i ~ .
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
IN RE NOKIA OYJ (NOKIA CORP.) CASE NO. 04 Civ. 2646 (KAK) SECURITIES LITIGATION CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
JURY TRIAL DEMANDE D
Lead plaintiffs Generic Trading of Philadelphia, LLC ("Generic"), Martin Bergljung an d
Gerald Hoberman, by their attorneys, for their Consolidated Class Action Complaint (th e
"Complaint") allege the following based upon knowledge with respect to their own acts and upo n
other facts obtained through an investigation made by and through plaintiffs' counsel, whic h
included a review of United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings b y
Nokia OYJ (Nokia Corp.) ("Nokia" or the "Company"), as well as securities analysts reports and
advisories about the Company, press releases, analyst conference calls, and other publi c
statements issued by the Company and posted on their website, media reports about the Company
and information learned from interviews of Nokia former employees and other knowledgeabl e
persons. Based upon the substantial facts already uncovered, plaintiffs believe that substantia l
additional evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth herein after a reasonabl e
opportunity for discovery.
2498821 NATURE OF THE ACTIO N
This is a securities class action on behalf of purchasers of the securities of Noki a
between October 16, 2003 and April 15, 2004 (the "Class Period"), seeking to pursue remedie s
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
2 . Defendant Nokia is a Finnish limited liability company with its executive office s
located at Keilalahdentie 4, FIN-00045 Nokia Group, P .O. Box 226, Espoo, Finland, and it s principal United States offices at 6000 Connection Drive, Irving, Texas, 75039 . The principal trading markets for Nokia securities are the New York Stock Exchange, in the form of America n
Depository Receipts ("ADRs") (where about 25% of Nokia's securities traded),and the Helsink i
Exchange (where about 60% of Nokia's securities traded), in the form of shares . In addition, throughout the class period, the shares were listed on the Frankfurt, Stockholm and Paris stock exchanges, and Nokia's shares were traded on the London stock exchange until November 2003 .
Nokia's securities were actively traded on each of these exchanges, all efficient market s throughout the Class Period . As of the end of 2003, Nokia's average number of shares exceede d
4.7 billion. On April 6, 2004, the day that Nokia first announced its disappointing first quarte r
2004 ("1Q04") financial results, Nokia lost about $17 billion of its market capitalization .
3 . For several years, Nokia has been the world leader in mobile communications , offering voice-centric mobile telephones, or cell phones, primarily marketed to consumers, operating on three major digital transmission technologies, Time Division Multiple Acces s
("TDMA"), Global System for Mobile Communication ("GSM") and Code Division Multiple
Access ("CDMA") . Nokia also marketed, with much less success, sophisticated or "smart" cel l phones, devices and communications systems and solutions to businesses, multimedia and 2 2498821 gaming devices (its "N-Gage" product) and worked with phone service operators (such as
AT&T) throughout the world to enhance their mobile systems networks. For the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2003, Nokia's net sales totaled $37. 1 billion and its net profit totaled $4 .5
billion. The company currently has approximately 50,000 employees, maintains production
facilities in nine count ries, and sells its products in over 130 countries .
4. For years, Nokia dominated the TDMA market, where it held up to a 75% market
share, and the GSM market, particularly in Western Europe, where its market share peaked in
first quarter 2003 ("1Q03") at 52.5% . Beginning in 2002, and throughout the class period, in the
United States, one of Nokia's major markets, Nokia's market share was severely damaged by the
shift by certain major U.S . phone service operators away from the TDMA technology to GSM technology, and even more by those operators who shifted from the TDMA to the CDM A technology. Until 2003, Nokia did not competitively market CDMA phones to major operators in the United States, choosing to attempt to develop its own chipset rather than license the preferred CDMA chipset developed and furnished to Nokia's competitors by Qualcomm. Only in mid 2003, did Nokia begin to successfully market low-end CDMA phones to the major systems operators in the United States, but it continued to lag far behind in the development of
CDMA phones, including the more advanced color and camera CDMA phones . In 2003, Nokia also lost market share in both the United States and Europe, as a result of its reluctance to customize phones for major phone service operators, including Verizon, Sprint, T-Mobile .
Vodafone and Orange SA .
