International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide © International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2005

International IDEA publications are independent of specifi c national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members.

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Graphic design by: Magnus Alkmar Front cover illustrations by: Anoli Perera, Sri Lanka Printed by: Trydells Tryckeri AB, Sweden ISBN 91-85391-43-3

A number of individuals (and organizations) have contributed to the development of this book. Our thanks go, fi rst and foremost, to Bernd Halling, External Relations Offi cer, who coordinated the content development of this book and for all his hard work and support to the book through its many phases. We also thank Ozias Tungwarara, Senior Programme Offi cer, who developed the concept from the beginning and helped in the initial phase of writing and collection of material, as well as IDEA’s Publications Manager, Nadia Handal Zander for her help in the production of this book.

Foreword

International IDEA was born in 1995 in a world tions—hence the notion of local ownership of the which was optimistic about democratic change. process of reform and development. For signifi - The end of the Cold War had ushered in a period cant political reforms and public policy decisions, of opportunity and innovation with democracy as there needs to be the space and time for knowl- well as more self-critical analysis of the quality and edge to be shared, for information to be circulated, achievements of democracies, old and new. The and for opinion groups to form and debate and to time was ripe for the idea of IDEA, the creation build consensus with key stakeholders. The qual- by a group of countries committed to democracy ity of the dialogue and the inclusive nature of the of a special body to assist in strengthening democ- decision-making processes will tend to condition racy anywhere in the world. the acceptability and effectiveness of the reforms in question. Building local capacity for dialogue Defi nitions of democracy differ and evolve. IDEA as well as for institutional strengthening has thus has had its own vigorous debates on the issue. been one of the priorities in the work of IDEA. What is clear for IDEA is that democracy goes be- yond the rule of law and the protection of human For IDEA, this has meant on the one hand an em- rights; it means more than good governance and phasis on the importance for local stakeholders the effective management of public resources. De- and political elites of using dialogue and public mocracy is about the use of power and the man- debate to establish a momentum and a consensus- agement of confl ict. We may formulate this as a based agenda for political reform. It has meant an set of political institutions and processes based on equally strong emphasis on learning from others, the principles of popular control over public deci- and developing comparative knowledge and expe- sions and decision makers, and equality of respect rience so as to enhance understanding about po- and voice between citizens in the exercise of that litical processes and institutions. control. However, IDEA has been insistent from the beginning, as now echoed by many, that there Every situation may be distinct but common el- are no blueprints for democracy since every coun- ements do emerge: there may be lessons to be try’s political institutions and practices are shaped learned in democracy and peace building, in en- by its history, its culture, and social and economic forcing standards of integrity and transparency for factors. The quality of democracy will vary accord- political parties and institutions, in designing in- ing to how well the institutions allow for these stitutional arrangements to enhance participation two principles to be given practical expression, and governability, in establishing good practice through processes of participation, representation, in political management, negotiating techniques accountability, transparency and responsiveness to and consensus building processes and so on. Such the citizens. Such processes depend on a culture of comparative knowledge and experience is more participation, in which pluralistic media, an active than ever in demand by political reformers at lo- civil society, competing political parties and other cal, national and intergovernmental level. IDEA mechanisms allow all citizens to acquire political has specialized in developing such materials in re- voice. sponse to needs and demands and in cooperation with a wide range of partners and user organiza- It follows that the task of making democracy work tions. belongs to the countries themselves, their citizens, civil associations, social and economic forces, The last decade has seen both major changes and professional associations and religious groups, as continuity in the business of democracy build- well as public bodies, political parties and institu- ing. IDEA’s basic premises have been confi rmed

4 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and vindicated but also sharpened over time. Ris- preoccupations and activities. In the decade to ing apathy and cynicism in various parts of the come, IDEA will continue to be a microcosm of world about democracy’s failure to deliver on ex- the international community of democracy-lov- pectations or provide any real control over polit- ing nations but it may well develop a more con- ical elites present one set of challenges. Confl ict ventional intergovernmental structure and draw and insecurity present other challenges: democrat- much closer to its Member states in future. It will ic processes should serve as the tools of confl ict certainly remain true to its philosophy of democ- management and remain paramount when tack- racy building, but should fi nd satisfaction as more ling security threats of all kinds, but they never- and more other bodies emulate IDEA, extending theless need very careful design and development its infl uence, although reducing its uniqueness. to avoid contributing to confl ict in society. Other IDEA will adapt to the changing scene, no more challenges, and also opportunities, arise from glo- a lone pioneer attempting to fulfi l an impossibly balization, mass communications and technology. ambitious global vocation, but acting in future as Tackling inequality has become perhaps the most a wise and enterprising partner for cooperation pressing task for democracy. Political institutions and a dynamic creator of networks in the expand- and processes need to ensure political equality and ing world of democracy building. popular control but they also need to ensure the political mandate and capacity to govern and de- I am privileged to have been part of IDEA’s jour- liver policies which serve to improve the lives of ney into its second decade, contributing to its re- citizens. Without both economic and political jus- newal and development. It was nearly ten years tice, democracy cannot thrive. ago when I fi rst encountered IDEA on one of its fi rst missions to start a process of democracy ca- These twin objectives need to remain present in pacity building. At the time, and now more than foreign trade and development cooperation poli- ever, I share their vision with all those who con- cies as well as in specifi c efforts at democracy pro- sider IDEA to be a wonderful idea. My thanks go motion by the international community. Com- to all those who have contributed to this shining pared with a decade ago, there is a vast increase in idea as well as those who have brought this anni- talk about democracy building, and much more versary book into being. May IDEA’s next decade knowledge too, although concepts and strategies be as bright as its fi rst! still vary widely. There are appreciably more re- sources available, but here are multiple challenges and needs. There is also a considerable growth in the number of pro-democracy actors, both in the not-for-profi t sector at national and internation- al level and in the public sector as an increasing variety of public agencies—different government departments, parliaments, judiciaries and so on— take initiatives related to democracy and govern- ance support. Karen Fogg This is a new environment for IDEA. It started Secretary-General out as a body with a unique vocation and a unique International IDEA structure. The fi rst decade was a period of inno- vation and passion. IDEA attracted many lively minds, then as now, and built up great expecta- tions, then as now. There have been many impor- tant achievements and this anniversary yearbook is an excellent opportunity to present some of these as well as highlight some of IDEA’s current

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 5 Table of Contents

Foreword ...... 4

Acronyms ...... 9

Introduction: A Reader’s Guide to IDEA’s Tenth Anniversary Publication ...... 11 Ingrid Wetterqvist Introduction ...... 11 About this Publication ...... 12 Part I: IDEA in the Democracy-Building Context ...... 12 Part II: IDEA’s Experiences ...... 13 Conclusion ...... 14

Part I The World around IDEA …1995–2005 ...... 16

1. Democracy Analysis ...... 19 Todd Landman 1.1. Introduction ...... 19 1.2. Defi ning Democracy ...... 20 1.3. Measuring Democracy ...... 20 1.4. Analysing Democracy ...... 22 1.5. Lacunae and Further Work ...... 24 References ...... 26

2. Democracy Building and the Political Dimensions ...... 29 Massimo Tommasoli 2.1. Democracy Building and Development ...... 29 2.2. Democracy, Poverty and Political Change ...... 30 2.3. Structural Features, Institutions and Agents ...... 33 2.4. Some Implications for Democracy Building ...... 34 References ...... 36

3. Themes in Democracy Assistance ...... 39 Richard Youngs 3.1. Overall Trends ...... 39 3.2. Reassessing Civil Society? ...... 42 3.3. Government-to-Government Institution-Building Aid ...... 44 3.4. Political Society: Parties, Parliaments and the Military ...... 45 3.5. Conclusion ...... 47 References ...... 48

6 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 4. Why Governance Matters in Achieving the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals ...... 51 UNDP Governance Centre, Oslo 4.1. Introduction ...... 51 4.2. The Millennium Declaration and Democratic Governance ...... 52 4.3. Why is Governance Indispensable to Achieving the MDGs? ...... 52 4.4. Human Development and Democratic Governance as a Framework for Achieving the MDGs ...... 54 4.5. The Challenge of Strengthening Democracy in a Fragmented World ...... 56 4.6. Regional Focus on Human Development and Governance ...... 57 4.7. Democratic Governance: the Road Ahead ...... 58 4.8. Conclusion ...... 59 References ...... 59

5. The People’s Voice: Trust in Political Institutions ...... 61 Michael Bratton, Yun-han Chu, Marta Lagos and Richard Rose 5.1. Limited Trust in Political Institutions ...... 62 5.2. What Explains Differences in Trust? ...... 67 5.3. Implications for Governance ...... 70

6. From ‘89 to 9/11: of Turmoil and Hope ...... 73 Konstanty Gebert

PART II Highlights of IDEA’s Work … Looking Back 1995 – 2005 ...... 83

7. Ten Years of Democratic IDEAs ...... 85 Charlotte Hjorth 7.1. Mandate and Objectives ...... 85 7.2. IDEA’s Guiding Principles ...... 85 7.3. Increasing Trust and Effi ciency in Electoral Processes ...... 86 7.4. The ACE Project for Sustainable Elections ...... 87 7.5. Women’s Participation ...... 88 7.6. Measuring Democracy: State of Democracy and Democracy Assessment ...... 89 7.7. Dialogue as a Route to Democracy : Capacity Building for Sustainable Democracy ...... 89 7.8. Democracy and Confl ict Management ...... 91 7.9. Democracy and Reconciliation ...... 92 7.10. The United Nations and Democracy ...... 92 7.11. Constitutional Reform ...... 92 7.12. Democracy at the Local and Regional Level ...... 92 7.13. Dialogue and Democracy Building ...... 93 7.14. Research and Dialogue on Political Parties ...... 93 7.15. Regional Activities ...... 94 7.16. Outlook ...... 96

8. Optimism to Realism: Ten Years of Electoral Development ...... 99 Andrew Ellis 8.1. Electoral Systems, Institutional Frameworks and Direct Democracy ...... 99 8.2. Internationally Run Elections in Post-Confl ict Transitions ...... 101 8.3. Looking at Elections from a Development Perspective ...... 102 8.4. Has Election Observation Outstayed its Welcome? ...... 105 8.5. The Independence of Election Administrations ...... 106 8.6. Election Administration as a Profession ...... 107 8.7. Gender and Elections ...... 108 8.8. Participation and Turnout: A Threat to Electoral Legitimacy? ...... 108 8.9. The Next Ten Years ...... 109

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 7 9. Ten Years of Progress: Enhancing Women’s Political Participation ...... 113 Julie Ballington 9.1. National Politics: Broadening the Scope of Participation ...... 113 9.2. Key Themes of IDEA’s Work on Women in Politics ...... 115 9.3. Using Special Measures to Increase Women’s Access to Politics ...... 118 9.4. Supporting and Encouraging Regional Change ...... 120 9.5. Conclusion ...... 123 References ...... 124

10. Democracy in Situations of Deep-Rooted Confl ict ...... 127 Timothy D. Sisk 10.1. The Turbulent 1990s: A World in Transition ...... 128 10.2. Themes of IDEA’s Work ...... 130 10.3. Countries, Regions and the International Community ...... 136 10.4. Conclusion: New Challenges, Themes and Approaches ...... 141

11. The State of Democracy Project ...... 145 David Beetham 11.1. Background ...... 145 11.2. An Innovative Methodology ...... 146 11.3. ‘First-Generation’ Assessments ...... 150 11.4. ‘Second-Generation’ Assessments ...... 152 11.5. The International IDEA Workshop ...... 154 References ...... 155

12. Building Democracy, Shaping the Future: International IDEA in Peru ...... 157 Kristen Sample and Daniel Zovatto 12.1. Introduction ...... 157 12.2. Crucible for Political Reform ...... 157 12.3. IDEA Begins Working in Peru ...... 158 12.4. Governance ...... 160 12.5. Political Reform and Political Parties ...... 160 12.6. Women and Political Participation ...... 162 12.7. Reconciliation ...... 163 12.8. Conclusion ...... 165

Annexes A. About the Authors ...... 168 B. Former and Current Members of IDEA’s Board of Directors ...... 171 C. IDEA Publications ...... 175

Tables and Figures Table 5.1: New Europe Barometer Surveys, 2004 ...... 62 Table 5.2: Summary of Institutional Trust ...... 63 Table 5.3: Institutions Least Trusted Everywhere ...... 66 Figure 5.1: Trusting and Distrusting Citizens, by Continent ...... 64 Figure 5.2: National Differences in Trust within Each Continent ...... 66 Figure 5.3: Positive and Negative Infl uences on Trust ...... 69

8 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Acronyms

ACE Administration and Cost of NAF National Accord Forum Elections Project NDI National Democratic Institute ACP Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacifi c NGO Non-governmental organization AEC Australian Electoral Commission OAS Organization of American States AHDR Arab Human Development Reports ODA Overseas development assistance AULA African Union of Local Authorities ODIHR Offi ce for Democratic Institutions BRIDGE Building Resources in Democracy, and Human Rights of the OSCE Governance and Elections OECD Organisation for Economic CB Capacity Building (Programme) Co-operation and Development CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of OHCHR Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner All Forms of Discrimination Against for Human Rights Women ONPE National Offi ce of Electoral Processes DAC OECD Development Assistance (Ofi cina Nacional de Procesos Committee Electorales) DFID UK Department for International OSCE Organization for Security and Development Co-operation in Europe DPD Regional Representative Council of PDP Participation and Democracy Indonesia Programme DRC IDEA handbook on Democracy and PR Proportional representation Deep-Rooted Confl ict: Options for R&G Rules and Guidelines Programme Negotiators SADC Southern African Development EIDHR European Initiative on Democracy Community and Human Rights SEEDS South Eastern Europe Democracy EISA Electoral Institute of Southern Africa Support Network EMB Electoral management body Sida Swedish International Development EP Election Programme Cooperation Agency EPIC Election Process Information SSR Security sector reform Collection Transparencia Asociación Civil Transparencia EU European Union UNDESA United Nations Department of GBS Global Barometer Surveys Network Economic and Social Affairs GOVNET OECD DAC Network on TRC Truth and Reconciliation Governance Commission GTZ German Agency for Technical UNDP United Nations Development Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Programme Technische Zusammenarbeit) UNEAD UN Electoral Assistance Division ICTJ International Centre for Transitional UNIORE Inter-American Union of Electoral Justice Organisations IDESI Institute for the Development of the UNMISET UN Mission of Support in East Timor Informal Sector (Institute de USAID United States Agency for Desarrollo del Sector Informal) International Development IFES International Foundation for Election Systems IULA International Union of Local Authorities MDGs Millennium Development Goals

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 9 “International IDEA broke new ground. First of all, it was global in its reach and it was not just about elections in developing countries. It was about the fundamentals of democracy worldwide. We were as concerned with the funding of political parties in established democracies as about the interface between democracy and under- development. Our mission remains as valid now as it was when we began.”

Sir Shridath Ramphal, First Chairman of International IDEA (February 1995–June 2001) And former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. Guyana.

“Today, democracy in Germany is taken for granted. This is the result of our troubled history and experience with two kinds of totalitarianisms. The fragility and weaknesses of democracy in the Weimar Republic made it possible in 1933 for the National Socialists to seize power, and to terrorize and repress the opposition. After the end of the Second World War, democratic elections were established in the western part of the divided Germany, but banned by state communism in the Eastern part. [The two parts] reunited only since 1990, the lesson I draw from our German way to democracy is that democratization is more than the promotion of freedom and elections – it can only succeed with the active participation of citizens and open dialogue. To me, democratization means learning: for overcoming totalitarian and authoritarian attitudes, for fi ghting intolerance, discrimination and inequalities by non-violent means. This is why Germany is keen on contributing to IDEA’s worldwide effort. IDEA is pivotal in promoting civic and political dialogues necessary for sustainable democratization.”

Dr Henning Scherf, member of the Board of International IDEA, President of the Senate and Mayor of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, Germany

10 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Introduction: A Reader’s Guide to IDEA’s Tenth Anniversary Publication

Ingrid Wetterqvist

Introduction

The International Institute for Democracy and Democracy building is as yet a relatively young Electoral Assistance (IDEA) was founded in 1995 thematic area, consisting of a fragmented commu- with a mandate to promote sustainable democracy nity of rapidly multiplying players: national gov- worldwide by assisting countries in building the ernments with diverging policies between develop- capacity to develop and strengthen their demo- ment and foreign ministries; international organi- cratic institutions. Ten years down the road, the zations, non-governmental organizations, profes- organization constitutes an essential interface be- sional politicians and party functionaries. It seeks tween academia, policy makers and practitioners, to reconcile diverging aims such as the improve- synthesizing research and providing a platform for ment of development policy, securing stability and discussion between nations and continents. advancing democracy as a normative agenda.

2005 marks the tenth anniversary of IDEA’s work, One way to bridge the fragmentation is to im- which rep resents a good opportunity to take a step prove the dissemina tion of information, multiply back and consider what the Institute has achieved exchanges of best practice, and promote research in its fi rst decade of existence. IDEA has therefore to increase understanding of the underlying proc- decided to produce a tenth anniversary publica- esses that favour or impede democratization, in tion to look at the changing environment of de- order to further consolidate a common knowledge mocratization in the last decade and IDEA’s role as base. a pioneer in promoting new tools for democracy building. This publication hopes to contribute to this proc- ess by presenting the fi eld of democracy building The tenth anniversary publication is to be the fi rst from different perspectives in an attempt to sum- of a series of reference publications for any reader marize the efforts in the fi eld and provide an an- who wants to keep abreast of the latest develop- nual focal point for practitioners and policy mak- ments in the furthering of democracy. Given the ers. diversity of and the rapid changes in the fi eld of democracy building, the publication cannot be The publication aims to illustrate how IDEA an exhaustive account of all developments in the contributes to democracy building in the prac- fi eld, but simply selects some of the topical issues tical and theoretical sense, and its experience of to represent the whole when it comes to cutting- how to make a difference in the fi eld of democra- edge developments. cy building. The debate on the different forms of

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 11 democracy building has intensifi ed in the last few Part I deals with current developments, the differ- years, but, despite the panoply of competing ap- ent facets of democracy building and the diverg- proaches, a consensus on some core ideas is emerg- ing players represented by the contributions of in- ing as common to all who work with democracy ternationally renowned authors and institu tions. issues. Not by chance, these ideas have been at the It builds the conceptual and empirical framework heart of IDEA’s work since the very beginning. for IDEA’s activities, which are selectively present- ed in the second part. IDEA recognizes that democratization is a proc- ess which requires time and patience, and which is Part II describes some of the activities of IDEA not achieved through elections alone. The IDEA in democracy building, via the perspectives of the approach is com- different IDEA programmes and the instruments parative and non- employed, and by highlighting the organiza tion’s IDEA recognizes that democratization is a prescriptive, and work in a sample region (Peru) to show the inter- process which requires time and patience, based on the be- play between broad institutional planning and re- and which is not achieved through elections lief that democracy gional activity. alone. The IDEA approach is comparative can only be built and non-prescriptive, and based on the from within in or- The ambition is not to render an exhaustive ac- belief that democracy can only be built from der to be sustain- count of IDEA’s activities in the last decade but to within in order to be sustainable. However, able. However, the provide the reader with some colourful examples the outside world can provide examples of outside world can drawn from IDEA’s vast range of experiences. best practice and lend support to processes provide examples that are essentially local. The support must of best practice and Part I: IDEA in the Democracy- be attuned to national specifi cities, as there lend support to Building Context are no one-size-fi ts-all solutions. IDEA processes that are believes that these founding principles upon essentially local. One of the prime questions in democracy build- which it operates remain valid to this day. The support must ing is how to defi ne democracy, and in the next be attuned to na- step, how to assess its quality in a given nation. In tional specifi cities, his chapter, Democracy Analysis, Professor Todd as there are no one-size-fi ts-all solutions. IDEA be- Landman of the University of Essex offers an in- lieves that these founding principles upon which it troduction to how to assess, measure and analyse operates remain valid to this day. democracy and its defi ning charac teristics. A clear understanding of the model and the caveats of de- True to its principles and to the fundamental prin- fi ning democracy is crucial in creating instruments ciples of demo cracy, IDEA offers no standard solu- for effective democracy building. tion, but rather understands the process of democ- racy building as a dialogue between the different The chapter by Massimo Tommasoli on Democ- actors, opinions and approaches. This is also re- racy Building and the Political Dimensions of fl ected in the structure of this publication, which Development looks at the challenges for the effec- in itself can be seen as a dialogue: the articles shed tiveness of aid in the promotion of democracy and light on democracy building from different an- in poverty reduction. He outlines why democracy gles and institutional perspectives, and the reader promoters should pay more attention to the role should form his or her own opinion and organize of structural features, institutions and agents in the pieces in a pattern that is useful to him. change processes, and rethink incentives for po- litical change. About this Publication In the following chapter, Themes in Democracy To better show the interrelationship between the Assistance, Richard Youngs traces the develop- political environment of democracy building and ment of democracy building over the last decade, the work of IDEA, the publication is divided into its challenges and its different forms as experi- two parts: enced by donor member states and in relationship

12 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) to other international players. range of IDEA’s activities in the different work- ing teams, on different continents and with dif- The UNDP Governance Centre’s contribution, ferent methods, a proof of the ‘diversity in unity’ Why Governance Matters in Achieving the Mil- approach towards democracy, built on its underly- lennium Declaration and the Millennium Devel- ing principles of tolerance, neutrality and academ- opment Goals, addresses the issues of democracy ic excellence. Thereafter IDEA’s different themat- and good governance in a systematic way by link- ic teams give their view of development in their ing development and the realization of the Mil- fi eld. lennium Goals to democracy building. It presents its experiences on how to stabilize democracy and The chapter on make it work. Optimism to Re- One of the prime questions in democracy alism: Ten Years building is how to defi ne democracy, and in While the previous authors try to defi ne and de- of Electoral Devel- the next step, how to assess its quality in a scribe democracy building from an analytical or opment highlights given nation. ‘objective’ perspective, the Global Barometer Sur- one of democracy veys (GBS) Network investigates empirically how building’s most ad- democracy is perceived by citizens on different vanced areas—sustainable electoral processes. An- continents. The chapter by Professor Richard Rose drew Ellis recounts the development of this area of the GBS Network, The People’s Voice: Trust from the optimistic climate of the mid-1990s to in Political Institutions, shows how a comparative the sober professional approach of the early 20th approach can help set the democracy debate in a 21st century, and the progress made on the way. country into motion, and how listening to the vox Electoral assistance has been a driver in interna- populi can help achieve local ownership by formu- tional cooperation in the fi eld, and has played an lating a political agenda that mirrors the expecta- important role in the emergence of a defi ned com- tions of citizens. munity of practitioners.

In his chapter, From ‘89 to 9/11: of Turmoil and The activity of the Electoral Processes team is a il- Hope, Konstanty Gebert, author and columnist in lustrative example of the IDEA principles in prac- the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborzca, invites us tice. It works on the assumption that elections to refl ect on the hazards and pitfalls that emerging alone do not define democracy, and shows why democracies encounter on their way to a state sys- tem that represents the will of their people. Gebert describes the changes from authoritarian regime to democracy against the backdrop of the collapse of communism and the growth of liberal democra- cies in Eastern Europe, mirroring the experien- ces and illusions of millions of people in the last 15 years. He also touches upon the acute issue of Islam and its relationship to democracy, and the often crumbled hopes of an increased democrati- zation of the Arab world, arguing that the West carries a far bigger part of the responsibility in its failure than it is ready to admit.

Part II: IDEA’s Experiences

The second part of the publication highlights IDEA’s own experiences with democracy building Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, Thorvald by way of key examples of its work over the last Stoltenberg and Sir Shridath Ramphal at the celebration of decade. First, a general overview shows the broad IDEA’s 10th Anniversary held on 28 February 2005

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 13 for democracies to succeed in situations of deep- rooted confl ict and to counter the threat of terror- ist attacks. However, he argues that IDEA’s work has generated numerous lessons, best practices and understandings not only of how democracy can survive in divided, confl ictual societies, but how democratic practices directly contribute to peace as the only long-term solution.

The chapter on The State of Democracy Project, by Professor David Beetham of Essex University, takes on the theme from the fi rst part of the year- book, democracy assessment and analysis, and gives an account of IDEA’s role in the process. Beetham outlines how the democracy assessment methodology developed by IDEA has proved to work and infl uenced other methodologies, and

Karen Fogg, Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Sir how it has been used as a teaching tool and even Shridath Ramphal, Timothy D. Sisk and Patrick Molutsi at the taken on a life of its own, triggering a second gen- celebration of IDEA’s 10 Anniversary held on 28 February 2005 eration of assessments initiated by the countries themselves. providing examples of best practice and options IDEA benefi ts particularly from the dynamic be- for improving institutional frameworks, achieving tween global and regional activities. The close con- local ownership via the training of locals and pro- nection with IDEA’s regional offi ces increases the posing cost-effective solutions, is so important to relevance of its academic work as there is a need to achieving sustainable electoral processes. connect to citizens and politicians in their natural habitat. As an example of this important connec- In her contribution, Ten Years of Progress: En- tion, the chapter on Building Democracy, Shap- hancing Women’s Political Participation, IDEA ing the Future: International IDEA in Peru gives staff member Julie Ballington points out that sta- an overview of the activities carried out by and the tistics show that ten years of efforts to improve achievements of one of IDEA’s regional offi ces. All gender participation are slowly starting to pay off, work has been carried out in partnership with lo- although much remains to be done. Information cal groups and through other forms of including must continue to be disseminated, comparisons locals, especially women and indigenous peoples, and examples be given of how an alternative sit- in keeping with IDEA’s principles on the impor- uation could look, and the strategies for how it tance of local ownership. could be attained pointed out. The strategies in- clude leverage of political parties, gender quotas, Conclusion electoral system design, drawing on and boosting the infl uence of those already elected, and, lastly, Given that democracy is a process and not a static raising awareness about the attitudinal obstacles in state of affairs, the discussion on democracy build- patriarchal societies. ing is in constant motion. Although the next de- cade is likely to witness a further consolidation An important area in democracy building is the of the community of practitioners in democracy role of democracy in confl ict resolution, affecting building, the number of policy instruments and all parts of democracy building. In the chapter on players will multiply and the interdependence of Democracy in Situations of Deep-Rooted Con- the national, regional and the international levels fl ict, Professor Timothy Sisk, IDEA Senior Policy to promote democracy will grow. The increasing Advisor, paints a sombre picture of the challenges number of democracies will also contribute to a

14 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) diversifi cation of democracy building.

IDEA will continue to play an important part in the advancement of democracy building, particu- larly as a platform for exchange and dialogue and as a catalyst to promote best practice to the ben- efi t of democracy in all parts of the world. The tenth anniversary book seeks to contribute to this process, not only by demonstrating conclusions and lessons drawn from democracy building, but, more than that, by opening up new points of de- parture. It should encourage activists and practi- tioners to draw their lessons from the past, while creatively shaping the future.

We hope you will enjoy reading it!

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 15 Masai women outside of Morogoro wait to cast their ballots in Tanzania’s 2000 elections. Photo taken by Julie Ballington, Programme Manager, Gender and Political Participation, IDEA.

Election workers load polling materials for delivery to remote voting districts outside of Milange, Zambezia Province, ahead of Mozambique’s 1999 election. Photo taken by Julie Ballington, Programme Manager, Gender and Political Participation, IDEA. PART I THE WORLD AROUND IDEA … 1995-2005

This section of the book deals with recent and current developments, the different facets of democracy build- ing and the different players which are represented by the contributions of internationally renowned authors and institutions. It builds the conceptual and empirical framework for IDEA’s activities, selectively presented in the second part of the book. ‘I have always felt that effective and reliable democratic processes are the best guarantee of human liberty and happiness, which is why we needed an international institute to establish and propagate guidelines. I would like it to go further in the fullness of time and become a recognized arbiter and watchdog of electoral practices.’

Lord Steel of Aikwood, politician, author and former Speaker of the Scottish Parliament, United Kingdom, member of the Board of International IDEA February 1995–June 2001

18 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 1. Democracy Analysis

Todd Landman

One of the prime questions in democracy building is Despite the historical advances and setbacks in de- how to defi ne democracy, and in the next step, how to mocracy, the world witnessed a fi rst wave of de- assess its quality in a given nation. This chapter offers mocracy that extended from the middle of the an introduction to how to assess, measure and ana- 19th century to the beginning of the 20th cen- lyse democracy and its defi ning character istics. A clear tury, and then three successive waves since World understanding of the model and the caveats defi ning War II, which advanced across Western and South- democracy is crucial in creating instruments for effec- ern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and tive democracy building. parts of Africa and Asia such that virtually 60 per cent of all independent nation states in the world 1.1. Introduction are now at least nominally democratic. The sec- ond wave comprised those democratic transitions The study of democracy has occupied political sci- that occurred largely in Western Europe and Ja- ence since the days of Aristotle, who used both pan after the defeat of the Axis powers. The third normative rules to guide his classifi cation of forms wave included countries that experienced demo- of rule (good vs corrupt), deductive derivation of cratic transitions between 1974 and 1989 (mostly the types of rule (monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia), while oligarchy, polity, democracy), and empirical meth- the fourth wave of transitions began with the end ods to map his typology onto the states of the day. of the Cold War and included countries in East- Since these early forms of normative and empiri- ern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Schol- cal analysis, democracy has been a vigorous idea: ars and practitioners working in the fi elds of pol- that in human communities it ought to be ordi- itical science, development studies, overseas ass- nary people (the adult citizens) and not extraor- istance and foreign affairs have sought to explain dinary people who rule. For John Dunn (1992), and understand the contours of this new ‘demo- ‘The idea itself is devastatingly obvious but also cratic universe’ while contributing to its successful tantalizingly strange and implausible’. Moreover, a consolidation and long-term sustainability. Such compre hensive comparative study of forms of gov- an effort has required working defi nitions of de- ernance stretching from ancient Mesopotamia to mocracy, measures of democracy, analysis of the the 20th century argues that the form of rule most factors that explain its emergence and perform- equivalent to democracy (i.e. the ‘forum polity’) ance, and policies that help to support countries has been the most rare and the most recent in world in their efforts to consolidate it. This chapter out- history (Finer 1997). lines the different ways in which democracy is de- fi ned, demonstrates the necessary and inexorable

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 19 link between conceptions and measures of democ- protection of the right to vote as well as the ex- racy, reviews the main empirical fi ndings from de- istence of uni versal suffrage. Liberal defi nitions mocracy analysis, and identifi es remaining lacunae of democracy maintain concerns over contesta- in the fi eld where further work is needed. tion and participation, but add more explicit ref- erences to the protection of certain human rights. 1.2. Defi ning Democracy Liberal defi nitions include an institutional dimen- sion that captures the idea of popular sovereignty, In many ways democracy is a classic example of and includes notions of accountability, constraint an ‘essentially contested’ concept (Gallie 1956), of leaders, representation of citizens, and universal since there is not now, nor is there likely to be, participation. But it adds a rights dimension, which a fi nal consensus is upheld through the rule of law and includes civ- on its defi nition or il, political, property and minority rights. Social Procedural defi nitions of democracy identify full content. Nev- defi nitions of democracy maintain the institution- the minimum requirements for upholding ertheless there are al and rights dimensions found in liberal defi ni- participatory competitive politics. Liberal certain features of tions of democracy but expand the types of rights defi nitions include the full protection of democracy about that ought to be protected, including social and civil, political, property and minority rights, which there is sig- economic rights. which are meant to curb the possible nifi cant consensus, negative consequences of democratic and the world has Taken together, these three defi nitions of democ- governance based on majority rule only. countless exam- racy share certain features such as the notion of Social defi nitions include additional ples of democratic peaceful competitive politics and some form of protections for economic and social rights, practices that have participation, but then add further features meant which are seen as essential for the full existed over long to protect individuals and groups across increas- participation of citizens in the collective periods of time ingly wider aspects of their lives. Procedural def- decisions that may affect their lives. and have now ad- initions of democracy identify the minimum re- vanced across vast quirements for upholding participatory compet- geo graphical spac- itive politics. Liberal defi nitions include the full es. The idea that democracy is a form of govern- protection of civil, political, property and minor- ance based on some degree of popular sovereignty ity rights, which are meant to curb the possible and collective decision making remains largely un- negative consequences of democratic governance contested. But it is the concern over the additional based on majority rule only. Social defi nitions in- features to this basic formulation that have pro- clude additional protections for economic and so- duced signifi cant and serious debate about the dif- cial rights, which are seen as essential for the full ferent defi nitions of democracy. For the purposes participation of citizens in the collective decisions of this chapter, these defi nitions of democracy in- that may affect their lives. There are thus ‘thin’ and clude procedural democracy, liberal democracy, and ‘thick’ defi nitions of democracy, and the differenc- social democracy, which we now consider in turn. es in them are inexorably linked with the degree to which political scientists have been able to meas- Procedural defi nitions of democracy, made most ure and analyse the patterns in the emergence, notably in Robert Dahl’s seminal work Polyar- maintenance and performance of democracy. chy (1971), include the two dimensions of con- testation and participation. Contestation captures 1.3. Measuring Democracy the uncertain peaceful competition necessary for democratic rule, a principle which presumes Social science measurement establishes a direct the legitimacy of some opposition, the right to link between back ground concepts and indicators challenge incumbents, protection of the twin by providing a systematized version of the back- freedoms of expression and association, the exist- ground concept, operationalizing the systema- ence of free and fair elections, and a consolidated tized con cept, and providing meaningful ‘scores’ political party system. Par ticipa tion captures the that vary across units of analysis (Adcock and Col- idea of popular sovereignty, which presumes the lier 2001). With respect to the measurement of

20 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) democracy, the numerous measurement efforts in tives, and at least 50 per cent enfranchisement for political science tend to specify democracy in its the male population (Boix and Stokes 2003). minimal and procedural form or provide indica- tors for the institutional and rights dimensions Standards-based measures of democracy also spec- that comprise liberal defi nitions. Fully specifi ed ify a set of cri teria for judging countries but, un- measurements of social democracy have thus far like the categorical measures, they assume democ- remained elusive, which can be explained in part racy to be more continuous and provide scales that by the political culture and ideology of (Ameri- range from low to high values. For example, the can) political science itself, which privileges nar- Polity data series takes into account both the demo- rower defi nitions of democracy, and in part by the cratic and the autocratic features of countries, while serious methodological challenges that have yet to its combined score on democracy ranges from be overcome in providing valid and meaningful –10 for a full autocracy to +10 for full democracy measures of economic and social rights (Landman (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Freedom House has two 2004). separate scales for political and civil liberties that range from 1 (full enjoyment of liberties) to 7 (full Political scientists have adopted a number of strat- restriction of liberties), which have often featured egies to operationalize democracy for empirical in cross-national comparisons in some combined analysis, including categorical measures, stand- form as a measure of democracy (see ; and Burkhart and Lewis- democratic practices. Seymour Martin Lipset Beck 1994). These scales provide greater variation (1959) established the fi rst set of categorical meas- in the level of democracy (as opposed to an ‘either ures of regime type that were used for cross-na- or’ classifi cation) and have wide-ranging spatial tional quantitative analysis, which ranged across and temporal coverage (e.g. between 194 and 200 a ‘democracy–dictatorship’ continuum includ- countries and territories for over 30 to 200 years). ing stable democracies, unstable democracies, While these measures provide greater variation in unstable dictatorships, and stable dictatorships. democracy, criticisms have focused on their less More recently, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and than transparent coding rules (especially those of Limongi (2000) developed a dichotomous classi- Freedom House); their illogical form of aggrega- fi cation scheme using a set of criteria for judging tion into single indices, which does not take into whether countries are democratic or authoritarian. account trade-offs between the institutional and To qualify as a democracy, a country must have rights dimensions; their inability to differentiate had its chief executive elected and its main legisla- the demo cratic performance of those countries tive body elected, and it must have more than one at the extreme ends of the spectrum (i.e. among political party. These criteria are quite narrow and mature democracies and highly authoritarian re- specifi cally exclude questions of accountability, gimes); and the possible presence of ideological freedom, participation and rights, among others. biases (Freedom House in particular) (see Munck This categorization rests on the assumption that and Verkuilen 2002). democracy is an ‘all or nothing’ affair and it tries to avoid over-counting the number of democracies Objective measures of democracy move away from in the world. Despite these assumptions and nar- a fi xed set of criteria and judgements about coun- row focus, this categorical method has provided try locations either into categories or on particu- democracy measures with a wide spatial and tem- lar scales and concentrate instead on available in- poral coverage for use in global quantitative com- dicators of democratic practices. To this end, Tatu parative analysis. Typically, the resulting data sets Vanhanen (1997) specifi es democracy in minimal include over 150 countries for between 40 (Prze- and procedural fashion along the lines of Robert worski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000) and Dahl and then provides separate measures of con- 100 years (Boix 2003). Indeed, for those studies testation and participation. He uses the percent- that reach back into the 19th century, democracy age share of smallest parties in the national leg- is specifi ed in even more minimal fashion to in- islature (100 minus the share of the largest par- clude free and fair elections, accountable execu- ty) as a measure of contestation and he uses the

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 21 percentage turnout in national elections as a meas- democracy in their heads when they answer stand- ure of participation. These two measures are then ardized questions. multiplied together and divided by 100 to pro- duce an ‘index of democratization’. While this Taken together, categorical classifi cation, stand- measure moves away from subjective and judge- ards-based scales, objective indicators and survey mental categories or scales, quite a few problems data have all been used to provide measures of remain. First, the measure of con testation does not democracy, and all have sought to establish a di- take into account the electoral system, which has rect link with a conceptual defi nition of democ- a direct relationship with the effective number of racy, which has tended to be specifi ed in a narrow parties in the legislature (Lijphart 1994b, 1999). fashion to include procedural and in come cases Countries with single-member district electoral liberal democracy. All the measures have aimed to systems tend to have a smaller number of parties provide comparability across the world and over than countries with proportional representation, time. In this way, the measures use defi nitions of which may lead to the false representation of con- democracy that ‘travel’ across many observable testation. Second, many countries have compulso- units that vary in time and space. This emphasis ry voting, which necessarily compromises the va- on achieving a greater scope of coverage and comp- lidity of turnout as a measure of voluntary partici- arability has, however, meant that these measures pation. Nevertheless, the measure has been used are operation alized at a relatively high level of ab- alongside other measures of democracy for quan- straction and are less sensitive to the cultural spe- titative analysis (Landman 1999). cifi cities of the different countries that comprise the world. In addition to these measures of democracy, an- other measurement strategy avoids making ex- But what have been the main fi ndings of empirical ternal judgements against pre-established criteria analyses that have used these various measures? or using the kind of objective measures outlined above and relies instead on public perceptions of 1.4. Analysing Democracy democracy through the collection of individual- level survey data. Such data provide an indication Empirical analysis in political science has hitherto of the degree to which mass publics support de- examined important questions on the emergence, mocracy in general, as well as indicators on mass maintenance, and performance of democracy. perceptions of the relative performance of democ- Since the early work of Lipset (1959), political racy and faith in democratic institutions. The vari- scientists have analysed the economic requisites ous ‘barometer’ studies began in Europe and have of democracy. Whether democracy is measured in subsequently been extended to Latin America and categorical or scalar terms, and regardless of the Africa, and are now part of the larger Global Ba- time period used, global comparative analysis has rometer Surveys. In contrast to the other extant consistently shown a positive and signifi cant rela- approaches to democracy measurement, these data tionship between high levels of economic devel- provide an indica- opment and democracy. Such a consistent fi nd- Once democracy has been established in tion of citizen sup- ing has led either to the weak claim that the two port for democra- are associated with one another or to the strong countries with high levels of economic cy, which exhibits claim that economic development causes democra- development, it tends not to collapse. In this signifi cant varia- cy. Both claims try to identify the endogenous and way, economic development supports the tion between and exogenous factors for the emergence of demo cracy. process of democratization but it does not within regions (e.g. Endogenous explanations argue that changes in- determine it. Lagos 1997). Sur- ternal to the process of economic development vey data has been necessarily lead to a series of social and political used throughout the social sciences, but the cross- changes that culminate in democracy. Such factors national use of survey data for democracy analy- have variously included the rise of an enlightened sis such as this rests on the vulnerable assump- middle class (Lipset 1959), the push for inclusion tion that all publics have a similar ‘model’ of by the working classes (Rueschemeyer, Stephens

22 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and Stephens 1992), and changes in the relative democracies are distribution of land, income and capital (Van- equally bad at Illiberal democracies are particularly hanen 1997; Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2003). guaranteeing the good at establishing the basic institutional Exogenous explanations argue that factors external protection of eco- mechanisms and protections for holding to processes of economic development help estab- nomic and social relatively free and fair elections, lish democracy, including changes in the relative rights, and point maintaining a relatively free press, power and strategic interaction of elites within au- to persistent prob- guaranteeing freedom of expression, thoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999), the strategic lems with social ex- and protecting rights to assembly and interaction between elites in the regime and elit- clusion and limited association for the development of political es in the opposition (Przeworski 1991; Colomer forms of access to parties, civil society organizations and 1991; Colomer and Pascual 1994), and social mo- justice, which mean bilization for individual rights of citizenship (Fow- that, although cit- trade unions, but they are less good at eraker and Landman 1997), as well as important izens are legally protecting citizens from ethnic, religious international factors such as diffusion, contagion, equal, they remain and gender discrimination, arbitrary coercion (Whitehead 1996), and globalization (Li socially unequal. detention, and torture, ill treatment and and Reuveny 2003). Economic development is not death in custody. absent from such exogenous explanations. Rather, There are a vari- they argue that once democracy has been estab- ety of institutional and cultural explanations for lished in countries with high levels of economic the presence of such illiberal democracies. Insti- development, it tends not to collapse (Przeworski, tutionally, analyses have shown that presidential Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000). In this way, democracies, and especially those with multipar- economic development supports the process of de- ty systems, are inherently more unstable, prone to mocratization but it does not determine it (Land- breakdown, and susceptible to extra-constitutional man 2001: 235–39). behaviour of presidents that makes the protection of rights precarious (Stepan and Skach 1994; Fow- Since these analyses have been more concerned eraker and Landman 2002). Parliamentary systems with explaining the emergence of democracy, they and so-called ‘consensus democracies’ perform have had very little to say about the quality or per- better across a range of indicators including politi- formance of democracy itself. Efforts to describe cal stability, economic per formance, and minor- the third and fourth waves of democracy using in- ity and other rights protections (Lijphart 1994a; stitutional and rights measures have shown that, 1999). Other institutional explanations focus on while the world has witnessed a dramatic growth weak and less-than-independent judiciaries (Mén- in the number of democracies, the latest waves dez, O’Donnell and Pinheiro 1999), corruption, have largely involved ‘illiberal’ democracies (Dia- reserve domains of military power, and vestiges of mond 1999; Zakaria 2003). Illiberal democracies past authoritarian practices (of either the left or are particularly good at establishing the basic in- the right) (Linz and Stepan 1996). Cultural ex- stitutional mechanisms and protections for hold- planations for the presence of illiberal democracies ing relatively free and fair elections, maintaining a concentrate on patrimonial and neo-patrimonial relatively free press, guaranteeing freedom of ex- forms of rule (Bratton and van de Walle 1997), pression, and protecting rights to assembly and and consistent levels of mass popular support for association for the development of political par- security and the quick prosecution of criminals ties, civil society organizations and trade unions, that undermine fundamentally a commitment to but they are less good at protecting citizens from human rights standards. ethnic, religious and gender discrimination, ar- bitrary detention, and torture, ill treatment and Beyond the analysis of conditions for the emer- death in custody. There is thus a sig nifi cant gap gence and main tenance of democracy, political between the procedural and institutional dimen- science has also turned its attention to the con- sions of democracy on the one hand and the pro- sequences of democracy. Research shows that de- tection of civil and minority rights on the other. mocracies have signifi cantly better human develop- Human rights advocates add that these illiberal ment records (Ersson and Lane 1996) and are no

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 23 worse at promoting democracies, even after controlling for classic ‘re- Beyond the propensity for democracies growth than au- alist’ factors such as relative power, distance and to commit themselves to international thoritarian regimes contiguity. Moreover, they have shown that the human rights obligations, they also show (Przeworski, Alva- presence of one democracy in the pair reduces sig- a much lower propensity to get involved in rez, Cheibub and nifi cantly the propensity to engage in a mili tarized ‘international entanglements’. Limongi 2000). dispute with another country, suggesting that de- Despite the prob- mocracies are simply less confl ict-prone than au- lem of illiberal de- thoritarian states. mocracies noted above, democracies are better at protecting ‘personal integrity rights’ (Poe and Tate 1.5. Lacunae and Further Work 1994; Davenport 2001), which shows dramatic improvement even after the fi rst year of a demo- This overview of defi nitions, measures and analy- cratic transition (Zanger 2000). Democracies (es- ses of democracy has shown that the considerable pecially new democracies) are also more likely to time and effort dedicated by political scientists to participate in the international human rights re- analysis of the emergence, maintenance and con- gime through ratifi cation of human rights treaties. sequences of democracy has made great progress. Fourth wave demo cracies tend to ratify more in- It is clear that there is a necessary and inexorable ternational human rights treaties with fewer reser- link between conceptions of democracy and the vations, followed by third wave democracies and indicators used to measure it, whether they are established democracies. But the inverse is true for categorical, standards-based, survey-based or ob- the actual protection of human rights, where ma- jective. It appears that economic development is ture democracies have better human rights records a requisite, if not a prerequisite, to democratiza- than third and fourth wave democracies, respec- tion, that certain institutional arrangements have tively (Landman 2005). better records of democratic performance across a range of indicators, and that democracies are gen- Beyond the propensity for democracies to commit erally better at participating in the international themselves to international human rights obliga- regime of human rights, protecting personal integ- tions, they also show a much lower propensity to rity rights, and resolving their international differ- get involved in ‘international entanglements’. Re- ences more peacefully. search on the ‘democratic peace’ has shown that since the mid-19th century pairs of democracies But, despite the great progress that has been made do not go to war with one another (Levy 2002), in the global analysis of democracy, much work and, beyond outright engagement in warfare, re- remains to be done, including devoting more at- search has also shown that democracies are sim- tention to the domestic history of democratiz- ply more pacifi c ing countries and the history of the international But, despite the great progress that has been than authoritarian system; giving more attention to the quality and made in the global analysis of democracy, regimes. For exam- depth of democratic practices, including those much work remains to be done, including ple, using a cross- that do not conform to the Western ideal; and devoting more attention to the domestic national and time- producing locally ‘owned’ democracy assessments history of democratizing countries and the series data set of that act as advocacy tools for domestic and inter- pairs of states (dy- national actors to engage in democratic critique, history of the international system; giving ads) from 1885 to refl ection and reform. more attention to the quality and depth 1992, Russett and of democratic practices, including those Oneal (2001) show With a few notable exceptions (Rueschemeyer, that do not conform to the Western ideal; that the probabil- Stephens and Stephens 1992; Boix 2003; Boix and producing locally ‘owned’ democracy ity of a militarized and Stokes 2003), the systematic study of the assessments that act as advocacy tools for dispute between emergence of democracy pays far too little atten- domestic and international actors to engage two countries is tion to history. It ignores the historical processes in democratic critique, refl ection and reform. greatly reduced if of both socio-economic and political change at both countries are the domestic level and it has tended to ignore the

24 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) changing structure of the world political system. undermine the pro- Lipset’s (1959) original study on the social requi- tection of civil and Beyond the inclusion of time, history and sites of democracy was a ‘snapshot’ analysis of a political rights. world structure in the study of democracy, world at one point in time, a time that saw proc- it appears that the analytical leverage esses of decolonization and the Cold War restruc- In addition to the gained from using fairly minimal defi nitions turing of the world. Analyses that added time con- need for great- and measures of democracy in global tinued to compare countries from the 1950s on- er analysis of so- quantitative analysis has meant that we wards, which again populated their samples with cial and eco nomic lack in-depth analyses on the quality of a large proportion of rich democracies and ig- rights under de- democracy. nored the history of global capitalist development mocracy, there is in which the core countries experienced different also a need for a ‘routes to modernity’ (Moore 1966) from those fuller analysis of traditional forms of rule that con- on the semi-periphery and periphery. The excep- tradict largely Western conceptions of the individ- tions to these analyses have either looked further ual and the ways in which relations between the back into history to a period that preceded the fi rst citizen and the state are mediated. In mature de- wave of democracy (Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes mocracies, citizen interests tend to be aggregated 2003) or controlled for the ‘location’ of countries and represented through political party organi- in the world economy (see Burkhart and Lewis- zations, social movement organizations, and/or Beck 1994; Foweraker and Landman 2004). other civil society organizations. However, many These latter studies have shown that economic de- countries in the developing world have other velopment is indeed a prerequisite for democracy, forms of interest aggregation and social organiza- but that the overall relationship between levels of tion that do not fi t these models, but nor are they economic development and democracy is different inherently inimical to stable democratic rule. For over time and space such that ‘early’ democratiz- example, it is typical for tribal chiefs in Burkina ers required a lower threshold of development to Faso to act as intermediaries between the villagers secure sustainable democracy, while those coun- in a particular tribe and voting in elections. Such tries on the semi-periphery and periphery of the a practice suggests that voting is not ‘free and fair’, world system accrue less democratic benefi t from but it differs little from the kind of patron–client patterns of economic development. forms of political control in Latin American de- mocracy or the political machines that have oper- Beyond the inclusion of time, history and world ated throughout the history of Chicago politics. structure in the study of democracy, it appears Rather than dismiss these practices outright, there that the analytical leverage gained from using fair- is a need to examine and analyse how alternative ly minimal defi nitions and measures of democracy and traditional forms of social organization repre- in global quantitative analysis has meant that we sent interests and how such forms of organization lack in-depth analyses on the quality of democra- interact with the formal institutions of democracy. cy. Even those studies that have sought to differen- In addition, many societies have large indigenous tiate democracy beyond single indices have tended and nomadic populations that do not fi t the West- to stop at liberal conceptions and measures, while ern notion of ‘fi xed’ individuals that participate fuller analysis that takes into account the relative freely in periodic democratic elections. Analysis protection of eco nomic and social rights is still should thus examine the ways in which such in- needed. The defenders of liberal democracy argue dividuals and the group identities to which they that such rights protections are extrinsic to a core ascribe engage in democratic politics. conception of democracy and that they are mat- Clearly, any attempt to add depth of analysis into ters of policy to be decided by any form of govern- the quality of democracy means that our ability ment (e.g. Foweraker and Krznaric 2001). But the to make empirical generalizations becomes par- human rights and development community have tially sacrifi ced and models of democracy will be long argued that the different categories of rights less able to ‘travel’ for comparative purposes. The are related in important ways such that a low pro- inclusion of tra ditional forms of rule, nomadic tection of social and economic rights may actually populations and indigenous communities, among

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 25 other contextually-specifi c practices, suggests per- References haps that the analysis of democracy requires ‘core’ indicators along the lines addressed in this review Adcock, R. and Collier, D., ‘Measurement Validity: A and ‘satellite’ indi cators that remain sensitive to al- Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative ternative forms of interest aggregation and repre- Research’, American Political Science Review 95/3 sentation. In this way, more grounded and locally (2001), pp. 529–46 ‘owned’ democracy assessments (see chapter 11) Boix, C., Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: can benefi t from the inclusion of such core and Cambridge University Press, 2003) satellite indicators. As the march of democracy — and Stokes, S., ‘Endogenous Democratization’, World continues across the globe, it covers an increasing- Politics 55 (July 2003), pp. 517–49 ly diverse set of countries, societies and peoples. Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N., Democratic Experi- So far the true meaning of the term ‘democracy’ ments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative remains unfi xed and is therefore fl exible. Yet the Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, core principles of popular sover eignty and collec- 1997) tive self-rule will continue to have wide appeal and Burkhart, R. E. and Lewis-Beck, M., ‘Comparative De- to be universally applicable. Democracy analysis mocracy: The Economic Development Thesis’, Amer- will continue to compare and contrast the ways in ican Political Science Review 88/4 (1994), pp. 903–10 which this ‘tantalizingly strange and implausible’ Colomer, J., ‘Transitions by Agreement: Modelling the idea has been realized throughout the world. Sys- Spanish Way’, American Political Science Review 85/4 tematic global comparative analysis will continue (1991), pp. 1283–1302 to answer certain important questions about the Colomer, J. M. and Pascual, M., ‘The Polish Games of emergence, main tenance and consequences of de- Transition’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies mocracy. More grounded and locally owned de- 27/3 (1994), pp. 275–94 mocracy assessments will continue to encourage Dahl, R. A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New civil society organizations, political parties and key Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971) stakeholders to invest in democracy and to advo- Davenport, C., Paths to State Repression: Human Rights cate for its improvement. Violations and Contentious Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 2000) Diamond, L., Developing Democracy: Toward Consoli- dation (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) Dunn, J., ‘Preface’, in J. Dunn (ed.), Democracy: The Un- fi nished Journey, 508 BC to AD 1993 (Oxford: Ox- ford University Press, 1992), pp. v-vii Ersson, S. and Lane, J. E., ‘Democracy and Develop- ment: A Statistical Exploration’, in A. Leftwich (ed.), Democracy and Development, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 45–73 Finer, S. E., The History of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) Foweraker J. and Krznaric, R., ‘Measuring Liberal Demo- cratic Performance: A Conceptual and Empirical Cri- tique’, Political Studies 45/3 (2000), pp. 759–87 Foweraker, J. and Landman, T., Citizenship Rights and So- cial Movements: A Comparative and Statistical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) Foweraker, J. and Landman, T., ‘Constitutional Design and Democratic Performance’, Democratization 9 (2/2002), pp. 43–66

26 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Foweraker, J. and Landman, T., ‘Economic development Mendez, J. E., O’Donnell, G. and Pinheiro, P. S. (eds), and Democracy Revisited: Why Dependency Theory The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin is Not Yet Dead’, Democratization 11/1 (2004), pp. America (South Bend, In.: Notre Dame University 1–21 Press, 1999) Gallie, W. B., ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceed- Moore, B., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democ- ings of the Aristotelian Society 51 (1956), pp. 167–98 racy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern Geddes, B., ‘What Do We Know About Democratization World (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1966) After Twenty Years?’, Annual Review of Political Sci- Munck, G. and Verkuilen, J., ‘Conceptualizing and ence 2 (1999), pp. 115–44 Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Ideas’, Jaggers, K. and Gurr, T. R., ‘Tracking Democracy’s Third Comparative Political Studies 35/1 (2002), pp. 5–34 Wave with the Polity III Data’, Journal of Peace Re- Poe, S. and Tate, C. N., ‘Repression of Human Rights search 32/4 (1995), pp. 469–82 to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analy- Lagos, M., ‘Latin America’s Smiling Mask’, Journal of De- sis’, American Political Science Review 88 (1994), pp. mocracy 8/3 (1997), pp. 125–38 853–72 Landman, T., ‘Economic Development and Democracy: Przeworski, A., Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: The View From Latin America’, Political Studies 47/4 Cambridge University Press, 1991) (1999), pp. 607–26 — Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A. and Limongi, F., — ‘The Economic Requirements of Democracy’, in P. B. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Clarke and J. Foweraker (eds), Encyclopedia of Demo- Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: cratic Thought (London: Routledge, 2001) Cambridge University Press, 2000) — ‘Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H. and Stephens, J., Policy’, Human Rights Quarterly 26 (November Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: 2004), pp. 906–31 Polity Press, 1992) – Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study (George- Russett, B. and O’Neal, J., Triangulating Peace: Democ- town: Georgetown University Press, 2005) racy, Interdependence and International Organizations Levy, J., ‘War and Peace’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001) Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations, Stepan, A. and Skach, C., ‘Presidentialism and Parlia- London: Sage, 2002), pp. 350–68 mentarism in Comparative Perspective’, in J. Linz Li, Q. and Reuveny, R., ‘Economic Globalization and and A. Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: An Empirical Analysis’, British Journal of Democracy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univer- Political Science 33 (2003), pp. 29–54 sity Press, 1994), pp. 119–36 Lijphart, A., ‘Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Vanhanen, T., The Prospects of Democracy (London: Constitutional Engineering’, European Journal of Po- Routledge, 1997) litical Research 25 (1994), pp. 1–17 (1994a) Whitehead, L. (ed), The International Dimensions of De- — Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty- mocratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Ox- Seven Democracies, 1945–1990 (Oxford: Oxford Uni- ford University Press, 1996) versity Press, 1994) (1994b) Zakaria, F., The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy — Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Perform- at Home and Abroad (New York and London: W. W. ance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale Uni- Norton, 2003) versity Press, 1999) Zanger, S. C., ‘A Global Analysis of the Effect of Regime Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A., Problems of Democratic Transi- Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977–1993’, tion and Consolidation: South America, Southern Eu- Journal of Peace Research 33 (2000) rope, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) Lipset, S. M., ‘Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review 53 (1959), pp. 69– 105

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 27 ‘Ten years ago in the mid-90s, when there were great breakthroughs in democracy building, the concept of having a special organization providing guidance on election administration and working on electoral processes and political parties was novel. IDEA’s work was the fi rst systematic approach in this fi eld and a very appropriate initiative.

