On the Cusp Between Democratic Transition and Consolidation in East-Central Europe?: Regime Change Patterns and External Impacts Reassessed

ON THE CUSP BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE?: REGIME CHANGE PATTERNS AND EXTERNAL IMPACTS REASSESSED

Geoffrey Pridham

University of Bristol, UK

Paper for Conference on EARLY LESSONS FROM THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: WESTERN INFLUENCES ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TRANSITIONS, organised by Centre for Applied Policy Research, Munich, and Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, in Bratislava, 12-13 October 2000 2

(1) From Democratic Transition to Democratic Consolidation

It is commonly assumed, on occasions reviewing the first decade of regime change in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE), that the countries in question have moved through transition to democracy and that they are well on the way to achieving democratic consolidation. Thus, those predictions that were cautious or pessimistic after Communist rule ended abruptly in 1989 will be entirely disproved. While such "Ten Years After" conferences have hardly been held in the euphoria that was also evident in that heady autumn, there is some complacency in such assumptions and quite a few basic questions are begged.

1.1 Firstly, there is no guarantee or inevitability about democratisation succeeding as if by some process of unstoppable evolution. Postwar Latin American politics and interwar European history provide suitable lessons that countries may embark on and even make it through democratic transition but then fail the tests of democratic consolidation. One may of course find contrasts that tend - largely justifiably - to show our present international environment as one more favourable to the chances for new democracies. However, it is generally recognised the first decade is vital in determining regime change outcomes; and, this is now past. Thereafter, one may speak of a growing probability (as distinct from certainty) that new democracies will become consolidated.

1.2 Secondly, the transformation that has been occurring in CEE is on a qualitatively unprecedented scale compared with previous regime changes in postwar Europe and, for that matter, in Latin America too. By and large, the types of economic systems then pre-existing political change were maintained, admittedly with some reforms (countries in Southern Europe and Latin America transited within the framework of capitalist systems), while postwar (re)democratisations had to dismantle war economies, if not already largely lain waste by hostilities, and embark on reconstruction (of essentially pre-existing economic systems). However, the replacement of socialist command economies by market economies has been a long and painful process, with inevitable repercussions on political democratisation. In East-Central Europe, at least, this has not however seriously injured the commitment to democratic rules and procedures among elites and publics; although, there is perhaps a case for arguing that the combination of different transformations may have retarded democratic consolidation. This last argument is all the stronger in the case of those countries - in fact, the majority of post-Communist states - that have simultaneously carried the burden of state- and nation-building.

Almost certainly, therefore, the overall democratisation process from transition's beginning to consolidation's end will take longer than, say, in post-Nazi Germany, post-Franco Spain or even post-Pinochet Chile. In this sense, the "Ten Years After" events are probably timed about right, for there is something very convincing about seeing the 1990s as the decade of transition and therefore the coming of the new millennium as - coincidentally - marking the shift to consolidation.

1.3 Thirdly, this transformation in CEE is also quantitatively on a scale which is unprecedented. Latin America has witnessed many more attempts at democratisation than the three in Southern Europe in the 1970s as well as the two post-Fascist cases and handful of redemocratisations in former occupied countries after 1945; but nothing like what's been happening in post-Communist Europe. There are some 27 cases altogether, including those formerly republics in the USSR. This systemic change is of epidemical proportions, but it also points up the considerable scope for cross-national variation here not only in regime change trajectories but also, quite possibly, regime change outcomes. So far, after the first decade, there are already signs of possible cross-national diversification on the latter count, although Belarus is the only obvious case of a new regime that has undergone democratic inversion to authoritarian rule inspired by a personalistic form of Soviet nostalgia. In-between, are to be found examples of so- called hybrid regimes, combining formal democracy with authoritarian practices with therefore uncertain outcomes. But, as Croatia has recently shown, hybrid regimes may, in special circumstances, take a new direction which clarifies regime change direction in one or other way. Furthermore, the very recent presidential election in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia demonstrates that formal democratic procedures certainly matter if given new political impetus.

In short, such cross-national diversification is bound to qualify generalisations about CEE as a whole being set on course for democratic consolidation. A parallel dimension to this point is cross-regional differentiation, involving distinctions between regional groupings of countries within CEE; and, that is an issue which this paper will later address with special reference to East-Central Europe (ECE). 3

1.4 Fourthly, and finally, discussion of a general shift from transition to consolidation is conditional on definitional clarity. Here, there is a problem for whereas the relatively brief period of transition may be fairly readily pinned down to identifiable transition tasks - the most prominent being the final agreement on a full constitution - definitions of democratic consolidation are more disputed and, accordingly, the source of rather different interpretations of when consolidation is achieved. The main academic controversy is between those (largely American) political scientists who stress formal democratic requirements and those (very largely European) who argue in favour of substantive democracy being tantamount to consolidation. Whereas the first are not surprised if consolidation may occur within a decade, the latter tend to equate its achievement with almost a generation or certainly two decades 1. But, as argued above, the occurrence in CEE of multiple transformation, where political democratisation is but one form of systemic change interacting with others, decisively swings the argument there in favour of the longer scenario. Just focussing on political regime change is not going to explain democratisation completely, let alone the overall transformation of which democratisation forms a central part 2. By transformation may be understood a fairly deep or fundamental process of change. This is likely to characterise democratisation the more it develops, i.e. transformation is more likely to arise from regime consolidation; although it is implicit in transition, for if you change a political system there will probably be some rather significant consequences. It is also likely to be a process that is distinctly more long- than short-term.

1.5 The following definitions are preferred, accepting this point. Democratic transition is seen as commencing at the point when the previous non-democratic regime begins to collapse, leading to a situation when, with a new constitution in place, the democratic structures are settled formally and political elites are prone to start adjusting their behaviour accordingly. Signs, therefore, of elite consensus or the formation of elite consensus are a significant indication of transition being accomplished. Transition tasks involve above all negotiating the constitutional settlement and settling the rules of procedure for political competition as well as dismantling authoritarian agencies and abolishing laws unsuitable for democratic life. These attributes are seen as characteristics of transition but not as absolutes. For example, delayed constitutional settlements may - or may not - bear witness to difficult transitions. In reality, as a very crude average, transitions have in the pre-postcommunist era taken around half a decade - in some cases, rather less; but in others, evidently longer.

Democratic consolidation is not only a much lengthier process but also one with wider and usually deeper effects. It involves in the first instance the gradual removal of the remaining uncertainties surrounding transition (e.g. constitutional, elite behaviour, resolution of civil-military relations). The way is then opened for the institutionalisation of a new democracy, the internalisation of rules and procedures and the dissemination of democratic values through a "remaking" of the political culture. Much depends in achieving this on the weight of historical inheritances and problems. It is also on these grounds that one may expect post-Communist countries, including those in East-Central Europe, to take time, in addition to the effects of the multi-transformation process.