5. Most importantly, however, beginning in 2002 Nokia's product roadmap began to deteriorate and Nokia failed to develop new and competitive phone designs . Instead of tendin g 3 2498821 to its core business and upgrading the features and quality of its mobile phones, Nokia poure d approximately 80% of its research & development budget to launch a series of ill-conceived
"smart phones" that were too bulky or costly for most consumers . With respect to Nokia's core products, engineers in Nokia's product development and research and development ("R&D" ) were permitted only nine to twelve months to plan and develop a new mobile phone, resulting i n an erosion in product quality. Corners were cut, particularly on the mid-range phones that fuele d the phone replacement market . Nokia held weekly meetings to address the quality issue s plaguing Nokia handsets that had been raised by operators . Approximately two years is require d to properly develop, release and "ramp-up" a new cell phone .
6. The weaknesses in the design of Nokia's product portfolio were well known within the company by early 2003 and stemmed from senior management's view that, base d upon its historical dominance of the market, Nokia could freely disregard its customers ' preferences. Thus, beginning in 2002 and into 2003, senior Nokia officers flatly rejected repeated requests to develop a "flip" or clamshell phone design despite customer surveys an d other input indicating Nokia was losing more than 15% of U. S . sales due to this portfolio shortcoming. Similarly, Nokia was unwilling to modify its production facilities and invest in improved color resolution through mega-pixel phones and other features demanded by it s customers. As a result, the Nokia brand became associated with low-end products, e.g., it was often the "free" or "penny" phone offered as a promotion by operators, and Nokia becam e increasingly dependent on new first-time customers in developing countries where Nokia' s phones sold at lower prices . Throughout 2002 and until fourth quarter 2003, the average sellin g price ("ASP") of Nokia's phones steadily dropped, sequentially, from quarter-to-quarter . 4 2498821 Nokia has historically been highly secretive about its phone road map and
provided few details that would allow visibility into its trends in performance to market analysts
and investors. In 2003, to compensate for its product development problems, Nokia conducted
two major reorganizations in which thousands of employees were laid off or transferre d
including from the new products marketing and development office in Irving, Texas, its interne t
communications office in Mountain View, CA, and from the Company's 300 employee
Broadband Systems Division in Santa Rosa , CA, which the Nokia closed completely in February
of 2003.
8. Despite the common knowledge within Nokia of its product portfolio
shortcomings, beginning in October 2003, with the announcement of Nokia's third quarter 200 3
("3Q03") results; at a two-day conference in Dallas , Texas in November 2003 that Noki a sponsored for market analysts following Nokia's stock; and throughout January 2004, Nokia' s
CEO and other senior officers aggressively touted the strength of its cell phone product portfolio and road map, (a schedule of planned new products in development and to be delivered into th e marketplace in future periods), falsely representing that Nokia's purportedly superior product s were the primary reason for its financial success, healthy phone ASPs and growing market share.
In fact, Nokia's strong performance in late 2003 was an aberration . In fourth quarter 2003
("4Q03"), despite Nokia's weak product line-up, a long-term downward trend in Nokia ' s phone market share and in its ASPs was momentarily interrupted when a massive surge in consume r demand caused component shortages at Nokia's major competitors, thereby suppressing thei r sales to Nokia's benefit. In January 2004, despite knowing Nokia's true problems with its phon e portfolio and product roadmap, and the looming resumption of the negative trend in the ASPs of 5 2498821 Nokia's phones that would necessarily flow from these product deficiencies, the defendant s issued guidances to market analysts of expected increases in Nokia sales of 3% to 7% in 1 Q04, as well as increases in its earnings per share . In January 2004, Nokia's CEO also announced that , based upon Nokia' s "current momentum ," he expected Nokia to further improve its phon e market share, particularly in Europe .
9. Even at Nokia's annual shareholders' meeting held on March 25, 2004 -- a mere two weeks before the disclosure of its shockingly poor 1 Q04 phone sales performance -- Nokia' s
CEO continued to falsely represent that Nokia's purported success was attributable to its "strong " and "very competitive" phone portfolio :
We reached these goals in part due to our strong product portfolio. As we have earlier stated, we launched 40 new products last year. This was a record number of mobile device launches for Nokia during one year. This year, we expect to launch a similar number of products . I strongly believe that our product portfolio continues to be very competitive.
For 1Q04, the quarter ended March 31, 2004, six days after the shareholders' meeting, Nokia' s mobile phone sales fell 15%, or $880 million . Nokia's 1Q04 operating profits on its mobil e phones was even worse -- they fell by 25%, or $300 million . Over the next week, Nokia's CEO would personally and finally admit the truth, that Nokia's phone portfolio (and roadmap ) particularly in its core mid-range phones sold in the critical phone replacement market was deficient and that these deficiencies were known to exist since early 2003 .
