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Serbia: Towards EU at LONG CONTENTS SERBIA: TOWARDS EU AT LONG LAST 1 No.94 MAY 2013 PG 1 OF 8 NEGOTIATING AGONY 3 Helsinki RUSSIAN INFLUENCE 4 HELSINKI COMMITTEE bulletin FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA address: Kralja Milana 10, Belgrade, Serbia tel. +381-11-3032-408; fax. 2639-437; bulletin e-mail: office@helsinki org.rs NO.94 // MAY 2013 CUTTING THE KOSOVO KNOT 5 http://www.helsinki.org.rs HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HELSINKI COMMITTEE Helsinki PRESSURE FROM THE RIGHT-WING BLOC 6 SERBIA: TOWARDS EU AT LONG LAST SERB ORTHODOX CHURCH 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 REUTERS Serbia and Kosovo’s normalization agreement territory of Kosovo and complies with the 2007 (signed on April 19) is crucial for both regional Ahtisaari plan for the autonomy of the Serb and bilateral stabilization. The agreement put community. an end to fragmentation of the region along ethnic lines and to the delusion that a change Certain concessions Belgrade got do not under- in international constellation would play into mine the agreement’s strategic dimension: defi- the hands of Serbia by enabling partition of nite withdrawal of Serbia and its institutions Kosovo: the option Serbia’s political and intel- from Kosovo North. lectual elites have banked on until the very end. Instead, the agreement practically guar- For Belgrade, the fact that the autonomous en- antees Prishtina’s sovereignty over the entire tity in the North would incorporate only four No.94 municipalities with Serb majority population Leaders of Serb municipalities in Kosovo North MAY 2013 (and only Mitrovica North) and that a commu- also raised their voice against the agreement. PG 2 OF 8 nity of municipalities would have a president, Head of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija a vice-president and a council was “a maximum Aleksandar Vulin resigned in protest: an act under given circumstances.” Major achieve- that in no way affected the government’s uni- ments, Belgrade said, was that the communi- ty. Serb leaders in the North were the first to bulletin ty of municipalities would appoint a regional threaten with a referendum but missed the police commander and that an appellate court mark. For their part, Aleksandar Vucic and Ivica would be established in Mitrovica North. Bel- Dacic accepted the idea of a referendum under HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HELSINKI COMMITTEE Helsinki grade also obtained guarantees from NATO that the condition that it was called in the shortest Kosovo police forces would not operate in Ko- possible while and, more importantly, stood sovo North without permission from the North- not in the way of the agreement’s implementa- Atlantic Alliance and the Serb community. tion while prepared. As it seems, the referen- dum will never be called. Faced with strong resistance from the conserva- tive bloc and the grey zone of politics, Premier All relevant international factors and organiza- Ivica Dacic was skillfully meandering through tions welcomed Belgrade and Prishtina’s agree- Brussels’ requests and domestic criticism. The ment. They mostly praised its historical aspect. ruling coalition – having itself traveled the The Council of the European Union recom- path from denial to acceptance – obtained rel- mended that Serbia should obtain a date for evant political legitimacy for a turn to take. The accession negotiations. EU summit is supposed Serbian government voted in the agreement as to decide on the issue in late June. one only two days after the Brussels paraph, while the parliament adopted it with 173 out of There is no doubt about a historical dimension 250 votes. the agreement has in Serb-Albanian relations. Albanians are for the first time ever equal part- Except for Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Ser- ners to Belgrade. On the other hand, real chal- bia /DSS/, all other opposition parties – Demo- lenges are still ahead. Interpretation of the cratic Party, Liberal-Democratic Party, Alliance agreement and, especially, its implementation of Vojvodina Hungarians and League of Vojvo- will be major stumbling blocs. dina Social Democrats – backed the agreement. Anti-European forces assembling Serb Radical EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Party, unrepresented in the parliament, and Catherine Ashton, experienced in dealing with various right-wing organizations (Dveri, Nasi, Balkan leaders, told Moscow’s Commersant, “1389,” and the like) apart from DSS, failed to ““We should not be so happy about it in ad- stage massive protests aimed at annulling the vance. History is not over yet. Both states are agreement. Not even Serb Orthodox Church’s still at the crossroads but two brave men have open support to this part of Serbia’s social and already chosen a path of peace.”1 political scene prevented an almost smooth Kosovo-related U-turn. This testifies that legiti- macy