Relations Between Serbia and China and Their Impact on Serbia’S Continued Democratization, EU Integration and Cooperation with NATO and the Member States

RASHOMON

Analysis of Bilateral Relations Between Serbia and China and Their Impact on Serbia’s Continued Democratization, EU Integration and Cooperation with NATO and the Member States

Belgrade | July 2019

This study has been published with the partial support of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Views and opinions expressed in this publication do not represent views and opinions of NED. CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 1

Executive Summary...... 3

Current political context in which relations between Serbia and China are being analyzed...... 6

Relations between Serbia and China...... 12

Bilateral relations between Serbia and China...... 12

Business-economic trends in Serbia...... 19

Economic relations between Serbia and China...... 21

Military and security relations between Serbia and China...... 27

Serbia in the Belt and Road Initiative ...... 36

Conclusions and recommendations...... 38

About CEAS...... 42 INTRODUCTION

Rashomon – the new report of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (CEAS) on bilateral relations between Serbia and China and their impact on Serbia’s continued democratization, EU integration and cooperation with NATO and the Member States has been produced as part of the project „Encouraging Debate on Euro-Atlantic Integration“, supported by the National En- dowment for Democracy (NED) from the USA.

CEAS was among the first analytical organizations in Serbia to have reported in somewhat greater detail on China’s intensified presence in the region of the Western Balkans and Serbia and the importance of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in its report Basic Instinct – The Case for More NATO in the Western Balkans (published in 2017, also supported by NED).

Relations between Serbia and China can be analyzed from several aspects, not infrequently mutually opposed, depending on what are considered to be Serbia’s principal short-term, mid- term and long-term goals, relevant and legitimate geopolitical circumstances and trends, and the likely peaceful and sustainable outcomes of outstanding regional issues. The sequence of steps to be taken to realize the priorities may be viewed from several angles as well. Therefrom the title Rashomon – after the cult film by Japanese director Akira Kurosawa.

In Rashomon, CEAS views bilateral Sino-Serbian cooperation and its desirable evolution, trends within BRI, and other regional and global topics from its standard angle – for Serbia to stay in a peaceful and democratic way on the track of European integration and strengthen cooperation with NATO and the Member States, while at the same time intensifying bilateral cooperation with other global actors in a way which would not jeopardize these goals. This, in turn, would contribute to the further improvement of fragile democratic practices and enhance Serbia’s resilience so as to together with its partners resist new global but also local influences on liberal democratic practices, from populist to corrosive and malignant ones.

Research carried out in preparing this report involved using publicly available professional literature and data, reports of foreign and domestic analytical organizations and think tanks that CEAS routinely follows, as well as publicly available information on the websites of the ministries and the Government of the Republic of Serbia, the Chamber of Commerce and others, and quotations from foreign and domestic media. In the course of this research, CEAS also conducted interviews with officials of the Republic of Serbia, businessmen doing business in Serbia, experts dealing with Serbia, diplomats and Western policy makers on Serbia and the Western Balkans1. The survey was conducted in the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019.

It is common knowledge that all CEAS reports on specific topics contain a somewhat lengthier chapter on geopolitical and internal circumstances which are the context of their analysis. That is the case with Rashomon as well.

The markedly dynamic international and regional scenes, the noticeable lack of transparency regarding investment and loan arrangements between China and Serbia, and, for legitimate reasons surrounding the Belgrade - Pristina dialogue, the non-availability of information on the Sino-Serbian position on this important topic, certainly make it more difficult to analyze current and predict future relations between Serbia and China.

1 The Western Balkans covers the territory of Albania and the former Yugoslavia, excluding Croatia and Slovenia.

RASHOMON 1 The great interest in the growing Chinese presence in the region of Southeastern Europe and its BRI initiative, which encompasses mainly Central European countries, (CEAS considers these terms political and not only geographical), exhibited by policy makers in the political West and the donor community over the past several years has resulted in numerous reports and statements on this trend as well.

Going over the relevant sources they have been following, the CEAS team observed that analyses of Sino-Serbian relations mainly focused on: the BRI initiative itself, China’s loans for strategic projects and investments in Serbia, and to a certain extent its influence in the media and political spheres, rightly described as sharp, and not soft power.

Somewhat less analyzed have been processes of intensified Sino-Serbian cooperation in the military, military-technical, security and telecommunications areas, and, more recently, also of inter-party cooperation of the leading party in Serbia, which is partly accounted for by the dynamic developments and the publication of the mentioned reports.

These processes may be adversely reflected on the attained level of democratic oversight of the security system in Serbia and the complementarity of its policies and methods with OSCE, EU and NATO standards and practices, and the level of protection of human rights and of the personal data of the citizens of Serbia, namely could further undermine the fragile democratic practices in Serbia and continued EU integration and the strengthening of cooperation with NATO.

That is why in Rashomon CEAS predominantly focuses on precisely these trends, seeking, as ever, to make the report complementary to other relevant sources. This accounts for the numerous quotations pertaining to major recent developments in Sino-Serbian relations, the EU steel quotas imposed on Serbia because of the Chinese steel plant and to aspects of military and security cooperation.

Rashomon specifically recalls the fact, quite often neglected when Sino-Serbian relations and the interests of China in the region are analyzed, that during its bombing campaign against the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), NATO among other also hit the Chinese Embassy. Three Chinese nationals were killed and over twenty persons sustained injuries on that occasion. The Embassy’s military attaché, who is believed to have been in charge of the intelligence unit in the building, was returned to China in a state of coma.

In the spring of 2019, Serbia commemorated by a series of events the twentieth anniversary of the deeply traumatic NATO bombardment of the FRY. In the course of 2018 and 2019, pro-government media in Serbia, and in particular the Russian Sputnik and its agency in Bel- grade, launched an intensive debate, one quite questionable from the scientific standpoint, on the effects of NATO bombardment on human and environmental health, and supported the setting up of several different „fact finding“ commissions. It is a less known fact that numerous Chinese factors were involved in this exercise, as well as in the interpretation of the causes of and motives for the campaign.

Account being taken of the foregoing, as well as of the fact that China is a member of the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) which has not recognized the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo, and that the UN SC adopted Resolution 1244, under which, apart from the Military Technical Agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO, the KFOR mission was established under a NATO mandate, and that Rashomon is being published

2 RASHOMON in anticipation of the resumption of negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina, CEAS took under particular consideration these very important aspects which definitely articulate Chinese interests in the region and consequently affect Sino-Serbian relations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Relations between Serbia and China can be analyzed from several aspects, not infrequently mutually opposed, depending on what are considered to be Serbia’s principal short-term, mid- term and long-term goals, relevant and legitimate geopolitical circumstances and trends, and the likely peaceful and sustainable outcomes of outstanding regional issues. The sequence of steps to be taken to realize the priorities may be viewed from several angles as well. Hence the title Rashomon – after the cult film by Japanese director Akira Kurosawa.

Rashomon is being published at a time of new geopolitical circumstances marked by a strategic great-power competition. Very complex and unpredictable developments along the world’s mercantile and military maritime routes, at the height of strained relations between the United States of America (USA) and Iran, are easily the most relevant geopolitical circumstance.

Bilateral relations between the Republic of Serbia (RS) and China are being stepped up at a very complex time for the RS. Internally it is seeking to strike a balance between preserving a minimum of democratic practices, which are certainly at much higher a level than in China, and continuing EU integration and regional cooperation, and attempts to reach an internal and foreign policy compromise on the possible form of a multidimensional agreement with Prishti- na, which would keep official Belgrade on the European track, while enlisting a democratically verified majority support in Serbia.

CEAS is of the view that these circumstances and the efforts of the RS state leadership have not been objectively considered by part of the political and analytical landscape, both local and Western. Another Rashomon or ulterior vested interests, remains to be seen.

In Rashomon, CEAS offers a range of arguments, from the opportunistic and irresponsible conduct of a part of the opposition, through problems created by pro-Kremlin structures, mainly related to Belgrade’s attempts to articulate its legitimate interests in negotiations with Pristina and the political West, to a series of positive steps and trends fostering better understanding and a renewal of strategic cooperation with the political West, and failure to live up to certain expectations of official Moscow, which may contribute to a degree of understanding for the corrosion of democratic processes in Serbia and the absence of transparency in the policies of the RS Government and President Aleksandar Vučić. However, such circumstances are unten- able over the long term without very negative implications for the state and society.

In its conclusions and recommendation given in Rashomon, CEAS reminds of the fact that, besides being Serbia’s important economic partner, China is a UN Security Council member which has not recognized Kosovo and is itself faced with disputes and challenges, like Taiwan and Tibet, which the interpretation of a possible comprehensive multidimensional agreement between Belgrade and Pristina might have implications on, and also that three Chinese nationals were killed in the NATO bombing campaign of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

RASHOMON 3 These are additional relevant circumstances that must be taken into account in analyzing the Chinese presence and Chinese policy trends in the region at large, as well as the bilateral relations between Serbia and China. CEAS is of the view that in point of fact the most important aspect of present-day Sino-Serbian bilateral relations is the Chinese position on what it would consider an acceptable resolution of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

The role of China in the region of the Western Balkans is significant, but considerably different in character than the destructive role of Russia. China is an important, but not the major politico-economic partner of Serbia. Strengthening bilateral relations between Serbia and China over the past few years has, for the time being, been a logical trend which has on the whole favorably impacted the internal economic and developmental situation in Serbia and Serbia’s geopolitical positioning.

At the same time, CEAS notes that already now this is not the case with Russia, however. Ser- bia would be well-advised to adopt as many measures as possible to approximate its current business operations with China and Chinese entities to European practices and expectations, primarily in terms of a level playing field in the market and transparency of procedures while respecting environmental standards.

A given recent expansion of Sino-Serbian military-technical and military relations could partly be perceived as compensating or countervailing for heightened Russian expectations from bilateral relations with Serbia in these areas, and partly as political decisions with greater internal political than strategic weight. Bearing in mind the sanctions imposed by the US and EU on Russia due to the war in Ukraine, and the US sanctions against persons involved in transactions with the intelligence or defense sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, articulated in the CAATSA Act, this is not necessarily a bad alternative, but it must be pursued very cautiously. The aggravating circumstance is, naturally, the lack of up-to-date strategic documents in the area of RS defense and security.

In the area of data exchange and protection, the EU is much more integrated with NATO and the USA, which fact also Serbia must already now take into account, balancing its expectations regarding support in the negotiations on Kosovo as well. Bearing also in mind all the global challenges around the use of China’s G5 technology, this is by no means an easy task for a small and militarily neutral country, especially given the lack of updated strategic papers.

CEAS is of the view that, given the geopolitical implications of developments in the South Chi- na Sea and generally the competitive trend among the great powers, the controversy surrounding the use of the Chinese G5 technology at the global level, on the one hand, and challenges in regulating personal data protection and exchange in Serbia as well as enacting other relevant laws and practices on the other hand, military and security cooperation between Serbia and China shall in the near future and particularly following the possible formalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, become the principal aspect of bilateral relations upon which

4 RASHOMON the possibility of Serbia’s further democratization, its EU integration and enhanced cooperation with NATO and the Member States shall crucially depend.

CEAS is of the opinion that the best future scenario for shaping Sino-Serbian relations for the Republic of Serbia and all its citizens would be for Serbia to stay on track of EU integration and reinforcement of cooperation with NATO and the Member States, while in parallel strengthening bilateral cooperation with other global and different actors in a way which would not jeopardize these goals, primarily by the earliest possible formalization of relations with Pristina on the basis of compromise, with its potential democratic verification in Belgrade, where China plays a role that is often overlooked.

That, in turn, would contribute to the further improvement of the fragile democratic practices and enhancing Serbia’s resilience to ward off, together with its partners, new global and local detrimental influences on liberal democratic practices and policies, from corrosive to malignant ones. Such an outcome would enable Serbia to, by strengthening the positive aspects of its cooperation with China, keep at bay the corrosion of democratic practices, which China has been carrying out through its sharp power in the areas of information and politics.

Formalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina in the near future would open up RS’s currently limited potential to adopt new strategic documents amid the exceptionally complicat- ed talks with Pristina.

Upon formalization and its institutional verification through constitutional amendments, Serbia would need to embark on developing its foreign policy strategy and adopting new defense and security strategies as soon as possible. Rid of the encumbering outstanding issue of Kosovo, they would have to consider the geopolitical circumstances more realistically than is the case with, for example, the proposed new defense and security strategies published this spring.

CEAS recommends that, should it be assessed that formalization will not take place any time soon, competent RS state authorities expedite the adoption of amendments and improvements to the above drafts or come up with new proposals of the relevant strategies. This is indispens- able for the Western partners to be able to officially assess Serbia’s predictability and reliability in coping with common challenges and threats. Having in mind the unusually complex and volatile geopolitical circumstances, this is necessary, though not simple for the RS.

In the long run, for a country of Serbia’s size, if bent on continuing the process of democratic consolidation and economic growth, the best way to optimize the positive and weather the negative global trends largely generated by China as a global power is regionalization through European integration, expansion and enhancement of cooperation with NATO and strengthening bilateral relations with the USA.

CEAS recommends that as a first short-term measure in pursuit of these goals. The EU, NATO and USA should try to better understand the breadth and depth of the challenges that Ser- bia’s leadership in office and Serbia as a society are currently facing. In the short run they can

RASHOMON 5 demonstrate it primarily by accommodating RS Government’s expectations regarding increased export quotas for steel produced in Serbia in the Chinese-owned steel plant, and by supporting a compromise solution for formalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina, which would bring Serbia closer to the political West.

In the mid-term perspective, CEAS recommends that the EU primarily endeavor to facilitate access to its infrastructural funds for applicant countries. The EU and NATO could together articulate the development of their mutual cooperation in the area of military mobility through a number of joint infrastructural projects in the region of the Western Balkans/Southeast Europe. Given the latest geopolitical developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as well as along global mercantile and military naval routes in general, Serbia as the largest and the only Danubian country in the Western Balkans certainly gains in importance and has a role to play in this context.

Belgrade, July 2019

Note: The Report Rashomon - analysis of bilateral relations between Serbia and China and their impact on Serbia’s continued democratization, EU integration and cooperation with NATO and the Member States has been produced as part of the project „Encouraging Debate on Euro-Atlantic Integration“, supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) from the USA. Views and opinions expressed in this publication do not represent NED’s views or opinions.

