and 70% overall below the poverty line according to the World Bank. A number of observers and actors in Rwanda commented that humanitarian and development organizations were resistant to integrate cause and effect of these events into their analysis in order to guide the development of their new and on-going programs and activities. This theme is one that re-occurs throughout the evaluation. It is one in which the USAID Mission has demonstrated its institutional capacity to develop and implement a strategy quite effectively in a post- conflict transition.

Findings and Recommendations

Saving Lives

USAID~Washingtonand USAID/Rwanda placed an experienced Food for Peace (FFP) officer in Kigali in 1997 to manage initially the food and later on (early 1998) non-food programs as well. Undoubtedly, this on-the-ground management presence, the only bilateral food aid presence in the country, saved lives. The officer was responsible for analysis that provided early warning and allowed donors to target food delivery to desperately vulnerable populations during the 1997 insurgency in the Northwest. USAlD led the international community in identifying the incipient conflict and calling for early support of government efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and stabilize the situation.

The Agency needs to develop a policy of identifying, recruiting, and promoting personnel with hands-on experience in complex emergencies and post-conflict transitions. These personnel need a strong analytic and technical background in food aid, nutrition, and other sectors. They also must have the political acumen to work closely with Embassy and State Department personnel and other donors on joint policy objectives and program options.

Monetization of Title I1 food aid was not in the case of Rwanda and is no2 generally a useful way to provide immediate budgetary support for government. Monetization did, however, prove to be an appropriate and flexible tool in USAlD's later integrated strategic plan for the country. While requiring over $ 1 million in of development assistance resources to manage and implement the program, the net effect for Rwanda of monetization was an additional $ 6 - 7 million in program resources. It generated $1.3 million in initialsales that was used in the humanitarian emergency brought on by the insurgency in the Northwest. For monetization of Title I1 aid to be effective, time must be built in for design and implementation, including collaboration with partners and oversight authorities. Policymakers and food-aid managers should propose and use monetization programs along with development assistance to enhance'postconflict transition. Consultation with USAID oversight authorities and partners is necessary to ensure support for innovative food and non-food aid programming. Staff training and increased backstopping capacity are needed to implement the programs and increase flexibility.

Commission for Refigees (LTNHCR), did not have adequate monitoring safeguards nor he World Food 1P r (if , 6J-/ monitoring and oversight in the refugee camps until a joint memo of understanding \ (MOU) was finally signed subsequently with LNHCR in March of 1997. In 1997, the government took over food distribution, with WFP as its implementing partner. Neifher the government nor WFP attempted comprehensive data collection and monitoring, however, until late 1998. The lac method for assessing vulnerability rnade it difficult to target aid and monitor its impact inside Rwanda. Outside, in the refugee camps, conducting rigorous, comprehensive, rapid surveys was problematic due to militarization by ex-FAR genocidaires. Security concerns, the food deficit, and waves of refigees back and forth across the region and country, where poverty is endemic and the population scattered on hillsides, also complicated matters.

But even when it was possible to target and monitor the assistance, WFP apparently did pot have or make available sufficient staff and dollar resources to do so. As a result, some /experts speculate, more food was supplied than necessary and more food than is usually the case was misappropriated. There have also been allegations that contractors managing kame of the camps for the international humanitarian organizations had more of an interest in continuing their programs than resolving refigee problems.

iven a number of factors. These include visible international political profile of d, and coupled with the recent ment of Rwanda played in food distribution and its alleged human rights abuses.

USAID'S Regional Economic Development Services Ofice for East and Southern Africa alleged there was massive diversion of food, but a WFP inspector general's investigation found no corroborating evidence. This simply underscores the need for adequate staffing and finding for better reporting up front, as part of the equation for assistance. The Agency has committed to do a better job of reporting. Its Humanitarian Assistance Goal now requires reporting on crude mortality rates, as a measure of lives saved, and on nutritional status of children under 5 in vulnerable populations in emergencies.

Several knowledgeable observers and operations experts pointed to USAID involvement as a model for on the grou tion targeting, monitoring, and humanitarian assistance. Pointing out that the issues and terrain are similar, they applauded USAID'S Ofice of Foreign Disaster Assistance significant invested in this capacity as a necessary cost of doing business in prolonged humanitarian emergencies.

USAID needs to ensure that the World Food Program has the necessary financial and staff resources available to conduct surveys with host government and nongovernmental partners to ensure adequate targeting, monitoring, and evaluation of its programs. These costs need to be included up front in USAID, WFP, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) programming.

Save the Children Fundmnited Kingdom conducted food economy surveys to identi@ vulnerability and need for food aid. However, with Rwanda's acute poverty and food deficit, the surveys were overly simplistic and incapable of providing a credible base for decision-making. Used in isolation they can lead to erroneous conclusions about need, identification of vulnerable groups, and effective targeting and monitoring of humanitarian assistance.

National and household-level surveys of vulnerable groups need to be conducted using methodologies that will generate comprehensive statistical data.

The Famine Early Warning System project helped at times by providing very limited technical information on price monitoring and weather and crop conditions. The Mission, however, was not satisfied with its assistance because it was too general and sporadic.

Linking Relief and Development

USAIDIRwanda understood and internalized in its culture and operations by late 1994 that relief and transition programs do not, themselves, have to be sustainable. Rather, they need to be viewed as a foundation for meeting immediate needs and a c-atalyst for longer- tments. At times, this may mean making USAID presence or investments visible trategic support for a policy change or intervention by others. At other times, USAID investments that support such activities as local government initiatives need to be supplemented by programs hnded by other U.S. government entities.

For example, the State Department provided money from its Population, Refbgees, and Migration Bureau directly through the LMCRand the LTN Development Program's Trust Fund in Rwanda and its Joint Programming Reconstruction Unit (JPRU), set up to provide housing and associated services. The U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda played a pivotal role in linking those resources with USAD'S local government initiative in the democracy and governance sector. Early USAlD transition initiatives to key ministries in late 1995 have also borne fruit in the government's capacity to mount the beginnings of a longer-term reconstruction and transition program, which is more comprehensive and includes multidonor funding; the well-integrated work of the International Red Cross and AFRICARE; and recent successful nationwide local-level elections. USAID/Rwanda took a risky but courageous stance in applying development assistance funds early on, incorporating critical input from the Ofice of Transition Initiatives to sustain and integrate work in Rwanda's Interior and Local Government ministries. This kind of integration of resources, undertaken somewhat serendipitously and against formidable bureaucratic constraints, helped bridge relief and development and helped the government build capacity to manage reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. A UN Development Program report on donor activities in Rwanda cited USAID/Rwanda and its integrated strategic plan as the only donor to link relief and development consciously in its strategic framework and operations.

-"' Several factors explain First, USAID/Rwanda had " what has been termed a experiences in post- genocide programming. Second, staff made a conscious effort to link relief and development through a relatively sound integrated strategic plan. Third, staff in key positions had the accumulated experience in transitions to make decisions with somewhat flexible program resources. Fourth, the staff were willing to take some risks in trying innovative programs. ,According to many interviewed, initially there was less than full interbureau buy-in in the Agency. However, the integrated strategic plan evolved into a partnership-different ofices and bureaus stretched their points of view and mandates, using a more collaborative learn-by-doing mentality. (Contracting and procurement remain significant constraints to transition programs.) Although not all ofices with USAID participated in developing the ISP, all participated actively in the process of implementation. This combination of factors has not been widely recognized.

The Agency needs to apply the integrated strategic plan concept, principles, and framework of analysis to its operations in complex humanitarian emergencies and postconflict transitions. It also needs to utilize experienced staff, combined with wider training opportunities, for personnel in contracts and Agencywide procurement.

The Agency must clearly delineate policy, program, and resource responsibilities, using a very specific "management contract" in overseeing and coordinating this interbureau process, particularly in establishing postconflict-transition integrated strategic plans. gement process in Washington-combining authority with decis y on programs and resources across operating units-has been repeatedly identified as perhaps the si effective field operations.

Prolonging conflict

Long-standing rehgee camps have become the hotbed for today's rebels and tomorrow's rulers. The rules of engagement have changed, but donors have not, by and large, changed the way they provide humanitarian assistance. Taking a position of neutrality, donors often follow traditional, international conventions in extending protection and providing resources. More unwittingly than in the past, perhaps, humanitarian assistance has become a valuable resource for those who wish to seize power and promote instability. It has also become, at times, a media moment and a highly politicized large-scale business. All these factors frequently block locally supported political solutions and even international interventions.

Humanitarian assistance was on trial in Rwanda as a source of conflict and of resources to ensure peace. U.S. food aid did, on the one hand, save lives in the short-term. _OOnr!.the other hand, it, ,.~~,,.. crg@-s,if u@i~ns..that prolmged .confllctinwhich .more,2eeop!e!o$.t~~~~.ms,, In 1996, massive amounts of U.S. food went to camps outside ehgees were used as pawns and shields to support the political and military~. objectives of the former pro-genocide government of Rwanda and the Hutu militias, or interahamwe. In this\-.. .." way. . -2 U. - supp ts.

Recommendations

With timely, more objective, economic, political and military on the ground analysis that was used and integrated into the Washington policy and decision-making process, it might have been possible to prevent those involved in the genocide from taking control of the rehgee camps. Objective analysis, including a look at regional implications, and some risk-taking in making hll use of available material and resources were the necessary but missing ingredients in establishing clear and effective policy objectives and program decisions in Washington.

Humanitarian conditions in Zaire were poor, and the new Rwandese government had been able to improve prospects early on. An eflective cross-border media campaign could have prompted many people to return in 1994, before the Hutu extremists cemented political control in the camps. Had the UN High Commission for Rehgees provided enough it may then have been possible to separate actual rehgees from the

Early in an emergency, the United States needs to clearly define its policy objectives and the role and use of humanitarian assistance, based on economic, military, and political analyses. A more rational USAID and U.S. government decision-making structure is required so those clear policy objectives are set ensuring that programs do not work at cross-purposes.

Humanitarian assistance will always be used, in the first instance, to save lives and alleviate suffering. It must, however, be more hlly integrated with foreign policy objectives. When that happens, humanitarian programs and resources can be a policy instrument and program tool to achieve those aims. In complex political emergencies, humanitarian assistance can be manipulated to support the political and military objectives of combatant groups. USAID and the U.S. government need to recognize early on when that is happening. It is essential to develop clear, objective, timely analysis to inform integrated, coherent policies. These, in turn, should guide decisions on program design and resource allocation. For example, effective use of media to counter insurgents' propaganda from the camps about the government of Rwanda could have prevented many from joining their cause.

Information in these types of situations is very difficult to obtain. More open sources of hard-corroborated information, reporting, and analysis are required to understand the many objectives (economic, military, political, and social) of combatants and other groups in complex emergencies. The Ofice of Transition Initiatives can play a pivotal role in providing information and analysis and coordinating assistance from USAID, the U.S. government, and other donors. A coordinator has been proposed for the Northwest, for example, who would provide the information and analysis that is key to preventing conflict and supporting postconflict transitions.

Using the Past as Guide

The events surrounding the 1994 genocide, carried out on a scale and intensity not seen in many decades, have an unrelenting influence on events in and opinions about Rwanda. Several people in Rwanda commented that humanitarian and development organizations resist using the causes and effects of these events as guides in developing new programs. The USAID Mission, however, demonstrated the capacity to develop and implement a strategy quite effectively in a postconflict transition. Hard Choices, No Exits

Both Hutu and Tutsi have used ethnic cleansing to maintain absolute control over resource allocation and decision-making in a centralized political and economic governance structure. A winner-take-all mentality has dominated Rwanda's governance since colonial times to maintain absolute control over a very centralized political and economic governance structure. This was done in order to maintain almost absolute control over the resource allocation and decision-making process. All this to ensure that it benefited exclusively and handsomely a tiny elite of the population. Understanding the Rwandan context and political and economic objectives and consequences of genocide is important for grasping the role that the subsequent and almost unprecedented levels of humanitarian assistance provided by donors, relative to the population of Rwanda, played in the mid to late 1990s. Moreover, ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi have taken active parts in numerous human tragedies over the years, including in 1994 Hutu killing Hutu (moderates and those that lived in different geographic areas).

As Peter Uvin, in Aiding Violence, and others have noted, the Hutu clique surrounding former president Juvenal Habyarimana diverted a significant share of national and donor resources to maintain its power, wealth, and control, retarding economic development and causing an astronomical increase in poverty. Poverty leapt from less than half to more than three-quarters of the population from 1990 to 1993 and worsened in the aftermath of genocide. He also documents an increase in what her terms "structural violence as a result of the increase in poverty. (Before the 1950s, the minority Tutsis had been the haves and the majority Hutus the have-nots.).

Such high levels of poverty all but precluded any reasonable basis for governance. There is no exit from this history of genocide and greed. The reality of mass killings, their causes, and their effects must be taken into account in rebuilding a governance structure that will prevent conflict from repeating itself in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region.