Now IDEA has to defi ne how it can promote democracy in connection with the paramount agenda for security: we can not abstain from the relationship of development–security–democracy.

How shall IDEA deal with countries like Afghanistan and Iraq? How do we relate to outside initiatives taken to enforce democracy—for example, Middle Eastern initiatives, which are seen as part of Pax Americana but have genuine elements of bringing a better form of government to that region?’

Jos van Gennip, member of the Board of International IDEA and member of the Upper House of the Netherlands’ Parliament

28 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 2. Democracy Building and the Political Dimensions of Development

Massimo Tommasoli

In its fi rst ten years IDEA has been actively engaged a democratic opening’. More recently, donors have in the fi eld of democracy building. The same period expanded this defi nition to address issues of capac- coincided with greater donor recognition of the im- ity and institution building even if it is not direct- portance of the political dimensions of development. ly related to a ‘democratic opening’. Democracy How has this trend changed the way donors take into assistance can therefore include forms of techni- account political processes in the context of aid policies cal assistance that are deemed useful to strength- and programmes? What implications does it have for en institutional frameworks for democracy pro- democracy building? This chapter looks at the chal- motion—such as electoral registration in Tanza- lenges for aid effectiveness in the promotion of democ- nia—or aid invested in static semi-authoritarian racy and in poverty reduction. Democracy promoters states—such as the funding of international ob- should pay more attention to the role of structural servation missions. Such measures have attracted features, institutions and agents in change processes, increasing resources as aid agencies have become and rethink incentives for political change. less willing to support countries with poor govern- ance (Groves and Hinton 2004). 2.1. Democracy Building and Development Although the defi nition of democracy assistance is fairly straightforward, it covers a wide range of ac- The impact of donor action on democracy build- tivities, some of which are categorized by the Or- ing can be seen in two important areas, the most ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel- obvious being through that range of activities that opment (OECD) Development Assistance Com- is traditionally labelled ‘democracy assistance’. It mittee (DAC) under the broader policy marker of can also occur as donors attempt to implement ‘participatory development and good governance’ poverty alleviation strategies and, as part of this (OECD DAC, 1995 and 2002), a general label cov- process, focus their efforts on structural and insti- ering everything from public sector management to tutional issues. peace building. Democracy assistance is, therefore, a varied landscape encompassing the provision of Democracy assistance consists of aid policies and technical assistance in more traditional areas (such programmes aimed at promoting and consolidat- as election management, constitutional reform, ing democracy in partner countries. Carothers parliaments, the judiciary, support to civil society) (1999) defi nes democracy assistance as ‘aid specifi - and new areas (such as the strengthening of politi- cally designed to foster a democratic opening in cal parties and civil–military relations). It also over- a non-democratic country or to further a demo- laps with wider development cooperation and hu- cratic transition in a country that has experienced manitarian objectives such as post-confl ict rehabil-

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 29 itation and recon- 2.2. Democracy, Poverty and Although the defi nition of democracy struction (Tom- Political Change assistance is fairly straightforward, it masoli 2004). It is covers a wide range of activities, some of therefore diffi cult Democratic institutions are a set of socially con- which are categorized by the Organisation to assess the overall structed arrangements for organizing political for Economic Co-operation and Development volume of aid fl ows competition, legitimating governments and imple- (OECD) Development Assistance Committee that can be catego- menting the rule of law. They are based on some rized under the form of popular participation, typically through (DAC) under the broader policy marker democracy assist- free elections to determine the composition of the of ‘participatory develop ment and good ance rubric. Never- legislature and the government. Constitutional- governance’ (OECD DAC, 1995 and 2002), theless, according ism and the rule of law, both of which establish a general label covering everything from to rough estimates, the basic rules of the game and protect the politi- public sector management to peace over the last 15 cal and civil rights and freedoms of individual citi- building. years up to 10 per zens, are also features of democracy (Luckham et cent of the overall al. 2000). volume of aid was devoted to democracy, human rights and governance (Uvin 2004). Democratic processes are based on inclusive forms of politics that aim to hold democratic institutions A second, more indirect way of democracy build- accountable, participatory and effective. They de- ing stems from the recent donor interest in politi- pend on a culture of participation, in which plu- cal change and power relations in recipient coun- ralistic media, an active civil society, compet- tries. A growing number of aid agencies see im- ing political parties and other mechanisms allow proved governance as a key element of democracy all citizens to acquire political voice. Democratic promotion. Specifi cally, the need to hold the state processes build the legitimacy of democratic in- more accountable to its citizens—and in particu- stitutions. An important aspect of democratic pro- lar to people living in poverty—in partner coun- cesses is the ability of citizens, acting independ- tries is a means of strengthening other democrati- ently or through government, to hold powerful zation initiatives. private interests as well as agents of the state to account. The fi rst, more traditional, approach to democ- racy assistance is addressed in the chapter entitled Most people involved in democracy promotion ‘Themes in Democracy Assis tance’. This chap- tend to use established democracies as a reference ter focuses on the second approach, namely, the point (all too often their own!). The same applies broader donor interest in political change and for assessing how particular institutions work. This development, the so-called power and ‘drivers of means that ‘gap analyses’ are often based on biased change’ analysis in development cooperation and assumptions which result in the development of its implications for democracy promotion. inappropriate prescriptive models. Any discussion of ‘democracy defi cits’, therefore, should recognize This chapter argues that democracy assistance that there is no ‘one size fi ts all’ institutional ar- could be more effective and achieve more realistic rangement for democracy building and, indeed, objectives if it is approached from a country’s his- applying an inappropriate solution may turn out torical and political context, rather than by sim- to be highly ineffective and even counterproduc- ply applying a sys- tive in some cases. tem of normative A growing number of aid agencies see standards. According to Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2003), improved governance as a key element of the challenge for democracy building is to over- democracy promotion. Specifi cally, the need come four types of democratic defi cit: of citizen- to hold the state more accountable to its ship, vertical accountability, horizontal account- citizens. ability and international accountability. The fi rst two refer to the gaps between formal democratic

30 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) institutions and the deep politics of society, and democracy as part of broader development coop- concern issues of citizenship and representation. eration strategies. In terms of citizenship and representa tion, prob- lems may include lack of constitutionally guaran- Although broadly-based growth is important for teed rights and effective exclusion from the public democracy, there is no clear evidence of causal sphere as a result of gender, societal inequalities, links between democracy and poverty reduction. lack of organization, cultures of intolerance, or in- Strong states can facilitate growth, irrespective of timidation and violence. Vertical accountability of the democratic or authoritarian nature of their re- governments relates to citizens’ ability to hold gov- gimes. Some authors like Leftwich (2002) even ernments, legislatures and political elites account- argue that democracy is a conservative system of able for their use of power, their defi nition of poli- power and that ‘the rules and operational condi- cies and their use of resources, as well as citizens’ tions of stable democratic politics will tend to re- space to formulate and aggregate their interests at strict policy to incremental and accommodationist all levels. The third democratic defi cit, of horizon- options’ that are not necessarily compatible with tal account ability, is related to issues of balance of the far-reaching and rapid change in the structure power and power sharing and the recurring prob- and use of wealth lem of the relationship between powerful and au- required by develop- Democracy assistance could be more thoritarian executives and the legislature and ju- mental processes. effective and achieve more realistic diciary. Interrelated problems include patronage, objectives if it is approached from a corruption and civil–military relations. Issues cut- Democracy has dif- country’s historical and political context, ting across the dimensions of citizenship/repre- ferent outcomes for sentation, vertical and horizontal account ability the poor, and the rather than by simply applying a system of include the degree of devolution and decentrali- patterns in the re- normative standards. zation, and their relevance to both the growth of lationship between democracy, on one hand, and the responsiveness the degree of democracy, pro-poor growth and of service delivery to the needs of the poor, on the poverty reduction performance are inconclusive. other. One of the reasons for this trend ‘lies in wide vari- ations in the substantive content of formal, elec- International accountability is assuming increasing toral democracy’. Poor people fail to have the in- importance and concerns the impact of decisions fl uence and voice that one would expect in dem- of international bodies or other countries on na- ocratic con texts due to: (a) their exclusion from tional political and economic processes, especially the political process, especially in the case of poor in terms of new challenges to global security; po- women; (b) the infl uence of different factors, both litical conditionality; and the implications of the formal and informal, other than the one often behaviour of multinational corporations. considered in political analyses (i.e. class identi- ties of people living in poverty) on their vote or Mainstream donor efforts in the area of democra- support for politicians, political parties and pro- cy and development aim to increase the level of ac- grammes (like patronage, clientelism, and ethnic, countability to the poor people in recipient coun- linguistic or regional identities); and (c) the pecu- tries. In theory, such accountability is achieved liar diffi culty poor people, particularly in rural ar- through elected governments. Donors recognize, eas, face in sustaining coherent, encompassing po- therefore, that democracy building is related to litical organizations. As Moore and Putzel (2000) political empowerment as a means of address- conclude, ‘in many democracies the poor are often ing poverty. Although there are different expecta- badly organised and ill-served by the organisations tions of accountability to the poor across the do- that mobilise their votes and claim to represent nor community, most governments in aid-recipi- their interests’. ent countries do not even meet the basic standards (OECD DAC 2005). Despite this, the potential Effective redistribution of resources cannot be the for democratization to impact positively on the direct result of increased political pressure by the poor provides suffi cient rationale for promoting poor. Instead, such measures require (a) the ruling

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 31 classes to be open accountability, based on the recognition of state In this sense, the state and its institutions to social equity resources as public goods. play a more important role for poverty concerns as a result reduction than formal democratic not only of their Taking the existence of the state for granted is a institutions, whose mere presence will not enlightenment but typical bias of many democracy promoters. Yet to necessarily benefi t the interests of people also of their inter- fall into this trap could produce paradoxical out- living in poverty. Better knowledge about est in a stable and comes, especially in situations where deep patron- confl ict free social age structures and opaquely functioning econo- the political systems in which donors environment, and mies shape people’s loyalties—irrespective of the intervene, and the dynamics that drive them, (b) ‘a state with the existence, mandate and procedures of formal in- is increasingly seen by donors as essential institutional ca- stitutions—as occurs in many countries in the for understanding the political conditions pacity to break the Arab region, in the former Soviet Union and in and consequences of aid. connections be- confl ict-prone environments like Afghanistan. tween venal politi- Ottaway (2003) argues that many structural con- cians, rapacious business interests and compliant ditions impede democratic transformation and bureaucrats’ (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor 2003). make semi-authoritarianism more likely. These In this sense, the state and its institutions play a include the shallowness of transitions, the extreme more important role for poverty reduction than polarization of society, the incomplete processes of formal democratic institutions, whose mere pres- state formation, the asymmetrical mechanisms for ence will not necessarily benefi t the interests of generating power, the absence of embedded demo- people living in poverty. Better knowledge about cratic elites, and the fallout from semi-authoritari- the political systems in which donors intervene, anism itself. She adds that failing to take account and the dynamics that drive them, is increasing- of such conditions may explain the fact that ‘de- ly seen by donors as essential for understanding mocracy assistance and international pressure for the political conditions and consequences of aid political change are two of the main reasons why (Moore and Putzel 2000). semi-authoritarian regimes exist’.

Similar conclusions can be drawn from the experi- The challenges for democracy promotion and ence of democracy building, where the focus is on poverty reduction are similar in one respect: the promoting democracy rather than reducing pover- need for donors to think less in normative terms, ty. Carothers’ cautionary remark (1999) that ‘de- with a fundamental shift to thinking more stra- mocracy aid, as well as the complementary tools of tegically, politically and historically. For aid prac- diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks, can do titioners this means taking a longer-term view of little to change the fundamental social, economic, the factors that shape the incentives and capacities and political structures and con ditions that shape for pro-poor change. It means also focusing on the political life in other countries’ could well apply to interplay between long-term structural factors and the broad limitations of external aid, not just de- short-term contingent ones (Unsworth 2001 and mocracy promotion (Carothers 2004). 2002). For democracy promoters the challenge is even greater, as democratic values are enshrined in Building state institutions does not consist of just particular institutional forms whose existence and translating institutions into a new context be- strengthening are often seen as the immediate out- cause they will work in different ways depending come of aid efforts, and whose social meaning is on the local political, social and institutional en- drawn from the political environments of ‘consoli- vironment. Nor can the solution be reduced to dated’ democracies. What needs to be done rath- institutional engineering or technical design, be- er than how to help make it happen seems to be cause public institutions are constructed through clearer to both aid specialists and democracy pro- a political process and their effectiveness can- moters. Both need a better understanding of the not be guaranteed by the expert technocratic political landscape of the context as an indispensa- knowledge invested in their design. State build- ble basis for action. ing also requires a shift in the very concept of

32 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) In conclusion, while there is no empirical evidence the broader systemic and institutional factors that that establishes a causal relationship in either di- are likely to infl uence a particular course of action rection between democracy and economic growth, to achieve reform. According to the DFID, such a there is growing acceptance of the fact that demo- process involves three broad factors: structural fea- cratic systems—in as much as they allow citizens’ tures, institutions, and agents ‘with relationships participation in policy formulation and imple- of power, inequality and confl ict at their heart’. mentation—are the system of governance most ‘Structural features’ include natural and human re- likely to be responsive to citizens’ needs. sources, economic and social structure, and other non-institutional facts; ‘institutions’ consist of the 2.3. Structural Features, frameworks and rules structuring the behaviour of Institutions and Agents agents; and ‘agents’ are individuals and organiza- tions pursuing particular interests. Recent policy debates between donors have fo- cused on the political dimensions of development The drivers of The ‘drivers of change’ agenda is a better (OECD DAC 2004). The interest in the links be- change approach way of understanding the means of tween development, democracy and aid effective- begins with a ba- achieving poverty reduction in developing ness was certainly prompted by the rapid changes sic country analy- countries because it takes into account in the political landscape that led to a new wave sis which identifi es other factors at play in any given context. of ‘democratic transitions’ in the 1990s. It is also the nature of a po- related to the broader debate re-examining the litical community under lying assumptions on which a range of de- within a country, government control of the terri- velopment issues have been approached: from tory, the history of state formation, embedded so- growth to service delivery, from good governance cial and economic structures, and other elements to democracy promotion. As a consequence, the that shape the basic characteristics of the political analysis of the political dimensions of develop- system. Factors such as the institutionalization of ment and aid has become an area of concern for the bureaucracy, policy mechanisms, political par- the same agencies that only a few years ago would ties, civil society organizations, the basis for politi- have considered those dimensions as issues well cal competition, the com position of the political beyond their mandate. A good illustration of this elite, the basis of political mobilization (around trend is the so-called ‘drivers of change’ approach, issues or patronage networks), the importance of launched by the UK Department for International ethnicity, and power-sharing issues are also iden- Development (UK DFID 2003) with the aim of tifi ed. An awareness is also needed of government enhancing donor agencies’ capacity to understand capacities, key mechanisms for vertical and hori- how change occurs and the relationship between zontal accountability and political resources. change and poverty reduction. The second step consists of the analysis which is Change has always been at the core of develop- similar to some aspects of IDEA’s State of Democ- ment policies and practices. In deploying their racy assessment methodology (see chapter 11), expert knowledge to effect change, development that is, an emphasis on the political system, the practitioners have been confronted with the chal- policy process, public fi nancial management and lenge of identifying the obstacles to the change the private-sector investment climate. Subsequent processes associated with development. They steps include an assessment of the role of external must also identify the individuals and institutions forces, an analysis of the effects on poverty, and deemed to act as change agents, so as to meet the operational implications. needs of the expected benefi ciaries. The ‘drivers of change’ agenda is a better way of understanding Drivers of change work has so far been carried out the means of achieving poverty reduction in devel- by the DFID in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Geor- oping countries because it takes into account other gia, Ghana, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Ni- factors at play in any given context. This approach geria, Pakistan and Zambia. Preliminary results forces development practitioners to understand show that donors’ assumptions about change and

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 33 poverty reduction making is more predictable and transparent, and The current debate in the donor community are not always cor- political mobilization is based less on local social on the political dimensions of development rect. More donors identities than on common issues and interests. shares a common concern about the need are interested in the All these objectives are part of the democracy- to understand political change, based same issues. On- building agenda as well. Addressing the close rela- on a better and more in-depth context- going work in the tionship between pol itical systems, power-sharing specifi c analysis. Pursuing such an agenda OECD DAC Net- mechanisms and policy making seems to be the work on Govern- next challenge for development cooperation—and would imply a shift from systems where ance (GOVNET) for democracy promotion as well. power is heavily concentrated and highly addresses the po- personalized to systems where power is tential and limits 2.4. Some Implications for more widely dis tributed, institutions are of political econ- Democracy Building more rule-based, policy making is more omy analysis as a predictable and transparent, and political tool for enhancing What are the implications of this debate for de- mobilization is based less on local social aid effectiveness. mocracy promotion? So far we have reviewed identities than on common issues and In 2002 the Swed- ‘how’ to make political change and reform hap- interests. ish International pen, and concluded that it is important for exter- Development Co- nal actors involved in democratization to focus on operation Agency (Sida) launched a series of ana- broad structural features as well as institutions and lyses, covering both formal and informal power re- agents if change is to be effected. lations and structures, focused on actors, processes and institutions as a means of understanding how 2.4.1. Incentives for Political Change to take account of these factors within programme planning at a country level. One of the reasons for Whether the objective is poverty reduction or de- this work (carried out in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, mocracy promotion, donors have started to ac- Kenya and Mali) was the awareness of the limita- knowledge the limitations of external actors to in- tions of democracy and human rights assessments fl uence change in partner countries. This recog- which were too focused on formal structures (the nition calls for a rethinking of the concept of in- constitution, the political system and other formal centives and dis incentives to bring about political democratic institutions). The German Agency for change. Technical Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Tech- nische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ) is also engaged in Traditional instruments of international pressure addressing political change and has developed an may have an impact, but new tools are needed. analytical tool, the ‘Governance Questionnaire’, The defi nition of ‘incentives’ provided by the which maps out six areas for assessing the politi- Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly cal environment: the state–society relationship; Confl ict—‘the offer of a reward by a sender in ex- the political system; the political culture, change change for a particular action or response by a re- agents and development paradigms; politics and cipient’ (Cortright 1997)—is the other side of the gender; economic policy and the political frame- same coin of traditional tools which include deter- works of markets; and international integration. rence, sanctions, coercion and conditionality. The scope of such instruments is limited and is mainly The current debate in the donor community on focused on applying short time pressure in a crisis the political dimensions of development shares a situation. Some donors, like the USA, make use common concern about the need to understand of indicators of democratic governance for aid al- political change, based on a better and more in- location purposes, as in the case of the Millenni- depth context-specifi c analysis. Pursuing such an um Challenge Account, which sets out measures agenda would imply a shift from systems where of democratic performance for defi ning eligibility power is heavily concentrated and highly person- conditions for recipient countries (Rich 2004). alized to systems where power is more widely dis- tributed, institutions are more rule-based, policy The drivers of change approach, however, is based

34 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) on a deeper understanding of the historical, so- In the fi eld of democracy building, the link be- cial and political context, and an assessment of the tween the con solidation of democratic institutions capacity to effect change of both institu tions and and the strengthening of democratic politics is key. agents within a particular country. As an approach Democracy-promotion policies and practices tra- it embodies more realistic assumptions about the ditionally focused on the role of institutions and limited role for external factors, including aid, to agents in democratization processes. Less atten- infl uence change processes. tion has been paid to the structural features affect- ing political change processes. Without an under- The concept of using aid incentives for democ- standing of the political landscape, interventions racy building warrants reconsideration. Within for poverty reduction, as well as democracy build- the DAC context, incentives could be defi ned as ing, can not only fail to achieve their stated objec- ‘any purposeful use of aid that strengthens the dy- tives; they can do harm. namics favouring democratic change’ (Uvin 2004) with the following objectives: Structural analysis helps to identify key underly- ing challenges: state control; deep ethnic divisions; (a) infl uencing actors’ behaviour; rents from the extraction of natural resources; or (b) strengthening actors’ capacities; a dominant and repressive landed class. Under- (c) changing the relations between actors (ethnic standing the basis of political accountability is es- groups, political parties, the state and civil society, sential, both in terms of its implications for work etc.); and on political parties, political party funding and (d) infl uencing the social and economic environ- parliaments, and as a fundamental basis for deter- ment in which political change processes take mining the incentive structures of key actors. As place. Bastian and Luckham (2003) point out, how par- ticular consti tutional arrangements play out de- These objectives are ranked in order from short- pends on context and elite interests. The impact term through to medium- and long-term; or, to of civil society action on change should be seen in use a drivers of change terminology, from the level context too by de- of individual agents and organizations (objectives veloping an under- (a) and (b)) to those of institutions (objective (c)) standing of the ba- Ultimately, there is a need for detailed, and struc tural features (objective (d)). Aid may sis of group mobi- country-specifi c information on the play a role mainly in the fi rst three categories, and lization. The same institutions and processes of democracy non-aid instruments are crucial for any meaning- applies to the ef- building to allow for a proper analysis of ful impact on the fourth. fects of multiparty what is needed for democratization. If they competition which are to be successful, practitioners need 2.4.2. Structural and Agency may yield positive to be armed with an understanding of the Explanations of Political Change results—incentives relationship between the institutional for less damaging frameworks, agents of change and Two frequently used conceptual frameworks for patronage politics, structural conditions characterizing understanding political change are ‘structure’ and more space for in- different societies. ‘agency’. Structural explana tions tend to stress the dependent me- signifi cance of the social, economic and political dia—or even have a structures of a society as the main factors deter- negative impact, depending on the context—cor- mining change, whereas agency explanations fo- ruption, fuelling local identity-based confl ict. cus more on the capacities and action of agents, that is, individuals and institutions, and their role Ultimately, there is a need for detailed, country- in contributing to political change. Approaches specifi c information on the institutions and proc- based on drivers of change and power analyses aim esses of democracy building to allow for a proper to take account of both structural and agency ex- analysis of what is needed for democratization. If planations and the interrelationship between the they are to be successful, practitioners need to be two. armed with an understanding of the relationship

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 35 between the institutional frameworks, agents of References change and structural conditions characterizing different societies. Bastian, Sunil and Luckham, Robin (eds), Can Democra- cy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Change in In the future, IDEA will continue to meet the Confl ict-Torn Societies (London: Zed Books, 2003) need to adapt insti tutional design to different Carothers, Tom, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning types of country circumstances, shaped by politi- Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for cal and historical factors, with a focus on inclu- International Peace, 1999) sive dialogue among local actors. For an institute — Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion like IDEA that aims to improve the design of key (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna- democratic institutions through a comparative tional Peace, 2004) knowledge of structural and institutional issues Cortright, David (ed.), The Price of Peace: Incentives and that condition democratic change, the capacity to International Confl ict Prevention, Carnegie Commis- understand the context in which democratic insti- sion on Preventing Deadly Confl ict, Carnegie Cor- tutions are built and strengthened will always be poration of New York (Rowman & Littlefi eld, Inc., extremely important. 1997) Groves, Leslie and Hinton, Rachel (eds), Inclusive Aid: Changing Power and Relationships in International De- velopment (London: Earthscan, 2004) For an institute like IDEA that aims to GTZ, ‘Governance Questionnaire: Draft’, State and De- improve the design of key democratic mocracy Division, Sectoral Project on Democracy institutions through a comparative and Rule of Law, Eschborn, 2004 knowledge of structural and institutional Leftwich, Adrian, ‘Debate: Democracy and Develop- issues that condition democratic change, ment: A Contra diction in the Politics of Economics’, New Political Economy 7/2 (2002), pp. 269–73 the capacity to understand the context in Luckham, Robin, Goetz, Anne Marie and Kaldor, Mary, which democratic institutions are built and ‘Democratic Institutions and Democratic Politics’, in strengthened will always be extremely Sunil Bastian and Robin Luckham (eds), Can Democ- important. racy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Change in Confl ict-torn Societies (London: Zed Books, 2003), pp. 14–59 Luckham, Robin, Goetz, Anne Marie and Kaldor, Mary (with Alison Ayers, Sunil Bastian, Emmanuel Gyi- mah-Boadi, Shireen Hassim and Zarko Puhovski), ‘Democratic Institutions and Politics in Contexts of Inequality, Poverty and Confl ict: A Conceptual Framework’, IDS Working Paper no. 104, University of Sussex, Brighton, 2000 Moore, Mick and Putzel, James, ‘Thinking Strategi- cally about Politics and Poverty’, IDS Working Paper no. 101, University of Sussex, Brighton, 2000 OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), ‘Chair’s Summary: Senior Level Forum on Develop- ment Effectiveness in Fragile States’, London, 13– 14 January 2005, DAC/CHAIR(2005)3, Organisa- tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1 February 2005 — DAC Orientations on Participatory Development and Good Governance (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995)

36 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) — ‘Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting Sys- tem’, DCD/DAC (2002)21, Organisation for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 30 July 2002 — ‘Summary Record of the GOVNET Informal Work- shop on Sharing Approaches to Understanding Driv- ers of Change and Political Analysis. Meeting held 1–2 June 2004’, Development Assistance Commit- tee, GOVNET, Paris, 1 July 2004 Ottaway, Marina, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003) Rich, Roland, ‘Applying Conditionality to Development Assistance’, Agenda 11/4 (2004), pp. 321–34 Tommasoli, Massimo, Le développement participatif: Ana- lyse sociale et logiques de planifi cation (Paris : Karthala, 2004) UK Department for International Development (DFID), ‘What Does Drivers of Change Mean for DFID? A draft approach paper’, Drivers of Change Team, DFID Policy Division, London, August 2003 Unsworth, Sue, ‘Understanding Incentives and Capacity for Poverty Reduction: What Should Donors Do Dif- ferently?’, mimeo, 23 April 2002 — ‘Understanding Pro-Poor Change: A Discussion Pa- per’, mimeo, 20 September 2001 Uvin, Peter, Human Rights and Development (Bloomfi eld: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2004)

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 37 ‘Sustainable democracy must be home grown. That’s why International IDEA presents options and not solutions to new and re-established democracies.’

Erling Olsen, former Speaker of the Danish Parliament. Member of the Board of International IDEA June 1998–June 2001 Acting Secretary-General of International IDEA April 2002–August 2002

‘Even if it is not perfect, democracy is without doubt the best of systems to guarantee the full development of human beings and national stability. In the last decade International IDEA has tried to tackle diverse aspects of the complicated democratic coexistence: electoral systems capable of forging a good political system, guaranties for a clean vote, and internal dialogues to solve national confl icts. Democracy building is still a challenge and it constitutes a responsible commitment in the creation of a more humane world. IDEA has a leading role to play during the next decade. We hope that when we celebrate the 20th anniversary in 2015, the global map will refl ect more light and fewer shadows on the panorama of universal democracy.’

Lourdes Flores Nano, member of the Board of International IDEA, President of the Alianza Electoral Unidad Nacional and candidate in the 2001 Peruvian presidential election

38 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

3. Themes in Democracy Assistance

Richard Youngs

This chapter traces the development of democracy slightly different emphases between these various building over the last decade, its challenges and dif- arenas, but all spread their political aid between ferent forms as experienced by donor member states these broadly convergent conceptual strands of and other international players. work. Indeed, the increasing homogeneity of de- mocracy aid profi les is striking, particularly when When IDEA was set up ten years ago, most donors considered against a background of perceived di- were just beginning to focus in a more systematic vergence of diplomatic strategies between coun- way on using aid resources to encourage demo- tries in the Organisation for Economic Co- cratic change in developing states. The organiza- operation and Development (OECD) Develop- tion itself represented one manifestation of this re- ment Assistance Committee (DAC). assessment. This chapter offers a general (and nec- essarily schematic) overview of the ways in which Focused on what are judged to be the individual Western governments’ democracy assistance pol- building blocks of political change, the vast ma- icies have subsequently evolved. It identifi es the jority of donors eschew any overarching classifi ca- more sophisticated approaches to democracy as- tion of ‘democracy assistance’. It is still impossible sistance that have taken shape in recent years and to identify total amounts of democracy aid in any highlights how the attempt to fashion more holis- precise fashion. For aid that is ostensibly aimed at tic strategies has brought its own set of problems. increasing transparency, some donors also contin- It is argued that efforts to temper the latter will ue to be incredibly opaque in sharing information constitute the next phase in donors’ progressive on their democracy assistance activities. honing of their democracy assistance strategies. Defi nitions in this sense remain elastic. Many ini- tiatives imple mented under a democracy assist- 3.1. Overall Trends ance label are at best tenuously re- It is still impossible to identify total During the last ten years donors have developed a lated to political amounts of democracy aid in any precise relatively standardized range of initiatives encom- reform; converse- passing what are seen to be democracy’s constitu- ly, much aid that fashion. For aid that is ostensibly aimed ent arenas: civil society, elections, political parties, has a strong politi- at increasing transparency, some donors parliaments, civil–military relations, state reform, cal impact is allo- also continue to be incredibly opaque in the rule of law and good governance. These have cated under other sharing information on their democracy become the familiar categories around which de- aid categories. Do- assistance activities. mocracy assistance is organized. Donors exhibit nors will support

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 39 almost identical • Out of a total European Commission aid budg- The amount of political aid has been individual projects et of 7.5 billion euros for 2004, only 124 mil- extremely modest in comparison to the but invariably reg- lion euros was available under the European magnitude of political challenges. ister them under Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights different catego- (EIDHR), but 2.9 billion euros was defi ned as ries of aid. Some contributing to governance and civil society re- donors appear intent on over-selling the amount form more broadly. they invest in democracy assistance; others seem • Germany, the largest European funder, now keen to play down their commit ment. Some do- allocates just over 100 million euros per year nors have stretched defi nitions of political aid in for a broad category of ‘governance’ projects, an effort to convince a sceptical audience that sig- which includes democracy, human rights and nifi cant resources are being devoted to democracy confl ict prevention work, and another 150 mil- and human rights; others insist that the key is to lion euros to the Stiftungen. maximize the chance of projects succeed ing on the • The Nordic states have consolidated their pres- ground by defi ning them as apolitically as possi- ence as proportionately the largest contributors. ble. The OECD measure of ‘government and civ- Aid for ‘democratic governance’ has consistent- il society’ category contains much support that is ly accounted for over 10 per cent of total Swed- not remotely related to democracy. ish ODA. Danish funding for ‘human rights and democratization’ has increased by over a A curious duality has emerged. On the one hand, third since 2001 and is due to be boosted by an donors’ individual ‘blocks’ of political aid (civil so- additional 65 million USD up to 2009. Nor- ciety support or rule-of-law projects, for instance) way gave 9 per cent of its bilateral aid to ‘civil have exhibited increasing similarities. On the oth- society and democracy development’ in 2003, er hand, no commonly agreed indicators to meas- and another 9 per cent to ‘Peace, reconciliation ure the impact of such aid have emerged. Indeed, and democracy’. the picture has become increasingly disparate, as • Elaborating a political aid portfolio slightly lat- democracy-related funding has been forthcoming er than the USA and other principal donors, from an array of new programmes covering con- Japan has gradually consolidated its position fl ict prevention, cultural cooperation, economic has a mainstream player in broadly defi ned governance and civic education, as well as separate ‘govern ance assistance’, with yearly allocations country-specifi c initiatives. of around 150 million USD comparing favour- ably with most European governments. Signifi cantly, reform-oriented aid has not With such cave- succeeded in offering a route into engaging ats it can be safely Overall sums remain self-evidently limited com- with more intransigent states. Authoritarian concluded that po- pared to the more established, mainstream aid states account for a small share of litical aid, broadly categories. Few would deny that big infrastruc- defi ned, was one of ture, health or education projects will naturally democracy assistance budgets compared the fastest-growing need more resources: to set these areas of ODA to semi-authoritarian and post-transition categories of aid alongside democracy assistance is hardly to com- countries. during the latter pare like with like. It is, however, diffi cult to refute half of the 1990s, the judgement that the amount of political aid has with the rate of increase fl attening off in the case been extremely modest in comparison to the mag- of most donors in recent years. Notable donor nitude of political challenges—as well as to the profi les include the following: signifi cance often claimed for such funding.

• The overall US investment in political aid in- As overall funding has increased, so geographi- creased during the 1990s, before reaching a cal priorities have shifted. During the 1990s two plateau of approximately 700 million USD a parallel logics conditioned the distribution of year, or 6–7 per cent of total overseas develop- democracy assistance. On the one hand, a large ment assistance (ODA). slice of democracy assistance appeared to follow

40 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) overall aid dis tribution, tacked onto donors’ pri- the prospect of greater leverage over Moscow. mary mainstream poverty reduction programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, most While such patterns are discernible, the broad ge- donors focused more heavily on post-transition ographical spread of donors is more striking. The scenarios, where a commitment to political reform majority of donors have offered a smattering of was evident. democracy assistance with similar thematic focus throughout the world. This is of a piece with do- German political aid was, for example, split be- nors’ similarly broad thematic coverage. All do- tween these two logics, going primarily to Latin nors support most thematic areas and most pro- America and Sub-Saharan Africa. By the end of vide assistance in all sectors. Nuances are appar- the 1990s, over a third of the US democracy budg- ent: French aid is more oriented towards state elit- et was going to Eastern Europe and Eurasia, while es, German aid towards regional-level governance, the main gainers after 2000 were states that had and British aid towards reform of public adminis- recently enjoyed democratic breakthroughs: Indo- tration. While these nesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Peru and Serbia. A simi- self-evidently refl ect It would be an exaggeration to argue that lar logic was refl ected in Japan’s ‘request-based ap- donors’ own do- donors have sought to export wholesale proach’ to demo cracy assistance (Japanese Inter- mestic specifi cities, their own particular model of democracy. national Cooperation Agency 2003). Both Swed- it would be an ex- ish and Norwegian political aid was heavily con- aggeration to argue centrated in a relatively small number of African that donors have sought to export wholesale their states, including Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, own particular model of democracy. Arguably, the Zambia and South Africa, although both these do- commonalities between donors’ democracy aid nors have increasingly developed a strong link be- profi les have become more notable than the dif- tween confl ict and democratic institution build- ferences. All donors have adopted something of a ing, with increasing shares of democracy assist- scatter-gun approach, supporting small parcels of ance going to Serbia, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, the every type of work in a large number of countries. Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Nepal, This represents a response to criticism levelled at Afghanistan and Cambodia. Several donors have Western governments for being interested only in introduced initiatives offering the ‘reward’ of ad- supporting democracy in a few select states and ditional aid where recipient countries demonstrate for conceiving democracy to be about elections democratic progress and a willing ness to cooper- only, or civil society only, or bicameral legislative ate on reform initiatives. This is, for example, a politics only. By the end of the 1990s it was not prominent feature of German governance aid and the case that democracy assistance was only being the US Millennium Challenge Account. offered in a small number of amenable countries, or only where immediate and signifi cant Western Signifi cantly, reform-oriented aid has not succeed- interests existed. In place of undue narrowness, ed in offering a route into engaging with more however, democracy assistance profi les have taken intransigent states. Authoritarian states account shape that lack thematic or geographical critical for a small share of democracy assistance budgets mass. compared to semi-authoritarian and post-tran- sition countries. In cases such as Libya, Burma, Debates in the past three years have centred on the Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba or Syria, relatively prospective reorientation of aid away from Eastern limited funding has been offered to exiled advo- Europe and the Balkans to the Middle East, the cacy groups and non-governmental organizations latter being the region that was most sparsely fund- (NGOs) gathering infor mation and monitoring ed during the 1990s. Donors have all announced rights abuses in these states. In order to overcome intentions to target democracy aid at the Middle obstacles to implementing effective political aid East, and have in some cases followed this through projects in Russia, donors have increasingly sought with new and increased funding designed with to pursue initiatives through the Council of Eu- this in mind. New funding under the US Middle rope, Russia’s membership of which is seen to offer East Partnership Initiative has attracted the most

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 41 attention. Signifi - 3.2. Reassessing Civil Society? The drift towards civil society funding cantly, France has established itself as one of the clearest also initiated polit- The drift towards civil society funding established trends of the 1990s. ical reform projects itself as one of the clearest trends of the 1990s. in the Maghreb This was in response to criticisms that donors had and Mashreq. This previously focused too narrowly on democracy’s constitutes a potentially major change to the na- formal institutional features, and in particular on ture of democracy assistance. If the latter was pre- elections. The vast majority of donors have grad- viously the preserve of specialists in aid ministries, ually reoriented their democracy assistance away one of the most routinely-made suggestions since from electoral support and monitoring. The claim 9/11 is that democracy aid needs to be invested that Western governments are only interested in with greater strategic purpose. Some tension is democracy’s formal façade is still often heard but is evident between foreign and development minis- not one that the evolving profi le of democracy as- tries on this question. As the latter have resisted sistance invites. Between the mid-1990s and 2004 the diversion of funds from the least developed the share of EIDHR funds allocated to electoral states into an agenda driven by more instrumen- assistance, for instance, fell from over 50 per cent tal foreign policy objectives, some new Middle to 14 per cent. By 2002, 48 per cent of US de- East reform initiatives have appeared within for- mocracy funds were being allocated to civil socie- eign ministries. This is leading to what one leading ty, up from one-third in 1997 and having climbed practitioner calls the ‘Balkaniza tion of democracy gradually over the decade; the share going to elec- assistance’, with a plethora of new funds appear- tions and political processes had fallen to only 7 ing across different parts of Western governments’ per cent. policy-making machinery. Tensions have recently deepened between the European Parliament, the Within the category of civil society support, most Commission and the European Council—and in- donors have continued to channel the largest share deed within each of these institutions—over the of their funds to NGOs. The largest single group question of how tightly democracy funds should of such recipients is still the large human rights or- be directed in accordance with strategic priorities. ganizations. Typically, a large international NGO will be supported to work with one of the two Critics argue that the distribution of European Un- or three main umbrella human rights NGOs in ion (EU) aid has in practice still been more decid- the recipient state. A far larger proportion of po- ed by internal trade-offs than coherently deployed litical aid budgets goes to the standard range of as a foreign policy tool (Santiso 2002: 419). It re- human rights issues—torture, the death penalty, mains to be seen how far geo-clientelism gives way xenophobia—than on the broader agenda of po- to a systematic har- litical reform. One of the most commonly sup- nessing of democ- A far larger proportion of political aid ported projects within European democracy assist- racy assistance to se- ance has been the incorporation of international budgets goes to the standard range of curity policy. human rights treaties and covenants into develop- human rights issues—torture, the death ing countries’ domestic legislation. While clearly penalty, xenophobia—than on the broader Another increasing- closely related, the human rights and democracy agenda of political reform. ly prominent debate strands of Western policies have not always been in this sense relates entirely mutually reinforcing: one complaint from to the paucity of linkage between external and in- aid offi cers is that diplomatic tensions focusing on ternal civil rights policies: without this many prac- select human rights issues have often complicated titioners and analysts fear that hardline anti-ter- aid projects on broader governance reforms within rorist provisions within the West leave democracy the state in question. promotion policy to survive in increasingly stony ground. To support civil society, donors have espoused a philosophy based around fostering community- level participation and organizational capacity.

42 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Concepts of local ownership that have dominated European donors, such as Sweden, have preferred develop ment policy thinking have fi ltered into de- to support highly politicized groups for their edu- mocracy assistance, making much of the latter look cational or humanitarian work and not simply for very much like an extension of new approaches to their being anti-regime. development. This is presented as part of a move towards strengthening general democratic process- The USA has certainly supported anti-regime ex- es and away from trying to engineer specifi c pol- ile groups from Iraq, Iran and Syria that other icy outcomes. Germany’s Development Ministry, donors have declined to fund. The State Depart- as one representative example, defi nes the aims of ment has sometimes intervened to channel funds its political aid to be ‘strengthening the political to openly pro-US groups, for example, in East- dimension of development’, enhancing ‘capabili- ern Europe and in some Middle Eastern countries ties for self-reliant problem solving . . . not . . . (Quigely 2000: 203; and Dalpino 2000). Howev- prescribing ready-made solutions’, encouraging a er, overall the approaches taken by the US Agen- ‘citizen-orientation of the state’, and boosting the cy for International participation of the poor in monitoring local gov- Development (US- A fi rmly established consensus has taken ernment performance (BMZ 2002). AID) have also ex- root among donors that democracy aid hibited an increas- needs to move away from the traditionally Expediency has certainly not been entirely ab- ing orientation to- sent: it is this type of project that has been pos- wards long-term, favoured set of internationally connected sible without signifi cant confronta tion with re- democratic capac- NGOs to support civil society organizations cipient governments. Most donors have been re- ity building. The that are more organically entrenched luctant to extend their focus to projects that are USA and other do- in local communities, and organized openly opposed by governments. Continuing sup- nors have all been around issues of real daily signifi cance port for organizations which are denied offi cial guilty of abandon- rather than abstract debates of competing recognition has invariably been problematic. Crit- ing their caution political interests. ics observe that many NGO recipients have been in supporting the the more moderate, measured, and arguably co- most critical civil opted sector of civil society. Many donor offi cials society organizations only very late in the day. For insist that much-maligned government-organized example, donors moved to support anti-Fujimori NGOs can usefully widen access to government groups in Peru when transition was already immi- reformers and provide a foothold from which to nent. Democracy aid has invariably followed more press for more genuine separation between civil than it has pre-empted tangible political change. society and the state. But in some cases donors Many activists in developing states in fact judge have stood rather meekly by while government au- European donors to have become more willing thorities sabotage externally funded projects. Do- than the USA to fund controversial projects. nors fl ag this as an area where future efforts must focus: in many contexts the need is not only, or Refl ecting a now well-worn critique of civil socie- even primarily, for more funding but for stronger ty support, a fi rmly established consensus has tak- political backing to ensure that projects are actu- en root among donors that democracy aid needs ally allowed to run in an effective manner. to move away from the traditionally favoured set of internationally connected NGOs to sup- The perception is widespread that the USA re- port civil society organizations that are more or- mains more drawn than other DAC donors to ganically entrenched in local communities, and supporting overtly politicized groups, dissidents organized around issues of real daily signifi cance and direct democracy propaganda through its rather than abstract debates of competing politi- civil society programmes. European donors com- cal interests. Many donors now aim to support a monly argue that a focus on linking social rights smaller number of NGOs, aiming for more tangi- initiatives to political reform work distinguishes ble impact with locally-rooted groups. Donors no European assistance from more directly political longer need to be convinced on this routinely re- US approaches. Even the more forward-leaning peated point. Talk of the need to move away from

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 43 standardized templates is ubiquitous; how to do links between regional and national public institu- this in practice is a matter of genuine uncertain- tions represents the largest slice of Germany’s po- ty. One currently debated question is whether and litical aid, drawing on what is seen as a particular, how to start incorporating business groups, of- domestically derived German expertise. Moreo- ten key protagonists in democratic transition that ver, donors profess a realization that state-building have so far been absent from political aid work. challenges are often those that need most atten- Another issue is whether donors should begin in- tion well after formal transition; some donors have cluding Islamist groups within their civil society consequently reversed incipient withdrawals from programmes; positive indications have been made places like Russia and the Balkans. on this, but caution, and in some cases opposition, still prevails at the level of implementation. Whether and how such initiatives have in fact served to enhance democratic quality, however, is 3.3. Government-to- in some cases not clear. Most rule-of-law projects Government Institution- have been strikingly formalistic. Work under this Building Aid category has focused mainly on offering support for setting up ombudsmen offi ces; legal advice on An increasingly prominent area of debate relates incorporating international human rights cove- to the role of aid channelled to state institutions nants into domestic legislation; measures to speed for capacity-building initia tives. A reassessment of up the processing of cases; provisions for copying the linkages between civil society and the state has laws; and judicial training, carried out by lawyers. been evident in recent years. Infl uential civil soci- It has rarely sought to address the broader politics ety protagonists have themselves advocated a more that continue to limit the effective use of such for- holistic approach to democracy assistance which mal measures. One critic characterizes approach- ceases overwhelmingly to target voluntary associa- es to the rule of law as ‘breathtakingly mechanis- tions as substitutes for a strong demo cratic state tic’, devoid of any linkage to the political process (Edwards 2004: 94). (Carothers 2003: 9). A recent German Develop- ment Ministry policy review raised concerns that Signifi cant amounts of government-to-govern- rule-of-law and other state reform projects were ment institution-building aid have been presented being used in a way that actually fomented local- as part of democracy assistance efforts. The corol- level corruption and patronage, and that recipi- lary to donors’ slightly less rosy view of civil soci- ent governments were disingenuously presenting ety actors has been a declared intent to pay greater standard social development projects as a ‘govern- attention to state-building challenges. The USA’s ance’ commitment. One diplomat acknowledged most senior democracy aid offi cial argues that re- that, within ‘governance’ budgets, democracy has sources have shifted into state-building projects in so far been ‘the missing link’. With institutional response to a recognition that civil society support support budgets exceeding democracy and human has invariably failed to generate smooth momen- rights funds many times over, these failings repre- tum towards democratic transition (Hyman 2002: sent one of the most debilitating shortcomings of 26–32). The state–elite focus has remained a dis- democracy assistance efforts. tinctive element of French political aid, with pri- orities listed as including the ‘training of foreign One of donors’ stated priorities has been to mar- elites’; export of the French legal system; social di- ry top–down capacity building more systemati- alogue and the strengthening of trade unions; con- cally to bottom–up accountability measures in stitutional support; and negotiated change through mutually reinforcing fashion. Offi cial discourse ‘national consultative committees’ (French Min- and policy statements are replete with refer- istère des Affaires Étranges, (DGCID) (undated)). ences to drawing out the ‘complementarity’ and Japan sees its main strength as lying in assistance ‘interconnections’ between democracy aid and to ‘improve the effi ciency of government capac- those mainstream aid budgets covering areas such ity building’ (Japanese Inter national Coopera- as public administration reform. The declared tion Agency 2003: 37). Support for more effective aim has been to generate greater ‘democratic

44 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) spillover’ from good governance projects—the lat- 3.4. Political Society: Parties, ter recognized to have more political overtones Parliaments and the Military than previously assumed. A new EU resolution on governance in 2004 formally enshrined an appar- A corollary to this concern with state–civil society ently broader and more holistic concept of good linkage has been a professed determination to fo- governance cooperation. The infl uential ‘drivers cus more intensively on the bodies often grouped of change’ frame work of the UK Department for together under the label of ‘political society’. A International Development (DFID) is predicated commanding majority of donors list as their main on the notion of building governance elements ‘lesson learned’ from the last ten years of democ- into all standard aid projects. Within German aid, racy assistance the need for a better understand- ‘democracy’ indicators have been incorporated as ing of the underly- ‘mainstream’ criteria within good governance pro- ing politics of de- Rather than good governance and the rule grammes. mocracy building. of law being approached as prerequisites They recognize that to democracy assistance proper, there is Some recent initiatives have attempted to link state civil society’s trans- evidence to suggest that they may end up reform work to enhanced civil society access to formative poten- as long-term sub stitutes for the latter. public policy making. It remains unclear, however, tial has been over- how far such trends are likely to extend. Alongside estimated and the frequent talk of ensuring better linkages, many of- essential aggregative role of political institutions fi cials still conceive a focus on the rule of law as a unduly overlooked. Comments from different do- separable, and in the short term preferable, objec- nors exhibit a striking commonality, averring the tive to democracy promotion. One senior EU aid need for greater recognition of ‘the centrality of offi cial is still able to assert that the rule of law politics’; of the democracy agenda’s ‘implications ‘is more important than democracy’ in European beyond the development assistance perspective’; of policy. Many rule-of-law projects have continued ‘the need for a political analysis of the structures of to focus overwhelmingly on procedural capacity power . . . and forces that can brake or promote and effi ciency, with little systematic coordination change’; of the need to move from isolated ‘tech- to assess qualitative impact on democratic process. nical’ initiatives to a comprehensively ‘political’ One aid offi cial acknowledges that, while the rel- approach. The development minister of one of the evance of public administrative reform to democ- largest democracy funders points to a need to recog- racy is now recognized, the question remains open nize that ‘democracy assistance is not simply more of ‘how do we let people . . . participate in a mean- development cooperation’. Several donors reveal ingful way’ in state reform projects. Some democ- that, partly in response to critiques of the gradual- racy offi cers still tend to see governance funding as ist ‘transition paradigm’, they have begun to com- a competitor to their own political efforts, lament- pile assessments of underlying power relationships ing the large amounts of aid diverted to govern- in a select number of recipient countries. ance projects that are far more integral (in their judgement) to economic liberalization than to the Relatively limited democracy agenda. shares of democra- A commanding majority of donors list cy assistance have as their main ‘lesson learned’ from the In practice, rather than good governance and the gone to direct par- last ten years of democracy assistance rule of law being approached as prerequisites to ty-building initia- the need for a better understanding of democracy assistance proper, there is evidence to tives. All but a small the underlying politics of democracy suggest that they may end up as long-term sub- part of party streng- building. They recognize that civil society’s stitutes for the latter. The assumption is still too thening work has uncritically made that all state-building capacity been carried out transformative potential has been over- work is reform-oriented; as one head of depart- by the party foun- estimated and the essential aggregative ment sweepingly claims, ‘Everything we do [in dations and, with role of political institutions unduly this sphere] is conducive to democracy’. It is a be- the exception of the overlooked. lief commonly asserted, but rarely demonstrated. US and German

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 45 foundations, these have continued to operate with donor recognized: ‘This is basic, but we are not extremely limited resources. The Stiftungen ac- doing it’. Doubts remain over how to combine as- count for 90 per cent of non-governmental party sistance for the party system in general with the foundation funds in Europe; no other European evident need in many contexts to bolster oppo- foundation receives more than 5 million euros a sition groups against a dominant party. One ob- year. The percentage of democracy assistance ac- server notes that donors have found it diffi cult to counted for by political party work never reaches fashion meaningful support where parties are pro- double fi gures. US party work declined steadily grammatically weakest—precisely the situation in during the late 1990s until in 2001 it represented which backing is most needed (Mair 2004: 136). under 5 per cent of USAID’s democracy and gov- In practice, initiatives have still been most readily ernance budget—at which stage it was identifi ed forthcoming that target individual parties as and as a priority focus for increased resources (USAID when opportunities for access exist. A dual chal- 1999). The most notable exception to such cau- lenge remains to link such support both upwards tion in the political party sphere was the explicit to the systemic level and downwards to strengthen backing given to anti-Milosevic opposition parties what are still often confl ictual relations between in the Balkans. political parties and civil society organizations.

