Belgrade and Pristina: Lost in Normalisation? by Donika Emini and Isidora Stakic

5 2 0 1 8 MICONI ANDREA/SIPA MICONI Belgrade and Pristina: lost in normalisation? by Donika Emini and Isidora Stakic The EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade The windy road to normalcy and Pristina, known as the Brussels Dialogue, started in March 2011 with the aim to ‘normalise’ The first phase of the Brussels Dialogue, the so- relations between the two parties, find solutions called ‘technical’ phase, lasted from March 2011 for long-standing disputes and, consequently, until February 2012; it resulted in nine agree- advance their prospects of European integra- ments between Serbia and Kosovo, of which tion.The newly adopted European Commission some have been implemented fully, some par- Communication on a credible enlargement per- tially, and some not at all. The second phase el- spective for an enhanced EU engagement with evated the Dialogue to a prime ministerial level, the Western Balkans (known as the new EU and it was at this stage that the First Agreement Strategy for the Western Balkans) reaffirms that of Principles Governing the Normalisation of the normalisation of relations between Kosovo1 Relations (known as the Brussels Agreement) and Serbia is key to their advancement on their was signed on 19 April 2013.3 This Agreement is respective EU paths.2 considered to be a major historical achievement and a milestone in the normalisation process, as However, during the seven years of the Dialogue, it tackled politically highly sensitive areas – such relations between Kosovo and Serbia have os- as security, the rule of law, the competences of cillated between normalisation and a state of local authorities in Serbian-inhabited areas in strained peace and conflict prevention. The as- Kosovo, and the judiciary. The Agreement con- sassination of a Serbian politician from north tains 15 points on a range of issues, the most Kosovo, Oliver Ivanovic, on 16 January 2018, important being related to the establishment of as well as the arrest of the Serbian government the Association/Community of Serb majority official Marko Djuric by Kosovo police in north municipalities and the dissolution of the Serbian Mitrovica, Kosovo on 26 March, has fuelled new parallel structures in north Kosovo. tensions and increased uncertainty surrounding the future of the normalisation process. Given The implementation of the Brussels Agreement these developments, what are the key obstacles proved to be even more challenging than the to more constructive relations between Pristina implementation of the Agreements reached dur- and Belgrade? ing the technical phase of the Dialogue, given European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) April 2018 1 the sensitivity of its content. Different parts of already on hold due to the presidential elections the Brussels Agreement have to date been im- in Serbia, and later on due to the parliamentary plemented to various degrees, with some of the elections in Kosovo, the resolution did not have points becoming a source of tension between any implications for the normalisation process. It the parties, rather than serving as a tool to reach did, however, fuel nationalist sentiments in both the overarching goal of normalisation – particu- countries, thus exacerbating tensions. larly the points related to the formation of the Association/Community of Serb majority mu- Relations reached a new nadir just ten days af- nicipalities. ter Haradinaj’s arrest, when a train departed from Belgrade bound for northern Mitrovica (a Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo north Kosovo municipality populated by Serbs), painted in the colours of the Serbian flag and SERBIA bearing the words ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ in 21 different languages. The train was eventually stopped before entering Kosovo by then Prime Minister of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic, who claimed that MONTENEGRO Kosovo-Albanians had tried to mine the railway. The train incident was followed by even more inflammatory rhetoric, with the then President Pristina of Serbia Tomislav Nikolic stating that “he would be willing to send the army to defend Serbs in Kosovo, if necessary”.4 The timing of the incident – a few months before the presidential elections in Serbia – suggests that it might have been intended to garner support among the parts of ALBANIA the Serbian electorate with nationalist leanings. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA War of words Such events, although frequently referred to as incidents, involve more than just an excessive use of inflammatory language. Instead, they are Data: UK FCO a manifestation of the true nature of the regional politics underpinning the Brussels Dialogue – During the first four years of the Dialogue, name- which both sides portray differently depending ly from 2011 to 2015, a number of Agreements on whether they are addressing their respective were reached, which created an appearance of domestic audiences or the international commu- progress. However, once the implementation of nity, particularly the EU. the Agreements was put on the agenda, the pace of the Dialogue slowed down significantly. Since The narrative crafted for international audi- 2016, the Brussels Dialogue has stalled, while ten- ences, for instance, is marked by a declaration sions have risen and nationalist rhetoric has be- of full commitment to the normalisation of re- come increasingly common. Tensions intensified lations, a readiness for compromise, and great sharply at the begin- concern for the well- ning of January 2017 ‘The domestic narrative is nationalist, being of citizens. The with the arrest of the rationale behind this former (and now cur- identitarian, and structured according is that further progress rent) Prime Minister on EU integration for Ramush Haradinaj, to a zero-sum logic, portraying one side both sides is condi- one of Kosovo’s po- either as the winners, or as the victims tioned on engagement litical leaders and war in the Dialogue. The veterans, in France of an ‘enemy other’.’ domestic narrative, based on a Serbian ar- however, is national- rest warrant for alleged war crimes. In response, ist, identitarian, and structured according to a the Assembly of Kosovo adopted a resolution de- zero-sum logic, portraying one side either as the manding the suspension of the Brussels Dialogue winners, or as the victims of an ‘enemy other’. until Haradinaj was released. As the Dialogue was For example, after the signing of the Agreement European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) April 2018 2 on the Association/Community of Serb majority meaning: for Kosovo it refers to a ‘border’ and municipalities, and the Agreements on energy and therefore a delineation between two countries, telecommunications, Serbian high official Marko while for Serbia it is perceived as an ‘administra- Djuric stated that the outcome is “a 5-0 victory for tive boundary line’ and is therefore an internal de- Serbia”, implying that the goal of the normalisa- marcation separating two regions. Back in 2012, tion process is to somehow defeat the other party.5 using this term was considered to be ‘the only way forward’. However, the debate over terminology Another even more drastic example occurred in will continue in Serbia in the framework of chap- December 2017 when the Serbian Minister of ters 23 and 24 of the EU accession process, and in Defence Aleksandar Vulin declared that Serbian Kosovo due to growing calls for the government armed forces are preparing for war.6 He explicitly to reach an agreement on a ‘border’ with Serbia. mentioned the violent attacks on Kosovo-Serbs by Kosovo-Albanians that happened 14 years ago Common Crossing Points (CCPs) (in March 2004) as an explanation as to why the Serbian army should be ready for the outbreak of war at any time. Kosovan politicians can be equally quick to use inflammatory rhetoric. For instance, Rudnica-Jarinje after Haradinaj’s arrest in France, his brother and SERBIA member of parliament, Daut Haradinaj, threat- ened that “not a single Serb would remain in Bernjak-Tabalije Kosovo” should France extradite him to Serbia. Merdare-Merdare These often aggressive narratives on both sides MONTENEGRO serve to win the support of nationalist elements of Mutivode-Mutivode society, without which the current political elites would struggle to remain in power. Another reason behind the slow implementation Konculj-Dheu i Bardhe of the Agreements and why the normalisation process has stalled is the employment of ‘constructive Depce-Mucibaba ambiguity’, an approach that aims to ensure the commitment of both parties to sometimes vague ALBANIA agreements, the details of which are to be speci- fied at a later date. This was applied in order to THE FORMER YUGOSLAV portray each Agreement as beneficial for both par- REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA ties, and to postpone the implementation of more sensitive aspects until a moment when enough trust has been built. However, in the process of implementation, this became one of the key obstacles, or even made the Agreements non-imple- Data: UK FCO, Kosovo police mentable, as genuine trust between the parties has not been established. Legally ambiguous Agreements have also allowed political elites to express triumphalism after each As the legally ambiguous parts of the Agreements round of talks, while local populations have yet are open to diverging interpretations, they have to feel the effects of concrete progress. This was become a source of endless (re)negotiation that reflected in the statements by Hashim Thaci, the elites use to postpone their implementation. current president of

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