CURRENT POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND CHINA ARE BEING ANALYZED

Rashomon is being published at a time of new geopolitical circumstances of strategic competition among the great powers increasingly described as the Great Power Competition.2 Under way are very uncertain negotiations between the USA and China on possible new trade arrangements, intensive debates around the challenges posed by the application of Chinese 5G technology,3 with particular implications for NATO, USA announcements4 of withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty due to Russian non-compliance and of non-renewal of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the USA and Russia.5

US President Donald Trump, allegedly, in the period immediately prior to the publication of the Rashomon, launched with Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping the idea of a new, trilateral treaty on strategic arms control, which would also include China.6 Already

2 Our Allies are Our Comparative Advantage. Author: Damon Wilson. Atlantic Council. February 2019. Available at: https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/our-allies-are-our-comparative-advantage 3 France’s 5G Bill Makes It Tough, But Not Impossible, for Huawei. Bloomberg. April 2019. Available at: https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-03/france-s-5g-bill-makes-it-tough-but-not-impossible-for-huawei 4 Trump says US will withdraw from nuclear arms treaty with Russia. The Guardian. October 2018. Available at: https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia 5 Ibid 6 Trump is laying groundwork for a new world order built around the US, China and Russia. CNBC. July 2019. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/01/commentary-trumps-new-world-order-is-built-around-us-china-russia.html

6 RASHOMON in 2018 the US Administration announced its withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran as well (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action-JCPOA) which, apart from the USA had been reached in the UN SC also by China, France, Germany, Russia and Great Britain.7

The complex dynamics of relations between the USA and Turkey, which definitely always have implications for developments in the Western Balkans, now also include Turkey’s decision to purchase the Russian S400 system8 which reportedly came straight from Erdogan’s office, and not from the Ministry of Defense. This is obviously not a simple development for NATO either. Erdogan’s Turkey is continuing gas explorations in Cyprus waters despite the sanctions the EU imposed on Turkey.9

Still, it seems that the very complex and unpredictable developments along the world’s mercantile and military sea routes, at the height of strained relations between the USA and Iran,10 are easily the most relevant geopolitical circumstance. In the summer of 2019, Russia and Iran also announced joint military exercises to be held in the Strait of Hormuz. It naturally cannot be disassociated from a breach by the Russian federation of the Montreaux Convention which regulates navigation of the Black Sea, in the eastern ports of which the Chinese are increasingly interested as well, and indeed the issue of the functioning of the Danube Commission,11 members of which among others are Serbia and Russia, against the backdrop of EU and US sanctions imposed on Russia on account of the war in Ukraine.

In the EU the composition of the new Commission is yet to be decided, with it being unknown whether it will include a new enlargement commissioner. In Great Britain the new -Brexit government - was only recently formed. The findings published in the last Progress Report of the former European Commission (EC) for Western Balkan countries were not overly optimistic.12 Member states, notwithstanding the EC recommendation, are procrastinating the launching of accession negotiations with North Macedonia.

The decision of the interim institutions in Kosovo and Metohija to impose customs tariffs at the rate of 100% on goods from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has resulted in a standstill in the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina which has adverse political and security implications. There are increasing indications of more direct US involvement in this process.13 The crisis of the government in Kosovo; the impossibility to form a government in BiH; the institutional crisis in Albania; EU steel import quotas for all countries outside the EU which are highly important for Serbia on account of the Chinese-owned Smederevo steel plant, and numerous other trends are definitely also of bearing on the current politics of China and Serbia and on their mutual relations.

7 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance. Arms Control Association. May 2018. Available at: https:// www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance 8 Time For Turkey-USA 2.0. CEPA. July 2019. Available at: https://www.cepa.org/time-for-turkey-usa-2 9 EU sanctions will not prevent Turkey from continued gas exploration near Cyprus. EurActiv. July 2019. Available at: https://www.euractiv. rs/eu-prioriteti/13982-tursku-sankcije-eu-nee-spreiti-da-nastavi-da-trai-gas-kod-kipra 10 Trump wants to talk. Iran isn’t interested. Politico. July 2019. Available at: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/07/ trump-iran-nuclear-north-korea-1399406 11 Romania says Russian military equipment for Serbia blocked. AP News. July 2019. Available at: https://www.apnews. com/ b780669496674536b8d2e24b0bd9030e 12 Commission staff working document. Serbia 2019 Report. May 2019. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood- enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-serbia-report.pdf 13 Candidate for US Ambassador to Serbia: Normalizing relations with Kosovo – a priority. VOA. July 2019. Available at: https:// www.glasamerike.net/a/kandidat-za-novog-ambasadora-sad-u-srbiji-u-senatu/5022186.html

RASHOMON 7 In brief, bilateral relations between Serbia and China are being intensified at an extremely difficult time for the Republic of Serbia when, on the one hand, it is seeking to maintain a balance between preserving a minimum of democratic practices in Serbia, which are certainly at much higher a level than in China, and pursue EU integration, and on the other attempting to reach a multidimensional agreement with Pristina, which would keep it on the European track while enlisting a democratically verified majority support in Serbia, all amid a complex and unpredictable geopolitical situation with China playing the role of a huge global power competing with the USA and the EU on a global scale.

One should not forget that China, as a member of the UN SC which adopted Resolution 1244, has not recognized Kosovo, whereas the impression is that it is occasionally deliberately overlooked, even when commenting on the Russian interest and influence on a possibly sustainable compromise. This document and the military-technical agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO are the grounds for the functioning of the KFOR mission in Kosovo.14 It therefore has its own reasons for and interest in vigilantly monitoring and being involved in negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, not least because of the possible implications of the interpretation of a possible solution on its disputes with Taiwan and Tibet. On account of the aforementioned and the different levels of disputes between China and the USA, the EU, and probably also Russia, starting from the current trade disputes to North Korea, which can only be in the realm of assumption, the form of a multidimensional agreement between Belgrade and Pristina that China would accept could partly be the result of a global package involving China.

It is indicative that the new wave of caveats about the allegedly alarming absence of democratic practices in Serbia, where in 2017 presidential elections and in 2018 elections for local self-governments in Belgrade, Aranđelovac and Bor were held, the legitimacy of which was not questioned by OSCE, USA and EU15, coincided with the legitimization of the adjustment of the administrative line between Serbia proper and Kosovo in some EU and US circles,16 as part of a comprehensive multidimensional agreement on future relations, and that it came from precisely the opponents of this solution who often lack other valid arguments appropriate to the new circumstances to challenge this approach. The last EC Progress Report in fact noted the errors which were conducive to the Report being more critical than usually.

A comprehensive multidimensional agreement that would involve an adjustment of the administrative line is not popular with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC)17 either, which has both its own legitimate interests concerning an agreement with Pristina and is highly influential in Serbian society, parts of the armed forces and the security system of the RS,18 and indeed and for different reasons, among a number of the ruling coalition’s voters and its leaders.

An agreement featuring this element, which might enable Serbia to stay on the EU track, is not a popular solution in the eyes of the majority of Serbs either, but is does enjoy somewhat greater support than some other legitimate peaceful options,19 and, given a greater involvement of other

14 NATO’s role in Kosovo. NATO. November 2018. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm 15 Presidential Election, 2 April 2017. OSCE. Available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/303286 16 Mogherini: We urgently need an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. Aljazeera Balkans. February 2019. Available at: http:// balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/mogherini-hitno-nam-je-potreban-sporazum-srbije-i-kosova 17 Patriarch Irinej: No division of Kosovo. Blic. October 2018. Available at: https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/patrijarh- irinej-nikakva-podela-kosova/v12hp1n 18 Ibid 19 CEAS and CESID Survey „Euro-Atlantic integrations and dialogue between Belgrade and Priština“. December 2018. Available at: https://www.ceas-serbia.org/images/2018/Presentation_CeSID_CEAS_08_11_2018_ZA_SAJT.pdf

8 RASHOMON pro-EU actors and a better atmosphere, first and foremost in Parliament, could perhaps elicit the necessary democratically voiced support.20

Indicatively enough, it is precisely in the case of a democratic verification of a possible agreement between Belgrade and Pristina in Serbian institutions that the importance of a democratically reached consensus is overlooked and fails to be accentuated by the very same actors who point to the trend of corrosion of democracy in Serbia.21

Even perennial promoters of the thesis of stabilocracy, the alleged EU policy of choosing stability at the expense of democracy in its dealings with Western European countries, of which they have quite a few valid examples, but apparently not enough feasible and sustainable solutions for breaking out of the vicious circle, as well as analysts of the corrosion of democratic processes due to the intensified hybrid activities of Russia and China in the region and in Serbia, for the most part suggest forms of solutions for new relations between Serbia and Pristina which enjoy even less support in the Serbian public than a multidimensional agreement with an adjustment of the administrative line as one of its elements.22

At the same time, passing below the radar is a series of significant developments and trends23 which bring Serbia24 closer to the political West and which CEAS has written about in some detail in its previous recent reports. Tendentially ignored or ironically commented upon are an increasing number of statements on the importance of strengthening relations between Serbia and the USA25 coming from the top state leadership and close commentators’ circles, through media campaigns26 and commemorations of important events which evoke all the historically significant examples of good relations between Serbia and the USA27, up to the historic visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Serbia in the summer of 2019.

During the visit a contract was signed for the acquisition of 18 Mistral28 anti-aircraft systems with 50 missiles, which is the first major arrangement of this type with a NATO Member State in the past 20 years.

Some active circles in the West which comment on the goings-on in the Western Balkans saw this as a dangerous move on the part of France. Regrettably and not infrequently, positive de-

20 CESID: Minimal electoral democracy. Danas. July 2019. Available at: https://www.danas.rs/politika/cesid-minimalna- izborna-demokratija/ 21 Western Balkans: Farther and farther from the EU. BBC. April 2018. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/ balkan-43807183 22 Drawing Borders. Florian Bieber’s Notes from Syldavia. May 2019. Available at: https://florianbieber.org/category/notes/ kosovo/ 23 Kosovo First – Analysis of the context of the process of adoption and analysis of the Draft Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Serbia CEAS Report. September 2018. Available at: https://www.ceas-serbia.org/sr/publikacije/7425- kosovo-pre-svega 24 From Moscow Without Love - on the occasion of 16th anniversary of the assassination of the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić, 20th anniversary of NATO bombing of Former Republic of Yugoslavia and 70th anniversary of the founding of NATO – the Kremlin structures against Đinđić’s dream of Serbia. CEAS Report. April 2019. Available at: https://www.ceas-serbia.org/sr/publikacije/iz-moskve- bez-ljubavi 25 The Hypnotist – Aleksandar Vucic, John Bolton and the return of the past. Author: Gerald Knaus. April 2019. Available at: https://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=194 26 Vi ste svet (You are the World). Video clip by US Embassy in Serbia. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=jgRFtjXMInA 27 Vi ste svet – Video clip by US Embassy in Serbia. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zu_ jLz7zYGU 28 “Serbia Reinforces Army Purchasing Mistral Anti-aircraft Defense Systems from France”. B92. July 2019. Available at: https://www. b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2019&mm=07&dd=16&nav_id=1566904

RASHOMON 9 velopments between Serbia and the political West rather than being seen as a gesture reflecting a perceived headway in relations resulting from positive steps taken by the RS and enhanced confidence, are seen as a zero sum game relative to other protagonists in the Region and as the West’s indulging Serbia. The same applies to the internal political situations in other countries of the Western Balkans,29 where going by the assessments of these highly influential circles alone one might conclude that the principal factor behind the negative trends in these countries was RS policy towards them. Terrorist attacks in the world, if there is any reference to the per- petrators being in any way familiar with Serbia, are quite often attributed by these same circles to the radicalization which has allegedly continually inspired Serbian politics over the past twenty-odd years. In so doing a multitude of other available information on events is purpose- ly disregarded without even assuming that perhaps some other unknown circumstances could have been at play.30

Similarly, the impression is gained that in analyzing and commenting events in the Western Bal- kans some Western and regional circles at times deliberately fail to see major new geopolitical regional and local circumstances which warrant a compromise to formalize relations between Belgrade and Prishtina in keeping with them and with a view to the sustainability and continued consolidation of democracy in the Western Balkans.

A case in point is the continued expansion of relations between Serbia and NATO, irrespective of the extremely complex Kosovo situation, and the ever increasing Russian expectations and gestures directed at the RS which are not necessarily in the service of peace and stability in the region. That is why it is very good news that there are numerous indications that the second cycle of the Serbia – NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) which will cover a three-year period (2019-2021) will be agreed by the end of 2019 31 and that the new NATO commander-in-chief Todd Walters sees the Serbian Armed Forces as: “..appreciated in peace missions worldwide. The Serbian army is demonstrating flexibility, a sense of duty and resolve to carry out its mission.“32

Precisely because of this the RS state leadership would be well-advised to relatively quickly undertake an internal assessment of the time frame within which an attempt at formalizing relations with Prishtina could be expected. If it is assessed that it would be somewhat longer, consideration should be given to adopting the national security and defense drafts published in the spring improved by amendments33 or coming up with new drafts.34 The existing strategies no longer realistically reflect current political-security-military circumstances. This is of the essence if Serbia is to continue to be considered a relatively predictable and reliable partner of the broader political West in a concerted response to regional and global security challenges. It would be a shame to detract from the good name of the RS, earned with good reason over the past few years, regardless of the challenges and the complex circumstances.