In the mid- to late 1990s, donors provided almost unprecedented levels of humanitarian assistance, relative to the population of the country. But the international community first ignored, then acknowledged, but did little to prevent the 1994 genocide, when the Hutu- controlled government sought to massacre the Tutsi.

It wasn't until December 1997 that U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright apologized for the failure of the international community and the United States to act to prevent genocide, and the role humanitarian aid had in sustaining the perpetrators of the genocide. Bill Clinton, president of the United States, followed suit three months later.

accidental.. .and that they were not the in 1994, and called them what they result of ancient tribal struggles. . . .These were-genocide .. .and condemned events grew from a policy aimed at the the use of humanitarian aid to systematic destruction of a people.. . sustain armed camps to supporl Never again must we be shy in the face of the evidence.. ,and we must work as partners with Rwanda to end this Madeleine Albright 10 President Bill Clinton ITin~l;Aimnrt These apologies set the stage for the questions this evaluation seeks to answer and make the link between USAID and U.S. government policy and decision-making that this evaluation addresses.

These "never again" statements by the most senior of U.S. officials also set the stage for aid workers today, who ask themselves whether they are doing the right things to support an economic and political postconflict transition in Rwanda. Indeed, a few aid workers interviewed said they constantly ask themselves if their assistance is inadvertently aiding violence at the margins. Authors of analyses of humanitarian assistance such as Mary Anderson, in Rising Fronz the Ashes, John Prendergast in Ten Commandnzents, and Peter Uvin in his Rwanda-specific Aiding Violence all recite the mantra: do no harnz. This is the easy part. The difficulty comes in ensuring that donor institutions and actions are appropriate-individually, bilaterally, and multilaterally.

In Rwanda, the actions of the international community in the last two decades did do harm. That continues to affect donor-government relations. Uvin states that development assistance, unwittingly or somewhat benignly, aided violence and supported creation of a culture of impunity that ultimately led to the 1994 genocide. Other publications, such as Gerard Prunier7sCrisis in Rwanda and Africa Rights' Rwanda, Killing the Evidence and Insurgency in the Northwest, document the role of political impunity, including government-planned or -sanctioned mass killings based on ethnicity. Even the World Bank in its study of post-conflict transitions (OED Eriksson) questions the role its assistance played in this regard.

The UN, through its armed forces, UNAMIR, also failed to act to prevent the genocide. The UN's role in the country today is plagued by troubled relations with the government of Rwanda over refugees, internally displaced persons, and alleged human rights abuses. Lack of funding and poor staffing of the UN human rights operations and the International Tribunal, which was to investigate war crimes only compounded the problem. The UN Development Program recently commissioned a study of the UN's involvement in Rwanda. It held at least one session in Kigali relating its involvement and relations with the government to its hture role there. One UN aid worker states in the report that the UN should consider closing up shop and leaving the country for a while. It could return later with a clean slate and begin a new relationship with the government.

Closer to home, the evaluation team found donors concerned that the United States developed a working relationship with the current government that was, at times, too close, evident in its silence regarding the government's alleged human rights abuses. Other donors criticized USAID and U.S. government support for Rwanda's suppression of the insurgency in the Northwest and their tacit support for its resettlement policy, which affects the predominantly Hutu population there.

Today, the dominant Tutsi minority in Rwanda with less than 10 percent of the population, and the present government realize officially that they cannot long control the political landscape and hope to escape another genocide. Whether they can create a stable political and cultural environment and a pluralistic, equitable governance structure remains to be seen. How donors support that process will be critical to a successfbl transition in the shadow of genocide.

Inside Rwanda, some killing continues, primarily in the Northwest. The vast majority of the perpetrators of genocide have now found sanctuary in Angola, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Leaders are scattered in dozens of countries throughout the world. Some receive humanitarian assistance as refugees; some are remnants of an organized militia; and others lead productive lives abroad. A small group of Hutu power advocates remains, however. They are determined to overthrow the government of Rwanda and complete the genocide. These extremists portray themselves as victims and look for legitimacy and international recognition as a government in exile, even in the midst of the genocide. Genocide is a thread that runs through the modern history of Rwanda and is a prism for this evaluation. Genocide has affected the fabric of Rwandese society, shaping both attitudes and actions in subtle, almost imperceptible ways.

This evaluation assesses three years of U.S. assistance (1996-1 999) in support of Rwandese government objectives: a non-ethnic society and a more participatory, decentralized government. It examines whether U.S. assistance saved lives, linked relief and development, and prolonged or shortened conflict.

A Costly Stalemate: the Zairian Refugee Camps 1994-1996

Maintaining the refugee camps at a cost of more than $1 million a day, donor fatigue set in early. By the end of 1995, the international community had spent $660 million to $750 million, mostly outside Rwanda on refbgee camps in Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire.

Many of the former military officers of the Force Armee Rwandaise and their staff, along with former government officials who had planned and implemented the genocide, went to the camps along with actual refbgees. Providing support and succor to them under the umbrella of humanitarianism contradicts the stated objectives, missions, and mandates (particularly the principle of neutrality) of humanitarian assistance.

Much less was spent on reconstruction in Rwanda, which was a sore point with the government. The camps for refugees and internally displaced persons were major sources of instability, posing life-and-death security issues for the fledgling government's survival. In the government's view, those badly needed donor resources should have gone toward Rwanda's reconstruction and rehabilitation, which would help win the hearts and minds of a divided population. The trade-off between resources for the camps and for the people in Rwanda was not one-for-one, but it was real, particularly when the need for justice and reconciliation is factored in. Rwandese refugees outside the country were symbols of a divided country. The government wanted them back as a sign of its ultimate victory and as a resource to help advance development.

Most of the predominantly Hutu population in the country's Northwest had fled by summer 1994, as it became apparent that the RPF was winning the war. Some went willingly; fearing for their safety; others followed the orders of their political and religious leaders. Many were forced, used as human shields. Some 850,000, including the remainder of the Hutu military forces of the former government-Force Armee Rwandaise-and government officials from the Northwest along with their families retreated July 14-1 8 into North Kiw, in what was then Zaire. (The country was renamed Democratic Republic of Zaire in 1998, after the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko.) Some made their way to rehgee camps in Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda. Others ended up, or were trapped, in the Zone Turquoise, a humanitarian corridor and safe haven the French set up in the Southwest that summer primarily for the protection of Tutsis. The end result was that the Northwest was almost totally devoid of people.

The rather simple plan of the Hutu extremists-former soldiers of the Rwandese army (FAR), former government officials, and allied Hutu militias, the interahamwe-was to depopulate the country. Their objectives were to 1) minimize the military victory of the Tutsi invading army, 2) call into question the legitimacy of the fledging government, and 3) use the protection of the rehgee camps, particularly in Zaire, to prepare for their return to power through Rwanda's Northwest.

The Hutu extremists assumed correctly that neither international humanitarian relief agencies, nor the national or regional governments of Zaire would separate them from actual rehgees. They established themselves in Mungunga Camp on Lake Kivu with the acquiescence of the Zairian authorities. They managed to consolidate military and political control of most of the camp population in Zaire within months. In December 1994, the former president of Rwanda Theodore Sinddikubwabo and Prime Minister Jean Kambana proclaimed a government-in-exile in Zaire. Incursions into Rwanda from the camps were verified in early December 1994.

Before January 1996, the Rwanda emergency was an internal and regional crisis with a widely dispersed caseload. Internally displaced Hutus and Hutu refugees began making incursions into the country and assassinating politicians, beginning with the prefect of Butare in February 1995. The perpetrators of the genocide used Ilwi Island as a base for forays into southern Rwanda. That base was finally eliminated in the spring of 1995, which helped stabilize the South.

A Small Window of Opportunity Closes

At the outset, a few international humanitarian workers in Rwanda and Zaire recognized the rehgee situation as a complex political-military predicament requiring a more sophisticated political and humanitarian response. The conundrum was how to abide by international humanitarian principles and maintain neutrality when the increasingly militarized camps were home to a significant number of people who were probably guilty of genocide and other high crimes, as well as to actual refugees. This was overlooked, forgotten, or overwhelmed by the immense need. The initial flood of rehgees into Zaire was accompanied in the first several weeks in July 1994 by an almost immediate reverse outflow-100,000 plus estimated people moved back to Rwanda. People returned for several reasons: facilities in the new camps were inadequate (50,000 died in Goma); they wanted to return home; there was a severe cholera outbreak on July 20~;and the Hutu militias did not yet have military and political control of the camps.

Once relief and military agencies brought the cholera epidemic (and later dysentery) under control and extended provisions and services to the camps, more rehgees were drawn to the camps. The former soldiers and Hutu militias increased their political and military control of the camps and didn't allow people to leave.

Stepping into the Breach: The Hand-off to UNHCR and WFP

As the battlefield portion of the war wound down in July 1994, the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Rwanda diminished, although it continued to protect and feed the growing prison population. The organization was somewhat relieved to be relieved of the growing and intractable problem in the camps.

The LJN High Commission for Rehgees did not want a repeat of its weak performance in the 1990-1 991 Gulf War. As a result of lessons learned there, the commisslon had improved logistical management for quick onset emergencies, particularly in war zones. It was determined to demonstrate that it could respond in an emergency such as Rwanda. Ultimately, the situation in Rwanda tested the limits of the emergency-response capacity not only of the UN High Commission, but also of the United Nations and the NGO relief community. In hindsight, UNHCR was incapable of handling the influx of 850,000 rehgees who crossed the border into the Kivu area of Zaire in a matter of days. It was not even ready for the 50,000 rehgees it expected, after several assessments and analyses of a contingency plan prepared in late June 1994. This pattern of large groups of Rwandese rehgees moving quickly repeatedly caught UNHCR off guard.

World Food Program, after some initial frenetic efforts, was in a relatively better position to provide food for the rehgees from regional stockpiles. After the first few days, the program patched together a system that worked quite well. Its main concern was getting an accurate count of the rehgees so that it could deliver the proper components of the food basket and an adequate overall amount. As the junior partner to WCR,World Food Program's role was to deliver the overall ration to the extended delivery points in the camps. This was a source of contention when it became clear that rehgee figures were inflated and the camps were militarized, making it difficult to target assistance. (As the problems worsened in 1996, USAID raised questions officially in the field and later in Washington about the inflated figures and diversion of food. Although the United States' pattern of policy decisions was unclear, the questions led, indirectly, to the decision to stop providing food aid temporarily to World Food Program for the camps.)

The UN High Commission for Rehgees faced the dilemma of protecting the camps' large and disparate population. (See Box I). Article 1 of the Organization of African Unity Convention grants refhgee status to people who have fled their country as a result of serious public disorder. However, many of the leaders and participants in the genocide should have been stripped of their refhgee status and protections under its exclusion clause.

In Washington and in the field, there was discussion about having UNHCR withdraw blanket protection status from some refhgees. However, at the most senior policy level, LICRwas most reluctant, as was State's Population, Refhgee, and Migration Bureau. The UN's decision not to exclude extremist Hutus widened its credibility gap with the government of Rwanda. Some Rwandese leaders concluded the UN had a hidden agenda, and opted for a survival strategy of going it alone on security issues when necessary.

The UN believed it was essential to maintain stability in an inherently unstable situation. Separating actual refhgees from former soldiers and members of the interahamwe Hutu militias in the camps was risky. A riot started in the Ngara Camp when Tanzanian authorities tried to arrest a former bourgemestre (the equivalent of a mayor appointed presidentially with cabinet vettinglapproval), suspected of war crimes. UNHCR was not convinced that the new government of Rwanda would welcome home refhgees and certainly not those involved in the genocide.

Whom Do You Trust? The Role of the Gersony Mission

Probably the most significant non-military factor hindering large-scale repatriation of refhgees was the understandable fear among Hutu refhgees that the Tutsis would seek retribution if the Hutu returned, guilty or not, of the crimes and atrocities committed. New and old refhgees also had disputes over and were competing for the same land and houses.

The new government released statements, launched media campaigns, and made proclamations about rule of law and welcome for refhgees. The Prefect of Gisenyi sent letters, used local church leaders in Congo, and sent previously returned refhgees to Congo to encourage those remaining to return. However, allegations of human rights abuses by the RPF and mass killings of Hutus during and after the war dogged the new regime, even after the RPF defeated the Force Armee Rwandaise.

UNHCR commissioned a team of consultants, headed by Robert Gersony, in late July 1994, to provide an analysis of the security situation that could support a speedy voluntary repatriation of the two million Rwandese refhgees in camps. According to the evaluation team interviews, the Gersony team found apparently some credible evidence of a centralized and systematic RPF decision to order the massacre of specific groups of Hutu in selected areas of the country. The average allegedly killed was 5,000 to 10,000 a month. An estimated 30,000 to 60,000 Hutu were killed from April through September 1994 when Gersony completed his mission there. No tangible proof was ever forthcoming, however, despite the UN special envoy's demands on the spot and subsequent requests. Gersony had undertaken a number of difficult missions for the U.S. government and his analysis was highly regarded in senior policy circles. The power of his opinion, in briefings to UNHCR and others, and in a report that was never published, eroded trust in the new government and its ability to safeguard the return of the refugees. An already skeptical UNHCR suspended all repatriation arrangements on Sept 28'.