While "transition" and "consolidation" are generally seen as distinguishable phases of the overall democratisation process, they should be distinguished qualitatively and not necessarily in terms of chronology. They are not strictly divisible as successive phases although invariably consolidation is completed after transition if not long afterwards, since it is a much longer part of the process. Conceivably, consolidation may start at one or more levels while

1 Defining democratic consolidation was the occasion for some quite lively conference discussions on new Southern European democracies during the 1980s and 1990s. A major work reflecting these debates is R. Gunther, N. Diamandouros and H-J. Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995). For the author's view at the time, see his own chapter 1 in G. Pridham (ed.), Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe (Routledge, London, 1990). 2 There is some similarity here with the conventional interpretation of how political systems generally operate. Easton, for instance, sees this as involving three hierarchical levels of decision-making, as follows: nation-building or decisions on identity, citizenship and the territorial as well as social and cultural boundaries of the nation state (who `we' are, relating to passion); constitution-making or decisions on rules, procedures and rights (relating to reason); and, the politics of allocation and distribution or decisions (within these parameters) on `who gets what, when and how' (relating to interest) (see D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (Wiley, New York, 1965), chapters 10-13. This framework is used by Offe in his discussion of the triple transformation (see C. Offe, Varieties of Transition, pp. 32-35) 4 transition is still in progress. For instance, civil society may emerge as viable soon after authoritarian collapse due to historical factors as well as developments under the predecessor regime, while elites are still tussling with transition tasks. In any case, democratic consolidation is viewed as a multi-dimensional/level process where different dimensions may develop at variable paces - and, notionally, consolidation may be achieved here at different points of time. There are, therefore, cusp-like aspects about such overlap between transition and consolidation especially where, in individual country cases, transition may not yet be complete but consolidation is already underway.

1.6 For this reason, this paper concentrates on developing a specific approach concerning movement towards democratic consolidation, with special reference to East-Central Europe. It does this by, firstly, an assessment of patterns of change over the past decade; secondly, by discussing whether ECE states represent a specially successful case of post-Communist transformation; and, then, by turning to measuring external, and especially EU, impacts on this process of regime change. Conclusions will be drawn about prospects and problems for the future.

(2) Looking Back over the Past Decade: Anticipating Democratic Consolidation

We turn now therefore to examining the different levels of democratic consolidation. This draws on the results for East-Central Europe in a detailed comparative study of European democratisations, not yet published 3 Applying these to the countries of ECE should provide us with two advantages. It should help us to assess more exactly how far they have moved down the road to achieving consolidation; but also allow us a better means for appreciating the dynamics of regime change in the region. These levels will be discussed in order, drawing out general policy implications, before concluding about the present state of democratisation in the region. They are presented in very abbreviated form.

2.1 Historical Determinants: these may comprise both negative elements (the difficult weight of the past) and positive elements (usable democratic legacy), but it is how these are utilised and handled that matters in transition. In this respect, ECE countries have mixed patterns with both democratic and authoritarian experiences and traditions before the Communist period. It was mainly in Czechoslovakia that positive recall of this experience was harnessed during the founding democratic years after 1989. Sometimes, negative comparisons have arisen as between the interwar authoritarian figure Pilsudski and President Walesa (1990-95) in Poland.

Rather stronger as an historical determinant was the reaction to the Communist era. Some cross-national variation was evident in the treatment of those involved in the previous regime, as over the issue of "lustration". Past associations have continued to affect politics in some ECE countries, as most recently in Poland. But, as a whole, there was a basic difference between ECE countries and those in the Balkans, where authoritarian practices developed either because hardly reconstructed ex-Communists remained in or returned to power (as in Romania until 1996) or because new types of rulers followed similar practices which did not conflict with long traditions in their countries (as with Berisha in Albania). By contrast, almost, former ruling parties in ECE countries converted into centre-Left ones (with the one exception of the KSCM in the Czech Republic). This undoubtedly helped these countries to "overcome" the past. Not insignificant too was a marked (and revived) sense of belonging by tradition to cultural Europe; and this, at the level of elite mentalities and educational circles contributed towards ECE moving on to the future - paradoxically, however, one which drew inspiration from the past. Of course, the international environment was far more favourable for the chances of new democracies from 1989 than it had been after 1918 and 1945. There was, for instance, no world war to recover from, there were no potentially dangerous neighbours, the West was more willing to help with reconstruction and, finally, the existence of the European Union offered a form of integrated framework that was unprecedented 4

Policy Implications: ECE countries are not so basically impeded by historical legacies as those in other regions of the post-Communist world, aside from specific national concerns with the Communist past. There is, however, a general problem of state capacity and legitimacy deriving from the Communist era, relating to administrative efficiency and public attitudes to public authority. This is not easily resolved at the public level, for an improvement

3 G. Pridham, The Dynamics of Democratisation: A Comparative Approach (Continuum, London, 2000). 4 R. Bideleux and I. Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change (Routledge, London, 1998), p. 606. 5 will take time; but at the level of administrative personnel reform may come through generational replacement of senior figures. There are also sustained pressures from the EU for improving state capacity ("Ability to assume the obligations of membership" in annual Progress Reports).

2.2 Authoritarian Breakdown and Collapse: unlike the countries of the Balkans, those in ECE went through reform cycles during the Communist period and these tended to end in strong protest against Soviet rule as occurred in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980-81. There developed a protracted crisis in Communist regimes - specifically, and most openly, in Poland, which became a trend-setter for eventual transition, while in Czechoslovakia, almost by contrast, the failed push for reform in 1968 was followed by two decades of "normalisation" or re-imposed Stalinisation. All these developments nevertheless had this significance that they pointed towards the possibility of systemic change at some undetermined date, dependent on wider circumstances changing - which turned out to come from Moscow's change of strategy under Gorbachev. In short, these countries experienced to varying degrees forms of liberalisation, albeit brief in several cases, and these facilitated the move to democratisation when it came. Such experiences left an imprint on inchoate civil society (which itself became a debating point with special reference to East-Central Europe in the final decade of Communism); and they became a reference point for the new democratic politics after 1989. Needless to say, the various transitions when they came turned out to be markedly peaceful in ECE with less violence (only really briefly with war in Slovenia but more seriously so in Croatia), and distinctly less disruption than in other post-Communist regions.

Policy Implications: insofar as some of the democratisation literature makes a link between pre-transition liberalisation, the nature of authoritarian collapse and subsequent transition trajectories and even with consolidation prospects - though this may be stretching diachronic linkages too much - then the general consequences in ECE are relatively mild though not necessarily uncomplicated. Czechoslovakia (and its two bifurcated republics) was on this basis likely to be more difficult than others because it underwent two basic political changes in relatively quick succession, in 1989 and 1993. However, its "velvet" (i.e. formally peaceful) division distinguishes it very much from the case of Croatia whose transition was interrupted and dominated by four years of war 5.