29 Russia Will Be the Main International Beneficiary If Albania’s Domestic Crisis Deepens. Author: Janusz Bugajski. CEPA. June 2019. Available at: https://www.cepa.org/moscow-gains-from-albania-turmoil 30 Why Serb Nationalism Still Inspires Europe’s Far Right. Birn. March 2019. Available at: https://balkaninsight. com/2019/03/22/why-serb-nationalism-still-inspires-europes-far-right/ 31 Bauk koji to možda i nije.(The make-believe bugaboo) Ekspres. February 2019. Available at: https://www.ekspres.net/ politika/bauk-koji-to-mozda-nije 32 Walters for RSE: NATO wants a stable Western Balkans. RSE. July 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa. org/a/ volters-nato-stabilan-zapadni-balkan-intervju/30065330.html 33 Ibid 34 Kosovo above all else – Analysis of the Draft Strategy of Defense of the Republic of Serbia. CEAS Report. December 2018. Available at: https://www.ceas-serbia.org/sr/publikacije/7657-kosovo-pre-svega-2

10 RASHOMON Official Belgrade continues to pursue a policy of a formally open door to the strengthening of the Russian presence in Serbia. However, state officials are ever more often heard to say that this too is primarily regardful of the role of the Russian Federation (RF) in negotiations on Koso- vo. The impression is gained that Russian officials are not exactly enthusiastic over the finally disclosed contours of what official Belgrade might consider a compromise solution for Kosovo – an adjustment of the administrative line, or another compromise arrangement. Therefore not surprising is the series of events in Serbia which hinder the reaching of an internal compromise on the form of an agreement with Pristina, which are directly linked to pro-Kremlin structures, local and foreign ones, that CEAS recently wrote in detail about in its report From Moscow Without Love, published in early April 2019.35 These important facts most often pass under the radar of influential Western analytical circles, primarily those who are sharply opposed to the idea of an adjusted administrative line as an element of a multidimensional agreement between Belgrade and Pristina.36

Frequently remaining under the radar of similar circles, on the other hand, are also a series of provocations by the interim institutions in Kosovo and Metohija, starting with the transformation of the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) without the consent of the Serbian community37 to the introduction of tariffs, the long-standing disinterest of the majority and a huge institutional standstill in prosecuting war crimes38, which it seems even some Western policy creators are beginning to see in this way or at least attribute to Pristina responsibility for the current dangerous standstill in the dialogue. The impression is gained that in analyses of developments in the Western Balkans, primarily of the Belgrade - Pristina dialogue, the interests of Germany and its relations with the current Washington administration are a priority rather than a sustainable democratically verified consolidation of relations in the Western Balkans, which would bring Serbia closer to the political West and the USA specifically.39

This, as well as the interests of other governmental and non-governmental factors in the region which are opposed to these efforts, the security implications of various potential forms of formalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina and the currently available mechanisms of action in their regard, the regional security challenges and threats with possible global implications, against the backdrop of hindered regional cooperation in the security area and the extensively described trend of growing populism in EU Member States, the non-existence of a relevant pro-Western- oriented democratic opposition in Serbia which would support a compromise on Kosovo, which Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić and the RS Government are striving to reach in apparently somewhat better coordination with the current US Administra- tion which is exhibiting some understanding for Serbian positions and the new circumstances,40 and the questionable positions of Russia and China, two UN Security Council members which have not recognized Kosovo, which is often tendentially overlooked in discussions on its status, on a possible compromise in the process of formalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina which would strengthen Serbia’s ties with the political West under EU and US auspices,

35 Ibid 36 Ibid 37 Kosovo Assembly: Transformation of the Kosovo Security Forces Begins. BBC. December 2018. Available at: https:// www. bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-46570294 38 Fourth Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy for the Prosecution of War Crimes. Humanitarian Law Center. July 2019. Available at: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/?p=36814 39 Ibid 40 Palmer for the Voice of America: We hope that the opposition will give up the idea of boycotting the elections. VOA. August 2019. Available at: https:// www.glasamerike.net/a/intervju-metjua-palmera-za-glas-amerike/5025325.html

RASHOMON 11 the increasingly destructive behavior of Pristina and the certainty of snap elections in Kosovo, contribute to the possibility of partly understanding the corrosion of democratic processes in Serbia and the absence of transparency in the policies pursued by the RS Government and Pres- ident Aleksandar Vučić.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND CHINA

BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND CHINA This passage specifically refers to important events and statements in the period immediately prior to the publication of the Rashomon report which may have not been covered by other similar reports and CEAS considers them relevant for an analysis of relations between Serbia and China

Diplomatic relations between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the People’s Republic of China were established on 2 January 1955.41 As often stated by Serbian and Chinese officials, relations between the two countries are characterized by a comprehensive strategic partnership and are traditionally friendly and good. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia says that China is one of the major pillars of RS’s foreign policy.

According to data of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) for 2017, the number of permanently residing Chinese in Serbia is 1,126, with 3,260 having temporary residence, while for instance in August 1998 there were only 30 Chinese nationals in Serbia.42

Bilateral cooperation between Serbia and China has shown an upward trend over the last few years and has been particularly intensified as of 2014.

China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited the RS on 15 December 2014 on which occasion the Third Summit of China and Central and Eastern European Countries was held in Belgrade. The visit of Li Keqiang is the first visit of a Chinese prime minister to Belgrade after 28 years.43 The then prime minister, and currently RS President Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister Li officially opened the „Mihajlo Pupin“ (Zemun-Borča) bridge for traffic in a commissioning ceremony.

China’s Vice Premier Zhang visited the RS on 22 June 2015. The main topics of the talks were bilateral cooperation and infrastructural projects – construction of the Belgrade-Budapest railway and of Corridor 11.44

41 Ibid 42 Where are the Chinese in Serbia buried? Nobody has ever seen a funeral of one of them, and for a reason! Espreso. February 2019. Available at: https://www.espreso.rs/vesti/drustvo/338365/gde-se-sahranjuju-kinezi-u-srbiji-niko-nikad- nije-video-sahranu-jednog-od-njih-za-to-postoji-i-razlog 43 After 28 years: Chinese Prime Minister arrives in Belgrade. Kurir. December 2014. Available at: https://www.kurir.rs/ vesti/ politika/1637809/posle-28-godina-kineski-premijer-stigao-u-beograd 44 Nikolić with the Chinese Vice-Premier. RTS. 2015. Available at: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/ politika/1956402/nikolic-sa-potpredsednikom-kineske-vlade.html

12 RASHOMON The then president of RS Tomislav Nikolić paid a visit to China in September 2015 to attend the ceremony commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, and 75 members of the Serbian Armed Forces also took part in the solemn military parade.45

Bilateral meetings between Serbia and China were also held at the level of cities. At the invita- tion of Beijing’s mayor, on the occasion of marking the 35th anniversary of the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between Belgrade and Beijing, the former mayor of Belgrade Siniša Mali visited Beijing in October 2015.46

China’s President Xi Jinping paid the first official visit to the RS on 17 June 2016, when 23 agreements and memoranda on cooperation were signed. On that occasion Jinping stated: „The mutual political trust of the two countries is being consolidated and cooperation in the fields of energy, the construction of traffic infrastructure and agriculture is recording new heights, while cultural exchange is dynamic and the exchange of people increasingly intensive“.47 Xi Jinping is the first president of China to have visited Belgrade after more than 30 years.

Tomislav Nikolić, former President of the Republic of Serbia and Director of the National Council for Coordination of Cooperation with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China and Aleksandar Vučić, President of the Republic of Serbia

Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress visited Serbia on 16 July 2017 and had meetings with the top officials of the Republic of Serbia.

In September 2017, Meng Jianzhu, special envoy of the president of China, Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China visited Serbia. Jianzhu met with Serbia’s Pres- ident Aleksandar Vučić. The Minister of the Interior, Nebojša Stefanović, also had a meeting

45 Visit of the president of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić to the People’s Republic of China, 30 August – 3 September 2015. Embassy of the Republic of Serbia in China. September 2015. Available at: http://beijing.mfa.gov.rs/lat/ newstext. php?subaction=showfull&id=1441775469&ucat=118&template=HeadlinesLat& 46 Ibid 47 Xi Jinping in Belgrade: A new page in history. RSE. June 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/si- djinping- stigao-u-beograd/27804941.html

RASHOMON 13 with Jianzhu where it was concluded that Serbia and China would enhance their cooperation in the field of security.48

In addition to frequent bilateral visits exchanged by Serbia and China, Serbia, curiously enough, has a governmental body, the National Council for Coordination of Cooperation with the Rus- sian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, headed by the former president of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić,49 which not infrequently acts as a parallel ministry of foreign affairs. The Council was set up by a governmental decision in May 2017. The decision states that the task of the Council is to „consider, direct and coordinate the implementation of the Agreement on Stra- tegic Partnership Between Serbia and Russia and the Agreement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between Serbia and China“, with the Council’s additional task being to „consider and direct cooperation between Serbia and China in connection with the implementation of China’s One Belt-One Road strategy in the territory of Serbia “.

It should be noted that in February 2018 it was announced that the Council would have 30 staff50 (which is a larger staff that that of some other state institutions, e.g. the Anti-Corruption Council). The Government of Serbia appointed Gordana Jakšić and Milan Milošević assistant directors of the Council. Gordana Jakšić and Milan Milošević were transferred to the Council from their positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the proposal of Ivan Mrkić, one-time adviser to President Nikolić, and currently a member of the Council. Among the employed with the Council in addition to them is also Milan Tadić, formerly a water polo goalkeeper and member of the national team and general manager of the “Lafarge” company in Beočin.51

Apart from them, on the staff of this team are some people with dubious biographies, like De- jan Simić and Pavle Bašić. The former vice-governor Simić’s claim to fame is the “suitcase”, affair when in 2006 he was charged with having asked the “Dunav TBI Group” for a bribe of two million Euros in order to procure for them a license for financial leasing operations from the National Bank of Serbia. Bašić, for his part, is Nikolić’s associate from the Presidency and is known for an affair in 2010 when the police arrested his brother Gordan and issued a wanted circular for him on the charge that they belonged to a group which had misappropriated Indus- trija kotrljajućih ležajeva /Ball Bearings Plant/ (IKL)’s US $ 7 million.52

48 Vučić dines with Chinese “top security guy”. Mondo. September 2017. Available at: http://mondo.rs/a1039990/Info/ Srbija/Aleksandar-Vucic-Kina-bezbednjak-obavestajac-Meng-Djiendzu.html 49 Tomislav Nikolić lands new job. RSE. May 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/srbija-novo-telo- rusija-kina/28504602.html 50 The citizens of Serbia shall be paying for an entourage of 30 for Tomislav Nikolić, which includes some with dubious CVs. Blic. February 2018. Available at: https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/gradani-srbije-placace-tomislavu-nikolicu-svitu- od-30-ljudi-u-kojoj-su-i- osobe/px5sq0p 51 Ibid 52 Šarić’s collaborator misappropriates IKL’s 36 million dinars. Blic. October 2010. Available at: https://www.blic.rs/vesti/ hronika/ saricev-saradnik-ostetio-ikl-za-736-miliona-dinara/j32gfqk

14 RASHOMON Tomislav Nikolić, former President of the Republic of Serbia and Director of the National Council for Coordination of Cooperation with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China and Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China

By May 2018 the office of the Council had spent over US $ 476,00053 from the budget of the Republic of Serbia. The public has no access to information how this money is being spent nor have any figures or financial reports of the Office been disclosed so far. According to the Law on the Budget it is known that US $ 209,000 was earmarked for the staff payroll in 2018, and US $ 123,000 for insurance.54

In mid-May 2019 Serbia’s Prime Minister Ana Brnabić met with Zhao Kezhi, China’s Minister of Public Security. The Prime Minister announced the signing of three documents on cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia and she also stated that one of the most important projects of this Ministry, the introduction of traffic video surveillance, was being implemented in cooperation with the Chinese company Huawei. In a communiqué issued on the occasion of the meeting between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Security of China, the Government Office for Cooperation with Media stated that „the Prime Minister is satisfied with the cooperation and relations between the two countries in all fields and assesses that they are characterized by comprehensive strategic partnership and steel friendship“.55

At the end of May 2019, Tomislav Nikolić had talks in Belgrade with a delegation of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference of the city of Guangzhou headed by Chairman Yu Jianshe.56 After talks with Nikolić, Yu Jianshe stated the following for the media: „Today every

53 Tomislav Nikolić has already spent 750,000 Euros from the budget, and what’s in it for the citizens? Blic. May 2018. Available at: https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/najskuplji-srpski-neradnik-tomislav-nikolic-je-vec-potrosio-750000-evra- iz-budzeta-a/ f209zqb 54 Ibid 55 Vučić with the Chinese minister: Strategic partnership in the security domain as well. Blic. May 2019. Available at: https://www. blic.rs/vesti/politika/vucic-sa-kineskim-ministrom-stratesko-partnerstvo-i-u-domenu-bezbednosti/lvv7q1x 56 Nikolić with a delegation of Guangzhou: Today every citizen of China knows that these two countries have traditionally good and friendly relations. Kurir. May 2019. Available at: https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/politika/3258277/nikolic-sa- delegacijom- guangdozoua-danas-svaki-gradjanin-kine-zna-da-ove-dve-zemlje-imaju-tradicionalno-dobre-i-prijateljske- odnose

RASHOMON 15 citizen of China knows that Serbia and China have traditionally good and friendly relations, which are constantly expanding. The main goal of our visit is to familiarize ourselves as much as possible with the situation in Serbia and be informed of the possibilities for the promotion of our cooperation“.

The People’s Republic of China has been recognized as a partner of major importance in the strategic documents of Serbia as well, namely in the current Strategy of National Security from 2009 which states that: „The Republic of Serbia shall continue to devote special attention to promoting close ties with the People’s Republic of China, India and Brazil as well as with other traditional partners and important factors of the international community.“

The new Draft Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Serbia which was published in April 2018, also mentions China as an essential element of Serbia’s strategic environment, but also in the context of a state which is of great importance for the preservation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia.57

Formulations like these in the drafts of new strategic documents are not surprising, particularly if account is taken of the official and expected further position of China on Kosovo. At a Security Council meeting on 10 June, 2019, Wu Haitao, the Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, reiterated the position of the People’s Republic of China and stated that Resolution 1244 set an important legal basis for the settlement of the Kosovo issue. „Our position on the Kosovo issue is consistent and clear. We believe that, within the frame- work of relevant Security Council resolutions, parties concerned should reach a mutually acceptable solution through dialogue. We see that as the best way to resolve the Kosovo issue. China respects Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We understand its legitimate concerns with regard to the Kosovo issue and commend its efforts to find a political solution to this issue.“58

In addition to Serbia’s good bilateral relations with China, Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić spoke about the close relations between the Serbian Progressive Party and the Communist Party of China. Speaking on Television Pink’s (television with national frequency) „Hit tvit“59 show in July 2019 he stated that „The Communist Party of China, they are a party close to the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), of which fact I am also very proud and we now have exceptional inter-party, not only intergovernmental cooperation of which I am especially proud. Namely, our party people went to China too, 15 of them and there they were shown some software demonstrating how the most powerful party in the world operates. To be an official there one must pass many a test to succeed, but once you do, of the 365 days in the year you must devote 200 to talking with the citizens. There is telephone software recording who you talked with, what ...“60

In November 2016, the Serbian Progressive Party became an associated member of the Euro- pean People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament.61 In June 2019, Jadranka Joksimović, International Secretary of the Serbian Progressive Party and Minister of European Integration

57 Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Serbia, 2009. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/ staticki_sadrzaj/dokumenta/strategije/Strategija%20nacionalne%20bezbednosti%20Republike%20Srbije.pdf 58 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN Security Council. 10 June 2019. Available at: http:// www.china-un.org/ eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/europe/ksw/t1671034.htm 59 Vučić: They are trying to forbid me to think, to speak the truth. Broadcast on the official YouTube channel of the Serbian Progressive Party. Guest appearance of Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić on the “Hit tvit” program. July 2019. Available at: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=HnGXJvljCzU&t=4283s 60 Ibid 61 SNS admitted into EPP. Blic. November 2016. Available at: https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/sns- primljena-u-evropske- narodnjake/0z6rr7l

16 RASHOMON participated in the EPP Political Assembly held in Brussels.62 As the Serbian Progressive Party aspires after membership in the EPP which is very important, utmost care must be exercised when entering into partnership arrangements with the Communist Party of China and the Unit- ed Russia Party.

On 23 July 2019, the First Vice-Premier of the Republic of Serbia and Minister of Foreign Af- fairs Ivica Dačić had talks with Chen Bo, China’s Ambassador to Serbia, on numerous topics from the field of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.63 Minister Dačić and Ambassador Chen talked about mutual support in international arena and the resolution of issues of common interest. The meeting between Dačić and Ambassador Chen confirmed that there was scope for additionally improving and intensifying cooperation, for exchanging information and for communication aimed at enhancing coordination in international organizations, and agreement on concerted activities to that end was reached.