Conceptually, donors’ main stated concern has Similar trends can be seen in parliamentary sup- been that the partisan, fraternal party approach port. This is another dimension of democracy used in Latin America, Southern Europe and building that has been under-represented in most then Eastern Eu- donor profi les. As in other areas, approaches in re- Relatively limited shares of democracy rope shows signs cent years have come to focus on the building of of ‘running out of connections between parliamentary support and assistance have gone to direct party- steam’. There has initiatives aimed at enhancing civil society interest building initiatives. been a shift away groups’ access to policy making. The largest cat- from support for egory of parliamentary work has gone to strength- individual electoral campaigns towards longer- ening the role of women in parliaments. This is term capacity building. Europeans moved in this an area that some donors have come to question, direction earlier than the US foundations (Caroth- however, expressing a concern that the focus on ers 1999: 150). Another trend is towards more in- women’s rights in parliament has often diverted at- clusive dialogue, bringing together a wide range of tention from broader reform work: in many cases, parties to fashion consensus on basic reform op- it is admitted, the problem has been less one of tions. The declared aim is to move way from self- women’s role within parliaments than of the weak- standing political party initiatives towards a more ness of parliament per se vis-à-vis the executive— holistic incorporation of party support into state an area less frequently addressed through democ- reform and civil society work. US offi cials talk, in racy assistance. Another trend is towards support this sense, of a move towards a ‘middle out’ ap- for regional parliamentary forums, with donors proach, linking party work to other thematic ar- supporting bodies such as the Southern African eas of democracy assistance. Sweden has recently Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary begun to initiate such party system approaches in Forum. Parliamentary exchanges have continued to Central America and East Africa. Several other do- expand, but it often stretches a defi nition to claim nors have begun tentatively to incor porate some that these are concerned with democracy promo- of this work into their own bilateral initiatives, tion in any direct sense. Some donors have been meaning that political party work is likely to be- concerned that one-off parliamentary exchanges come increasingly less the unique preserve of the have had no discernible impact and thus need to be semi-autonomous foundations. used as a base from which to develop longer-term The implementation of such logic is acknowl- capacity-building assistance. Most donors claim to edged to be still in its early stages. Strategies em- be keen to divert funds away from support for for- phasize the broader context of, and structural mal committee structures, equipping parliamen- impediments to, party development, but as one tary libraries and the trans position of new rules

46 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and procedures in parliaments, towards increasing training courses parliaments’ responsiveness to citizens. In practice, there is rarely any The reform of civil–military relations has much support still goes to funding equipment and follow-through been perhaps the most neglected of all very technical drafting provisions. from donors to as- democracy’s constituent arenas. sess how these can The reform of civil–military relations has been be harnessed to perhaps the most neglected of all democracy’s contribute to more reform-minded militaries. The constituent arenas. Suffering from a low degree more self-critical donors increasingly acknowledge of awareness among the main makers of decisions that the proclivity in SSR work towards ‘training on political aid, this issue has to a signifi cant de- the trainers’ programmes continues with little idea gree been left to defence ministries. Where it has of what, if any, impact these might be achieving. been incorporated into democracy assistance pro- Most donors remain cautious of confusing mili- fi les it has invariably been through a confl ict-pre- tary and development aid too much: the Japanese vention lens. Assessments of democracy aid rarely Government and others prefer any focus on mili- pick up how much traditional defence diplomacy tary reform to be supported through multilateral has transmuted into security sector reform (SSR) institutions. work. These have developed almost as two diff erent policy-making worlds. A quid pro quo has increas- 3.5. Conclusion ingly taken root: defence ministries have trimmed traditional defence cooperation into reform-ori- Common threads have gradually woven them- ented SSR initiatives; in return an erstwhile scep- selves into donors’ democracy assistance pro- tical development community has accepted that grammes during the last ten years. In each case, SSR does have a genuine place in reform and con- the evolution in approaches to democracy build- fl ict prevention objectives. The USA launched an ing has been simultaneously signifi cant and cir- initiative to incorporate USAID-led accountabil- cumscribed. Most unequivocally, donors stress a ity elements into Defense Department military conviction that democracy assistance is moving training, aimed at encouraging civil society par- away from support for self-standing projects in ticipation in the formulation of defence policies different thematic sectors towards the moulding (USAID, ‘Civil–Military Relations Resources’). of holistic linkages between different arenas. At European donors all run similar projects. Sweden the same time, political aid still often appears to has launched a pilot project on democratic over- function as a relatively modest and hermetically sight of the military in Honduras, while the Dutch sealed pocket of aid activity. A shift away from at- Government has sought to elaborate an integra- tempts at direct institutional engineering is uni- tion of the development, diplomatic and defence versally proclaimed and acclaimed; but it is uncer- elements of political reform initiatives. A number tain that what has emerged in its place is capable of donors have recently been engaged in DAC dis- of generating signifi cant democratic change. At cussions on the possi bilities of incorporating SSR best, the value of gradualism remains convincing- work into development aid. ly to be substantiated, and in the absence hitherto of assessment mechanisms it has intuitive rather While such moves are of signifi cant import, in than demonstrable merit. Few benchmarks have overall terms SSR initiatives have only very tenta- been rigorously designed or applied that suffi ce tively moved away from standard military capacity to hold donors to account against their own logic building towards assistance aimed at the broader of incremental capacity enhancement. Independ- restructuring of civil–military relations. It is wide- ent monitoring agencies are lacking at the political ly acknowl edged that SSR initiatives are primarily level, while on the ground judgement is rarely de- about consolidating alliances with third-country rived from the participation of local ‘stakeholders’ militaries, albeit in parallel with new human rights (Crawford 2003). training and courses on democratic oversight run with security forces. Where democracy and hu- It is now widely recognized that democracy assist- man rights modules have been added to military ance will at most impact at the margins, and that

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 47 support relating to the broader context of political References change represents a hitherto underestimated key. Yet in practice democracy offi cers commonly re- BMZ, Good Governance in German Development main focused simply on ‘running good projects’ Cooperation, Position Paper no. 50 (June 2002) and meeting the reporting requirements attached Carothers, T., Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning to these. Concepts and criteria relate, at one lev- Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for el, to individual projects, at another level to ge- International Peace, 1999) neric macro-level aims: ‘good governance’ and ‘the Carothers, T., Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: rule of law’. One is too narrow to look beyond the The Problem of Knowledge, Working Paper no. 34 confi nes of individual parcels of aid; the other is (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for too broad to guide actionable priorities. A central International Peace, 2003) challenge for democracy assistance is to fashion French Ministère des Affaires Étranges, Direction from all the strands of new thinking elaborated in générale de la Coopération International et du this chapter strategies able to articulate a linkage Développement (DGCID), ‘La coopération pour la between these two levels. promotion de l’état de droit’, ‘La défense et la promotion des driots de l’Homme’ (undated), Crawford, G., ‘Promoting Democracy from Without: Learning from Within (Part I)’, Democratization 10/1 (2003), pp. 77-98 Dalpino, C., Deferring Democracy: Promoting Openness in Authori tarian Regimes (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) Edwards, Michael, Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) Hyman, G., ‘Tilting at Straw Men’, Journal of Democracy 13/3, (2002) Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Roads to Democracy and Governance 23 (2003) Mair, S., ‘Multi-partisan or Bi-partisan Cooperation? What is the Best Solution for Democracy Assistance’, in Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Enhancing the European Profi le in Democracy Assistance 136 (2004) Quigely, K., ‘Lofty Goals, Modest Results: Assisting Civil Society in Eastern Europe’, in M. Ottoway and T. Carothers (eds), Funding Virtue (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000) Santiso, C., ‘Reforming European Foreign Aid: Development Cooperation as an Element of Foreign Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review 7/4 (2002) USAID, Civil–Military Relations Resources, USAID, ‘Political Party Development and USAID’, Democracy Dialogue December 1999

48 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

‘Building democracy involves much more than arranging free elections. Freedom of speech and the press must be protected, as well as the rights to assemble and establish political parties. A fair judiciary must be built up.

In a country with democratic traditions, these rights are self-evident. But less than half of the world’s countries that have declared independence and are UN members are countries where the people themselves determine their government.

The majority of the world’s population does not have ownership of their government. Typically, power has been secured through the establishment of a single party system, a military coup or by bloodlines. The state leaders consider themselves owners of the state, and they see the duty of citizens as keeping them in power. Those who attempt to rock the boat are prevented from doing so and punished accordingly.’

Harri Holkeri, member of the Board of International IDEA, former Prime Minister of Finland, and former Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

50 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 4. Why Governance Matters In Achieving the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals*

This chapter addresses the issues of democracy and 4.1. Introduction good governance in a systematic way by linking devel- opment and the realization of the Millennium De- More countries than ever before are working to velopment Goals to democracy building. It presents build democratic governance. Their challenge UNDP’s experiences on how to stabilize democracy is to develop institutions and processes that are and make it work. more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens, including the poor. The UN Development Pro- gramme (UNDP) works to bring people togeth- No state can truly be called democratic if it er within nations and around the world, building offers its people no escape from poverty; and no partnerships and sharing ways to promote partici- country can truly develop, so long as its people pation, accountability and effective ness at all lev- are excluded from power. els. UNDP acts to help countries strengthen their electoral and legislative systems, improve access to Kofi Annan, justice and public administration, and develop a Secretary-General, United Nations greater capacity to deliver basic services to those most in need.

One of the most important lessons of the last The critical importance of democratic govern- two decades is that democratic governance ance in the developing world was underlined at is the glue that holds all other development the Millennium Summit, where the world’s lead- priorities set out across the Millennium ers resolved to ‘spare no effort to promote democ- Development Goals together. racy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as re- spect for all internationally recognized human Mark Malloch Brown, former Administrator, rights and fundamental freedoms, including the United Nations Development Programme current Chief of Staff to the UN Secretary-General right to development’. A consensus was reached which recognized that improving the quality of

*This chapter was contributed by the UNDP Governance Centre in Oslo.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 51 democratic insti- fi nancial system. This goal also includes a commit- The critical importance of democratic tutions and proc- ment to good governance, development and pover- governance in the developing world was esses, and manag- ty reduction, both nationally and internationally. underlined at the Millennium Summit, ing the changing On current trends, however, at least 59 countries where the world’s leaders resolved to roles of the state are unlikely to meet their targets and 33 countries ‘spare no effort to promote democracy and civil society with more than a quarter of the world’s popula- and strengthen the rule of law, as well as in an increasingly tion will achieve fewer than half of the goals by globalized world, 2015. If this lack of progress continues, it will take respect for all internationally recognized must underpin na- more than 130 years to rid the world of hunger. human rights and fundamental freedoms, tional efforts to re- An even more troubling aspect of these bleak facts including the right to development’. duce poverty, sus- is that many of the countries least likely to achieve tain the environ- the MDGs are the world’s poorest—the least de- ment and promote human development. veloped countries. Most of these are in Sub-Saha- Whether the Millennium Development Goals ran Africa where 23 of the region’s 44 countries are (MDGs) agreed on at the Millennium Summit failing in most areas (UNDP Human Development will be reached depends in large part on how suc- Report 2002). cessful governments, civil society, citizens and in- ternational institutions will be in promoting and These discouraging facts beg the question what implementing the concepts of democratic gov- is needed to hasten the pace of progress towards ernance. UNDP believes that political and hu- achieving the MDGs. There are various debates man development is as important to achieving the concerning economic growth, technology, macr- MDGs as economic growth. Sustained poverty re- oeconomic policy, or the more elusive concept of duction requires equitable growth, but it also re- governance. While there are many opinions on quires that poor people have political power and what must come fi rst or which is more important, a voice. The best way to achieve that in a manner most would agree that all these elements are need- that is consistent with the Millennium Declara- ed, and that all these factors are indeed related to tion objectives and MDGs is by building strong improving governance in developing countries and deep forms of democratic governance at all (Fukuda-Parr and Ponzio, undated). levels of society. The fact is that most of the countries that are not 4.2. The Millennium Declaration on track to meet the MDGs do not have free and and Democratic Governance democratic political systems. While freedom and democracy are not necessarily prerequisites for In September 2000 the world’s leaders adopted the development, very few democratic countries are UN Millennium Declaration, committing their among the world’s poorest. Countries where po- nations to stronger global efforts to advance de- litical rights and civil liberties are limited, where velopment and poverty eradication, securing hu- corruption is rampant, where ruling parties have man rights, democracy and good governance. The dominated for decades, where women have less MDGs that emerged from the Declaration are opportunities or where there is ethnic or religious specifi c, quantitative and measurable targets to be discrimination tend to be among the poorest and achieved by 2015 or earlier. The goals focus on the least likely to achieve the goals. eight essential areas of development, from halving extreme poverty and hunger, to making primary 4.3. Why is Governance education available to all girls and boys, reduc- Indispensable to Achieving ing child and maternal mortality, reducing gender the MDGs? disparities and empowering women, arresting the spread of HIV/AIDS, and ensuring environmental Although most people agree that governance is es- sustainability. MDG 8, ‘Global partnership for de- sential in the development process there are differ- velopment’, promises to create a more transparent, ent understandings about what governance means. rule-based and non-discriminatory trading and In a historical development context it is possible to

52 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) identify three main phases of the governance con- such activities distort a country’s ability to invest cept. in health and education. The good governance agenda, however, is too nar- First, from the 1960s to the mid-1980s develop- row for achieving the goals and objectives of the ment was seen to be state-led through a ‘planning’ Millennium Declaration. First, the Declaration framework where strengthening public adminis- has a broader agenda that covers peace, democra- tration was the focus of what is today called ‘gov- cy and human rights. The world’s leaders in 2000 ernance’. Development assistance during this pe- clearly committed them selves to more than just riod was concerned with technological transfers good governance when they stated that: and building state capacity. In the second phase, the governance debate turned to implementation We will spare no effort to promote democracy and of economic reform programmes that were part of strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all a larger economic liberalization agenda in devel- internationally recognized human rights and fun- oping countries. damental freedoms, including the right to devel- opment. We resolve therefore to strive for the ful- During the 1980s and 1990s attention turned to fi lment of all human rights, including the rights issues such as the lack of adequate legal frame- of minorities, women, migrant workers, to work works for investors, lack of fi nancial transparen- against racism and for more inclusive political cy and accountability, weak institutions that were processes and to ensure the freedom of the media unable to enforce laws, corruption and ineffective and the right to information for all (United Na- administration. These concerns can be described tions Millennium Declaration 2000). as a good governance agenda that is preoccupied with creating effi cient institutions and rules that The MDGs have also in many ways become a promote development by making markets work manifesto for the world’s poor. In this aspect, eco- and ensuring that public services are managed ef- nomic growth is just one of the means for achiev- fectively. The World Bank is generally seen as the ing the MDGs and will remain inconsequential strongest proponent of the good governance agen- in many countries unless there is a change in their da which includes the rule of law (i.e. enforcing governance structures. Economic growth is clear- contract and property rights), combating corrup- ly not enough be- tion (emphasizing greater fi nancial transparency cause the benefi ts The fact is that most of the countries that and accountability), and ensuring effi cient pub- of growth may not are not on track to meet the MDGs do lic service delivery and basic social services such as be channelled to not have free and democratic political schools and health care. The good governance pri- the poor or to ex- systems. While freedom and democracy orities are aimed at increasing economic effi ciency panding their social are not necessarily prerequisites for and growth by helping to set an environment that and economic op- development, very few democratic is conducive to private investment. portunities. countries are among the world’s poorest. Few would disagree that economic growth, fi nan- Second, although cial transparency and accountability are essential there is no automatic relationship between growth to achieving the MDGs. After all, the cornerstone and human development, growth can contribute measurement for MDG 1 of halving poverty is per to human development if increased incomes and capita gross domestic product (GDP).1 The rule of higher government revenue translate into social law, effi cient public service delivery and market- and productive spending that positively infl uences friendly institutions are also necessities to encour- human development indicators such as health and age economic investment and growth in develop- education (UNDP 2003d). ing countries. There is no doubt that countries with economic mismanagement and rampant cor- The Millennium Goals demonstrate a develop- ruption are far less likely to achieve the MDGs as ment agenda that is for human development, not

1 GDP per capita is also an essential indicator for several human development measures including the Human Development Index.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 53 just economic growth. Goals such as improving ac- In seeking that ‘something else’, human develop- cess to water and increasing literacy rates are con- ment shares a common vision with human rights. cerned with expanding the well-being of people The goal is human freedom. And in pursuing ca- as opposed to just promoting economic growth. pabilities and realizing rights this freedom is vital. As several UNDP Human Development Reports People must be free to exercise their choices and have pointed out, economic growth is a means to to participate in decision making that affects their an end, not an end in itself (UNDP Human De- lives. Human development and human rights are velopment Report 2000, 2002, 2003). mutually reinforcing, helping to secure the well- being and dignity of all people, building self-re- 4.4. Human Development and spect and the respect of others. Democratic Governance as a Framework for Achieving the UNDP defi nes human development as ‘develop- MDGs ment of the people, for the people and by the peo- ple’. Of the people because the aim is to lead a more human life; by the people because develop- While it may be unclear whether demo- ment depends on the creative effort of men and cratic governance enhances economic women, not on nature or luck; and for the people growth, it is clear that democratic gov- because the objective is not to add zeros to the na- ernance enhances human development. tional accounts but to improve the lives of people.

Human Development Report 2002: Deepening In this perspective, the true goal of public poli- Democracy in a Fragmented World cy is to provide more options for citizens to live their lives in an increasingly satis factory way. In a word, development is ‘freedom’. And freedom, in Human development is about much more than the addition to being the objective, is the best way to rise or fall of national incomes. It is about creating achieve development. an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs aim in accordance with their needs and interests. Peo- to secure the environment which can produce free- ple are the real wealth of nations. Development is dom and human capabilities. A human being can- therefore about expanding the choices people have not be ‘free’ unless he or she has an enabling en- to lead lives that they value. And it is thus about vironment that provides choices. The MDGs can much more than economic growth, which is only be conceived of as the core tools needed to make a means—if a very these choices. Moreover, the key economic and so- important one—of cial rights, such as the right to food, education and The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs enlarging people’s health, are clearly refl ected in MDGs 1-7. Human aim to secure the environment which can choices. development and the MDGs need to be delivered produce freedom and human capabilities. by environments that provide democracy, the rule A human being cannot be ‘free’ unless he Fundamental to of law and human rights as described in the Mil- or she has an enabling environment that enlarging these lennium Declaration. provides choices. choices is build- ing human capa- 4.4.1. Democratic Governance for bilities—the range Human Development of things that people can do or be in life. The most basic capabilities for human development are the Whereas the good governance agenda sought to chances to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowl- enhance public service delivery and economic edgeable, to have access to the resources needed for management in order to promote private invest- a decent standard of living and to be able to partici- ment and economic growth, human development pate in the life of the community. Without these, demands a broader notion of governance. Human many choices are simply not available, and many development advocates in the 1990s introduced oppor tunities in life remain inaccessible. concepts such as ‘humane governance’. In contrast

54 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) to good governance, the concept of humane gov- framework within which countries achieve hu- ernance seeks to make governance more people- man development through poverty eradication, oriented, focused on human rights and global se- environmental protection and regeneration, gen- curity. This concept aims to tackle ‘inhumane gov- der equality and sustainable livelihoods. The Mil- ernance’ which is characterized by fi ve persistent lennium Declaration clearly supports the same global problems: framework by emphasizing peace, human rights and good governance as the process for delivering • the failure to meet basic needs; the MDGs. • discrimination against and denial of human rights to women, indigenous people and Democratic governance is the most human-de- others; velopment-friendly system of governance and the • failures to protect the environment and to primary vehicle for the articulation of individuals’ safeguard the interests of future generations; interests and the fulfi lment of their deepest aspira- • lack of progress in abolishing war; and tions. It is also essential for the nurturing of civil • failure to achieve the spread of ‘transnational society as an indispensable partner in the manage- democracy’ (Falk 1999). ment of public affairs.

A similar approach to humane governance was From a human development perspective, good introduced in the 1999 UNDP Human Develop- governance means demo cratic governance. Ac- ment Report on South Asia. The report developed cording to the UNDP Human Development Report a policy agenda for human governance dedicat- 2002, democratic governance entails the follow- ed to securing human development along three ing: lines: fi rst, structures and processes that support the creation of a participatory, responsive and • People’s human rights and fundamental accountable polity (good political governance); freedoms are respected, allowing them to live second, a com petitive, non-discriminatory and with dignity. equitable economy (good economic governance); • People have a say in decisions that affect their and, third, a society in which people are given the lives. ability to self-organize (good civic governance). • People can hold decision makers accountable. • Inclusive and fair rules, institutions and prac- Building on these ideas of governance, the UNDP tices govern social interactions. Human Development Report 2002 elaborated on • Women are equal partners with men in the the concept of ‘democratic governance’. Like good private and public spheres of life and decision governance, democratic governance seeks effi cient making. insti tutions and a predictable economic and polit- • People are free from discrimination based on ical environment necessary for economic growth race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other at- and the effective functioning of public services. tribute. But democratic governance shares with humane • The needs of future generations are refl ected in governance the objective of securing political, civ- current policies. il, social, economic and cultural rights for all. A • Economic and social policies are responsive to democratic governance reform agenda would aim people’s needs and aspirations. at building institutions and rules that are not only • Economic and social policies aim at eradicating effi cient but also fair and are developed through a poverty and expanding the choices that all peo- democratic process in which all people have a real ple have in their lives. political voice. Consequently, good governance may not be democratic, while democratic govern- That is why governance for human development ance is always good governance (Fukuda-Parr and places individuals and their choices at the cen- Ponzio, undated). tre of the development process and embraces the principles of empowerment, participation, eq- For UNDP, democratic governance must be the uity and sustainability. Ownership, decency and

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 55 accountability are Authoritarian leaders promise better outcomes and Democracies also contribute to political among the most argue that demo cracy must be sacrifi ced for eco- stability and thus to human security because important under- nomic growth and social progress. But there is no open space for political contests allows for lying principles of evidence of such a trade-off. Statistical studies fi nd more peaceful resolution and management governance for hu- that neither authoritarianism nor democracy is a of confl ict. man development. factor in determining either the rate of economic growth or how it is distributed (UNDP Human Democratic gover- Development Report 2002). The lesson from these nance is valuable in its own right. But it can also empirical fi ndings is that, while democracy can advance human development and MDGs for the contribute to equitable socio-economic progress, following reasons. it is neither a panacea for eradicating poverty nor a luxury for poor countries. • When more than economic growth is consid- ered, democracy can work to put in a political 4.5. The Challenge of dynamic to respond to the social and economic Strengthening Democracy in a priorities of people and contribute to reducing Fragmented World poverty and promoting human development. This is particularly essential for developing These fi ndings raise some fundamental questions: countries that are not on target to reach their where and why do the incentives to respond to MDGs. A human development-centred de- people’s needs fail in democracies? Why does de- mocracy would for example prioritize health mocracy not have stronger links with the equitable and education issues over military spending. expansion of social and economic opportunities • As Amartya Sen has demonstrated, famines do for the public at large? Why are social injustices not take place in countries where there is free- widespread even in long-established democracies? dom of the press and access to information. Even in times of food shortages, public pressure The UNDP Human Development Report fi nds that obliges the government to act when a famine there are two main reasons why democracy defi cits is looming. History provides ample examples persist: fi rst, corruption and the control by an elite of the opposite occurring in non-democratic subvert democratic institutions; and, second, the countries. In general, democratic institutions inadequate reach of democratic institutions causes can check authoritarian leaders from adopting limited participation. ruinous policies. • Democracies also contribute to political stabil- Corruption, abuses of power, intimidation by ity and thus to human security because open criminal elements—all weaken democratic ac- space for political contests allows for more countability. Oversight and regulatory agencies peaceful resolution and management of con- may also fail to act when they have been politicized fl ict. Although riots and demonstrations are or are under the infl uence of special interests. Judi- more frequent in democracies, they are far less cial proceedings can be undermined when they are destabilizing there than in dictatorships. Em- open to bribes, providing little protection to ordi- pirical studies also show that democracies do nary people, particularly the poor and vulnerable. not wage wars with each other. The opposite Women, for instance, may well get little justice can be said about authoritarian regimes, which from male-dominated courts. The issue of mon- are far more prone to confl ict and war, which ey in politics is especially serious because it can in turn severely undermines human develop- distort democratic institutions at every level. Elec- ment and human security. toral processes can obviously not operate without • Democratic institutions and processes that give fi nancing; but, where money plays a decisive role voice to people, and hold rulers accountable, as in politics, it turns unequal economic power into well as open com petition for power, make poli- unequal political advantage and undermines the ticians more likely to respond to the needs of fundamental democratic principle of ‘one per- ordinary people. son, one vote’. The issue of money in politics is

56 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) equally contentious in developed and developing more responsive to their needs. countries. 4.6. Regional Focus on Human What needs to be done to break the vicious cycle Development and Governance of corruption and control by an elite? Strengthen- ing the key institutions of demo cracies is a neces- Since the fi rst Human Development Report was sary fi rst step which represents a tremendous chal- launched in 1990, there have been several regional lenge in new democracies. Capacity building and reports which promote regional partnerships for support to parliaments, public administration, infl uencing change and addressing region-specifi c electoral bodies, judicial systems, the media and human development approaches to human rights, civil society are some of the areas in which UNDP governance, poverty, education, economic reform, and other development actors work in collabora- HIV/AIDS and globalization. tion with national counterparts. Activities in these areas include, for example, strengthening political With regard to democratic governance, the region- parties, which are often far from institutionalized al reports that have arguably received the greatest and virtually disappear between elections. Many attention are the Arab Human Development Report media bodies are still subject to restrictions or do (AHDR) of 2002 and 2003. not have adequate professional capacity. In many new democracies, political reforms have not been The AHDR 2002 challenged the Arab world to consolidated and the executive continues to exer- overcome three cardinal obstacles to human de- cise control over the judiciary and legislature. In velopment posed by widening gaps in freedom, this context UNDP and partners work with the women’s empowerment and knowledge across the government to establish independent oversight region. A look at international, regional and lo- bodies for elections or human rights insti tutions cal developments affecting Arab countries since that are charged with investigating human rights the report was issued confi rms that those chal- violations. Capacity building and the strengthen- lenges remain critically pertinent and may have ing of the judicial system are also key activities, as become even graver, especially in the area of free- justice and the rule of law have been shown not dom. Nowhere is this more apparent than the sta- to be accessible for many citizens in developing tus of education and knowledge in the Arab world countries. According to the Human Development at the beginning of the 21st century, and this is Report 2002, only 47 of 81 countries that took the theme of the second report. Despite the pres- steps to democratize in the 1980s and 1990s are ence of signifi cant human capital in the region, considered to have completed these reforms. the ADHR 2003 concluded that disabling con- straints hamper the acquisition, diffusion and Strengthening institutions, however, is only part production of knowledge in Arab societies. This of the solution. Political pressure and change also human capital, under more promising conditions, have to come from outside formal structures, could offer a substantial base for an Arab knowl- through the emergence of more vibrant demo- edge renaissance. The Report affi rms that knowl- cratic politics, led by watchdog media and activist edge can help the region to expand the scope of citizen groups. A global trend of the last decade human freedoms, enhance the capacity to guaran- has been the explosion across the world of civil tee those freedoms through good governance, and society organizations and civic participation, de- achieve the higher moral human goals of justice manding greater accountability of government and human dignity. It also underlines the impor- and other powerful actors such as private business tance of knowledge to Arab countries as a pow- and multilateral organizations. erful driver of economic growth through high- er productivity. Its closing section puts forward a Civil society organizations can play a critical role strategic vision for creating knowledge societies in in developing the social and political capacities of the Arab world based on fi ve pillars: guaranteeing the poor, increasing their effectiveness in infl uenc- key freedoms; disseminating quality educa tion; ing governance institutions and making the latter embedding science; shifting towards knowledge

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 57 based production; In the 1980s and early 1990s the ‘good govern- In the 1980s and early 1990s the ‘good and developing an ance’ debate was cast as fi nding alternatives to the governance’ debate was cast as fi nding enlightened Arab state-dominated economic and social develop- alternatives to the state-dominated knowledge model. ment of previous decades. In the present day, good economic and social development of The AHDR 2003 governance is more about improving and reform- previous decades. makes it clear that, ing the functioning of democratic institutions, in- in the Arab civili- cluding the ‘deepening of demo cracy’, strengthen- zation, the pursuit ing accountability and exploring more active and of knowledge is prompted by religion, culture, his- creative roles for non-state actors. According to tory and the human will to achieve success. Only the UNDP’s Human Development Report 2003: defective social, economic and political structures Millennium Development Goals: A Compact among hinder this quest. Arabs must remove or reform Nations to End Poverty, the development policy these structures in order to take the place they de- approaches of the 1980s and 1990s focused too serve in the world of knowledge at the beginning much on macro economic and govern ance reforms of the knowledge millennium. to the detriment of those structural constraints that keep the poorest countries in a ‘poverty trap’. UNDP believes that these reports can help spark While this is true, sound governance is indispen- the necessary debate on how countries and regions sable if the MDGs are to be achieved. should approach democratic governance issues and strengthen human development for all citi- International cooperation in support of demo- zens, including women and the poor. cratic governance would need to take on a broader agenda. Beginning in the early 1990s, many devel- 4.7. Democratic Governance: opment assistance providers began shifting away the Road Ahead from traditional public-sector management con- cerns and modest decentralization programmes To achieve the vision and goals of the Millenni- to dealing with sensitive governance areas such as um Declaration requires democratic governance. human rights, parliamentary support, judicial re- There is a need for democratic governance that form and corruption. Responding to the growth responds to peoples’ priorities and needs, which in the number of transitional democracies, the amounts to more than people just having the right electoral assistance role played by several multi- to vote. It must be about strengthening voice and lateral and bilateral agencies has served as a key power through democratic politics that make par- entry point for undertaking a ‘new generation of ticipation and public accountability cut through governance projects’. These recent developments elite control of institutions. There is a need for have generated a new kind of demand for research democratic governance that gives priority to poor and analysis relating to governance. The recent people’s interests, which is about more than insti- publications, knowledge tools and other govern- tutions and rules ance activities undertaken by organizations such that promote ef- as UNDP and IDEA are very much evidence of The UN system and partner organizations fi ciency; it is also this recent trend. can play an important role on the new about fairness and frontiers of governance policy advice and social justice. The UN system and partner organizations can play institutional strengthening, especially in an important role on the new frontiers of govern- areas that bring political elements into Democratic gov- ance policy advice and institutional strengthening, economic and social development. ernance in the especially in areas that bring political elements fast-changing glo- into economic and social development. Besides bal community of the 21st century is more than institutional constraints on addressing the broader public management within borders. It also con- issues of democratization and human rights— cerns operations, rules and practices beyond bor- such as enhancing the functioning of parliaments, ders and by actors beyond the state—civil society the media, civil society organizations, and state– groups and private businesses. citizen relations—the approach to governance by

58 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) UN organizations will no doubt emphasize part- nership rather than conditionality (UNDP, Arab The importance of partnership is refl ected Human Development Report 2002, 2003). in MDG 8—the anchor without which the fi rst seven goals cannot be attained. The importance of partnership is refl ected in MDG 8—the anchor without which the fi rst sev- en goals cannot be attained. In calling on the inter- national community to promote a global partner- ship for development, MDG 8 supports strength- References ening mutual accountability between North and South, with the latter countries improving govern- Falk, Richard, On Humane Governance, quoted in ance and eliminating corruption in order to ad- UNDP, South Asia Human Development Report 1999 dress their development needs effectively. On the Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko and Ponzio, Richard, ‘Governance: other hand, developed countries have committed Past, Present, Future: Setting the Governance Agenda themselves to increasing overseas development as- for the Millennium Declaration’ (undated), systems likely to benefi t the South. UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (Oxford: Oxford 4.8. Conclusion University Press, 2003) (2003a) — Arab Human Development Report 2003 (New York: The UN Millennium Declaration of 2000 com- UN Publications, [2003]) (2003b) mits rich and poor countries to advance develop- — Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and ment and eradicate poverty by promoting human Human Development (Oxford and New York: Oxford rights, democracy and good governance. By 2015 University Press, 2000) or earlier developing countries are to have achieved — Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democ- the MDGs which range from halving poverty to ar- racy in a Fragmented World (Oxford and New York: resting the spread of HIV/AIDS. At present rates, Oxford University Press, 2002) however, many developing countries, including — Human Development Report 2003. Millennium Devel- the worlds’ poorest, will not achieve the goals. opment Goals: A Compact Among Nations to End Hu- man Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) Whether the MDGs will be reached depends in (2003c) large part on how successful governments, civil so- — Making Global Trade Work for People, 2003 (2003d) ciety, citizens and international institutions will be United Nations, Millennium Declaration, UN document in promoting and implementing the concepts of A/RES/55/2, 18 September 2000 democratic governance. The UNDP believes that political and human development is as impor- tant to achieving the MDGs as economic growth. Sustained poverty reduction requires equitable growth, but it also requires that poor people have political power and voice. The best way to achieve that in a manner consistent with the Millennium Declaration objectives and MDGs is by building strong and deep forms of democratic governance at all levels of society.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 59 ‘Living together democratically calls for, above all, attaining a profound and generalized change in individual attitudes to establish a global conscience able to breed true solidarity. We must learn to reconcile the tension between worldwide and local interests, in order to little by little become citizens of the world without forfeiting our respective roots, and to participate actively both in national and community life.

Consequently, what we demand and pursue is education for peace: to prevent violence, intolerance, selfi shness and ignorance. Education should serve the cause of human dignity through democratic harmony in freedom . . . as well as for modernity and progress in solidarity.

In so doing, education can and should contribute decisively to bring peace and sustainable development to the entire world, once and for all.’

Dr Ricardo Díez-Hochleitner, member of the Board of International IDEA and Honorary President of the Club of Rome

60 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 5. The People’s Voice: Trust in Political Institutions

Michael Bratton , Yun-han Chu, Marta Lagos , Richard Rose

The Global Barometer Surveys Network investigates scientists have the responsibility to dig deeper in empirically how democracy is perceived by citizens on order to fi nd out why government is popular or different continents. This chapter shows how a com- unpopular. Is unpopularity due to a dislike of a parative approach can help set the democracy debate political personality who can be voted out of offi ce in a country into motion, and how listening to the at the next election? Is it due to economic failings vox populi can help achieve local ownership by for- that may be the result of a world depression rather mulating a political agenda that mirrors the expecta- than a government’s mistakes? Is it due to corrup- tions of citizens. tion in government? Or does the unpopularity of a democratically elected government refl ect popular If you want to know what is happening in a coun- dissatisfaction with democracy itself? try, how do you fi nd out? Talking to a cross-sec- tion of the people who live there is an obvious Opinion polls are an extremely effective tool for way to determine what people are thinking. Pub- comparing and understanding political, econom- lic opinion surveys do just that: they collect data ic and social trends. Epictetus, the slave philoso- about knowledge, values, opinions, attitudes and pher, addressed the core problem of public opin- behaviours and measure the collective views of a ion: ‘Perceptions are truth because people believe representative sample of a defi ned population. in them’. Jean Jacques Rousseau, the fi rst major philosopher to use the term ‘public opinion’, said Understanding popular attitudes is especially im- ‘whoever makes his business to give laws to a peo- portant in new or unstable democracies, because ple must know to sway opinions and through them the authority of ‘governors’—that is, the hold- govern the passions of men’. Nonetheless, we need ers of the chief offi ces of state, whether elected or to be aware of the scope and limitations of pub- not—is not secure and citizens’ readiness to sup- lic opinion survey port democratic political institutions is untested. data. Public opin- In established democracies government agencies ion polls are best Public opinion polls are best at answering regularly conduct sample surveys of the popula- at answering ques- questions about what people are doing, tion to get feedback for shaping public policies; tions about what what they are thinking and what kind political parties use polls to formulate their voting people are do- of government they would like to have. appeal; and the mass media sponsor public opin- ing, what they are Yet the evidence from opinion polls still ion polls to provide instant evaluation of what thinking and what leaves open for discussion why people governors are doing and to conduct hypothetical kind of govern- differ in their attitudes and what the policy ‘horse races’ which show who would be the winner ment they would implications are. if an election were held that day. Academic social like to have. Yet the

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 61 evidence from opinion polls still leaves open for political concerns are common to citizens in every discussion why people differ in their attitudes and political system, lots of questions are common in what the policy implications are. GBS surveys across four continents.

The GBS Network is a scholarly collabora- Asking citizens what they think is especially neces- tion of social scientists that addresses the task of sary if trust in political institutions is to be evalu- fi nding out what people are thinking and doing ated. Inevitably, governors want to claim that the by conducting representative sample surveys institutions they direct are trusted by the masses. in more than 50 societies in transition in But political elites are not unbiased judges of pub- Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America lic opinion at the grass roots, and the fact that peo- . Its questions ple vote in elections is not proof that they trust focus on funda mental problems of governance politicians. rather than the ephemeral concerns of a nightly television show. Independence from government 5.1. Limited Trust in Political means that the surveys are designed to increase Institutions understanding of what citizens see as the faults as well as the strengths of their political institutions. Trust is of fundamental importance for ‘govern- Each of the four GBS partners writes its question- ance’, the process by which government policies naire for maximum are carried out through the cooperation of citizens Asking citizens what they think is relevance with- with public offi cials. While implementing popu- in its continental lar decisions is easy, leaders need the ‘governance especially necessary if trust in political context, whether capital’ that trust provides in order to carry out institutions is to be evaluated. Inevitably, it is the legacy of unpopular decisions. If major political institutions governors want to claim that the institutions communist rule in are deemed trustworthy, citizens are more likely to they direct are trusted by the masses. But Eastern Europe or cooperate with unpopular decisions necessary for political elites are not unbiased judges of the political con- the long-term benefi t of a society. If institutions public opinion at the grass roots, and the sequences of pov- are distrusted, citizens may refuse to cooperate or fact that people vote in elections is not erty and illiteracy ignore laws and regulations, and the effectiveness proof that they trust politicians. in Africa. How- of government is thereby reduced. ever, since many

Table 5.1: New Europe Barometer Surveys, 2004

Country Survey dates Number of respondents Belarus 16–28 November 2004 1,000 Bulgaria 18–25 October 2004 1,231 Czech Republic 29 November–6 December 2004 1,071 Estonia 5–19 November 2004 940 Hungary 10–30 November 2004 992 Latvia 5 November–22 December 2004 956 Lithuania 3–19 December 2004 1,113 Poland 24–30 November 2004 943 Romania 1–10 October 2004 1,110 Russia 3–23 January 2005 2,107 Slovakia 3–10 November 2004 1,036 Slovenia 26 November–6 December 2004 1,000 Ukraine Jan.–Feb. 2005 2,000

62 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Table 5.2: Summary of Institutional Trust

Army Police Courts Parliament Party1 Country mean (% trusting2) A. AFROBAROMETER Mali 79 63 50 62 58 62 Tanzania 72 51 54 69 66 62 Malawi 72 64 61 38 45 56 Mozambique 49 50 59 54 64 55 Lesotho 50 51 58 49 55 53 Botswana 60 57 57 37 43 51 Ghana 54 51 45 48 51 50 Uganda 51 43 51 48 56 50 Namibia 50 48 42 47 59 49 Kenya 58 28 37 53 65 48 Zambia 52 42 49 40 32 43 Senegal 61 45 42 25 26 40 South Africa 32 35 39 31 32 34 Cape Verde 35 36 43 22 19 31 Nigeria 21 11 22 11 16 16 Afro-Barometer (53) (45) (47) (42) (46) (47)

B. NEW EUROPE BAROMETER Estonia 57 45 46 18 7 34 Hungary 39 43 45 23 16 33 Lithuania 61 33 26 17 10 30 Romania 60 32 26 15 9 28 Poland 59 36 22 8 3 26 Latvia 36 36 35 14 10 26 Slovakia 48 27 24 12 10 24 Slovenia 30 33 25 19 10 23 Czech R 29 28 26 13 15 22 Bulgaria 38 35 15 7 6 20 Russia 38 15 21 11 10 19 New Europe (45) (33) (28) (14) (10) (26)

C. EAST ASIA BAROMETER PR China 95 77 72 86 94 85 Thailand 76 55 60 54 47 58 Mongolia 67 48 47 61 42 53 Hong Kong 63 na 69 52 22 52 Philippines 54 47 50 44 35 46 Korea 59 50 51 15 15 38 Taiwan 58 45 41 20 16 36 Japan 48 48 61 13 9 36 East Asia (65) (53) (56) (43) (35) (50) 1 Note: trust for the ruling party. 2 Percentage excludes ‘don’t knows’.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 63 Army Police Courts Parliament Party Country mean (% trusting2) D. LATINO BAROMETRO Brazil 54 37 42 28 16 35 Uruguay 33 50 37 25 17 33 Chile 36 48 20 23 13 28 Colombia 41 37 19 13 9 24 Costa Rica Na 36 31 20 10 24 Venezuela 34 26 19 18 14 22 Honduras 27 33 19 19 12 22 Panama Na 35 20 17 15 22 Mexico 40 17 13 21 10 20 El Salvador 25 34 17 14 11 20 Paraguay 23 24 17 14 11 18 Argentina 27 22 16 14 8 17 Peru 26 23 12 13 8 16 Nicaragua 22 26 15 11 7 16 Bolivia 19 14 16 13 6 14 Ecuador 25 17 8 6 6 12 Guatemala 11 16 12 10 8 11 Latino Barometro (26) (29) (20) (16) (11) (21)

1 Note: trust for the ruling party. 2 Percentage excludes ‘don’t knows’.

Figure 5.1: Trusting and Distrusting Citizens, By Continent

New Europe East Asia

Distrust 53% Little, no trust 42%

Don´t know Trust Neutral Latin AmericaA lot or some 9% Africa 26% 21% trust 49%

Little, no trust 75% Little, no trust 51%

Don´t know 5% Don´t know 6% A lot or some A lot or some trust 20% trust 43%

Source: Global Barometer Surveys , New Europe 2004/05: 11 coun- tries; Latin American 2003: 17 countries; East Asia 2001 – 2003: 8 countries; Africa 2002 – 2003: 16 countries. Average is for 5 institutions per country.

64 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) During their term of offi ce, political leaders often express positive trust. become unpopular because of their own behaviour or because their efforts to deal with such issues as There are substantial national differences. Conti- the economy or rising crime are unsuccessful. In nental averages of trust mask substantial differ- a democratic system, a low level of popularity can ences between countries within each continent. lead to defeat at a general election, and authori- Global Barometer surveys demonstrate that in tarian leaders can be deposed abruptly too. When every society public opinion is not homogeneous, leaders are unpopular, trust in political institu- as political culture theory postulates. The higher tions provides a reservoir of political support. Fur- the average level of trust, the bigger the distance thermore, the rejection of an elected incumbent between countries (see fi gure 5.2 and, for details, does not auto matically lead to rejection of the in- table 5.2). For example, among 15 African coun- stitutions of democratic governance. Finally, while tries, trust averages as high as 62 per cent in Tan- electoral demands for prosperity cannot guarantee zania, where a largely rural population has long an economic boom, a high level of popular trust experienced the stable rule of a dominant party. can make governance work better by encouraging Yet in Nigeria, where a more urbanized popula- cooperation between governors and governed. tion has endured a turbulent history of repeated military interventions into politics, only 16 per Trust in political institutions is thus particularly cent say they trust political institutions. The range appropriate to address through surveys of pub- in Asia is similarly great, because an extraordinary lic opinion. Every GBS includes questions about 85 per cent of respondents in the People’s Repub- trust both in key representative institutions (par- lic of China report trusting their institutions and liament, political parties) and in the key institu- in three other Asian countries more than half reg- tions that maintain the state’s authority (the army, ister trust. However, the average level of trust falls the police and the courts). Since interviews are to 36 per cent in Japan and in Taiwan. conducted in more than three dozen languages, the exact wording of questions must vary between Across half of Europe the widespread distrust of continents but the meaning is common. For ex- political insti tutions remains a legacy of commu- ample, the New Europe Barometer asks: ‘To what nist rule. In Russia and Bulgaria only one in fi ve extent do you trust each of these political institu- on average trusts political institutions. Trust in in- tions to look after your interests?’ and the Latino- stitutions is highest, but still at a low level, in Esto- barometro asks—‘Per favor, mire esta tarjeta y di- nia and Hungary, where an average of one in three game, cuánta confi anza tiene en cada uno de estos show some trust. In Latin America, too, countries instituciones?’. The replies show the following. differ only in the degree to which the majority of citizens are distrustful. Guatemala has the distinc- On every continent there are trusting and distrusting tion of registering the lowest average level of trust, citizens. In societies in transformation, political in- 11 per cent. Brazil has the relatively highest level stitutions have not (or have not yet) secured the of trust, 35 per cent. trust of a majority of citizens. The degree of trust and distrust differs across continents. In East Asia There are big differences between political institu- almost half the evaluations of fi ve major political tions in the trust they enjoy. In every country on institutions register a lot of trust or some trust, every continent the degree of trust shown specifi c and in Africa more than two in fi ve responses are political institutions varies. These differences are positive. However, the pie charts in fi gure 5.1 evident within as well as between countries. On likewise show that on each continent about half each continent the army—the institution with the withhold trust from political institutions. The sit- least claim to be democratic—ranks fi rst or sec- uation is less favourable in the post-communist ond in terms of trust. This is true not only in post- countries of Europe and in Latin America. Clear communist countries and Asia, where the army majorities register distrust in political institutions has usually remained politically neutral, but also there. Yet the picture is not totally negative, for at in Africa and Latin America, where military rule least a fi fth of responses in each of these continents has frequently occurred. Even in countries where

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 65 the army has been in power and where the overall yet to establish a reputation of being independent level of trust in institutions is low, such as Argen- of the governing powers and free of corruption. tina and Nigeria, the army is nonetheless less dis- trusted than civilian institutions. Even though competitive elections are held in GBS countries, representative institutions con- Table 5.3: Institutions Least Trusted Everywhere sistently rank lowest in trust. In nine of the 11 Figures are percentages of the level of trust European countries newly covered by the New Europe Barometer, nine-tenths of citizens with- Afro Asia Euro Latino hold trust from their political parties. Similarly, Army 53 65 45 26 only 14 per cent of new Europeans express trust Courts 47 56 28 20 in their popularly elected Parliament. Hungary is Police 45 53 33 29 the only country in which as many as one-sixth ex- Parliament 42 43 14 16 press confi dence in both Parliament and the par- Parties 461 35 10 11 ties. Latin Americans have not been subject to the intense pressure of communist party mobilization, 1 In African countries the result refers to the level but they too distrust both parties and their parlia- of trust in the ruling party only, not parties in gen- ments. The ‘highest’ level of trust in representa- eral. tive institutions is found in Brazil and Uruguay, Source: Global Barometer Surveys yet only one in four trusts the parliament there . and one in six trusts parties.

Further evidence exists to support the level of trust Even if they are not chosen in free and fair elec- in insti tutions exercising the state’s authority: the tions, African leaders often create a party appara- police, for example, usually rank second in the de- tus to mobilize support and channel patronage. gree of trust on each continent, and fi rst in Latin Hence, the Afrobarometer asks separately about America. Even though communist regimes were trust in the ruling party and in the opposition par- often described as police states, because coercion ties. The answers show relatively high trust in the was the prerogative of special interior ministry and ruling party, averaging 46 per cent, and relatively ruling party personnel, the police register a rela- low trust in opposition parties, averaging 23 per tively highest level of trust. The courts rank rela- cent. There are wide variations in trust for the rul- tively high in popular trust too. However, in Eu- ing party and the parliament. For example, 69 per rope and Latin America the absolute level of trust cent of Tanzanians say they trust Parliament, as is one-third or less, indicating that the courts have against only 11 per cent of Nigerians.