2.3 Formal Regime Transition and Institutional Design: these countries were not exceptional in modifying former Communist constitutions, but there was a clearer movement here than in the Balkans and countries from the former Soviet Union towards executive accountability rather than the concentration of executive powers, evident in the preference for parliamentary over presidential government. In some cases, this preference prevailed after phases of uncertainty as in Poland under Walesa and Slovakia under Meciar. In several Balkan countries, and notably in Russia, variations of presidential rule have persisted or dominated. In ECE, where hybrid regimes have been the exception (as in Croatia) rather than the rule, this cross-national option for parliamentarism has had various effects (including reinforcing a tendency for elitism in these new democracies) but, most importantly, it has opened the way for democratic institutionalisation. Institutional guarantees (constitutional provisions and restrictions on constitutional revision) and the establishment of judicial review illustrate this. But there remains an absence of legal culture, and there are problems of creating constitutional legitimacy which at this still relatively early stage is still fairly dependent on functional requisites, namely government performance. While support in ECE countries is high for democratic institutions, there is low support or approval for their performance 6. Nevertheless, on balance, the consequences of institutional design are rather more hopeful than otherwise as an indicator of progress towards democratic consolidation.

Policy Implications: ECE satisfies those in transitology who argue that parliamentary government is better for new democracies than presidential government. There is clearly scope for further democratic institutionalisation but by and large along the lines developed. The main policy implication is undoubtedly the problem of government performance. This is hardly surprising given the enormous burdens of new democratic elites in these countries, with multiple transformation imposed on routine government overload; but some improvement is probably necessary eventually for securing democratic consolidation.

5 M. Tanner, Croatia: a Nation Forged in War (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997) has an apt title although it doesn't as such explore the relationship between transition and war. 6 e.g. see D. Fuchs and E. Roller, `Cultural conditions of transition to liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe' in S. Barnes and J. Simon (eds.), The Postcommunist Citizen (Erasmus Foundation and Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 1998), esp. p. 63. 6

2.4 The Political Dimension - Actors and Linkages: various developments have been surprisingly positive, given transition difficulties envisaged at the outset, although some of these have persisted. In particular, ECE countries have an impressive record of regular alternation in power, more than in the postwar and Southern European democratisations. This is usually taken as an indicator of a new democracy functioning suitably, although in Poland's case it also reflected party system instability. Such alternation cannot be taken as steadfast evidence of regime consolidation as such, although it may be viewed as a sign of progress especially if alternation is uncontested. In ECE countries, this success owes something to the democratic conversion of former Communist regime parties, thus making it easier for them to be accepted as elected parties of government - in stark contrast, for instance, with postwar Italy where the Communist Party remained in opposition for decades. Even in Slovakia, where the Meciar experiment leaned towards authoritarian practices, alternation has taken place and, most notably, in 1998 with Meciar's defeat by a more united multi-party opposition. In Balkan countries, alternation has more commonly had systemic implications, as in Romania and Bulgaria during 1996-97 when ex-Communist forces were voted out of power . On other counts, ECE is less distinguished as in not developing effective and cohesive oppositions and overcoming party system fragmentation, except in Hungary. Nevertheless, parties have come to dominate the new democratic politics, in line with Western European parliamentary patterns, while they have remained weak in articulating links with society. This clear control by political elites is underlined by the relatively easy establishment of civilian control over the military. This includes Poland which had a background of martial law before transition.

Policy Implications: while most developments are positive or point in a positive direction, weak elite/mass linkages do present a serious problem (although one should note this is also present in some mature Western democracies). As such, that does not create an overt problem for democratisation unless disillusionment with democracy were to be utilised by anti-system forces. What it does, however suggest is that on this level consolidation will take longer than otherwise, for parties are fairly central actors in promoting democratic attachment societally.

2.5 Economic Transformation and Democratisation: economic experience has not been easy in ECE countries since 1989, as indeed elsewhere in the post-Communist world, because it has been a matter of economic system change rather than merely adjustment and modernisation - which is, simply put, what occurred in previous European democratisations from 1945. But, by and large, ECE countries have recovered from the most difficult phase of this change by regaining the pre-1989 level of GDP from the mid-1990s although in some cases (like Slovakia) unemployment has remained at a high level. This pattern is in some contrast with Balkan countries where economic renewal has been much more difficult, and thus poses more of an obstacle to democratic consolidation. Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Romania are partial exceptions in terms of their economic progress compared with other Balkan countries. Economic transformation in ECE has not as such threatened the chances of new democracies in the region, because of underlying elite and mass commitment to democracy, although there is a case for arguing that it has perhaps slowed progress to democratic consolidation. Having said that, it should be noted there was marked cross-national variation in economic strategies across ECE. These ranged between shock therapy in Poland and to a degree also in Czechoslovakia/ the Czech Republic and, on the other hand, gradualism in Hungary and a more chequered pursuit of economic policy in Slovakia after independence. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions as to whether the one strategy or the other facilitated democratic consolidation more, but undoubtedly political factors intervened in all cases such as through the division in Czechoslovakia and short-term pressures in Poland's push for radical economic change. Interactions between economic transformation and democratisation are of course complex and are not exclusive of other influences such as civil society developments and trends in public attitudes.

Policy Implications: a sustained effort in economic policy is still necessary, especially in Slovakia, but the problems of economic adaptation impacting negatively on democratisation are likely to diminish gradually over the next decade (aside, that is, from unforeseen adverse international developments). Such a prognosis cannot be made about most Balkan countries, not to mention the Russian Federation and other former Soviet independent republics (the Baltic states are a marked exception on economic development grounds).

2.6 Civil Society and Democratisation: the record at this level is mixed, but this is not really surprising given the deeper effects of the Communist legacy and the fact this level of democratisation simply takes time to develop. This is only qualified where pre-transition liberalisation allows for some early start (as in Hungary) or where a civil consciousness has remained despite the totalitarian experience and draws on previous democratic politics (as in the Czech Republic). Slovakia benefited less by association from the interwar democracy than the Czech Republic, but 7 then civil society certainly emerged in the course of the 1990s, stimulated among other things by aversion to Meciar's authoritarian leanings. But, various problems remain and are easily identified: (as noted above) parties have had persistent difficulties in establishing meaningful links with the publics (in part because of the very elitism of transition in these countries); there is a low trust in parties and in public authorities which is in part a consequence of Communism (significantly this is less of a problem in Hungary which underwent liberalisation under the former regime); and, again, associational development has been hampered by this previous regime legacy. It could, then, be said that changes at this level, albeit limited, are basically a hopeful sign for eventual consolidation; but that, in view of the remaining problems, achieving that at this level is likely to take the best part of a generation as from 1989. There will almost certainly be some cross-national variation here. Countries with strong ethnic cleavages are likely to take longer, but this problem tends to demarcate ECE from the Balkans where they are much more common. Meanwhile, one positive factor is that education levels in ECE are relatively high, precisely as a result of this being a priority under the previous regimes. Ironically, this positive Communist legacy has made the spread of democratic values easier. Altogether, therefore, the prospects for fostering democratic traditions in these countries are fairly good in the long run.