Cooperation between Serbia and China and not of late, also encompasses the academic com- ponent, involving, among other, cooperation between Serbian and Chinese universities as well as Chinese language courses. This cooperation was institutionalized in 2006 by the establishment of the Confucius Institute in Belgrade. The Confucius Institute in Belgrade was officially opened on 27 August 2006 at the Faculty of Philology of Belgrade University, following the signature of the following: Memorandum on Educational and Cultural Cooperation between the Ministries of Education of the Republic of Serbia and the People’s Republic of China (Jan- uary 2005 in Serbia), Agreement on the Joint Establishment of the Confucius Institute between HANBAN and Belgrade University (In July 2006 in Beijing), and the Agreement on the Joint Establishment of the Confucius Institute between the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade and the Nanjing Normal University (May 2006 in Belgrade).64 As of December 2009, the Chinese partner is the University of Media and Communication of PR China.

In March 2019, Human Rights Watch published a 12-point Code of Conduct for colleges and universities to adopt to respond to Chinese government threats to the academic freedom of students, scholars, scientists and educational institutions. The Code in particular refers to the work of Confucius Institutes: „Reject Confucius Institutes. Refrain from having Confucius Institutes on campuses, as they are fundamentally incompatible with a robust commitment to academic freedom. Confucius Institutes are extensions of the Chinese government that censor certain topics and perspectives in course materials on political grounds, and use hiring practices that take political loyalty into consideration.“65

In mid-July 2019, Darko Trifunović66, research fellow at the Belgrade Faculty of Security Stud- ies met with the Minister of Energy and Mining Aleksandar Antić on the occasion of the former’s appointment to high research posts in two Chinese institutions dealing with the BRI

62 Jadranka Joksimović at the EPP Political Assembly in Brussels. Serbian Progressive Party. June 2019. Available at: https://www. sns.org.rs/lat/novosti/vesti/jadranka-joksimovic-na-politickoj-skupstini-epp-u-briselu 63 Mutual Support of Serbia and China in International Fora. Government of the Republic of Serbia. Jul 2019. Available at: https:// www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/399996/medjusobna-podrska-srbije-i-kine-u-medjunarodnim-forumima.php 64 Confucius Institute in Belgrade. Available at: http://konfucije.fil.bg.ac.rs/wp/o-nama/ 65 Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. Human Rights Watch. Mart 2019. Dostupno na: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190321_china_academic_freedom_coc. pdf 66 Human Rights Organization Condemns Darko Trifunovic. Srebrenica Genocide 1995. February 2008. Available at: https://srebrenicagenocide1995.wordpress.com/2008/02/26/human-rights-organization-condemns-darko-

trifunovic/?fbclid=IwAR396NZBH_HyCv37LFB0_Joy5CBDuofa40yfdcujVo-J4FpvrrEfbdmOlPk RASHOMON 17 initiative.67 The FUDAN Chinese University conferred on Trifunović the title of research fellow in the rank of associate professor. The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences - Center for European Studies - elected Trifunović professor and appointed him coordinator for research and promotion of activities associated with the “Belt and Road” project. Indicatively enough, in Serbian and regional media, Trifunović often introduced himself as a professor at the Fac- ulty for Security Studies, whereas at the end of April 2019 the dean of the Faculty for Security Studies sent a circular letter to the media informing the public that Darko Trifunović was not a professor at the Faculty of Security Studies. He is also well known as the Srebrenica genocide denier and co-author of the First Report of the Government of the Republic of Serbia denying genocide in Srebrenica.68

On 25 July 2019, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Government of the Republic of Serbia reported that the Belgrade Applied Studies Academy, which comprises the former higher vocational schools for hotel management, tourism and health, hosted a five-member delegation of the Tourism College in Zhejiang from the Chi- nese Hangzhou province.69 This visit resulted from the Memorandum on Cooperation signed in December 2018 between the former College of Hotel Management from Belgrade and the Zhejiang College. By signing a Letter of Intent in the Ministry of Education, Science and Tech- nological Development, these two institutions embarked on the first stage of their future cooperation, which includes the opening of an Office for Sino-Serbian Cooperation in the field of the Hospitality Industry, Tourism and Health Tourism. According to the Ministry, the principal activity of this office shall be the exchange of students and professors, practical training, work on joint projects, organization of joint conferences, congresses and journals, as well as cooperation in the field of culture.

Some faculties of the Belgrade and Novi Sad Universities also have Chinese language teaching and cultural exchange departments, as for instance the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad, which in May 2014 opened on its premises the Confucius Institute of Novi Sad University.70

Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), is planning to introduce Chinese language courses in schools. With that objective in mind an agreement has been signed with the Confucius Institute from Beijing on the engagement of professional Chi- nese language teachers to work in the school system of Republika Srpska.71

The idea of teaching the Chinese language in the schools of Republika Srpska came in 2017 from Chen Bo, current Chinese ambassador to Serbia and former Ambassador to BiH, who proposed it to the former president of Republika Srpska and current Chairman of the BiH Pres- idency, Milorad Dodik, who supported the idea, saying that it would be very useful.

In 2017 the Chinese language was introduced as an elective subject in some schools in Repub- lika Srpska, while currently the idea is to introduce Chinese language teaching throughout the

67 Strengthening scientific and research cooperation between Serbia and China. Government of the Republic of Serbia. July 2019. Available at: https://www.srbija. gov.rs/vest/399024/jacanje-naucne-i-istrazivacke-saradnje-srbije-i-kine.php 68 Report About Case Srebrenica. Documentation Centre of Republic of Srpska. Bureau of Government of RS for Relation with ICTY. Available at: http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/documents/srebrenica.pdf 69 Sino-Serbian cooperation in the field of hospitality and tourism. Government of the Republic of Serbia. July 2019. Available at: https://www. srbija.gov.rs/vest/400641/srpsko-kineska-saradnja-u-oblasti-hotelijerstva-i-turizma.php 70 Confucius Institute of Novi Sad University. Available at: http://konfucije.ff.uns.ac.rs/o-nama/ 71 Bosnian Serbs to Sign Deal on Expanding Chinese Teaching. Balkan Insight. Jun 2019. Available at: /https:// balkaninsight. com/2019/06/13/bosnian-serbs-to-sign-deal-on-expanding-chinese-teaching/

18 RASHOMON educational system of Republika Srpska. In June, 2019 an agreement was signed by Natalija Trivić, minister of education of Republika Srpska and Ji Ping, China’s ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Relations between Serbia and China were additionally bolstered by the signing of the Agree- ment on the Abolition of Visas. The Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Serbia on the Abolition of Visa Requirements for Holders of Ordinary Passports, which was signed on 5 November 2016, went into force on 15 January 2017. Under this agreement citizens of the Republic of Serbia, holders of ordinary passports shall be allowed to travel visa-free to the People’s Republic of China as tourists, on business or to visit relatives and to stay there for a period not exceeding 30 days.72 Serbia is not the only country in the region to have signed such an agreement with China. The Agreement between the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Recip- rocal Abolition of Visa Requirements for Holders of Ordinary Passports was signed in Budapest on 27 November 2017 and entered into force towards the end of May 2018,73 while citizens of Croatia and Montenegro still require visas.

BUSINESS-ECONOMIC TRENDS IN SERBIA In this Chapter CEAS presents updated business and economic figures and assessments of economic trends in Serbia with particular reference to the operation of HeSteel, the challenges surrounding steel quotas and the challenges they pose for Serbia’s economy and its relations with the EU, again with particular reference to important developments immediately prior to the publication of Rashomon

The gross domestic product (GDP) of the Republic of Serbia in 2017 amounted to US $ 41.3 billion, increasing in 2018 to US $ 50.6 billion.74 According to the reports of the Republican Statistical Office (RSO), in the first quarter of 2109 the growth of the gross domestic product in real terms relative to the same period of last year was 2.5%.75 RSO also reports that in 2018 the foreign trade deficit increased by 30 percent to US$ 6.3 billion.76

RSO reports demonstrate that the European Union continues to be Serbia’s major foreign trade partner. By the end of 2018, Serbia realized 63.2 percent of its overall foreign trade with Euro- pean Union countries.

The second-ranking partner were CEFTA countries, with which a trade surplus was chalked up amounting to US $ 2.2 billion,77 mainly as a result of the export of agricultural produce, oil and oil derivatives, iron, steel and metal products. The largest deficit was recorded in trade with

72 The Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Serbia on Abolishing Visas for Holders of Ordinary Passports came into force on 15 January 2017. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China. December 2016. Available at: http:// rs.chineseembassy.org/srp/sgxx/sghd/t1427763.htm 73 BiH citizens can travel to China without visas as of 29 May. N1. May 2018. Available at: http://ba.n1info.com/Vijesti/ a258548/Gradjani-BiH-mogu-u-Kinu-bez-viza-od-29.-maja.html 74 Trading Economics. Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/gdp 75 Republican Statistical Office. Available at: http://www.stat.gov.rs/sr-latn/vesti/20190531-kvartalni-bruto-doma%C4%87i- proizvod-i-kvartal-2019/?s=090202 76 Serbia’s foreign trade deficit up by 30 percent. N1. January 2019. Available at: http://rs.n1info.com/Biznis/a456529/ Spoljnotrgovinski-deficit-Srbije-porastao-za-30-odsto.html 77 Ibid

RASHOMON 19 China,78 primarily on account of imports of cellular network telephones and laptops, as well as with Germany.

At a conference following the second review of Serbia’s arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) - The Policy Coordination Instrument – held in May 2019, IMF team leader Jan Kees Martijn pointed out that Serbia’s economic growth was strong, that the public debt was decreasing and that inflation was low and stable, as well as that many key reforms had been implemented.79

In mid-June the RS Ministry of Finance announced that Serbia had been taken off the FATF „gray list” (FATF is an intergovernmental task force set up to combat money laundering), having met all requirements for combating money laundering and preventing the financing of terrorism.80 The Ministry of Finance Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering stated that Serbia had expressed its commitment to complying with the FATF Action Plan at the highest level and had implemented it in full, and was as a result struck off this list at a FATF plenary meeting in Orlando, USA.81

The past year saw extensive legislative activity in Serbia: 12 laws entered into force, over 60 pieces of subsidiary legislation, guidelines and other documents were adopted. The new regulations include the new Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terror- ism, as well as amendments to the Criminal Code in the section dealing with the incrimination of the crime of money laundering. The new National Strategy for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism is planned to be adopted by the end of 2019.82

Standard and Poor’s Credit-Rating Agency assesses that, absent major disruptions in global trade, Serbia’s GDP shall grow by 3.2% in 202083, thanks to domestic demand based on a strong labor market and continued investment activity supported by the strengthening of bank lending and enhanced monetary policy credibility.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel also noted the positive trends in Serbia’s economy. At the plenary session of the Poznan Western Balkans Summit held at the beginning of July 2019 as part of the Poznan Berlin Process, the German Chancellor commended the progress achieved in the Western Balkans region, but particularly singled out Serbia. “The Western Balkans region has made good progress in terms of economic growth. I do not wish to mention anyone in particular, but Serbia has achieved very positive development.” – stated Ms. Merkel.84

78 Serbia’s foreign trade deficit up by 30 percent. Danas. January 2019. Available at: https://www.danas.rs/ ekonomija/ deficit-srbije-u-spoljnotrgovinskoj-razmeni-povecan-za-30-odsto/ 79 IMF: Serbia’s economic growth strong, public debt declining, inflation low and stable. Danas. May 2019. Available at: https://www. danas.rs/ekonomija/mmf-privredni-rast-srbije-snazan-javni-dug-pada-inflacija-niska-i-stabilna/ 80 Serbia taken off the FATF „gray list”. Politika. June 2019. Available at: http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/432241/Srbija- skinuta-sa-sive-liste-FATF-a 81 Serbia taken off the FATF gray list. Ministry of Finance. Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering. June 2019. Available at: http://www.apml.gov.rs/srp2681/novost/Srbija-skinuta-sa-sive-liste-FATF-.html 82 Ibid 83 Communiqué re the assessment of Republic of Serbia’s credit rating by S&P Global Ratings. Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Serbia. June 2019. Available at: https://www.mfin.gov.rs/newsitem.php?&id=14639&change_lang=ls 84 Merkel commended the Western Balkans, and this is why she singled out Serbia. Blic. July 2019. Available at: https:// www. blic.rs/vesti/politika/merkel-pohvalila-zapadni-balkan-a-evo-zbog-cega-je-posebno-istakla-srbiju/hyykeg8

20 RASHOMON At the end of July 2019, Jorgovanka Tabaković, Governor of the National Bank of Serbia, presented the 2018 Annual Financial Stability Report.85 In the context of financial stability, over the past two and a half years Serbia reduced the US dollars share of its debt from one third to approximately one fifth of its overall public debt in June 2019.86 For four consecutive years the balance of payments current account deficit has been fully covered by the net inflow of foreign direct investments, which in 2018 reached 8.2% of the gross domestic product.87

Poland Serbia Hungary Latvia Albania EU Average EU Average 11 28

Economic growth in the first half of 2018. Source Talas – www.talas.rs ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND CHINA „Serbia and China are bound by friendship made of steel. We owe great gratitude to both you personally and to China for everything that you have done for Serbia“ – stated Serbia’s Presi- dent Aleksandar Vučić in talks with the Chinese head of state Xi Jinping in April 2019.88 At the same time, Prime Minister Ana Brnabić stated „that total Chinese investments in completed, on-going and planned projects have reached US $ 11.2 billion “.89 Here a terminological distinc- tion should be made between the term investments which is most often used in public speech and the term loans, which is what Chinese investments in fact are.

Of the total of about US $ 2.2 billion that entered Serbia from China, almost two thirds are actually loans and only one fourth, namely about US$ 561 million, actual Chinese investments. In the process, Chinese exports to Serbia increased by about US $ 700 million, i.e. from somewhat over US $ 1.5 billion to US $ 2.2 billion, while Serbia’s exports to China rose from US $ 20 million in 2015 to some US $ 100 million in 2018. Thus in the purely foreign trade area China profited far more than Serbia.90

85 Annual 2018 Financial Stability Report. National Bank of Serbia. July 2019. Available at: https:// www.nbs.rs/internet/ latinica/90/90_2/finansijska_stabilnost_2018.pdf 86 Speech by Jorgovanka Tabaković, governor of the National Bank of Serbia on the occasion of the presentation of the 2018 Annual Financial Stability Report. National Bank of Serbia. July 2019. Available at: https://www.nbs.rs/internet/ latinica/90/90_2/ fs_prezentacije/prezentacija_fs_07_2019_govor_JT.pdf 87 Ibid 88 Vučić met with Jinping: Serbia and China bound by steel friendship. N1. April 2019. Available at: http://rs.n1info.com/ Vesti/a478978/Vucic-se-sastao-sa-Djinpingom.html 89 Serbia and China: How much is steel friendship costing us. Author: Mijat Lakićević. Peščanik. May 2019. Available at: https:// pescanik.net/srbija-i-kina-koliko-nas-kosta-celicno-prijateljstvo/ 90 Ibid

RASHOMON 21 Since 2007 China has invested over US $ 29 billion91 in large-scale construction projects in Eastern Europe. It has invested the most in Serbia, where the total sum exceeds US $ 10 billion.92 Ranking second is Hungary with almost US $ 4 billion, then follow Poland with about US $ 3 million and Romania with US $ 2.5 billion.93

Serbian officials often emphasize that China is Serbia’s major partner in Asia.94 In 2017 the volume of trade between RS and China reached the amount of US $ 1,830 billion, of which RS exports to China amounted to US $ 62 million (a 140% increase over 2016), and imports from China to US $ 1,767 billion (a 14% increase).