Figure 5.2: National Differences in Trust within Each Continent (Mean trust in institutions) 100%

P.R. China 85% 80

60 Mali/Tanzania 62% East Asia mean 49% Afro mean 43% 40 Japan/Taiwan 36% Brazil 35% Estonia 34% NEB mean 26% 20 Latino mean 20% Nigeria 16% Russia 19% Guatemala 11% 0 Africa East Asia Latin America New Europe

Source: Global Barometers Surveys:

66 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) In Asia trust in representative institutions is on av- people differ in their evaluation of major political erage greater, but variations are extreme. Although institutions. These include social differences be- Japan is the oldest democracy covered by the East tween young and old or between men and wom- Asia Barometer, only 13 per cent trust the Par- en; economic differences between those who see liament and 9 per cent trust the political parties, themselves or their country as better or worse off which are divided into factions and spend lavishly fi nancially; differences in pol itical performance, in competing for votes. In the People’s Republic of such as the level of corruption in government; and China, trust appears abnormally high: 94 per cent cultural differences distinguishing, for example, say that they trust the party—an answer that may Chinese from Jap- refl ect prudence as much as the positive qualities anese or Russians of party offi cials at the grass roots. from Hungarians. While all societies require individuals to trust some social relations, the radius of While all societies require individuals to trust some Contrasting theo- trust differs radically. In an established social relations, the radius of trust differs radically. ries about why peo- democracy, the radius can extend from In an established democracy, the radius can extend ple differ in trust the home to national political institutions. from the home to national political institutions. have practical im- However, the radius is usually much However, the radius is usually much shorter in au- plications. Insofar shorter in authoritarian regimes, because thoritarian regimes, because people develop strong as generational dif- people develop strong face-to-face ties face-to-face ties in order to insulate themselves ferences between in order to insulate themselves from from oppressive state institutions. In addition, young and old are oppressive state institutions. In addition, people need strong face-to-face ties in order to the chief determi- people need strong face-to-face ties in cope with the shocks and stresses of change. This nant, there is little order to cope with the shocks and stresses can produce an ‘hour-glass’ society in which ordi- that today’s gov- of change. nary people trust informal face-to-face networks ernors can do to while distrusting political insti tutions. This is the prompt an increase case in post-communist societies: the New Europe in political trust. Only the gradual turnover of Barometer found that 70 per cent trust most peo- generations could alter the trust in political insti- ple they know, while only 41 per cent trust most tutions. But insofar as economic conditions are in- people in their society, and just 26 per cent trust fl uential, then governors can try to ‘buy’ trust by major political institutions. promoting a rising standard of living. If political performance infl uences trust, governors can earn 5.2. What Explains Differences more trust by rooting out corruption in the politi- in Trust? cal institutions for which they are responsible.

Just as free elections reveal differences of opinion Before prescribing what needs to be done, we must about who should govern, so in every country sur- determine which of the competing explanations of veyed there are major differ ences between citizens trust is best supported by the systematic statisti- about trust in political institutions. In the aver- cal analysis of evidence. Many explanations of why age Asian and African country, from two-fi fths to individuals in countries as different as Chile, Chi- one-half of the people interviewed express trust in na or the Czech Republic trust or distrust politi- political institutions, while the other portion do cal institutions are stated as universal propositions not. Moreover, there are differences of degree in about the motivation of people every where, for ex- the extent of trust or distrust. The New Europe ample, ‘It’s the economy, stupid’. The multi-conti- Barometer fi nds that one-fi fth of post-communist nental scope of GBS allows such generalizations to citizens are neutral or sceptical about rather than be tested by pooling survey data from all countries actively trustful or distrustful of institutions, and on each continent and then identifying infl uences those expressing extreme distrust are outnumbered and trends and comparing the results to ascertain by those who are a little or somewhat distrusting. similarities or differences between continents.

Many theories are put forward to explain why Since many citizens have limited knowledge of

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 67 politics, political trust or distrust is more a refl ec- infl uences across four continents identifi es many tion of a generalized attitude towards political in- common patterns independent of national con- stitutions as a whole than a specifi c view of the text. Figure 5.3 shows the seven infl uences that courts or politi- across continents have the biggest impact on po- cians. Individuals litical trust, whether positive or negative. Even though the level of trust may differ seem to have a pre- from one institution to another, an African dis position to be What a government does has the biggest impact who trusts the police is more inclined to more or less trust- on trust. While the point may seem obvious, it is trust parliament, and a Latin American who ing of all political often overlooked. Governors fi nd it easier to blame distrusts the courts is more inclined to institutions. Even the world economy or foreigners for citizens dis- distrust political parties. though the level trusting them than to accept that distrust is their of trust may differ own fault. Citizens who see the government treat- from one institu- ing people like themselves fairly and equally will tion to another, an African who trusts the police have more trust in political institutions than those is more inclined to trust parliament, and a Lat- who think it unfair. People can be treated fairly in American who distrusts the courts is more in- with a professional bureaucracy in an authoritar- clined to distrust political parties. Therefore, the ian regime. However, an authoritarian regime is answers that each individual gives about trust are less likely to be trusted, and citizens who see their combined into a single measure of trust, the aver- government as democratic are likely to trust it. age of their responses about trust in the army, po- lice, courts, parliament and political parties. A government that abuses its authority has a big negative impact on trust. Corruption at the na- Even though explanations of trust have different tional level can lead to a waste of scarce resources theoretical rationales, they are not mutually ex- and the conspicuous enrichment of a narrow pol- clusive. For this reason we use multiple regression itical elite. At the local level, corruption can take analysis to determine how strong each social, eco- the form of offi cials extracting money from poor nomic, political and cultural infl uence is after con- people for doing what public offi cials ought to do trolling for the effect of other infl uences. Given anyway. Thus, the trust a government gains by be- the wealth of social struc ture, economic and polit- ing perceived as democratic will be lost if it is also ical measures in each GBS questionnaire, initially perceived as corrupt. analysis was undertaken with two dozen potential infl uences on trust. As is invariably the case, statis- Economic conditions have a big impact on trust tical analysis found in political insti tutions. The state of the nation- that many poten- al economy rather than individual circumstances What a government does has the biggest tial infl uences were is particularly important. If individuals view the impact on trust. While the point may seem in fact unimpor- national economy positively, then on a four-point obvious, it is often overlooked. tant. Regressions scale their level of trust rises by more than one- were therefore re- third of a point. Government gets the credit or the run taking into account only the substantial infl u- blame for the national economy whether or not ences on several continents. its actions are a major cause of prosperity. Many factors outside the control of government can pro- The results of multivariate statistical analysis are duce a sense of economic progress, for example, robust, explaining the 38 per cent of the varia- a boom in oil prices benefi ts the Russian econo- tion in the extent to which individuals do or do my irrespective of what its governors do. Likewise, not trust their political institutions in East Asia, a fall in world commodity prices hurts African 21 per cent in Africa, 19 per cent in Europe economies. and 12 per cent in Latin America.2 Analysing

2 Space does not permit us to include the full statistical results as an appendix. In order to focus on the chief fi ndings and their implications here, we pro- pose to publish the statistical details of the regression analysis at .

68 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) In established democracies, political interest and Chinese trust in political institutions is two-thirds education are expected to encourage positive atti- of a point higher than would be expected, a boost tudes towards political involvement. However, in big enough to offset the negative effect arising societies in transition this is only half true. Those from the perception of the government as corrupt. who are interested in politics and identify with a One possible explanation for the Chinese distinc- political party are more likely to trust political in- tiveness is political. The starting point by which stitutions. But, insofar as a government is untrust- Chinese evaluate their government may not be an worthy, then the more you understand what is go- idealized democracy but the repression and fear of ing on politically, the less you will trust it. Thus, the Cultural Revolution. Today’s government in in transition societies, educated citizens tend to Beijing is thus gaining political trust by liberaliz- be less trustful of political institutions. A great- ing insti tutions in comparison with a totalitarian er knowledge of how a country ought to be gov- past. The past has also created a positive economic erned makes educated people more aware of the legacy. Although China is poor in absolute terms, gap between the ideals, including those enshrined during the last decade the economy has grown in their national constitution, and how governors at the extraordinary rate of 9 per cent a year. Al- actually use and abuse political institutions. This though the countries included in the Latinobaro- implies that political involvement is less likely to metro differ in many respects, national context has refl ect the civic virtues of an ideal democracy and less impact on trust. Differences in trust among more likely to be due to individuals calculating Mexicans and among Argentineans refl ect individ- that party ties and being in the know politically ual circumstances that also affect people through- are useful ways to advance their material interests out the continent. Not only is Nigeria’s govern- and career. ment distrusted in the absolute sense, In established democracies, political An advantage of identifying common patterns of but its political in- interest and education are expected to trust is that the regression analysis simultaneously stitutions are more encourage positive attitudes towards identifi es exceptions to the rule, including coun- distrusted than political involvement. tries where political conditions cause citizens to would be the case if differ to a degree from the overall pattern outlined Nigerians saw their above.3 The citizens of the People’s Republic of political system as other Africans do. The effect of China deviate most from other East Asian citizens. national context may be due to ethnic minorities

Figure 5.3: Positive and Negative Infl uences on Trust

More 1 trusting Good More Grovt Political economy democratic fairer interest 0,5 .35 .33 .33 Party ID .10 0

.11 - 0,5 -.37 More corrupt Less - 1 -.24 trusting More education Note: Each bar shows the average change in the level of political trust across all continents. For more detail see .

3 National exceptions were identifi ed by iteratively coding several major countries on each continent as dummy variables in order to see whether their national context, net of the other infl uences identifi ed in fi gure 3, had a substantial impact on trust. The four countries discussed above are the ones that showed the biggest impact on their continent.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 69 feeling that the federal government does not care prescribes steps that can be taken to reduce cor- about them or suspicions that popularly elect- ruption . In addi- ed new leaders are just as corrupt as the soldiers tion to abstaining from corruption, offi cials in so- they have succeed- cieties in trans formation need more incentives and ed. Encouraged by training to be bureaucrats, that is, public offi cials Promoting the rule of law and bureaucratic economic recov- who exercise their powers impartially and fairly ac- fairness is the single biggest step governors ery, Russians show cording to the rules. could take to increase trust. The more more positive atti- individuals perceive their government as tudes towards their Improving democratic practices will also increase corrupt and unfair, the less likely they are to conditions but this trust. While the great majority of countries cov- trust its institutions. does not boost po- ered in GBS surveys hold elections, this is not suf- litical trust. Rus- fi cient to make government trustworthy. Where sians whose atti- free elections are held, if political parties are led by tudes are otherwise the same as those of citizens of cliques that blatantly ignore public opinion, few Central and Eastern Europe are less trusting. people will want to identify with a political party. Distrust will also occur wherever an elected gov- Many of the attitudes that increase trust are cumu- ernment claims legitimacy yet is seen as the less- lative. People who see their government treating er evil, and politicians use offi ce to enrich them- people fairly, being democratic and being associ- selves. In new democracies the sine qua non for ated with economic success are likely to be a full trustworthy government is that elected representa- point higher in trust in political institutions than tives should be accountable to the courts. If they citizens who view their country negatively on all are not, laws on campaign fi nance and civil society three counts. But in some instances the same infl u- generally will not be enforced and representative ences may have the opposite effect. If people view institutions may be viewed with suspicion. the economy as successful but regard their govern- ment as corrupt, then corruption cancels out the Where government is associated with economic gain in trust generated by economic success. growth, there is more trust in political institutions, because growth implies effective government. In a 5.3. Implications for single term of offi ce the government of a devel- Governance oping country cannot deliver a high standard of living, but it can achieve economic growth. This The GBS diagnosis of the causes of distrust also not only encourages citizens to be more optimistic highlights how governors could act to increase about the future but also to be more trusting of trust. Since many of the causes of distrust are political institutions here and now. The example due to the actions of governors, prescriptions for of China demon strates that it is the speed of eco- change are within their responsibility. The prior- nomic growth rather than the absolute standard of ity for increasing trust in political institutions is a living that promotes greater political trust. Since change in the behaviour of government offi cials. the way in which individuals evaluate the nation- al economy is more important for trust than the Promoting the rule of law and bureaucratic fair- economic circumstances of individual households, ness is the single biggest step governors could take this helps the government, since even those who to increase trust. The more individuals perceive do not benefi t directly from growth will still be their government as corrupt and unfair, the less positively infl uenced by macroeconomic improve- likely they are to trust its institutions. Even though ment. public offi cials may argue that corrupt practices are traditional, that does not make them any more Whether an increase in public education has a acceptable to ordinary citizens who are vulner- positive effect on trust depends on government able to exploitation by unfair offi cials. Transpar- performance. Where political institu tions are jus- ency International not only assesses the extent to tifi ably distrusted, higher levels of education will which national political systems are corrupt; it also go hand in hand with increased distrust. Given

70 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) the very strong desire of young people in societies in transformation to become more educated, this Many of the measures required to increase will produce pressures on politicians to make their political trust are within the hands of institutions more trustworthy or face the conse- governors: improving adherence to the rule quences of political alienation and an educated de- of law and reducing corruption at all levels; mand for structural change in the regime. making offi cials conform to bureaucratic principles of fairness towards citizens; The bad news for distrusted governors is also the improving the responsiveness of central good news for political reformers. Political distrust democratic institutions such as parties is not due to shortcomings of individuals, such as and parliament; and promoting economic a lack of education, or to a national political cul- ture. Rather, high levels of political distrust refl ect growth. In short, good government makes low levels of political and economic performance for trust and bad government makes for by governors. Many of the measures required to distrust. increase political trust are within the hands of gov- ernors: improving adherence to the rule of law and reducing corruption at all levels; making offi cials conform to bureaucratic principles of fairness to- wards citizens; improving the responsiveness of central democratic institutions such as parties and parliament; and promoting economic growth. In short, good government makes for trust and bad government makes for distrust.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 71 ‘Gorbachev—Glasnost and Perestroika—presented us with the stellar moment when everything seemed possible. The Cold War was over. The Wall was torn down and democratization took off. The need for help and advice became obvious and with that the creation of ground rules for democracy.

Bengt Säve-Söderbergh and Sweden saw the importance of a truly international institute whose sole ambition was to support and promote democracy worldwide . . . That was the beginning of IDEA.’

Thorvald Stoltenberg Former Foreign Minister of Norway and UN Special Representative in the former Yugoslavia. Vice-Chairman of the Board of International IDEA November 1995–June 2001 Chairman of the Board June 2001–June 2003

72 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

6. From ’89 to 9/11: of Turmoil and Hope

Konstanty Gebert

This chapter invites us to refl ect on the hazards and The rest of the world was an abstraction. Sure, pitfalls that emerging democracies encounter on their some of us occasionally could and did travel way to a state system that represents the will of their abroad, meaning to the ‘West’: a trip to Czechoslo- people. Gebert describes the changes from authoritar- vakia or Bulgaria did not count, because there we ian regime to democracy against the backdrop of the saw the same oppression and lies, only in different collapse of communism and the growth of liberal de- wrappings. The West was much too different to be mocracies in Eastern Europe, mirroring the experi- able to relate to our fate and too different for us to ences and illusions of millions of people in the last be able to understand its problems. I myself was 15 years. able to spend one summer in France and Italy: yes, capitalism was decaying—but what beautiful de- We never really believed we would live to see the cay! In Paris I ran into a group of Argentinean ex- day. As the 1980s dragged on, we kept following iles. We traded experiences, realiz ing with growing our underground routines: writing, printing, dis- amazement the similarities of our predicaments, tributing, organizing. But this was more out of a with one signifi cant exception: their junta was sense of lack of alternative than hope that we would capable of killing more people each month than succeed in tilting the balance. Jaruzelski’s military ours managed in eight years. But beyond that, regime clearly had the upper hand: Russia’s perma- communication with this group of Argentineans frost still extended to the Elbe, and the West was as was impossible: for them Moscow was admitted- sympathetic to the socialist regime—and as ineffec- ly a fl awed ideal, but also a necessary restraint on tual—as ever. People were in and out of jail, queues rapacious American imperialism. Yet for us Ron- in front of shops got no shorter, and the lies in the ald Reagan was the fi rst US president in decades morning paper and on the evening news remained who seemed to un- cheerfully brazen. What kept us going was the feel- derstand: we root- What kept us going was the feeling that ing that freedom is addictive. The sheer pleasure ed for him! When freedom is addictive. of thinking what you want, writing, printing and he called the USSR dis tributing it, more than outweighed the risk of an ‘evil empire’, we spending a few years in jail so long as the regime were euphoric. This was, after all, what for years was not prepared to kill. And clearly it was not: we had been screaming to deaf ears. For the fi rst the relatively few deaths during demonstra tions or time we no longer felt alone in a world affl icted in police cells were seen to be working ‘accidents’ with moral indifference bordering on insanity. rather than murder. At this rate things could go But, legitimately enough, my Argentinean friends on indefi nitely. We spoke vaguely of our children remained supremely unconvinced. growing up in a free Poland eventually.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 73 It was not that we were totally oblivious to their an espresso ristretto which I chose after mature de- fate. When I rammed through an article condemn- liberation (Warsaw coffee shops offered a spoon of ing Pinochet in the underground paper I was ed- ground coffee in a glass, topped with boiling wa- iting at the time, one of our best editors resigned ter—if they had any coffee, that is), I realized that in protest. Her father had been murdered by the a system which cannot offer even its benefi ciaries Russians in Katyn, and anyone fi ghting the com- something which was available to any Italian pas- munists had to be her ally. So, when I published ser-by simply cannot last. And yet, as a religious another article, this time criticizing the invasion of friend of mine used to say: ‘I know God will pro- Grenada, on the ground that it seemed retrospec- vide. I just hope He provides until He provides’. tively to legit imize the invasion of Afghanistan, I should have been forewarned. I expected some But provide He did ... and then came 1989. backlash—but not Sitting for two-and-a-half long months at the I realized that a system which cannot offer that several hun- Round Table negotiations, I saw our communist even its benefi ciaries something which was dreds of readers adversaries give up position after position, one il- would henceforth lusion after another, until they came to the stark available to any Italian passer-by simply refuse to buy my realization that they were wrong, we were right, cannot last. ‘red rag’ at un- they knew it, we knew it and they knew that we derground dis- knew. Their humiliation was almost embarrassing tribution points. I had betrayed them. This split and satisfi ed any thirst for revenge by our negotia- continued into the 1990s, when a former leading tors. Yet success was not predetermined. The So- underground activist travelled to London to visit viet permafrost was beginning to thaw, to be sure. Pinochet, who at that time was under house ar- But we had witnessed such thaws before, and cli- rest pending examination of a Spanish extradition matic change does not affect tanks. On the other request. The Polish visitor presented the Chilean hand, it was not obvious that people would vote general, in the name of the Polish people, with an for us anyway if given a democratic chance. A few ornamental pendant engraved with the icon of the leading personalities aside, all we had was a banner Black Madonna. I then debated him furiously on and a legend. The adversary had public faces, or- television. ‘I thought that what united us was our ganization and money. During a break in the talks, opposition to pulling people’s fi ngernails’, I told the deputy Minister of the Interior, the secret po- him ‘and now I see that what divides us is the lit- lice’s man at the Round Table, earnestly tried to tle detail of whose fi ngernails are not to be pulled’. convince me that we should go for a deal which He laughed. would ensure that at least 40 of our leaders would get safe seats in Parliament. He was worried that And yet, during that otherwise depressing earlier people would not vote for unknown faces: our trip abroad—no agreement with the Argentine- guys would not get elected—and then everybody ans, and a constant awareness of the fact that I will accuse the Reds of forging the results. He left was seeing what Poland could never be—I had a me half-convinced. sudden fl ash of insight about the inevitability of our victory. It happened, of all places, in a pro- We voted on what turned out to be ‘Tienanmen vincial Italian bar. Watching the dazzling array of Day’, 4 June. On the evening news, images of poll- liquor bottles displayed behind the counter (back ing alternated with footage from the Beijing mas- at home, my monthly ration card had a coupon sacre, starkly illustrating what the alternative solu- that entitled me to buy a bottle of vodka), I sud- tion could look like. When the dimensions of the denly realized that no such bar exists between the communists’ defeat became clear—the Solidarity Elbe and Vladivostok. Not in the most expensive list had taken all 35 per cent of the parliamentary hotels for foreigners. Not in the secret den of the seats open for free elections under the Round Ta- Central Committee building. Not anywhere: the ble deal, and all but one of the 100 freely elected system could simply not cope with the diversity of Senate seats—a group of generals visited Jaruzel- possible choices, nor were the potential customers ski and, pointing to China, tried to convince him on our side of the fence aware it existed. Sipping the damage could still be undone. To Jaruzelski’s

74 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) credit, he refused a repeat performance of his coup With 15 years’ hindsight, the shock therapy seems of 13 December 1981 and stuck to his part of largely justi fi ed, even if the price paid—Poland’s the deal. Two years later, during Yanayev’s farci- 20 per cent unemployment rate, currently the cal attempt to seize power in Moscow, Warsaw TV highest in the EU—was huge. But all it takes is a sought out General Kiszczak, Jaruzelski’s right- visit to our eastern neighbours to see the results of hand man, to ask for his opinion about events. ‘I shock therapy’s supposedly soft version—the shock would have done things differently’, said Kiszczak, without the therapy. Shop shelves fi lled up mirac- and smiled. He certainly would have. But in July ulously in just a few months, and bars like the one 1989 the National Assembly elected Jaruzelski I had marvelled at in Italy became commonplace. president, although Solidarity could have blocked Shops were no longer full of people with money that vote. One month later a former political pris- and ration cards but nothing to buy. Instead, more oner and Solidarity adviser, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and more they were full of goods—and of poten- was appointed prime minister, later unanimously tial customers, happy to be rid of ration cards, but approved by Parliament. The Great Polish Deal without the money to buy what was now freely was under way. available. ‘We fought for free Poland, and what we got was free prices’, people would grumble. The But it was still a Polish deal only. The Soviet em- fact that Poland’s freedom was in fact a part of pire might, as we now know, have been in its death that bargain, soon ceased to impress. We, who had throes already, but no one then would have taken been surprised that the West takes its freedom for its imminent death for granted. Its armies were sur- granted, were now treating ours no differently. rounding us from all sides; in fact they had a heavy pres ence inside the country itself: the Red Army But freedom does not necessary mean justice, es- was to leave fi nally only a couple of years later. pecially the kind that compensates, even symboli- All the events now associated in popular imagery cally, for historical wrongs. There had been no tak- with 1989—Berliners tearing down the Wall, the ing of the Bastille. While we, who had been at the execution of Ceausescu and his wife, Czechs toast- Round Table, lost our desire for revenge in the face ing President Havel—were yet to happen. The of our adversaries’ humiliation, 40 million Poles military coup in Poland in 1981 and Tienanmen were not present in the room with us at the time. weighed heavily on our minds, and we trod cau- There was no symbolic event (as in Berlin, Prague tiously—not on eggshells but on a minefi eld. and Bucharest) which would psychologically com- pensate for Jaruzelski’s military coup on 13 De- Too cautiously, no doubt. Despite later rumours, cember 1981 and for the terror and despair that there never was a secret deal not to prosecute the date stood for. A protracted negotiated transition communists, for, yes, we were determined, once could hardly foot the bill, and economic recovery, and for all, to break the vicious circle of revenge. with all the concomitant injustices, was but a poor There was a purge, especially of the police and substitute. No, Jaruzelski did not deserve Ceauses- the armed forces, but it was far from massive. A cu’s fate (I doubt if even Ceausescu himself did). few torturers from the Stalinist times were even- And yet it would have done no harm to see, just tually sentenced to jail, but the trials of generals for a day, the fear Jaruzelski and Kiszczak, for the massacres of 1970 in ‘their’ eyes that But freedom does not necessary and 1981, drag on inconclusively to this very we had lived with mean justice, especially the kind that day. The Communist Party was not outlawed: it for so many years. compensates, even symbolically, for simply disbanded and renamed itself. And as the What we saw in- historical wrongs. country went into economic shock therapy (with stead was the self- prices freed and privatization encouraged) former satisfi ed smugness communists often found them selves on top of the of former apparatchiks turned successful entre- heap, with their privileged knowledge and access preneurs. No way could strike leaders or under- to the former state economy. Meanwhile former ground printers compete with that. worker activists often found themselves at the bot- tom. But at least we had political power. One year after

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 75 being elected, Jaruzelski, by then marginalized and over, goodness, fairness and justice would some- irrelevant, resigned, and, riding a populist wave, how automatically prevail. This, of course, is the Lech Walesa, Solidarity leader and Nobel Peace illusion lyrique typical of any revolutionary move- Prize winner, was elected, effortlessly crushing his ment. The system made the implementation of former adviser and fi rst non-communist prime goodness, fairness and justice impossible—but its minister. This was bad enough news for those of removal would only make the implementation, us who had actually voted for the dour-faced, un- gradual and incremental at best, of those values sexy but responsible Catholic liberal Mazowiecki. possible. It would not guarantee their triumph. But, worse still, Mazowiecki only came third, de- And though Poles today are split roughly evenly in feated also by an émigré businessman from Can- their assessment of whether the country is better ada whose simple programme—‘I made millions off than it was 15 years ago, not one political party abroad, so I know attempts to capitalize on that nostalgia by propos- We assumed that by building an how to make Po- ing a return to the past. The present is condemned underground civil society, we had land rich’—was in the name of the illusions we held, and not in successfully promoted the civic ideal of more convincing the name of the past itself. to voters than Maz- responsible politics. owiecki’s heroic bi- Only defeated revolutions live on in the popular ography and indu- imagination as dreams of what could have been. bitable achievements. But we should have seen the Successful ones, such as ours, are invariably a dis- writing on the wall: in the 1989 Senate elections, appointment, as what could have been is con- the only seat not won by Solidarity was taken by fronted with what we actually made of it. Social a businessman who (no small feat) had even man- reality has an inertia of its own and, human nature aged to be expelled earlier from the Communist being what it is, the dream must inevitably win Party for corruption. We assumed that by building and reality must pay the price. Twice already, in an underground civil society and emerging victori- the free and fair elections they had spent 40 years ous we had successfully promoted the civic ideal of suppressing, the former communists have been responsible politics. But Mazowiecki was just one brought back to power due to the electorate’s sheer of the many players of that story, whereas Walesa and legitimate disgust over the way their oppo- was the main actor. And the triumph of consumer nents had bungled things once in power. The ex- capitalism following our victory had triggered as- communists being no better, they too got dumped pirations better expressed by crooked businessmen once their turn in offi ce was over. This provided than by paragons of civic virtue. We had only our- us with small satisfaction: we were not supposed selves to blame for our delusions. to be as bad as them!

So, had it all been worth it? The question had been Yet even the communist comeback and the free asked earlier. When on 13 December the military and unfettered trans ition of power it entailed was came to arrest, for the umpteenth time, veteran a victory of sorts. It proved, once and for all, that oppositionist Jacek Kuron, they bundled him into the democracy we had built was genuine, to the an armoured personnel carrier and let him watch, point of allowing its former enemies to regain through the gun-slits, the army occupying the city. power by popular will and of their giving it up ‘Well, Mr Kuron? Was it worth it?’ a gloating of- peacefully once their popular mandate was with- fi cer asked. ‘You know what?’, Kuron slowly an- drawn. By a supreme irony, thanks to us the com- swered, ‘The fi rst time you guys came to arrest me, munists could, at long last, claim the legitimacy all it took was three cops and a car. Now you had they so craved and could never attain under their to mobilize all this. Was it worth it?’. Clearly, a own regime. This ultimate test was to us proof system that could deal with political opposition that Central Europe’s democratic breakthrough only through arrests and eventually martial law of 1989 could be replicated elsewhere: in the new was beyond salvation, and we were right to over- states emerging from the rubble of the USSR, in throw it. But because the system was evil, corrupt the Arab world, and ultimately across the globe. and unjust, the expectation was that once it was Not that we adopted Fukuyama’s naïve prophecy

76 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) of the end of history—we had been immersed in the national enemy, the party leader the leader of history far too long and emerged much too scarred the nation. His job remained that of crushing the to fall for that one—but we knew that the progress adversary. The quarter of a million dead that fol- of democracy is feasible, even if it is not immedi- lowed seemed an inevitable consequence. ately and universally attainable. No homo sovieti- cus, no putative ‘Russian mentality’, and no ‘Asian And we, the just recently expanded communi- values’ could ultimately stand in its way. To put it ty of democratic states, still basking in the glory simply: I believe than those who witnessed 1989 of a peaceful transition, were accomplices to the have no moral right to be historical pessimists. If crime. We had let genocide happen again in Eu- we could do it against such odds, then eventually rope, quibbling over fi ne points of international anyone could. law while war raged. As the American journalist David Rieff had put it: ‘After Sarajevo we now Fukuyama’s illusion lyrique was ultimately shat- know what “Never again!” means. It means that tered by 9/11. For us the turning point came much never again shall Germans kill Jews in World War sooner, with the wars in the former Yugoslavia. On II’. Only that, and nothing more. It was hard to the face of it, of all the Central European states believe. In August 1992, Bosnian Vice-President that country was best poised to assume the tran- Ejup Gani explained to me that ‘soon Europe will sition to democracy smoothly, and possibly even come to defend Bosnia’. ‘No, I am not a fool’, he to salvage something out of the general socialist responded to my incredulous reaction. ‘It is not disaster. Its descent into hell, which I witnessed at naiveté. They will have to help us not out of good fi rst hand, living as my paper’s correspondent in will, but out of self-interest. After all, we in Sara- Sarajevo during the siege, showed that optimism jevo are defending the very principles on which would have to wait. The war itself was horrible Europe is founded. The unacceptability of war. enough. What made the experience even worse The primacy of citizenship over ethnicity. Rule of was the unavoidable conclusion that it was a prod- law. They cannot abandon us without abandoning uct not of dictatorship but of democracy, even if these. Therefore, they will come.’ its roots lay deep in the country’s Titoist legacy of crushing all dissent, which made the negotiated They didn’t, of course. We didn’t. The continent’s resolution of confl ict impossible. There was no de- democracies, old and new alike, were tested and nying that Slobodan Milosevic was elected by a found lacking. Bosnians of all ethnicities and popular vote: I was one of the international ob- creeds and their friends worldwide watched with servers of the elections of 1992, and could fi nd incredulity and despair. For three years, all over little evidence of fraud. There was also no denying the Muslim world, from Khartoum to Riyadh to that this popular vote was a fully conscious one: Kuala Lumpur, people watched on television their it is hard to forget the thousands of inhabitants co-religionists being butchered live, with Europe of Belgrade cheering their troops leaving to ‘liber- doing nothing. To their eyes, this was a test within ate’ Croatian Vukovar. And even if these crowds the test. After all, Europe had been telling Islam were again out on the streets a decade later, to top- that it is certainly welcome as long as it adopts ple Milosevic, one cannot reject the gnawing sus- European customs and mores. The Bosnian Mus- picion that their complaint was not that he had lims did, to a point that their more practising started the war, but that he was not able to win it. brethren even found unacceptable. They rarely It seemed, to use a metaphor, that if one wanted went to mosque. They emancipated their women. to translate from the language of communism to They drank wine. They intermarried with non- that of democracy, one had to change both the vo- Muslims. They espoused democratic politics with cabulary and the grammar, and that had proved to passion. And genocide was what they got in re- be too diffi cult a task. But if one wanted to trans- turn. It was impossible for them not to draw con- late from the language of communism to that of clusions about the value of European promises nationalism, the task was much simpler: all it took and guarantees. It was also impossible not to see was changing the vocabulary. The grammar, as it Afghanistan, Chechnya, Israel/Palestine and Bos- were, remained the same. The class enemy became nia other than as instances of the same thing. The

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 77 Muslim world did not need to wait for Samuel issue. It treats terror not as a symptom but as the Huntington to believe that a war of civilizations root cause of evil. Even if it succeeds militarily— is under way. All it needed to do was to turn on a which is still very much an open question—by television set. failing to tackle the reasons behind the legitimacy that the use of terror enjoys among wide segments None of this should be interpreted to mean that of Muslim public opinion worldwide it will fail 9/11 was a consequence of the failed policies of to reach its goal. It is not enough to tell armed Is- the West in respect to the Muslim world. Al Qa- lamic fundamentalists ‘You cannot vanquish us’. ida, in all probability, would have struck anyway In order to defeat them, one has to convince their even had the West not failed: its target is conquer- passive supporters that they need not feel defeated; ing the Muslim world, not infl uencing Western that a victory of the West can be their victory as policy. If anything, well, for the values in whose name the struggle is Osama Bin Laden being fought are ones they can identify with too. It is true, of course, that the treatment meted and his followers That it is worthwhile for them to change both the out to Iraqi prisoners by their American believe the Bos- vocabulary and the grammar of their political dis- jailers is no different from standards which nian Muslims got course. apply in jails all over the Arab world—but their just deserts the West has repeatedly claimed that it precisely for hav- For this to be effective, however, talking is not is to be judged by its own standards, not ing abandoned the nearly enough, and military action falls complete- those of undemocratic regimes. From this strict observance ly short of the mark. Yes, it is true that US military perspective, the Americans have failed they consider to intervention in the former Yugoslavia, fi rst in Bos- miserably, and indeed strengthened their be binding on all nia and then in Kosovo, was undertaken to protect adversaries’ cause. Muslims world- essentially Muslim populations from oppression wide. Indeed, the at the hands of a regime representing a nominally Islamic Mujahed- Christian nation. Yet the fi rst intervention came din who came to Bosnia to fi ght against the Serbs much too late to save a quarter of a million peo- were thoroughly disgusted by their local co-reli- ple who were butchered as the world looked on, gionists, and they in turn were no less afraid of and raises the issue of why (since it was possible these Islamic fi ghters than the Serbs themselves. in 1995) it did not happen in 1992, which would The issue is not so much Al Qaida’s deeds, ab- have made all the difference. And the Kosovo in- horrent though they are, but the credibility it has tervention, though timely, has led to an inconclu- gained in many Islamic societies. Without it, Bin sive situation in which the Kosovo Albanians are Laden would be only a criminal, and not a po- left stranded short of the independence they legiti- litical problem. His message to the Islamic world mately believe to be their only guarantee of their is that adopting Western mores and values, from safety. The pogrom of Kosovo Serbs at the hands indi vidualism to democracy, not only is wrong of their erstwhile victims in March 2004, though from a religious standpoint but, more important- despicable and deserving even stronger condem- ly, does not work. Whatever you do, Bin Laden nation than that the international com munity and his supporters preach, the West will still hate made, was an entirely predictable consequence you for being Muslim. You cannot change that, so of this stalemate. With the passage of time, these all that remains is to recip rocate the hatred and be shortcomings loom larger than the interventions stronger. This is not a question of political choice, themselves and seriously vitiate, in the eyes of its they say, but of naked survival. And they have no critics, the argument that the West does, in fact, dearth of evidence to support their case—from the care about the fate of Muslim populations. horror of Bosnia to the outrage of the French ban on headscarves. There is precious little evidence Afghanistan could have made a much more con- pointing the other way. vincing counter-argument had not the disastrous war in Iraq almost completely eclipsed the achieve- The war on terror, legitimately launched by the ments accomplished there. It can be con vincingly USA after 9/11, fails completely to address this argued that since the intervention, for all the

78 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) blunders made in its reconstruction, Afghanistan laws it invokes for itself. Nor is it alone in this is in better shape today than at any moment in perception of the world. The ‘headscarf’ crisis in its recent history. Yet the success of its fi rst-ever France is legitimately seen as an example of rank relatively decent elections, made possible by the dis crimination, a refusal of Muslim women’s right US victory over the Taliban, pales in comparison to practise their religion as they see fi t, and the lo- with the impact of the atrocities committed by cal enforcement of similar bans in different places these self-same Americans in Abu Ghraib—and in Germany and Italy adds a Europe-wide dimen- especially with the relatively muted offi cial reac- sion. The popularity in Europe of Oriana Falacci’s tion to their uncovering. It is true, of course, that anti-Muslim pamphlets is seen as confi rmation of the treatment meted out to Iraqi prisoners by their what Europeans really think. For Muslim intellec- American jailers is no different from standards tuals observing the West, Huntington is only the which apply in jails all over the Arab world—but acceptable face of Falacci’s prejudice. the West has repeatedly claimed that it is to be judged by its own standards, not those of undem- And what he says can hardly strike them as novel, ocratic regimes. From this perspective, the Ameri- for his vision of the world seems to be but the (ad- cans have failed miserably, and indeed strength- mittedly intellectually more sophisticated) mirror ened their adversaries’ cause. image of Bin Laden’s preaching. ‘East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet’: both The more so as this outcome can be interpreted of them could probably agree with this succinct not only as a result of deplorable lapses and abuses wording of Rudyard Kipling. If the British author committed in the confusion of war, or as being Kipling was the spokesman of an unabashed and due to lack of a clear vision of priorities in the unselfconscious Western colonialism, then Bin dizzying worldwide political turmoil of the 1990s. Laden is simply turning his words around to use Samuel Huntington’s theory of the ‘clash of civili- them against a West that is no longer colonialist, zations’ seems to have replaced Fukuyama’s prom- in the name of an East which overtly proclaims ise of an end to history as the theoretical blueprint conquest as its goal. For all the mad ravings of Al of Western strategic thinking—the despot follow- Qaida’s leader, why should the vision of the fl ag of ing in the footsteps of a failed utopia. It is of no Islam fl oating over Westminster and Capitol Hill importance that Huntington’s theory does not fi t be more abhorrent than that of a Christian fl ag the facts. It fulfi ls a deeper need, that of providing fl oating over Baghdad and Cairo? After all, the lat- an underlying narrative which purports to explain ter actually occurred, whereas the former remains the complexities of an unfolding political drama. only a delusional dream. So what if in the Gulf War a mixed ‘Christian’ and ‘Muslim’ coalition had confronted a putative Yet there is a fundamental difference. Western co- ‘Muslim’ leader who had for years been butcher- lonialism col lapsed not only under the thrust of ing other Muslims, be it Iranians or his own un- anti-colonial resistance but mainly because the fortunate subjects? Of no importance that in Bos- West itself fi nally understood it to be both non- nia most of the ‘Christian’ world sided eventual- enforceable and unjust. The war in Algeria, Eu- ly with Bosnian Muslims against ‘Christian’ Ser- rope’s bloodiest post-war colonial confl ict, ended bia. Inconsequential that, in the second Iraq war, although the Algerian resistance was mainly mil- the attack by a ‘Christian’ USA on Muslim Iraq itarily crushed but a substantial part of France’s was roundly condemned by most of the ‘Chris- political elites and civil society reached the con- tian’ West. Irrelevant that the ongoing slaughter clusion that the political price to be paid for of Muslim Chechens by ‘Christian’ Russia en- that victory was unacceptable. The war spawned joys the diplomatic support of the very Muslim two coup attempts in France, one of them suc- Arab League, careful not to alienate a long-stand- cessful: French democracy was under threat. It ing ally. All these developments seem to be of lit- seemed that France could have had either Alge- tle import when compared with the stark facts of ria or democracy, but not both, and success fully Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. The ‘Christian’ gave up the former to save the latter. But Algeria, USA overtly denies Muslims the protection of the 50 years later, still remains a violent dictatorship

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 79 undermined by a bloody civil war: the legacy of internal violence will remain a feature of its politi- successful violence haunts the streets of Algiers cal scene, just as it remains one in Algeria. All this and Oran to this very day. Similarly, the legacy of would be serious enough without the added bur- the military success of Tito’s partisans was one of den of the vision of a clash of civilizations being the elements that led to the outbreak of the wars endorsed by extremists on both sides of the ever of the 1990s: the lesson for many Serb and Croat more bloody, if invisible, front line which today leaders was that violence pays. And it does, but at crosses entire continents. a price. A price that much of the West has decided is unacceptable. Fifteen years after 1989, four years after 9/11, the world is not a safe place. But, just as the illusions Polish civil society drew different conclusions from of utopia proved to be groundless, an endorse- the terrible bloodletting the country went through ment of distopia would be unwarranted. As the in World War II. Contrary to its own understand- Polish poet Stanislaw Jerzy Lec had said, ‘Man fa- ing of history, from the 1950s onwards Poland op- vors good over evil, but the circumstances do not posed communist dictatorship by different forms favor him’. Fair enough—and yet these self-same of non-violent civil resistance. Even General circumstances are man-made. To quote another Jaruzelski’s 1981 military coup did not goad Poles Polish poet, the Nobel Prize winner Czeslaw Mi- into taking up arms, though it seems this had been losz, ‘The avalanche changes its course depend- expected, and possibly invited, by the junta. This ing on the stones it rolls on’. This last quotation legacy of non-violence led to the peaceful transi- was often used in our underground writings in the tion of 1989 which, in turn, paved the way for 1980s, although little did we know how quickly similar developments elsewhere in Central Europe the stones would prevail. Hope does not demand and built a solid foundation for the democratic re- that we be blind to turmoil, for it is turmoil’s an- gimes which emerged. To be sure, not every nation tidote. had the good luck of having a non-violent option available. No one can blame Croats, Bosnians, Ko- sovars or Chechens, to name only them, for hav- ing taken up arms when their very existence was at stake. Conversely, the abandon ment of Bosnia by the democratic powers had, as we saw, seri- ously undermined their credibility; and the hor- ror of Rwanda drove that lesson home beyond the Muslim world. And no one can blame the USA for having responded militarily to 9/11. On the contrary, the war in Afghanistan against the Tali- ban and Al Qaida not only made the world a safer place but also gave the Afghans their fi rst chance at democratic development.

Yet violence has a price tag attached. Success in Afghanistan was one of the precipitating factors of the disastrous decision to invade Iraq, for rea- sons that were in part trumped up, in part spuri- ous. The overall impact runs directly against the historical optimism generated by 1989: not only has the progress of democracy been seriously im- paired by those who would be its standard-bearers, but the USA is already starting to feel the Algerian con sequences of the war at home. And it is a safe bet that, whatever happens to Iraq in the future,

80 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

Former Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson at the fi rst Democracy Forum held by International IDEA in Stockholm, 12-14 June 1996.

Former IDEA Secretary-General, Bengt Säve-Söder- bergh and Prof. Muhammad Yunus, Founder and Director of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, at the IDEA Democracy Forum, ”Democracy and Poverty: A Missing Link?”, held in Stockholm, 8 - 9 June 2000. PART II Highlights of IDEA’s Work Looking Back … 1995-2005

This section illustrates IDEA’s own experiences with democracy building by giving key examples of its work over the last decade. First, a general overview describes the breadth of IDEA’s activities and methods on different continents – proof of the ‘diversity in unity’ approach towards democracy building which rests on the principles of tolerance, neutrality and academic excellence. Thereafter, IDEA’s thematic teams provide more detailed accounts of developments in their own areas. ‘My congratulations on the 10th anniversary of IDEA are combined with personal recognition of the valuable work being undertaken in democracy promotion: in Sri Lanka, I was privileged to experience IDEA-moderated workshops bringing together confl icting parties from different ethnic, religious and political backgrounds; and as a Board Member of Transparency International I was impressed by the excellent IDEA study, ’Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns’, giving real help in the development and management of political parties and their key role in democratic systems. Just two highlights from the wide range of democracy-promoting activities initiated by IDEA—activities of great value for the peaceful development of our world. ’

Jermyn P. Brooks, member of the Board of International IDEA and member of the Transparency International Board of Directors

‘Electoral administration had been a slow grower in the administration garden, as practitioners and academics worked at substantially different aspects of common problems. International IDEA’s great, and lasting, achievement was to bring the two unfamiliar tribes together in a series of productive projects and publications which assembled data and formulated norms and then made both widely available. At the same time its parallel commitment to democracy focused more closely on particular countries in the round with some pioneering work and through its summer conferences, which attracted wider audiences. From its inception International IDEA undertook a job no one else was doing across so broad a range of objectives and activities.’

Colin Hughes, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of Queensland, Australia. Member of the Board of International IDEA June 1996–June 1999

84 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

7. Ten Years of Democratic IDEAs

Charlotte Hjorth

This chapter highlights IDEA’s work and experiences more detail in later chapters. with democracy building. It gives a general overview of the broad range of IDEA’s activities in the different 7.1. Mandate and Objectives themes and regions that have been the focus of IDEA’s work over the past decade. These features position IDEA effectively to achieve the objectives set out in its founding IDEA was created in 1995 to assist both nations statutes, which are to: in transition to democracy and established de- mocracies to develop and deepen a lasting culture • promote sustainable democracy worldwide; of democratic institutions and processes. IDEA’s • consolidate democratic electoral processes; status is unique: it is an independent intergovern- • disseminate the norms associated with multi- mental organiza tion with a global mandate to pro- party pluralism; mote sustainable democracy. • support national capacity to build democratic institutions and processes; Ten years later, IDEA consists of 23 member states • increase the knowledge, transparency and ac- from all continents and four associate members countability of democratic electoral processes; representing international non-governmental or- and ganizations, working together to promote sustain- • be a bridge-builder between academia and able democracy. practitioners in the fi eld of democracy by serv- ing as a meeting place. The composition of member states balances de- mocracies from the North and the South, devel- 7.2. IDEA’s Guiding Principles oped and developing countries, which both ena- bles IDEA to operate impartially and contributes From the fi rst seeds of development and the adop- to its singular position as a mediator and facilita- tion by the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) of the tor in the highly politicized fi eld of democratiza- motion proposing the creation of an international tion. body to further the cause of democracy, Part II of this anniversary publication shows how certain basic prin- IDEA’s status is unique: it is an independent these principles relate to IDEA’s achievements in ciples have under- intergovernmental organiza tion with a its different programmes and activities. This chap- pinned IDEA’s ac- global mandate to promote sustainable ter offers a brief general overview of IDEA’s activi- tions. democracy. ties in the last decade which are all addressed in

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 85 Underlying IDEA’s the foundation of IDEA suggested electoral ob- Underlying IDEA’s work are the principles, work are the prin- servation as the main focus of the organization, in fi rst, that democratization is a long-term ciples, fi rst, that reality over the last decade IDEA has developed its process which cannot be achieved democratization is niche in the broader area of electoral assistance. through elections alone; second, that a long-term proc- Over the last ten years IDEA has produced a range democracy must be home-grown in order ess which can- of products, tools and resources to support the de- to be sustainable and not something that not be achieved velopment of good practice in sustainable elector- through elections al processes. These include the codes of conduct can be imposed from the outside; and, alone; second, that for election observation, election administration third, that there is no universal form of democracy must be and pol itical parties, as well as the guidelines for democracy that is applicable to all nations: home-grown in or- involvement in electoral observation and for the democracy must be attuned to each society der to be sustaina- evaluation of free and fair elections. and its people. However, IDEA believes in ble and not some- certain core democratic values such as thing that can be The Election Programme (EP) aims to increase free and fair elections, the existence and imposed from the confi dence in elec toral processes and to facilitate unfettered functioning of multiple political outside; and, third, electoral participation. IDEA has been active in parties, respect for human rights and the that there is no numerous fi elds and published a wealth of infor- independence of the media. universal form of mation, both in hard copy and electronically. All democracy that is publications are in English but some have been applicable to all na- translated into Spanish, French and other lan- tions: democracy must be attuned to each society guages relevant to IDEA’s programme activities. and its people. However, IDEA believes in certain core democratic values such as free and fair elec- 7.3.1. Landmark Publications tions, the existence and unfettered functioning of multiple political parties, respect for human rights The IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design and the independence of the media. (1997, 2002 and 2005) details what to consider when modifying or designing an electoral system. IDEA believes that the result is most effective As an important institutional setting in any de- when it catalyses debate around the available op- mocracy, the choice of electoral system can help tions and leaves it to local stakeholders to make to further specifi c outcomes, such as encouraging the critical choices. So, rather than prescribing an cooperation in a society torn by confl ict and divi- externally imposed model of democracy, IDEA’s sion, or to exacerbate polarization if it leads to a approach is to present available options and the ‘winner-takes-all’ result. Due to high demand, an means to make comparisons. updated edition of the handbook was published in 2005, and will be promoted in collaboration with 7.3. Increasing Trust and partners in different regions. The current versions Effi ciency in Electoral exist in several languages, as a CD ROM and as a Processes project web site. The new edition is to be trans- lated into French and Spanish; translations into In just ten years IDEA has established itself as a Russian, Arabic, Nepali, Singhalese and Tamil are leading organization promoting sustainable elec- planned for the future. toral processes and has gained widespread recog- nition for its work in practitioner and academic 7.3.2. Voter Turnout Data Collection expert circles. Since 1996 IDEA has been collecting data on vot- From the very beginning IDEA’s mandate includ- er turnout. Three global reports have been pub- ed articulating and strengthening the internation- lished since then, the latest being Voter Turnout al standards and guidelines for the conduct, ad- Since 1945: A Global Report (2002). An online ministration and observation of elections. While Voter Turnout Database has been updated continuously since

86 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 1999. This is one of the most com prehensive re- The Election sources available and includes information on Process Informa- In just ten years IDEA has established voter turnout and election results for parliamen- tion Collection itself as a leading organization promoting tary and presidential elections since 1945. A (EPIC) Project is sustainable electoral processes and has recent addition is a regional report on Voter Turn- a joint undertak- gained widespread recognition for its out in Western Europe with a special annex on ing in partnership work in practitioner and academic expert the 2004 European Parliament elections, entitled with UNDP and circles. Europe Expands, Turnout Falls: The Signifi cance of IFES, which com- the 2004 European Parliament Election. plements the ACE Project by collecting comparative data on election 7.4 The ACE Project for systems, laws, management and administration. Sustainable Elections The online database also contains useful country profi les and is The 1996 elections in India, the world’s largest de- meant to be a resource for election observers, re- mocracy, involved the mobilization of 4.5 million searchers, practitioners and the media. In order to polling station workers for the 830,000 polling continuously improve the database, regional re- booths needed to service an electorate of 600 mil- search partnerships are established with electoral lion. Such numbers show the need for effi ciency in organizations, universities and research centres to fi nanc ing and managing elections. Cost-effi ciency help collect data effi ciently. Currently, 12 regional is a prerequisite for sustainable democracy, espe- hubs cover 64 countries, with research on another cially in emerging democracies since the interna- 50 countries due to come online in 2005. tional donor community often tends to pull out after the fi rst or second elections. 7.4.1. BRIDGE Training on Election Management In 1998 the Administration and Cost of Elec- tions (ACE) Project The Building Resources in Democracy, Govern- was launched to deal with this aspect of elections. ance and Elections (BRIDGE) project was initi- It has produced the fi rst comprehensive encyclo- ated in 2002 in partnership with the Australian paedia on electoral cost and administration issues, Electoral Commission (AEC) and the United providing best practices and practical options. Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) Founded by IDEA in cooperation with the UN and has developed course curricula for interac- and the International Foundation for Election tive adult training of election offi cials on election Systems (IFES), it is available in English, French planning and management. It is popular among and Spanish as a CD ROM and as an interactive election managers around the world, and has web site. been translated into Portuguese, French, The Administration and Cost of Elections It is recognized as the world’s top online resource Georgian, Russian in the fi eld, and is currently being transformed into and Spanish. (ACE) Project has produced the fi rst ‘ACE 2’, adding a more dynamic dimension. The BRIDGE training comprehensive encyclopaedia on electoral main elements will be knowledge services, includ- material has been cost and administration issues, providing ing a bulletin board and an online help desk with used in projects in best practices and practical options. experts answering questions, knowledge network- East Timor, Papua ing with virtual communities for professional peer New Guinea, Fiji, groups, and capacity development building region- Australia, Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Geor- al and country partnerships, peer exchanges and gia, to name but a few. The continued develop- courses to increase electoral staff capacity. With ment of course material, training of facilitators 1 million hits per month, of which 10 per cent stay and further regional promotion are foreseen. more than fi ve minutes and 10 per cent come back within a month, the ACE web site is a continuing The EP engages in numerous other activities, success which clearly responds to a real demand. including the pro vision of technical support,

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 87 advisory missions, there are different types of quota that can be used From the outset IDEA has understood and facilitation of strategically to increase women’s repre sentation. that true democracy has been achieved networking and Since 2002 IDEA has collaborated with Stockholm only when all sections of society are cooperation be- Uni versity on a research project about the use of properly rep resented. This also means full tween electoral quotas to increase women’s representation. The in- representation of women, who make up management bod- formation gathered is being incorporated on an on- more than half the world’s population ies (EMBs), as well going basis into an online database, Electoral Quo- as research on a tas for Women , number of impor- which was launched in 2003 and contains informa- tant electoral themes such as the media dimension tion on electoral quotas in more than 90 countries, of elections, and improving access to elections for as well as some 30 case studies. the disabled, migrant workers and overseas voters. The EP has several forthcoming publications, in- Workshops on regional experiences of the imple- cluding the Handbook on Electoral Dispute Resolu- mentation of quotas in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin tion, the Handbook on Structuring and Financing of America and the Arab World have been held and Electoral Management Bodies, and a Handbook on reports published, including case studies and in- Direct Democracy, all due for publication in 2005– formation on when, where and how quotas have 7. It is also in the process of developing and trans- worked, with the aim of raising aware ness on the lating electoral tools for the Arab world. use of quotas as a tool to increase female represen- tation. 7.5. Women’s Participation 7.5.3. Regional Support 7.5.1. Gender Participation: Women in Parliament IDEA has developed regional partnerships to sup- port the role played by women in society. IDEA From the outset IDEA has understood that true also recognizes that structural changes in the elec- democracy has been achieved only when all sec- toral system can lead to the increased participation tions of society are properly represented. This also of women in politics. In Peru, for example, IDEA means full representation of women, who make collaborated with the Asociación Civil Transpar- up more than half the world’s population (52 per encia (Transparencia) in convening a multiparty cent). Whether in new or established democracies, round table to draft an electoral code aimed at in- this goal has not yet been achieved, as only 16 per troducing reforms for increased women’s partici- cent of the world’s parliamentarians are women. pation. One of the recommendations of the round table—a 30 per cent quota provision for women For a decade now, IDEA has sought to provide on lists at both general elections and for leading tools and strategies for those who are dedicated to posts within parties—was adopted by the Peruvi- correcting this political imbalance. A fi rst attempt an Congress in 2003. was made with the publication of Women in Par- liament: Beyond Numbers (1998). It looks at the Regionalized versions of Women in Parliament: obstacles women face in getting into parliament, Beyond Numbers in Bahasa Indonesian, French, how to overcome them and how they could make Spanish and Russian have been useful in the pro- a greater impact once they enter parliament. Writ- motion of a stronger role for women politicians ten by researchers and parliamentarians, it exam- in different societies. In Indonesia, its launch in ines the impact that quotas and electoral systems 1999 started a process that was to end four years have on women’s rep resentation. later with the inclusion in the general election law of the recommendation that parties fi eld a min- 7.5.2. Gender Quotas imum of 30 per cent women. As a follow-up, the One Hundred Women for Parliament initia- One way to tackle the imbalance in women’s repre- tive helped identify and train women candidates, sentation is by the use of gender quotas. However, and to prevent party leaders from ignoring the

88 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) recommendation in the 2003 law. institutional re- form, political par- From the outset IDEA has promoted locally With numerous projects running across the globe, ties, regionalism driven and owned dialogues and IDEA plans to continue in the coming decade to and local self-gov- assessment processes as the most tackle the challenge of women’s under-representa- ernment. Twelve strategic way of strengthening democracy. tion in politics, and to provide them with the tools discussion papers to leverage their position once in power and to were published in achieve proportional representation at senior deci- English and Georgian. The IDEA Democracy As- sion-making levels within political parties. sessment Framework was also adapted for South Asia, where the methodology will be used in a 7.6. Measuring Democracy: two-and-a-half-year research project led by the The State of Democracy and Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Democracy Assessment New Delhi. Dialogues on democracy analysis have also been initiated in West Africa. The issue of how best to analyse democracy and evaluate democracy assistance is attracting increas- 7.6.2. Evaluation and Future Direction ing attention within the inter national communi- ty. IDEA has contributed to the debate in many Having taken a lead role in developing the assess- ways. While stressing its belief in the local own- ment methodology, IDEA has ensured that sec- ership of demo cracy evaluation, the State of De- ond generation activities will continue unabated. mocracy Project was inaugurated in 2000 with the The Human Rights Centre at the University of aim of developing a methodology for assessing the Essex has been designated as the appropriate in- condition of democracy, and progress towards or stitution to provide a core institutional base to co- regression from democratic norms and practices in ordinate future work on assessments and enable a given country. further developments in this fi eld in partnership with IDEA. 7.6.1. Creating a New Methodology 7.7. Dialogue as a Route to Recognizing the diffi culty of establishing a de- Democracy: Capacity Building mocracy index, IDEA developed an alternative— for Sustainable Democracy or even new—method for evaluating democracy based on a theoretical framework that presents From the outset IDEA has promoted locally driv- general democracy denominators which are not en and owned dia- country-specifi c. Instead of developing numeri- logues and assess- cal indexes which rank countries, it prefers the ment processes as IDEA operates as an impartial facilitator, development of country reports. The methodol- the most strategic bringing together national stakeholders ogy was created through a partnership with pro- way of strength- from all sections of society to produce a fessors David Beetham and Stuart Weir, building ening democracy. ‘democracy road map’ or democracy reform on a methodology developed for the UK Democ- Since 1996, IDEA agenda. International experts are often racy Audit. The methodology seeks qualitative an- has called this invited to generate the debate but not to swers to a range of universal questions which are method ology the provide a diagnosis. complemented by quantitative data where appro- Capacity Build- priate. ing Programme for Sustainable Democracy (CB). The methodology is outlined in detail in the Handbook on Democracy Assessment (2002) and In the fi rst years of IDEA, CB helped to defi ne na- The State of Democracy: Democracy Assessment in tional democracy agendas and build local capacity Eight Nations Around the World (2003). In 2003 to assess the needs for institu tional reform. It was a democracy assess ment exercise in the South complemented by the Rules and Guidelines Pro- Caucasus touched upon critical issues, including gramme (R&G) which provided the generic and

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 89 parties involved. In this way it constitutes a moral commitment to working towards the achievement of the goals set out in the text. The report is then presented to the government, civil society, politi- cal parties, the supreme court, the parliament, the uni versities and the international donor commu- nity.