Policy Implications: these are summarised in the above paragraph (sentence 4).

2.7 Stateness, National Identity and Democratisation: there have been serious difficulties in bridging ethnic divides across Central & Eastern Europe, and even political parties have had problems in this respect. However, ECE has for historical-cultural reasons less of such a burden to face in its democratisation processes, compared with the Balkans. The issue of the Russian minorities in the Baltic states has not been easy to resolve, but it has been facilitated by economic development while EU pressure on behalf of their status has been influential. In Slovakia, where difficulties did arise, these were more for political than societal reasons because of intransigence towards the Hungarian minority on the part of the Meciar Government. The different political atmosphere since the 1998 election has alleviated matters, not least because the Hungarian party has been included in the coalition government. There was, admittedly, the high tension between both parts of the former Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s which for a time distracted from transition tasks, but it was resolved through the split in the country which has probably been beneficial to democratisation in both new states, notwithstanding complications in the Slovak case. Thus, this phenomenon has represented no serious threat to democracy, although for a time in the earlier 1990s this was not clear. Issues of national identity have occasionally arisen, but there is now a noticeable tendency for this to be related to the European framework, suggesting that identity issues are less likely to overflow into nationalism. Another positive development yet to come could be that eventual economic prosperity will help to integrate ethnic minorities better into the societies in which they live. That would again suggest a difference from the Balkans, for the reason stated above.

Policy Implications: this is still a sensitive area and it demands skilful handling by governmental elites and political elites in general. This suggest much time is needed before this level is sufficiently resolved to harmonise with democratic consolidation. The EU and other international organisations, which give attention to minority and human rights, represents a positive factor, although at the same time they often highlight such issues a-contextually thus sometimes adding to domestic tension.

2.8 International Dimensions of Regime Change: progress during the 1990s has been considerable for most ECE countries as shown in the extent to which they have joined various European organisations and have been moving towards membership of the European Union. They are well ahead of Balkan countries, despite some differences in this respect between ECE countries, with Slovakia and two Baltic republics behind the others; while non-Baltic republics from the USSR have much less chance of going this far in integrating into Europe. The consequences of this development are quite self-evident, all the more as the EU is insistent in its demands for accession, and these include pressure but also support for democratisation and economic transformation. This progress is likely to continue into the near future, dependent that is on the EU itself preparing adequately for a major enlargement.

Policy Implications: these are standard, given the current negotiations with Brussels and the need to accommodate through implementation the whole of the acquis communautaire across virtually all policy sectors. Defence policy is the salient exception among the various "chapters", not being properly covered under CFSP, but NATO enlargement does impact very much on matters of defence policy organisation and infrastructure. 8

2.9 Finally, what lessons can be drawn regarding countries in East-Central Europe and cross-national aspects of their regime change? This multi-level framework tends to fill out the picture of these countries having passed through transition and being recognisably on the road towards democratic consolidation. Poland finally agreed on a full constitution in 1997, thus satisfying the main formal requirement of transition, although it had already in several respects progressed with consolidation tasks not least because of its decisive economic strategy. As Hungary shows, a pre-transition liberalisation phase usually helps to accomplish democratisation more speedily. Czechoslovakia and its two successor states did not benefit from such a development, although their interwar democratic experience provided a reference point of which no other ECE country could boast. Slovakia may be seen as located on the cusp between completing transition and early consolidation - as there is a remaining problem of achieving cross-party elite consensus on liberal democracy - although at the level of civil society it has made substantial progress.

In conclusion, therefore, noteworthy progress has been made towards achieving democratic consolidation especially in the establishment of a full range of democratic institutions, tenacity in working through economic transformation, limited but significant evolution in civil society and some success in containing ethnic problems. It may be suggested that another decade will see many but perhaps not all ECE countries near or at the end of the road to consolidation. Inevitably, however, this conclusion for the whole region has to be modified on two grounds - cross- national variation and, obviously, in relation to the different levels of consolidation. While there is not likely to be a dramatic time difference between regime change outcomes in these countries, now that Slovakia has been catching up over the past two years, clearly Croatia has still a decade of Tudjman's rule to overcome despite the best efforts of the new democratic government there to work through transition. On all levels there are still major tasks to be achieved during democratisation in ECE. These include obtaining constitutional legitimacy, improving elite/mass linkages, much sustained effort to complete economic transformation before its beneficial effects work in favour of democratisation and a fuller evolution of civil society. Altogether, then, East-Central Europe is by and large at a halfway stage in the course of its democratisation process.

(3) Are East-Central European Countries a Special Case of Post-Communist Transformation?

It has become common to categorise and grade different regional groupings of post-Communist countries undergoing systemic change over the past decade, with implications for their regime change outcomes and consolidation prospects. Without variation, East-Central Europe is given the best chances for its countries developing established democracies in the course of time; whereas those in the Balkans (sometimes called South-East Europe) and the non- Baltic former Soviet republics are as a rule less reliable possibilities. Such categorisations do of course ride roughshod over cross-national variation within each grouping. And this is probably greater in the last two than in ECE, e.g. by EU criteria Bulgaria is distinctly in advance of other Balkan countries, but there are nevertheless commonalities. Passing comparisons above between this region and the Balkans in particular suggest ECE may be a special case of post-Communist transformation.

One may, on the contrary, start by asking the "why not" question - why have the democratisations in this region not failed? This question was not unrealistic as of the early 1990s, despite post-1989 euphoria, not merely because of the high uncertainty often characteristic of early transitions to democracy. This question was more concretely justified in view of the sheer magnitude of the ambitious tasks ahead and, in particular, the prospect of economic dislocation impacting powerfully on the chances for these then fragile new democracies to consolidate themselves. The economic recession in the early 1990s helped to dispel post-authoritarian euphoria and added to cautious predictions as to whether ECE countries would make it through transition to consolidation. And, then, in neighbouring Yugoslavia systemic change took a violent turn leading to sustained bloodshed. Rather by contrast, the one case in ECE of state disintegration - that of Czechoslovakia - occurred without this patterns of events - "velvet" indeed, albeit acerbic at times and not very consensual.

More specifically, democratisation in ECE has not failed for a combination of reasons which are here stated briefly:

3.1 Firstly, a sustained commitment to making the new democratic politics work has been evident at both elite and public levels to a degree not found in the other post-Communist regions as shown consistently by opinion research 9 trends 7. This is despite the hard experience of economic change; hence, the more dire predictions that this would undermine these new democracies have not been upheld.