UNHCR7sview that a political settlement was needed, including perhaps negotiations with the perpetrators of the genocide, contributed to the stalemate that took more than two years to resolve. By 1996, many diplomats and humanitarian assistance and aid agencies came to the conclusion that the political and human rights issues in Rwanda, the camps, and the region could only be solved by separating the former soldiers and interahamwe Hutu militias from the refugees. In its own evaluation, UNHCR characterized this "pattern of abuses by the new Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), as a mistaken conception early on" and determined that mass voluntary repatriation from the newly established camps in Zaire was a real possibility.

Donor distrust of the new government and inability to reach a quick policy decision on the camps unwittingly helped Hutu extremists. They gained a false sense of enhanced legitimacy and a chance to regroup, revitalize themselves on refugee rations, and re-arm.

Mounlting Refugee Cost - No End in Sight

By early 1996, some effort had been made to get more accurate head counts and improve household distribution of food. Elite Zairian armed forces had improved security in some camps. There was even a proposal to have an independent, private sector firm provide security (and separate actual refugees from militant Hutu extremists) for $50 million.

Assistant Secretary George Moose outlined a "push-pull" U.S. government strategy in spring 1996, with the aim of encouraging rehgees to leave the camps and return home. Consideration was given to moving camps from the borders, stockpiling food in the communes in Rwanda, and placing human rights monitors in the country to provide some assurance to returnees. Further discussions led to a draft formal proposal, containing the push-pull elements, being agreed to in Goma, Zaire with donors by USAID Chief of Staff Richard McCall and subsequently at a Rwanda Donor Roundtable meeting in Geneva in June 1996. This acknowledged that voluntary repatriation was the preferred USG option but the on-the-ground reality dictated that this was becoming less and less viable. It outlined several steps that included closing some rehgee camps and repatriating and relocating refugees and withdrawing rehgee status to those carrying arms and guilty of crimes against humanity. This included finding a way to apply the exclusion clause of the Geneva and OAU conventions.

A multidonor refugee proposal was finally cobbled together with donors in the fall of 1996. However, UNHCR remained opposed to apply the cessation clause, reluctant to invoke exclusion and withdraw protection, as was State PRM. Field staff in their reports to both organizations remained divided in their opinions. In the end, all the donor efforts to resolve the crisis came too little, too late.

The backdrop, however, was one of frightening dollar and human costs. The average cost for maintaining a rehgee in the Great Lakes region has been estimated as high as $1 per d& early in the emergency, declining to $.60-$.80 per day depending on logistics, housing, and ration size and composition. Initial estimates of camp populations were off by up to 40 percent, according to the Join2 Evalualion for Emergency Assislance in Rwanda. Use of satellite imagery and some on-the-ground counting brought actual numbers down somewhat by the end of 1995. By UNHCR's own estimates, overcounting

In August 1996, a little noticed event foreshadowed grander events to come. After several rounds of consultations and negotiations, the government of Rwanda was able to repatriate all but several hundred of more than 60,000 Rwandese rehgees in Burundi. Almost all returned without physical duress to their home communes. here was no evidence of mass retribution or arrests as a result. LrNHCR had not been in favor of the repatriation. It considered the government's involvement heavy-handed and believed, up until the last moment, that the rehgees would not return en masse.

Despite the government's success, UNHCR, State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, arnd several donors continued to have serious reservations about the government's intentions and ability to protect rehgees in the event of a massive return from the camps in Zaire. During September and October 1996, a high-level UNHCR official went to the Great Lakes region to assess how a new rehgee policy could be implemented and whether there was the possibility of a massive return under voluntary or other conditions. While the U.S. Embassy in Kigali viewed such an event highly possible and desirable, UNHCR in Geneva and the US Mission to the UN in Geneva remained doubthl. They were looking for a political solution that would guarantee the safety of the rehgees.

An Uncalculated Mistake: Ethnic Cleansing in Zaire

The second major humanitarian emergency in two years found the major groups involved unprepared. This time it occurred in Zaire and involved both rehgees and perpetrators of the genocide. (Once again, a senior U.S. official apologized for not preventing the crisis See Box 2.) With some of the Zairian army, Hutu extremists launched a campaign of "ethnic cleansing," killing the surrounding Tutsi populations in Masisi, Zaire, in fall 1995. From March through June 1996 more than 65,000 Tutsi fled Masisi. The UN High Commission for Rehgees designated them rehgees. The remaining Tutsis began an armed rebellion. As the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko began to collapse, the Zaire military tried to expel the Tutsi community of 400,000 who had been settled south of Lake Kiw since the 18h century. In October, the Zairian deputy governor of South Kiw ordered all Tutsis to leave the country within a week or be killed. This unified a number of diverse anti- government groups in eastern Zaire. With active support of the Rwandese government, they rose up against the Zairian government and ultimately overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997. Most important, the order provided the political cover and the excuse the Rwandese government needed to intervene in Zaire and dismantle the camps.

The Tutsi Response

Rebel Tutsi forces in eastern Zaire, backed by the Rwandese Patriotic Front, began to gather steam. The French and others proposed the UN mount an international force to provide a "humanitarian corridor" that would safeguard and provide access to camps in Zaire.

Since April 1995, Vice President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame, a major-general with the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front, had been saying privately and publicly that if the international community would not resolve the problems in the camps, those in the region would. With the arrival of the U.S. military advance teams in Kigali in 1996, military commanders from the United States and other Western countries made it clear that they would not, as part of this force, separate refugees from Hutu extremists. Kagame and the rebel forces in Zaire put their own military plan in place. In their view, the proposed international force would replay the French Operation Turquoise of 1994, which ended up guaranteeing the safety of Hutu extremists. A repeat would only extend the political stalemate in the camps under the guise of a cease-fire, giving the perpetrators of the genocide more time to improve their position, they believed.

As early as May 1995, the former political and military leaders of Rwanda were signing formal agreements to cooperate and share resources in Bukavu with the Burundian Hutu rebel group, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy, and its military arm, the Force for Defense of Democracy. One of several formal regional alliances, this agreement provided radio equipment for the propaganda campaign against the Rwandese government. (It also established joint forces after the army of Laurent Kabila forced Mobutu Sese Seko from office in 1997 and the camps were dismantled.)

The political organization was called the Liberation Army of Rwanda (ALIR). The military organization was called the Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR). PALIR issued a document in the camps, "Let Us Liberate Our Country: The Basic Principles of Our Victory." It used the tract for political indoctrination in the camps in 1995 and 1996 and later to organize the people against the government in the insurgency campaign in the Northwest in 1997. It called for a liberation war supported by a popular uprising, outlined principles for the revolution, and defined roles of all members of society, from priests and journalists to farmers.

The Hutus used the camps in Zaire as a staging ground for raids into Rwanda. They sought to destabilize local authorities by raiding commune offices, destroying records and freeing prisoners arrested on suspicion of genocide. At the same time, the interahamwe Hutu militias and ex-soldiers used propaganda campaigns to establish local networks of civilian supporters in the Northwest and other parts of Rwanda. People were financially motivated to join by being encouraged to loot the homes and communities of Tutsis. These recruits were known as resistants if they acted as guides for soldiers during military operations, or insurgents, if they joined the part-time active militia. The networks, predominantly Hutus, fed and housed the political and military cadre of ex-soldiers and Hutu militias. Some were inspired to kill individuals and moderate local leaders who refised to join; others had to be coerced to participate and also at times kill those who would not participate. In this manner, PALIR and ALIR mobilized Hutus to complete the "unfinished business of genocide." Moderate Hutu leaders in government positions and others not taking sides were forced to join the movement or risk death. (See Box 3)

By 1996, the PALIR-ALIR propaganda and military campaign was in fill swing in the Northwest. When the RPA launched counter-offensive search-and-destroy missions, the Hutu militia mixed with the local people who had fled for fear of being killed by the RPA. The RPA indiscriminately killed members of the militia and former soldiers, along with local civilians. This firther alienated the local population-the goal of PALIR and ALIR. During summer 1996, as it became clear that donors were eventually going to close some of the refigee camps in Zaire, PALIR and ALE began to establish military commands and organized sectors to operate in,the Northwest.

That campaign set the stage for the third crisis in as many years. The Rwandese government and the international community were surprised by the rapidity with which it materialized and the deep trauma it caused. While less costly ($100,000 a day and thousands killed), this emergency was the result of a carefil plan to destabilize and possibly overthrow the government, beginning in the Northwest.

1996: A Different Kind of Humanitarian Emergency

In December 1996 one million, mostly Hutu, rehgees returned to Rwanda within a month. Most had fled because they had been led to believe that the Tutsi-dominated RPA would kill them if they stayed. They returned either because 1) they believed that was not the case, 2) their life in the camps had been so bleak as to make return comparatively less of a risk, 3) they were expelled (as were many refigees in Tanzania), or 4) they were fleeing the violence and chaos of the rapidly escalating civil war in Zaire. With the massive refigee return, the immediate problem was shelter, the longer-term issue reintegration.

The international relief community, fielled by the press, had been predicting the mother of all complex humanitarian emergencies in Zaire. It had not prepared for a large-scale return to Rwanda, despite several reports from the field that that was likely. UNHCR was adamant until the end that very few refigees would return to Rwanda. The government made some preparations for the refigees' return, but it did not want to have relief stations or camps set up on the border that might delay the returnees on their long march home to their communes. Local people, in the end, were the ones who managed and resolved the refbgee crisis.

The international humanitarian community provided limited assistance for the journey, some of which was useful, some not. The United States and others directed a final fi-ee distribution of U.S.-supplied World Food Program food in the days before the camps were dismantled. Most refbgees were in good physical shape and needed only limited assistance for the journey.

Many international relief groups stated publicly that a million people were at risk of dying. Some very critical observers have said senior policy leaders of the major international relief groups went through their Cassandra-like hand-wringing in an attempt to manufacture another crisis. Many conspired to make a bad situation worse, advocating military intervention using a force without the political and military mandate to resolve the situation, which would merely have perpetuated the status quo.

The Third Humanitarian Emergency: The Insurgency in the Northwest.

The 1997 insurgency in the Northwest was, for the new government, a test in its struggle for survival. Even before arriving in Rwanda, the evaluation team heard about the importance of understanding the role of the Northwest in the country's political and economic development. The Northwest includes the two prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengheri; before the genocide they had a combined population of some two million people, more than a fourth of the country's population. It is the breadbasket of the country and the tribal home and power base of the previous Hutu president, Juvenal Habyarimana. This region had been the prime benefactor of earlier donor development resources.

The root causes of the insurgency are found in the refugee camps in countries surrounding Rwanda that housed the political and military elites and associated structures of the former Rwandese government. The camps were safe havens where these forces set up a government in exile and gathered the political and military force to mount a cross-border insurgency in an attempt to destabilize and overthrow the newly installed government of Rwanda. Their objective was to complete the genocide, using a campaign of propaganda and terror that would destroy the political and economic structures in the Northwest (and beyond) and gain the support of the local Hutu population. . (See box 4)

In May 1997 as camps were closing, 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers moved into the Northwest from the camps. Several thousand remained in Zaire maintaining it as a base for operations. Many of those remaining were perpetrators of the genocide who were afraid to return home because, as suspects, they thought they would be killed by the RPA. The leaders, mostly ex-soldiers and officers of the Rwandese army, set up basesin the volcanic forests straddling the Zaire-Rwanda border. By late 1997, they ratcheted up the pressure, spreading propaganda about the government's plans for retribution against returning Hutus. They increased their campaign of terrorism in western Rwanda, displacing new groups every few months. No situation in recent memory presented the humanitarian community with such a corhsed and difficult task

The Hutus targeted Tutsi survivors of genocide and other Tutsi refbgees who were driven out of Zaire by Nutu militias. The then-governor of North Kivu, Zaire, supported the militias. He called Zaireans of Tutsi origin "bats who were neither birds nor mammals; neither Rwandese nor Zairian." For security reasons, the refbgees had been moved from a camp on the border to the Mudende Camp in the commune of Mutura. On Aug. 21, 1997, Hutu extremists, including men and women, overran local defense forces and killed 300- 400 people( some estimate ranged much higher), 148 of whom were Congolese Tutsis. There were strong allegations that local NGO Hutu aid workers acted as accomplices.

In a second massacre of Congolese Tutsi (and some Hutu) in Mudende on December 10, 1997, 300 to 1,400 people were killed. The involvement of the local population, the organization of the Hutu militias, and the ease with which they carried out the attack were signals that the government had a serious security problem in the Northwest. The savagery exceeded the intent of completing the genocide, shocking the country and relief workers. The attending physician at the hospital in Gisenyi, who treated the victims, told the evaluation team that even in 1999, many wounded, unaccompanied, or orphaned children are still in the hospital.