In Burkina Faso, certain key recommendations of the IDEA democracy assessment report Democ- racy in Burkina Faso (1998) were adopted by the government in the wake of a political crisis which prompted the establishment of a council of ‘wise men’ to advise on how to improve democracy in that country. The creation of an independent and permanent electoral commission and the adoption of a new electoral code are two notable examples.

Both measures refl ect IDEA’s emphasis on institu- normative tools to develop guidelines for institu- tionalizing the democratic process: in this instance tional development and reform. they led to the holding of free and fair elections and a more equitable representation of the opposi- 7.7.1. National Dialogue as a Route to tion in parliament. Reforming Democratic Institutions The method developed in the CB programme is IDEA operates as an impartial facilitator, bring- very process-oriented, and any specifi c projects ing together national stakeholders from all sec- undertaken to further consolidate demo cracy are tions of society to produce a ‘democracy road informed by the fi ndings of the report. For in- map’ or democracy reform agenda. International stance, in Burkina Faso a radio programme was experts are often invited to generate the debate but produced as a means of bringing the debate to the not to provide a diagnosis. The methodology was greater public. Theatre groups staged plays ahead fi rst tried on a national scale in Burkina Faso, and of the local elections in 2000 about why it is im- then in Guatamala, Nigeria and Indonesia. Simi- portant to vote, how to register to vote and the lar, though more limited, interventions have been voting process itself. In the course of the last dec- made in Nepal, Bosnia and Romania. ade IDEA has concluded similar projects in Ni- geria, Guatemala and Indonesia, and new projects The process is initiated with a series of meetings have been initiated in Georgia and Peru. with key stake holders in the country such as un- ions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), The CB programme intended to increase the the government and political parties. A working number of options available to stakeholders in the group is created out of these representatives, com- democratization process and to advise the interna- plemented with international experts and IDEA tional community on how it could best support staff. The group takes responsibility for convening demo cracy. In the initial years of the programme, dialogues and discussions; through this process experience was gained in the fi eld on identifying it identifi es the opportunities and challenges for critical areas for support and methods developed consolidating sustainable democracy; and it makes and tried on targeting interventions that added concrete recommendations for advancing the de- value. As the programme matured, so too did the mocracy agenda. The process is fi nalized with the programme approach, and country programmes publication of a demo cracy assessment report, evolved into regional programmes. Although which is endorsed and published in the name of all CB is still engaged in fi eld projects, it mainly

90 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) focuses on promoting successful methods of de- level of governments and the European Com- mocracy support and making them available to mission, but the dis cussions that led to the new those working in the fi eld. Two specifi c examples agreement also included actors from civil society. are the Handbook on Democratic Dialogue which is The resulting IDEA report, Dialogue for Demo- currently being written with UNDP and the Or- cratic Development: Policy Options for a Renewed ganization of American States (OAS), and the new ACP–EU Partnership (1999), identifi ed 80 prac- programme on constitution-building processes. tical ways of promoting democratic development within the ACP–EU Partnership. Many of these 7.7.2. The Public Agenda Project recommendations were included in the fi nal text, the Cotonou Agreement. The basis of the Public Agenda Project is similar to the democracy assessment process: it aims to hear On partnership and co-operation agreements: the voice of the people. This is achieved through ‘The EU and its partners agree that respect for a survey. For the fi rst time ever, a regional public fundamental Human Rights and democratic prin- opinion survey, conducted by the South-Eastern ciples and the rule of law underpins the internal Europe Democracy Support Network with IDEA and external policies of the parties and constitutes support, was carried out in all nine territories of an ‘essential element’ of partnership agreements’ the Balkans. In 10,000 face-to-face interviews, (Annual Report 2004 on the European Commu- public attitudes towards economic, social and po- nity’s Development Policy and External Assist- litical issues and their trust in public fi gures and in ance, 2004) domestic and inter national institutions were sur- veyed. Interestingly, people appeared to be more 7.8. Democracy and Confl ict concerned about domestic issues such as unem- Management ployment, corruption and poverty than about the historical ethnic tensions and international geopo- As the 20th century drew to a close the major- litical concerns that seemed to occupy the minds ity of confl icts took place within and not between of their leaders. The survey was useful to both lo- states. At the same time there was a growing reali- cal authorities and the international community zation that democracy if applied can be a crucial because it pointed to the policies for which there is means of eliminating confl ict and building sus- genuine popular support. A similar survey is used tained peace processes. In 1998 IDEA published in IDEA’s dialogue project in Nepal. the handbook Democracy and Deep-Rooted Con- fl ict: Options for Negotiators. It provides ideas and 7.7.3. Dialogue for Democratic options for negotiators to draw upon when brok- Development within the ACP–EU ering peace and building or rebuilding democracy Partnership in a country emerging from violent confl ict. The underlying theme of the handbook is that the de- In the last two decades the international commu- mocratization process is part of and supports the nity has attached increasing importance to de- confl ict management process: not only does it pro- mocracy and good governance as pre requisites for vide a means for countries to emerge from a diffi - sustainable development. In 1998 the European cult past, but it also provides the structures which, Commission asked IDEA to organize a conference if they operate suc- around the political dimension of the Lomé Con- cessfully, are able to As the 20th century drew to a close the vention, which established the legal framework manage endemic majority of confl icts took place within and for relations between the EU and the 71 states of confl ict peacefully Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacifi c (ACP), and in the future. not between states. At the same time there which was up for renegotiation. was a growing realization that democracy, The handbook has if applied, can be a crucial means of The EU wished to build political development been used in train- eliminating confl ict and building sustained and democracy into the new agreement. The ing for diplomats peace pro cesses. Lomé Convention had been negotiated at the and UN staff and in

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 91 university courses. It has been used by those nego- of the impact of the UN Mission of Support in tiating peace in confl ict situations from Colombia East Timor (UNMISET) and the future role of to the Balkans. Numer ous seminars and regional the UN in promoting democracy in the country. workshops have also been held in the Caucasus, A workshop was held in 2004 with a fi nal report Asia–Pacifi c, Latin America and Africa. A region- on lessons learned published in 2005. alized Spanish version was launched in Colombia in 2001 at a seminar co-sponsored by the Inte- 7.11. Constitutional Reform rior Ministry and the UN University for Peace. The book is available also in Bahasa Indonesia and In 2000 IDEA contributed to the dialogues on Burmese. An updated edition in English is due to constitutional reform in Indonesia by providing in- be published in 2005. formation on how to increase public participation and strengthen democratic institutions. In 2003 7.9. Democracy and IDEA provided support to the democratic institu- Reconciliation tional framework of Indonesia by way of options for the design of the second chamber, or Region- In 2003 IDEA published Reconciliation After Vio- al Representative Council (DPD), which was es- lent Confl ict: A Handbook, which presents a range tablished after a 2001 constitutional amendment. of choices for the design and implementation of IDEA also demonstrated its credibility and effec- reconciliation processes as part of confl ict man- tiveness through a project to support the DPD, agement and peace-building. Pragmatic advice for which the fi rst elections were held in 2004. and options are provided for policy makers fac- ing the challenge of constructing a shared demo- IDEA also assisted the constitutional reform proc- cratic future for a society divided by a violent past. ess in Nigeria. In Nepal, a dialogue on constitu- Demand has been intense, leading to the book tional processes as a way of addressing the ongo- and summaries being translated into French and ing confl icts and political stalemate in that coun- Spanish. The summaries have been trans lated into try engaged key stakeholders at the national and Singhalese and Tamil to support the peace initia- regional levels. tives in Sri Lanka. 7.12. Democracy at the Local The publication of the handbook has given rise to and Regional Level several important partnerships, including the Of- fi ce of the UN High Commissioner for Human In 2000 IDEA launched the handbook Democracy Rights (OHCHR) and the International Centre at the Local Level: the International IDEA Hand- for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in New York. IDEA book on Participation, Representation, Confl ict has cooperated with these two organizations on Management and Governance at the Internation- seminars and the production of policy papers. As- al Union of Local Authorities (IULA) conference sistance has also been provided to Sierra Leone’s in Brazil. The book recognizes the importance of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in participation at the local level as a symptom of the dissemination of its report, as well as a number functioning democracy. Local democracy can also of activities organized with the TRC in Peru. be an important mechanism for communities to manage confl ict situations. 7.10. The United Nations and Democracy Since then, IDEA has worked on local govern- ment in several areas: IDEA has cooperated with the UN on peace- • in 2003 Democracy at the Local Level: A Guide keeping and democracy-building initiatives, nota- for the South Caucasus (in English and Russian) bly with evaluations of the UN peace missions in was the result of a regional dialogue; Kosovo and Sierra Leone, with fi nal reports be- • a capacity-building project for local govern- ing published in 2004. A preparatory mission was ments in Southern and Eastern Africa was de- sent to East Timor in 2003 to plan the assessment veloped together with the African Union of

92 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Local Authorities (AULA) in 2003, with the re- functioning of par- sults of four pilot studies on local democracy ties, management Political parties are vital to the democratic assessment released the following year; practices, mecha- process due to their capacity to represent • a pilot project on democracy in the Arab world nisms to ensure a different interests, present candidates for was initiated in 2003 which includes a regional diversity of can- representative offi ce, and provide citizens dialogue on electoral reform, the political par- didates and how with political choices. Wherever political ticipation of women and strengthening politi- members are in- parties are weak, democratic systems are cal parties; and cluded in party at risk. • similar dialogues have been carried out in Peru decision-making and Nepal. processes is present- ed in order to encourage a culture of democracy 7.13. Dialogue and Democracy within political parties. Building The programme will be conducted in collabo- IDEA is to publish by the end of 2005 a handbook ration with regional partners. It began in Latin on democratic dialogue as a method for promot- America with a focus on the funding of political ing democracy in cooperation with UNDP and parties. Central America was added to the pro- the OAS. This publication draws on numerous gramme next and the research broadened to exam- case studies where dialogue has been the method ine the functioning of parties. Later, Western and of facilitating public participation to analyse and Southern Africa, South Asia, Central and Eastern assess democracy, and to develop reform agendas Europe and the Andean countries were added; with genuine public ownership. This methodol- and in 2005–6 East Africa, the Arab region, other ogy is crucial to countries emerging from violent parts of South America, East Asia, the Pacifi c, and confl ict as they attempt to build sustainable de- lastly Western Europe and North America will be mocracy. included in the project.

7.14. Research and Dialogue on The intention is to publish and develop an on- Political Parties line database as a key part of the project. This will enable the dissemination of comparative informa- Political parties are vital to the democratic proc- tion, best practice and material useful to parties ess due to their capacity to represent different in- and others via the IDEA web site. Workshops will terests, present candidates for representative offi ce, also be held to generate regional debate on politi- and provide citizens with political choices. Wher- cal party reform. ever political parties are weak, democratic systems are at risk. Yet they face increased distrust, their 7.14.1. The Role of Money in Politics member ships are dwindling, and they have trou- ble renewing their intellectual and organizational The sources of funding for political parties infl u- capacity. ence both public trust and the outcome of elec- tions. They may also affect how many women get IDEA is conducting a global research project on put on party tick- the impact of external regulation and internal ets. IDEA’s research The sources of funding for political parties management challenges on the effectiveness of po- produced the hand- infl uence both public trust and the outcome litical parties. In broad terms, the study is seek- book on Funding of of elections. They may also affect how ing to establish how electoral laws, regulations Political Parties and many women get put on party tickets. and fi nancing affect the stability, membership Election Campaigns and internal operations of pol itical parties. Much (2003), which con- of these data, including information on gender tains one of the largest collections of information quotas, is assembled on a regional and compara- on party fi nance regulations, covering more than tive basis in order to assist with the development 100 countries, and compares the different laws of policy options. Information on the internal and regulations from a regional perspective. The

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 93 Guatemala. At the end of its bloody civil war in 1996, IDEA was invited by the Guatemalan Gov- ernment to help assess the challenges to the coun- try’s democratization process. The result was voiced in the report Democracy in Guatemala: A Mission for an Entire People and a national mechanism, the Participation and Democracy Pro gramme (PPD), was created to follow up on the recommendations. Workshops were held in 2003 with political par- ties on women’s par ticipation (indigenous women in particular), the political participation of women at the local level and internal democracy of politi- cal parties.

Peru. IDEA has been involved in a range of activi- ties in Peru including the provision of assistance to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Com- mission and conducting a democracy assessment in 2003. book analyses enforcement problems and possi- bilities for the effective public disclosure of party A regional research study assessing the con- funding. tinent’s evolution in political, electoral, eco- nomic and social terms in 20 years of democrati- 7.15. Regional Activities zation, carried out jointly with the Inter-American Development Bank, resulted in the report Politics 7.15.1. Latin America Matters: Democratic Reform and the Quest for Devel- opment (2002). IDEA has also contributed to the The 1990s saw a wave of democratization sweep democratization process in Mexico, Paraguay, Co- through Latin America. Free and fair elections lombia, El Salvador and Chile, and plans to con- were held in many countries, and several autocrat- tinue to work for political reform, participation ic regimes were deposed. However, the region still of women and other under-represented groups as faces four important challenges: well as the strengthening of political parties. • exclusion; • corruption; 7.15.2. Africa • poverty; and • inequality. The African continent is struggling with a number of diffi culties including socio-economic problems, These are all caused by the political system, which HIV/AIDS, widespread corruption and endemic is controlled by oligarchies; this in turn affects re- civil wars which hamper its democratic evolution. gional stability. The problem of unresponsive and unrepresentative political systems in the majority Nigeria. The election of General Olusegun Oba- of countries in Latin America has led to crises of sanjo as president in 1999 opened up a window governability, representation and participation, of opportunity for democracy in Nigeria. IDEA to institutional weakness, and to low levels of ac- was invited to provide advice on constitution- countability and transparency. Political reforms al laws, to assist the independent electoral com- have not produced economic reform and are there- mission and to assess the transition to democra- fore perceived to have failed to deliver tangible cy. In the course of 2000, IDEA facilitated dia- improvements in people’s everyday lives, leaving logues between state institutions, the private sec- them disappointed with the promises of democ- tor, the military and civil society, which resulted racy. in the assessment report, Democracy in Nigeria:

94 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building. IDEA later provided technical assistance and a post- mortem of the 2003 elections. IDEA has also supported nationally-driven democracy assess- ments in Burkina Faso, and facilitated expert as- sessments of democracy in Ghana and Benin. IDEA holds training courses for electoral admin- istrators in Africa, notably in South Africa and Mozambique, using material from the BRIDGE programme.

7.15.3. South and South-East Asia

South and South-East Asia pose many challenges for democratic con solidation. The region includes India, the world’s largest demo cracy, and China, the world’s largest non-democracy. In between are a variety of regimes: monarchies, military dicta- torships, oligarchies and democracies. IDEA is conducting a regional assess ment on the state of the seats contested, but the army stepped in and democracy in South Asia, developing a base-line the result was ignored. Since 1997 IDEA has been study of democracy in fi ve South Asian countries using a multi-pronged strategy vis-à-vis Burma: to assist communities to share information on pro moting dialogue through the Association of how to deal with the common challenges of plu- South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) network; ralism, diversity and socio-economic inequalities. mobilizing European Union opinion to sup port democratic forces; and supporting activities that Indonesia. After the resignation of Presi- anticipate the transition to democracy. IDEA also dent Suharto in 1998 and the opening up of po- supports the National Reconciliation Programme litical space for democratization, IDEA advised which engages the ethnic nationalities in dialogue political parties and civil society on the options on confl ict resolution; assists constitution drafting for and implications of electoral system choices. processes; and works for the increased inclusion of In 1999 IDEA provided technical assistance in the women in the political arena. development of material for civic education and training women to run for public offi ce. The re- 7.15.4. The South Caucasus port Democratization in Indonesia: An Assessment (2000) was the result of political dialogue to as- Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the sess how best to consolidate democracy. IDEA also early 1990s, there was enormous potential for de- supported efforts to further the constitutional re- mocratization, but the trans ition has been more form process, strengthen the political participation diffi cult than expected. Wars within and between of women, support the emergence of democratic the three Caucasian republics, lingering authori- electoral processes and institutions, and ensure ef- tarianism, the transition to primitive capitalism fective regional representation. leading to a dramatic drop in living standards and mass emigration are some of the diffi culties en- Burma. The political climate in Burma is such that countered. There are positive signs, however, with work for a democratic transition must necessar- ceasefi res holding well and the increasing atten- ily take place outside the country, in collaboration tion the inter national community is paying to the with the supporters of democratic oppo sition in region. exile. In the 1990 elections, the democratic oppo- sition led by Aung San Suu Kyi won a majority of IDEA supports the home-bred democratic proc- esses in the South Caucasus. A democracy

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 95 demo cracy by bridging the gap between academia and practitioners in the fi eld.

The following chapters outline in more detail IDEA’s achievements in its ten years of existence. Much work remains to be done before democracy can be said to prevail as the state system of choice worldwide. IDEA will continue to innovate in the fi eld of democracy in the coming decade in order to turn the hope for universal democracy into a global reality.

assessment and report entitled Georgia: Challenges Towards Sustainable Democracy (2002) were fol- lowed by an advocacy phase leading to the devel- opment of an agreed agenda for change. BRIDGE training was carried out in Georgia in 2002 and further strengthening of the election management capacity is planned through a tailor- made BRIDGE curriculum for the South Cauca- sus. IDEA will also organize debates around the recently translated handbook Democracy at the Lo- cal Level: A Guide for the South Caucasus.

7.16. Outlook

One of IDEA’s founding principles is to operate at the very fore front of democracy advocacy, ex- ploring the frontiers of insti tutional design and reform, and catalysing networks and democratic processes, thereby supporting the development of sustainable democ- Much work remains to be done before racy through lo- cal ownership. Its democracy can be said to prevail as the strengths lie in its state system of choice worldwide. IDEA being a global or- will continue to innovate in the fi eld of ganization, which democracy in the coming decade in order to is also small and turn the hope for universal democracy into a effi cient enough global reality. to respond fast as an independent fa- cilitator. As the name implies, IDEA should be an incubator for new ideas on how to promote

96 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

‘The combination of countries and people gave us credibility. It was not just seen as an institution coming from the North again to teach developing countries how to arrange their affairs. We offered something that incorporated experiences from different continents, not only from Europe or North America. The idea was quite obvious – I was surprised that no one else was doing it.

At that time many people were focusing on elections and electoral observation, expecting that democracy would come more or less automatically. But I knew that electoral observation doesn’t create democracy. You have to go further down the road with electoral work, and also with democracy work. You have to combine the two basic principles of preparing handbooks on good practices with a process that is focused on institutions.’

Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, First Secretary General of International IDEA (1995 – 2002) current Ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

‘The right to vote under universal adult franchise gives to every citizen an opportunity to participate in the democratic process and to select the government. This right must be used not only to operate and defend democracy but also to make it more effective and meaningful. This is a tremendous responsibility.’

Dr Subhash C. Kashyap, member of the Board of International IDEA, former Secretary- General of the Indian Parliament’s Lower House, and former Constitutional Adviser to the Indian Government on PRI Laws

98 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 8. Optimism to Realism: Ten Years of Electoral Development

Andrew Ellis

This chapter highlights one of democracy building’s have been held under security conditions that did most advanced areas—sustainable electoral processes. not come close to enabling the free expression It attempts to recount the development of the area and debate of ideas during an election campaign. from the optimistic climate of the mid-1990s to the Since 9/11, there are many who view democracy sober professional approach of the early 21st century, as a component part of the ‘war on terror’ and the and the progress made on the way. Electoral assistance quest for security. has been a driver in international cooperation in the fi eld, and has played an important role in the emer- The initial euphoria that took hold in the 1990s gence of a defi ned community of practitioners. as many countries held their fi rst elections has evaporated. The explosion of interest in elections since that time has led to many important and When IDEA opened its doors in 1995 there was solid gains. Much of the ‘muddling through’ that a great sense of optimism about the future of de- characterized the early 1990s has gone. Ethical mocratization and the power of elections. Many codes and guidelines for elec tions have emerged; countries of Central and Eastern Europe had al- standards have been debated; an enormous pool ready held two successful elections, and a proc- of knowledge about what makes elections run well ess of political change and consolidation appeared has been accumulated and is widely accessible; and to be well under way. South Africa’s fi rst univer- electoral administration has grown into a profes- sal franchise election in 1994 had been successful. sion of its own, with a distinct identity and skills. There was a sense that a new wave of democracy Networks of electoral practitioners have formed was rolling, with elections as defi ning moments and peer support mechanisms are emerging. The and the perception that an external stamp of ap- limited and ad hoc application of electoral experi- proval from international observers was a key part ence has been replaced by global sharing of elec- of the process of democratization. toral expertise. IDEA has played a major role in helping to catalyse this process of change and de- Ten years on, a more sober climate prevails. The veloping the tools and materials to support it. assumption that established democracies know how to conduct acceptable elections was dealt a 8.1. Electoral Systems, heavy blow in Florida in 2000. Groups seeking to Institutional Frameworks and retain power in transitional countries have sought Direct Democracy to conduct façade elections, acceptable on the surface but maintaining their single set of estab- The conventional, if somewhat simplistic, wis- lished power interests within ‘soft authori tarian’ dom of the 1990s that elections defi ne democ- states. From Chechnya onwards, some elections racy is now under challenge. There is increasing

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 99 recognition that successful elections are built upon may use their knowledge of electoral systems to the legitimacy of institutional frameworks, even if promote designs which they think will work to this is sometimes obscured by realpolitik. These their own partisan advantage. Alternatively, those frameworks have many component parts, includ- involved in the process of designing an electoral ing constitutions, political laws (for example those system may lack basic knowledge and information regarding the struc- so that the choices and consequences of different The conventional, if somewhat simplistic, ture of legislatures electoral systems are not fully recognized. Realists wisdom of the 1990s that elections defi ne or the regulation now recognize that short-term, self-interested, sec- democracy is now under challenge. There of political parties), toral and even venal con siderations will be in play electoral laws and when change is promoted. Democratic reform- is increasing recognition that successful electoral system de- ers need to seek to ensure that long-term and vi- elections are built upon the legitimacy of sign. The essential sionary considerations of national interest coexist institutional frameworks. interconnection of alongside them. The necessary information and all of these is only tools are now available to help them. now beginning to be understood. For example: electoral systems infl uence political party systems, Alongside the choice of systems for elections, the which in turn infl uence future electoral system de- last ten years have seen an increase in the use of sign. Over the last ten years there has been great- referendums and citizens’ ini tiatives. The number er recognition that the design of political systems of national referendums worldwide increased cannot be imposed, that there are no perfect so- throughout the 20th century, and there is no sign lutions, and that the involvement of stakeholders that the process will be reversed. Direct democracy through dialogue is critically important if they are instruments are no longer only used in Switzer- to achieve legitimacy. land, in western states of the USA and on other isolated occasions. Once direct democracy instru- There has been marked, although not universal, ments are in place, it is unlikely that they will ever progress towards more practical realism in the fi eld be abolished: the strength of ‘They want to take of electoral system design. In the past, it was rare away your right to decide’ as a campaigning argu- for electoral systems to be consciously and delib- ment is self-evident. Similarly, when a neighbour- erately selected. Often the choice was accidental, ing country or state has a referendum, there may with the impact of colonialism and the effects of well be pressure for the practice to spread, as is infl uential neighbours especially strong. In almost shown by the number of refer endums that have all cases, the choice of any par ticular electoral sys- accompanied the process of European integra- tem had a profound effect on a country’s political tion. life: once chosen, the electoral system usually re- mained fairly fi xed as political interests solidifi ed Our understanding of the consequences of direct around and responded to the incentives presented democracy is not very far advanced. Electoral par- to them. ticipants and stakeholders cannot wish away the growth of direct democracy. Those who are in- In the last ten years there has been more conscious herently suspicious of direct democracy confront thought and debate about electoral system design. those who enthusiastically promote it as the so- Whether it is part of a transition, a response to lution to a wide range of problems of democra- a political crisis within an established democracy, cy. A synthesis has not yet emerged about how di- or merely because campaigners for political reform rect democracy and representative democracy can attempt to put electoral system change onto the complement and reinforce each other. agenda, the pro cess of change is fundamentally political. Electoral system choice is not a question to which independent technicians can produce a single ‘correct answer’. The consideration of po- litical advantage is an inevitable factor in the proc- ess of change. Political actors with vested interests

100 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design, fi rst published in 1997, rapidly became a standard text for electoral system de- signers and students of electoral system design worldwide. The New International IDEA Hand- book of Electoral System Design (2005) covers the process of electoral system change and the polit- ical and institutional context in which electoral systems work in more depth than the original handbook, describing what factors to consider when modifying or designing an electoral sys- tem. Created for policy makers, politicians and election administrators, it is also an excellent tool for commentators, students and interested members of the public. The New Handbook ex- plains in a practical way how countries choose or inherit electoral systems as well as how and why they may be changed or modifi ed. It de- scribes how electoral systems interact with the larger institutional, political and social context 8.2. Internationally Run and framework in a country, and how they can Elections in Post-Confl ict affect participation, reach out to minorities, as- Transitions sist in alleviating confl icts and help instil faith in a sceptical electorate. In the last ten years those who have sought to im- plement demo cracy, build democratic institutions The New Handbook also addresses issues of and hold pluralist elections have often received increased concern and debate such as the po- a level of media coverage and international sup- tential role for the electoral system to increase port. Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor all come to women’s political participation. mind, with Afghanistan and Iraq being more re- cent examples. The attention of the international Policy makers are provided with options and community has, however, mostly focused on the comparative lessons from around the world. election itself. As these cases have demonstrated, The New Handbook includes: although factional leaders may emerge from a con- • a precise and simple-to-understand explana- fl ict, there may well be few political incumbents. tion of the electoral systems in use in more The institutional interests of other stakeholders are than 200 independent states and related ter- even less obvious. Moreover, not everyone is com- ritories; mitted to ending the confl ict, and international • an explanation of the advantages and disad- and external actors may have their own contradic- vantages of using different electoral systems; tory or controversial agendas. An internationally • 18 case studies written by regional experts; organized transi- • an analysis of measures that can be taken to tional election also Electoral participants and stakeholders involves a major promote the representation of women and cannot wish away the growth of direct minorities; and investment of re- democracy. Those who are inherently • a colour-coded map showing which systems sources. It is there- suspicious of direct democracy confront are used where in the world. fore unlikely to be rejected as ‘unsuc- those who enthusiastically promote it as cessful’ by those the solution to a wide range of problems of involved in the democracy. process, short of

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 101 complete breakdown. community is that resources often arrive late or are insuffi cient. Worse, elections are sometimes used Those whose commitment to democracy is only as an exit strategy by the international commu- limited hold a negotiating card: do it our way— nity. Experience shows that timing of elections is or at least in a way we can live with—or we will important, that quick elections are not necessarily restart the confl ict. benefi cial, and that it is always better to back up Donor countries have often responded When the choice a commitment to legitimize government through has to be made, the elections with complementary measures to en- enthusiastically to forth coming elections, reality is more like- hance the legitimacy of interim governments. but treated them as isolated events. ly to be that ‘peace’ Regrettably, this approach has the comes fi rst. Ques- Such elections raise the question of the defi ni- potential to yield a variety of undesirable tions of the accept- tion of an ‘acceptable election’. Afghanistan and consequences. ability of an elec- Iraq, for example, have shown that security condi- tion then become tions that allow for competitive campaigning, or nego tiable. International pressure for ‘positive re- even the proper organization of the election itself, sults’ and the need for continuing donor commit- cannot be taken for granted. IDEA’s Internation- ment mean that time will be on the side of those al Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the who are against democratic change. In the real Legal Framework of Elections go some way towards world, Afghanistan and Iraq are the most recent answering the question. Yet more needs to be done examples of political pressure to ‘declare victory’ to arrive at a broader consensus on exactly what after the elections without a clear strategy about constitutes ‘minimum standards’ and who decides post-election commitment of the donor commu- if they have been met or breached. nity. 8.3. Looking at Elections from a No consensus exists about the notion of democra- Development Perspective cy building through international intervention, as there are major unresolved questions which affect Donor countries have often responded enthusias- the role of elections and the perception of elec- tically to forth coming elections, but treated them tions. The international community is often not in as isolated events. Regrettably, this approach has the position to maintain support for ‘international the potential to yield a variety of undesirable con- norms of democracy and governance’ against fi rm, sequences. For example, only focusing on the elec- if sometimes covert, opposition by signifi cant lo- tion itself unwittingly lends support for replays of cal actors. When agreements are reached, the pres- the same semi-authoritarian scenario every four or sure has often been to hold elections and to es- fi ve years. At election time, opposition forces are tablish new institutions as fast as possible—but temporarily allowed enough space to participate this may merely serve to entrench the major par- but are ultimately bound to fail. Election perform- ties to the confl ict, as illustrated by the elections ance may show technical improvements, but little in Bosnia which followed just nine months after or no long-term progress towards democratization the 1995 Dayton and pluralism is visible. Agreement. Is it The planning of future electoral assistance better (if it is real- The planning of future electoral assistance needs needs to emphasize the development of istic) to hold local to emphasize the development of political frame- political frameworks and democratic culture. elections fi rst, with works and democratic culture. The priority placed the opportunities on technical electoral assistance should become they may present for cooperation and reconcili- part of a comprehensive strategy of capacity build- ation? ing to strengthen democratic processes and insti- tutions. The relationship between the political, Election planners are beset by diffi culties or agen- foreign policy and development agendas is often das that are beyond their control. The reality of sensitive and contradictory and may not necessari- post-confl ict missions funded by the international ly be consistent with the democratization process.

102 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) The ACE Project provides a globally accessible online infor- mation resource on election administration. Work has now been completed on 12 different topic areas: electoral systems; legislative frame- work; electoral management; boundary de- limitation; voter education; voter registration; voting operations; parties and candidates; vote counting; media and elections; election integ- rity; and elections and technology. In 2004, CD ROMs in English, French and Spanish were produced in addition to the hard copy and online information. From the perspective of development, if electoral ACE was originally developed by IDEA in support is to produce long-term benefi ts, it needs partnership with the International Founda- to include three important elements. tion for Election Systems (IFES) and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs First, electoral processes and structures must be ro- (UNDESA). In 2003 IDEA took over re- bust, credible, cost-effi cient and affordable within sponsibility for the coordination of ACE. In recipient country budgets. It is surely better for a 2004, in preparation for ‘ACE 2’, the project poor country to develop an imperfect yet ‘good partnership was joined by Elections Canada, enough’ election mechanism, which can be fund- the Mexican Elections Commission (Institu- ed by the national budget with perhaps a small to Federal Electoral), UNDP and the Elector- amount of external support at election time, than al Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). ACE to develop a system that relies on more technically 2, in addition to updating the complete con- advanced machinery that is beyond local fi nancial tent of ACE, is designed to include interac- and human resources, and for which long-term tive knowledge services, electoral ‘commu- support is unlikely to be forthcoming. The UN nities of practice’, and peer group support intervention in Cambodia in 1992–3, for exam- networks, building on the online electoral ple, cost some 2 billion USD, while with a better encyclopaedia and the collection of sample managed election the level of donor assistance for materials. the 2003 national elections was only 12 million USD.

Second, investment in electoral administration The EPIC Project brings together comparative information tions to electoral events. Twinning arrangements, about electoral legislation and regulations in cooperation between electoral management bod- an easily accessible form. Developed and im- ies (EMBs) and the development of regional and plemented by IDEA in partnership with IFES local training networks and curricula in elections and UNDP, material for EPIC is assembled management—particularly in local languages—all through a worldwide network of research part- contribute to longer-term capacity building. The ners, each of whom monitors developments in BRIDGE interactive training course, developed electoral laws in their own region. together by IDEA, the Australian Electoral Com- mission (AEC) and the UN Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD), offers this possibility. Third, it is important to support and encour- age planning and evaluation cycles. In the ‘time– money–quality’ equation, time is the often the most critical item—as well as the scarcest—for

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 103 an election administration. Politicians will nor- mally take all the time available to resolve political questions, because negotiating concessions made late are almost always more valuable. Although election administrations have adequate time avail- able in theory, in reality they are always operating under time constraints to produce a ‘good enough’ election.

Unfortunately many of the international commu- nity’s electoral assis tance interventions, particu- larly in the 1990s, have been found The time has come to review the emphasis wanting. Luckily, on election observation now that alternative donors have learnt approaches to transparency and integrity a number of les- are being developed and now that resources sons if they are to are limited. provide effective assistance: reports as an important means of identifying 1. Avoid event-driven approaches and short time- future technical assistance agendas. lines. Electoral support is often considered only 4. Respond to the trend towards election manipu- when a polling day is identifi ed, usually 18 lation through the media. More and more at- months away at most. Political hesitancy can tempts to manipulate elections through the then curtail the key early planning and train- media are occurring in the weeks before polling ing stages of election preparation. Subsequent day. Electoral assistance planning needs to pro- short timetables create great pressure to spend vide a means of responding to this challenge: donor funds with little time to implement best the development of globally applicable codes of practice. conduct and guidelines for the role of the me- 2. Plan for sustainability. The overall aim should dia in elections would be valuable. be the development of the human and organi- 5. Ensure technical advice is appropriate. External zational capacity to run effective elections that advice fl avoured by ‘we know what’s best for are both ‘good enough’ and sus tainable within you’ is rarely helpful. the national budget in the longer term. First 6. Ensure procurement is driven by need and not by elections are often visible and well funded, and supply. Vendor-driven agendas and lengthy in- may even set standards that are too high; sec- ternal donor procedures can result in expensive ond and third elections are equally important options, such as helicopter trans port of ballot in developing long-term electoral capability. papers or chartered plane transport of materials Commitments to follow up electoral assistance sourced out of country, rather than more cost- programmes need political will to outlast poll- effective local solutions that take time to devel- ing day. Long-term training and capacity build- op. The quality of electoral assistance should be ing are the key. ensured by value-for-money and accountability 3. Avoid reinventing the wheel. When the only pri- procedures, not compromised by them. ority is to deliver an election under pressure of 7. Assist the whole electoral process. Give more em- time, with all knowledge and direction coming phasis to the electoral planning process, in- from outside, the result can include loss of in- cluding the consultation and involvement of stitutional memory, lack of continuity, and lack stakeholders, the timely drafting and reviewing of ownership among local stakeholders in the of laws and regulations, and the development electoral process. Each election process should of calendars and operational plans. The criti- build on the previous one, using observation cal importance of electoral dispute resolution

104 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) mechanisms should also not be underestimated. application of these 8. Strengthen electoral processes, don’t just judge criteria, became Most insidious of all was the realization them. Funding an observation mission alone more common be- by some governing elites that the entire can be an easy, visible and low-risk disburse- cause registration electoral process can be allowed to be ment of funds allocated to an electoral proc- takes place when technically clean as long as the media ess, especially where there are controversial is- there are fewer out- environment in the months leading up sues surrounding it. Local stakeholders fi nd siders around. At- to the election is suffi ciently under their it strange that funding is available to judge a tempts to affect re- control. process but not to help make it work. sults by falsifying the numbers dur- 8.4. Has Election Observation ing counting and tabulation of votes also contin- Outstayed its Welcome? ued. Observer groups responded by trying to en- sure that observation took place throughout the International observation has been a major focus electoral process, deploying long-term observers of activity and expenditure in the last ten years from the beginning of registration through to the and is often the subject of debate. The time has swearing into offi ce of those elected. The wider in- come to review the emphasis on election observa- volvement of civil society organizations in domes- tion now that alternative approaches to transpar- tic observation and the growing competence and ency and integrity are being developed and now professionalism of parallel vote tabulations helped that resources are limited. to identify and counter some attempts at fraud. But the resolution of electoral disputes remained Early election observation concentrated on the act a problem because these matters could be delayed of voting. As the authoritarian elites of 1990 strug- until after the international caravan had moved gled to comprehend what was happening around on. them and react fast enough, this symbolic pres- ence was often suffi cient to prevent manipulation Most insidious of all was the realization by some of the vote. At the same time the international seal governing elites that the entire electoral process of approval of observers became an important vali- can be allowed to be technically clean as long as dation of the process of democracy building. the media environment in the months leading up to the election is suffi ciently under their control. However, large-scale observation raised issues. Al- Opposition voices may even be allowed during legations of observation as electoral tourism sur- that short period when the international spotlight faced, sometimes with a real basis in fact. In large is on. Methodologies for media monitoring have countries especially, international obser vation mis- been developed but need to be deployed effective- sions could only be present in a fraction of polling ly before polling commences. stations, and it was not always clear that observers knew what they were looking at. As a result, ob- The question is whether international observation servation methodology became stricter and more is worth its con- professional, observer training more rigorous, and siderable cost? Is The question is whether international observer selection more considered. In this respect it better to use re- observation is worth its considerable cost? both the EU and the Offi ce for Democratic Insti- sources to support tutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Or- domestic observer ganization for Security and Co-operation in Eu- networks, or are these most effective with the sup- rope (OSCE) played an important part. Attempts port of internationals in situations where the op- to steal elections by ballot-stuffi ng became rarer. ponents of democracy are really determined? Are Those who sought to manipulate elections were audits and peer reviews a better approach to en- learning new ways how to escape control. suring transparency and integrity in the future? Is it indeed more effective to concentrate resources Attempts to infl uence election results by the use on the development of fully independent, effective of selective criteria for registration, or selective and empowered election administrations?

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 105 8.5. The Independence of This concept was so successful that over half of the Election Administrations world’s EMBs now take this form.

The organization of elections was traditionally a But realism shows that independence on its own specialist back water in the administrations of es- is not enough. Formal independence laid down in tablished democracies, often located within the legislation has been shown to be a chimera when government or local government service. Individ- political control of the appointment procedure ual committed offi cials worked in their electoral is used to create a compliant body. The election service for many years often in isolation and with commission of Ukraine for the late 2004 elections their role unrecognized. The considerable inde- was formally independent, but inspired no confi - pendence of the Election Commission of India dence: it had to be completely replaced before the was a shining exception too often unknown out- rerun of the second round of the presidential elec- side that country. tion. Independence is beginning to be understood not only as desirable in itself but also as a means of Elections in ‘new democracies’ in the early 1990s ensuring electoral management that is impartial, did not initially address the question of how to de- accountable and transparent—and perceived to be velop an election administration. so. Nonetheless, there are still battles to be fought. The lack of public confi dence in ex-communist Independent EMBs may have to fi ght with gov- civil services led to the adoption of election ad- ernments or legislatures to ensure that their budg- ministration practices in which commissions were ets are suffi cient to organize elections effectively, fi lled by political party nominees at every level, and then to receive the money when it is needed. with good practice being assured by the members mutually policing each other. The optimistic ap- Realism has also, rightly, led electoral management proach to transitions brought huge international debate into the realms of sustainability, service de- presences: for example, there was one internation- livery and effi ciency. The budgets for elections are al person in every Cambodian commune for nine signifi cant in almost all countries and enormous months in 1992-3, and one international supervi- in larger countries. Decisions about equipment are sor in every registration station and every polling not easy, especially in the information technology station in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. Even- fi eld, where new systems become obsolete almost tually it was realized that the level of resources and as soon as they are installed and vendors have an commitment required to mount such efforts could interest in promoting their product whether or only ever be one-off, and that such interventions not it is appropriate. Electoral procurement needs were in any event disproportionate in scale. to be transparent and accountable if corruption is to be prevented. But the challenges of delivering Gradually, the importance of election adminis- cost-effective elections against time deadlines, re- tration has dawned. When developing democra- taining institutional memory in electoral manage- cies started to plan their second elections and the ment, and ensuring transparency and appropriate plethora of international resources was no long- choice in procurement will not go away. er available, the importance of national electoral management as a manifestation of national sover- The staffi ng requirements for EMBs fl uctuate eignty became readily apparent. African and Latin enormously: in the lead-up to an election, a huge American countries joined India in showing the number of people are needed for a short period, but value of EMBs that only a small core staff is needed on a con tinuous are independent basis. The question of what short-term electoral Independence is beginning to be understood of the executive staff do between elections remains a complex issue not only as desirable in itself but also as a branch, reporting worldwide. To illustrate the scale of this problem, means of ensuring electoral management to the legislature a general election in a developing country can be that is impartial, accountable and or even set up as the biggest single organized activity undertaken by transparent—and perceived to be so. a separate fourth anyone at any time. branch of the state.

106 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) IDEA has played a major role in the last ten The building of sustainable electoral adminis- years in bringing together EMBs from around trations relies on the development of the capaci- the world, enabling experience to be shared ty of election administration staff being a prior- and both formal and informal networks to be ity. In response to created. IDEA’s Code of Conduct for the Eth- this need, IDEA, Election administration is now seen as a ical and Professional Administration of Elec- the AEC and the profession that requires training, specialist tions has played an important role in this proc- UNEAD devel- ess, and is available in English, French, Por- oped a compre- knowledge and practical skills. tuguese, Russian and Spanish. In response to hensive training the current challenges faced by electoral man- curriculum for electoral administrators called agement bodies—especially in the context of the BRIDGE Electoral Administrators’ Train- structuring, fi nancing, and issues of sustaina- ing Curriculum . The curriculum covers all aspects of elec- IDEA is developing tools and resources for use tions and uses an activities-based adult learn- by policy makers and practitioners in election ing methodology to build capacity and develop law and administration to improve election professionalism. The training is global in scope management, which will be contained in the and uses comparative examples to illustrate op- forthcoming IDEA Handbook on the Structure, tions and best practice. Throughout the course Finance and Evaluation of Electoral Manage- guiding principles for election administration ment Bodies. such as impartiality, accuracy and transparency are incorporated into the course activities.

8.6. Election Administration Currently available BRIDGE modules as a Profession include: • an introduction to electoral administration; The isolation of election administrators within • electoral systems; the civil services of their own countries used to • public outreach; be matched by a lack of contact between election • boundary delimitation; administrators in different countries. The increas- • registration of voters; ing number of countries which hold elections, • election contestants; the growth of international interest in elections, • preparation for the electoral event; and the explosion in inter national technical as- • polling and the count; sistance—and indeed observation—have reversed • electoral observers; and this. Regional electoral organizations and EMB • strategies for sustainability. networks increasingly share knowledge, best prac- tice and materials with each other, thereby promot- BRIDGE materials are now available in Ara- ing the implementation of professional standards bic, Bahasa Indonesia, English, French, Por- in electoral management. For example, Southern tuguese and Russian, with Spanish planned. African EMBs maintain regular contact through The BRIDGE project partners conduct regular the SADC Election Commissioners’ Forum, and international ‘Training of Facilitators’ courses those in Latin America through the Inter-Ameri- where potential trainers are taught how to de- can Union of Electoral Organisations (UNIORE). liver the BRIDGE course. To ensure the quality Election administration is now seen as a profession of BRIDGE course delivery, only fully accred- that requires training, specialist knowledge and ited BRIDGE trainers are able to run BRIDGE practical skills. Training material for electoral ca- training courses. pacity, such as the BRIDGE curriculum, is impor- tant. Courses in electoral management are avail- able in several places such as the University of Cal- gary, Canada, and Griffi th University, Australia.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 107 8.7. Gender and Elections diffi cult to be effective, being expected only to shut up and follow the leadership’s instructions. The last ten years have seen wider acceptance of the principle that representation of women in- The importance of gender balance in election ad- volves representation by women. Pressure has ministration recruitment, from commissioners to grown for both electoral and political legislation polling station offi cials, is now better recognized. that encourages the election of women through There is also more awareness of how women may gender-friendly electoral systems and quotas, and be disadvantaged by literacy or access requirements for action within political parties to encourage the in registration and polling procedures. Consider- nomination of more women candidates. able experience and best practice exists in targeted voter education to encourage women’s participa- The method of list proportional representation tion, and it is important to ensure that this is de- has been shown to encourage more gender rep- veloped to match local conditions. resentation as women seize the opportunities for ‘balanced tickets’ on party lists. However, mere- Little attention has yet been given to gender as- ly fi xing the basic form of the electoral system is pects of electoral dispute resolution. How are ap- not enough. Systems with a larger number of seats pointments made to adjudicating bodies? Do the per districts can substantially increase the number procedures to lodge a claim and have it heard ap- of women elected. On the other hand, a strongly pear more onerous or threatening to women? fragmented party system, in which small parties elect just one or two male leaders as their repre- 8.8. Participation and sentatives, may reduce this number. Turnout: A Threat to Electoral Legitimacy? Pressure has grown for both electoral and Legislation or regu- political legislation that encourages the lations increasingly Participation and voter turnout have been a cause of growing con cern in both established and devel- election of women through gender-friendly include provisions for voluntary or oping democracies. IDEA has played an important electoral systems and quotas, and for action mandatory quotas. role in this debate by assembling and maintaining within political parties to encourage the These are more ef- the worldwide Voter Turnout Database . It has taken most of the last ten tioning of candi- years to identify and address the fundamental is- dates on the list is taken into account as well as sues affecting turnout and to develop practical ad- gender balance. The development and operation vice for those seeking to promote or protect elec- of quotas have been detailed in the IDEA/Univer- toral involvement. sity of Stockholm Global Database of Quotas for Women . The International IDEA Voter Turnout Da- tabase is continuously updated and is a com- Party procedures for choosing candidates, along prehensive compilation of global voter turnout with the nomina tion and election procedures for statistics. The material is a resource for the im- internal party management bodies, play a major portant debate about voter turnout, participa- role in determining whether parties are ‘gender- tion and effective voter education. Two associ- friendly’. Women candidates and potential candi- ated publications, Voter Turnout Since 1945: A dates have created support networks and ‘women Global Report and Voter Turnout in Western Eu- only’ training through cross-party caucuses. How- rope, include statistics from parliamentary and ever, the quest for stability—and sometimes also presidential elections from nearly every con- pressure to take action against corruption—has tested national election since the end of World often led to excessively tight control of elected War II. Graphs, charts and tables illustrate members by political parties, by strengthening trends in voter turnout and enable a compari- the power of the central party leadership. In such son between old and new democracies. situations elected women have sometime found it

108 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) In addition to the statistics, these publications dis- cuss relevant issues such as the development of the franchise and voter registration. Voter registration is a key part of exercising franchise, and is there- fore a prerequisite for electoral participation. His- tory shows us that the removal of barriers to regis- tration is essential to the full exercise of a citizen’s political rights. The Global Report also analyses voter registration methods around the world.