3.2 Secondly, the severe economic recession through which these countries moved - and which deepened the "valley effect" of their transitions - turned out to be more of a difficult phase rather than a semi-permanent structural condition inhibiting consolidation.

3.3 Thirdly, their starting points for socio-economic modernisation were rather better than other post-Communist regions in particular because the distorting effects of their Communist regimes were less strong than elsewhere 8. Almost by contrast, the Communist regimes in the Balkans in many cases reinforced historical legacy problems relating to the dominance of the state over society and patrimonialist traditions deriving from Ottoman rule 9.

3.4 Fourthly, civil society is present and to a limited degree vibrant in ECE countries. This tends to mark them off from countries in the Balkans - notwithstanding differences between Romania and Bulgaria and, say, Albania - and also those from the former USSR, with again the exception of the Baltic states and occasional evidence of civil concerns expressed even in Russia.

3.5 Fifthly, state-and nation-building has been far more burdensome a task in these two other regions than in ECE, although this cannot be made into an absolute distinction. In ECE, the main cases have been the same Baltic states as well as Slovakia and Slovenia. The Czech Republic was able to resolve matters by benefiting from the former Czechoslovak institutional infrastructure in Prague and from the absence of strong minorities. Despite complications over large Russian minorities in the Baltic republics, and official antagonism towards the Hungarian minority in Slovakia in the mid-1990s, these problems were not comparable with the at times overwhelming difficulties of state development and ethnicity in many of the Balkan countries.

3.6 Sixthly, and finally, while the same European or international organisations have been available for the other regions, East-Central Europe has benefited more from close contact with them for a number of reasons. These include political approximation (greater ease in satisfying the demands of democratic conditionality, more transnational conformity of political parties with those in Western Europe), more dynamic economic change but - not to be underrated - is a sense of historical-cultural mission behind the "return to Europe". In the Balkans, by virtual contrast, motivation towards Europe has been more negatively inspired by a wish to "escape from the Balkans", with the weight of its traditional and still current problems. Geographical proximity of ECE to the European heartland may be a factor too, but this should not be over-emphasised in the age of the new technology.

3.7 Taken together, East-Central Europe comes across by and large as a distinctive region in the post-Communist age. Some of the reasons are conjunctural and more relative than absolute compared with other regions; but, also, some of them relate to historical roots within ECE countries. This goes for socio-economic modernisation and state-and nation-building and, to some extent, also for civil society and the international dimension. While ECE may be differentiated in comparison to other areas of Europe (less developed than Western Europe, but more advanced than the Balkans), it has enjoyed at the same time a sense of its own identity. This has been highlighted by the idea of "Central Europe" or Mitteleuropa which has a long historical lineage and has been revived as a point of discussion after the fall of Communism 10.

7 See Peter Ulram, `Mainly sunny with scattered clouds: political culture in East-Central Europe' in G. Pridham and A. Agh (eds.), Ten Years After: Democratic Transition and Consolidation in East-Central Europe (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001). 8 This is supported by the evidence provided on twenty post-Communist countries in Ole Norgaard, Economic Institutions and Democratic Reform: the Comparative Analysis of Post-Communist Countries (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2000). 9 On these problems in the Balkans, see G. Pridham, `Democratization in the Balkan countries: from theory to practice', chapter 1 in G. Pridham and T. Gallagher (eds.), Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans (Routledge, London, 2000), esp. pp. 9-18. 10 See A. Agh, The Politics of Central Europe (Sage, London, 1998), pp. 4-5; and, A. Hyde-Price, The International Politics of East Central Europe (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996), pp. 51-52. 10

Thus, given the perhaps surprising advances made in these countries, it is possible to refer to them in general as a model of positive development towards establishing new democracies. Such judgements are naturally coloured by expectations. These were at times unrealistic. On the other hand, this assessment is positive relative to the magnitude of transition tasks a decade ago. This sense of ECE being at the forefront of post-Communist experience is supported by the common reckoning that they are the likeliest future member states to join the EU from the East. Notwithstanding cross-national differentiation within the region of East-Central Europe, there are sufficient similarities which contain differences between the countries concerned. But East-Central Europe cannot easily be considered a model for other post-Communist countries to emulate, for - as we have discovered - the differences between ECE and most countries of the Balkans, not to mention those that broke away from the Soviet Union, are too strong for this to happen without considerable problems and a marked delay. As noted in the multi-level analysis of democratic consolidation in the previous section, these differences are not concentrated but embrace most levels, including the degree of institutional certainty and authoritarian practices, the depth of economic change, the extent of nationalism and rootedness of ethnic cleavages as well as the real prospects for European integration.

(4) Estimating External Influences on Regime Change: Looking towards EU Enlargement

While it is generally (and justifiably) assumed that there is a dynamic relationship between European integration and democratic consolidation, this is rarely explored at a concrete level. This is indeed complex as European integration, and external impacts in general, have diverse effects on different levels of regime change; just as there is now hardly a sector of domestic policy not in some way affected by policy plans and actions in Brussels. But, EU enlargement represents the greatest single challenge to new democracies in ECE in the decade ahead; and for this reason, some points of differentiation are developed and applied briefly.

Various considerations may assist in approaching interactions between Europeanisation and domestic pressures during the accession period. Firstly, it is possible to measure Europeanisation impacts at the policy level, sector by sector as previous national legislation has to be modified or, if non-existent, the acquis fills the legislative void. With new democracies the situation is special because their policy directions, as indeed their political systems, are still in a formative phase so that, notionally, the scope for Europeanisation impacts is especially large.

Secondly, one should differentiate between domestic pressures in terms of levels of political involvement and interest within accession countries. This may be done by focussing on government and institutions as well as the wider political arena and also the socio-economic arena. The emphasis should be on those actors and influences that are relevant to both consensus-building and mobilisation potential over EU accession. This will provide a measure of how far an applicant country's European strategy is elite-driven or whether it has wider motivation or deeper forms of support that will probably reflect on its subsequent behaviour as a member state. It will, furthermore, make it easier to identify from which quarters domestic problems derive during the course of what are usually lengthy and complicated negotiations for accession.

Thus, a crucial variable is whether a wide political consensus exists from the start of accession negotiations. Compared with previous enlargements of the EU, Central & Eastern Europe is remarkably different in this respect. While historical and political motivation is certainly strong, it has been accompanied from early on by broad consensus in applicant countries. This should bode well for the current accession process, but the question still remains: how firm is this consensus or is it more formal than substantial?