The massacre was also aimed at settling scores with Hutus who would not support genocide in what was now called the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Rwanda, as the insurgents stepped up their campaign, the population increased pressure on the government to do something to halt them. Government forces killed people indiscriminately on a number of occasions, resulting in the death of innocent people. It was, however, difficult to distinguish between innocent people and insurgents as many of the local population were involved.

In a brutal midday attack in the Kayoe commune in Gisenyi on June 1998, 33 Tutsi rehgees were killed and 17 badly injured. The target was 1959 Tutsi refbgees who had returned from the Democratic Republic of Congo and resettled there. (See Box 5)Events such as these forced the government to change tactics to what it calls winning the hearts and minds of the local people. The government decided that instead of allowing displaced people to live in houses spread out over the hillsides, it would establish resettlement sites near commune centers where the government could protect them more easily.

This policy became the cornerstone of the campaign to stabilize the Northwest and promote economic development. The government intends to use the same approach to urbanize rural areas and provide better services to a centralized population. Layout Note There is a hidden empty text box o'n right side of this paragraph) It is controversial-some view it as forced resettlement and government control-and may well be unfeasible. Resettlement schemes in other countries have not been economically or socially viable.

Much of the Northwest remained depopulated in 1998. Many people had left their homes, joining the insurgents in the forest, or moving to shelters near commune offices. About a third were living in camps by mid-1998, when the government of Rwanda asked World Food Program for massive assistance. The evaluation team visited communes in the Gisenyi Prefecture on the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, along the main route Hutu militias and ex-soldiers of the Rwandese army took in making forays into Rwanda. Local people told the evaluation team that the solution to the infiltrator problem lies on both sides of the border. The Democratic Republic of Congo must disarm insurgents, and the RPA must keep them out of Rwanda. Until very recently, infiltrators moved easily from Kivu into Rwanda, and Tutsi were attacked on both sides of the border by the same killers. Many of the same themes and issues were raised in the evaluation team's discussions with the prefect (Epimaque Ndagijimana) and sous-prefect of Gisenyi, and bourgmestres and other commune leaders of Kanama and Rwenve, and USAD'S Women in Transitions groups in Karoga (the home commune of former President Habyarimana)

The insurgency has had far-reaching economic, political, and social consequences for the region and the country. Food production plummeted to close to zero in much of the region. Much of the population has been traumatized by the wave of killings. Many watched their own families massacred at home or in supposedly safe government- and UN-run camps. Families also had to deal with split loyalties. Parents had to denounce their own children to authorities or risk being killed by them or later by the insurgents. Hutu militias and insurgents looted and burned a number of commune offices and murdered or terrorized officials. ( See Box 6) Services ground to a halt; water sources were destroyed; health problems multiplied. As Hutus targeted schools and educators, the educational system ground to a halt and remained in shambles in March 1999.

I. Saving Lives

There is no question that U.S. emergency humanitarian assistance helped stem the tragedy that at times seemed to know no end. It helped save countless thousand of lives and alleviate suffering for millions. Strategic decisions about supporting remaining at-risk populations and mitigating food insecurity in designated areas have helped Rwanda mount and follow the long road to recovery.

Role of the Government in Emergency Response

The government of Rwanda played a significant role in coordinating the emergency response. It used local groups to shape the type and distribution of commodities and technical assistance and built up its capacity to make use of humanitarian assistance in resolving its problems. In some cases it took on more than it could handle, such as . assessing vulnerability and monitoring food assistance. Nevertheless, in cooperation with USAD and selected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), it exerted a strong influence on the allocation of emergency resources. Some NGOs helped the government with its physical space constraints, others with its decisions on program implementation. In a few cases, NGO staff were seconded to the government. Eventually the government took the lead in directing coordination and distribution of relief, developing a collaborative approach to the continued response. Ultimately, its role in the emergency is highly instructive for future responses to complex humanitarian emergencies.

Vulnerability Assessments and Targeting

Better vulnerability assessments in Rwanda improved capacity to target and reach vulnerable people. Lack of vulnerability assessments in the early phase of the response, 1996-1997, hampered targeting, as well as subsequent monitoring.

Had finding for rapid appraisal vulnerability assessments and monitoring been integrated into programs, U.S. government finding entities and their implementing partners would have had a much better handle on how to manage the emergency effectively. However, assessments are more of an add-on than a requirement. In addition, both World Food Program and the Rwandese government need to reassess their commitment and ability to carry out assessments and monitoring. World Food Program must make staff and technical expertise available to conduct surveys and vulnerability assessments. The Famine Early Warning Systems project for rapid response to emergency needs should be reassessed.

Incorporating assessment and monitoring into emergency response might require capacity- building for implementing partners and elimination of weaker organizations, but it would have made management of the emergency much more efficient.

A related matter is the role of feasibility and pre-project assessments in shaping the scale of response and its manageability. Absent strong feasibility or pre-project assessments, emergency activities often grew out of hand. While large projects offer economies of scale, they often become unmanageable. Small, community-based projects have greater chances of success. Therefore, it is important to consider the appropriate number of implementing partners. Using small, local resources, rather than large-scale military operations, promotes local capacity, ownership, and identity, essential to support transition.

Since the 1995 multidonor evaluation of Rwanda, donors have made some refinements in coordinating emergency aid. However, a stark absence of international commitment to managing the heavily militarized cross-border camps in 1995-1996 may have worsened nutritional status of some refugees.

Foodfor Peace Takes Lead in Food Aid

USAID'S decision to put an experienced Food for Peace officer in Kigali came late in the emergency, but just in time to provide the necessary support to USAID, other donors, and the government of Rwanda to use food aid effectively. Since 1997, Food for Peace has taken the lead in shaping food aid, working with the government and World Food Program.

USAID would have dealt with assessment and targeting issues sooner had it put the officer in place earlier. In a large emergency such as Rwanda's, involving millions of dollars of U.S. food aid, a Food for Peace official should be quickly placed on the ground.

Emergency Monetization Activity. The initial stimulus for monetizing P. L. 480 Title I1 food resources was initially an informal understanding between USAID and the World Bank to help the GOR meet its increased budgetary constraints in the wake of approximately one million Rwandese pouring back into their country. The fbnding, in the amount of US$lO million, would support the reintegration of rehgees into the society and enhance the security of vulnerable Rwandese. Originally, WFP was to receive the Title I1 commodities for monetization. One assumption about this program was that general, free food distributions would cease prior to introducing commodities for monetization for fear that commercial products could not compete with "free" food. In the end, this could not happen because of continuing pockets of food insecurity around the country.

In USAIDysreview of the proposal for this program, several conceptual issues were raised. One was the intended use of the monetized hnds, namely whether or not they would be used for livelihood and food security purposes. There had been some debate about whether the fbnds would be directed at food insecure areas or at high potential areas or, another way of putting it, at the production of food staples or at food crops that could be sold internally for increased household food security. Another issue was whether the real need by the GOR was for food or for cash. The answer to that was that it needed both, badly.

The monetization of Title I1 food aid for immediate budgetary support to the government of Rwanda was never a practical possibility. (However, the monetization program did become a key component of the Mission's strategy and a critical flexible resource in response to changing needs later on, in linking relief and development.)

There are still pockets of food insecurity, d e

- - structural food deficit and remains dependent on food aid. This is caused a; much by the economic decline that started before the war, as to the aftermath of the tragedy with its pervasive social and economic dislocation.

Food for Work. Monetization. In late 1997, FFP agreed to a program to monetize $10 in Title I1 food assistance. This program initially intended to assist the GOR with food security program support for GOR Ministries; it made its first sales in September 1998. Resources generated from the sales were immediately used for emergency activities in the North West and dedicated to reintegration of rehgees and high impact areas in order to reduce the food gap. In the spring of 1999, more deliberate food security assistance programs began. The fbnds generated from monetization at the time the evaluation team was in the field totaled $1.9 million in sales in Rwanda and Kenya and $1.3 million in sales in Egypt, of which only $350,000 has found its way to Rwanda. Competitive bidding, rather than sole-sourcing, and the marketing, analysis, and sale of Title I1 commodities slowed the procedure and greatly added cost, as did extensive third-country sales. Food for Work programs have been used to help improve terracing and reclaim marais (lowland wet areas traditionally cultivated in the dry season, not now in use because they require drainage, and drains are in disrepair.). The study team visited both types of program in the Prefectures of Butare and Gikongoro. Both will improve productive capability of the land and can promote development of local agricultural associations. These programs therefore have the potential to link improved food security with development of local government. World Vision staff in Gikongoro are providing basic money management and marketing skills to associations, and some associations are already beginning to take control of their economic lives. Such programs are good examples of the relief to development principle. Catholic Relief Services works with Rwande,se government officials in the communes to reclaim wetlands using USAID food and funding through Food for Work. These programs promote development of farmer associations. In some cases, improved drains will allow plantings for wet and dry season crops.

In most cases, Food for Work is supporting projects that improve productivity of "private" land. Increased productivity usually justifies the investment in improvement, sometimes quadrupling the investment four times in a season. (Land ownership in Rwanda is in flux, with multiple layers of access conventions and ownership. As land is improved, pressure to own or access it will increase.) Although the government has approved the land iinprovement projects, ownership and access issues are unclear. To clarify them, however, may needlessly hinder improvement of food production. Food for Work, however, covers all costs of terracing.

The Food for Work program continues to provide emergency food aid through targeted, quick-impact, community-based activities and infrastructure development. It is supported by the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response's Food for Peace and implemented by the World Food Program.

Inadequate targeting has meant more food than necessary has been distributed. Some have questioned whether excess distribution and some Food for Work projects have hurt local markets and farmers' investments in land productivity. However, the team found USAID interventions have not apparently caused massive market dislocations.

Recommendations

The Agency needs to develop a policy of identifying, recruiting, and promoting personnel with hands-on experience in complex emergencies and post-conflict transitions. These personnel need a strong analytic and technical background in food aid, nutrition, and other sectors. They also must have the political acumen to work closely with Embassy and State Department personnel and other donors on joint policy objectives and program options.

Policymakers and food-aid managers should propose and use monetization programs along with development assistance to enhance postconflict transition. Consultation with USAID oversight authorities and partners is necessary to ensure support for innovative food and non-food aid programming. Staff training and increased backstopping capacity are needed to implement the programs and increase flexibility.

USKQ needs to ensure that the World Food Program has the necessary financial and staff resources available to conduct surveys with host government and nongovernmental partners to ensure adequate targeting, monitoring, and evaluation of its programs. These costs need to be included up front in USAID, WFP, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) programming.

National and household-level surveys of vulnerable groups need to be conducted using methodologies that will generate comprehensive statistical data.

11. Linking Relief and Development

The caseload of internally displaced persons in Rwanda was both Hutu and Tutsi who had survived the genocide and remained. Although they typically had access to land, they often did not have the means to grow food. Seed stores, food stores, and agricultural implements had been wiped out in the 1994 war. Under the Arusha Accords, refugees who had been out of the country for more than 10 years had to relinquish any claim to family land. The government, therefore, pushed for housing and land for these old caseload refugees. Neither old nor recent rehgees were likely to have the means of production. Some may have brought tools back, but had inappropriate seeds. Although documentation is spotty and often anecdotal, the international community generally believed that food insecurity was widespread during and after the 1996A season.

The refugees have resettled-some in their former homes, some in new areas that they believed to be safer. The result: Rwanda has now an estimated between 7 one-half and 8 one-half million people, one third of whom have just returned and another large percentage of whom have recently moved at least once. Most of the people had reason to believe the government and possibly many of their neighbors meant them harm. The .government, however well intentioned, had very few resources or trained officials to counter that perception.

Issues of stability, security, justice, and acceptance and legitimacy of the new government were linked and often necessary precursors to more traditional development needs in agriculture, commerce, education, and health. The structural needs of the society required urgent response. (This was also the conclusion of the Joint Evaluation for Emergency Assistance in Rwanda, Vol. 4, p. 99, which warned against returning to pre- 1994 development plans and encouraged future development to target structural change and governance.) In this context, it was important to link relief to development and meet the ongoing need for flexible programs and leadership.

The government of Rwanda and some international analysts believed that the need for stability and security thrust to the forefront processes not normally associated with food security and development needs in postconflict societies. Legitimization of the government, decentralization, and justice were key targets in the transition to development. Several major bilateral and multilateral donors did not share this view, however.

As the only bilateral donor with a food aid officer in country, USAID was in a unique position to monitor closely events in the Northwest as the humanitarian emergency unfolded in 1997, following the mass repatriation. USAID/Rwanda reported on the worsening situation and that it was closing down its assistance program in the Northwest in its Results Review and Resource Request in 1997.

At the R4 review in Washington that spring, USAIDrnashington determined that the instability in the Northwest was likely to jeopardize USAID investments in the country. USAIDrnashington asked the Mission to shift some of its resources, if possible on security grounds, to support the Rwandese government.