Much of the existing analysis of participation re- lates to estab lished democracies. Most people es- tablish their pattern of electoral participation (or otherwise) in the fi rst three elec tions after they reach voting age and this pattern hardly changes until they die. Any new measures to promote par- ticipation are therefore more likely to affect new voters rather than older ones whose voting pattern consequence of giving rise to a lifetime of disen- (or lack thereof) is set. franchisement for many of the intended benefi ci- aries’. Yet reversing this policy and increasing the How people perceive elections is also important. voting age again is clearly not politically possible. The habit of electoral participation is more likely to be developed when election results are perceived What are the implications for voter education? to make a difference to the conduct of government What knowledge or skills are needed to encour- or when elections look likely to be close, either in age a new elector to engage with elections? With a national context or in the context of the elector’s the proliferation of media channels on which news own dis trict. This raises further questions. How can be found 24 hours a day and with the almost does socialization affect voting? What determines instant access to information provided through which young people become habitual voters and the Internet, is political awareness now acquired which do not? Interestingly, people who vote usu- in a different manner from the way in which it was ally engage in other kinds of citizens’ participation acquired in the past? What is the best way nowa- in community activities. days of enabling people to make informed deci- sions about electoral participation and electoral It appears paradoxical that in some countries, choice? Do developing democracies face the same for example Sweden, interest in politics has in- or worse problems in the electoral area? creased even though turnout has fallen. The para- dox is explained by a big increase in the number Questions about turnout have become clearer in of thoughtful independent people, alongside a big the last ten years. Political and institutional re- increase in the number of uninterested, non-parti- formers, election administrators and civic educa- san people—both of which groups, one may spec- tors now have some understanding about the ef- ulate, are made up of younger rather than older fects of their choices on participation and turnout. people. The biggest challenge of turnout may be Yet the implications of their decisions may not be- that of engaging the young, urban, unemployed come apparent for years and could then take dec- and unqualifi ed ‘underclass’ who may be switched ades to undo. out of society generally. 8.9. The Next Ten Years The widespread reduction of the voting age to 18 has reduced turn out in established democ- When the development of elections in the last ten racies. Mark Franklin has described this as ‘a years is looked at as a whole, it is possible to draw well-intentioned decision with the unanticipated much encouragement from it. How to hold an

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 109 acceptable election is now widely understood, al- though the achievement of higher electoral stand- ards and sus tainable elections needs more work in some countries. Such cases would benefi t from the knowledge sharing and assistance that comes from electoral management networks and regional peer support.

The challenge for election administration now focuses on issues of credibility, transparency, integrity, protecting electoral pro cesses from par- tisan pressure, and on how technically effi cient election administrations relate to other interested players in the electoral process.

In the wider political context, much more needs to be known about different approaches to institution building. The new security agenda has placed fur- ther political diffi culties in the way of promoters of pluralist, acceptable, professional and sustain- able elections. In many countries there are people who will continue to try to subvert elections to outmanoeuvre political structures which encour- age power sharing and pluralism, and to manipu- late independent and professional electoral man- agement processes. The potential for technology to enable people to express their opinions directly on individual issues will add a new dimension to the debate and create tension between represent- ative democracy and direct democracy. Electoral and institutional reform has moved forward, but the agenda for future electoral and institutional re- formers remains as full as it was ten years ago.

110 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

‘In the mid-1990s there was not much work done concerning elections and democracy. We saw an opportunity to do something in this area and there was great enthusiasm about founding International IDEA. The Institute was one of the fi rst institutions to discuss women in politics. I believe that the report ’Women in Parliament’ was an eye-opener for a lot of people, and it started processes in many countries. I, for example, gave this book to the female foreign ministers when we met in New York during the UN General Assembly 1997.

Hostile opinions about political parties are often expressed. But I think people understand that parties are a decisive component of democracy. We need them as a channel for our views, the primary stream for infl uence. Efforts must be made to renew and strengthen political parties, in old as well as in new democracies.’

Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Chairperson of the Board of International IDEA, former Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden, and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

‘IDEA’s commitment to providing comparative information on how to advance gender and democracy issues in general, and how to promote the participation and representation of women in political life in particular, has been valuable to South Africa as a young democracy and has largely infl uenced our policies. Belonging to an international Institute such as IDEA – which does not draw conclusions about the connection between types of quota provisions and the representation of women globally, but does provides quantitative information about quota types and rules – has enabled our nation to implement the quota system in an informed way. While not legally defi ned, South Africa’s quota system has stood women a good chance of getting elected and winning a higher percentage of representation in parliament.’

Dr Brigalia H. Bam, member of the Board of International IDEA, Chairperson of South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission and former General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches

112 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

9. Ten Years of Progress: Enhancing Women’s Political Participation

Julie Ballington*

This chapter shows that ten years of efforts to improve provide relevant gender participation are slowly starting to pay off, policy options and From the very beginning, IDEA understood although much remains to be done. data to those work- that women’s participation in politics ing to fi nd practica- was, and remains, central to democratic The year in which IDEA was born was also the year ble solutions to un- governance. the world’s governments recognized that, despite der-representation the increased and rapid transition to democracy in of women. While many regions, ‘the popular par ticipa tion of wom- taking into account a global perspective, it has en in key decision making as full and equal part- tried to ensure that materials generated also refl ect ners with men, particularly in politics, has not yet an awareness of and comparison between nation- been achieved’ (United Nations 1995). From the al, regional and local contexts. This chapter traces very beginning, IDEA understood that women’s IDEA’s efforts to enhance women’s political par- participation in politics was, and remains, central ticipation over the last decade. to democratic governance. IDEA also recognized that if the world’s new and emerging democracies 9.1. National Politics: were to be truly democratic and benefi t from their Broadening the Scope of previous struggles, half of the world’s popula tion Participation could not be excluded. It also affi rmed that older, estab lished democracies were failing in their com- The last two decades have witnessed a widespread mitments to include women in public life. trend towards democratization in most parts of the world, revitalizing the debate on participatory For the last ten years, IDEA’s Women in Poli- democratic governance. Overall the last decade tics programme has sought to shore up different has seen modest progress with regard to women’s methods and models for enhancing women’s po- presence in national parliaments. While in 1995 litical participation. By bridging the gap between women accounted for 11.3 per cent of members the academics and practitioners, IDEA aimed to of parliament, this fi gure has increased to 15.6 per

*This chapter was written with contributions from Francesca Binda (Senior Advisor, Political Parties Programme), Kristen Sample (Andean Re- gional Director), Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham (Head of South Asia Programme), Yee Yin Yap (Assistant to the Director of Operations) and Leena Rikkilä (Programme Manager, Asia) from IDEA, and Azza Karam, former Senior Programme Offi cer at IDEA between 1996-1998.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 113 ‘insuffi cient mechanisms at all levels to promote the advancement of women’ as two areas of signifi - cant con cern where action was critical for the ad- vancement of women. This was further expanded to encompass women’s participation in post-con- fl ict state building, which fi nds expression in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, passed in October 2000. In the debate introducing Resolution 1325 in 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that ‘peace is inextricably linked to equality between women and men . . . maintaining and promoting peace and security requires equal participation in deci- sion-making’ (Whittington 2004).

The slowly changing face of parliamentary repre- sentation to include women was not an inevita- ble consequence of the broadening of the political cent in 2005 (IDEA 2005). More than 30 women space in democratization processes. Rather, it is the have served as heads of government and/or state result of sustained mobilization, institutional en- since 1995, and in 2005, 19 women preside over gineering, political party commitment and greater houses of parliament. Yet, while more women now recognition by the inter national community for hold elective offi ce gender equality. This international discourse has than ever before, been the foundation of concerted efforts to sup- The slowly changing face of parliamentary signifi cant chal- port women’s full political participation in the last representation to include women was lenges to women’s ten years. Women’s activism and mobilization at not an inevitable consequence of the political participa- the country, regional and international level has broadening of the political space in tion remain. been pivotal to keeping gender equality fi rmly democratization processes. Rather, it is the rooted on the international agenda. result of sustained mobilization, institutional The equal partici- engineering, political party commitment pation of women Important progress has been made in some re- and men in pub- gions, notably the Nordic countries, where wom- and greater recognition by the inter national lic life is one of en’s representation in parliament averages 40 per community for gender equality. the cornerstones cent. The percentage of parliaments that have of the Convention reached the Beijing target of at least 30 per cent on the Elimination women in parliament has increased threefold in of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women the last ten years, to 6 per cent (Inter-Parliamen- (CEDAW) adopted by the UN General Assembly tary Union 2005). Yet in many parts of the world in 1979, in force since 1981. Today, more than real gains in women accessing legislatures have not 20 years since the signing of the Convention, 179 occurred. Women have become impatient and are countries are party to it and bound to take meas- demanding changes at a much greater pace. ures to promote women’s participation in deci- sion-making and leadership positions. This chapter provides an overview of IDEA’s work in identifying the key factors responsible for the In 1995, the UN Fourth World Conference on gradual increase in women’s representation, in- Women held in China generated renewed pres- cluding the effect of institutional frameworks, po- sure for the implementation of CEDAW provi- litical parties and the implementation of special sions: the Beijing Platform for Action identifi ed measures like quotas. In seeking to bridge the di- ‘inequality between men and women in the shar- vide between academia and practitioners, IDEA ing of power and decision-making at all levels’ and provided tools and strategies for those men and

114 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) women who are committed to correcting the im- politics. In the Preface, Frene Ginwala explains balance in politics. For the last ten years IDEA has the essence of the handbook: ‘The representation asked: ‘What are the best strategies to increase the of women and the inclusion of their per spective political representation of women? Which strate- and experience in decision making will inevitably gies work, and in which structural and political lead to solutions that are more viable and satisfy a contexts?’. IDEA always strives to identify and broader range of society’ (Ginwala 1998). deal with different national realities. In the area of women in politics, these realities reveal the various structural or attitudinal con ditions that either fa- Regionalizing Outreach vour or hinder the participation of women in pub- Responding to ongoing requests for the trans- lic life. lation of the Women in Parliament handbook into different languages, International IDEA 9.2. Key Themes of IDEA’s Work has produced the following regional versions: on Women in Politics • French 2002 Key themes in the area of women’s political par- • Indonesian 2002 ticipation have included: • Spanish 2002 • overcoming the challenges of being elected to • Russian (abridged) 2003 parliaments; • English (revised) 2005 • the effect of socio-economic and cultural bi- [Includes 25 country case studies from all ases; regions of the world] • the central role that political parties and elec- toral systems play; and • safeguarding and increasing women’s access to The original idea behind Women in Parliament: decision-making bodies through the use of spe- Beyond Numbers was that women in public life re- cial measures. quire usable information on how to effect politi- cal change in decision-making bodies. There is an Various reform options and information have emphasis on the entire process of participation— been made available in reports and handbooks on from the very beginning to the end—as well as the these issues, as well as through the pro duction of means of making an impact. The handbook edi- 100 country and regional case studies including tor, Azza Karam, explains that ‘it is clear that the 85 quota case studies. IDEA is also mindful that more active and engaged women are in politics, increasing numerical representation is just the fi rst the more there is a need for a culling and systema- step in the process of facili tating changes in gender tization of their experiences in such a way as to power relations, as numbers need to be comple- elaborate how it is that they make it to these bod- mented by women politicians using their leverage ies and what they can do once in them’. to address issues of women’s inequality in society at large. With Women in Parliament, the provision of re- alistic tools and strategies for practitioners seek- 9.2.1. Women in Parliament: Challenges ing to increase women’s par ticipation in political and Opportunities institutions is central. IDEA frames these barri- ers as falling into two main categories: attitudinal IDEA produced its fi rst comprehensive handbook and socio-econom- on women’s access to political decision making, ic factors, and po- Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, in 1998 litical and institu- For the last ten years IDEA has asked: (revised in 2005). The handbook is a practical tional factors. Al- ‘What are the best strategies to increase tool for overcoming the obstacles women encoun- though the socio- the political representation of women? ter throughout the parlia mentary electoral proc- economic and ide- Which strategies work, and in which ess, and provides a number of options on how to ological factors structural and political contexts?’ bring about constructive change and infl uence in cannot be ignored,

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 115 much emphasis has been placed on the political which typically produce higher party magnitudes and institutional factors that infl uence the levels of (the district magnitude is the number of seats per representation of women, and these can, and very district and the party magnitude is the number of often do, change over a short period of time. seats a party can win in a district). The magni- tudes are important because they affect party strat- 9.2.2. Political Parties and Institutional egy when choosing candidates. If the district mag- Rules Matter nitude is one, as it is in majoritarian systems, the party can only win one seat in a district and cannot Women in Parliament clearly highlights the effect ‘balance the party ticket’. Female candidates must that institu tions have on women’s access to par- compete directly with men, and winning a party liament. In his chapter in the handbook, Richard nomination is heavily infl uenced by money in pol- Matland illustrates the consequences of diff erent itics, name recognition and the advantage enjoyed electoral systems. While they alone do not deter- by incum bents. When district magnitude increas- mine the level of representation of women, elec- es, the chances that a party will win several seats toral systems are important because they can be, increases and party leaders may be more conscious and regularly are, changed. Matland also high- of balancing the party’s ticket. Party gatekeepers lights the impact of political parties: although in may also consider balancing the demands of dif- some contexts independent candidates are elected ferent factions in the party. If a women’s branch (typically running on issue-specifi c or particular of the party exists, women may well demand to be ethnic tickets), political parties assume the prima- allotted winnable positions. ry responsibility for candidate nomination. Par- ties are entrusted with perhaps the most strategic Second, in PR systems, a party receives seats in di- responsi bility in democracy—to prepare and se- rect proportion to its overall share of the national lect candidates for election and to support them in vote, with seats being fi lled from lists of candidates positions of leadership and governance. submitted by political parties. Most PR systems use closed lists where the political party determines Proportional representation (PR) systems are the ranking of candidates. This system can be ben- viewed as the most ‘women-friendly’. It is no coin- efi cial for women if a suffi cient number are placed cidence that 14 of the 15 countries with the high- in winnable positions on party lists. However, the est representation of women in the world have absence of party support for women candidates PR electoral systems and average representation remains one of the greatest obstacles for women, 34.7 per cent women in their parliaments. At the as Nestorine Compaoré explains in her case study other end of the on Burkina Faso: ‘While the proportional list sys- Proportional representation (PR) systems spectrum, the 15 tem facilitates the promotion of women, its effects are viewed as the most ‘women-friendly’. It countries with the are not really felt unless the political parties have lowest representa- made the decision to promote women and place is no coincidence that 14 of the 15 countries tion of women use the women on their lists in positions such that with the highest representation of women plurality or major- they have a chance of getting elected. Few parties in the world have PR electoral systems and ity systems, aver- nominate women, and they are generally placed at average representation 34.7 per cent women aging one per cent the bottom of the lists’. in their parliaments. women in their legis latures.1 Woman-friendly institutions, including PR sys- tems, high district magnitudes and closed party As Matland explains in Women in Parliament, there lists, provide the opportunity for, but do not guar- are several reasons why electoral systems matter. antee, high levels of female representation. Oth- First, PR systems have higher district magnitudes er factors infl uencing the election of women to

1 This is not to imply that only electoral systems matter, as representation will be affected by other factors, inter alia the level of democratic development. Data are taken from Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Women in National Parliament’, February 2005, available at .

116 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) parliament include the cultural standing of wom- en, the organization of women in civil society and Partners in the dissemination of IDEA’s funding. However, the effects of electoral systems Women in Parliament handbook include: on women’s representation are signifi cant and di- rectly affect pol itical parties’ nomination process- • Centre for Democratic Governance es: where parties are willing to nominate women (CDG), Burkina Faso candidates in suffi cient number and place them in • Centre for Legislative Development electable positions, there is a higher chance that (CLD), Philippines political parties will send a representative group of • Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO), members to parliament. Indonesia • EISA, Promoting Free and Credible 9.2.3. Beyond Numbers Elections in Africa • Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) It is relatively easy to enumerate the various chal- • Mujeres Democrata-Cristianas de America lenges regard ing women’s political participation, (MUDCA), Venezuela but it is much harder to appreciate the strengths • National Democratic Institute (NDI), and positive differences women have made in their selected country offi ces chosen professions. The second theme of the hand- • Netherlands Institute for Multiparty book shifts the focus to how women can move ‘be- Democracy (NIMD) yond numbers’ in par liament to make an impact • Organisation of America States (OAS) on the political process. Azza Karam and Joni Lov- • Participation and Democracy Programme enduski outline how women can reform the inher- (PPD), Guatemala ent ‘institutional masculinity’ which characterizes • SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) most legislatures by implementing a ‘rules strat- • Second Vice-Presidency of the Congress of egy’. They identify three key areas: learning the the Republic of Peru rules, using the rules and changing the rules. • Social and Political Institute for Women (ISPM) of Argentina By using the rules strategies, the authors outline • Transparencia, Peru how change can be brought about in four key ar- • UNDP, selected country offi ces eas. • UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (a) institutional and procedural change, to • Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan, YJP, Indonesia alter the institution to become more ‘woman- friendly’—a matter not simply of including more women but of increasing gender awareness; In addition to the rules strategy, there are mecha- (b) representational change, by undertaking ac- nisms to help women maximize their power and tions to ensure women’s continued access to the effectiveness. They include working in partnership legislature, placement in important parliamentary with men, enlarging the pool of eligible and as- positions and presence in government; piring women politicians and taking positive ac- (c) impact and infl uence on the ‘feminization’ of tion to increase women’s access to the legislature. legislation and policy, ensuring that women’s is- Within the legislature, women’s caucuses and net- sues are put on the parliamentary agenda; and works and other gender machinery are vital to en- (d) discourse change, involving change inside and suring that women’s interests remain on the parlia- outside par liament: efforts should be made to al- mentary agenda, and that gender equality is main- ter parliamentary language to integrate women’s streamed within different political, social and eco- perspectives, while making use of a par liamentary nomic concerns. platform to alter public attitudes. Karam notes that far from creating a book to be added to the dusty bookshelves of many a li- brary, IDEA designed the Women in Parliament

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 117 handbook to be quotas have not resulted in an increase in the Far from creating a book to be added to used as an advoca- number of women in politics, and, occasionally, the dusty bookshelves of many a library, cy tool by its tar- have had the reverse effect. With the emphasis IDEA designed the Women in Parliament get audience. The placed on quotas as a means of guaranteeing wom- handbook to be used as an advocacy tool by book does more en’s presence in parliaments, IDEA recognized that its target audience. than review the lit- gender quotas present many challenges, both in erature on women’s practice and in academic research. IDEA therefore participation: it is prioritized the issue of electoral quotas as an area enormously practical, being based on the experi- requiring further research and gathering of experi- ence of the authors, a number of whom are poli- ence to ascertain how and when quotas work best. ticians themselves. IDEA’s work has also focused This was a natural complement to the Women in on how to get the information to those practition- Parliament: Beyond Numbers handbook. ers working in the fi eld. Over the years IDEA has worked with several regional and international or- As initial mapping of the implementation of quo- ganizations, NGOs, academic institutions, parlia- tas unfolded in 2002, it soon became obvious that ments and politicians. such a research undertaking would require a part- ner organization, and ideally one involved in large- 9.3. Using Special Measures scale research projects. Fortunately such a partner to Increase Women’s Access to was close at hand: Drude Dahlerup at the Depart- Politics ment of Political Science at Stockholm University has also identifi ed that research on the application 9.3.1. The Rise of Quotas and of electoral quotas as a priority. In late 2002, the Reservations for Women IDEA/Stockholm University Electoral Quotas for Women project was born. Because of the obstacles women face in the elec- toral process, spe cial measures have been imple- 9.3.2. Analysing Electoral Quotas mented to safeguard women’s presence in par- for Women liament and other elected positions. In terms of political parties, they may consist of developing Increasing women’s representation and participa- incentives to attract women to the party (such as tion in decision-making bodies requires informa- providing funding to run an election campaign), tion on which measures have worked in differ- providing networks, training and skills develop- ent countries within different political contexts. ment for women candidates to stand for election, As only limited comparative research and data on or setting a target within the party that a certain quotas were available, the project initially aimed number of executive positions will be held by to gauge whether, and under what conditions, women. But the most common special measures quotas have been implemented successfully. It also are electoral quotas, which are defi ned as manda- acknowledged the need to raise general awareness tory or targeted percentages of women candidates of the use of gender quotas as an instrument to in- for public elections. crease the political representation of women and to show that they can be, and are being, applied The mid-1990s saw the emergence of what has now successfully. been termed a ‘quota fever’: several countries and hundreds of political parties adopted quota rules. ‘The Global Quota Database is the most com- While some countries experimented with reserved prehensive and complete global resource on seats for women as far back as the 1950s, the real electoral quota issues. It is a very useful instru- push for quotas came after the UN’s Fourth World ment and simultaneously a wonderful picture Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. of the progress that has been made.’

The introduction of quotas in the past ten years Lourdes Flores Nano, 2004 IDEA Board of Directors has met with some success. In other instance

118 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) The fi rst step was the collection of global informa- tion on the use of quotas on a country-by-country basis, detailing the types of quotas and enforce- ment measures used. The information is made widely accessible through the Global Database on Electoral Quotas for Women, which was launched in March 2003. The initial results were somewhat surprising: nearly 100 countries had either im- plemented quotas, previously had quotas or were considering implementing quotas. Of these, 14 countries have quota provisions guaranteed in the constitution, and 32 in legislation. In addition, 130 political parties in 61 countries had voluntar- ily begun experimenting with quotas.

9.3.3. Analysis and Trends

But numbers alone do not tell the whole story. The web site does not draw conclusions about the con- nection between types of quota provisions and the a particular country context. They usually inter- representation of women globally, so further quali- act with other factors such as the presence of an tative information was collected through a series of organized and strong women’s lobby both with- fi ve regional workshops convened in 2003–4. These in and outside political parties, the existence of a allowed country and regional information on quota political will to increase women’s representation, implementation and enforcement to be collated, and the type of the electoral and party system. and a network of researchers and experts working • Electoral systems matter. Quotas are less likely in this fi eld to be developed. Workshops were con- to succeed in electoral systems based on single- vened in Africa, Asia, the Arab states, Europe and member constituencies, where a party presents Latin America with reports compiled summarizing one candidate, unless reserved seats are used in the main fi ndings of the meetings. This has revealed that system. Evidence suggests that party quotas some interesting fi ndings. (legislated or voluntary with placement man- dates) in multi-member districts are likely to be • Quotas can be effective. Evidence from around the most effective. (Place ment mandates specify the world suggests that where quota are imple- which positions women must hold on a party mented, and properly enforced, they are a high- list, for example, every second or third posi- ly effective strategy to accelerate women’s politi- tion.) cal participation. There are 16 countries which • The devil is in the detail. How quota provisions have reached the target of 30 per cent women in are formulated directly affects their implemen- parliament: ten are from Europe, three from Af- tation: many quotas are simply not enforced, ei- rica and three from Latin America. While these ther because the law stipulates a target but does countries do not share similar levels of socio- not specify how to obtain it, or because politi- economic development, 14 of them have im- cal parties ignore it in the absence of enforce- plemented quotas. Of these, four have legislat- ment mechanisms. Political parties may meet ed quotas, including Rwanda, which is now the a 30 per cent target of women on party lists but world leader with 48.8 per cent women in the place women at the bottom of the lists in largely Parliament. In a further ten countries, one or unwinnable positions. more political parties have implemented volun- • Golden opportunities. Timing is an important tary party quotas. consideration: there are certain opportunities in • There is no ‘one-size-fi ts-all’ model. Quotas tend the political process that may facilitate the in- not to work in isolation and must be adapted to troduction of quotas. In countries under going

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 119 transition and constitutional and legal reform, 9.4. Supporting and there is a small window of opportunity for the Encouraging Regional Change introduction of quota laws. It is much harder to amend the constitution and rewrite electoral or IDEA understands that change will only be party laws in established regimes. achieved when all the actors involved in public • Post-confl ict norm? It is now common for quo- life are committed to and employ the tools and tas to be con sidered as a way of securing wom- strategies for reform. Francesca Binda notes that en’s representation in post-confl ict states. In gaining that commitment requires the involve- fact most of the recent experiences with quo- ment of parliamentarians, political parties, civil tas have emerged from transitional and post- society, non-governmental organizations, interna- confl ict states. They have taken varying forms, tional organiza tions and the media. IDEA devel- ranging from voluntary party quotas adopted ops regional and country partner ships which ac- by the ruling (liberation) parties in Mozam- knowledge and support the role played by women bique and South Africa, to reserved seats and in politics and society, including women’s move- con stitutional quotas, most recently in Rwanda, ments, their involve ment in national liberation Afghanistan and Iraq (Ballington and Matland struggles and peace settlements and negotiations, 2004). their contribution to post-confl ict nation building and their role in the development of nations. Quotas will not be successful when introduced as a single measure. In the short term they may dra- 9.4.1. Latin America matically increase the representation of women, but they allow parties to make concessions to women By working through its country and regional pro- without necessarily addressing key gender issues. grammes, IDEA facilitates a process of informa- The attainment of gender justice in post-confl ict tion sharing and country com parisons on a range states and in the consolidation of democracy in the of issues, whether it is the establishment of new in- long term depends on a host of factors including the stitutions or the reforming of existing practices. In development of a democratic political culture, the Latin America, most nations face serious challeng- level of mobilization of women in civil society, and es in terms of the depth and quality of their de- the transparency and accountability of democratic mocracies. There is a growing popular perception institutions. Most importantly, the attainment of that democratic governance systems have failed gender justice depends on the political will of party to respond effectively to the demands of citizens. leadership (Ballington and Matland 2004). Women remain sig nifi cantly under-represented in most Latin American legislatures.

Within this context, IDEA has identifi ed the is- IDEA’s Products on Quotas: sue of women’s political participation as a priority. • Global Database of Electoral Quotas for Kristen Sample explains that this focuses on three Women, at main areas: fi rst, the dissemination of comparative • Reports on the implementation of quotas in statistics and experiences on women’s political rep- Africa, the Arab states, Asia, Europe and resentation through IDEA’s Mujeres en Parlamen- Latin America to: más allá de los números [Women in Parliament: • More than 80 country case studies Beyond Numbers] handbook; second, by providing • Global handbook on implementing quotas comparative information on the implementation to be produced during 2005-6. and enforcement of electoral gender quotas; and, third, by research on electoral systems and their impact on women’s political participation. The following examples illustrate how IDEA has col- laborated with different organizations to dissemi- nate its products and messages and share lessons learned.

120 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) to the Congress in October 2004. A vote was still ‘Transparency in nomination and selection pending at the time of publication. processes is important to foster a culture of in- clusiveness and democracy within political par- Guatemala. IDEA has focused on disseminating ties. It is apparent that women are confronting information and products where women are sig- both explicit and implicit barriers when trying nifi cantly under-represented in political life in Lat- to reach higher positions within parties. Quo- in America. In Guatemala in 2002, IDEA worked tas are one mechanism to address these barri- in partnership with different women’s groups and ers.’ a local partner, the PPD, to discuss the main chal- International IDEA, 2003 lenges and opportunities to increase the political The Implementation of Quotas: Latin American participation of women at the local level, espe cially Experiences of indigenous women. Women’s political partici- pation in Guatemala is a particular problem due to their marginalization both because of their sex Peru. In 2002, IDEA identifi ed Peru as a priority and because of their ethnicity. Other countries in country given its recent transition to democracy which IDEA has worked with local and regional after long years of authoritarian rule. Among the women’s organizations include Argentina, Bolivia, priorities identifi ed for the Peru Pro gramme were Ecuador and Venezuela. electoral system reform, political party strength- ening and women’s political participation. Af- 9.4.2. Asia ter receiving requests from different stakehold- ers, including the president of the Congressional IDEA’s main focus has been on supporting democ- Commission on Women and Sustainable Devel- ratization processes in South and South-East Asia. opment, IDEA provided assistance on the reform Despite a lengthy history of demo cratic rule, the of the election and quota laws, and the develop- region has long been highly volatile, exacerbated ment of a political party law. IDEA and its local by a rise in religious fundamentalism, communal partner, Transparencia, supported the creation of politics and religious, ethnic and social confl ict. a multi party round table, which focused on draft- IDEA has focused on the areas of electoral system ing the country’s fi rst political party law. A 30 per reform, democracy building and confl ict man- cent quota provision, in terms of both general agement through sustained dialogue and politi- election lists and leadership posts within political cal party strengthening. Within these areas, IDEA parties, was included in the round table’s proposal highlights the importance of supporting women’s and eventually passed by the Peruvian Congress in inclusion and participation. The following exam- October 2003. ples show how IDEA has worked to strengthen women’s political participation in South Asia. IDEA focused on supporting the implementation of the law through a multi-pronged strategy in- Indonesia. Since 1998, IDEA has provided strate- cluding designing and implementing gender-sensi- gic advice to government and civil society on op- tive training modules which include clear explana- tions relating to the electoral system, the admin- tions of the content of the law and its implications. istration of electoral management bodies (EMBs) At least 35 per cent of the participants trained are and initiatives to strengthen women’s political par- women. An inter-party seminar on women’s politi- ticipation. Through a dialogue with dynamic and cal participation in Peru was also convened to raise progressive groups in civil society, members of the awareness of the key role of political parties to sup- Parliament, political party members and academ- port women’s candidacies. Following the successful ics, IDEA has aimed to strengthen women’s par- design and informa tion campaign around the po- ticipation within Indonesian politics at the na- litical party law, the IDEA–Transparencia multi- tional and provincial levels. party round table drafted an electoral code which included reforms aimed at increasing women’s po- litical participation. This draft code was presented

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 121 once they were in parliament. IDEA also worked Obstacles Preventing Women from Becoming with the women’s caucus in the Parliament to cre- Members of Parliament in Indonesia: ate better linkages with civil society and helped • The cultural context in Indonesia is still to identify a common agenda for women across heavily patriarchal. The common percep- party lines. In 2002 IDEA facilitated a series of tion is that the political arena is for men, Asian Study Visits where Indonesian politicians and that it is inappropriate for women to and activists, both women and men, gathered become members of parliament. knowledge and shared experiences with counter- • The selection of candidates by political parts in India, Thailand and the Philippines. parties is usually conducted by a small group of offi cials or party leaders, almost IDEA was invited to provide advice on the design always men. In Indonesia awareness re- of a new electoral system in Indonesia. At a gath- garding ering of diverse political parties, IDEA provided gender equality and justice is still low, and various options and models of electoral processes thus male political leaders have a dispro- while stressing the impact that different systems portionate infl uence over party politics and have on patterns of representation of women, mi- women do not receive much support. norities, regions, and new and established political • The media has yet to effectively mobilize parties. In the run-up to the April 2004 general the public regarding the importance of elections, IDEA facilitated training for 27 wom- women’s representation in parliament. en candidates, aspiring to be elected to the DPD, Indonesia’s second chamber. (Nine were eventu- Khofi fah Indar Parawansa, Women in Parliament: ally elected.) Women were relatively successful in Beyond Numbers, the polls, taking a total of 21 per cent of seats in Indonesian edition, 2002. the DPD, nearly double the number elected to the lower house. Additionally, IDEA has provid- ed practical advice to women in Indonesia and During 2001, the debate on women’s political rep- South Asia on electoral quotas and reserved seats. resentation and participation in politics increased A workshop in Jakarta in 2002 provided an op- and dominated much of the political agenda, be- portunity for women to discuss strategies for lob- ing fuelled by active and outspoken civil society bying for quotas and reform of their individual organizations and activists. One of the critical is- electoral systems. sues was the adoption of a 30 per cent quota for women in the electoral process. In 2002, IDEA Burma: Dialogue processes. Recognizing that de- produced an Indonesian version of the Women in mocracy cannot be achieved without the active Parliament: Beyond Numbers handbook with the participation of women, IDEA both main streams inclusion of case studies from South Asia which and especially targets women’s political participa- served as the basis for discussions on strategies for tion and empowerment with capacity-building in- increasing and strengthening effective political itiatives. To this end, IDEA works with Burmese representation in Indonesia’s political institutions. exiles to help prepare them in the event of politi- cal spaces being opened up in Burma. IDEA has The IDEA programme specifi cally addressed organized workshops on negotiating political set- those needs by organizing workshops and dissemi- tlements, on sharing experiences from South Af- nating information for women in political parties rica, and on federal constitution-making process- and civil society. The goal was to help identify po- es, sharing experiences from India and Australia, tential women candidates for the 2004 parliamen- which men and women activists attended. IDEA tary elections, provide training on fundamental has also organized specifi c activities on the role campaign techniques, and create linkages between of women in peace building, sharing experiences women candidates and civil society so that they from South Africa and Colombia, Sri Lanka and would have resources to draw on in identifying the Philippines. the development and political issues to articulate

122 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is an interesting case because 9.5. Conclusion it elected the fi rst female head of government in the world, Prime Minister Bandaranaike, in 1960, IDEA enters its second decade with the under- and is the only country in South Asia to have standing that there is still much work to be done adopted proportional representation. However, to increase women’s political par ticipation. In the rates and strength of women’s political partici- 2005 the representation of women in the world’s pation in elected bodies have declined in recent parliaments stands at less than 16 per cent. But years, to less than 5 per cent in 2005. As a result of numbers do not tell the whole story, and IDEA the ongoing confl ict and violence in political life, will continue to work to understand the issues be- high rates of literacy and employment have not yond numbers. Those who work to increase the translated into increased political representation participation of women in political life are begin- of women. Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham ning to ask how women might be more effective explains that IDEA aims to assist key stakeholders in advancing a women’s agenda in political life. to articulate gender concerns in post-confl ict set- Many women who are active in political life want tlements, in the peace and reconciliation processes to understand how they can leverage their posi- and in the building and strengthening of demo- tions, their knowledge and their networks to make cratic institutions. IDEA is therefore supporting a a difference and to improve conditions for more publication which reviews women’s political par- women to be actively engaged. Binda argues that ticipation and intends to disseminate a ‘Gender policy makers are beginning to recognize that rep- Manifesto’ as the basis of dialogues with political resentation means more than elected politics. It parties to secure their commitment to mainstream means that more women must have seats at the gender concerns. Cabinet table, more women must be appointed to senior decision-making positions, and more wom- Nepal. Nepal is in the throes of one of its most en’s voices must be heard and included when ma- grave political and constitutional crises after the jor political reform or transformation is undertak- royal takeover in early 2005, and the fate of repre- en. sentative institutions and inclusive con stitutional processes is uncertain. Exclusion has contributed In each country the methods may be different, but to a deep sense of alienation among many people very few governments around the world will deny and has provided a constituency of support for the that women’s participation in the political system extra-parliamentary struggles taking place in Ne- needs to be increased. It is IDEA’s challenge to ex- pal. The number of women active in the Maoist amine the options, collect evidence of best prac- People’s Army is considered to be unusually high. tice, provide models for reform and encourage the reformers. As we strive to inform the debate Since working for constitutional reform in Ne- on women’s participation we, in turn, learn from pal from 2004, IDEA has received requests from the many courageous, creative and active men and Nepalese stakeholders for information on differ- women who truly believe that democracy can only ent electoral systems for ensuring inclusive govern- be achieved when ance. There is pressure for the Women’s Commis- all citizens are rep- sion, among others, to be given constitutional and resented in all po- Policy makers are beginning to recognize legal recognition as an autonomous body to facili- litical structures that representation means more than tate the formulation of gender-sensitive action pro- which effect their elected politics. It means that more grammes and electoral system reform. As a part of lives. women must have seats at the Cabinet a series of dialogues on constitutional processes, table, more women must be appointed to IDEA has organized dis cussions on special meas- senior decision-making positions, and ures and electoral system design, to generate rec- more women’s voices must be heard and ommendations for improving the participation of Nepal’s marginalized communities, including its included when major political reform or majority: women. transformation is undertaken.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 123 References ‘In truth, many years after the [Women in Par- liament] handbook in 1998, I believe that Ballington, Julie and Matland, Richard, ‘Political Parties IDEA’s ongoing contributions to the fi eld of and Special Measures: Enhancing Women’s Participa- women in politics still echo down the corridors tion in Electoral Processes’, Paper presented at the UN of many an institution, NGO, governmental Expert Meeting: Enhancing Women’s Participation in body and academy. A testament to its leader- Electoral Processes in Post-confl ict Countries, Offi ce of ship, certainly, but also to the hard work of the the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement diligent and committed staff members. Long of Women (OSAGI) and Department of Political Affairs may it continue.’ Expert Group Meeting, New York, USA, 19-22 Janu- Azza Karam, 2004 ary 2004 Ginwala, Frene, ‘Foreword’, in International IDEA, Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, ed. Azza Karam (Stock- Taken together, these features contribute to holm: International IDEA, 1998) IDEA’s unique approach: drawing on facts, lived Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Promoting Partnership between realities, combined insights and experiences, and Men and Women in Parliament: The Experience of the an emphasis on both the creation of a critical mass IPU’, in International IDEA, Women in Parliament: and using the institutions and forging the neces- Beyond Numbers, 2nd edn (Stockholm: International sary strategic alliances to make a difference to the IDEA, forthcoming 2005) broader political process—and to make sure that United Nations, ‘Fourth World Conference on Women Plat- the information provided refl ects the realities of form for Action’, 1995, article 15, Whittington, S., ‘UN Goals for Gender Mainstreaming’, Paper presented at the conference on Women and Post- War Reconstruc tion: Strategies for Implementation of Democracy Building Policies, Florida International Uni- versity, Miami, March 2004

124 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

‘One of the essential features of a democracy is holding elections at regular intervals. By themselves, however, elections are not suffi cient to ensure the emergence and establishment of a pro-people government that would honour promises made during an election campaign and respect the principles of good governance and accountability.

A pro-people government can only be achieved with the existence of a well-structured, politically motivated and ever-dynamic civil society acting as a constant watchdog of democracy, raising its voice and making it heard whenever necessary and relentlessly keeping the people’s elected representatives on their toes.’

Cassam Uteem, member of the Board of International IDEA and former President of the Republic of Mauritius

126 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 10. Democracy in Situations of Deep-Rooted Confl ict

Timothy D. Sisk

An important area in democracy building is the role mitigation of ten- of democracy in confl ict resolution, affecting all parts sions in diverse, Today, a new, profound challenge exists of democracy building. This chapter paints a som- confl icted societies. for the promoters of democracy: deep bre picture of the challenges for democracies to suc- and widespread scepticism has emerged ceed in situations of deep-rooted confl ict and to coun- IDEA’s work has about democracy’s ability to succeed in ter the threat of terrorist attacks. However, it argues focused on key situations of deep-rooted confl ict. that IDEA’s work has generated numerous lessons, thematic areas — best practices and understandings not only of how de- managing transi- mocracy can survive in divided, confl ictual societies, tions, consensus-oriented institutional design, but of how democratic practices directly contribute to electoral systems and election processes, political peace as the only long-term solution. parties, learning across regional frontiers, and the UN and democracy. Additionally, its work has fo- When IDEA opened its doors in 1995, the organi- cused on states with internal confl icts, as in South- zation stepped into a troubled world that was reel- ern Africa, Indonesia, Colombia, Nepal and Rus- ing from deep-rooted ethnic, religious and nation- sia, and in unsettled regions such as the Balkans, alist tensions. By the mid-1990s, with the Cold Latin America, West Africa and South-East Asia. War swept into history by the rapid collapse of With its worldwide mandate, this work has gener- the Soviet Union and a new, ‘turbulent’ period of ated a number of important lessons learned, best rapid political, economic and social change under practices, and enduring understandings about how way, the drama of addressing deep-rooted confl ict democracy must be nurtured to survive in deeply around the world shaped the organization’s de- divided societies, and how democratic values and mocracy promotion work in virtually every cor- practices can directly promote peace. ner of the globe. Over the last decade, IDEA’s programmes in situations of deep-rooted confl ict In the 21st century, the organization continues have explored how, ironically, the process of de- to confront the 1990s-type challenges of democ- mocratization often heightens deep-rooted confl ict racy through war-to-peace transitions, as in Af- even as the long-term solution to strife in divid- ghanistan or Kosovo, and democracy’s capacity to ed societies is to manage confl ict through the bal- stimulate new social confl icts, as in many societies lot box and in the halls of parliament rather than of the Middle East. Today, a new, profound chal- on the battlefi eld or the streets. The challenge for lenge exists for the promoters of democracy: deep IDEA has been, and remains today, to show how and widespread scepticism has emerged about de- inclusive and participatory processes and institu- mocracy’s ability to succeed in situations of deep- tions of democracy can and do contribute to the rooted confl ict. In a world characterized by fears

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 127 of terrorism and a humanitarian emergencies in the short term and IDEA’s recent work on democratic dialogue global war against a renewed determination to fi nd ways in which and democratic practice directly responds extremist move- democracy can be developed and structured to re- to the cynics with the message that the ments—from the duce strife among contending groups rather than answer to fear, terror and violence lies in United States to exacerbating tensions. promoting the democratic values of mutual Russia to Spain, understanding, trust and tolerance. Indonesia and the 10.1.1. War-to-Peace Transitions troubled coun- tries of the Mid- Superpower tensions, regional rivalries and ideo- dle East—democracy agendas have been set aside logical polarization had fuelled many wars around in favour of national security. IDEA’s recent work the world since decolonization and the emergence on democratic dialogue and democratic practice of new and independent nation states. Beginning directly responds to the cynics with the message in the 1960s and ending with the independence that the answer to fear, terror and violence lies in of Namibia in 1990, many post-colonial countries promoting the democratic values of mutual un- had witnessed devastating internal wars fuelled by derstanding, trust and tolerance. the struggle between communism and the West. As the international system rapidly changed with 10.1. The Turbulent 1990s: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many of these A World in Transition wars lost their sponsors and the parties in confl ict found themselves trying to negotiate a settlement to war. From Namibia to Nicaragua, El Salvador, IDEA began its work in 1995 in a world that had Cambodia and Mozambique, long-running wars transformed democracy promotion in two impor- were settled in the early 1990s through peace tant ways. First, many of the long-running civ- agreements. il wars and social confl icts that had raged in the years of Cold War rivalry began to wind down in The processes of such war-to-peace transitions di- the mid-1990s. From Namibia to El Salvador, and rectly involved negotiating the terms of post-war Cambodia to South Africa, long-running wars of democracy. This meant perilous political changes, revolution and counter-revolution and struggles such as the holding of national elections, the trans- for national liberation ended in sustained peace formation of rebel forces into political parties, new processes. In these confl icts, democracy emerged institutions to protect human rights, fundamental as the exit path from those struggles despite all the social and economic change such as land reform, diffi culties of establishing tolerance and trust after and—perhaps the most diffi cult problem—set- so many years of fi ghting. tling accounts from past episodes of violence or human rights abuses through processes of transi- Second, the changing political landscape in many tional justice. Traditionally, democracy theory and settings in the 1980s and early 1990s generated practice had little experience of such complex and new internal confl icts that precipitated violent widespread social changes, and much of the early struggles among contenders for power and, in the learning in this area was through costly trial and worst instances, new civil wars. Most of the tran- error. sitions that occurred in this turbulent age were in societies that are highly diverse along ethnic, ra- The UN especially was often called in to lead the cial, religious or ideological lines. The quick in- processes of change and in some situations—as in troduction of democracy could easily exacerbate Namibia and Cambodia—to organize the all-im- confl ict and undermine the possibility that, over portant transitional governments and tense elec- time, democracy would lead to freedom, human toral processes. In ‘complex’ peace operations, the rights and peaceful politics. In the Balkans, former UN’s peacekeeping doctrines expanded beyond Soviet states, and other societies undergoing vol- security mandates to state and democracy build- atile transitions—such as Algeria or Indonesia— ing. The landmark UN-administered elections widespread social confl ict created immediate in Namibia in 1990 and the diffi cult Cambodian

128 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) elections of 1993 highlighted the new context in which democracy as the exit strategy to civil war is seen. Throughout the late 1990s and today, de- mocracy promotion in countries emerging from civil war remains a critical element of IDEA’s work.

10.1.2. Democratization and Confl ict

At the same time, new challenges for democracy as confl ict manage ment emerged. On 2 March 1992 a referendum in the troubled former Yugo- slav province of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ratify an earlier decision by separatists there became the last straw—or the spark that accelerated a brutal civil war in which crimes against humanity and genocidal acts later occurred. The turn to a referen- dum in Bosnia in 1992 was an ill-considered dem- ocratic approach for resolving a complex question of managing a disintegrating federation. Similarly, aspirants for political power—both incumbent democracy’s potential to infl ame confl ict was seen elites and new challengers—may well see the route in an aborted election in Algeria in January 1992. to victory in elections as espousing divisive themes In that country, an opposition Islamist party was that stoke public fears and build support for ex- poised to win a majority of seats in the country’s tremist positions. Appeals to nationalism, reli- Parliament: when the secularist military and rul- gious fundamental- ing regime saw the likely outcome of democracy ism, ethnic solidar- The turn to a referen dum in Bosnia in at work, they cancelled the second round of vot- ity, or xenophobia 1992 was an ill-considered democratic ing. The Islamists revolted and the election deba- and external threats approach for resolving a complex question cle precipitated a civil war, which ultimately cost become preferred more than 150,000 lives. Elections are some of paths to power of managing a disintegrating federation. the most visible elements of a nation’s democrati- through the ballot zation process and therefore highly prone to incite box. Democracy—or rather democratization—is confl ict. then a driver of confl ict rather than a means by which divided societies can fi nd unity in diversi- These two instances alone made it clear that de- ty. mocratization could exacerbate tensions in di- vided societies, evoking fears of loss of citizenship Because democratization can lend itself to elite rights, political power, or separation of church and manipulation and extremism, and can generate state. Along with a myriad other examples of the fears of loss or for survival because the outcome new post-Cold War openness, the 1992 events in of elections is inherently unknown (or all too well Bosnia and Algeria underlined that democratic known, when there is a dominant majority), there processes could well be confl ict-inducing and that are clearly inherent tensions for those in the in- transitions to democracy contained real and seri- ternational community, such as the UN, between ous perils for societies and the international com- the values of introducing democracy and the im- munity. peratives of managing confl ict. These tensions are seen before wars, as in Bosnia and Algeria, as seen This problem both set the stage for IDEA’s entry above, but also after wars. When the Bosnian war into the democracy promotion world and remains fi nally ended in late 1995, there was a rush by the a theme of much of its past and current work. international community to hold post-war elec- The rationale is this: as democracy is intro duced, tions in order to legitimate the new government

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 129 just steps in a much longer and diffi cult process. Democracy also needs mechanisms to guarantee a balanced distribution of power between differ- ent levels in government as well as state and civil society.

From the confl ict resolution fi eld, the emphasis on consensus building, negotiation and problem solv- ing, managing fear and insecurity, and promoting reconciliation emerged as the most important ele- ments. Indeed, in war-to-peace transitions, for ex- ample, it was realized that from a purely practi- cal perspective democracy could emerge as a con- fl ict resolution instrument of choice for protago- nists in civil wars: it could allow them to continue the fi ght they had waged on the battlefi eld, but in the more secure setting of electoral debates and in parliament. Democracy, depending on how it is formed by the Dayton peace accords. The push for ‘crafted’ or designed, could become a solution in quick elections in September 1996, less than a year which all would not be lost, as it would be in the after hostilities had ended, reinforced the power event of defeat on the battlefi eld. of nationalist parties. Many observers now believe that these elec tions were premature and that they IDEA’s work has been underpinned by the core contributed to the hardening of relations between realization that democracy need not be only about the Bosnian ethnic groups for years afterwards. competition for power through elections, about winners and losers through the ballot box, or 10.1.3. Solutions: Democratization as about the heightening of social divisions through Consensus Building campaigns to defi ne the national identity and in- terest. Indeed, well-crafted and designed democ- IDEA’s work has wrestled with these two essential racy, emanating from negotiations among the contexts for democracy promotion in the volatile protagonists in situations of deep-rooted confl ict, 1990s and into the 21st century. In situations of can be confl ict-mitigating. Much depends on how war-to-peace transitions, and with concerns about democracy is defi ned, the processes by which it democracy as confl ict-inducing, the answer has is created, and how its institutions can be struc- been to try to marry somewhat disparate approach- tured to promote ongoing bargaining, inclusion, es in academic research and in refl ective practice of tolerance and, above all, the avoidance of winner- democratization and confl ict manage ment. From takes-all outcomes in favour of consensus-based the democratization side, lessons of the 1970s and decision making. 1980s revealed that democratization processes of- ten involved the negotiation of pacts, or agree- 10.2. Themes of IDEA’s Work ments, among incumbent leaders and others such as security forces and police and opposition ele- From the outset, IDEA’s work in the fi eld of de- ments. Likewise, mocracy building and confl ict management has the change to de- focused on both the processes of democracy mak- Likewise, the change to democracy unfolds mocracy unfolds ing—through negotiation and bargaining, often in a series of stages in which election in a series of stages with mediation, monitoring, and sometimes im- events, while perhaps the culminating in which election plementation by the inter national community— moment, are just steps in a much longer and events, while per- and the outcomes of such processes, namely new diffi cult process. haps the culminat- institutions. Consistent with the overall approach ing moment, are of the organization in highlighting the theme of

130 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) ‘democracy in the making’, the emphasis of its voluminous, 414- work has been threefold. page handbook, In war-to-peace transitions, it was Demo cracy and realized that from a purely practical First, the programme has sought to defi ne the Deep-Root ed Con- perspective, democracy could emerge as wide range of options, alternatives and practical fl ict: Options for a confl ict resolution instrument of choice tools for building consensus-oriented democracy, Negotiators (DRC). for protagonists in civil wars: it could illustrating the panoply of choices in handbooks, Published in 1998, allow them to continue the fi ght they had resource materials and databases. The themes on the handbook pro- waged on the battlefi eld, but in the more which it has focused are negotiations in post-war vides a path-break- secure setting of electoral debates and in settings, the overall problem of ‘institutional en- ing synthesis of the parliament. gineering’ or design, electoral system choice as a democratization particularly important decision, and public poli- and peace-making cies to promote inclusion and fairness. These op- fi elds. The handbook and the subsequent dissem- tions have been illus trated over time with refer- ination efforts dramatically spread the view that ence to a wide set of case studies from all regions democratization could be confl ict-mitigating in of the world, to include sharing lessons learned the essentially internal confl icts of the 1990s, and from one situation (such as South Africa) to aid that there are a wide range of options available to considerations of transition paths in another (such deliver a sustainable peace through a democratic as Burma). transition. In the foreword to the volume, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan summed up the es- The second approach has been one of concrete de- sential insight that underpinned the work: ‘Build- mocracy assessments in societies that face severe ing stable and solid internal political structures [in problems of social confl ict. From post-war Guate- intra-state confl icts] is not a separate task from cri- mala to post-authoritarian Nigeria, democracy as- sis management, but needs to be a part of it’. sessments have illustrated the application of cross- cutting themes such as rebel-to-political-party makeovers or electoral system design through in- Themes of the 1998 DRC Handbook depth studies that involve local actors in demo- • Importance of Democratic Institutions cratic dialogues to explore issues and themes in “…Making appropriate choices about their own contexts. democratic institutions – forms of devolu- tion or autonomy, electoral system design, Third, IDEA has sought to evaluate how the in- legislative bodies, judicial structures, and ternational community can be better prepared so on – is crucial in building an enduring to help ease the transition to democracy in situ- and peaceful settlement.” ations of sharp social confl ict. Focusing especial- • Confl ict Management, Not Resolution ly on inter national organizations such as the UN, “There needs to be … more pragmatic in- IDEA has emphasized the importance of helping terest in confl ict management: how to deal parties in confl ict to design institutions, to organ- with it in a constructive way, how to bring ize, hold and monitor elections, to manage proc- opposing sides together in a co-operative esses of transitional justice and reconciliation, and process, how to design a practical, achiev- to empower women and civil society to help make able, co-operative system for the construc- democracy sustainable in the long run. In this sec- tive management of difference.” tion, some of the key insights and fi ndings from • The Importance of Process these three areas are described. “The process by which parties reach an outcome impacts signifi cantly on the qual- 10.2.1. Managing Transition: ity of the outcome. Attention must be Negotiating for Democracy paid to every aspect of the process of ne- gotiations in order to reach a durable out- IDEA’s fl agship publication in the fi eld of de- come.” mocracy and confl ict management is the rather

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 131 The DRC handbook brought together scholarly • The basis of representation. Countries in deep- research and practical fi eld experience in a way rooted identity confl icts face a fundamental that carefully linked the changing nature of con- choice: will identity be the basis of representa- fl ict and confl ict management in the late 20th tion, for example through ethnic political par- century (especially the phenomenon of internal, ties, or should the rules of the democracy sys- identity-based confl ict), analysis of the patterns of tematically promote or even forbid the organiza- national-level and cross-border confl ict dynamics, tion of politics along identity lines? Approaches negotiation processes and problem solving, demo- can offer starkly different choices for countries cratic levers (institutions), and considerations for managing cultural differences through democ- sustaining a settlement over time. In illustrations, racy, from group-based approaches such as the boxes, menus and fact sheets the handbook pre- political system of Lebanon to more integrative sented an extremely complex and rich set of schol- approaches, such as those adopted in South Af- arly fi ndings and practical lessons learned in an ac- rica, or even combining both elements. cessible and user-friendly format. • Power sharing. Winner-takes-all institutions, in From the peace-making and confl ict resolution which some participants may be absolute losers fi eld, the handbook highlighted what became and all or almost all participants have the fear widely accepted aspects of understanding and ne- of being absolute losers, are unlikely to lead to- gotiating war-to-peace transitions, namely, from wards a sustainable peace. the very start of negotiations in the so-called pre- negotiation phases, protagonists in deeply divided • Autonomy and devolution. There is no single, societies keenly understand how various democra- simple way to design an autonomy scheme. cy-related options, such as elections, devolution or While many observers in terri torial confl icts a truth commission, may affect their interests. In see autonomy as a natural compromise between peace nego tiations it is vitally important to develop claims for secession (or national independ- a negotiation process that can resolve overall issues ence) and terri torial integrity, autonomy is an early—such as separation of com munities versus inherently diffi cult balance to achieve. More- power sharing—that can anticipate and consider over, there are different options for federalism the most important decisions—such as the elec- as well; and the implications of federalism for toral system—and that as far as possible involves economic performance and a just distribution all relevant parties in the institution-building proc- of national resources further complicate the ess, including potential ‘spoilers’. If a democratic choice. Nonetheless, many peace settlements settlement is to emerge from a peace negotiation today feature democratic federalism as a core process, it must be approached as a design exercise compromise. in which the consequences of decisions made are understood well into the future. • Type of executive: presidentialism versus parlia- mentary systems. One of the most important 10.2.2. Institutional Design choices to be made is between having a strong president and having a strong par liament with The DRC handbook also highlighted that the a relatively weaker executive. In divided socie- choice of alternative institutions—rules for how ties, this choice is no trivial or technical mat- the ‘game’ of democracy will be played—is a critical ter. When an individual president is directly and possibly decisive aspect of peace nego tiations. seen to represent a single identity group to the Poorly chosen institutions can doom even a well- exclusion of others, presidentialism becomes a intended negotiation process or can undermine the recipe for confl ict. On the other hand, parlia- sustainability of demo cracy over time. On the oth- mentary systems with coalition-style govern- er hand, aptly chosen institutions can tip the bal- ments can lead to deadlock in decision making ance from recurrence of violence towards a sustain- and ineffective governance. able, democratic peace. Some of the institutional choice fi ndings that emerged are as follows.