of these forces has not only dried up but also that the society as a whole is exhausted and aware that this is the only choice Serbia could possibly make. 1 Blic, April 28, 2013. No.94 NEGOTIATING AGONY And so it happened that in the shadow of Brus- MAY 2013 sels negotiations conservatives won the first PG 3 OF 8 After a series of successful rounds from Octo- round at home. On April 8 the Serbian govern- ber till late March 2013 negotiations came to a ment unanimously turned down the agree- standstill. Belgrade was expected to have its say ment while asking for a continuation of the di- about the normalization agreement by early alogue. This only strengthened the conservative bulletin April. Acceptance implied denial of the strategy bloc’s belief that any agreement with Prishtina for Kosovo’s partition and dismissal of parallel was out of question and that Serbia would fi- structures in Kosovo North. nally give up the European course – this being HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HELSINKI COMMITTEE Helsinki their ultimate goal.2 Belgrade negotiators insisted on autonomous legislative and executive powers for the Serb The agreement on dismissal of parallel institu- community (the judiciary and the police in the tions was a turning point in negotiations. That first place) and on a ban on the Kosovo Army was the hardest test for Belgrade’s cooperative- in Kosovo North. A “community of municipali- ness: it had to give up the plan for Kosovo’s ties” as such would have resembled Republika partition that had been the sum and substance Srpska, entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which of its demands. Almost until the very end Ivica was “unacceptable” as US Ambassador in Bel- Dacic kept insisting that partition was the best grade Michael Kirby put it. This was the more solution. Aware that he would be the one on so since the 2007 Ahtisaari plan, incorporated the carpet – either should he sign or not – Dac- into Kosovo’s Constitution, did not envisage ic included Vice-Premier Aleksandar Vucic in that organizational forms of the Serb commu- the negotiating team.3 nity should be invested with such authorities. Of all the leaders of the ruling coalition Pre- In the dramatic last act Serbia’s top leaders mier Dacic is obviously the best aware of inter- were seeking a face-saver: to avoid saying “no” national and domestic realities. In this context to Brussels on the one hand, and to convince the constructive turn he made was also the big- domestic public, especially conservative circles, gest. He skillfully played on warmongering ca- that negotiations were leading towards rejec- reers of some officials of the incumbent regime tion of Albanian claims on the other. This time (Socialists from the Milosevic era). In an arti- their mastery of trickery, manipulation and cle he penned for the NIN weekly on the occa- buying time seemed doomed. EU was unbend- sion of the 10th anniversary of Zoran Djindjic’s ing in its demands. However, it allowed extra assassination, he wrote, “There maybe some ten days for Belgrade to finally decide: to take justice in the fact that today I am the most or leave what it has been offered at the negoti- ating table. Two positions crystallized over the turmoil at 2 „…“The unity reached in the final act of Brussels nego- home: political pragmatism of Ivica Dacic and tiations is growing stronger and stronger thanks to the anti-Europeanism and xenophobia of the influ- participation and support of President of Serbia Tomis- ential conservative circles. President Tomislav lav Nikolic,“ wrote Milorad Vucelic, editor-in-chief of the Nikolic – to whom the later have counted on – Pecat magazine, a couple of days before the government actually belongs to this current. decided to say „no.“ Pecat, April 5, 2013. 3 According to unofficial sources, Dacic asked Catherine Ashton to invite Vice-Premier Aleksandar Vucic to partici- pate in the last, eight round of negotiations. No.94 responsible for a peaceful solution, a negoti- turned down the “Brussels paper.” Premier MAY 2013 ated solution.”4 Dmitry Medvedev statement on the occasion PG 4 OF 8 that is was “Serbia’s privilege to solve the Ko- The balance of power in the parliament was sovo problem” did not solve the dilemma. Ivica also crucial for the breakthrough in the Kosovo Dacic explained that “Russia was most annoyed policy. Apart from the considerable majority with learning about some developments in Ser- bulletin of parliamentarians from the ruling coalition bia’s foreign policy post festum” (allegedly this (Serb Progressive Party, Socialist Party of Ser- referred to Tadic-Ashton agreement to move bia and United Regions), Democratic Party /DS/ the Kosovo issue from UN to Brussels).5 His ex- HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HELSINKI COMMITTEE Helsinki and Liberal Democratic Party /LDP/ backed the planation leads to the conclusion that Moscow agreement with Prishtina.
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