The 2009 Agreement between China and RS on Economic and Technological Cooperation for Infrastructure Projects lent momentum to the intensification of economic relations, resulting, among other, to cooperation on a number of infrastructural projects in the Republic of Serbia – construction of the Pupin (Zemun-Borča) Bridge, the Kostolac Thermal Power Plant project, construction of two sections of the Obrenovac-Ljig highway on Corridor 11, and other. One of the most important Sino-Serbian projects, which is being implemented as part of the mecha- nism of Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries, is the construction and modernization of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line, in which Hungary is also participating. On 18 April 2016, the Government of Serbia signed a contract with the Chinese company HeSteel on the sale of the assets of the Smederevo Steel Plant, takeover of which was completed by the end of June 2016.

Signature of the agreement on the acquisition of the Smederevo steel plant between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Chinese „HeSteel“company

91 The Chinese miracle in Serbia, investments of nearly US $ 10 billion. Politika. January 2019. Available at: http://www. politika.rs/ sr/clanak/419657/Kinesko-cudo-u-Srbiji-investicije-od-blizu-10-milijardi-dolara 92 Ibid 93 Ibid 94 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Bilateral relations with foreign countries. Available at: http://www. mfa.gov. rs/sr/index.php/spoljna-politika/bilateralni-odnosi/117bilateralni-odnosi/11465-kina?lang=lat

22 RASHOMON Apart from the mentioned office of the National Council for Coordination of Cooperation with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, already in 2013 the Republic of Serbia set up a Joint Intergovernmental Committee for Commercial and Economic Coopera- tion between Serbia and China, its principal tasks being investment cooperation; cooperation in infrastructure; facilitation of investments; regional investment cooperation, promotion of investments in industry, financing of financial institutions.95

In 2003, the Smederevo Steel Plant was sold under the name Sartid to American US Steel for US $ 23 million and until early 2012 was among Serbia’s major exporters accounting for around 13% of its exports.

In April 2016, a government task force accepted the bid of the Chinese company HeSteel for the privatization the Smederevo Steel Plant for the price of US $ 51.6 million.96 Previously, in January 2012, the Serbian Government bought the Steel Plant back from US Steel, its owner since 2003, for one dollar.

Ever since the Plant’s privatization, the European Union has been closely following developments and how the Chinese investment is actually being implemented in practice.97 Ever since the arrival of China’s HeSteel in Smederevo the European Steel Association – Eurofer 98, has also been voicing its concerns, fearing the possible re-export of Chinese products through Smederevo. The EU is also concerned that Serbia will not stop supporting and subsidizing the Steel Plant through unofficial channels, which would be contrary to regulations. One of the ways of unofficially financially supporting the Chinese company is for citizens of Serbia to subsidize the Steel Plant through the unrealistically low price of electricity, because of which the Electric Power Company has no funds to construct new facilities on its own but must obtain a loan from China (of US $ 700 million) for the construction of a new thermal power plant (350 megawatts) in Kostolac, which will sell cheap electricity to the Chinese investors in Smedere- vo.99

At the same time, EU suspects sales at dumped prices on its markets. For that reason, only several days after HeSteel’s takeover of the Steel Plant, Brussels launched an investigation into suspected price dumping fearing a potential “outpour“ of a large quantity of cheap Chinese steel onto the European market through Serbia. How the EU regards the Chinese investment is tellingly illustrated also by the statement of Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn, to the effect that Beijing might turn future Union members into „Trojan horses“.100 In 2018 exports of the Chinese company HeSteel were worth US $ 780 million.

HeSteel cooperates with firms in Serbia selling them steel directly as a raw material, which they apparently sell on third markets after processing. That is the case with the marketing of such products on the markets of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iraq. An example of this is

95 Ministry of Finance: Beginning works on Corridor 11 as soon as possible a priority. Available at: https://www.mfin.gov. rs/newsitem. php?&id=9625&change_lang=ls 96 Government accepts HBIS bid for privatizing the Železara /Steel Plant/. Portal Serbia.com. April 2016. Available at: http://www.serbia. com/srpski/vlada-prihvatila-ponudu-hbis-za-privatizaciju-zelezare/ 97 Good results of the Železara /Steel Plant/, (un)justified fears of EU intervention. N1. January 2019. Available at: http:// rs.n1info.com/ Biznis/a450348/Dobri-rezultati-Zelezare-ne-opravdana-bojazan-od-intervencije-EU.html 98 EUROFER (The European Steel Association). Available at: http://www.eurofer.org/ 99 Ibid 100 Beware Chinese Trojan horses in the Balkans, EU warns. Politico. July 2018. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/ article/ johannes-hahn-beware-chinese-trojan-horses-in-the-balkans-eu-warns-enlargement-politico-podcast/

RASHOMON 23 the firm101 Unipromet d.o.o.102 from Čačak which has announced acquiring a share of the UAE market. At the same time, a company whose owners are Zoran Bojović103 and Aleksandar Smil- janić104, which is registered as a manufacturing, trading and services enterprise, is announcing the export of steel items into Iraq as well. According to the owners, the company processes over 5,000 tonnes of steel per month, and as three new lines are being put into operation output will increase by about 2,000 tonnes, making them currently the largest buyer of steel from the Smederevo Steel Plant and one of the leading exporters in Serbia.105 In this way the Chinese HeSteel manages to export 60.000 tons of steel to markets outside the EU annually through one company alone, the production origin of which is not subject to Eurofer control.106

Towards the end of January 2019, the European Commission (EC) stated that EU member states supported its plan to introduce steel import quotas on imports from third countries. The safeguard measures went into effect on 4 February. The objective of the measures was to protect European steel producers, after producers around the world diverted their trade to the European market as a result of earlier unilateral measures of the United States of America restricting steel imports to the US market.107 Member states in point of fact supported the provisional safeguard measures imposed by the European Commission already in July 2018. As announced by the European Commission, the measures will remain in force until July 2021 and can be reviewed and reversed in case of „changed circumstances“.

Following the January restrictions, steel imports quotas into the European Union were nevertheless increased by 5 percent from 1 July 2019.108 That practically means that the new, higher tariffs also apply to exports of steel from the Smederevo Steel Plant. The Serbian steel mill has now practically been given the possibility to increase its exports – exactly how much is hard to say, because the 5 percent increased quota does not refer to our country only but to all non-Eu- ropean Union countries. This increase, namely, was envisaged by the safeguard measures the European Union introduced on 2 February 2019. A progressive quota liberalization was fore- seen, meaning that all countries, Serbia included, could export a total of 3.3 million tonnes of steel until the end of June this year. The European Commission will be considering another increase by July 2020.109

According to the global quota applicable as of February, by the end of June 2019 all „third countries“ could export to the EU only 3.3. million tons of steel, and/or steel products. Eurofer data shows that over just the first three months since the imposition of the restriction third coun-

101 List of items prohibited for import (or transit) or of conditionally accepted articles. Available at: http://www.postesrpske. com/sites/media/drzave/UjedinjeniArapskiEmirati_AE.pdf 102 Unipromet.d.o.o. Unipromet was founded in 1990 and the basic activities of the enterprise are manufacturing and building in road equipment. In the meantime they have positioned themselves as a regional leader in the manufacture and installation of protective steel fences, portal frames and vertical signalization columns, as well as of various noise abatement systems. They are recording a steady growth. Available at: https:// unipromet.co.rs/o-nama-unipromet/ 103 Unipromet d.o.o. Board of Directors. Available at: https://unipromet.co.rs/bord-direktora/ 104 Ibid 105 Unipromet starts exporting to the Emirates and Iraq – the Čačak firm increases steel processing by 2,000 tonnes monthly. Ekapija. January 2018. Available at: https://www.ekapija.com/news/1992539/unipromet-pocinje-izvoz-u-emirate-i-irak- cacani- povecavaju-preradu-celika-za 106 Ibid 107 European Commission release. January 2019. Available at: www.ec.europa.eu 108 Republic of Serbia. Ministry of Finance. Customs Administration. Available at: http://www.carina.rs/lat/ PoslovnaZajednica/ PorekloRobe/Stranice/Kvote.aspx 109 Ibid

24 RASHOMON tries exported 2.2. million tons of steel to the EU, most of which Turkey.110 Safeguards in the form of import quotas were introduced this February and cover 26 categories of steel products originating from non-EU countries, including Serbia. For steel producers in Serbia the quotas apply to three categories of products: hot-rolled sheet and strip, cold-rolled sheet and strip and tinplate products.111

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia Ana Brnabić stated, in connection with the announced review of the EC decision on import quotas for steel from Serbia,112 that she expected an immediate increase of quotas, but that Brussels’s decision, whatever it may be, would not be crucial. The PM stated that the Government was working daily on the issue of steel quotas with both HeSteel and European Commission representatives. She pointed out that the Government was trying to demonstrate to the European Union that Serbia could not be treated as any other third country, as it had an SAA, which was practically an agreement on free trade with the EU. Brnabić emphasized that by imposing quotas on Serbia the European Union was in breach of the SAA, whereas Serbia had to honor that agreement by not providing state aid to anyone, its steel mill included, which some other countries which were not in a process of accession could do.113 CEAS is of the view that EU should accommodate Serbian expectations in this field as early as possible as that would be in the common interest.

On 24 July 2019, Zorana Mihajlović, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia and Minister of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure, attended in Smederevo the laying of the foundation stone for the new plant of the HBIS114 Group Serbia agglomeration.115 A total of US$ 120 million will be invested in the new plant, and the Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure issued a building permit for the construction of the mentioned plant in Smedere- vo. Minister Mihajlović announced continued investments in the development of infrastructure in Smederevo and the planned beginning of construction of Smederevo Port in March 2020, which would be linked by railroad with railway Corridor 10.

In mid-December 2018, the Chinese Zijin Mining Company officially took over the Bor Mining and Smelting Basin (RTB Bor). The Chinese company paid US $ 350 million for the recapital- ization of RTB Bor, acquiring a 63 percent stake in the company. Zijin Mining also settled US $ 200 million of RTB Bor’s debt to government-owned public companies, the Tax Administration and banks.116 This company is China’s major producer of gold and the second largest producer of copper ore.

In the beginning of July 2019, the Minister of Mining and Energy of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Antić met with a delegation of the National Development and Reform Commission

110 Blic, July 2019. EU increases steel import quotas: We do not wish to destabilize the Serbian market. Available at: www. blic.rs 111 Increased EU quotas for steel from Serbia in October at the earliest. Ekapija. July 2019. Available at: https://www. ekapija.com/ news/2559040/vece-kvote-eu-za-celik-iz-srbije-najranije-u-oktobru 112 By imposing steel import quotas EU is in breach of the SAA. Government of the Republic of Serbia. 1 July 2019. Available at: https://www. srbija.gov.rs/vest/394964/uvodjenjem-kvota-za-uvoz-celika-eu-krsi-ssp.php 113 Ibid 114 Official name „HeSteel Srbija ajron i stil” (HeSteel Serbia Iron & Steel in English), namely „HBIS grupa Srbija ajron i stil d.o.o. Beograd” (HBIS GROUP Serbia Iron & Steel d.o.o. Beograd in English) 115 Further investment in infrastructure in Smederevo. Government of the Republic of Serbia. July 2019. Available at: https:// www.srbija.gov.rs/ vest/400212/dalje-investicije-u-infrastrukturu-u-smederevu.php 116 Chinese „Zijin” takes over RTB „Bor”. Politika. December 2018. Available at: http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/418404/ Kineski-Zidin-preuzeo-RTB-Bor

RASHOMON 25 of PR China (NDRC), headed by vice-chairman Ning Jizhe.117 Ning stated that the takeover of the Smederevo Steel Plant as well as the strategic partnership of Zijin company with RTB Bor were among the most important projects, and that the plan was for Serbia to be among the major producers of copper in Europe.

CEAS is of the view that consideration should be given to another factor in respect of cooperation between Serbia and China in the field of the production and export of both the Steel Plant and RTB Bor, namely the environmental aspect. It is a fact that China’s interest in cooperating with Serbia in these areas can among other be explained by Serbia’s less restrictive standards in respect of environmental protection and emissions of noxious gases than, e.g. EU standards, as Serbia is still not an EU member.118 Copper exploitation also poses environmental risks, because the arsenic content in parts of the ore in Bor is over 20 percent, on account of which it is forbidden in the EU.119

In view of China’s importance for the economic development of Serbia, in which RTB Bor and the Smederevo Steel Plant play an important role as companies in the majority ownership of Chinese entities, Serbia would indeed be well-advised to adopt maximum measures to bring its current business dealings with China and Chinese entities as close as possible to European practices and expectations primarily in terms of a level playing field in respect of market shares, the transparency of procedures and environmental standards.

Aleksandar Vučić, President of the Republic of Serbia and Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China

China and RS continued to cooperate in the field of infrastructural projects throughout 2019 as well. At the end of April 2019 a Serbian delegation led by Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić visited the People’s Republic of China and signed a number of bilateral agreements in Beijing.