132 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) • National conferences. National conferences have system, electoral had a diffi cult track record as a means for com- dispute resolution Scholars and policy makers agree that prehensively design ing new institutions. Be- and election-relat- perhaps the single most important choice a cause they include a wide range of actors in ed vio lence. Some country can make for effectively managing confl ict situations, they are often too unwieldy of the fi ndings in confl ict is a wise and appropriate decision as negotiating forums to achieve much progress each of these ar- on the type of electoral system. on contentious issues. At the same, national eas are highlighted conferences can be very effective in ratifying here. decisions made in prior negotiations by bring- ing additional parties into the negotiating, • Electoral system choice. There is a consensus symbolizing national unity, and ratifying fi nal among scholars of democracy that electoral sys- accords. tems are the most widely manipulated aspect of democratic design, that is, how the electoral These themes and others, such as human rights in- system functions can help to tilt the politics of struments, transitional justice and truth commis- a country (or other political unit such as a city) sions, and national machinery for gender equality, in a particular direction. The stark choice be- are illustrated in the DRC handbook through the tween types of majority rule systems and those use of case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina, that are based on proportional representation Bougainville, Fiji, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, (PR) has been widely covered in IDEA’s pub- South Africa and Sri Lanka. The handbook has lications. Although there is a presumption that been translated into Spanish for dissemination in the emphasis of PR on inclusion, combined situations such as Colombia, into Bahasa Indone- with parliamentary systems, is best for situa- sia for work in Indonesia and into Burmese for tions of deep-rooted confl ict, there have been possible work in Myanmar/Burma. situations in divided societies when in fact ma- jority rule options or presidential systems seem 10.2.3. Electoral Systems, Election to have had confl ict-managing effects. Processes

Scholars and policy makers agree that perhaps the Electoral System Choice and ‘Engineering’ single most important choice a country can make Moderation in Divided Societies for effectively managing confl ict is a wise and ap- “… It is increasingly being recognized that an propriate decision on the type of electoral system. electoral system…. can help to ‘engineer’ co- Because such systems translate votes into seats in operation and accommodation in a divided electoral processes, they have important ramifi ca- society.” tions for who gains power, who is included and The New International IDEA Handbook of excluded, how political parties form and compete, Electoral System Design (2005) how politicians campaign for votes and, ultimate- ly, whether politics is conducted as a winner-takes- “The collective evidence from elections held all system or as a competition for relative or pro- in divided societies to date suggests that an portional shares in post-election governments. appropriately crafted electoral system can help to nurture accommodative tendencies, but IDEA’s research and policy work in this area has that the implementation of an inappropriate been covered in a variety of materials, including system can severely harm the process of con- the DRC handbook, the Handbook of Electoral fl ict resolution and democratization in a plural System Design (ESD handbook), the Administra- state.” tion and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project, and the Democracy and Deep-Rooted Confl ict: Options Election Process Information Collection (EPIC) for Negotiators (1998) Project. These materials have covered important issues such as electoral system choice, the impli- cations of electoral system choice for the party

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 133 List PR is of 2001, IDEA was involved in a consortium of Among the key principles of local-level known to be well international organiza tions to train local elec- confl ict management through democratic suited to managing tion offi cials to manage this most important decision making are: inclusion, recognition, confl ict in divided event in the life of this new nation, focusing on and self-worth for all elements of the societies. The alter- a variety of topics in election administration. community; and satis faction of basic native vote and the human needs, such that no single group is single transferable 10.2.4. Public Policy vote may also be systematically disadvantaged through helpful, although Beyond negotiation processes and institutional de- deep-seated poverty. the impact of the sign, much of IDEA’s work has focused on a wide Fijian experience range of public policy options that inculcate dem- is still being analysed. Options that explicitly ocratic values and promote confl ict management recognize the presence of communal groups are in situations of deep-rooted confl ict. Among them also sometimes valuable. The overall conclusion are broad themes of public policy, such as instru- is that there is no perfect, ‘one size fi ts all’ elec- ments to promote, monitor and protect human toral system for divided societies. This makes rights; specifi c policies such as those that relate to IDEA’s efforts to clearly and carefully articu- language use; various levels of policy making, such late options and to help policy makers think as managing culturally diverse cities; and process- through the expected effects of various options es for making public decisions, such as consensus- all the more useful in so many confl icted socie- based policy making. IDEA’s work has evaluated ties today. many of these public policy issues.

• Election processes. Ensuring that elections are pro- • Diversity policy in multi-ethnic states. Grievances fessionally conducted in a free and fair manner over diversity issues such as religious, cultural or is important for any society, but in deep-rooted language rights are a common and sometimes confl ict situations, given the suspicions, fears pivotal driver of confl ict in deeply divided so- and doubts, it is especially important that elec- cieties. With regard to language, for example, a tion management bodies are either composed debate rages over whether the state should en- of members who are accepted and respected courage assimila tion through the adoption of a as independent or are representative of all the single offi cial language, or whether ‘linguistic major political forces on a ‘mutually policing’ pluralism’ is preferable. Similar debates occur basis; that they are unbiased in their activities; over whether a democratic country should fos- that they are able to function in all the vari- ter a strong, unifi ed national identity or wheth- ous areas of a country; and that they do not er ‘unity in diversity’ is a more realistic and de- wittingly or inadvertently advance the cause sirable framework for public policy. of any particular faction or group. IDEA has published a set of ethical guidelines for elec- In a study of democratizing Indonesia in 2000, tion administration and worked to ensure their for example, three approaches were advocated applica tion in the particularly volatile settings to help promote religious pluralism: inter-reli- of deep-rooted confl ict. gious dialogue processes, participatory activities among a wide range of diverse groups to foster For example, IDEA evaluated the establish- trust, and developing a common national iden- ment and per formance of the election manage- tity that explicitly embraces religious diversi- ment authorities in post-war Mozambique to ty as a core essence of being Indo nesian. The ensure that the election process was perceived study (see below) concludes that: ‘In a demo- as free and fair: such a determination is critical cratic nation, every group has an equal right to to maintaining peace in the country, in which speak out and to associate. But there should be former combatants now compete for politi- a constitutional guarantee that the foundations cal power. Similarly, in preparation for East of the nation will not be modifi ed by anyone or Timor’s landmark UN-administered elections any one group in power’.

134 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) • Local governance: managing culturally diverse and a compar- cities. Recognizing that all major metropolitan ative study of The role of ‘collaborative’ decision-making areas today are vibrantly multicultural, IDEA’s such confl icted processes to resolve thorny issues and work on local governance has also evaluated cities as Johan- deep divisions has been a hallmark of the how public policies can foster democratic val- nesburg, Jerusa- local-level democracy work. ues of trust and peaceful coexistence. In De- lem and Belfast. mocracy at the Local Level: The Internation- al IDEA Handbook on Participation, Repre- • Local governance: consensus-based policy mak- sentation, Confl ict Management, and Gover- ing. IDEA’s local-level democracy work has nance, policies to foster inclusion and tolerance also sought to present, describe and evaluate in divided cities were evaluated. The fi ndings processes of consensus-based decision making of this and subsequent work on democracy at through a wide variety of public policy mak- the local level underscore the close relationship ing efforts. The role of ‘collaborative’ decision- between inclusion, democracy and confl ict making processes to resolve thorny issues and management. deep divisions has been a hallmark of the local- level democracy work. Such processes involve systematic information sharing in divided com- Citizen Participation and munities, structured consultation, public deci- Confl ict Management sion-making approaches, and community-level “Often the diffi cult issues faced by a commu- dispute resolution procedures. nity are too complex and involve too many divergent interests to be successfully resolved For example, in South Africa community-level at the ballot box. Facilitating citizen partici- peace commissions have successfully managed pation in decision-making processes can aug- local-level disputes—and kept them from be- ment electoral democracy by helping to build coming national-level problems—while at the trust and confi dence and by managing or re- same time building the ‘social capital’, or trust, solving disputes that cannot be arbitrated by that has subsequently allowed for the develop- elections alone.” ment of more inclusive, tolerant and effective local democracy structures during the country’s Democracy at the Local Level (2001) fi rst ten years of democracy (1994–2004). The South African experience underscores a more central point that has resonated in much of Among the key principles of local-level con- IDEA’s work on local-level confl ict and meth- fl ict management through democratic decision ods for its democratic management: democracy making are: inclusion, recognition, and self- is not just about elections, it is a form of public worth for all elements of the community; the dialogue, sometimes best fostered in highly lo- satis faction of basic human needs, such that calized settings. no single group is systematically disadvantaged through deep-seated poverty; practical methods 10.2.5. Reconciliation of building consensus are essential; the struc- ture of political decision making is equally im- In post-war settings, the linkage between success- portant at the local level, where in multicultural ful reconcilia tion processes and the long-term vi- contexts power sharing should be encouraged; ability of democracy has become more apparent confl ict can be mitigated by fostering a sense in recent years. Without reconciliation in post-war of local pride and ‘love of place’; and minority settings, democracy is impossible because the trust, par ticipation in decision making needs to be tolerance and mutual understanding necessary for encouraged, as does a variety of cultural identi- democracy to function—for example, the willing- ties. Among the case studies in the Democracy ness to risk loss of power in an election—simply at the Local Level handbook are evaluations of do not exist. Legacies of past violence threaten fu- local-level peace building in post-war Bosnia ture democratization.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 135 a number of ways. At the country level IDEA has Some Themes of the 2003 Reconciliation worked both on an ad hoc basis, through mis- after Violent Confl ict Handbook sions or studies at a particular moment in time, • Reconciliation should be pursued for moral and more formally with its own offi ces in especial- reasons, but there is a pragmatic element ly important countries such as Indonesia and Ni- as well: some degree of reconciliation after geria. Most important has been its work in sharing internal confl ict is an absolute prerequisite lessons learned from similar or comparable cas- for democracy to succeed over time. es, such as the efforts to help democratization in • There is no easy recipe for a reconciliation Burma by convening a workshop on fi ndings that process; there is no universally accepted, might be conveyable from a relative success case perfect model. such as South Africa. • Lessons in failed reconciliation are as in- structive as those processes that have been 10.3.1. Country-Level Initiatives considered relatively more successful. • There is a consensus emerging that those IDEA has launched a number of country initia- culpable of gross violations of human rights tives in its fi rst decade, many of which have been should be prosecuted. in countries emerging from civil war, those facing • Truth commissions are a popular approach, deep ethnic, racial or religious tensions, and those but they are not appropriate in all settings. such as Colombia or the South Caucasus coun- tries that still remain challenged by internal war. In some of these initiatives IDEA has used the ap- In 2003 IDEA launched a signifi cant publica- proach and methods of its State of Democracy as- tion entitled Recon ciliation After Violent Confl ict: sessment project to evaluate linkages around peace A Handbook. With themes, case studies, options in confl ict-prone societies. This section highlights and guides to further resources, the handbook just some of the work IDEA has conducted in sev- provides a look at what many analysts see as a pre- eral troubled countries. requisite for successful democracy in societies that have experienced extensive confl ict and violence. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia’s civil war from Since the publication of the handbook, IDEA 1992 to 1995 left deep social scars which continue has launched new activities on the reconciliation to inhibit the prospects for democracy through the theme in countries such as Sri Lanka. Dayton peace accords. IDEA has analysed how to improve democracy in such a war-torn country, 10.3. Countries, Regions and beginning with initial evaluations of the 1996 elec- the International Community tions to the creation of local capacities for democ- racy advocacy through the creation of a Founda- Developing concepts of consensus democracy and tion for Democracy within the country. For exam- articulating options are useful only when applied ple, following the 1996 elections IDEA launched in specifi c settings in which careful attention to his- a major fact-fi nding mission to determine how tory, social and economic conditions and region- the initial stability provided by the international al circumstances, and international action come community’s military and political intervention to together. IDEA’s implement the terms of Dayton could be trans- work at the coun- Developing concepts of consensus formed into a strategy for reconciliation and dem- try, regional and ocratic consolidation. The fi ndings of the mission democracy and articulating options are international level are found in the 1996 publication ‘Beyond the ‘96 useful only when applied in specifi c has sought to dis- Elections: A Two Year Window of Opportunity settings in which careful attention to seminate informa- for Democracy, Proposals for the Transition to- history, social and economic conditions, tion, share lessons wards Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. regional circumstances and international learned, and assist action come together. in particular tran- Burma. The continued authoritarianism of sition processes in the military junta, the detention of democracy

136 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) activists such as Aung San Suu Kyi, and ongoing ethnic and religious tensions characterize the trou- bles contemporary Burma faces. For several years IDEA has facilitated a number of dialogues among Burmese and specialists in the inter national com- munity to evaluate how a transition to democracy in Burma could occur, what institutional designs could facilitate confl ict management and how a process of national reconciliation could unfold. Among the specifi c products of this work are re- ports on dialogues that have been held since 2000 on democratic alter natives, lessons from South Af- rica for constitution making, and, more recently, how constitutional arrangements can be struc- tured to help promote minority rights in a demo- cratic Burma.

The State and Minority Rights in Burma “Burma requires innovative measures, which are appropriate and realistic for its specifi c needs…. The people of Burma must develop Former Chairman of IDEA Board of Directors, Thorvald Stolten- berg, at the launch of the Handbook on Democracy and Deep- a federal culture through education and prac- Rooted Confl ict: Options for Negotiators (1998). tice, even during the struggle, in order to create a stable and peaceful country. Ethnic and reli- Management held in Bogota. On the immediate gious divisions are not in themselves inherently agenda was a reform process before the Colombia problematic.” Congress. Members of parliament, government offi cials, specialists and representatives of civil so- “The real challenge here is not social division ciety engaged in a wide-ranging, lively debate on but how these social divisions were dealt with. how democracy could be improved and how the The issue is whether the divisions are used to af- devastating civil war could be brought to an end. fi rm identity or to exclude some groups through Among the topics considered at the event were violent or non-violent means and to ensure the electoral system reform, the internal democracy groups have no political space. When this hap- of political parties, and the fi nancing of political pens, the divisions become unhealthy.” parties.

The Role of State Constitutions in Promoting Minority Rights Under Federalism: Dialogues in Guatemala. Following 36 years of devastating civ- Support of a Democratic Transition in Burma (2003). il war, the parties to the confl ict in Guatemala signed a landmark peace agreement in 1996; the National Accords featured wide-ranging promise Colombia. Colombia’s civil war takes place in a for change in this deeply confl ictual society, where country which, despite high levels of violence, disputes over land, indigenous rights and state- continues to have electoral contests and, despite sponsored human rights abuses fed armed confl ict widespread violations of human rights, still has that cost over 150,000 lives. Constitutional and procedural democracy. Commensurate with the electoral reforms are among the promises made in launch of the Spanish-language version of the the peace agreements. As the Accords were being DRC handbook, in August 2001 IDEA teamed implemented, IDEA launched a dialogue process up with other organizations for a country-level in- in the country to systematically evaluate the twin itiative on Democratic Institutions and Confl ict goals of implementing the peace agreement and

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 137 building a new democracy. The assessment proc- years. In 2000, IDEA conducted a major democ- ess yielded a sub stantial report, Democracy in Gua- racy assessment of confl ict-torn Indonesia, which temala: A Mission for the Entire Nation (1997), at the time was experiencing religious and ethnic which evaluated the entire range of problems, tensions, economic stress, secessionist violence, challenges and promises for the war-torn country. and tough struggles among newly empowered civil One of the most important and enduring fi ndings society and long-powerful military elites. of the study relates to the impor tance of reform of the state’s security forces, the protection of human IDEA’s work in Indonesia featured not only a set rights by all sides, and the inculcation of a new of recommenda tions on furthering the transition culture of respect for the rule of law. to democracy and helping to consolidate the new democratic system, but also a benefi cial process of discussion among a wide array of stakeholders in Human Rights and the Rule of Law in the country. Guatemala “The credibility of the justice system must also Since the 2000 democracy assessment, IDEA has be salvaged. To accomplish this, reform of the pursued a variety of programmes to implement the system cannot be deferred. This does not mean fi ndings. It also worked with the Election Com- simply an administrative modernization or a mission prior to the 2004 elections and supported change in laws and procedures, but rather a the establishment of the new Regional Represent- complete reformulation of the administration atives Council, including holding workshops for of justice within the framework of democratic women candidates and for elected members—for institutions. In Guatemala, the democratiza- example, in the fi eld of relationships with constit- tion of the justice system implies a profound uents and regional-level authorities. transformation of the judicial culture, particu- larly of the offi cials responsible for providing justice. This reform must extend beyond sim- Key Elements for Consolidating Indonesia’s ply changing laws and norms, in order to allow Democracy for the building of a system with real support • Reform of the state and its institutions in the democratic experience, characterized by • Civilian authority and the armed forces equality, equity, socio-economic inclusion, and • The structure of the economy and respect for human dignity. In this sense, it is • corporate governance necessary to constitutionally recognize the ex- • Democratization and decentralization istence of principles, criteria, and procedures • Democracy and the rule of law that indigenous peoples have developed to re- • Constitutional Review and electoral reform solve confl icts among their community mem- • Democracy and a democratic culture bers, as well as the validity of their decisions.” • Religious pluralism and peaceful coexistence • Advocacy and monitoring by civil society Democracy in Guatemala: A Mission for the Entire organizations People (1998) • Women’s participation in politics

Democracy in Indonesia: An Assessment (2000) Indonesia. The post-Suharto transition to de- mocracy in Indonesia has been one of the most dramatic, and potentially confl ict-ridden, transi- Nigeria. Since independence, Nigeria has seen its tions from authoritarianism to democracy in re- share of violent confl ict. From the Biafran seces- cent years. The October 2004 elections, which sionist struggle between 1967 and 1970 to the were relatively peaceful and featured a transition present-day ethnic and religious street violence, from a defeated incumbent to a fairly elected chal- the country has also seen multiple transitions lenger, underscore how far the world’s most popu- from authoritarian military to civilian rule. The lous Muslim-majority country has come in recent latest transition from a military to civilian regime,

138 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) which is perhaps the most promising, culminated regional settings, in the 1999 election of General Olusegun Obas- the organization Learning across national frontiers has anjo as president. Having already been involved has sought to trans- also been a hallmark of IDEA’s work in its in the launch of the 1998 DRC handbook, the fer experiences and fi rst decade. By bringing together policy new president endorsed a comprehensive democ- lessons learned, to makers and specialists in regional settings, racy assessment—a top-to-bottom review—of the help establish re- the organization has sought to transfer fractious country that featured consultations with gional norms and experiences and lessons learned, to help an exceptionally broad spectrum of Nigerian soci- operational capaci- establish regional norms and operational ety. The result was a 414-page report released in ties, and to build capacities, and to build networks of Abuja, the Nigerian capital, in 2000, entitled De- networks of de- democracy specialists able to provide mocracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for mocracy specialists Nation Building. The assess ment addressed in a able to provide mu- mutual support and to share knowledge. straightforward and frank manner the diffi culties tual support and to the country faces as it seeks to consolidate democ- share knowledge. The regional work has focused racy under diffi cult circumstances. on those areas in which confl ict has been an en- during feature of the region, and in which transna- Among the key recommendations of the Democ- tional or cross-border monitoring and cooperation racy in Nigeria report are the following. have shown themselves to be effective in helping provide security and promoting democratic devel- • Nigeria needs a new social compact. The success opment. of the transition to democracy depends on the extent to which the relationship between the With the troubled transition of the Balkan states state and the citizenry can be redefi ned. emerging from the former Yugoslavia through war, • Constitutional development process. As a matter division of territory and international military in- of urgency and as part of the development of tervention, IDEA has sought to promote peace in a new social compact, it is important to insti- the region through support of the South Eastern tute a national dialogue process that includes Europe Democracy Support (SEEDS) network. a constitutional development process based on The project conducted, among other activities, an the principles of equality, justice, and the guar- important and timely survey in 2002 on citizen at- anteed enjoyment of individual and communal titudes towards democracy. The results, published rights and freedoms. as South Eastern Europe: New Means for Regional • Democratic dividend. Priority should be giv- Analysis (2002), were signifi cant: most citizens en to delivering the dividends of democracy care more about economic than ethnic issues; Eu- through comprehensive social and economic ropean integration is a strongly desired aim; Kos- policy frameworks targeted at poverty allevia- ovo has been a relative success, whereas there are tion, security, communal harmony and envi- deep concerns about Republic Srpska (in Bosnia), ronmental protection. Bosnia as a whole, and Macedonia; and the region has a long way to go towards achieving democracy Since the 2000 assessment exercise, IDEA has as a path to confl ict management. Other regional become more extensively involved in democracy initiatives have focused on monitoring of elections promotion in Nigeria. With an in-country team, in Kosovo, local democracy there, gender equity, it has continued activities focusing on national di- and democracy in Romania. alogues, political participation, constitutional re- form and national reconciliation. The South Caucasus region has also been troubled since its inde pendence following the collapse of 10.3.2. Regional Initiatives the Soviet Union. The war of secession in Azerba- ijan, unsettled sovereignty and claims for ethnic Learning across national frontiers has also been autonomy in Georgia, and endemic problems of a hallmark of IDEA’s work in its fi rst decade. By corruption in Armenia and throughout the region bringing together policy makers and specialists in set the stage for IDEA’s democracy promotion

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 139 efforts in this area. at Goree Island off the coast of Senegal in August IDEA’s work on the UN and democracy In September 2001 1999 that brought together offi cials and specialists yielded a report for the UN Millennium IDEA released a from a wide variety of West African states. More Summit in 2000 entitled Democracy and major democracy recently, IDEA held a workshop in Sierra Leone Global Cooperation at the United Nations: assessment report for administration personnel, and new work is Towards Peace, Development and on Georgia, Geor- planned on electoral guidelines and election mon- Democratization. The report urged the UN to gia and the South itoring through the principal sub-regional organi- Caucasus: Chal- zation, the Economic Community of West Afri- eschew a technical approach to democracy lenges to Sustain- can States (ECOWAS). In Southern Africa, IDEA promotion in its peace operations and able Democracy, has engaged in wide-ranging work to help newly to embrace more openly the political which found that created electoral management bodies manage elec- agenda of democracy as peace building; to the country faces tion processes, to share information and experi- consider more carefully how elections are exceptional chal- ence, and to develop regional guidelines for politi- only a single step in the democratization lenges of corrup- cal parties in the conduct of election campaigns. enterprise and to avoid a view of elections tion and a ‘shadow as a panacea; and, fi nally, to resist the state’, restive eth- In other regions, such as South Asia, IDEA has be- pressure to turn to democracy as a ‘quick nic groups seeking gun to build on its work in democracy assessments fi x’ for bringing a peace operation to a to break away from and dialogues and has used the State of Democra- speedy fruition. control by Tbilisi, cy assessment approach to evaluate a return to de- religious tension mocracy in idyllic but war-torn Nepal, to promote and discrimina- reconciliation and the peace process in Sri Lan- tion, de facto discrimination against women, and ka, and to begin to develop a regional network of serious electoral fraud in the elections that have democracy advocates to cooperate across borders been held since independence. and to include the region’s pivotal states of India and Pakistan. In the Arab world, where security In 2003, IDEA conducted a cross-regional com- concerns loom large in every state, IDEA works parison of local demo cracy in the region, which to further buttress the nascent political reform ef- found that, while some gains had been made in forts seen in recent years. The focus of activity is establishing legal frameworks, the realities on the on political party development, gender equality ground suggest that all states in the region face and women’s repre sentation, and electoral system tremendous challenges in creating a meaningful reform. Earlier, in 2000, IDEA published a report system of local democracy. IDEA now has a pro- entitled Democracy in the Arab World: Challenges, gramme offi cer working in the region to further its Achievements, and Prospects; among its key fi ndings democracy-building work, the highlights of which was that managing Islamist political action will re- are published in a newsletter entitled Dialogue. main a dilemma for democracy promoters in the Among the regional projects are dialogues for con- region for some time to come. While ideally re- stitution reform. gimes should become open and introduce com- petitive elections, could extremists come to power IDEA’s Africa programme also operates in an ex- through the ballot box with the intention of de- ceptionally large and diverse region that has ex- stroying democracy once in power? perienced confl ict and deep-rooted confl ict. Al- though in many countries such as Mozambique 10.3.3. Democracy and the United and Angola, or Sierra Leone and Liberia, wars Nations have offi cially ended, problems of confl ict still be- set many states on the continent. The IDEA Af- In April 1999 the UN Commission on Human rica programme has, in addition to its work in Ni- Rights adopted a landmark resolution which for geria, focused on cross-border learning in West Af- the fi rst time unambiguously proclaimed every rica and the development of new democratic insti- individual’s right to democracy. Supported by 51 tutions, norms and standards in Southern Africa. governments and opposed by none, Resolution 57 For example, IDEA convened a major conference of that year affi rmed in a new way that democracy

140 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) is a fundamental human right that includes, in the and, fi nally, to resist the pressure to turn to de- words of the resolution: mocracy as a ‘quick fi x’ for bringing a peace op- eration to a speedy fruition. The UN has adopted (a) The rights to freedom of opinion and ex- many of the recommendations in the report over pression, of thought, conscience and religion, time, as evidenced in the careful and strategically and of peaceful association and assembly; sophisticated approach the world body has taken (b) The right to freedom to seek, receive and to organizing elections in 2004 in Afghanistan. impart information and ideas through any me- dia; (c) The rule of law, including legal protec- A fi nal element of the UN and democracy project tion of citizens’ rights, interests and personal is a series of seminars the organization has held security, and fairness in the administration in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone on the of justice and independence of the judiciary; promotion of local democracy. Recognizing that, (d) The right of universal and equal suffrage, as although essential, national elections do not trans- well as free voting procedures and periodic and late into ground-level infusion of democratic val- free elections; (e) The right of political partici- ues in a war-torn society, IDEA’s work highlights pation, including equal opportunity for all citi- the importance of elections and citizen partici- zens to become candidates; (f) Transparent and pation initiatives in local settings. The results of accountable government institutions; (g) The this activity are published in a new report, Democ- right of citizens to choose their governmental racy and Peace-Building at the Local Level: Lessons system through constitutional or other demo- Learned (2004). cratic means; and (h) The right to equal access to public service in one’s own country. 10.4. Conclusion: New Challenges, Themes and In the same year, IDEA began working on a Approaches project related to the UN’s role in promoting de- mocracy in comprehensive peace opera tions. In Like the 1990s, the 21st century has brought with sum, for the UN, democracy is both an intrinsic it an entirely new set of challenges for internation- human right and a practical objective necessary for al democracy promotion in a world beset by vio- the creation of viable states and the organization lent confl ict. Certainly the terrorist attacks in the of legitimate governments, as part of an ‘exit strat- United States on 11 September 2001 have placed egy’ for winding up complex peace opera tions. Be- national security concerns at the top of the inter- ginning in 2000, IDEA has organized a number national agenda, often at the expense of human of seminars that have brought together UN of- rights. Moreover, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which fi cials, veterans of peace operations and experts UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has dubbed ‘il- to evaluate how the twin goals of peace keeping legal’, was fought in part with the aim of bringing and democracy promotion have been pursued in democracy and liberty to Iraq through the barrel countries such as Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, East of a gun. While this enterprise may in the long Timor, and Kosovo. run still prove to be successful despite the obvious setbacks that have been encountered by advocates IDEA’s work on the UN and democracy yielded of the intervention, both the new climate of fear a report for the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 and the Iraq controversy have reinforced a deep entitled Democracy and Global Cooperation at the and widespread scepticism about the ability of de- United Nations: Towards Peace, Development and mocracy to contribute to confl ict management in Democratization. The report urged the UN to es- today’s tumultuous climate. Added to these secu- chew a technical approach to democracy promo- rity concerns is the fact that in many countries de- tion in its peace operations and to embrace more mocracy has not been seen to deliver the goods openly the political agenda of democracy as peace in terms of contributing suffi ciently to economic building; to consider more carefully how elections development; it is not unusual to hear talk of a are only a single step in the democratization enter- ‘democracy defi cit’ in terms of public support for prise and to avoid a view of elections as a panacea; free and fair elections when the public’s principal

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 141 concerns are per- facilitate more sustainable reforms. In order to contribute successfully to peace, sonal and econom- political institutions and processes must ic security. Finally, given the deep and enduring scepticism clearly and unambiguously advance the that democracy can in fact contribute to the man- very basic aims of governance: human IDEA’s work must agement of deep-rooted confl ict, in 2005 IDEA security and human development. To have face up to these con- will launch a new handbook together with an on- value, democracy in situations of deep- temporary chall- line resource guide to re-evaluate anew the fun- enges in much the damental relationships between democracy and rooted confl ict today must go well beyond same way as the confl ict management. The new project, Democra- negotiating well-designed institutions— work of the 1990s cy and Deep-Rooted Confl ict: Options for Peace however important that may be—to ensure addressed the through Democracy Practices, starts from the that today’s confl icts, too, are indeed best burning issues of premise that, in order to contribute successfully addressed over time by creating political that turbulent dec- to peace, political institutions and processes must systems in which tolerance, trust and ade. Today, IDEA’s clearly and unambiguously advance the very basic mutual understanding are the values upon efforts focus on aims of governance: human security and human which real world security and development prior lessons well development. To have value, democracy in situ- imperatives are realized. learned, such as ations of deep-rooted confl ict today must go well the enduring im- beyond negotiating well-designed institutions— portance of insti- however important that may be—to ensure that tutional design, engineering and crafting for con- today’s confl icts, too, are indeed best addressed fl ict manage ment. In 2004, IDEA began a new over time by creating political systems in which project to evaluate how constitution-making tolerance, trust and mutual understanding are the processes and institutional choices can contrib- values upon which real world security and devel- ute to confl ict management. In this project, con- opment imperatives are realized. stitutional processes focus on broad inclusion of all social segments in constitutional talks and the subsequent implementation and sus tainability of agreements reached. In case studies of constitution making in countries such as Afghanistan, Guate- mala, Nigeria, Colombia and Kenya, among oth- ers, the project will take further the evaluation of the conditions under which clever institutional choices and well-conceived deliberation can tip the balance towards peace and away from violence in divided societies.

Similarly, the theme of democracy building as a dialogue is taken up anew in a project that will draw on the experience of prac titioners in a vari- ety of settings to derive lessons for effective proc- esses of structured discussion to evaluate democra- cy’s quality and performance. The dialogue project began its work in earnest in 2004 and will yield a signifi cant new handbook in 2005. The hand- book, which is being created in a partnership with UNDP and the Organization of American States, has moved beyond the evaluation of democracy it- self to key issues of setting national agendas for improving democracy, consensus building in dif- fi cult issue areas, and ways in which dialogue can

142 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

‘Which democracy model did we want to promote? Following extensive consultations around the world as drafters of the statutes we resolved that IDEA should be mandated to support sustainable democracy worldwide. Hence, its commitment to work with both new and long-established democracies. IDEA’s programme to support democratic development in Burkina Faso, initiated in 1996, was a milestone in the struggle for advancing democracy in one of the poorest African countries.’

Adama Dieng, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and Registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda since March 2001. Senegal. Member of the Board of International IDEA February 1995–June 2001

144 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

11. The State of Democracy Project

David Beetham

This chapter provides an account of IDEA’s democ- 11.1. Background racy assessment process. It outlines how the democ- racy assessment methodology developed by IDEA has An essential element in any country’s process of worked and infl uenced other methodologies, and how democracy building or democratic reform is a it has been used as a teaching tool and even taken stage of stocktaking—to assess progress to date on a life of its own, triggering a second generation of and to identify the most serious weaknesses that assessments initiated by the countries themselves. should be addressed. This is what a systematic de- mocracy assess ment seeks to provide. Its potential The State of Democracy project was established audience is not only political decision makers but by IDEA at the end of the 1990s with the follow- also the public or civil society more widely. Such ing aims: an assessment can serve to raise public awareness about what democracy involves and to inform de- • to develop a robust methodology for assessing bate about what standards of performance people the condition and progress of democracy in any should expect from their govern ment. It can con- country of the world; tribute to public discussion about ongoing reform, • to pilot the methodology with in-country part- and help to identify priorities for a reform pro- ners in a number of countries, both to test gramme. It can also provide an instrument for as- its effectiveness and as a direct con tribution sessing how effectively reforms are working out in to democratic development in the respective practice. countries; • to draw comparative conclusions from these as- The idea of systematically assessing the level or sessments about the successes and setbacks of quality of a country’s democracy has a long ped- democratization to date, as a guide to the glo- igree, although it became more prevalent during bal state of democracy; and the 1990s with the emergence of many new demo- • to promote the use of the assessment method- cracies. Historically, such assessments have been ology more widely by a variety of user constitu- designed to serve widely differing purposes. On encies, through the production of a handbook one side are the quantitative tables of global demo- and other publications, and through the fos- cratic performance developed by Freedom House, tering of a global network of democracy asses- the World Bank or the Polity IV dataset, which sors. enable comparisons to be made between countries on a small number of key indicators. (Recent ex- amples of these are included in UNDP 2002: 38– 41.) Here every country’s performance on each

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 145 indicator is assessed and aggregated into a single instructive or judgemental, although this ought overall score or league table for rough comparative not exclude the involvement of invited external purposes. Such quantitative tables have also been experts with comparative experience of conduct- developed and used by social scientists to enable ing such assessments. correlations to be made between levels of democ- racy and other variables, such as economic devel- This facilitative purpose has characterized the State opment or respect for human rights. of Democracy’s assessment methodology from the outset. It also has other innovative features which On the other side there are in-depth analyses of have gained it international recognition, of which democratic governance in individual countries de- the following are the most signifi cant: signed by international development agencies for • the criteria for assessment are derived system- an explicit policy purpose: to identify weaknesses atically from clearly defi ned democratic norms in potential recipients of economic aid, or to lo- and principles; cate points where • the framework of search questions provides a external political comprehensive and coherent itemization of de- One of its key principles is that assess ments intervention might mocracy’s key features, which is readily intelli- should be conducted by citizens of the be most useful gible and easy to use; country concerned, not by outsiders sitting or most effective • the assessment process and framework can be in judgement upon it. This is because (Crawford 2001). applied to established and emergent democra- any process of reform is more likely to be These assessments cies alike; effective if not only the process itself but are typically quali- • fi nished assessments can combine qualitative also the defi nition of its priorities is ‘owned’ tative rather than and quantitative analysis; and by the people concerned. quantitative in • the practice of involving a wide range of par- form, and they are ticipants from the outset, and submitting the sectorally disaggre- preliminary fi ndings to a national conference gated so that the respective strengths and weak- for peer review, enhances the legitimacy and nesses of different aspects of democratic govern- political salience of the assessment process. ance can be individually identifi ed. From this per- spective, to sum all these together into a single The next section will briefl y elaborate on each of score, as is done in the fi rst type of assessment, these features in turn. not only obscures as much as it reveals; it cannot provide the evidence needed for a targeted reform 11.2. An Innovative programme. Methodology

The assessment methodology developed for IDEA’s The assessment methodology was originally pio- State of Democracy project is closer to the second neered by a group involved in auditing the state of than the fi rst type of democracy assess ment men- democracy in the United Kingdom, in response to tioned above in that its purpose is to contribute widespread concerns about the democratic condi- directly to a programme of democracy building tion of that country at the end of the 1980s. The and democratic reform. Unlike the assessments methodology was, however, considerably modi- conducted by other international agencies, how- fi ed and developed for IDEA’s State of Democra- ever, this one is designed to be domestically rather cy Project. Most important in this was the assem- than externally driven. One of its key principles is bling of an international group of experts from that assess ments should be conducted by citizens every region of the world to critique and refi ne of the country concerned, not by outsiders sitting a draft assessment framework. In the process, sig- in judgement upon it. This is because any proc- nifi cant concerns and experiences from emergent ess of reform is more likely to be effective if not democracies and developing countries were incor- only the process itself but also the defi nition of porated into the assessment method. Its distinc- its priorities is ‘owned’ by the people concerned. tive features can thus be seen as the outcome of an Outsiders can at most be facili tative rather than international process of peer review.

146 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 11.2.1. Democratic Norms 11.2.2. Framework of Assessment Questions Most types of democracy or governance assess- ment either fail to explain or justify their selection The assessment framework sets out in a logical or- of items to be assessed, or are explicit about the der the main ele ments which together comprise a normative criteria against which a given country’s functioning democratic polity and society. It be- practices are to be evaluated. The State of Democ- gins with the citizen and his or her rights, includ- racy method is based on a simple assumption that ing the legal insti- democracy is to be defi ned in the fi rst instance by tutions necessary a set of norms or principles, and only secondar- to guarantee these The State of Democracy method is based ily by the institutions and practices through which rights in practice; on a simple assumption that democracy is these principles are realized. When we are trying to moves on to the to be defi ned in the fi rst instance by a set of assess how democratic a given institution or prac- assessment of the norms or principles, and only secondarily tice is, the criterion has to be how far it actually institu tions of rep- by the institutions and practices through helps to realize a relevant democratic principle. So, resentative and ac- which these principles are realized. for example, if what makes elections democratic is countable govern- that they enable citizens to choose their rulers and ment; assesses the hold them accountable, then these norms will not contribution of civil society to political partici- be realized to the extent that the citizen’s choice pation and government responsiveness; and con- is unduly restricted, or the choices made are not cludes with the international dimensions of de- fairly refl ected in the governmental outcome, or mocracy. In all, the framework has 14 sections, ar- a government is able to control or manipulate the ranged as follows: choices in the fi rst place. It follows that it is not • Citizen rights: nationhood and citizenship, the enough to specify a checklist of items to be as- rule of law and access to justice, civil and politi- sessed without explaining what their contribution cal rights, and economic and social rights. is to democratic life and the norms against which • Representative and accountable government: free they are to be assessed. and fair elections, the democratic role of po- litical parties, government effectiveness and The underlying democratic principles that have accountability, civilian control of the military driven the State of Democracy assessment meth- and police, and minimizing corruption. od are twofold: popular control of public deci- • Civil society and popular participation: the me- sions and decision makers, and equality between dia in a democratic society, political participa- citizens in relation to those decisions—in short, tion, government responsiveness, and decen- popular control and political equality. These prin- tralization. ciples are applicable to both direct and representa- • Democracy beyond the state: the international di- tive democracy. In relation to the latter, however mensions of democracy. (the normal form for contemporary government), these principles are realized through a set of medi- Although all these different components can be ating norms: those of participation, authorization, treated separately for analytical purposes, they are representativeness, accountability, transparency, all interdepend- responsiveness and solidarity. These are the norms ent, and any over- Nothing, for example, has more discredited against which the actual working of the main in- all assessment has the democratization process than the stitutions of democracy has to be assessed, wheth- to consider how assumption that it is largely a matter of er it be legislatures, the electoral process, access to they relate to one electoral democracy alone, without any justice, the rights of citizens, or whatever. This re- another and work lationship between norms and practices provides together in con- consideration of what happens in the long the underlying logic to the assessment framework text. Nothing, for periods between elections, or of what basic and method (for a convenient summary see Inter- example, has more supportive conditions are necessary if national IDEA 2002). discredited the elections are to be genuinely ‘free and fair’. democratization

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 147 process than the as- These questions are all deliberately framed sumption that it is in the comparative mode, on the assumption largely a matter of that democracy is a matter of degree, not an electoral democra- all-or-nothing affair, which a country either cy alone, without has or does not have. any consideration of what happens in the long peri- ods between elections, or of what basic supportive conditions are necessary if elections are to be gen- uinely ‘free and fair’. The assessment framework encourages the different elements to be seen in re- lation to one another, while also enabling the dif- ference in democratic performance between them to be identifi ed.

Each section of the framework outlined above contains a list of four or fi ve search questions, which an assessment team will seek to answer. By for assess ment. Should it be an internal one, for way of example, the list of questions for section 8 example some appropriate point in the past, say of the framework (civilian control of the military the end of an authoritarian regime, from which and police) is: progress can be charted, or some target for attain- ment which the government has explicitly set it- 1. How effective is civilian control over the armed self or which is implicit in popular expectations of forces, and how free is political life from mili- how governments should perform? Or should it tary involvement? be external: the level attained by some appropriate 2. How publicly accountable are the police and comparator country in the region, or an interna- security services for their activities? tional standard of good or best attainable practice? 3. To what extent does the composition of the Assessors may wish to combine these, but the de- army, police and security services refl ect the so- cision must be theirs in the light of which kind of cial composition of society at large? standard will carry the most persuasive force in the 4. How free is the country from the operation of given context. This is only one of the many ways paramilitary units, private armies, warlordism in which the framework can be tailored to local and criminal mafi as? circumstances, albeit within a common method and question base. These questions are all deliberately framed in the comparative mode, on the assumption that democ- 11.2.3. Universal Applicability racy is a matter of degree, not an all-or-nothing af- fair, which a coun- At fi rst sight it might seem surprising that an as- Yet the established democracies are also try either has or sessment methodology should be applicable to es- in need of reform and improvement, as the does not have. This tablished as well as emergent democracies. Most raises the question qualitative assessments are designed to be applied widespread collapse in public confi dence of what counts as a to recently established democracies, typically to and participation in representative good com parative deter mine whether they attain the threshold for processes demonstrates. standard against external assistance, say, or for membership of a which a country’s democratic ‘club’ such as the European Union. performance can be judged in each respect. One Here the level of attainment of the established de- of the strengths of the assessment method is that mocracies is assumed to be the self-evident stand- it is left to the assessors themselves to decide what ard against which newcomers should be judged. is the most appropriate comparator or standard

148 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Yet the established democracies are also in need of These concerns are reform and improvement, as the widespread col- precisely refl ected What value does the popular control of lapse in public confi dence and participation in in the search ques- government have, they asked, if a govern- representative processes demonstrates. They also tions of the interna- ment is itself relatively powerless in the have problems with ‘money politics’, with the tional section, and face of international agencies, or if major defence of basic rights, economic as well as civil, are able to capture decisions affecting the well-being of with social inclusion, with gender equality, with the democracy- citizens are taken beyond the state? And accountability of the security services, and so on. relevant aspects of can a country be called democratic if it is Such problems may be more acute in the emergent a country’s external not consistent in its respect for inter national demo cracies, but they are common to all, and we profi le, whether the law, or in its support for democracy and can all benefi t from each other’s experience of how country belongs to best to tackle them. the relatively pow- human rights beyond its borders? erful or powerless A basic assumption of the State of Democracy as- international players. sessment method is that the democratic norms and principles outlined above have a universal applica- 11.2.4. Qualitative or Quantitative bility and appeal, even though they may not be Findings? universally applied in practice. It is this universal appeal of democratic values that enables a carefully Answering the search questions in the assessment designed assessment framework itself to have gen- framework is primarily a research-based exercise, eral applicability. This is not a question of impos- though this need not involve the assessors in un- ing our values or standards on others, as should be dertaking or commissioning new primary research clear from the country-centred approach already themselves. It is rather a matter of identifying ex- discussed. Indeed, nothing better demonstrates isting data and evidence from a variety of sourc- the universality than having established democra- es, including opinion surveys, and organizing it cies subject themselves to the same self-assessment systematically so that it answers the questions as process as is expected of emergent ones. It is for closely and convincingly as possible. Often this this reason that the pilot studies in the State of De- requires a qualitative or discursive treatment; at mocracy Project included two established democ- other times the fi ndings can be best expressed in racies (Italy and New Zealand) alongside others, quantitative form. even though a concern with the ‘old’ democracies may not be a central part of IDEA’s mission. It would be a mistake to draw a sharp contrast be- tween assessment fi ndings in qualitative or quan- An example of how careful design can enable titative terms. Some issues can only be treated dis- search questions to tap into the concerns of coun- cursively, for example, any account of the legal ba- tries in very different circumstances can be drawn sis for the respective powers of citizens, legislatures from the fi nal section of the framework, on the in- and executives, and the procedures through which ternational dimensions of democracy. That such a these are real ized in practice, or a survey of the his- section was included at all was due to the prompt- torical and social context which alone can make ing of contributors from the South, who were par- a country’s democratic process intelligible. When ticularly sensitive to the way in which a country’s it comes to assessing outcomes, some of these cer- policies can be determined from outside. What tainly lend themselves to quantifi cation and coun- value does the popular control of government try comparison. Most obvious examples are sub- have, they asked, if a govern ment is itself relatively jects such as voter turnout, the representative ness powerless in the face of international agencies, or of legislatures, gender participation rates, patterns if major decisions affecting the well-being of citi- of social and economic inequality, and so on. Less zens are taken beyond the state? And can a coun- obviously, it is sometimes possible to fi nd one or try be called democratic if it is not consistent in its two quantitative indicators which throw light on respect for inter national law, or in its support for a whole area of public life; for example, the ratio democracy and human rights beyond its borders? of different populations in prison, the percentage

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 149 of the prison pop- 11.2.5. Legitimacy of the Assessment The State of Democracy Project has ulation awaiting Results rejected the practice of reducing complex trial, or the aver- and nuanced qualitative judgements to age length of time For assessment fi ndings to have a public impact is a question not just of effective presentation but numerical form, which delivers a simple taken to bring cases of a public recognition of the legitimacy of the as- ‘score’, or of then weighting different to court can illumi- sessment process. At the end of the day, assessing aspects of democracy and aggregating the nate a whole crimi- nal justice system. the level or quality of a country’s democracy is a results into a competitive league table of Here a simple table judgemental activity, aspects of which are bound democratic performance. can be worth vol- to be contro versial. It is all the more important, umes of text. therefore, to be able to defend the integrity of the process. A number of elements can contrib- The State of Democracy Project has rejected the ute to this. One is the selection of the assessors, practice of reducing complex and nuanced quali- who need to be credible experts in their respective tative judgements to numerical form, which deliv- fi elds. A second is the involvement of a range of ers a simple ‘score’, or of then weighting different potential stakeholders in the planning stages of the aspects of democracy and aggregating the results assessment. A third, obviously, is the quality and into a competitive league table of democratic per- objectivity of the data and evidence on which the formance. The results of such reduction and ag- judgements are based. The fourth is the practice of gregation are usually arbitrary, and give a mislead- submitting draft fi ndings to a national conference ing impression of objective precision to what are for peer review by a wide range of opinion. To- essentially subjective judgements. The reason for gether these can answer criticisms that the assess- the currency of such league tables lies in the pub- ment is merely partisan. I have already mentioned lic demand for simple measures which can be read the legitimacy which comes from an assessment at a glance, where few have the time or patience to process that is dome stically rather than externally wade through a large volume. This is primarily a driven and conducted. In addition, the robustness matter of presentation rather than of the intrinsic of the assessment method, the explicitness of its appropriateness of normative basis and the standing of IDEA itself as numbers or a text. promoter and partner have all contributed to the For assessment fi ndings to have a public Contributors to the legitimacy of the assessments to date. It is to a re- impact is a question not just of effective State of Democracy view of these that this chapter turns next. presentation but of a public recognition of Project have experi- the legitimacy of the assessment process. mented with various 11.3. ‘First-Generation’ methods of present- Assessments ing fi ndings in sum- mary or simplifi ed form: The pilot programme of eight country assessments • the executive summary, both as part of a larger fi nanced by the Institute and the various spin-offs text and for separate publication; constitute the ‘fi rst generation’ of assessments us- • the selection of a few key fi ndings for a media ing the IDEA methodology. Only the most signif- handout; icant outcomes from the pilot programme will be • the development of qualitative as well as quan- summarized in what follows. titative tables; and • graphic presentations in the form of charts and 11.3.1. Pilot Country Assessments diagrams. These presentational methods have developed as The eight countries selected for assessment by in- the project has progressed, and can be developed country partners were Bangladesh, El Salvador, further. Italy, Kenya, Malawi, New Zealand, Peru and South Korea. All of these produced democracy assessments covering the full range of the assess- ment framework, including executive summaries.

