ON THE CUSP BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE?: REGIME CHANGE PATTERNS AND EXTERNAL IMPACTS REASSESSED Geoffrey Pridham University of Bristol, UK Paper for Conference on EARLY LESSONS FROM THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: WESTERN INFLUENCES ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TRANSITIONS, organised by Centre for Applied Policy Research, Munich, and Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, in Bratislava, 12-13 October 2000 2 (1) From Democratic Transition to Democratic Consolidation It is commonly assumed, on occasions reviewing the first decade of regime change in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE), that the countries in question have moved through transition to democracy and that they are well on the way to achieving democratic consolidation. Thus, those predictions that were cautious or pessimistic after Communist rule ended abruptly in 1989 will be entirely disproved. While such "Ten Years After" conferences have hardly been held in the euphoria that was also evident in that heady autumn, there is some complacency in such assumptions and quite a few basic questions are begged. 1.1 Firstly, there is no guarantee or inevitability about democratisation succeeding as if by some process of unstoppable evolution. Postwar Latin American politics and interwar European history provide suitable lessons that countries may embark on and even make it through democratic transition but then fail the tests of democratic consolidation. One may of course find contrasts that tend - largely justifiably - to show our present international environment as one more favourable to the chances for new democracies. However, it is generally recognised the first decade is vital in determining regime change outcomes; and, this is now past. Thereafter, one may speak of a growing probability (as distinct from certainty) that new democracies will become consolidated. 1.2 Secondly, the transformation that has been occurring in CEE is on a qualitatively unprecedented scale compared with previous regime changes in postwar Europe and, for that matter, in Latin America too. By and large, the types of economic systems then pre-existing political change were maintained, admittedly with some reforms (countries in Southern Europe and Latin America transited within the framework of capitalist systems), while postwar (re)democratisations had to dismantle war economies, if not already largely lain waste by hostilities, and embark on reconstruction (of essentially pre-existing economic systems). However, the replacement of socialist command economies by market economies has been a long and painful process, with inevitable repercussions on political democratisation. In East-Central Europe, at least, this has not however seriously injured the commitment to democratic rules and procedures among elites and publics; although, there is perhaps a case for arguing that the combination of different transformations may have retarded democratic consolidation. This last argument is all the stronger in the case of those countries - in fact, the majority of post-Communist states - that have simultaneously carried the burden of state- and nation-building. Almost certainly, therefore, the overall democratisation process from transition's beginning to consolidation's end will take longer than, say, in post-Nazi Germany, post-Franco Spain or even post-Pinochet Chile. In this sense, the "Ten Years After" events are probably timed about right, for there is something very convincing about seeing the 1990s as the decade of transition and therefore the coming of the new millennium as - coincidentally - marking the shift to consolidation. 1.3 Thirdly, this transformation in CEE is also quantitatively on a scale which is unprecedented. Latin America has witnessed many more attempts at democratisation than the three in Southern Europe in the 1970s as well as the two post-Fascist cases and handful of redemocratisations in former occupied countries after 1945; but nothing like what's been happening in post-Communist Europe. There are some 27 cases altogether, including those formerly republics in the USSR. This systemic change is of epidemical proportions, but it also points up the considerable scope for cross-national variation here not only in regime change trajectories but also, quite possibly, regime change outcomes. So far, after the first decade, there are already signs of possible cross-national diversification on the latter count, although Belarus is the only obvious case of a new regime that has undergone democratic inversion to authoritarian rule inspired by a personalistic form of Soviet nostalgia. In-between, are to be found examples of so- called hybrid regimes, combining formal democracy with authoritarian practices with therefore uncertain outcomes. But, as Croatia has recently shown, hybrid regimes may, in special circumstances, take a new direction which clarifies regime change direction in one or other way. Furthermore, the very recent presidential election in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia demonstrates that formal democratic procedures certainly matter if given new political impetus. In short, such cross-national diversification is bound to qualify generalisations about CEE as a whole being set on course for democratic consolidation. A parallel dimension to this point is cross-regional differentiation, involving distinctions between regional groupings of countries within CEE; and, that is an issue which this paper will later address with special reference to East-Central Europe (ECE). 3 1.4 Fourthly, and finally, discussion of a general shift from transition to consolidation is conditional on definitional clarity. Here, there is a problem for whereas the relatively brief period of transition may be fairly readily pinned down to identifiable transition tasks - the most prominent being the final agreement on a full constitution - definitions of democratic consolidation are more disputed and, accordingly, the source of rather different interpretations of when consolidation is achieved. The main academic controversy is between those (largely American) political scientists who stress formal democratic requirements and those (very largely European) who argue in favour of substantive democracy being tantamount to consolidation. Whereas the first are not surprised if consolidation may occur within a decade, the latter tend to equate its achievement with almost a generation or certainly two decades 1. But, as argued above, the occurrence in CEE of multiple transformation, where political democratisation is but one form of systemic change interacting with others, decisively swings the argument there in favour of the longer scenario. Just focussing on political regime change is not going to explain democratisation completely, let alone the overall transformation of which democratisation forms a central part 2. By transformation may be understood a fairly deep or fundamental process of change. This is likely to characterise democratisation the more it develops, i.e. transformation is more likely to arise from regime consolidation; although it is implicit in transition, for if you change a political system there will probably be some rather significant consequences. It is also likely to be a process that is distinctly more long- than short-term. 1.5 The following definitions are preferred, accepting this point. Democratic transition is seen as commencing at the point when the previous non-democratic regime begins to collapse, leading to a situation when, with a new constitution in place, the democratic structures are settled formally and political elites are prone to start adjusting their behaviour accordingly. Signs, therefore, of elite consensus or the formation of elite consensus are a significant indication of transition being accomplished. Transition tasks involve above all negotiating the constitutional settlement and settling the rules of procedure for political competition as well as dismantling authoritarian agencies and abolishing laws unsuitable for democratic life. These attributes are seen as characteristics of transition but not as absolutes. For example, delayed constitutional settlements may - or may not - bear witness to difficult transitions. In reality, as a very crude average, transitions have in the pre-postcommunist era taken around half a decade - in some cases, rather less; but in others, evidently longer. Democratic consolidation is not only a much lengthier process but also one with wider and usually deeper effects. It involves in the first instance the gradual removal of the remaining uncertainties surrounding transition (e.g. constitutional, elite behaviour, resolution of civil-military relations). The way is then opened for the institutionalisation of a new democracy, the internalisation of rules and procedures and the dissemination of democratic values through a "remaking" of the political culture. Much depends in achieving this on the weight of historical inheritances and problems. It is also on these grounds that one may expect post-Communist countries, including those in East-Central Europe, to take time, in addition to the effects of the multi-transformation process. While "transition" and "consolidation" are generally seen as distinguishable phases of the overall democratisation process, they should be distinguished qualitatively and not necessarily in terms of chronology. They are not strictly divisible as successive phases although invariably consolidation is completed after transition if not long afterwards, since it is a