117 Raising the level of cooperation with PR China in the fields of energy and infrastructure. Government of the Republic of Serbia. July 2019. Available at: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/396597/podizanje-nivoa-saradnje-sa-nr-kinom-u- oblasti-energetike-i-infrastrukture.php 118 Figaro: Serbian copper in Chinese hands. N1. April 2019. Available at: http://rs.n1info.com/Biznis/a476170/Figaro- Srpski- bakar-u-rukama-Kineza.html 119 Ibid

26 RASHOMON Zorana Mihajlović, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Construction, Transport and In- frastructure and the consortium „Power Construction Company of China and Azvirt (Azerbai- jan)“120 signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation to implement the project of construction of a bypass around Belgrade on the E70/E75 motorway and a freight roundabout railway, the Bubanj Potok- Pančevo section (Sector C). The estimated value of the execution of the works is about 500 million Euros. Zorana Mihajlović also signed with the Chinese company CRBC a General Agreement for the Reconstruction and Modernization of Railway Sections on Corridor 10, the Belgrade – Niš - Preševo - state border with the Republic of North Macedonia sections.121

As on April 2019, the value of Serbia-China projects in the area of transport infrastructure amounted to a total of approximately US $ 8.4 billion.122

During the visit Serbia’s officials stressed that a strategic goal of Serbia’s cooperation with China was also the development and promotion of the land section route of the Maritime Silk Road – the railway- road corridor from the Port of Piraeus to Central Europe with a strategic route across Serbia’s territory. The Deputy Prime Minister also signed a Memorandum of Un- derstanding between the Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Serbia and the Ministry of Commerce of China setting up a Working Group on Investment Cooperation. The establishment of the working group is aimed at promoting bilateral economic and commercial relations, strengthening investment cooperation in different fields, the exchange of information on laws, regulations and other related information which is not of a confidential nature and refers to investments.123

MILITARY AND SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND CHINA In this chapter CEAS particularly focused on latest developments of relevance to assessing military cooperation between Serbia and China and which may not have been covered by previous reports

Over the past few years a perceptible trend of intensified cooperation between the Republic of Serbia and China in the fields of military and civilian security is in evidence, which up to recently had not been the case. That is perhaps the reason why this area of bilateral cooperation between Serbia and China has so far been somewhat less frequently analyzed than the loans, investment, economic and political aspects of these relations. The geopolitical implications of developments in the South China Sea and generally the trend of competition among the great powers, the controversy surrounding the use of the Chinese G5 technology at the global level, on the one hand, and challenges in regulating personal data protection and exchange in Serbia as well as enacting other relevant laws and practices on the other hand, effectively limit the possibility of more precise analysis and forecasts. Still, CEAS is of the opinion that already in near future and particularly following the possible formalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, they shall become the principal aspect of bilateral relations upon which the possi-

120 Ms. Mihajlović signs several agreements. Tanjug. April 2019. Available at: http://www.tanjug.rs/multimedia. aspx?izb=f&GalID=402733&vs=1&page=0 121 Ibid 122 Ibid 123 A number of agreements signed on the first day of the visit to Beijing. RTS. April 2019. Available at: http://www.rts.rs/ page/stories/sr/ story/13/ekonomija/3500547/prvog-dana-posete-pekingu-potpisano-vise-sporazuma.html

RASHOMON 27 bility of Serbia’s continued democratization, its EU integration and enhanced cooperation with NATO and the Member States shall crucially depend.

China’s importance for Serbia in the areas of defense and security is also reflected in the fact that China is referred to in Serbia’s strategic documents, namely in the existing 2009 National Security Strategy in Chapter IV – National Security Policy, subchapter IV.I. Foreign Policy where it is stated that: „The Republic of Serbia will continue to give special attention to the deepening of close ties with the People’s Republic of China, India and Brazil, as well as with other traditional partners and important factors of the international community.“

The draft of the new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia which was published in April 2018, and which by the time of the publication of this report has not been through par- liamentary procedure, also refers to China as an essential element of Serbia’s strategic environment but also in the context of a state which is of great importance for the preservation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia.124

The chapter of the draft National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia entitled I. Stra- tegic Environment, refers to China in the following context: „...With a view to the further development of democracy, stability and prosperity of the region, it is important for the Republic of Serbia to promote relations with the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, as well as with other traditional partners and important factors of the international community.“ In chapter IV – National Security Policy, subchapter IV.I – Preservation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia, it is emphasized that Serbia’s continued cooperation with the key factors of international relations and all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council is of strategic importance. Of particular importance are relations with the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.125

In late July 2019 the Ministry of Defense published its „Newsletter /Informator/ on the Work of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia“ According to the Newsletter, over the past few years the USA has been the RS Ministry of Defense’s major donor with US $ 4,625,620 million in donations in 2017 and US $ 3,283,765 million in 2018.126 Although the 2017 and 2018 Newsletters do not mention donations from the Russian Federation, the Ministry of De- fense stated in a communiqué released on 31 July 2019 that the Russian Federation was the major donor of the Serbian Armed Forces with: „..six MiG-29 fighter planes, with the realization under way of a donation of 30 BRDM-2MS armored reconnaissance vehicles and 30 T-72MS tanks with appertaining logistical support elements.“127 The RS Ministry of Defense explained the discrepancy between the Newsletter and the „state of facts“ by saying that the Newsletter did not report on donations which are currently under way or where both parties have not yet consented to the disclosure of information on the amounts of the donations concerned.128

124 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia. 2009. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/ staticki_ sadrzaj/dokumenta/strategije/Strategija%20nacionalne%20bezbednosti%20Republike%20Srbije.pdf 125 Draft of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia. 2018. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/ file/ staticki_sadrzaj/javna%20rasprava/strategije/Nacrt%20Strategije%20nacionalne%20bezbednosti.pdf 126 Newsletter on the work of the RS Ministry of Defense. RS Ministry of Defense. July 2019. Available at: http://www. mod.gov.rs/ multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/informator/2019/jun/Informator_o_radu_jun_2019_godine_cirilica.pdf 127 Russian Federation Serbian Armed Forces major donor. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia. July 2019. Available at: http:// www.mod.gov.rs/cir/14235/ruska-federacija-najveci-donator-vojske-srbije-14235 128 Ibid

28 RASHOMON The wave of intensified cooperation between Serbia and China in the areas of military and civilian security began in 2017. In June 2017, the then Minister of Defense of the Republic of Serbia, Zoran Đorđević, received members of a high delegation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army headed by Colonel General Zhao Keshi, Head of Logistics and Supply of the Central Military Commission, which was paying a three-day visit to the Republic of Serbia. On meeting the delegation, Đorđević stated: „China is one of the strategic partners of our country with which we have exceptional political and economic relations. We also recognize the great potential for expanding cooperation in the field of defense and wish to forge firm and long-term bonds in all areas of common interest “.129 Minister Đorđević and Colonel General Keshi agreed to intensify military cooperation in the period ahead through joint training and exercises as well as the development of scientific-technological and military-economic cooperation. Đorđević also added that “…Serbia appreciates China’s foreign policy, based on the principles of peaceful problem solving and respect for all factors in international relations, which was also evident in the country’s support to the legitimate aims of Serbia to resolve the situation in Kosovo and Metohija in a peaceful way through the diplomatic efforts of our officials.”130

In mid-May 2018, Colonel Milan Ranković, Head of the Department for International Military Cooperation of the Defense Policy Sector of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia and Senior Colonel Ma Yongbao, Military Attaché of PR China to our country, signed the 2018 Plan of Bilateral Military Cooperation between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China.131

In mid-September 2018 Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić led a Serbian delegation on an official visit to the People’s Republic of China.132 The media reported that during the visit the procurement was agreed of state-of-the-art drone systems for the Serbian Armed Forces, which would be assembled in Serbia,133 while the original components would come from Chinese manufacturers. In question are five sophisticated drone systems, two of which combat drones with laser guided missiles and bombs. The unmanned aerial vehicles have reconnaissance and artillery fire direction capacity. They are also equipped with photo-electronic systems enabling day and night reconnaissance and missile and bomb guidance. Assistant Defense Minister Nenad Miloradović134 confirmed that the Ministry of Defense was negotiating the acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles with several Chinese technological partners, and that the package being negotiated would include the transfer of technology for integrating complex reconnaissance UAVs which the Serbian industry and the Military Technical Institute would be manufacturing for the needs of the Serbian Armed Forces. Miloradović underlined that the unmanned aerial vehicles would have the capacity to reconnoiter targets, determine target coordinates at day and night and laser-guide its missiles and bombs complement. These are two systems of the

129 Đorđević: Strengthening cooperation in the field of defense with China. Blic. June2017 . Available at: https://www.blic. rs/vesti/politika/djordevic- jacanje-saradnje-u-oblasti-odbrane-sa-kinom/j6x1xgh 130 Ibid 131 Plan of bilateral military cooperation signed with China. RS Ministry of Defense. May 2018. Available at: http://www. mod.gov.rs/lat/12615/ potpisan-plan-bilateralne-vojne-saradnje-sa-kinom-12615 132 Armed Forces acquiring drones from China. Blic. September 2018. Available at: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/ politika/ aktuelno.289.html:749970-POTVRDjENO-PISANjE-NOVOSTI-Vojska-dobija-dronove-iz-Kine 133 Novosti“ article confirmed: Armed Forces acquiring drones from China. Večernje Novosti. September 2018. Available at: http:// www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:749970-POTVRDjENO-PISANjE-NOVOSTI-Vojska- dobija- dronove-iz-Kine 134 Miloradović: The Ministry of Defence is acquiring UAVs. Blic. September 2018. Available at: https://www.blic.rs/ vesti/ politika/miloradovic-ministarstvo-odbrane-nabavlja-bespilotne-letelice/xt2cnx7

RASHOMON 29 new generation of unmanned combat aerial vehicles, each system consisting of three drones, a ground control station and a remote video terminal.135

In October 2018 Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin had talks with his Chinese counterpart Wei Fenghe on the margins of the International Xiangshan Forum in Beijing. The Minis- try of Defense reported that they talked about strengthening cooperation in the field of defense in light of the excellent relations between the presidents of Serbia and China.136 Vulin expressed gratitude for the support that China has been extending to Serbia for many years in respect of the issue of Kosovo and Metohija and underscored the importance of the joint participation of the troops of the two countries in peacekeeping operations under UN command, offering his Chinese counterpart Serbian training centers for multinational operations.

Aleksandar Vulin, Mnister of Defense of the Republic of Serbia on a visit to the People’s Republic of China

Aleksandar Vulin, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Serbia and General Wei Fenghe, Minister of Defense of the People’s Republic of China

135 Serbia looks to acquire Chinese drones and the technological know-how. Defense news. September 2018. Available at: https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2018/09/20/serbia-looks-to-acquire-chinese-drones-and-the-technological- know-how/ 136 “Excellent Relations Between China and Serbia...”. B92. October 2018. Available at: https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/ index. php?yyyy=2018&mm=10&dd=26&nav_category=11&nav_id=1461168

30 RASHOMON In July 2018, Defense Minister Vulin paid an official visit to the People’s Republic of China137 during which he visited two Chinese defense industry companies, “AVIC” and “CATIC”, which develop and manufacture aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and anti-aircraft defense systems, as well as the elite 3rd Guard Division of the People’s Liberation Army which is responsible for the defense of Beijing. On that occasion Minister Vulin stated: „The skill level and equipment of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is the goal that we have set for ourselves. Our Armies will cooperate in exactly these two areas in the future.... our objective is to ensure that the appropriate assistance so often extended to our armed forces by the Chinese side is adequately used but also to make use of their know-how, training, their instructors, everything that this great, multimillion-strong army is capable of providing to us. “138

In mid-September 2018, Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić led a Serbian delegation on an official visit to the People’s Republic of China.139 During the visit the procurement was agreed of state-of-the-art drone systems for the Serbian Armed Forces, which will be assembled in Serbia, while the original components will come from Chinese manufacturers. In question are five sophisticated drone systems, two of which combat drones with laser guided missiles and bombs. The unmanned aerial vehicles have reconnaissance and artillery fire direction capacity. They are also equipped with photo-electronic systems enabling day and night reconnaissance and missile and bomb guidance.

In Brussels, there is an emerging awareness that the flow of Chinese money into Europe has positioned Beijing to shape the Continent’s economic landscape and influence its politics.140 Chi- na’s deepening involvement in Europe is now registering at multiple levels—financial, technological, telecommunicational political, and increasingly military—and could soon reorder the foundations of Euro-Atlantic relations.

China’s economic modernization has been accompanied by geostrategic assertiveness, first along its immediate periphery, then deeper into the Indo-Pacific, and now across Central Asia into Southeastern Europe. China’s military aspirations to Europe ramped up in 2011, with the first notable deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLAN) Navy in the Mediterranean. Since the publication of its 2015 “white paper” on military power, Beijing has pursued, in addition to military modernization, determined long-term efforts to increase the equipment and skill level of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and to gain access to key ports in the Mediterra- nean as a gateway to southeastern Europe. The PLAN141 is tasked with mapping the operational zones it deems strategically important, gathering maritime information and building on the extension of the Belt and Road Initiative and the 16 + 1 to increase China’s political influence.

As NATO celebrated its 70th anniversary in Washington, the impression is gained that insuf- ficient attention was devoted to Chinese acquisitions of critical European infrastructure (espe-

137 Minister Vulin in Beijing: Serbian Armed Forces catching up with the world. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia. July 2018. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.rs/cir/12836/ministar-vulin-u-pekingu-vojska-srbije-hvata-korak-sa- svetom-12836 138 Minister Vulin: The skill level and equipment of the Chinese Army is the goal we have set for ourselves. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia. July 2018. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.rs/cir/12839/ministar-vulin-obucenost-i- opremljenost-kineske-vojske- cilj-koji-i-mi-sebi-postavljamo-12839 139 Armed Forces acquiring drones from China. Blic. September 2018. Available at: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/ politika/ aktuelno.289.html:749970-POTVRDjENO-PISANjE-NOVOSTI-Vojska-dobija-dronove-iz-Kine 140 Will China Drive a Wedge Between the US and Europe? Author: Andrew Michta. The American Interest. April 2019. Available at: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/04/22/will-china-drive-a-wedge-between-the-us-and-europe/ 141 PLAN - People’s Liberation Army Navy

RASHOMON 31 cially key ports142), which is a compelling security issue. Chinese state-controlled firms now hold stakes in more than ten European ports on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, from Bel- gium to Spain to ownership of the Greek port of Piraeus. It should not be forgotten that almost one-tenth of Europe’s transport container terminal capacity is under Chinese control.143

A given recent expansion of Sino-Serbian military-technical relations could partly be perceived as compensating or countervailing for heightened Russian expectations from bilateral relations with Serbia in these areas, and partly as political decisions with greater internal political than strategic weight. Bearing in mind the sanctions imposed by the US and EU on Russia due to the war in Ukraine, and the US sanctions against persons involved in transactions with the intelligence or defense sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, articulated in the CAATSA Act, this is not necessarily a bad alternative, but it must be pursued very cautiously. The aggravating circumstance is, naturally, the lack of up-to-date strategic documents in the area of RS defense and security.

It is impossible to mention the security aspect of China’s influence without reference to the Chinese technology company Huawei. Huawei is the world’s second largest manufacturer of smartphones, having recently displaced Apple from second place, and the Chinese company sells over 10% of all smartphones on the world market.144 However, significant restrictions have recently been imposed on sales of these devices in the USA on account of the suspected involvement of the Chinese state in the management of this company, as well as links with the Chinese Army. At the beginning of 2018, Verizon and AT&T (the largest mobile operators in the USA) refused to include Huawei devices in their supply in the USA citing security concerns. In February 2018 the three major US intelligence agencies warned US citizens against using Huawei devices, and several months later President Trump signed the Defense Authorization Act, which forbids US Administration staff and contractors to use Huawei devices.145

In October 2016, the companies Telekom Serbia and Huawei signed a multiannual contract for the procurement of equipment, services and works to modernize the fixed network of Telekom Srbija. Under this contract Telekom Srbija shall invest up to US $ 166 million in order to improve through cooperation with Huawei Company the fixed internet and multimedia.146 This agreement was reached following China’s President Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia in March 2016.