150 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) In each case draft fi ndings were submitted for re- 11.3.2. Comparative Publications view to a national conference of experts, including journalists, academics, politicians, human rights The fi rst of two comparative publications aris- lawyers, and public offi cials such as electoral com- ing from the State of Democracy project was the missioners, parliamentary clerks, and so on. The Handbook on Democracy Assessment (Beetham full reports and summaries were photocopied for et al. 2002a). As its title implies, the aim of the domestic circulation to a wide range of audienc- hand book was to disseminate and democratize es. All were published electronically on the IDEA the process of democracy assessment by providing web site, and those for Bangladesh and New Zea- a step-by-step guide which any group could use land were also published in book form by a local on its own account. In particular it would stimu- publisher in partnership with IDEA (Barman et late other country assessments beyond those that al. 2002; and Henderson and Bellamy 2002). could be fi nanced by IDEA. The fi rst part of the handbook explains the assessment framework and What sort of impact did they have? This has proved provides a guide to each stage of the assessment diffi cult to evaluate defi nitively. Many of the asses- process, from assembling a group of stakeholders sors were involved in a wide range of other democ- through to strategies for dissemination of a fi n- racy initiatives, and the results of the assessment ished report and media publicity. The second part fed into their other work and contacts. It is a mis- gives examples of fi nished assessments, and differ- take, therefore, to draw too sharp a distinction be- ent ways of presenting their fi ndings. The third tween academics and practitioners, since most of part offers a systematic compendium to assist as- the academic assessors saw themselves as ‘public sessors in answering each of the search questions intellectuals’ who had a foot in the world of pub- in the framework. Against each question is set a lic policy as well as academia, and had developed summary of the types of data required to answer their own political and media contacts. A number the question, a list of helpful sources for the data, of the national conferences to discuss draft fi nd- and the location of examples of good practice as ings had a direct impact on the political scene. In possible standards for the assessment. The hand- Peru many of the participants were to become in- book concludes with a do-it-yourself question- volved in the constitutional discussions and inter- naire version of the assessment framework, which im arrangements following the ousting of Presi- could also be used for an elite survey by country dent Fujimori. In Kenya the conference brought assessors. Since there is no equivalent in the assess- together on one platform for the fi rst time leading ment fi eld, the handbook has had considerable in- represen tatives of the competing constitutional re- ternational impact. form proposals put forward by the government and civil society, respectively. In Bangladesh rep- Whereas the handbook was designed to dissem- resentatives from the antagonistic political parties inate the methodology of the pilot project, a sec- of government and opposition both attended. In ond volume, entitled simply The State of Democra- such contexts the assessment process provided a cy, aimed to disseminate its key fi ndings (Beetham neutral meeting point which transcended political et al. 2002b). The fi rst part of this volume con- antagonisms. tains the executive summaries from all the eight pilot assessments, set out according to each of the Time and resource limitations prevented the lev- 14 sections of the framework in turn. A second el of involvement of stakeholders, especially from part presents the fi ndings comparatively in a series civil society, at an early enough stage of the assess- of innovative qualitative and quantitative tables. ment process. Had this been possible, the fi nished A third part draws out some general conclusions assessment would have had wider political salience about the democratization process from the pilot and impact. Since this was a pilot programme, it studies. These show that some aspects of democ- was important to draw appropriate lessons from racy can be introduced or reintroduced relative- it which have been incorporated in the two com- ly quickly and successfully, especially where the parative publications which represent the second removal of constraints on basic freedoms simply output from the programme. requires governments not to act oppressively or

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 151 obstruct ively. Other features, however, involve a to develop an international network of those in- much longer haul, since they require positive ac- volved in democracy assessment from the many tion from governments to develop effective sys- international contacts already stimulated by the tems of accountability and inclusion, and an alert project. These include the experts involved in and active civil society. One advantage of includ- the original design of the framework, the asses- ing established democracies in the pilot scheme sors from the pilot countries, those involved in a has been to show that they too have experienced second generation of country assessments (see be- continuing problems, and where there is therefore low), and other interested parties from develop- mutual benefi t to be gained by sharing diffi culties ment agencies, non-governmental organizations and potential solutions to them. (NGOs) and academia. In addition, members of the project team have made presentations on the 11.3.3. Infl uence on Other Assessment IDEA methodology at international meetings in Methodologies Morocco, Germany and Mongolia (2002–3), and written them up for the academic community in The work and publications of the State of Democ- Democratization (2004), the Journal of Democra- racy Project have already had a considerable infl u- cy (2004), and other publications (see Beetham ence on other organizations working internation- 2004a and 2004b). ally in the fi eld of democracy and governance as- sessment. Among these, the UK Department for 11.3.4. Pedagogical Applications International Development (DFID) made use of the methodology in the development of its own One unanticipated outcome of the State of De- governance assessment framework, and personnel mocracy Project has been the pedagogical appli- from the project were involved in designing and cations of the assessment framework. Although piloting a participatory assessment process for the originally designed as a research instrument, it has DFID in Indonesia and Nigeria. The UN Eco- proved to be equally useful as a device for teaching nomic Commission for Africa used the framework about democracy and its problems, and in devel- in the design of its oping analytical skills of assessment for students at comparative gov- a number of levels. Aspects of the framework have One advantage of including established ernance assessment been used as a component in civic education in democracies in the pilot scheme has been programme, devel- Kenya and Malawi. They have been employed in to show that they too have experienced oping the meth- international courses for practitioners run by the continuing problems, and where there is odology further by British Council. And the framework as a whole therefore mutual benefi t to be gained by adding a citizen has formed a component in Master’s level mod- sharing diffi culties and potential solutions satisfaction sur- ules at universities in Australia, Canada, Germa- to them. vey and elite ques- ny, New Zealand and the UK. In addition, it has tionnaire to the re- formed the core of the foundation under graduate search component course in political science at the University of To- of the assessment process. Again, personnel from ronto, where students undertake an assessment of the State of Democracy Project were involved in their own country and one emergent democracy an advisory capacity. The Inter-Parliamentary Un- as their required project. Again, these are only the ion is currently developing a set of criteria for as- applications known to the author through person- sessing the parlia mentary dimension of democracy al contact, and there are likely to be many others. which explicitly takes the IDEA methodology as its starting point. 11.4. ‘Second-Generation’ Assessments These are examples of clearly identifi able infl u- ence. Others may pass unnoticed simply because Second-generation assessments are those where the process of dissemination of ideas is subterra- particular countries have taken up the IDEA nean and involves a complex mixture of many fac- framework and methodology on their own ini- tors. One way of assisting further dissemination is tiative and used them with their own sources of

152 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) funding. Typically, they have adapted the meth- The Democracy in odology to their own situa tion and improved it, South Asia project, One unanticipated outcome of the State while still keeping the basic framework of search involving compara- of Democracy Project has been the questions intact. All have attempted to involve po- tive assess ments of pedagogical applications of the assessment tential user groups and agencies from both gov- fi ve countries, has framework. Although originally designed ernment and civil society in the assessment process highlighted new as a research instrument, it has proved to from an early stage. Other innovations or modi- thematic issues be equally useful as a device for teaching fi cations they have made are worth summarizing in the assessment briefl y. framework, such as about democracy and its problems, and in protection against developing analytical skills of assessment The UK Democratic Audit has a successful histo- tyranny, and has for students at a number of levels. ry of identifying under-researched topics of public developed a multi- importance in the democratic fi eld and publish- level approach to ing research papers on them, prior to a complete implementing it. Besides a research component democracy assessment. Its research on public non- and an elite survey, it has initiated as series of de- governmental agencies (or ‘quangos’) and on al- mocracy dialogues between different ‘knowledge ternative electoral systems for the UK has proved communities’ at regional, national and local lev- particularly infl uential. Its most recent full democ- els, and has complemented these with a number racy assessment, Democracy under Blair, using the of case studies exploring key puzzles about the IDEA framework, ran into a second edition, such working of democracy in practice. A distinctive was the demand (Beetham et al., Democracy un- theme of the assessment is the idea that democra- der Blair 2002 and 2003). The pamphlets summa- cy changes as it travels to new countries, and that rizing the assessment fi ndings used diagrams and a common template has to be sensitive to cultural visuals in an innovative way, and were circulated specifi cities in each country and region.4 to all members of Parlia ment (MPs), as well as to supporters of the main democracy and human Democracy assessments recently initiated in the rights NGOs. The authors have acted as advisers Philippines and the Republic of Ireland have opted to government and to select committees of Parlia- for implementing the assessment framework as a ment, and are developing the assessment section rolling programme, in which sections of particular on economic and social rights into the fi rst full- importance to funding agencies are given fi rst pri- length audit of these rights in the UK. ority. Getting suf- fi cient funding for A distinctive theme of the assessment is the A group based at the Australian National Univer- a complete assess- idea that democracy changes as it travels to sity has won a major research council grant to fi - ment is not always new countries, and that a common template nance a democracy assessment of Australia on the easy. It should be has to be sensitive to cultural specifi cities IDEA model. Like the UK, it has adopted a strat- said, however, that in each country and region. egy of publishing interim research papers on is- for all these second- sues such as electoral systems and political equal- generation assess- ity, or corruption and Australian democracy, so as ments it has proved a strong selling point to po- to establish an early public profi le. Australia is the tential funding bodies that the assessment meth- fi rst federal system to be assessed using the IDEA od and framework have been successfully tested in framework, and it is of considerable interest to see practice, and have now achieved inter national rec- how it can be adapted for assessing a multi-level ognition and credibility. In due course it will be polity. Other distinctive features of the Australian important to review the experience of these later assessment are its emphasis on deliberative democ- assessments, and particularly the innovations they racy as a key component of public life, and its par- have made. This process began at an IDEA work- ticularly active web site and assessment network shop in June 2004, and will be carried forward at (see ). an international meeting in Canada in June 2005.

4 The project is led by Professor Peter de Souza at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 153 effects: between, say, contributing to the public debate or dis course of democracy; enriching civic education within and without the academy; devel- oping consensus around a reform agenda; infl u- encing specifi c reforms or reform agents; and eval- uating the effectiveness of reforms once undertak- en. Some of these effects are easier to assess than others. It was agreed that it would be mistaken to prioritize either the short- or the long-term effects, but that a successful assessment ought to be able to contribute to both.

Particular interest centred on how the assessment work undertaken to date might be of use to the donor community, which tends to be interested in shorter-term policy outcomes. Attention focused on how the distinctive expertise of academics in comparative analysis and the evaluation of differ- ent assessment methodologies could be helpful to 11.5. The International IDEA donors in the development of more precisely fo- Workshop cused governance indicators and in the mounting of training programmes and conferences. Making The workshop held in London in June 2004 such links between academic and policy-orient- brought together many of those who had been in- ed work had always been a distinctive feature of volved in the development of the assessment frame- IDEA’s activities. work and in the pilot country assessments, togeth- er with participants As for the future of the State of Democracy Project, in the second gen- it was agreed that its success to date had given it a Not all the outcomes of an assessment were eration of assess- momentum that exceeded its original conception. exhausted by the impact of a particular ments. The aims The international network created by the fi rst gen- product or publication, but that the process of the workshop eration of assessments, and publications such as itself was also important. were to review the the handbook, helped to stimulate the second gen- State of Democra- eration without new fi nancial resources being re- cy Project to date, quired from the Institute itself. Nevertheless, most to assess its strengths and limitations, and to con- of the suggestions for improvement of the meth- sider proposals for its development. odology made at the workshop, for developing it for different user constituencies, for revising the Much of the discussion centred around the issue of handbook, and even for supporting further coun- how to assess the impact of country assessments, try assessments, could best be provided by a part- given that their purpose was to contribute to the nership between IDEA and a leading academic in- democratization process itself. A number of useful stitution. The University of Essex Human Rights distinctions emerged from the discussion. It was Centre has been chosen for this purpose. pointed out that not all the outcomes of an assess- ment were exhausted by the impact of a particular product or publication, but that the process itself was also important, especially where it involved a wide range of stakeholders, and contributed to the development of an ongoing monitoring capac- ity within civil society. Another distinction was between longer- and shorter-term infl uences or

154 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) References

Australian National University, Barman, D., Rahman, Golam and Siddiqui, Tasneem, State of Democracy in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Department of Peace and Confl ict Studies, University of Dhaka, 2002) Beetham, David, ‘The Quality of Democracy: Freedom as the Foundation’, Journal of Democracy 15/4 (October 2004), pp. 61-75 (2004a) — ‘Towards a Universal Framework for Democracy Assess- ment’, Democratization 11/2 (April 2004), pp. 1-17 (2004b) Beetham, D., Bracking, S., Kearton, I. and Weir, S., Inter- national IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) (2002a) Beetham, D., Bracking, S., Kearton, I., Vittal, N. and Weir, S. (eds), The State of Democracy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) (2002b) Beetham, D., Byrne, I., Ngan, P. and Weir, S., Democracy under Blair, 1st edn (London: Politico’s, 2002) and 2nd edn (London: Politico’s and Methuen, 2003) Henderson, John and Bellamy, Paul, Democracy in New Zea- land (Christchurch: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacifi c Studies, University of Canterbury, 2002) Crawford, Gordon, Foreign Aid and Political Reform (Basing- stoke: Palgrave, 2001) International IDEA, ‘Democracy Assessment: The Basics of the International IDEA Assessment Framework’, Stock- holm, 2002 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening De- mocracy in a Fragmented World (New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2002)

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 155 ‘The international community must embrace different brands of democracy as equal and above all not favour specifi c cultural or historical models. While the European Union, the United States and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries will be important drivers in the process of further democratization, it is the young democracies of Latin America, Africa and Asia that will give credibility to the process. We need ideas, not ideology, as well as collaboration between equals, not a sermon from developed to developing democracies. The capacity and willingness to pursue a dialogue is an important feature of a democratic culture.”

Ambassador Andrés Rozental, IDEA Board Vice Chairperson and President of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations

156 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 12. Building Democracy, Shaping the Future: International IDEA in Peru

Kristen Sample, Daniel Zovatto

This chapter provides a glimpse at the activities of It was amid this legacy of disenchantment com- one of IDEA’s regional offi ces, in Peru. In so doing bined with hope for a change that IDEA began it illustrates how IDEA benefi ts from the interaction its work in Peru, beginning with various missions, between thematic and regional activities. The lessons conferences, background research and meetings learned on the ground from politicians and citizens with local actors in 2001 and offi cially opening its feed into the overall subject work of the organization country offi ce in February 2002. and serve to enhance its credibility. IDEA has helped to bring politicians and citizens 12.1. Introduction from across the political spectrum together for di- alogue on such issues as the obstacles to good gov- The opening years of the new millennium found ernance, political parties, electoral reform, wom- Peru, an Andean country of 27 million people, on en’s participation in politics and reconciliation in the threshold of political change. After nearly two the wake of political violence. IDEA’s neutrality decades of political violence and ten years of au- and its ability to bring to the table research and thoritarian government, and in the wake of a cor- experience from other countries allowed it to play ruption scandal that had shaken the country to an important role in the reshaping of Peruvian de- the core, the groundwork was being laid for move- mocracy. ment towards more participatory, trans parent de- mocracy. 12.2. Crucible for Political Reform The transition government had called elections that were held successfully in 2001 and had Peru’s return to democracy in 1980 was complicat- launched investigations into the web of govern- ed by political insurgency that continued through ment corruption that came to light in late 2000. a second democratically elected administration, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) from 1985 to 1990. By the time of the 1990 elec- was beginning to gather testimony about the po- tions, the economy was in ruins, infl ation was out litical violence, while the National Accord Forum of control and political violence—both a cause (NAF) was bringing leaders of political parties and and a result of lack of governance, especially in ru- civil society together to draw up plans for address- ral areas—had spread. ing the country’s major problems. Peruvian voters held the country’s political parties

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 157 of civil society organizations and churches, came together in the NAF to discuss common problems and develop consensus about possible solutions.

A Country Distrustful of Democracy? The legacy of a decade of corruption and distrust is refl ected in Peruvians’ ambivalence about democracy. According to the 2004 Latinobarómetro survey, 45 per cent of Peruvians believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, down from 63 per cent in 1996 and below the regional average of 53 per cent. Only 7 per cent, however, said they were satisfi ed with the way democracy functioned in the country.

partly responsible and expressed their disenchant- 12.3. IDEA Begins Working ment by electing a political unknown, Alberto Fu- in Peru jimori, who lacked the backing of an established party and opted for an authoritarian style. In April It was against this backdrop that IDEA decided to 1992 he closed Congress (although international begin working in Peru. There was a feeling within pressure even tually forced him to call a constit- the organization that IDEA was ready to engage in uent assembly) and placed the judiciary under a new country programme, and in Peru, as it was presidential control. During the Fujimori admin- in the process of democratic transition, there was a istration, Congress passed a law that nearly quin- solid opportunity for IDEA to contribute. tupled the number of signatures required for po- litical organizations to register. This forced most Weak party systems characterize most of the An- of the country’s political parties into oblivion. dean countries. Parties are the least trusted insti- tutions in all fi ve countries, and political analysts The collapse of the Fujimori government came have commented on the inability of the region’s amid a massive cor ruption scandal in late 2000, parties to offer constructive proposals or interact shortly after he began a third term following elec- with civil society. tions that most international observers considered fraudulent. The In 2001, IDEA launched introductory activities transition govern- in Peru under the direction of Daniel Zovatto. In a region marked by upheaval, helping to ment launched One of the fi rst projects was a demo cracy assess- recover and stabilize democracy in Peru corruption investi- ment that was part of the State of Democracy se- would be good not only for Peru but also for gations. Alejandro ries. The study was under way when the Fujimori the entire Andean sub-region. Toledo then won government fell, forcing the authors to revise their the presidency in assessment. the 2001 elections. The State of Democracy in Peru, 2000–2001 was During the upheaval, the Organization of Ameri- offi cially released in Peru in July 2001 at a cer- can States (OAS) brought many of Peru’s top polit- emony co-organized by IDEA, the Catholic Uni- ical fi gures together for round table dialogue. Dur- versity, Transparencia, the Andean Commission of ing the transition government, fi gures from across Jurists and the Dialogue and Proposals Institute. the political spectrum, along with representatives IDEA followed up with a seminar on the state

158 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) of democracy, co-sponsored by the Carter Cent- er, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and Four Interlinked Areas of the IDEA Peru Transparencia, which drew about 300 people a Programme day from various sectors of Peruvian society to dis- • Governance cuss civil society and public opinion; political par- Following the IDEA democracy assessment ties, representation and the party system; reform of 2001, IDEA sponsored Citizens for Good of the armed forces and the national defence; and Government. This group of experts exam- electoral reform. ined the exercise of citizen power through the framework of political parties, civil society and The latter topic was also a focus of IDEA’s early the media; and key public policies. actions in Peru, with a two-day seminar on elec- • Political reform toral system reform followed by the publication of — Working with Transparencia, IDEA invited the content of the event. IDEA co-sponsored the the leaders of the country’s 12 major political seminar with the Carter Center, the NDI, Trans- parties to meet together to discuss the frame- parencia and the International Foundation for work for a Political Parties Law. This conclud- Election Systems (IFES). ed with the passage of the law in 2003. — Similar dialogue was established to reach After the elections of 2000 and 2001, IDEA de- consensus on elements of a new electoral cided to take another step in its commitment, code. opening its Peru offi ce in February 2002. IDEA — IDEA published an overview of the chal- consulted a broad range of Peruvian fi gures and lenges facing the party system in the region represen tatives of IDEA’s member states about the and proposals for addressing them. strategic areas in which IDEA could best take ac- — IDEA launched Agora Democrática in tion in Peru. The research identifi ed the need to March 2004, a programme for political par- work with political parties, in partnership with lo- ticipation that will form the core of its work in cal organizations. the coming years. Transparencia, being a non-partisan civil society • Women and political participation organization, already had extensive experience in — IDEA Peru sponsored a workshop on the civic education, the fostering of citizen participa- implementation of quota laws in the region, tion, especially in elections, and helping to ensure pinpointing areas for improvement. Another free, fair and transparent elections. Transparencia seminar included a focus on women’s political became a key local partner, especially in the draft- participation in various Latin American coun- ing of the Political Parties Law and proposals for tries. electoral reform. The Peruvian organization also — IDEA Peru provided political parties with provided IDEA with space for its Peru offi ce dur- technical assistance in applying the quota law ing the fi rst year of operation. and expanding women’s participation within parties. Building on the consultation process and with lo- — Agora Democrática contributed to increas- cal partnerships in place, IDEA established its of- ing women’s participation in politics, not just fi ce in Peru in February 2002 with a mandate for in Peru but throughout the Andean region. support in four programme areas: governance, po- • Reconciliation litical reform, women, and political participation — IDEA Peru assisted the TRC by providing and reconciliation. a comparative study on the work of truth com- missions. — IDEA and Transparencia jointly sponsored, and documented the results of citizen gather- ings in seven cities.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 159 12.4. Governance policies for economic growth with social equality; gradual, effective decentralization of government; The 2001 democracy assessment, conducted by and effi cient public administration. four Peruvians with extensive experience in po- litical and social analysis, examined the legacy of Citizens for Good Government drew up position various undemocratic practices that had character- papers, holding seminars in various parts of the ized Peru’s recent history. It found that poor indig- country to present the ideas and gather input. ‘It enous Peruvians were largely excluded from public was important to go out into the provinces to dis- life, that there was a lack of protection for minori- cuss the position papers with people outside Lima’, ties and that people tended to be tolerant of au- Roncagliolo said. thoritarian leadership. It also revealed that citizen participation was mainly limited to elections. The group continues to meet independent- ly, under the leadership of coordinator Susana Given the new political climate in the post-Fuji- Pinilla Cisneros, the executive president of the mori years, both the study’s authors and the IDEA Institute for the Development of the Informal Sector staff felt that a broader, more participatory as- (Instituto de Desarrollo del Sector Informal, IDESI sessment was needed. Thus was born Citizens Nacional). for Good Government, which brought together a group of distinguished experts in such fi elds as public policy, law, political science, sociology, an- Achievements: Governance thropology, business administration and econom- • The 2001 democracy assessment (carried ics. out before International IDEA opened its Peru offi ce) laid the groundwork and pro- ‘The idea was vided direction for the organization’s later The fi rst problem area involved to form a group actions. institutions—political parties, civil society that was pluralis- • Citizens for Good Government, which and the media—that provide the framework tic, from a politi- broadened the debate on the issues raised in for the relationship between citizens and cal standpoint, and the democracy assessment, made an impor- the exercising of power. The second set interdisciplinary’, tant contribution to discussion of govern- of problems was related to key public said Rafael Ron- ance issues in the country. policies for economic growth with social cagliolo, who head- ed the IDEA Peru equality; gradual, effective decentralization offi ce in 2003. of government; and effi cient public 12.5. Political Reform and When Peruvian of- administration. Political Parties fi cials decided to relaunch the Na- When IDEA began working in Peru, the country tional Accord Forum in early 2004, Roncagliolo was the only one in the region that did not have a became the forum’s technical secretary. law on political parties. Working with Transparen- cia, IDEA invited the leaders of the country’s 12 The group met throughout 2003 and into 2004, major political parties to meet together to discuss analysing the state of democracy in the country the framework for a Political Parties Law. and identifying several ‘critical knots’ that needed to be ‘untied’ in order for democracy to function The process, which began in 2002 and conclud- properly. ed with the passage of the law in 2003, included working groups that met in Lima and seminars or- The fi rst problem area involved institutions—po- ganized in four other regions of the country with litical parties, civil society and the media—that local party leaders and representatives of civil soci- provide the framework for the relationship be- ety organizations. The result was the participatory tween citizens and the exercising of power. The drafting of what many experts consider to be one second set of problems was related to key public of the most comprehensive and modern political

160 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) parties laws in Latin America.

Highlights of the law include requirements for offi cial registration of parties, including party by-laws and the establishment of local commit- tees throughout the country to ensure broad par- ticipation and avoid centralization; guidelines for democratic processes within the parties, including internal elections overseen by the National Offi ce of Electoral Processes (Ofi cina Nacional de Procesos Electorales, ONPE) and mechanisms for public and private fi nancing of parties. The latter were modifi ed by Congress when the draft law came up for debate, but the law provides a starting point on which the parties can build.

‘The challenge now is to make the law a reality’, says Kristen Sample, IDEA’s Peru Director. In Oc- tober 2004, IDEA co-sponsored a Latin Ameri- can seminar on party fi nancing as another step to- ‘preferential vote’ or use another mechanism for wards that goal. assigning seats to winning parties. This debate has included inter-party dialogue, coordinated The law and the process that gave rise to it drew by Transparencia in partnership with IDEA, and the attention of the Rio Group in 2003, when a seminar on reform of the electoral system, co- Peru chaired the group. At the Rio Group’s re- sponsored by IDEA in December 2001, at which quest, IDEA researched and published ‘Demo- speakers from various Latin American countries cratic Govern ance and Political Parties in Latin presented an overview of experiences in electoral America’, an overview of the challenges facing the reform in their nations. party system in the region and proposals for ad- dressing them. The process that led to Peru’s Political Parties Law and the study prepared for the Rio Group raised ‘The document was extremely good and contin- IDEA’s profi le in Latin America and served as a ues to serve as a reference’, IDEA’s Peru Director catalyst for plans to expand into the Andean re- Roncagliolo said. The study’s proposals—includ- gion. ing strengthening parties, developing mechanisms for building consensus, making parliaments more responsive, reforming party systems, promoting ‘The drafting of the law showed that it is political education, developing strategies for social possible to get members of political parties and economic development and fostering cooper- from across the spectrum, both those repre- ation among political parties in the region—were sented in Congress and those that are not, to adopted by the Rio Group presidents at their 17th sit down together to discuss issues of com- Summit in Cusco, Peru, in May 2003. mon interest that lead to the development of a specifi c product’. A dialogue of the type that led to the Political Par- ties Law was later established to promote consen- Percy Medina sus on the elements of an electoral reform that Secretary General of Transparencia will include a new electoral code. Political lead- ers are grappling with such issues as whether the military and police should have the right to vote, Launched in March 2004, Agora Democráti- the make-up of districts, and whether to retain the ca seeks to support political party systems in the

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 161 Andean region. It focuses on four types of result: proposals for political reform; the promotion of a Achievements: Political Reform culture of dialogue; strengthened political parties; • The process sponsored by IDEA and Trans- and training for political and civil society leaders. parencia led to what is hailed as one of Lat- in America’s most complete laws on politi- During 2004 the programme published three cal parties. Both the consensus-based draft- books: Political Parties in the Andean Region: Be- ing of the law and its content can serve as tween Crisis and Change; Women, Political Parties models for similar processes in other coun- and Electoral Reform; and Women in Political Par- tries, as well as for other reforms of the ties in Peru, along with a pamphlet entitled ‘An state. Overview of Women’s Political Participation’. It • IDEA’s participation in the process led to also sponsored a series of public inter-party dia- requests from the Rio Group and Latin logues, attended by party leaders and members, as American Parliament to prepare documents well as representatives of public and private insti- on political parties legislation to serve as tutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) a reference for the region. That, in turn, and the media. Debate has focused on strategies broadened opportunities for partnership in for strengthening political parties and the role the region. they should play in society. • The process that led to the Political Parties Law has also served as a model for consen- Eight political training workshops were held in sus building on electoral reform, also spon- 2004 in various parts of the country for more than sored by Transparencia and IDEA. 325 people representing 16 political groups and • During its fi rst year of operation in Peru, six civil society organizations. More than 37 per the Agora Democrática project provided cent of the participants were women and 60 per training for members of political parties in cent were young people. Agora Democrática has various parts of the country on such issues fostered networking among the graduates of these as political ethics, the electoral system, pro- workshops. It has also provided technical assist- cedures for party registration, women’s par- ance to parties on implementing the Political Par- ticipation in political parties, and fi nancing ties Law, increasing democracy and women’s par- mechanisms and oversight. ticipation within parties, and implementing fi - nancing mechanisms and oversight. Peru’s 1997 quota law required that at least 25 per IDEA’s work in the area of political parties led to a cent of the candidates on parties’ slates for the leg- fruitful relationship with key leaders on Peru’s po- islature must be women. A similar provision for litical scene, including Lourdes Flores Nano, who municipal elections was included in the Electoral heads the Unidad Nacional party and stood for Code. The quota was later raised to 30 per cent president in 2001. Flores Nano is now a member for con gressional, regional and local elections. As of IDEA’s Board of Directors. a result, the proportion of women in public of- fi ce has increased, although it remains below the 12.6. Women and Political quota target. Participation ‘Peru was a country where, in spite of quota laws Not until 1955 did women in Peru win the right to and a certain level of political development, the vote and hold public offi ce. In 1985, only 5.6 per presence of women in political life was quite lim- cent of the seats in the lower house of Congress ited’, IDEA’s Myriam Méndez-Montalvo said. and 5 per cent in the Senate were held by women. Ten years later, the number had risen, but only to In February 2003, IDEA sponsored a workshop 10.8 per cent in the unicameral Congress. on the implementation of quota laws in the re- gion, comparing the experiences of various coun- tries and analysing the gains made and the areas in

162 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) which improvement was still needed.

In January 2004 another Latin American seminar was held, focusing on women, political parties and electoral reform. Participants from different Latin American countries noted three obstacles to wom- en’s political participation: 1. they must want to be elected; 2. they must receive their party’s nomination; and 3. they must win the vote of their constituents.

The second barrier was seen as key and, while quo- ta laws are a step towards overcoming it, further changes are needed within par ties, including train- ing, placing women higher on candidate slates for general elections and greater equality in campaign fi nancing. Peru’s Political Parties Law took an im- portant step with its requirement that 30 per cent of the candidates in internal party elections must 12.7. Reconciliation be women. Peru’s TRC, which spent two years gathering tes- IDEA Peru has been providing political parties timony and preparing a 17-volume report on the with technical assistance in applying the quota law political violence of the past two decades, found and expanding women’s participation within par- deep divisions within Peruvian society, refl ected ties. The Agora Democrática programme will also especially in the disenfranchisement of poor and help increase women’s participation in politics, not indigenous Peruvians. Most shocking of all was just in Peru but throughout the Andean region. the TRC’s calculation that 69,000 people—twice The training for party members offered through the previous estimates—had been killed or disap- the programme will both ensure that more women peared during the violence. Many of the victims are prepared to hold offi ce and foster a more posi- lacked identity documents: as far as the rest of the tive attitude to women’s participation. country was concerned, they had never existed.

Achievements: Women’s The TRC’s report analysed the factors that led to Political Participation Peru’s political violence, the reasons why anti-sub- versive strategies succeeded or failed, and the con- • IDEA’s emphasis on women’s political partici- sequences of the violence. Most importantly, it pation has helped place that issue high on the made recommendations for reparations to the vic- country’s political agenda, with access to expe- tims and changes in the state and society to make rience from other countries that have provided it less likely that the country would suffer a repeti- important input. tion of that dark moment in its history. • IDEA provided technical assistance to politi- cal parties in the implementation of the Politi- IDEA arrived in Peru at a key moment. The TRC cal Parties Law, in the drafting of the Electoral had offi cially begun its work, but public support Code, and in areas related to women’s partici- was far from unanimous, government backing was pation, such as internal quotas and the training lukewarm and promised funding had not been of women to hold party posts and public offi ce. forthcoming. Under those circumstances, interna- tional support for the TRC and its work was crucial.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 163 from Uruguay, Guatemala, Chile and Argentina, as well as Ireland and South Africa, focusing on the reconciliation and rebuilding that lie ahead once a country has faced the truth about its past.

Both Peru’s executive branch and the Congress have been slow to act on the TRC’s recommenda- tions. While reforms such as changes in the pro- cedures for applying for identity documents, po- litical participation and electoral reform, as well as the inclusion of human rights issues in training for the military and police, partly respond to the TRC’s recommendations, far more is needed.

In late October 2004, victims of the violence and other concerned citizens marched on Congress to demand action. It remains to be seen whether their pleas will be heard and what further activities might help Peru along the road to reconciliation. IDEA Peru assisted the TRC in a variety of ways. It prepared a comparative study of the work of truth commis- Achievements: Reconciliation sions in other Lat- • International IDEA lent important sup- Of the Latin American countries, it is now in American coun- port to Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation the political developments in the Andean tries. With Trans- Commission. The citizen gatherings that region that have become the focus of parencia, it also were held to gather local input for the international attention; 30 years ago it was sponsored citizen commission’s work resulted in the draft- the Southern Cone, and 15–20 years ago gatherings in seven ing of concrete local, regional and nation- Central America. cities around the al democratic agendas that described the country, including problems in the various areas where the the capitals of three meetings were held, proposed solutions of the departments that had been hardest hit by and suggested steps for beginning to im- the violence. plement the solutions. These agendas are now in the hands of local and regional gov- IDEA focused especially on the reconciliation ernments for implementation. aspect, as this would lay the groundwork for re- • The international seminar on reconcilia- building relations among Peruvian citizens and in- tion experiences resulted in a compendium stitutions in the future. IDEA’s 2003 handbook of knowledge that provided input into the on reconciliation was an ideal tool for this task truth and reconciliation process in Peru. and helped solidify its contribution to the TRC’s It is also available to other countries grap- work. pling with the effects of political violence and the need to reconcile sectors of soci- In June 2003, just two months before the com- ety that have been distanced by disenfran- mission was to present its fi nal report, IDEA co- chisement, discrimination and violence. sponsored an international seminar in Lima called ‘From Denial to Recognition’, focusing on the pro- cesses that had followed the work of truth com- missions in various Latin American countries. The event put the Peruvian experience into the region- al context by including comparative experiences

164 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 12.8. Conclusion Some Vital Partnerships Over the past three years, IDEA’s work in Peru has IDEA’s work in Peru has created strong part- contributed to dialogue and proposals on crucial nerships with civil society and regional and in- issues related to political parties, political reform, ternational organizations. This has helped lay electoral reform, political participation, especially the groundwork for plans to expand for Agora by women, and reconciliation after episodes of po- Democratica programming in the Andean re- litical violence. gion in 2005. Partnerships between IDEA and other agencies While Peru has clearly taken steps to distance it- supporting the consolidation of democracy in self from the recent years of authoritarianism and Peru and the region include: violence, its democratic institutions continue to face critical challenges. The other Andean nations • the Inter-American Development Bank share these challenges, though there are important (IDB), which helped support the Citizens differences between countries. for Good Government programme which led to a series of proposals for strengthening The Andean region has the lowest levels of citi- democracy in the country; zen support for democracy in Latin America. • the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), Throughout the region, people perceive that de- which supported the preparation of the mocracy has not improved their economic situ- study for the Rio Group.; ation or made them more secure, and they tend • The British Government’s Department for to blame political parties. There has been a rise International Development (DFID), which of local and regional populist movements in the supported the drafting of the Political Par- region, some with an authoritarian bent, and in ties Law; both Peru and Bolivia mobs have lynched mayors • DFID and UNDP, co-sponsoring the Ago- who were believed to be corrupt. ra Democrática programme to support the consolidation of political parties through- In all the countries, the party system is character- out the Andean region; ized by a plethora of political groups and elector- • beginning in 2005, Agora Democrática ac- al options, a tendency to confrontation instead of tivities at the regional level will be carried dialogue and consensus, lack of capacity for devel- out in partnership with the Comunidad oping specifi c policies and programmes, corrup- Andina de Naciones, Parlamento Andino, tion, limited democracy within parties, little turn- UNDP, DFID, IDB and the Netherlands In- over in party leadership, weak party organization stitute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD); and limited capacity for outreach. • Transparencia: co-sponsor of the process leading to the Political Parties Law, among Helping the Andean countries to address these other things. issues is the mission of the Agora Democrática programme. Expanding from Peru, activities are scheduled to start up in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecua- dor and Venezuela in 2005–6. By promoting con- sensus-based processes for political reform, IDEA will thus play a role in developing more solid dem- ocratic institutions in the region.

The challenges are great, but so are the potential rewards—greater equity and citizen participation, and a democratic system that is truly representa- tive of and responsive to the needs of the people.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 165

Annex A. About the Authors

Julie Ballington has managed International technical adviser for the establishment of the Pales- IDEA’s work on Women in Politics since 2001. tinian Legislative Council (1996–7), as coordinator She has overseen the production of the handbooks for the OSCE Offi ce for Democratic Institutions on Women in Parliament, and has spearheaded and Human Rights for the local elections in Bos- the work on Electoral Quotas for Women since nia and Herzegovina (1997), and as Chief Techni- 2003. Before joining IDEA in 2001 she headed cal Adviser to the Palestinian Election Commission the project on Gender and Elections at the Elec- for the European Commission technical assistance toral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) based in programme for all aspects of preparation for the Johannesburg, South Africa. Her research interests fi rst Palestinian elections (1994–6). He was previ- include issues relating to the political representa- ously Vice-Chairman (1980–6) and Secretary Gen- tion and participation of women, voter turnout eral (1985–8) of the UK Liberal Party and Chief and electoral politics. Executive (1988–9) of the UK Liberal Democrats. He has a BA in Mathematics from the University of David Beetham, Professor Emeritus at the Uni- Cambridge, UK; an MSc in Statistics from the Uni- versity of Leeds and Fellow of the Human Rights versity of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK; and a BA in Centre at the University of Essex, was research co- Law from Newcastle upon Tyne Polytechnic. ordinator for International IDEA’s State of De- mocracy Project. He has published widely on Konstanty Gebert was born in 1953 in Warsaw democracy and human rights and acted as con- and graduated from the Warsaw University sultant to many international organizations. He Psychology Department. He was co-founder of the is currently acting as rapporteur for an interna- (unoffi cial) Jewish Flying University, 1979, and of tional group of parliamentarians developing crite- the Polish Council of Christians and Jews, as well as ria of good practice for the parliamentary dimen- co-founder, in September 1980 in Warsaw, of a sion of democracy under the auspices of the Inter- white-collar trade union that soon merged with Parliamentary Union, Geneva. His latest book, Solidarity. After avoiding internment in the 1981 Democracy: A Beginner’s Guide will be published by coup, he became known as editor and columnist One World Publishers, Oxford, in spring 2005. of KOS fortnightly and of other underground pub- lications under the pen name of Dawid Warszaw- Michael Bratton is Professor of Political Science ski. In 1989 he joined the new independent daily and African Studies at Michigan State University. Gazeta Wyborcza, where he is a columnist and in- Among his many publications are Democratic Ex- ternational reporter. In 1997 he founded and until periments in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2000 he was editor-in-chief of the Jewish intellectu- 1997, with Nicolas van de Walle) and Public Opin- al monthly Midrasz, and is now its publisher. Since ion, Democracy and Markets in Africa (Cambridge 2005, he has been the Polish representative of the University Press, 2005, with Robert Mattes and E. US Taube Foundation for Jewish Life and Culture. Gyimah-Boadi). He is the co-founder and co-di- He has lectured in Poland and abroad. rector of the Afrobarometer. Charlotte Hjorth is a journalist and communica- Andrew Ellis has been Head of Electoral Processes tions consultant in Brussels, working with televi- at International IDEA since 2003. He was a sen- sion, the private sector and the EU-institutions. She ior adviser for the National Democratic Institute has written for several international publications in (NDI) in Indonesia (1999–2003), and has worked Sweden, Belgium, UK and the US, specializing in for the European Commission on the electoral as- reporting on EU affairs, Democracy and Interna- sistance programme in Cambodia (1997–8), as tional Politics.

168 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Marta Lagos is founder and Director of Latino- her tenure with CRS, she focused on activi- barómetro, an annual opinion survey in 17 coun- ties aimed at strengthening civil society. She has tries in Latin America, and was formerly head of lived and worked in Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala and a Chilean think tank, CERC, which conducted Chile. She has a Master’s degree in Public Policy opinion polls during the transition to democracy from Harvard University. in Chile during the 1980s and 1990s. She trained as an economist in Heidelberg, Germany, and is Timothy D. Sisk took his PhD in Political Science the founding director of her own polling company (comparative politics and research methods) with MORI (Chile), associated with MORI UK since distinction and is now Associate Professor in the 1994. Graduate School of International Studies, Univer- sity of Denver, where he also serves as faculty in Todd Landman is Senior Lecturer in the Depart- the Master of Arts Program in Confl ict Resolution ment of Government and Co-Director of the Hu- and Director of the BA programme in Interna- man Rights Centre at the University of Essex, UK. tional Studies. Dr Sisk is the author of fi ve books, He is the author of Protecting Human Rights: A including Democratization in South Africa (Princ- Com parative Study (Georgetown University Press, eton, 1995) and Power Sharing and International 2005), Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics Mediation in Ethnic Confl icts (Carnegie Commis- (Routledge, 2000, 2003), Governing Latin America sion on Preventing Deadly Confl ict, 1995), and (Polity Press, 2003, with Joe Foweraker and Neil many articles. He specializes in the nexus between Harvey), and Citizenship Rights and Social Move- democracy and governance and the management ments: A Comparative and Statistical Analysis (Ox- of confl ict in deeply divided societies, especially ford University Press, 1997, with Joe Foweraker). those emerging from a period of intense social vio- Dr Landman has published numerous articles in lence. His recent research has focused on system- the British Journal of Political Science, Internation- atic approaches to confl ict assessment and govern- al Studies Quarterly, Human Rights Quarterly, De- ance institutions, and processes for confl ict man- mocratization, and Political Studies. He is currently agement. working on a new book entitled Studying Human Rights (Routledge). Massimo Tommasoli is Director of Operations at International IDEA. He holds a PhD at the Ecole Professor Richard Rose pioneered the use of Ba- des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales of Paris. rometer surveys to study mass response to trans- From 1999 to 2003 he has been Head of the Good formation following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Governance and Confl ict Prevention Unit in the Since 1991 he has organized more than 100 na- Development Co-operation Directorate (Devel- tionwide surveys in 16 post-communist countries opment Assistance Committee - DAC Secretari- in Central and Eastern Europe and the former So- at) of the Organisation for Economic Co-opera- viet Union (see ) tion and Development (OECD). In this capacity and written fi ve books based on this material. His he led the Secretariat work of the DAC Networks scientifi c publications have been translated into on “Good governance and capacity development” 18 different languages. He is a Fellow of the Brit- (GOVNET) and on “Confl ict, peace and develop- ish Academy and director of the Centre for the ment co-operation” (CPDC). He also worked in Study of Public Policy at the University of Strath- UNESCO and, as senior policy advisor, in the Di- clyde, UK. rectorate General for Development Cooperation of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Kristen Sample serves as International IDEA’s he has also been a member of the Technical Evalu- Director for the Andean Region as well as its Re- ation Unit of the Steering Committee for Devel- gional Coordinator on Women’s Political Partici- opment Co-operation. Lecturer at Italian Univer- pation. Before coming to IDEA in 2003, she was sities and international training centres, he is au- the Deputy Regional Director for Catholic Relief thor of seven books and various essays and articles Services (CRS), one of the United States’ largest in edited books as well as social and political sci- international development organizations; during ence journals. His most recent publication is “Lo

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 169 sviluppo partecipativo. Analisi sociale e logiche di economy and democratization. He is the coordi- pianifi cazione” (Carocci, Rome, 2001) (“Partici- nator of the Asian Barometer Survey, a regional patory Development. Social Analysis and the Ra- network of surveys on democracy, governance tionale for Planning” - also published in Spanish and development that covers more than 16 Asian by Iepala Editorial, Madrid, 2003 and in French countries. Among his recent English publications by Karthala, Paris, 2004). are Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), Consolidating Ingrid Wetterqvist is Head of Planning and Ex- Third-Wave Democracies (Johns Hopkins Univer- ternal Relations at International IDEA, having sity Press, 1997), China Under Jiang Zemin (Lynn joined IDEA in February 2004. She was previous- Rienner, 2000), and The New Chinese Leadership: ly Director at the Department for Global Devel- Challenges and Opportunities after the 16th Party opment at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Af- Congress (Cambridge University Press, 2004). fairs, which she joined in 1990. She was posted to Tanzania between 1992 and 1995, and to Zam- Daniel Zovatto joined International IDEA as Re- bia between 1995 and 1997. Ingrid holds a BA in gional Director for Latin America in 1997, after business administration from Uppsala University. being Executive Director at the Centre for Elector- She has been working with democracy and human al Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL), a special- rights in development, both as a practitioner and ized programme at the Inter-American Institute of as a policy maker, for most of her career. Human Rights (IIHR), from 1989 to 1996, and serving as its deputy director for two years. He has Richard Youngs is Senior Research Fellow at the a Master’s degree in International Studies from Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el the School of Diplomacy of the Spanish Minis- Diáologo Exterior (FRIDE) in Madrid, and a lec- try of Foreign Affairs, a Master’s Degree in Hu- turer at the University of Warwick, UK. Prior to man Rights, a PhD in International Law from the joining FRIDE, he was an EU Marie Curie Re- Complutense University in Madrid, and a Mas- search Fellow from 2001 to 2004. He studied at ter’s degree in Public Administration from John Cambridge (BA Hons) and Warwick (MA, PhD) F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Uni- universities, and previously worked as an analyst versity, USA. He is the author of over 60 articles at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Of- dealing with issues in law and politics, as well as fi ce. His recent publications include Internation- 14 books on matters concerning human rights, al Democracy and the West: The Role of Govern- elections, political parties, and democracy in Latin ments, NGOs and Multinationals (Oxford Univer- America. Among his most recent publications are sity Press, 2004) and ‘Europe’s Uncertain Pursuit De las normas a las buenas practicas: El desafío del of Middle East Reform’ (Working Paper no. 45, fi nanciamiento politico en América Latina (OAS/ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, IDEA, co-authored with Steven Griner); Dinero June 2004). He has worked on a number of de- y política en América Latina: una visión comparada mocracy promotion initiatives, including projects (FLACSO); and La política importa: Democra- funded by the European Commission, the Euro- cia y desarrollo en América Latina (IADB/IDEA, pean Parliament, the British and Spanish devel- co-authored with Mark Payne, Fernando Carrillo opment ministries, and a range of research insti- and Andrés Allamand). tutes.

Yun-han Chu is Distinguished Research Fellow of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Si- nica and Professor of Political Science at the Na- tional Taiwan University. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Min- nesota and joined the faculty of National Taiwan University in 1987. Professor Chu specializes in the politics of Greater China, East Asian political

170 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Annex B. Former and Current Members of IDEA’s Board of Directors

President Martti Ahtisaari June 2000–June 2003 Co-Chairperson of the New York-based EastWest Institute; Chairperson of the International Crisis Group, Brussels; former President of the Republic of Finland

Dr Brigalia Bam June 2003 to date Chairperson of South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission; former General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches

Mr Jermyn Brooks June 2003 to date Member of the Board of Directors of Transparency International; former Global Managing Partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers

Ms Cheryl Carolus February 2000–June 2002 Former High Commissioner for the Republic of South Africa in London, UK; CEO of South African Tourism

Mr Thomas Carothers June 2001–June 2004 Vice President for Studies and Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Dr Adama Dieng February 1995–June 2001 Registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; former Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists

Dr Ricardo Díez-Hochleitner June 2002 to date Honorary President of the Club of Rome; former Minister of Education, Spain

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 171 Ms Lourdes Flores Nano June 2003 to date President of the Alianza Electoral Unidad Nacional; candidate in the 2001 Peruvian presidential election

Sir Henry de Boulay Forde November 1995–June 1999 Lawyer and former Foreign Minister and Attorney-General of Barbados

Dr Frene Ginwala November 1995–June 1999 Former Speaker of the National Assembly, South Africa

Ms Lena Hjelm-Wallén June 2003 to date Chairperson of the Board; former Deputy Prime Minister; former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Mr Harri Holkeri June 2003 to date Former Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); former Prime Minister of Finland

Dr Ignacio Astarloa Huarte-Mendicoa June 1999–June 2002 Former Secretary for Security and former Under-Secretary of Justice, Spain; former Secretary-General of the Chamber of Deputies; former Secretary of the Central Election Commission

Professor Colin Hughes January 1996–June 1999 Professor of Political Science, University of Queensland; former Electoral Commissioner of Australia

Dr Kuniko Inoguchi June 1999 to date Professor of Political Science, Sophia University, Tokyo; former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN Conference on Disarmament

172 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Ms Mónica Eliana Jiménez de la Jara November 1995–June 2003 Rector of the Universidad Catolica de Temuco, Chile; former Vice-Chair, President of the Board of PARTICIPA; former Executive Director of Corporación APRENDER; former member of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Chile

Dr Subhash Kashyap June 2003 to date Former Secretary-General of the lower house of the Indian Parliament; Constitutional Adviser to the Indian Government

Ms Kaci Kullman Five June 2003 to date Former Cabinet Minister and Chairperson of the Conservative Party of Norway

Ambassador Legwaila Joseph Manson John Legwaila June 2001–June 2003 Special Representative to lead the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

Mr Manmohan Malhoutra January 1996–June 2003 Secretary-General of the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, India; former Assistant Secretary-General of the Commonwealth; Adviser to the former Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi

Ms Maureen O’Neil June 1998–June 2004 President of the International Development Research Centre, Canada

Dr Erling Olsen June 1998–June 2001 Former Speaker of Parliament, Denmark; former Minister of Housing and former Minister of Justice, Denmark

Sir Shridath Ramphal February 1995–June 2001 Former Chairperson of the Board; former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and Co-Chairperson of the Commission on Global Governance

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 173 Ambassador Andrés Rozental June 2002 to date Vice-Chair of the Board; President of the Mexican Council on International Affairs; former Deputy Foreign Minister, Mexico

Ms Daw Aung San Suu Kyi November 1995–June 2003, June 2003– honorary board member General Secretary of the National League for Democracy in Burma and Nobel Peace Prize laureate

Dr Henning Scherf June 2001 to date President of the Senate and Mayor of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, Germany

David Steel, Lord Steel of Aikwood February 1995–June 2001 Former Presiding Offi cer, Scottish Parliament; former President of Liberal International, UK

Ambassador Thorvald Stoltenberg November 1995–June 2003 Former Chairperson and Vice-Chair of the Board; President of the Norwegian Red Cross; former Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence of Norway; former UN Special Representative in the former Yugoslavia

Mr Cassam Uteem June 2002 to date Former President of the Republic of Mauritius

Senator Jos van Gennip June 2001 to date Member of the upper house of the Netherlands Parliament

174 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Annex C. IDEA Publications

International IDEA has produced over 150 publi- ferent languages, including Arabic, Bahasa Indo- cations over the past decade. They range from nesia, Georgian, French, Russian and Spanish. handbooks, country reports and guidelines to briefer reports such as policy papers, agendas for The following is a selected list of main publica- debate, leafl ets, and synthesis reports. Most of tions produced between February 1995 and June IDEA’s publications have been translated into dif- 2005:1

Handbooks:

• The IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (1997, repr. 2002) • Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers (1998)2 • Democracy and Deep Rooted Confl ict: Options for Negotiators (1998) • Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Confl ict Management and Governance (2001) • Handbook on Democracy Assessment (2002) • The State of Democracy: Democracy Assessments in Eight Nations around the World (2002) • Reconciliation after Violent Confl ict: A Handbook (2003) • Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns (2003) • Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook (2005)

Country and region based reports:

• Consolidating Democracy in Nepal (1997) • Democracy in Romania (1997) • Democracy in Guatemala (1998) • Democracy in Burkina Faso (1998) • Burkina Faso’s Electoral System: A Report (1999) • Advancing Democracy in Slovakia through Local Self-Governance (2000) • Democratization in Indonesia: An Assessment (2000) • Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation Building (2000) • Democracy in Bangladesh (2002) • Democracy in the Arab World: Challenges, Achievements and Prospects (2000) • Towards Sustainable Democratic Institutions in Southern Africa (2002) • Democracy at the Local Level: A Guide for the South Caucasus (2003) • Elections Assessment in the South Caucasus: 2003–2004 (2003) • Democracy at the Local Level in East and Southern Africa: Profi les in Governance (2004) • Building Democracy In Egypt: Women’s Political Participation, Political Party Life and Democratic Elections (2005) • Building Democracy In Jordan: Women’s Political Participation, Political Party Life and Democratic Elections (2005) • Building Democracy In Yemen: Women’s Political Participation, Political Party Life and Democratic Elections (2005) • Developing Local Democracy in Kosovo (2005)

1 A complete list of IDEA publications is available on IDEA website . 2 A new edition of Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers will be published by the end of 2005.

Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide 175 Codes of Conduct and Guidelines:

• Code of Conduct: Ethical and Professional Observation of Elections (1997) • Code of Conduct: Ethical and Professional Administration of Elections (1997) • Code of Conduct: Political Parties Campaigning in Democratic Elections (1998) • Guidelines for Determining Involvement in International Election Observation (2000) • International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of Elections (2002)

Voter Turnout:

• Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997 (1997) • Youth Voter Participation: Involving Today's Young in Tomorrow’s Democracy (1999) • Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global Report (2002) • Voter Turnout in Western Europe since 1945: A Regional Report (2004) • Europe Expands, Turnout Falls: The Signifi cance of the 2004 European Parliament Elections (2004)

Gender Quotas series:3

• The implementation of Quotas: Asian Experience (2003) • The Implementation of Quotas: Latin American Experiences (2003) • The implementation of quotas: African Experiences (2004)

Other:

• Dialogue for Democratic Development: Policy Options (1999) • The Future of International Election Observation (1999) • Democracy and Global Co-operation at the UN (2000)

Selected Publications in Spanish:4

• Mujer, Partidos Politicos y Reforma Electoral (2004) • Acuerdo Nacional: Pasado, Presente y Futuro (2004) • Los Nudos Criticos de la Gobernabilidad: Propuestas para un Buen Gobierno (2004) • Partidos en la Región Andina: De la Crisis al Cambio (2004) • El Estado (2005) • Etíca y Liderazgo Políticos (2004) • Inclusión y Participación (2004) • Sistema de Partidos Políticos (2004) • Sistema Electoral (2004) • Guía Metodológica para la Formación Política (2004) • La Descentralización (2004)

3 By the end of 2005, IDEA will publish two more reports on gender quotas, which look at experiences from Eastern Europe and the Arab World. All reports and case studies on gender quotas are available at . 4 This list includes only some of the recent publications produced by the IDEA regional offi ce in Latin America, some co-published in partnership with regional and national counterparts. Most of these publications are only available in Spanish. A comprehensive list of publications on Latin America is available at .

176 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)