10. Although defendants were aware that Nokia's 4Q03 performance and the singl e quarter uptick in its ASP were obtained as a result of factors that would not recur, that certain o f its newly released high-priced products, such as the N-Gage gaming device, had been soundly rejected by consumers , and that it was steadily losing market share in Weste rn Europe, its most F 2498821 important market, in large part because defendants had stubbornly refused to customize Noki a
phones for key phone service operators, defendants on January 22, 2004, proclaimed Nokia' s
"best ever performance" and a structural shift in its long-deteriorating trend of its ASPs .
Simultaneously, in making its projections of 3 to 7% sales growth, Nokia's CEO assured
investors that its forecasting was "fact-based," that he received weekly revenue reports, includin g
by reference to the performance of its competitors, and that Nokia "had exceptionally good
visibility throughout the channel ." The CEO further emphasized that for the critical European
market, Nokia expected to gain market share in 1 Q04, and that in Europe, its "produc t
positioning was really well in the fourth quarter, particularly in the high end ."
11 . Despite the strongest industry-wide growth in the history of mobile phones, on
April 6, 2004, defendants shocked the market with the announcement that, rather than increasin g
3% to 7%, Nokia' s net sales had declined 2%. (The severity of Nokia 's predicament became
even clearer when on April 16, 2004 defendants released Nokia's 1 Q04 financial statements that
showed an extraordinary 15% decrease in sales of its core mobile phones business, and
announced that sales would continue to be depressed in later qua rters.) In Nokia's April 6, 2004 press release, Nokia revealed that, "[D]ue to certain gaps in its product portfolio, mainly in th e mid-range, the company was not able to fully capitalize on positive market developments ." And,
later that day, Ollila admitted that he had seen this shortcoming "early on last year." Although as
late as the March 25, 2004 shareholders conference, Ollila had loudly trumpeted Nokia's releas e during 2003 of a "record" forty new phones, in reality Nokia's product portfolio had sharpl y degraded and Nokia simply recirculated the same series 400 phones with different face plates , colors and minor cosmetic changes. Nor had there been "new" phones in the roadmap for release 7 2498821 in 1 Q04. Defendants soon revealed additional reasons for Nokia's poor performance -- th e failure of the N-Gage gaming device, its misjudgments in the development of clamshells, th e drift away from TDMA to CDMA technology, and problems in Nokia's relationships with phone
service operators -- all facts which defendants well knew, and concealed, when they mad e representations to analysts and investors about Nokia's supposedly robust product portfolio ,
growing success in CDMA, fixed operator relationships , and rosy sales forecasts .
12. With the shock of the April 6, 2004 announcement, the price of Nokia's ADR s traded in the United States, and its stock traded throughout the world, dropped 16% for a single-
day trading loss in market capitalization of $17 billion. With the additional revelations made o n
April 16, 2004, Nokia's stock price dropped another 9%, for another $8 billion one-day drop i n
Nokia's market capitalization .
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13 . The claims asserted herein arise under and pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) o f
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78(a), and the rules and regulations promulgate d
thereunder by the SEC, including Rule l Ob-5, 17 C .F.R. §240.1 Ob-5 .
14. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 2 8
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, Section 22 of the Securities Act, 15 U .S.C. § 77u, and Section 27 o f
the Exchange Act, 15 U . S .C . §78aa.
15. Pursuant to the "effects test" of extraterritorial jurisdiction this Court ma y
properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of (a) all investors who purchased o r
acquired Nokia securities traded on U.S . Markets, and (b) American investors who purchased or
acquired Nokia securities regardless of where those securities traded . 8 2498821 16. This court may also properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
of foreign class members who acquired Nokia ordinary shares traded on foreign markets unde r
the "conduct test" articulated by the Second Circuit, which provides that a federal court has
subject matter jurisdiction if (1) the defendant's activities in the United States were more tha n
`merely preparatory' to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere, and (2) these activities o r
culpable failures to act within the United States `directly caused' the claimed losses .
17. Defendants engaged in extensive securities fraud-related conduct in the U .S . ,
which was part of a single fraudulent scheme spanning the U.S. and Europe. The domestic
conduct was not merely "preparatory" or perfunctory acts, but led directly to losses by bot h
foreign and domestic investors. In addition to the substantial U .S . conduct in furtherance of the
fraud, Nokia has a vast U .S . presence that justifies the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction ove r
the claims of all plaintiffs who, relying on the health and value of Nokia's substantial U .S . businesses, acquired Nokia securities traded on foreign markets, and were defrauded b y
defendants' misrepresentations .