This will only eventually be answered by the test of long negotiations; but, meanwhile, from the above discussion, one may unscramble the domestic politics of applicant states and look at key actors within different interlocking arenas. These compromise: Governance, comprising policy approaches and institutional aspects; the Political Arena, including parties, the media and public opinion; and, the Socio-Economic Arena, including different interests and the possibilities for civil mobilisation. It postulates interactions not only within domestic politics but also especially between that and the EU in a two-directional sense: inner-directed, with Europeanisation pressures impacted on the domestic front; and, outer-directed, with domestic pressures responding to inner-directed ones as well as originating internally. Conceivably, inner-directed pressures may stimulate intensified interactions among different domestic actors and influences. 11

4.1 Governance: this is variously defined as both policy-oriented and institutional. It is to be expected that Europeanisation will be considerable on the policy level through the adoption of the whole acquis. For, Brussels expects not merely legislative incorporation of this but also its practical implementation 11. As to institutional procedures and structures, change is likely to be less radical but pressures are very real already as applicant states have to manage their negotiations competently at the domestic level. Moreover, Brussels pays serious attention to the administrative capacity of accession countries as central to their ability to assume the obligations of membership and requires administrative reform to be carried out prior to membership.

At this stage of the process, the European policies of post-Communist countries are essentially responsive. Their predominant concern is to negotiate entry to the EU and in the course of this accept more or less uncritically the legislative output over time of the EU. It is in the traditionally domestic policy sectors that most attention is focussed, as nearly all of the "chapter" headings indicate, with the most difficult likely to include agriculture (because of structural change required) and the environment (due to economic costs and the vastly complicated task of implementing highly technical legislation). Since the easier "chapters" tend to be placed first in the order of negotiations it is only really those applicants which commenced negotiations in 1998 that are feeling the pressure at a wider political level. Special issues have come to the forefront with some potential for creating anxiety like migration and land purchase in the Czech Republic and notably agriculture in Poland because of the size of the farming business in that country.

In the Czech Republic, reform of the judiciary has been slow as highlighted in the 1999 Progress Report. Now, a whole range of further measures are planned under different headings: short-term priorities (e.g. improving the qualifications of judges and training them in the application of European law, improving the accessibility of information for decisions by judges); medium-term priorities (e.g. modernising public administration in the field of justice, using information technology to improve management and measures to promote judicial self-administration); institution building needs (e.g. rationalising the court workload and simplifying proceedings in court); and, financial needs, including EU assistance 12. According to officials in the Finance Ministry, drafts of new laws are invariably sent to Brussels for consultation with relevant directorates-general and also where applicable with member states 13. Slovakia has only recently started negotiations but already in the environmental field the government has made various institutional changes in different ministries and has adopted or is planning a raft of measures on air protection, waste management, water protection, nature and landscape protection, industrial pollution, noise pollution and nuclear safety 14.

Despite general strategic agreement over EU entry, it is not impossible that the deadline pressures of negotiations and differences over specific policy sectors might place an added onus on national governments already facing policy difficulties on other grounds. This may cause difficulties in the area of European policy especially when there is a policy linkage problem. In Slovakia, the new Dzurinda Government was under sustained pressure to prove the country's democratic credentials after the Meciar period and demonstrated this with a series of decisions satisfying the EU's political conditions. One final measure required was a more liberal language law concerning the use of Hungarian, as a virtual sine qua non for opening negotiations with Brussels. This was duly passed in summer 1999, but only after serious differences between the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) and some other parties in the Government, but which did not in the end threaten government stability 15. Of course, where there exist some basic differences over European integration between or within coalition partners then the impact of pressures from

11 According to the deputy head of the European Committee in Lithuania, there is a fall-back position with a transition period but it has to be argued for in each case (interview with Darius Zervolis, Vilnius, July 2000). This represents a much tougher requirement than was the case with Southern enlargement. 12 Czech Government, National Programme for the Preparation of the Czech Republic for Membership of the European Union (Prague, 1999), section 1.1.2, pp. 4-12. 13 Interview with Jiri Vetrovsky, Milena Horcicova and Jan Gregor, Ministry of Finance, Prague, March 2000. 14 Government Office, Slovak Republic, National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire (Bratislava, 2000), section 3.6.1, pp. 284-323. 15 The inclusion of the SMK in the Dzurinda Government was, among other things, motivated by EU considerations, and these helped to overcome reservations expressed during the government formation in autumn 1998. 12 negotiations may be more damaging, as eventually occurred in the case of the Solidarity Electoral Action-Freedom Union (AWS-UW) government in Poland (1997-2000) 16.

As to institutions, coordinative structures are a familiar part of the government machine in applicant states. But, in general, the record so far is mixed with some cross-national variation but there are also predictable efficiency problems in countries that abandoned Communist rule only a decade ago. The Visegrad countries are better prepared than most having introduced some bureaucratic streamlining at the top level to cope with the intense policy implementation pressures, although the Czech Republic has at times been criticised for poor organisation. However, quite common to all countries is a shortage of suitable and sufficient expertise of EU affairs among their public administrations, but this will probably in the course of time be resolved. More serious perhaps is the absence of an enforcement culture, due to bureaucratic inheritances from the Communist period, such as in countries like Romania, so that monitoring implementation of the acquis becomes difficult 17.

4.2 The Political Arena: while areas of governance in accession countries are very largely engaged in the official business of convergence with the EU, thereby conforming with demands from Brussels, the wider political arena is not so subject to this basic constraint so that criticisms and dissent are more likely to surface at this level as well as in the socio-economic arena. Much depends on how political parties and the media handle issues and whether this promotes some debate that is informative or rather polemical. Since publics in accession countries are not as a rule well-informed about EU affairs, there is a tendency for them to be influenced by opinion-makers.

Elite consensus is itself somewhat inhibiting to wider debate. This has been particularly true in cases like Hungary, unlike in some other countries where criticism of the EU has stimulated responses. This occurred in the Czech Republic with Klaus's condemnation of European monetary union and the EU approach to social policy 18. In Poland, too, the advance of negotiations has profiled some issues that have begun to arouse concern despite cross- party support for accession. Such a development has however remained so far restricted, but the "bite" of negotiations may well provoke new or predictable tension points in political exchange. It is much less in evidence in those countries which have only recently opened negotiations, although Slovakia has a background of polarisation between government and opposition parties, especially during the Meciar period. Such polemical handling of European policy had some impact on the public. Accordingly, party supporters tend there to follow party lines over this question with significance divergence of opinion between supporters of both sides 19.