In July 2018, the British Government published a report criticizing the security protocols of Huawei phones, and recently Australia also prohibited Huawei and ZTE, the second Chinese manufacturer of smartphones, to provide technology for its 5G network. Huawei has regular contracts with the Chinese Army for the development of dual use communication technologies. Since January 2018, Huawei has been actively involved in the 863 Program financing (Program 863 was initiated in 1986 with the objective of improving the Chinese Army’s (PLA) technological capacity by using and financing private companies to develop technologies with

142 Are China and Russia going to dominate the Mediterranean Sea? The Philadelphia Inquirer. April 2019. Available at: https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/nato-china-russia-italy-israel-ports-mediterranean-european-union-20190405.html 143 Ibid 144 Is Huawei a Genuine Security Threat? TechCo. September 2018. Available at: https://tech.co/huawei-genuine-security- threat-2018-09 145 Huawei Technologies v. U.S.: Summary and Context. Lawfare. April 2019. Available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/ huawei-technologies-v-us-summary-and-context 146 Telekom Srbija and Huawei presented ALL-IP transformation package. MTS. October 2016. Available at: https://www. mts.rs/ otelekomu/vesti/1767/telekom-srbija-i-huawei-predstavili-projekat

32 RASHOMON commercial and military applications) assisting the development of 5G networks with a view to use in military applications.

Some cybersecurity and international security experts believe that the possibility of Chi- na mounting cyber attacks via consumer technical devices is a genuine threat.147 Indicatively enough, the Chinese authorities are authorized to demand that technological companies, such as Huawei, hand over all and any useful information or to provide access to communications and technologies owned or sold by the company. The Chinese authorities may use such information and access to facilitate espionage or cyber attacks employing Huawei communication technologies or networks. Consumer technical devices like telephones supported by Huawei technologies (or the technologies of other Chinese technology companies) are easier for the Chinese authorities to penetrate and exploit, for precisely the aforementioned reasons.

Chinese law requires the establishment of committees comprised of members of the Communist Party in all Chinese companies. According to the US Select Committee on Intelligence, these committees are vehicles for the Party by means of which to exert influence and pressure on the companies and monitor their work. US Congress Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report back in 2012 stating that precisely these committees were the vehicles by which the Party exerted influence and pressure on companies and placed them under surveillance.148

How high a threat to state security can the procurement and use of Chinese technologies pose is not something that can be seen in Serbia’s media, nor do Serbia’s officials speak about it at all, as attested to, among other, by the fact that the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of has purchased and is using Huawei technology.

On 25th July 2014 an accident happened on Belgrade’s Brankov Bridge when a young man was killed.149 The hit-and-run driver escaped, even though the police was on his trail. The following month the Serbian police found out that the suspect had fled to a town in China and sent his photograph to Chinese authorities. Only three days later, Chinese police arrested the man aided by cutting-edge technology. This impressed Serbian officials who, unlike their Chinese coun- terparts, were still using analog surveillance equipment and facilities with limited technical capabilities.

The Chinese company claims that the project „Safe City“ will shorten the time of police investi- gations, improve arrest rates, prevent organized crime and decrease the overall crime rate.150 On Huawei company’s official website „Safe City“ is described as a project which will contribute to heightened security during various events like sports matches, that already in its first stage it has helped solve criminal cases and that it will generally upgrade the technology used by Serbia‘s Ministry of the Interior.151

147 China’s Pursuit of Overseas Security. RAND Corporation. 2018. Available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_ reports/RR2271.html 148 146 Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE. A report by Chairman Mike Rogers and Ranking Member C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. House of Representatives 112th Congress. October 2012. Available at: https:// intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative%20report%20(final).pdf 149 Ibid 150 Big Brother Comes to Belgrade. Foreign Policy. June 2019. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/18/big- brother- comes-to-belgrade-huawei-china-facial-recognition-vucic/ 151 Ibid

RASHOMON 33 Towards the end of January 2019, the Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia Nebojša Stefanović announced that in order to improve the safety of citizens and combat crime, over the next two years a Huawei surveillance system would be deployed at 800 points throughout the capital of Serbia involving the installation of 1,000 high-definition cameras using facial and license plate recognition software, as well as that this is part of the strategic „Safe City“ project.152 The first agreement on cooperation between the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia and the Huawei Company was signed already in 2014. The next important strategic agreement with Huawei was signed in February 2017 when the introduction of eLTE technology was agreed in order to improve public safety and upgrade data exchange with a view to the improved safety of the citizens.153 The Ministry of the Interior then issued a communiqué stress- ing that members of the Ministry of the Interior would be able to exchange more information and video content through the eLTE network as well as to use them for upgrading the flow of information required for their everyday work.

The expanded scope of cooperation in the field of security surveillance between Serbia and Chinese companies, primarily Huawei, was reaffirmed in September 2018 when the Minister of Finance Siniša Mali signed yet another agreement.

In March 2019, the SHARE Foundation154 filed a request with the Ministry of the Interior for access to information of public importance asking for information on the locations of stationary cameras, including the analysis based on which these locations were chosen, and for details on the public procurement and relevant procedures. The Ministry declined SHARE Foundation’s request explaining that all documents concerning the public procurement of the video surveillance equipment in Belgrade were protected, being marked as “confidential”.155

In 2018, the Law on Personal Data Protection went into effect in Serbia which largely adopted the new standards of European Regulations in this area (primarily the EU General Data Pro- tection Regulation GDPR), while some civil society organizations as well as the Office of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection warned that the Law failed to specifically provide for a number of instruments to ensure the implementation of the Law.156 It should be stressed that up to now the Republic of Serbia has not taken any steps towards drafting a law to regulate video surveillance in public spaces in order to avoid potential abuses of facial identification software, which can create leeway for abusing citizens’ personal data.

As Huawei has in recent years been accused by some states, like the USA, Great Britain and Australia, of industrial and political espionage in cooperation with the Chinese authorities, public procurement procedures for such software and its use should be attended by a democratic public discussion and, among other, a detailed data protection impact assessment of these technologies undertaken.

152 Can China become Serbia’s „Big Brother“? BFPE. Author: Stefan Vladisavljev. February 2019. Available at: https://bfpe. org/da-li-kina-moze-postati-veliki-brat-srbije/ 153 Cooperation with “Huawei” to improve the safety of citizens. RTS. February 2017. Available at: http://www.rts.rs/ page/ stories/sr/story/125/drustvo/2617784/saradnja-sa-kompanijom-huavej-u-cilju-vece-bezbednosti-gradjana.html 154 SHARE Foundation is a nonprofit organization established in 2012 to advance human rights and freedoms online and promote positive values of an open and decentralized Web, as well as free access to information, knowledge and technology. Available at: https://www.sharefoundation.info/sr/o-nama/ 155 Are the locations of the new surveillance cameras and the risks to the constitutional rights of citizens known? SHARE Foundation. March 2019. Available at: https://www.sharefoundation.info/sr/da-li-su-poznate-lokacije-novih-kamera-za- nadzor-i-rizici-po-ustavna- prava-gradjana/ 156 Ibid

34 RASHOMON On the other hand, the Kingdom of Norway is supporting Serbia in the field of digitization, personal data protection as well as protection against cyber attacks. Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, on her visit to Belgrade at the end of June 2019, stressed that Norway was determined to continue to support Serbia in the area of digitization, but that, however, enhanced efficiency also entailed vulnerabilities, as well as that it was important to protect personal data but also against cyber attacks. She added that Norway would continue to help Serbia in establishing a better data security system before the funding of expensive equipment was secured.157

Norway is facing a tough political decision on who should be allowed to build out its next-generation telecommunications network amid a push by the U.S to shut out China’s Huawei Tech- nologies Co. Norwegian Digitization Minister Nikolai Astrup stated in March 2019 that this decision was not „black and white“.158 Norway is looking over the compliance with its security laws ahead of a pending tender where suppliers such as Ericsson AB and Huawei are set to compete in the roll-out of the 5G networks. Norway’s Telenor ASA has used Huawei technology in its 4G network, and so far, according to Norwegian officials, there are no indications of any security issues with the network.159

In April 2019, the Minister of Innovations and Technological Development Nenad Popović signed three agreements with the Chinese company China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRB- C)160 whereby conditions have been created for works to begin on the execution of the Borča Serbian-Chinese Industrial Park project. The Project Development Agreement, the Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Company, as well as the Business Plan of the Serbian-Chinese Industrial Park, which shall cover an area of 320 hectares in Borča, were signed.

On the occasion of the visit of Serbia’s delegation to the People’s Republic of China, the Re- public of Serbia deepened its cooperation with the Chinese company Huawei. The Minister of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications Rasim Ljajić signed a Memorandum of Understand- ing between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Huawei Company for the „Smart Cities“ project. The Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications stated that this document was signed with the objective of developing the strategy of smart cities, by positioning Huawei as a strategic partner for cities and local self-governments like Belgrade, Niš, Novi Sad and others. Minister Ljajić said that the „Smart Cities“ pilot project would first be implemented in the city of Niš: „Now we need to define what services would be implemented in Niš and which would benefit the citizens. We should define with the city of Niš whether it is traffic signalization, whether it is parking spaces, or water meter control. In any case something which shall be useful for the citizens of Niš“.161

In Serbia the restrictions that the company Google imposed on the company Huawei were very calmly received. After in May 2019 the US Company Google announced that it was banning

157 Status quo slowing both Serbia and Kosovo down. Politika. June2019. Available at: http://www.politika.rs/sr/ clanak/432426/Status- kvo-usporava-i-Srbiju-i-Kosovo 158 Norway Mulls Huawei 5G Decision That’s Not ‘Black and White’. Bloomberg. March 2019. Available at: https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-25/norway-mulls-huawei-5g-decision-that-s-not-black-and-white 159 Ibid 160 China Road and Bridge Corporation. China-Serbia Economy Association. Available at: http://cseacn.org/crbc- srb/?lang=sr 161 Smart cities coming to Serbia from China. RTS. April 2019. Available at: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/13/ ekonomija/3504093/pametni-gradovi-iz-kine-stizu-u-srbiju.html

RASHOMON 35 the company Huawei from access to Google services, Tatjana Matić, State Secretary in the Ministry of Telecommunications stated that „The conflict between Google and Huawei will not be reflected on the cooperation the Government of Serbia has with this Chinese IT giant nor on its long-term cooperation within the “Belt and Road“ process.162

Activities concerning the application of Chinese telecommunication technology and software in defense and security systems are potentially more dangerous trends. The RS must be wary lest it compromise its security system with Chinese equipment and software and thus jeopardize the attained level of protection of individual civil rights without a broad consensus on its necessity and preclude further EU integration, first and foremost.

SERBIA IN THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE Over the past five years China has been increasingly active in the Central and Eastern Europe regions. This drive was institutionalized in 2012 by the establishment of the 16+1 regional group which brings together 16 Central and Eastern Europe countries and the People’s Republic of China. In the first year or two, 16+1 was more or less a vacant form in quest of its mission. Its mission materialized only when the Chinese President Xi Jinping presented the grandiose vision of the new Silk Road (later „One Belt, One Road“; current name „Belt and Road“ Initia- tive). Since the drafting of this strategy towards the end of 2013, 16+1 has basically become its European sub-section, with concrete projects being routinely announced as milestones for both the 16+1 and for the „Belt and Road“ Initiative.

The 16+1 is not a regional bloc of Central and Eastern European countries for policy coordination vis-à-vis China; it is rather a platform for 16 bilateral relationships between Beijing and Central and Eastern European countries, an arrangement that China generally prefers to apply in diplomacy – in all bilateral relations, China, as a rule, is the bigger party. Instead of coordination, Central and Eastern European countries often compete for the position of China’s favorite partner in the region. In the race who will be China’s greater „friend“, one can say that with its „friendship made of steel“163 Serbia has secured a place for itself far ahead of the rest of the group making it a special “1”.

This competition among the 16 „partners“ is partially the consequence of the group’s structure: the 16+1 group have a secretariat164 with administrative staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, where policies and projects are elaborated. These projects shall be implemented in Central and Eastern European countries individually, through National Coordinators165, which

162 Matić: Serbia continues and advances cooperation with Huawei. N1. May 2019. Available at: http://rs.n1info.com/ Biznis/ a485621/Matic-Srbija-nastavlja-i-dodatno-unapredjuje-saradnju-sa-Huavejom.html 163 Mali: Serbia-China steel friendship, Vučić and Xi Jinping meet again. Blic. April 2019. Available at: https://www.blic. rs/ biznis/vesti/mali-celicno-prijateljstvo-srbije-i-kine-vucic-ponovo-sa-si-djinpingom/jlvbbqp 164 China – Brief Introduction to the Secretariat for Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries. China CEEC. November 2016. Available at: http://www.china-ceec.org/chn/msc/mscjj/t1409883.htm 165 Coordinators for Central and Eastern Europe. China CEEC. Available at: http://www.china-ceec.org/chn/zdogjxty/

36 RASHOMON is usually the rank of deputy minister in the government, without the relevant expertise and staff support. The initiative is mainly launched from China, with Central and Eastern European countries being reduced to passive recipients of Beijing-created policies.

Of the original 16 countries, eleven are European Union members, and five are not. Thirteen are NATO members and three are not. There are three states of the former Soviet Union, four from the Višegrad Process, six ex-Yugoslav republics, two Black Sea countries and Albania.

However, what indubitably matters to China are geographical facts, 16 Central and Eastern Eu- ropean countries in the geographical swath between the post-Soviet area and Western Europe. In China’s strategic thinking 16+1 is seen as the next step in the gradual process of projecting influence along the continental Eurasian area, which started with the setting up of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001(or even the one preceding it, The Shanghai Five, established in 1996).

In March 2019, the Italian Government166 signed an Agreement on Cooperation with Beijing in order to officially become a member of the Belt and Road Initiative, making it the first G7 member to sign on to this initiative, while in April 2019, following the Dubrovnik Summit, Greece too joined the Chinese strategic project.

On April 22, 2019, the Chinese Lead Group for the Promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative published a report briefly outlining the development of the Initiative and its results since it was launched over five years ago. The Report states that by the end of March 2019 China had signed as part of the Belt and Road Initiative 173 agreements on cooperation with 125 countries and 29 international organizations and bilateral cooperation contracts with numerous countries.167

The mutual distribution process greatly accelerated following the Crimean crisis and the West’s imposition of sanctions on Russia in 2014. After Crimea, President Putin did not have much of a choice but to turn to China, even if by so doing Russia became the junior partner in this new pseudo-alliance. In 2015 Putin’s own neo-imperialistic project, the Eurasian Economic Union signed a coordination agreement168 with the „Belt and Road“ Initiative (then still called „One Belt, One Road“), whereby basically the Shanghai Organization cooperation model spread to the entire post-Soviet area. (And, indeed, colored revolutions are referred to in the document). As assessed by Russian experts and commentators,169 Russia effectively enabled China to become a world power by granting it access to its own backyard in the area of Central Asia and the former Soviet Union.