Working with the government, other donors, and implementing partners, using Food for Peace, OFDA, the Ofice of Transition Initiatives, and some development assistance resources, the Mission mounted a program to deal with some of the root causes of conflict in the Northwest. In early fall the Ofice of Transition Initiative's Women in Transition program established a presence in several sites in the region. As the evaluation team witnessed in Karoga, USAID used the Women in Transition program strategically to identify strong women's groups that could begin agricultural production. These and other groups of women who had returned from the Democratic Republic of Congo or from nearby Gishwati Forest demonstrated that it was safe for their husbands and families to return. The Women in Transition efforts bolstered the government's campaign to make the region more secure and stable by restarting agriculture production.

The Mission had experienced transition staff who understood the political, economic, and military dynamics of the situation in the Northwest and used the flexible resources at their disposal to adapt their program to changing needs. A number of interviewees in the region said, for example, that when OFDA returned in 1998, it developed and helped implement a realistic short-term strategy to help the government stabilize the region. The ofice funded a permanent district hospital in Gisenyi, a symbol of support and succor amidst the campaign of terror. It also funded, through Catholic Relief Services, seeds and tools in the critical months of July and August, which jump-started agricultural production.

The Mission, OFDA, and sayimplementing partners, (World Food Program, the UN's Office of Coordination for Humanitarian AfTairs, and the UN International Children's Fund, as acting security coordinator for the Northwest operation) had the ingredients for success-a good understanding of OFDA's objectives, local knowledge, and the capacity to work with government and local groups. They demonstrated commitment through their strategic choice of interventions, which created a synergy with the Women in Transition program. The Mission also received program support and backstopping from high-level Washington decision-making and was given wide latitude to use flexible program resources at key points and locations.

Title 11 food proceeds (eventually totaling $1.3 million) followed in September. By the end of 1998, USAID has almost $4 million in monetization and OFDA non-food aid in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi Prefectures in the Northwest. These were small but essential elements in support of the government campaign.

The Mission is now looking to backfill the foundation it laid with more sustainable development programs in all sectors. This flexible and strategic program response was one successful aspect of the Mission's effort to link relief and development in postconflict transition. Team visits to different parts of the country showed that agricultural recovery and reconstruction of infrastructure are beginning to take hold. OFDA's long-term commitment to seed multiplication program, for example, shows strong promise.

In retrospect, corporately, USAID has been somewhat slow in accepting the strategic importance of linking relief to development in its programming. The Agency, initially in Rwanda, decided against making that link explicit, as described below, in responding to the emergency in Rwanda. Later, however, USAID took significant steps toward identifying paths and mechanisms to make the transition from relief to development. As time went on the links grew stronger. Several processes contributed to this-some planned, some accidental.

The Integrated Strategic Plan

USAID/Washington made a controversial but successful decision to create a strategic plan that integrated development, transition, and humanitarian assistance programs across USAID bureaus and with the State Department in a shorter time frame than the customary five-year country strategy. Officials began pressing for the integrated strategic plan at the time of the December 1996 mass repatriation. The impetus for an integrated plan came from the president's Greater Horn of Africa lnitiative (GHAI).

Further impetus came from the money pouring in to the crisis. The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Disaster Assistance Response Team spent more than $25 million dollars in late 1996 when the refbgees returned from Zaire. That money that was not as well-integrated with transition planning process as it should have been. There appeared to be pressure to obligate money in a very short amount of time. State Department's Population, Refbgee, and Migration Bureau spent more than $20 million of its own, which was not, in USAID'S view, connected to the strategic planning and decisions USAID and the government of Rwanda were making for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country. While there were different agendas at work, several policymakers viewed this process as an opportunity for more flexibility and for building a product, both bureaucratically and realistically, that would be worth more than the value of the parts.

Once the decision to create an integrated strategic plan was made, however, there was a lack of understanding within USAID as to who was in charge of the process. The very small and busy USAIDRwanda Mission in Kigali was initially resistant to undertaking the analysis and developing and committing resources. The Mission eventually agreed to host and work with a small team from AID-Washingon, which arrived in February 1997.

The team included a retired USAID foreign service officer, and representatives from the Bureau for Humanitarian Response; the bureau's office for policy, planning, and evaluation; Food for Peace; the Africa and Global bureaus; and the Regional Economic and Development Services Ofice for East and Southern Africa. All USAID offices signed off on the plan. The Bureau of Humanitarian Response only participated in a limited fashion, however, even though one of its division chiefs was co-team leader. Although a Food for Peace officer was on the team, OFDA and the Office of Transition initiatives did not directly participate.

Outside the Agency, the Embassy team and the State Department's Central African Affairs section of its Africa Bureau were supportive but State's Population, Refbgee and Migration Bureau chose not to participate. This may have been because there was no centralized authority for collaboration and ultimate integration. But the bureau could not have spared staff for necessary fieldwork, anyway. Further, it declined to commit resources to'the plan because it was not convinced that the recommendations for use of its resources-developing feeder roads in Rwanda-was inappropriate.

Failure to participate in crafting the plan's central concepts must have reduced the initial stake these offices had in its implementation. More than one interviewee thought the plan would have been better integrated if all the major fbnding offices had participated in shaping it. (Many mentioned that communication increased between Mission development planners and OFDA, particularly in 1997 and 1998. Most attributed this to the presence of capable, full-time Bureau of Humanitarian Response liaison staff in the Mission, however. At the outset, Mission planners made no overt attempts to engage OFDA programmers in discussions of integrated programs.)

Most, but not all, senior Agency policymakers and the USAID/Rwanda Mission itself believe it was a success. U7henUSAID/Washington reviewed it, reviewers said they found it lacked focus, had a weak analytic base, and poor integration of programs and resources. The Africa Bureau and the Bureau of Humanitarian Response held different views on the vision of the plan. This experience points to the value the integrated strategic plan has in encouraging programmers from all fbnding sources to look at problems across a common framework and to look for ways that programs can complement each other.

U7henthe plan was drafted, USAID assumed a high probability of instability, particularly in the Northwest. USAID and the U.S. government concocted a mixture of development and humanitarian programs. The plan designated three sectors for engagement, tracking USAID comparative advantage and the needs of the country.

The team's transition action plan, accepted by AID/Washington as an integrated strategic plan in April 1997, set three strategic objectives:

1. Increased rule of law and accountability in governance

2. Increased Rwandese capacity to provide effective decentralized, sustainable primary health care and basic social services

3. Increased ability of rural families in targeted communities to improve household food security

The plan's strategic objectives provided a framework that was sufficiently broad yet contained specific goals, so that it could serve as a management tool both for the Mission and for USAID/Washington. The plan was flexible enough to meet changing circumstances yet it provided a basis for managing for results and permitted progress to be monitored. Also picking up on a theme of the GHAI, the plan provided crisis modifiers to shift strategy and programs in case of instability. The Mission took advantage of the flexibility of a transition program in managing its results reporting packages, winning praise from the USAID/Washington results review and resources request (R4) process in demonstrating results in a qualitative but in-depth manner.

The plan was guided heavily by the principles of the GHAI, articulated in its documents on linking relief and development. It stresses:

I. Integrating U.S. government policies and resources for program coordination

2. Linking relief programs to transition and development programs

3. Moving quickly toward transferring ownership to Rwanda of all processes (such as developing a reconstruction plan, implementing shelter and housing construction).

4. Doing business differently, by reducing paperwork, reporting, and authorization requirements, and increasing flexibility

5. Coordinating with other donors

6. Thinking regionally about solutions and programs

7. Reviewing results periodically and making adjustments

8. Planning for the short term (one to three years)

Disaster Assistance Relief Teams Integrated into Strategic Plan

OFDA, mainly through the excellence of its field-based Disaster Assistance Relief Teams, played a critical role in informing U.S. authorities of changing emergency conditions in Rwanda and in the emergency itself. Its impact could have been even greater had certain mechanisms, such as multi-year funding been available to it.

The disaster relief team over time integrated its mandate into USAID's integrated strategic plan and worked effectively with the government of Rwanda. The team kept at least one staff person in Kigali long after the initial emergency and was highly responsive to the precarious situation in the Northwest. Experience, capacity, and some degree of the right "chemistry" enabled the team to contribute significantly to linking relief to development. In fact, this was one of OFDA's first experiences in working so closely with a government in a complex humanitarian emergency.

The ofice faced a few constraints, some of which were beyond its control. For example, the team had only one week to plan the expenditure of $25 million in shelter (and housing). With a little more time, it might have developed a more rational, cost-effective approach to shelter. In addition, its approach to linking relief and development was compromised by the absence of a multiyear spending authorization.

The team's work in sheltering returnees was not completely successfbl, in part because the government of Rwanda set standards for construction of permanent shelters that far exceeded OFDA's emergency temporary shelter standards. However, shelter standards varied. The evaluation team saw iess sophisticated refugee shelters and housing in southern Rwanda that were appropriately designed and cost effective. The team also saw integration activities, such as water and irrigation pro-iects, for returnees in the South. These fill voids in essential community needs. These activities, supported by the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, also stimulated civic and community leadership, accountability, and participation in the development of infrastructure.

Is The Integrated Strategic Plan a Crisis Prevention Strategy?

The short answer is a qualified yes, but not quite yet. While USAD interventions could not be credited with preventing a humanitarian emergency in the Northwest, they were essential in showing donors they could make a difference by supporting government efforts to stabilize the region. Farmers, local officials, and NGO representatives told the evaluation team a number of times that USAID's presence and assistance was a necessary element of government efforts to stabilize the region. They cited primarily USAID'S immediate assistance-providing seeds, tools, and shelter. But they also said that by their presence USAID and World Food Program demonstrated support for local initiative and capacity, which caused a sea change in the population's attitude toward the interahamwe Hutu militias and insurgents. The people needed government help in turning their backs on those who sought to destroy their country. The insurgency was over. For now, people wanted a government that would provide security and an environment of tolerance, not terror and tyranny. To the extent that USAID, through its integrated strategic plan, was able to react as it did to support these objectives in the Northwest, the plan has been a prevention strategy. The longer answer to the question is that more analysis is needed. As the Mission begins its analytic work to prepare for a new strategy next year, several frameworks and tools may help. Development assistance is but one tool, probably a minor one that needs to be used in a more integrated fashion to steer a course away from conflict and genocide. This will be a challenge in developing USAID'S next strategic plan for Rwanda.

For now it can be said that the Agency made a good effort to integrate resources and programs and correctly assumed instability. The Mission staff in Kigali, with many hurdles to leap, used their instinct and skills, learned in working through the 1994 emergency and other postconflict transitions in previous assignments, and did save lives, alleviate suffering, and shorten conflict. As one person on the USAIDRwanda staff put it, "we are living the integrated strategic plan every day out here, one day at a time."

The management structure used in Rwanda and in Somalia in previous emergencies may be a model the Agency should examine. It incorporated a mix of U.S. direct hires and personal services contractor staff, along with NGO partners. Integrated strategic planning tapped the accumulated experience of USAID/WashingtonYsOFDA, Food for Peace, Ofice of Transition Initiatives, and the Africa Bureau. People and operating units were willing to take risks, stretch mandates and procedures, and work incredibly hard to make a difference. This kind of commitment and the results underscore the need to cultivate and select transitional program leadership not typically found in the development community.

Continued high-level engagement of the Agency's chief of staff and his ofice energized implementation. But high-level Washington involvement within and outside the Agency also generated many problems, including multiple programs and fbnding sources, contradictory guidance and conflicting mandates from fbnding sources.

Impact of the Integrated Strategic Plan on Linking Relief to Development

The integrated strategic plan did not call for specific types of coordination or specific activities that would have required collaboration. Rather, it provided an Agencywide document that the Africa Bureau and all the ofices of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response considered when programming fbnds. It was a lens through which other government agencies also looked when programming fbnds for Rwanda. Since the plan was accepted, there have been several indications of closer interagency cooperation; greater relationships among relief, transition, and development programs; and some indication of linking across mandates.

For example, USAIDRwanda will help the Ministry of Agriculture increase productivity and generate more private commercial activity in the agriculture sector, building on the Seeds of Hope program. In addition, some of the management lessons coming out of Food for Work programs and relief for development programs run by World Vision and others will inform development assistance support for grassroots programs. Unfortunately other potential links have been lost. Food for the Hungry International emergency agricultural support in Kibungo Prefecture went unused because of lack of finds and the pull of other priorities. At least development assistance staff were aware of this link and would have built on that program had finding been available.

Funds that the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has programmed since the strategic plan's acceptance have typically followed the direction of the plan. The office referred specifically to goals outlined in the integrated strategic plan in justifjling finding programs in the Northwest in a cable from OFDA Deputy Director William Garvelink, October 1998.