18. In addition , there was but a single worldwide market for Nokia American
Depositary Shares (securities) which traded in tandem with Nokia stock on foreign exchanges
and that market was defrauded by defendants' conduct, causing extensive effects both in thi s
country and abroad .
19. In addition to Nokia's vast U.S. activities, a significant number of defendants'
false and misleading statements were initially made in the United States, including at a two-day
"Capital Markets Day" conference convened in Dallas, Texas in November 2003 by Nokia an d several of the individual defendants for market analysts covering Nokia's stock . All of 9 2498821 defendants' false and misleading statements identified in the Complaint were disseminate d
within the U.S ., including by Forms 20-F and numerous Forms 6-Ks filed with the SEC durin g
the Class Period, as well as in its 2003 Annual Shareholders Report posted on Nokia's website .
20. Prior to and during the Class Period, false and misleading statements not made in the United States were disseminated into the United States and internationally through the mean s
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including but not limited to the mails, interstat e telephone communications, the internet and the facilities of the national securities markets .
21 . According to the Company's Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31 ,
2003, signed and filed with the SEC on February 6, 2004, over seven percent of Nokia's long- lived assets, valued at 120 million euros, were located in the U .S . In 2003, Nokia received approximately $4.5 billion dollars in net sales from the United States, making the United State s
Nokia's largest market . In addition, Nokia Corp. employs approximately 6,600 people in the
United States . Approximately 25% of Nokia's securities trade on the New York Stoc k
Exchange.
22. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to Section 22 of the Securities Act, 1 5
U.S.C . § 377u, Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U . S.C . §78aa, and 28 U .S .C. § 1391(b).
Nokia is headquartered in Espoo, Finland, but conducts business and maintains a U .S. headquarters in Irving, Texas and other facilities in Forth Worth, Texas, Mountain View ,
California, Los Angeles, California, San Diego, California and White Plains, New York . In
addition, Nokia and the individual defendants chose to hold Nokia's 2003 and 2004 Capital
Markets Day events, Nokia's annual presentation to market analysts reporting on Nokia's stock, in the United States. 10 2498821 23 . In addition, many of the acts and practices complained of herein, including the
dissemination of materially false and misleading statements, occurred in this District .
24 . In connection with the acts alleged in this Complaint, defendants directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including but not limite d to the mails, interstate telephone communications and the facilities of the national securitie s markets.
THE PARTIE S
25 . Generic Trading of Philadelphia, LLC , Martin Bergljung and Gerald Hoberman were appointed as Co-Lead Plaintiffs by this Court on August 12, 2004. Co-Lead Plaintiffs purchased or otherwise acquired the common stock or ADRs of Nokia during the Class Period a t prices that were artificially inflated by defendants' misrepresentations and omissions and suffere d damages thereby, as detailed in their certifications incorporated by reference herein and attache d as Exhibit A.
26 . Defendant Nokia is a Finnish limited liability company with its executive offices located at Keilalahdentie 4, FIN-00045 Nokia Group, P .O. Box 226, Espoo, Finland, and its principal United States offices at 6000 Connection Drive, Irving, Texas, 75039 . The Company concentrates its business in four major areas : Mobile Phones, Multimedia, Networks and
Enterprise Solutions . Nokia is the self-described world leader in mobile communications , primarily offering voice-centric mobile telephones, enhanced communicators, entertainment and gaming devices and media and imaging telephones. In fiscal year 2003, Nokia's net sales totale d
$37.1 billion, and its net profits totaled $4 .5 billion. The company currently has approximately
50,000 employees, maintains production facilities in nine countries, and sells its products in over 11 249B821 130 countries . The principal trading markets for Nokia securities are the New York Stoc k
Exchange, in the form of ADRs, and the Helsinki Exchanges, in the form of shares . In addition,
the shares were listed on the Frankfurt, Stockholm, London and Paris stock exchanges. Nokia' s
securities were actively traded on each of these five exchanges, all efficient markets, during th e
Class Period.
27 . Defendant Jorma Ollila was at all relevant times Nokia's Chairman of the Boar d
and Chief Executive Officer. Ollila was the lead presenter at Nokia's Capital Markets Day even t
held in Dallas, Texas in November 2003 .
28. Defendant Pekka Ala-Pietila ("Ala-Pietila ") was at all relevant times Nokia' s
President, and an executive board member.
29. Defendant Matti Alahuhta ("Alahuhta") was at all relevant times Nokia' s
Executive Vice President, Chief Strategy Officer, and an executive board member .
30. Beginning January 1, 2004, Defendant Richard A . Simonson ("Simonson") was
Nokia's Chief Financial Officer and an executive board member.