166 Italy Signs on to Belt and Road Initiative: EU-China Relations at Crossroads? The Diplomat. April 2019. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/italy-signs-on-to-belt-and-road-initiative-eu-china-relations-at-crossroads/ 167 Participants satisfied with 16 + 1 Summit in Dubrovnik, Greece new member. EurActiv. April 2019. Available at: https:// www. euractiv.rs/eu-i-zapadni-balkan/13716-uesnici-zadovoljni-samitom-16-1-u-dubrovniku-grka-novi-lan 168 Joint statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on building the Silk Road Economic Belt and establishing the Eurasian Economic Union. Global Law. May 2015. Available at: http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/section/gjty!fetch.action?id=TOEL000080 169 Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations after the Ukraine Crisis. Author Alexander Gabuev. Carnegie Moscow Center. Jun 2016. Available at: http://carnegie.ru/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefitsrussian-chinese- relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953

RASHOMON 37 A variation of the process of „Eurasian Integration,”170 or of Russian and Chinese attempts to create a new bloc treaty in „Eurasia“, is now taking shape in Eastern Europe, which Moscow also traditionally regards as Russian turf. China’s moving into the region by way of the 16+1 Initiative can be perceived in this context as the westernmost arm of this new system of association in Eurasia. In sharp contrast with distributions in Central Asia, however, there is a con- spicuous difference: Russia is formally not a 16+1 member.

This has led some observers171 to conclude that China has outplayed Russia in Central and Eastern Europe by the 16+1 concept. Some even claim that Europe should applaud China’s advance in Central and Eastern Europe for precisely that reason, as a counterbalance to the ever increasing Russian influence.172 It, however, seems that facts on the ground do not bear out such a position. Russia has not objected to or complained of China’s alleged foray into its Central European and Eastern European backyard. If anything, there is every indication of smooth cooperation being pursued by the two powers across the region.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

China is a SC member which has not recognized Kosovo. At the same time it is a country faced with disputes and challenges, like Taiwan and Tibet, which the interpretation of a possible comprehensive multidimensional agreement between Belgrade and Pristina might have implications on. China is a country whose three nationals were killed in the NATO bombing of the FRY. These are additional relevant circumstances that must be taken into account in analyzing the Chinese presence and Chinese policy trends in the region at large, as well as the bilateral relations between Serbia and China.

Account being taken firstly of the political West’s expectations of an early formalization of Belgrade – Pristina relations through a comprehensive multidimensional agreement, secondly of the described geopolitical circumstances concerning China’s relations with the USA, Russia the EU and NATO, and thirdly of the fact that Serbia’s continued democratic consolidation and its foreign-policy orientation shall largely depend on the substance of that agreement and the manner in which it is reached, CEAS is of the view that the most important aspect of present-day Sino-Serbian bilateral relations is the Chinese position on what it would consider an acceptable resolution of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

The role of China in the region of the Western Balkans is significant, but considerably different in character than the destructive role of Russia. China is an important, but not the major politico-economic partner of Serbia. Strengthening bilateral relations between Serbia and China over the past few years has, for the time being, been a logical and positive trend which has on the whole favorably impacted the internal economic and developmental situation in Serbia and Serbia’s geopolitical positioning.

170 Eurasian Integration: Caught Between Russia and China. Authors Mathieu Duchâtel & François Godement & Kadri Liik & Jeremy Shapiro & Louisa Slavkova & Angela Stanzel & Vessela Tcherneva. ECFR. June 2016. Available at: http:// www. ecfr.eu/article/essay_eurasian 171 China’s geopolitical aims: The curious case of the 16-Plus-1. Author Kerry Brown. The Diplomat. May 2017. Available at: http:// thediplomat.com/2017/05/chinas-geopolitical-aims-the-curious-case-of-the16-plus-1/ 172 EKONOMIKA: Můžeme být u toho, nač váhat?. Author Jan Zahradil. Published by Neviditelny Pes. May 2017. Available at: http://neviditelnypes.lidovky.cz/ekonomikamuzemebytutohonacvahatdsv/p_ekonomika.aspx?c=A170523_200104_p_ ekonomika_wag

38 RASHOMON Bearing in mind the relatively positive assessments by Western financial institutions of Serbia’s financial standing, but also Serbia’s comparatively small size, there is no scope for excessively fearing a debt threat on account of Chinese infrastructural loans and the manner of their re- payment, but one should nevertheless not drop one’s guard. There is room for more precisely defining specific arrangements and their comparison with comparative arrangements coming primarily from the political West, both in terms of size and the manner of implementation, notably their transparency and their potential falling short of EU expectations in respect of environmental standards.

A given recent expansion of Sino-Serbian military-technical and military relations could partly be perceived as compensating or countervailing for heightened Russian expectations from bilateral relations with Serbia in these areas, and partly as political decisions with greater internal political than strategic weight. Bearing in mind the sanctions imposed by the US and EU on Russia due to the war in Ukraine, and the US sanctions against persons involved in transactions with the intelligence or defense sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, articulated in the CAATSA Act, this is not necessarily a bad alternative, but it must be pursued very cautiously.

The activities related to the application of Chinese telecommunications equipment and software in defense and security systems as well as in public administration are more acute and potentially more perilous trends. The RS must be careful lest it compromise its security system with Chinese equipment and software in a way that might jeopardize the attained level of protection of citizens’ individual rights in the absence of a broad consensus on its necessity and preclude further EU integration, first and foremost. In the area of data exchange and protection, the EU is much more integrated with NATO and the USA, which fact also Serbia must already now take into account, balancing its expectations regarding support in the negotiations on Kosovo as well. Bearing also in mind all the global challenges around the use of China’s G5 technology, this is by no means an easy task for a small and militarily neutral country.

China’s increased interest in intensifying linguistic and cultural cooperation programs as well as scientific cooperation would be welcome in any country. For Serbia it would be very ben- eficial over the long term if in future it were pursued with protection against the corrosive effects of Chinese sharp power on the attained level of protection of fundamental individual and minority rights, freedoms, and democratic practices. With all its weaknesses and challenges, Serbia is a by far more progressive country in these spheres than China. It has certainly been largely assisted by the political West over the past twenty years on that score. Serbia’s resilience to itself protect its democratic practices and freedoms from Chinese sharp power is unfortu- nately still not high, so that in this area of bilateral relations also the best course is a long-term strategy of Serbia’s European integration and strengthening its relations with NATO, with the

RASHOMON 39 parallel strengthening of good bilateral relations with the world’s great democracies, primarily the USA.

CEAS is of the opinion that the best future scenario for shaping these relations for the Republic of Serbia and all its citizens would be for Serbia to stay on track of EU integration and reinforcement of cooperation with NATO and the Member States, primarily the USA, while in parallel strengthening bilateral cooperation with other global and different actors in a way which would not jeopardize these goals, primarily by the earliest possible formalization of relations with Pristina on the basis of compromise, with its potential democratic verification in Belgrade, where China plays a role that is often overlooked.

That, in turn, would contribute to the further improvement of the fragile democratic practices and enhancing Serbia’s resilience to ward off, together with its partners, new global and local detrimental influences on liberal democratic practices and policies, from corrosive to malignant ones. Such an outcome would enable Serbia to, by strengthening the positive aspects of its cooperation with China, keep at bay the corrosion of democratic practices, which China has often been carrying out through its sharp power in the areas of information and politics.

Upon formalization and its institutional verification through constitutional amendments, Serbia would need to embark on developing its foreign policy strategy and adopting new defense and security strategies as soon as possible. Rid of the encumbering outstanding issue of Kosovo, they would have to consider the geopolitical circumstances in a geopolitically more realistic way than is the case with, for example, the proposed new defense and security strategies published this spring.

Should Belgrade successfully formalize its relations with Pristina in a way enabling it to stay on the course of EU integration and strengthen relations with NATO and the individual Member States, primarily the USA, which CEAS considers the most favorable outcome, the foregoing new strategies would have to project future relations with China in a way that would not jeopardize these primary interests. Although very broadly defined, the concept of Global Power Competition which is increasingly being used in the West to describe the new geopolitical circumstances, the new strategic documents of the USA and the EU and recent NATO decisions point to deep differences in fundamental values, the principles of the internal order of member states and perceptions of respect for the international liberal order which revisionist powers, like primarily Russia, but also China are eroding.

The state leadership would be well-advised to relatively quickly undertake an internal assessment of the time frame within which an attempt at formalizing relations with Pristina could be expected. If it is assessed that it would be somewhat longer, consideration should be given to adopting the national security and defense drafts published in the spring improved by amendments, or coming up with new drafts. The existing strategies no longer realistically reflect current political-security-military circumstances. This is of the essence if Serbia is to continue to be considered a relatively predictable and reliable partner of the broader political West in a concerted response to regional and global security challenges. It would be a shame to detract from the good name of the RS, earned with good reason over the past few years, regardless of the challenges and the complex circumstances.

40 RASHOMON In the long run, for a country of Serbia’s size, if bent on continuing the process of democratic consolidation and economic growth, the best way to optimize the positive and weather the negative global trends largely generated by China as a global power is regionalization through Eu- ropean integration, partnership with NATO and strengthening bilateral relations with the USA.

CEAS recommends that as a first short-term measure in pursuit of these goals, the EU, NATO and USA should seek to somewhat better understand the breadth and depth of the challenges that Serbia’s leadership in office and Serbia as a society are currently facing. In the short run they can demonstrate it primarily by accommodating RS Government’s expectations regarding steel quotas, and by supporting a compromise solution for formalizing relations between Bel- grade and Pristina, which would bring Serbia closer to the political West.

In the mid-term perspective, CEAS recommends that the EU primarily endeavor to facilitate access to its infrastructural funds for applicant countries. The EU and NATO could together articulate the development of their mutual cooperation in the area of military mobility through a number of joint infrastructural projects in the region of the Western Balkans and Southeast Europe. Given the latest geopolitical developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as well as along global mercantile and military naval routes in general, Serbia as the largest and the only Danubian country in the Western Balkans certainly gains in importance and has a role to play in this context.

RASHOMON 41 ABOUT CEAS

The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (CEAS) is an independent socio-liberal think-tank organization founded in 2007 in Belgrade, Serbia.

The motto which the CEAS follows in its work is “Progress, Determination, Influence”.

We stand for:

• Adoption of the principle of the precedence of individual over collective rights, without disregard for the rights which individuals can only achieve through collective action; • Strengthening of the secular state principle and promotion of a faithless understanding of the world; • Development and preservation of a more open, freer, more prosperous and more cooperative international order founded on smart globalization. Our advocacy and research work is mostly focused on:

• Contemporary Serbian, Regional and Trans-Atlantic Foreign and Security Policies; • Full Serbian membership in EU and NATO; • Russian and other non-democratic influences on the stabilization and democratization of Western Balkans; • Importance of connection between security sector reform and transitional justice in the post- conflict Balkans; • Promotion of Responsibility to Protect, the international humanitarian and security doctrine; • Overcoming of the democratic deficits of multiculturalism. Among CEAS’s most popular reports are: “Rashomon - Analysis of the bilateral relations between Serbia and China and their impact on the continuation of Serbia’s democratization, EU integration and cooperation with NATO and the Member States” (2019), “From Moscow With- out Love” (2019) , “Kosovo First - Analysis of the draft of the Defense Strategy of the Re- public of Serbia” (2018), “Kosovo First - Analysis of the context of the adoption process and analysis of the draft National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia” (2018), ”West Side Story” (2018), “Vencislav The Virgin” (2018), ”Basic Instinct – The Case for More NATO in The Western Balkans“ (2017), “Guide through information security in the Republic of Serbia” (2016), “Eyes wide shut – Strengthening of Russian Soft Power in Serbia– goals, instruments and effects” (2016), “The Missing Link: Security sector reform, ‘military neutrality’ and EU-integration in Serbia” (2014), “Guide through information security in the Republic of Serbia” (2016), “Keeping up with the private security sector – II” (2015), “Keeping up with the private security sector” (2013), “X Factor Serbia” (2013), “CEAS analysis - The Law on Classified Information” (2015), “CEAS analysis - Security Vetting in Serbia” (2015), “CEAS analysis - Protection of Whistleblowers in Serbia” (2015), “Extreme Makeover” (2014), “10x in favor NATO” (2014), “CEAS analysis of the Law on Amendments of the Law on the Security Intel- ligence Agency” (2014), “Putin’s Orchestra” (2014), “Putinization” (2014), etc.

CEAS is the only member from the Region of South-Eastern Europe to have full membership in ICRtoP- the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. The coalition brings together non-governmental organizations from all over the world to collectively strengthen the normative consensus for the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), with the aim of

42 RASHOMON better understanding this principle, pushing for the strengthened capacities of the international community to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu- manity, and to mobilize the non-governmental sector to push for action to save lives in RtoP country-specific situations.

CEAS is a member of the Coalition for RECOM – a coalition comprising more than 1,800 organizations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, advocating for the founding of the Regional Commission for establishing facts about war crimes and other serious violations of human rights committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 2001.

CEAS is among the most visible think-tanks in the Balkans, with a wide media, institutional and social outreach. CEAS has been quoted in leading prominent liberal media such as The New York Times, Washington Post, Politico, etc. In December 2016, CEAS Director Jelena Milic was elected as one of the POLITICO 28 Most influential People in the annual POLITICO 28 list of people who are shaping, shaking and stirring Europe.

In mid-2018 CEAS became one of the 22 leading international organizations, and the only one from the Western Balkans, which are partners of the Atlantic Council (AC USA) on the new strategic project DisinfoPortal. AC USA is considered one of the most influential think tank organizations in the world.

CEAS programs have been so far supported by: Open Society Fund (OSF); Think Tank Fund, Budapest; National Endowment for Democracy, USA; Rockefeller Brothers Fund, USA; Eu- ropean Commission; Balkan Trust for Democracy – GMF, Serbia; NATO Public Diplomacy Division; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Serbia; Royal Nor- wegian Embassy in Belgrade; Visegrad Fund, Slovakia; Friedrich Nauman Foundation, Serbia; Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Serbia; USA Embassy in Serbia.

RASHOMON 43 RASHOMON Analysis of Bilateral Relations Between Serbia and China and Their Impact on Serbia’s Continued Democratization, EU Integration and Cooperation with NATO and the Member States July 2019

Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (CEAS)

11000 Belgrade, Serbia Tel/fax:Dr. Dragoslava +381 11 Popovica 323 9579 15 [email protected] | www.ceas-serbia.org | @CEASSerbia