Formal support for such links has come from the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, run by the Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSOESA). In spring and summer 1998, a team from USAIDfWashington and REDSOESA helped the Mission prepare a study of the next steps in addressing food security and agricultural development. The study did not mention the integrated strategic plan, but it described its terms of reference. The study recommended designing programs immediately to build on existing programs from the emergency phase and "ensure smooth continuity." The study also follows the strategic plan in seeking a regional perspective in development solutions.

Programs and Response Mechanisms

USAID programs addressed both emergency and development needs in several areas.

Seeds and Tools. Today's standard humanitarian response program entails an immediate move beyond providing emergency health care and handing out food, particularly for those groups with some access to agricultural land. Like many donors, USAID'S Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance financed NGO distribution of seeds and tools in most regions of Rwanda. In 1995, distribution of seeds and tools was widespread and largely untargeted, according to the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda, Vol. 4. These were helpfil to farmers in the first difficult season after the war. But, as the joint evaluation notes, continued poorly rationalized distribution can hinder development by creating expectations of entitlement.

Donors, NGOs, and government ministries debated this issue. Broad distribution had been planned for 1996, but government ministries led the decision to reduce distributions in the 1996B and 1997 seasons. Distribution has now largely stopped, except in two prefectures in the Northwest. In the rest of the country, NGOs and bourgemestres, in effect mayors appointed by the Cabinet and President, still offer seeds and tools to vulnerable families. In the Northwest, farmers have not been able to return to the land and there has been widespread looting of farm supplies, so OFDA supports two extensive seed and tool programs there.

There is no indication of regional severe food insecurity, except in the Northwest. But there is no comprehensive, professional, and accurate picture of the country's potential food needs. The government extension system still does not provide a systematic, reliable system for reporting on crops and anticipated yields. Donors still rely on anecdotal evidence to target food aid, but as NGOs develop larger, more comprehensive programs and a better understanding of agricultural dynamics, that evidence is becoming more refined. NGOs are now typically replacing grants with credit.

Animals have traditionally been a valuable means of maintaining soil fertility and providing nutritional security. Lack of animals is one ofthe primary causes of poverty among rural Rwandeses, according to experts interviewed and recent studies (World Bank Poverty Update, p. 13 May 1998).

A standard, !A hectare plot can see increased yields with the use of the manure of one cow, experts said. Relief organizations, however, have been slow to include chickens, cows, goats, or rabbits in emergency packages.

Donors had conflicting ideas about what their mandates should be and some thought providing animals went far beyond emergency assistance. They also had concerns about cost. Many donors refused or only reluctantly funded such projects. OFDA, for example, turned down many NGO proposals to restock animal herds in 1995-1996. But after much discussion, the office hnded several small restocking projects in 1997-1998. Most local experts confirmed the value of animals, which has been one of the first purchases families make who have done well enough to produce some income. Many families are now buying animals, either with their savings or by taking out loans. Financing animal purchases represents 21 percent of Women in Transition activities, using 7 percent of the Office of Transition Initiatives' funds.

Seeds of Hope. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda mentioned Seeds of Hope as a vehicle for a seed service project in 1995. However, it did not document its more significant role of coordinating the location, delivery, and reproduction of seed immediately after the war in 1994. These early activities, although outside the scope of this evaluation, are an excellent example of collapsing the relief-development continuum into a short-term relief for development activity. (Linking Relief and Development in the Greater Horn of Africa. USAID Constraints and Recommendations, May 1996 uses the term "relief for development" and addresses the idea that relief should be developmental.)

Experts from the Centre Internationale dYAgricoleTropicale led a group of International Agricultural Research Centers in a campaign to educate people about the need to identify suitable seed for planting in the first seasons after the war. The experts knew productive cropping in Rwanda's microclimates required highly adapted seed. Inappropriate seed would severely reduce, and in some cases eliminate, yields. The impact on local food security, as well as the psychological impact on farmers, would have been further disruption in a country already reeling from disruption.

The Seeds of Hope program encompassed three activities: identifying Rwanda-adapted seed and rootstocks first in the agricultural research centers' seed banks, then elsewhere in the country; multiplying seed stocks, usually outside of Rwanda, for the 1995A season; and working with NGOs heading into Rwanda in July-August 1994, alerting them to the need for adaptive seed. (Not all Noslistened, and the momentum of inappropriate seed orders already placed as well as the urgency of other issues overcame some. But alerting NGOs, led to the discovery of more local seed than might have been the case, to more appropriate seed being purchased for 1994A season, and to widespread utilization of multiplied appropriate seed being used in subsequent seasons.)

Following government criticism for multiplying seed outside of Rwanda, the program began working with the Rwanda agricultural research system and World Vision Relief and Development to train and contract with Rwandese farmers for seed multiplication. This process is now being expanded under Seeds of Hope 11. Seed price and demand, particularly for Irish potato, is so high that private operations supply most seed with minimal international support. The USAID Mission, since development of its integrated strategic plan, is building on Seeds of Hope to strengthen the country's agricultural research system.

Building Government Capacity and Legitimization. Most analysts agree that development assistance programs prior to 1994 failed to address structural issues at the root of Rwanda's widespread poverty. Most also agree that participation and belief in a stable, fair, competent government is essential to the stability needed to begin meaninghl agricultural and econoinic development. It will also play a central role in reducing conflict.

In the 1994-1995 response, USAID programs addressed the government's emergency capacity requirements. The Agency provided basic equipment for 10 ministries, including health, interior, justice, and the president's ofice. USAID realized early the importance of helping the government come to grips with the complexity of addressing justice for the genocide. The Agency underwrote the costs of the Rwandese-initiated International 1995 Genocide Conference and the provision of a range of assistance to the Ministry of Justice. This included building rehabilitation, provision of office supplies, equipment, vehicles, training of court clerks, training for lawyers in English, support for a media campaign on the genocide trial process, setting up a central database for genocide prosecutors, and sponsoring workshops and other processes leading to the creation of a genocide law. Basic equipment was provided for local police units in support of LWAMIR and other training programs.

USAID support to the Ministry of Health moved ahead of its work with the agriculture ministry, primarily because more health staff stayed in Rwanda or returned shortly after the 1994 war. USAID supported decentralization by helping build health management systems in the prefectures, and providing management training through private Africa- based management consultants. OFDA is helping the ministry establish an emergency response unit. This program, scheduled to end in April 1999, looked for ways the ministry could define the practical scope of it ability to respond, and searched for creative ways to mobilize effective responses with few resources. No emergencies have yet tested this new capacity. 'OFDA sent Disaster Assistance Response Teams in 1994, 1995, and 1996-97. The office retained a staff presence and sent smaller assessment and programming teams in 1998. An OFDA representative tracked OFDA-hnded projects and provided a link with USAIDRwanda through March 1998.

The Disaster Assistance Response Teams had to program $25 million in a short period of time in 1996. Most staff interviewed agreed that rapid programming forced some hasty decisions which, in retrospect, might have been different had there been more time for program design and assessment of the NGOs implementing the hnds. Some NGOs not working in Rwanda were funded on the strength of their success with emergency housing elsewhere. Inexperience and other problems plagued some programs.

Most staff interviewed noted tensions between the 1996-97 disaster response team and USAIDRwanda staff. The Mission budget, at only $6 million, was much smaller. And the Mission had built relationships and programs that could easily be undermined by OFDA money.

Many at the Mission were also concerned that OFDA, accustomed to programming through international NGOs, would not be sensitive to the government's need to take the lead in some areas and build capacity in others. In fact, OFDA officials did work closely with USAIDRwanda leadership in responding to government guidance. Government capacity was not a target of the programs hnded in this period, however. At the encouragement of the government, most hnds went to housing.

Most subsequent OFDA funding has gone to emergency needs in the Northwest. However, it has supported capacity-building in the Ministry of Health, continued emergency agricultural development in Gikangoro and Kibungo in the south and west of Rwanda and has recently hnded a position for OCHA to handle monitoring and reporting in the Northwest.

The Joint Evaluation for Emergency Assistance in Rwanda notes that two of the NGQs most active and expert in agricultural development were loath to support programs for export agriculture in conjunction with their emergency agricultural programs. The NGOs did not want to stray too far from emergency mandates and "antagonize traditional supporters of sector projects." Development assistance hnds were available for agriculture, but USAIDRwanda spent long management hours trying to free them up. It took two years to get concurrence on their use. Food Program. The assistance went to camps, seed protection programs, general distributions. In 1997, the organization agreed to monetize $10 million in Title I1 food assistance. The intent was to use the food security program to support government ministries. The first sales were made in September 1998. Those resources were immediately used for emergency activities in the Northwest. In the spring of 1999, more deliberate food security assistance programs began. The funds available from the sale of Title I1 food is dedicated to reintegrating refugees, supporting areas such as the Northwest, and reducing the food gap.

The Mission has used development assistance funds through AFRICARE to support local governance initiatives and provide post-election support. Both programs promote decentralization and provide organizational development and managerial training to grassroots leaders.

Women in Transition provides development assistance on a small scale that has been particularly well received both by the government and the international community. Through 1998 it had reached 162,6 14 women. While that is a relatively small percentage of those in need in Rwanda, most interviewed said the program provided valuable examples of initiative and organizational skills. The program also encourages interaction among women of different ethnic groups, promoting the development of commercial activities between Tutsis and Hutus in a volatile, sensitive climate.

These outcomes exceed the original intent of the program: to put small amounts of resources directly into rural women's associations. At a higher level, Women in Transition has helped change institutional approaches. The Ministry of Gender took the Women in Transition approach in its programs, prompting formation of women's committees, sparking Cabinet-level discussions about decentralizing resource allocation, and encouraging the Ministry of Interior to decentralize.

A recent and valuable use of the Women in Transition program is in support of women's groups in the Northwest. This area has seen a recent increase in the number of women farmers. The new arrivals are typically women sent to grow food for groups still hiding from RPA forces in the hills and mountains of the Rwanda-Democratic Republic of Congo border. The groups in hiding are constantly barraged with propaganda from extremist leadership, or are threatened if they appear to cooperate with the Rwandese government. The women sent to farm are a litmus test for claims that returning to a Tutsi-dominated Rwanda is dangerous. The Women in Transition program, which helps women return to a viable agricultural existence, could be a valuable tool in encouraging return, discouraging extremism, and reducing violence.

In 1998, The Office of Transition Initiatives funded the Local Governance Support Unit in the Ministry of the Interior aimed at building grass-roots decision-making and organization. This government unit was established to run the AFRICARE project mentioned previously, under USAlD DA funded auspices, from within the government and to help the ministry move towards decentralization. While these activities are related, they are not interchangeable. This is another interesting example of how sequencing finds in transitions are not linear. The program provides $90,000 per commune for project implementation with organizations that have demonstrated financial and project management capability. Like Women in Transition, the project seeks to "seed'' examples of accountability and management in small groups. It will support the development of governance in conjunction with elections for sector and cell leadership scheduled for spring 1999. This program works in 15 communes in four prefectures.

Initially, stovepiped USAID finding continued to encourage stovepiped programming, with inconsistent integration of resources or programs across sectors. This has, however, evolved. For example, discussions about the future of Women in Transition now include the Ofice of Transition Initiatives in Washington, the Africa Bureau, and USAIDRwanda. The Ofice of Transition Initiative-funded assistance to the Rwandese government's decentralization unit and the Women in Transition programs have been cited more than once as among USAID's better-integrated interventions. The evaluation team found it significant, however, that there were no immediate plans to build on transition oflice programs once terminated, or to support leadership and organizational skills developed under them.

This may be because transitions do not occur in linear sequence, but have more to do with connections and links across programs, projects, and staff. One transition program does not necessarily lead to another. It is more important to apply what is learned from experience in a less-than-predictable environment.

Women In Transition itself has gone through quite a transition. Initially it provided direct survival or foothold grants to rural women's associations, encouraging them to use any excess, returns, or benefits to support additional local needs (frequently orphans' school fees). The ofice now experiments with larger grants to women's communal committees, which are responsible for making local subgrants. The committees deal more with individuals than associations, who in turn use the excess for local needs.

At a higher level, Women in Transition has been responsible for changing the mode and style of negotiation and cooperation with the local authorities, bourgemestres, and with local women's representatives. The emphasis on field work has increased: three to four field teams work outside Kigali three to four days a week and guarantee short turnaround times from initial contact to delivery ofthe check. Finally, Women in Transition has almost completely taken over management and oversight itself. On the one hand, the ministry of Gender and Women's Development and USAID are not involved in running the ofice. On the other hand, the ofice is more closely linked with the Mission and its programs are more integrated into the Mission portfolio. About $1 million in development assistance hnds goes to Women in Transition programs. The effective field work, direct resource allocation, and local-level stimulation of activity have not gone unnoticed by the architects of the local governance initiative, many members of the Cabinet, and the USAID Mission.

As the Mission begins final implementation of the integrated strategic plan and pays more attention to the development end of the transition continuum, the ongoing Women in Transition program encourages many to consider, in a new light, the potential for rural people to do more for themselves.

