Human Rights in Serbia in 2012 – Populism: Entropy of Democracy
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HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA IN 2012 POPULISM: ENTROPY OF DEMOCRACY ABRIDGED VERSION HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA IN 2012 POPULISM: ENTROPY OF DEMOCRACY Abridged version BELGRADE, 2013 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana PB HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 1 Human Rights in Serbia in 2012 POPULISM: ENTROPY OF DEMOCRACY (Abridged version) publisher Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia for the publisher Sonja Biserko layout and design Ivan Hrašovec Cover page drawing: Courtesy of Alvaro Cabrera This abridged online (pdf) edition has been produced with the assistance of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Belgrade. The contents of this edition are the sole responsibility of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the Netherlands MFA. Full edition in Serbian: ISBN 978-86-7208-186-2 COBISS.SR-ID 191407628 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 2 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 3 3 Contents I – INTRODUCTION Conclusions and Recommendations ...................................... 7 Human Rights: In the Shadow of Xenophobia ............................. 17 Extreme Right-Wing: A Value System Imposed on the Society ................ 31 Transitional Justice: Inappropriate and Inconsistent ........................ 45 II – THE JUDICIARY Snail-Paced Reform ................................................. 59 Anti-Crime Campaign: Between Self-Satisfaction and the Realities ............ 77 Questionable Privatizations: Still in EU’s Focus ............................ 87 Prisons: Overcrowded and Inadequate ................................... 89 III – THE SECURITY SYSTEM: SLOW ADJUSTMENT TO EUROPEAN STANDARDS Serbia’s Military Neutrality and EU Security and Defense Policy ............... 95 Major Challenges for the Ministry of the Interior and Law Enforcement. .115 The Situation of the Ministry of Defence and Serbia’s Armed Forces ...........123 IV – SERBIA’S ASSEMBLY Extreme Multipartism ................................................161 V – DRAMATIC ECONOMIC SITUATION The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Election Results ......................175 VI – RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES: PRIVILEGED MAJORITY CHURCH Institutional Framework ..............................................199 VII – ETHNIC MINORITIES Still Targeted by Nationalists ..........................................243 VIII – THE MEDIA In the Service of the Government ......................................269 IX – KOSOVO Progress Made under the Pressure from Realities ..........................303 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 2 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 3 4 X – SERBIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS Bosnia-Herzegovina: Waiting for the Circumstances to Change ...............317 XI – SERBIA AND THE WORLD Serbia Turns Toward EU ..............................................343 Russian interests in Serbia ............................................363 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 4 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 5 5 I – INTRODUCTION HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 4 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 5 6 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 6 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 7 7 Conclusions and Recommendations Though formed a year ago, the Serbian government is still at the begin- ning – it has not yet adopted a systemic program or strategy. The struc- tures in power are in permanent election campaign having an eye on their ratings on the one hand and demonization of the former government on the other. The biggest party of the ruling coalition, SNS, spares not even its coalition partners from criticism. SNS populist rhetoric is mainly after promoting Vice-Premier Aleksandar Vučić. The predominant populism is best exemplified by the arrest of suspects in “the struggle against corrup- tion” and the “socially-oriented” budget for the year 2013 that subsidizes health insurance of a larger circle of citizens. All this gives rise to specula- tions about early elections, which are not to be ruled out. Aleksandar Vučić manifests a growing ambition to hold all the reins of power. He already controls all security services. Hence, citizens are under the impression that he is the most powerful man in Serbia. The steps the government has taken so far do not indicate its inten- tion to reform the security sector; on the contrary, they indicate an ambi- tion to strengthen partisan control over it. They neither indicate a plan for setting up permanent anti-corruption institutions and mechanisms. Pri- marily through the media controlled by parts or entire security services corruption is used for political showdowns and elimination of business competition. The security sector that has not undergone reform, operating under half-finished and legally discordant system of the democratic con- trol and with cadres compromised on corruption will be unable to meet ambitious duties that have been allegedly imposed on it. Despite a changed rhetoric and the agreement signed with Prishtina what marks domestic policy, except for populism, is a strong resistance to Serbia’s Europeanization and modernization. Populism is nothing but one of manifestations of Serb nationalism that persists as the only ideology now in the hands of Aleksandar Vučić. One cannot deny that some gov- ernmental steps – such as negotiations with Prishtina agreement – were HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 6 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 7 8 serbia 2012 : INTRODUCTION positive. But only the implementation of the agreement will show whether or not the government signed it in good will. Speaking of the promises given in the election campaign, most of them have not been met – and stand no chance for being met. The public in Serbia responded to the U-turn in the decades-long Kosovo policy as to something that could not have been avoided. People have been aware for long that Kosovo was a lost cause. Kosovo has been used only as a tool for the achievement of the goals in Bosnia. Persistence on the “Kosovo policy” threatened to “drown” Serbia. Germany’s resolute- ness to put an end to the misuse of Kosovo and clearly define precondi- tions for Serbia’s membership of EU turned out to be most efficient. Belgrade’s and Prishtina’s agreement was in the focus of attention of domestic and international public alike. Kosovo has always been the topic the pro-European and anti-European Serbia clashed on. The platform that preceded the agreement opened the door to dilemmas about Serbia’s fu- ture course. Generally speaking, the attitude towards Kosovo oscillates be- tween two extremes: the irrational belief that getting a part of Kosovo is still a possibility on the one hand, and grim social and economic reali- ties on the other. Resistance to Europeanization is to be expected in this context. As an exponent of the conservative bloc, President Tomislav Nikolić retained his ambivalent attitude towards Kosovo and Serbia’s course to- wards EU. All his Kosovo related statements have been contradictory. They stand for his attempt to win over the public, especially the conservative circles he represents but also reveal his poor understanding of interna- tional circumstances. Nevertheless, his natural allies (SPC, parts of SANU, right-wing organizations such as Dveri, Naši et al, right-wing papers such as NSPM, Pecat, Geopolitika, etc. and broadcasters like Copernicus or Ra- dio Focus, DSS and other parties of the bloc) had expected him to behave quite differently once in power. Now, disappointed in Nikolić they criticize him profusely. The conservative bloc takes that Serb Progressive Party has let it down as it failed to make a clear break with the “treacherous” policy of Demo- cratic Party and its leader, Boris Tadić. According to it, the West “precisely HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 8 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 9 Conclusions and Recommendations 9 cast SNS as the lead only a party with patriotic aura could possibly play.” So far the advocacy for the establishment of a “strong patriotic bloc” as “a genuine opposition and a new force at the Serbian political scene” sounds more like a cry for the moon than a serious threat. The attempt by anti-Eu- ropean forces assembling DSS, SRS and their allies from right-wing groups and organizations to stage massive protests failed: so far these forces to not pose a serious threat to the ruling coalition. Kosovo North leader’s opposition to the agreement is chilling out. This only testifies that their area for maneuver has always depended on Belgrade. Their grudge, deprived of Belgrade’s support, can only to some extent stand in the way of the agreement’s implementation. The democratic opposition and civil society organizations do not re- spond promptly and adequately to the state of affairs in the society: they are either tired out and disappointed, and take uncoordinated actions or irresponsible, corrupt and prioritize personal or group interests over the country’s modernization. All this contributed to an atmosphere of apathy. The present-day situation in Serbia calls for prompt responses from the opposition, civil society organizations and free media. The process of accession to EU is crucial for Serbia regardless of all the criticism of EU for its ongoing crisis. That is