Parties have a central role in maintaining political consensus. Since they both reflect ideological standpoints but also harness popular concerns while seeking to maximise their electoral prospects, under Europeanisation pressures they may voice public concerns in a way that either does not challenge consensus or in populist fashion departs from this for partisan advantage. The general picture till now is one that broadly confirms the picture of overwhelming political consensus. Governing parties support official policy except where (as in Poland) there has been some dissension within the government camp. While opposition parties also adhere to their countries' European strategies, differences emerge on specific issues and sometimes tactics in negotiations with Brussels. To some degree, such positions may be opposition politics; but, beyond that, interest lies in how far policy-substantive differences have any wider meaning. In the Czech Republic, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) emphasises a looser political construction for the EU and opposition to further supranational plans while the KDU-CSL has supported the strong pro-integration position of fraternal Christian Democrats in Western Europe and the Social Democrats, more

16 See G. Blazyca and M. Kolkiewicz, `Poland and the EU: internal disputes, domestic politics and accession', in Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, December 1999, pp. 131-43. 17 K. Hughes, H. Grabbe and E. Smith, Attitudes of the Central and East European Countries to Integration, Discussion Paper No. IGS99/3, Institute for German Studies, University of Birmingham, 1999, p. 100. See European Commission, 1999 Regular Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession (Brussels, 1999), pp. 59-60 and section 4 for critical comments on Romania's failure to carry out public administration reform 18 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1998), p. 73. 19 See, for instance, the results of the survey on attitudes to EU and NATO of the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Bratislava, `Aku zahranicnu politiku pre nasu verejnost?' in Sme, 29 April 2000. 13 pro-integration than the ODS, have stressed the value of the Social Charter 20. Such differences do indeed reflect party ideologies, although it does not follow this will lead to a significant divide over accession. Such party- political differentiation is much less in evidence in countries like Bulgaria where political consensus among the parties is very high but negotiation issues have not yet had much wider impact.

The ability of parties to hold with the political consensus on accession will depend also on the role of the media and the tendencies of public opinion. In other words, they may not be able to control what limited debate there has been up to now if pressures from both these directions start mounting. Debate in Poland has intensified not least because both parties and the media have pursued lively arguments, albeit polemically, but this is also because the country's position in talks with Brussels has become more complicated and government impatience has increased, while there has been a decline in public support for accession (from admittedly a very high level).

Again, the difference between countries that commenced negotiations in 1998 and 2000 is apparent. In Romania, for example, the quality of media coverage has been fairly factual with generally positive views about integration, but the connection with economic reform is rarely made and the possible impact of EU membership on the economy little discussed 21. In Estonia, on the other hand, more than two years of negotiations have produced more media debate but then there was little of that before they started. Media attention has focussed on the practical implications of accession, with a habit of treating some issues of concern in a populist way 22. Similarly, in the Czech Republic, media coverage has grown with negotiations, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 being a turning-point. Since then, coverage of issues has become more concrete and there is now more technical understanding of EU affairs compared with the somewhat amateurish approach of the Czech media in the earlier 1990s 23. Given the political pressures that surface with negotiation problems, predictably the media selectively popularise some issues over others such as the criticisms from Brussels in the annual Progress Reports. All this does not have to represent serious Euroscepticism but rather normal political life where Europeanisation pressures are transmitted through the usual mechanisms of political pluralism on the domestic level.

Public opinion may be described as by and large broad but shallow in accession countries. Popular support combines with a low level of information about the EU; and this does not seem to have so far changed significantly with the onset of negotiations. In Poland, for example, the high level of support has been accompanied by widespread ignorance about the specific costs and benefits of joining 24. However, a decrease in support in the past two years has coincided with occasional confrontation between the government and Brussels, as over new visa rules which aroused protests from some areas of local opinion 25. The same pattern has been present in the Czech Republic, where stable support for entry is linked to low issue awareness, but there debate has been less emotional than in Poland. But there appears to be a limit as to how far national publics may be mobilised on concrete issues and their ignorance of fairly complex EU affairs overcome (but there are also problems of projecting EU affairs to the publics of member states). Some survey evidence suggests it is still broader questions, like support for democracy and a free market economy, that affect backing for EU entry rather than utilitarian factors like individual financial well-being 26.

20 V. Handl and M. Zaborowski, Comparative Czech and Polish Perspectives and Policies on the Eastern Enlargement of the EU and the Prominence of the "German Factor", report, Institute for German Studies, University of Birmingham, 1999, pp. 20, 37. 21 Hughes, Grabbe and Smith, Attitudes of the Central and East European Countries to Integration, pp. 96-97. 22 ibid, p. 64. 23 Interview with Petr Zavadil, head of foreign department, Lidove Noviny, Prague, March 2000. But he pointed out that the technical content of EU policies was difficult to project to the public, as `the people in general don't understand the complex nature of enlargement'. 24 Hughes, Grabbe and Smith, op. cit., p. 83. 25 Blazyca and Kolkiewicz, `Poland and the EU', pp. 137, 142. 26 e.g. R. Cichowski, Choosing Democracy: Citizen Attitudes and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, working paper no. 12,, 2000, pp. 15-26. The survey also confirmed the strong independent effect that political partisanship has on popular attitudes towards EU membership. 14

The issue of NATO is usually more divisive in EU accession countries, for whereas the EU image is generally rather positive that of NATO is still affected by past memories from the Communist period and therefore arouses feelings. Somewhat by contrast, government leaders have tended to prefer more rational arguments in favour of EU entry. If this gives a clue about difficulties in projecting the EU onto domestic politics, any disillusionment of expectations about EU accession is not likely to be exploited by influential political forces.

4.3 The Socio-Economic Arena: limited public engagement with the politics of accession casts some light on European/domestic interactions in the socio-economic arena. This explains why there have been no consistent spillover effects onto this question from other policy areas, especially economic.

The EU does provide a fairly consistent pressure for economic reform; and, it could be argued this contributes, perhaps indirectly, to social and economic hardship which ensues. Decision-makers are certainly aware of this connection, but there is so far little evidence of such awareness among the wider arenas, whether political or socio- economic. It is indicative that parties which depart from the European consensus do not as a rule exploit economic issues, or if they do, this is not the dominant issue but rather matters relating to national identity and culture. In the Czech Republic, for example, there is no convincing evidence of increased economic dissatisfaction having affected views on the EU 27. In Bulgaria, there was a severe economic crisis some years ago, but this has not affected the strong political consensus there on the EU; and, indeed, the timing of this was such that it occurred well before EU negotiations were opened. In this context, it is interesting that the wider arena is, if anything, more aware of the accession process as such rather than the broader integration process involving CEE countries since the early 1990s. This is not surprising since the rhetoric of politicians is very largely focussed on the former and on entry dates, the media has only with negotiations begun to pay serious attention to EU matters and opinion research concentrates on support for EU membership. Other European organisational links (apart from NATO membership) make much less impact, and this includes the Europe Agreements with the EU itself which have been in force in many cases since the mid-1990s 28.