Some, for example, have considered turning Women in Transition into a microcredit institution, perhaps using core staff to train and organize women in other areas. While the top Mission management sees the good works Women in Transition has accomplished, the evaluation team found the Mission has not really had time to consider how to fully integrate the many, many lessons from this activity in its portfolio. The evaluation team found the Women in Transition model fosters a unique partnership of government, USAID, and NGO that effectively taps and develops local ownership and leadership. There are several sources of funding and interlocking partnerships but no stakeholder has overriding control or ownership. That makes it an effective and vital support for transition. The team hopes this evaluation will spark Mission interest to incorporate this work into it larger portfolio.

Role of International NGOS

While the international community struggled to meet the needs of the emergency, the initially fragile government of Rwanda gained capacity, consolidated its position, and began to take charge. This is to be expected of any government, but the Rwandese argued that establishing its leadership was essential to stability. They believed that returnees had to begin to build trust in the government immediately; that this was central to reducing violence. The government felt strongly it had to prove there would be no ethnic retribution and that support would be provided equally.

USAID and its implementing partners were the earliest supporters of this position. Largely through U.S. government encouragement, NGOs operating with U.S. funds now seek opportunities to build government capacity by encouraging partnerships in development projects. NGOs that implement programs with USATD hnding today have close working relationships with the relevant ministries. In addition, initial U.S.-funded programs, such as its support for the Ministry of Health, led the international community in building government capacity.

Not all donors share the U.S. government's faith in the government of Rwanda. Some are vocal critics of the government. World Bank documents cite evidence that the government is committed to accountable governance and good management, but in interviews European donors expressed reservations.

NGOs also vary in their faith in both the government's capacity to administer emergency programs competently and in its commitment to fair and honest application of assistance. Most now work more closely and receive more guidance from the government. The government prefers ministry capacity-building to NGO-run programs. It unilaterally took over some hnctions, such as food distribution. All NGOs interviewed believed that government capacity remains inadequate to administer most programs with the accountability donors require. Some believe the government cannot meet high technical standards in delivery.

In emergency operations, NGOs have come to expect a level of freedom from government regulation. Most of the large NGOs that respond to humanitarian emergencies often operate where no government exists (for example, Haiti and Somalia) or where the government is very weak (such as Bosnia, and the former Soviet Union). In some countries, NGOs operate in government-controlled areas and in areas controlled by armed groups opposed to the government. In some countries, "government" does not seem to be the appropriate noun for the civil ruling mechanism. In these circumstances, NGOs have taken pains to avoid working with either side, preferring an independent stance that does not support the politicaI aims of any group. These working conditions have fostered among NGOs self- sufficiency, development of programs based on their own "apolitical" humanitarian principles, and a tendency to be skeptical of governments or military-led civil administration.

An unusually large number ofNGOs-150 international organizations-responded to the emergency in Rwanda, according to The Joint Evaluation for Emergency Assistance in Rwanda, Vol4. The team held many discussions on the paragovernmenial role they played in the response, and whether they supported or undermined the indigenous capacity for development.

The first months of the emergency, donors, through implementing NGOs, controlled assistance programs and resources. For the average Rwandese, there were two sources of power: the RPA, which dealt with law and civil order, and the international NGOs that ran social services and humanitarian assistance. (NOTE Layout-there may be a hidden text box on the left of this paragraph)

As the government began to establish direction and programs for regaining civil and social control, it found it difficult not just to work NGOs into their programs, but even to begin a dialogue with them when their hnding was secure and programs under way. Communication between the government and most NGOs was poor.

In 1995, the Ministry of Rehabilitation initiated NGO registration, with government approval. (Interestingly, OXFAM and Save the Children - United Kingdom (SCFIUK)) provided technical assistance to help develop the registration and approval process.) When several NGOs, including some prominent European-based Francophone NGOs, missed registration deadlines, the government expelled them in late 1995. (At the time, the government expelled or restricted activities of 56, about a third of the NGOs in Rwanda.) Later, it insisted on approving all assistance.

Emma Bonino, the European Community's Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs and head of the European Community's Humanitarian Ofice (ECHO) saw the government as meddling with the NGOsYwork and suspended aid to Rwanda for a time. Ms. Bonino was very outspoken in her criticism of proposals to politicize humanitarian aid to Rwanda and the rehgee camps in Zaire during a visit to Rwanda in spring 1996 with USAID Administrator Brian Atwood. She was critical of any suggestions to withdraw protection or humanitarian assistance to refugees.

NGOs were in a difficult position. On the one hand, they were providing relief services under the principle of neutrality. On the other hand, in press conferences in the region and abroad, they were taking political stances on human rights issues and actions.

Some, including the Rwandese government, viewed this as taking sides. The government perhaps could have handled NGO relations more diplomatically. However, several international NGOs rehsed to accept the primacy of Rwandese law governing the actions of their employees in the country. The newly independent government, awash in NGOs, was not willing to grant what would have been, in essence, diplomatic status and immunity from prosecution to NGOs and staff. These side issues made it even harder for the major donors to come to grips with the lloming rehgee crisis in Eastern Zaire.

The government believed it should be leading the welcome for returnees streaming back in November and December 1996. It wanted to avoid encouraging formation of new camps near the Zaire border because former soldiers and nleinbers of the inlercrhumwe (Hutu militias) responsible for the genocide would be able to use them as bases. Consequently, the government did not permit many of the activities NGOs planned, particularly those near the border. Since then, NGOs have been required to get approval of all programs from one or more government ministries.

Ingredients of a Successful Transition to Development

To respond effectively in a complex emergency, USAID must coordinate its efforts and deal with processes that are atypical of traditional humanitarian response programs ranging from security concerns to locating appropriate seed stock for replanting. A wide variety of programs addressed emergency needs-saving lives and alleviating suffering- and also addressed structural needs. The integrated strategic plan improved USAIDys coordination and facilitated the complex relationship between these issues. The plan defined USAIDysassistance goals and helped the Agency begin to consolidate plans and think across the spectrum of USAID offices and bureaus involved.

1. Flexibility

Complex humanitarian emergencies are rarely one-event disasters. The conflict that creates them continues, changes character, and often migrates. It is now well accepted that responding flexibly is key to supporting stability. Both OFDA and the Office of Transition Initiatives can be flexible in programming and responsive with hnding. Through monetization, Food for Peace funds can also be used flexibly. Since 1996, all USAID offices involved have been responsive to needs and requests from USAIDRwanda, and have funded programs as required or shifted funding and emphasis as the emergency evolved. Office of Transition Initiatives programs and responsive OFDA funding have reduced violence and improved food security in the Northwest.

OFDA and Office of Transition Initiatives funding for emergency agricultural programs have been particularly effective in accelerating agricultural startup and returning production to near pre-war levels. Reluctance to fund provision of small animals may have retarded recovery somewhat. People living in densely populated, highly cultivated environments who have lost their shelter and means for subsistence may need the basics- tools, seeds, chickens, goats, and rabbits. A one-time infusion of the basics enables people to speed up reconstruction and replace income so that they can rebuild their lives.

The Food for Peace monetization program provides flexibility in programming funds, but is not a quick-response program. Begun in 1997, it is only now providing program funds. Availability of these funds to address urgent issues now, however, will help promote stability and support food security.

2. Flexible Staffing

Flexible programs are critical, but flexible staff are even more important, many of those interviewed said. While USAID heightened efforts to give the Mission flexible tools to respond to evolving needs and unforeseen emergencies, the innovative and timely use of these tools requires staff with the energy and interest to do business differently. Mission staff included more people with experience in emergencies and transitions than is typical. These experienced staff and others provided a constituency for flexible programming and helped push the integrated strategic plan, supported the monetization program, developed a dialogue with OFDA, and supported programs of the Office of Transition Initiatives.

Successfully linking relief and development also required filltime Bureau of Humanitarian Response staff from OFDA, the Office of Transition Initiatives, Food for Peace and the Africa Bureau. Recruiting to staff up the Mission in Kigali was a serious and continuing problem that affected implementation. However, as these permanent staff began to work out of the Mission, program integration improved. In particular, foreign disaster assistance programs and Mission goals were much better integrated by 1997-1998, after fulltime staff were placed in Kigali (at about the time the integrated strategic plan was accepted).

Key USAIDfWashington staff also supported flexibility and responsiveness. Without their determined support, it is unlikely that such a range of programs would have been put in place in Rwanda, nor would their rules of operation have been so flexible.

3. Regional Solutions

The one program that could be called regional is the Seeds of Hope program, and it was only regional in the sense that it involved regional trade and research programs. In fact, the goal of the program shifted to creating indigenous seeds and reducing regional seed trade. The regional ties in Seeds of Hope would be useful, but they do not address regional military or economic dynamics, which are tied closely to violence and economic development in Rwanda.

The team noted no other initiatives that addressed problems regionally, with the exception of some guidance from the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. Because conflict and trade are clearly cross-border issues, the team believes that failure to actively work toward regional solutions will reduce the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to Rwanda.

4. Moving from Relief Dependency to Development

Since 1996, the Rwandese government has pushed to end programs that only provide relief. Few relief programs still operate outside the two prefectures in the Northwest. World Food Program restricts food delivery to extremely vulnerable groups, such as orphanages and some mother-child health programs.

Any Food for Work program has the potential to create dependencies. Programs in Rwanda are meant to support increased food production, which will, in theory, make more people food secure. The dynamics of mobilizing large work forces for this goal should not be discounted. Nevertheless, a brief study of markets, prices, and expected production increases suggests that farmers could pay for much of the land improvement themselves in one or two seasons. It is never easy to induce subsistence farmers to risk investment. However, loan guarantees for improved terracing or other mechanisms that lead to fewer expectations of entitlement should be explored.

5. Building Capacity

Emergency programs aimed to support local and government capacity. In early 1995, the government was, to some extent, a void. USAID and the nascent government began to create a human resource base, set up an organizational structure, build up materials, and train a leadership cadre at the national and local level. USAID hnded programs to support government capacity in agriculture, health, justice, and law and order.

USAID and the U.S. government also recognized the need of the Rwandese government to unravel the social and psychological issues surrounding the genocide. USAlD provided essential support for creating processes for prosecution, essential to clarifying the situations of the majority of Rwandeses and defining a path toward justice. USAID provided financial support and encouraged the Rwandese government to hold the International Conference on Genocide to build support and capacity to deal with the many facets of postgenocide Rwanda. This led to further work with the Ministry of Interior on nonethnic national identity cards, assistance to local authorities, and eventually the local government initiative and other ongoing decentralization work.

Recommendations: Innovation and Integration USAIDRwanda and the Agency should consider innovative use of regional and development assistance resources to build on the foundations of the integrated strategic plan, linking relief and development beyond the agriculture sector. Resources are still needed in the Northwest to ensure the area and the people associated with the insurgency are reintegrated. However, programs should have national scope. Specifically, the Mission should consider using money available through the State Department's Great Lakes Justice Initiative to help rebuild infrastructure, as part of reconciliation, local governance, and capacity-building initiatives.

Education, particularly in the Northwest, is needed to bolster reconciliation, counter hate propaganda, and help the government restore services.

The integrated strategic plan should be rolled over for at least one more year before a longer term strategy is developed. As a pilot conflict-prevention country for the Agency, Rwanda should first analyze the potential for conflict and establish a base of understanding before examining specific sectors and proposing specific programs. That could feed into development of the strategic framework.

This evaluation did not assess health sector investments of the integrated strategic plan. However, people continually pointed to them as noncontroversial interventions that supported government policy to decentralize decision-making and resource allocation, link relief and development, and empower local populations.

111. Aiding Conflict: Focus on the Northwest

Understanding the Context

The evaluation team heard constantly about the need to understand the context, particularly the establishment of the camps in Zaire. Most of the outsiders in Rwanda did not understand, or were unwilling to deal with the unfolding sequential humanitarian emergencies as the RPF marched to victory in 1994. Most relief workers only wanted to deal with establishing camps and working out the logistics of supply lines, not the policy issue emerging over refugee protection for perpetrators of the genocide. In Goma and Bukavu in Zaire and in Tanzania, however, some said these were not ordinary refugees and raised the issue that donors needed to address protection for these people.

In its own evaluation of the Rwanda-Zaire crisis, the UN High Commission for Refugees recognized that it had made considerable advances in planning for contingencies in many technical areas, except for protection response, its core mandate. Moreover, despite its long involvement in the region, UNHCR was not entirely knowledgeable about the three caseloads of refugees and their cultural, social, and political backgrounds. (See box 6.)

The U.S. and donor plan put together in 1996 to encourage refugees to leave, by moving camps, stockpiling food in Rwanda, and putting human rights monitors in the country, was judged by many to be too cumbersome, potentially too expensive, and too dependent on the vicissitudes of Zairian and regional politics. In the end, it was also too late.