It might be supposed that economic interests would be more informed about the broader integration process, because of the EU's early attention to commercial and economic links, but the signs are of not strong involvement by them as yet on EU matters although there is some national variation. In the Czech Republic, no major interest groups have opposed EU entry but some like state-owned enterprises and agricultural workers might prove sensitive to negotiations and there are already indications that difficulties in economic transition are adversely affecting the ability of economic actors to adapt to the EU's acquis 29. In Estonia, some sectors have voiced concerns including parts of industry as well as farmers (who have objected to the mound of hygiene and veterinary regulations from Brussels), but support remains high among the influential business community 30.

It is, however, in Poland - another "first wave" applicant country - where the one major exception so far is to be found. It is therefore relevant to ask why this is so. The reasons are partly linked to the advance of negotiations but not exclusively. Indeed, the fact this has happened in Poland more than in other "first wave" countries suggests there might be some national-specific explanation. EU issues are now well-covered in the media and a connection has been made here with sectoral interests. In summer 2000, for instance, the situation deteriorated with trade unions angry about redundancies and the rise in inflation, farmers anxious about their livelihood being possibly destroyed through the imposition of EU policies and standards as well as stories about companies losing business because of their inability to conform to new environmental laws 31. However, this situation arose at a time when negotiations had become more difficult and rumours were circulating that Polish entry might well be delayed, thus

27 Hughes, Grabbe and Smith, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 28 For example, the Czech press did not give much coverage to the Council of Europe - as `it is difficult to explain what it is' - or to the meetings of the Joint Parliamentary Committee between the Czech Parliament and the European Parliament, an institutional provision of the Europe Agreement, only `if there is some story' coming from the latter (interview with Petr Zavadil, Lidove Noviny, Prague, March 2000). 29 Hughes, Grabbe and Smith, op. cit., pp. 51, 55. 30 ibid, pp. 67-68. 31 Report in The Times, 20 June 2000. 15 adding to the political impatience already present in Warsaw. National pride was evident too but there were also cultural factors at work. Poland has a particularly large agricultural sector, but it is not simply this factor which certainly matters in terms of the magnitude of the problem of change posed by accession. The land and countryside has a special significance to Polish culture, so that it is not too difficult a step for the EU to be presented as a threat to Polish culture in some farming circles 32.

The socio-economic arena is in any case a complex area entailing a mixture of factors including influences from past experience. In Slovakia, it has been found there is a link between anti-Western attitudes and reservations towards the EU while younger are more open than older Slovaks to trusting people from Western Europe - implying the former were less conditioned by life under the Communist regime. This past influence also coloured the view taken by some people that Slovakia was a small and newly sovereign country that was vulnerable to exploitation by the capitalist Western world. At the same time, there was an overwhelming preference among the public for EU countries over Russia as partner countries. Furthermore, the picture was complicated in that party preferences cut across these patterns quite strongly, with supporters of Meciar's party finding Western European countries less friendly than supporters of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK). Politics therefore confused the influence of sociological factors. To illustrate this further, the Hungarian minority took a more favourable view of Western Europe than Slovaks on average despite their being more rurally based and having a weaker educational background (both factors which normally indicate lower sympathy in that country towards the West). For Hungarian Slovaks, there was a political motive in seeing the EU as offering protection from discriminatory pressure at home - not surprising since the EU gave visibility to issues of minority rights 33.

Altogether, there are issues and mentalities that could, with effective political mobilisation, be brought to bear as a domestic pressure against EU accession, but the commitment of political elites and political parties to this European strategy has prevented this from happening so far. This commitment is likely to come under greater strain during the course of entry negotiations in the next years, but it does not follow this will open up to a wave of Euroscepticism. Summarising evidence quoted above, the picture is one of fragmented disaffection or concern over European integration and this presents some obstacle to full-scale campaigns against that.

(5) Conclusion

The EU has acted as a regular outside stimulant and support agent in encouraging the completion of democratisation. This has by and large reinforced the positive image of the EU in these countries despite occasional polemics over lack of progress in meeting Brussels' fairly stringent demands of democratic conditionality. Economic transformation has not had a profound effect on attitudes towards EU entry, notwithstanding pressure from Brussels on this front, but in many cases the worst of this transformation is over, especially in those states from East-Central Europe which are ahead in negotiations. Issues relating to national identity have arisen but in a diffuse way, and except on the sensitive issue of minorities the EU has not impacted greatly on the problem of nation-building. The pressures on new states and their institutional structures are certainly intense, through the time pressure of negotiations, but this problem has not greatly affected the wider political arena. It is clear, then, that the relationship between EU accession and multiple transformation has not so far created a dangerous threat to consensus over EU entry despite the overall pressures and demands from these.

Thus, Europeanisation pressures on domestic politics have been fairly extensive. It is reasonable to suppose these will increase during the course of negotiations. So far, interactions between different levels within domestic politics have been fairly restrained given the magnitude of the task in joining the EU. This may well change once Platonic attitudes to EU membership became replaced or challenged by new realities, although the Polish experience may not be exactly repeated since national-specific factors do count. In the end, it is how the complexities of

32 Hughes, Grabbe and Smith, op. cit., p. 86. 33 This paragraph draws on GfK Slovakia, Public Awareness Campaign, report, 1998, passim; also, conversations with Kamil Sladek, Director, Centre for European Policy, Bratislava and Grigorij Meseznikov and Olga Gyarfasova, Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Bratislava, May 2000. It may be noted that the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia similarly supports EU entry as a way of improving their political and economic status. 16 enlargement are handled politically and whether political actors find short-term advantage in exploiting disaffection with what is a long-term departure in their countries' histories.

If, overall, this analysis comes to a somewhat more optimistic conclusion than expected, there are also some reasons for caution. There is a potential for the gap to widen between elites and mass opinion, all the more as the accession process is one-sidedly driven from Brussels. Enlargement negotiations, as do also negotiations among EU member states, tend to strengthen an elitist bias since they are traditionally dominated by government executives. There are public signs of this, as when decision-makers in CEE countries use EU demands to justify the passage and implementation of unpopular measures. This is a practice also adopted by EU member states when convenient. But the difference is that new democracies in post-Communist countries are more vulnerable to growing mistrust towards political elites on the part of national publics and perhaps also special interests. If that became a serious problem, then the political consensus behind their European strategies would indeed be at risk. And, this is all the more likely if the EU, unprepared as it is, seeks to delay accession. In those CEE countries affected, this could seriously affect the domestic dynamics behind their drive to join the EU.

One can, finally, see here the link between the accession process and democratic consolidation being either confirmed or put in jeopardy. The political conditions (democratic conditionality) are clearly a case where the link is a direct one; but, otherwise, one is more likely to speak of indirect effects. For example, EU pressure leading to better governance may conceivably enhance a new democracy's reputation in the eyes of its citizens. However, if for various reasons the accession process were to unwind, there are already signs from applicant countries that internal tensions as well as those with Brussels would readily increase. The negative repercussions on regime change in these countries could be considerable. That would at least pose a serious challenge to the progress so far made towards democratic consolidation on their part.