USAD and the U.S. government were unable to assess the refugee camp situation in late 1994 with the mass exodus of former Rwandese government oficials (including ex- soldiers and interahanzwe Hutu militias) and refugees. This contributed to its inability to set clear, coherent policy objectives on humanitarian assistance in the camps. As a result, USAlD and the U.S. government (as well as the rest of the international community) saved some lives in the short term with humanitarian assistance programs through 1996. However, support for a status quo in the camps was extremely costly and ultimately untenable, both economically and politically as it inadvertently placed at risk the internal security of the new Rwandese government. All but a few in the Washington policy scene ignored the consistent intelligence gathering and e-mail reports of some USAID staff during 1995- 1996 and the queries raised by the U. S. Embassy in Kigali.

USAID food and other humanitarian resources provided to World Food Program and delivered to UNHCR and its implementing partners in the refugee camps outside Rwanda were distributed to and consumed by the Rwandese government in exile, former soldiers of the Rwandese Army, FAR, and interahamwe Hutu militias responsible for the genocide. In some camps, the political structures established imposed a tax on humanitarian assistance. Collected by ersatz bourgemestres, presidentially appointed mayors, that money was used to buy and trade for arms with local authorities in Zaire.

UNHCR program officials were unable to provide adequate analysis of the refugee situation as it rapidly emerged in late 1994. High-level policy officials were unwilling to accept withdrawal of blanket protection and take immediate steps to separate refugees from those suspected of crimes and atrocities. The Gersony findings of September 1994, that the new Rwandese army had initiated a reverse genocide of Hutus, were the most pivotal in sowing distrust of the government among donors.

The role these rehgee camps and their non-refugee population played in the insurgency in eastern Zaire and Northwest Rwanda has long been suspected but not clearly documented until recently. The lack of corroborated, reliable information on conditions in the region has made it difficult to understand the root causes of conflict and to ensure that USAlD policies and humanitarian and development programs, first, are not prolonging conflict, and second are designed and targeted strategically to mitigate or prevent conflict.

Some Rwandese internally displaced persons and refugees were willing to return in large groups in 1995 and 1996 if provided a safe opportunity. But the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda, State Department's Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau, and the U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva did not agree on use of the exclusion clause or withdrawing blanket protection. They also had differing assessments on how much trust to place in the Rwandese government and on its ability to provide security and assistance to returning refugees. This made it impossible to establish a coherent policy on refugee return and repatriation that USAID humanitarian and assistance programs could have supported. In addition, decisions had regional implications for eastern Zaire and the Great Lakes region, so any solution required a regional approach. State's Africa Bureau and National Security Council (NSC) were unable to resolve their policy differences, particularly with regard to Zaire.

The proposed international force to provide a humanitarian corridor into Zaire in 1996 would have inadvertently prolonged the conflict and maintained the status quo had it gone into operation. Without a mandate to separate combatants from refigees, the outcome would have been similar to that of the French Zone Turquoise in 1994, which, in an attempt to create a safe corridor for Tutsis, allowed government perpetrators of the genocide and members of the Hutu militias to operate freely in the region, planning the insurgency in the Northwest and eastern Zaire, forging regional alliances, and building up their capacity in the rehgee camps around Rwanda. ['"\ The costly stalemate that finally ended in late 1996 with local initiatives to empty the refigee camps could have been averted early on. Donors could have decided not to extend blanket protection to all that crossed the borders from Rwanda and withdrawn food and 996, the U.S. government's push-pull ive.

USAID food----- aid assistance provided to ref3 World Food ~ro~ram%d~~~~frob I? ged the conflict in the *,,'b,.b'-, *,,'b,.b'-, ",.. ' . . region andsubse I.-." _ lX_.....-,-. .... -1 --+,, To make strategic choices and decisions about program design and location in ongoing complex emergencies, accurate and objective information is essential. Corroborated, on- the-spot reporting and analysis, by groups such as Africa Rights, has been instrumental in providing a detailed account of the Northwest insurgency and a larger picture of trends in the region.

As the evaluation team talked with local officials, expatriate staff, and educated Rwandese, moving from Kigali through the Northwest, the power of the UN's written and electronic information, through its Internet information service, IRIN, was apparent. That information has been critical to this evaluation in elucidating the political and military objectives of the insurgents in the Northwest, the people in the region, and the government, as well as the role humanitarian assistance played in prolonging or shortening conflict. It is not, however, information that bilateral and multilateral donor agencies can easily attain because of access and security.

A combination of factors helped USAIDRwanda adjust its program to meet fast-changing needs in Rwanda in 1998 and 1999 and effectively develop a crisis prevention strategy. The integrated strategic plan assumed instability and built in crisis modifiers in the strategic planning and implementation process. USAIDRwanda's 1998 Results Review and Resources Request noted progress in several sectors, but underscored the Mission's assessment of conflict in the Northwest. The review of that report led to a commitment by the Mission and USAID/Washington to review the Mission's program and assess the needs in the region. They renewed involvement of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Food for Peace, and the World Food Program. The Mission, with the leadership of the Food for Peace officer, made some strategic shifts of resources and programs to support government efforts to separate the people living in the Northwest from the insurgents and perpetrators of genocide. The Office of Transition Initiative's Women in Transition program was a valuable link in the ultimate success of this strategy.

Recommendations: Bold, Clear, Consistent Policy Objectives

The conflicts in Rwanda, during 1990-1 995 and 1996 to the present, offer valuable lessons about modern conflicts and wars. They are the kinds of situations the United States will find itself facing and increasingly involved in over the next century.

A Rwandese military commander with long experience in the struggle said the actual fighting, the real combat, encompasses only one third of a campaign. Two thirds is the indiscriminate killing of civilians and the chitchat of political and military propaganda campaigns. The propaganda, he said is the key to victory in these protracted modern-day wars, because that is the way to win the hearts and minds of the people. Ethnic cleansing or genocide is increasingly the tool of choice to rationalize wars and galvanize local people to join the fighting. This strategy is effective, analysis indicates, when there are few groups in a population. The fewer the groups (and the smaller the countries), the higher the risk. Large-scale conventional military forces will be used only for short periods because they're largely ineffective except at key points in these primarily civil wars.

The U. S. government and USAlD were faced with a difficult situation in 1994. The U. S. government, in the aftermath of fighting in Somalia, was determined not to get involved in another conflict in Africa. And, it was distracted by other African and domestic political issues, e.g in southern Africa with the election ofNelson Mandela and the U.S. political campaigns for off-year bi-elections for the House and Senate. Rwanda was still in chaos; the fragile military governing structure was untested in controlling its own population following the genocide. Establishing refugee camps on Rwanda's borders was an easy temporary solution because it relied on the conventional wisdom and assumption that all refugees are victims.

However, if USAID, the government, and the UN High Commission for Refigees had conducted timely, more objective political and military analysis of the emerging situation, it might well have been possible to prevent the members of the former government, who had been involved in the genocide, from taking control of the camps. Objective analysis, including a look at regional implications, and some risk-taking in making fill use of available material and resources by policy and program decision makers were the necessary but missing ingredients in setting clear policy objectives and implementing supportive program decisions. As we now know, truly voluntary repatriation was not possible while groups of genocide perpetrators moved across borders and congregated in Zaire. The risk of violent confrontation should have been weighed against clear policy and program objectives. Humanitarian assistance could have been both carrot and stick on either side of the border.

Humanitarian conditions in Zaire were poor. The situation within Rwanda was still in flux presenting refugees and the international community with a prisoner's dilemma paradigm. Had the new Rwandese government been able to improve prospects early on, this could have acted as magnet pulling refugees back. Suspicions about the human rights bonafides of the new government acted a counterforce. However, an effective and diligent cross- border media campaign could have prompted many people to return in 1994, before the Hutu extremists cemented political control in the camps. Under these conditions, had the UN High Commission for Refugees provided enough protection officers, it would then have been possible to separate actual refugees from the militaristic groups.

By 1995, such a strategy would not have worked. The seeds of mistrust in the new government had already been sown by the never-proven allegations that the new Rwandese Army was massacring Hutus. The ensuing political stalemate allowed the camps to become sources of future conflict in eastern Zaire and Northwest Rwanda.

Donors helped perpetuate militaristic groups' domination of the camps and forestall an exodus by using the local Rwandese government centralized political structure of bourgemestres, rather than family heads of household. By mid-1 996, there were signs that, given the right conditions, Rwandese refugees might leave the camps en masse. The push- pull strategy of the U.S. government and USAID to encourage refugees to return to Rwanda could have worked, if more NGOs had followed the lead of several that left the camps over providing humanitarian assistance to the interahamwe, the Hutu militia responsible for the genocide, and the former soldiers of the Rwandese Army, the Force Armee Rwandaise or FAR. However, this would have required USAID, State Department, and the embassies to develop a coherent policy, and they held conflicting views.

From 1996 through 1998, a number of international NGOs alleged that the government of Rwanda was committing human rights abuses. Publicity of those allegations further fostered a negative climate that made it difficult to develop a clear U.S. government policy on the camps and garner support for the Rwandese government.

The relatively quick onset of the insurgency in the Northwest caught many donors by surprise. Although some groups, primarily USAID, reported problems in 1997, U.S. policymakers paid little attention until the insurgency became a major security threat, requiring massive amounts of humanitarian assistance. The government of Rwanda may not even have been aware of the magnitude of the insurgency until very late in 1997. It was not until mid-1998 that Rwanda adjusted its military and humanitarian programs, eventually starting to bring the insurgency under control by the end of 1998.

Early in an emergency, the United States needs to clearly define its policy objectives and the role and use of humanitarian assistance. Those decisions must be based on succinct but thorough economic, military, and political analyses. A more rational USAlD and U.S. government decision-making structure is required so that policies and programs do not work at cross-purposes.

Humanitarian assistance will always be used, in the first instance, to save lives and alleviate suffering. It must, however, be more hlly integrated with foreign policy objectives. When that happens, humanitarian programs and resources can be a policy instrument and program tool to achieve those aims.

In Rwanda and in other complex political emergencies, humanitarian assistance was and can be manipulated to support the political and military objectives of combatant groups. USAID and the U.S. government need to recognize early on when that is happening. It is essential to develop clear, objective, timely analysis to develop integrated, coherent policies. These, in turn, should guide decisions on program design and resource allocation. For example, eflective use of media to counter insurgents' propaganda from the camps in the Northwest about the government of Rwanda could have prevented many from joining their cause.

Information in these types of situations is very difficult to get. More open sources of hard- corroborated information, reporting, and analysis are required to understand the many objectives (economic, military, political, and social) of combatants and otlier groups in complex emergencies. The Ofice of Transition Initiatives can play a pivotal role in providing information and analysis and coordinating assistance from USAID, the U.S. government, and other donors. A coordinator has been proposed for the Northwest, for example, who would provide the information and analysis that is key to preventing conflict and supporting postconflict transitions.

The Northwest insurgency is an example of a complex emergency with significant regional factors. U.S. policy was flawed in part because the government didn't have timely information, regional analysis, or agreement on a coherent set of objectives. This was an acute problem in 1995 -1998 and remains a problem today.

Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, humanitarian assistance can be both carrot and stick to support well-crafted U.S. government policy and program objectives. Several observers with experience in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region said the U.S. government was overly timid in its use of food aid as a policy instrument. USAID and the U.S. government did not face a strictly humanitarian situation, and agencies and bureaus differed in their analysis of the problems and their agenda when it came to establishing and dismantling refugee camps on Rwanda's borders.

Box 3. Page 19

"You Hutu Fools, who keep giving money which is used to buy weapons kill your fellow Hutus. You say you are studying. Don't you know where those who studied are? How many studies did Kagame undertake, he to who you give your money, who leads all these massacres. Wouldn't it be better to give your money to PALE as a contribution towards freeing ourselves?

And you Tutsi, you have stretched your noses and necks in overconfidence because you think you have protectors. .And you Hutus you support the Inyenzi (Tutsi cockroaches) in their extermination of the Hutu, instead of fighting with ALIR.

We will kill you until you are no longer contemptuous. The path of a sustained war is led and supported by the majority of the population. This is the path of a lasting war, led by militants associated with the majority of the population, and whose objective is to change the lives of all people, especially the oppressed, the common people. Our goals are to kill and obstruct those people used by the State in a fight against the majority people and to cohabit with the people and be close and polite to the people.. .97

Tracts like this one appeared in Ruhengheri and Gisyeni prefectures in the Northwest in mid- 1997 to sow hatred and dissent among the local Hutu against the local Tutsi. They were backed up by numerous brutal killings as a public reminder that death was the penalty for not collaborating with the insurgents. C, .3 s d $ ba cd ba '5d 8 0 d) d 80 0 m dj d 0 d 73 cd s C-i A a) zd k 63 73 S d z 0 73 C,d 5 d) ba 8 5 73 2 d) 8 3 73 d d cd 3 cd" N E3 3 m 8 d) d 4 0 a 4 0 Z a0 m tcc -3 0 0 C) 73 G 3 0 2 k C4 0 I I I <