31 . Defendant Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo ("Kallasvuo") preceded Simonson as Nokia' s
CFO, and was also Nokia's Executive Vice President, General Manager of Mobile Phone s
Division, and an executive board member . Kallasvuo was a key presenter at Nokia's Capita l
Market day event held in Dallas, Texas in November 2003 .
32 . During the class period, Defendant Anssi Vanjoki was a Nokia Executive Vice
President, General Manager of its Multimedia Division, and an executive board member .
Kallasvuo was a key presenter at Nokia's Capital Market day event held in Dallas, Texas i n
November 2003 . 12 249882_1 33 . Defendants Ollila, Ala-Pietila, Alahuhta, Simonson, Kallasvuo and Vanjoki ar e
referred to herein as the "Individual Defendants ."
34. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants, as senior executive officers
and/or directors of Nokia, were privy to confidential and proprietary information concerning
Nokia, its product portfolio and performance, market share, phone sales prices, and present an d
future business prospects . The Individual Defendants also had access to material adverse non-
public information concerning Nokia, as discussed in detail below . Because of their positions with Nokia, the Individual Defendants had access to non-public information about its business , products, markets and present and future business prospects via access to internal corporat e
documents, conversations and connections with other corporate officers and employees , attendance at management and board of directors meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to them in connection therewith . In light of their public representations to investors and to market analysts, these defendants either knew their statements were false or were reckless in failing to confirm their truthfulness before they spoke .
35 . The Individual Defendants are liable as direct participants with respect to the wrongs complained of herein . In addition, the Individual Defendants, by reason of their status a s senior executive officers and/or directors, were "controlling persons" within the meaning o f
Section 20 of the Exchange Act and had the power and influence to cause the Company t o engage in the unlawful conduct complained of herein . Because of their positions of control, th e
Individual Defendants were able to and did, directly or indirectly, control the conduct of Nokia' s business.
13 2498821 36. The Individual Defendants, because of their positions with the Company, and/or
because of their presence when false representations about Nokia were made by other Noki a
officers and employees, controlled and/or possessed the authority to control the contents of its
reports, press releases and presentations to securities analysts and through them, to the investing
public. The Individual Defendants were provided with copies or recordings of the Company' s
reports, press releases and presentations alleged herein to be misleading, prior to or shortly after
their issuance and had the ability and opportunity to prevent their issuance or cause them to be
corrected.
37 . As senior executive officers and/or directors and as controlling persons of a publicly-traded company whose securities were, and are, registered with the SEC pursuant to the
Exchange Act, and were traded on the NYSE and governed by the federal securities laws, the
Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate promptly accurate and truthful information with respect to Nokia's performance, growth, operations, trends, business, products, markets , management, revenues, and present and future business prospects and to correct any previously
issued statements that had become materially misleading or untrue, so that the market price of
Nokia's securities would be based upon truthful and accurate information . The Individual
Defendants' misrepresentations and misleading omissions during the Class Period violated thes e
specific requirements and obligations .
38 . The Individual Defendants are liable as participants in a fraudulent scheme and
course of conduct that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of Nokia securities b y
disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material advers e
facts . The scheme (i) deceived the investing public regarding Nokia's business, operations, 14 2498821 management and performance, and the intrinsic value of Nokia securities, and (ii) caused
plaintiffs and members of the Class to purchase Nokia securities at artificially inflated prices.
PLAINTIFF'S CLASS ACTION ALLEGATION S
39. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class consisting of all those who purchased the
securities of Nokia between October 16, 2003 and April 15, 2004 (the "Class Period") and wh o
were damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class are defendants, the officers and directors of th e
Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal
representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a
controlling interest.
40. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members i s
impracticable . Throughout the Class Period, Nokia ADRs were actively traded on the NYSE and its shares were listed on the Helsinki, Frankfurt, Stockholm and Paris stock exchanges . While the exact number of Class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time and can only b e
ascertained through appropriate discovery, plaintiffs believe that there are thousands of member s in the proposed Class . Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified fro m records maintained by Nokia, its depositary or its transfer agent and may be notified of th e pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions .
41 . Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as al l members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants' wrongful conduct in violation o f federal law that is complained of herein. 15 2498821 42 . Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of th e
Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation .
43 . Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class an d predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class . Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are :
a. whether the federal securities laws were violated by defendants' acts a s alleged herein;
b. whether statements made by defendants to the investing public during the
Class Period misrepresented material facts about the business and operations of Nokia or omitte d material facts; and
to what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the proper measure of damages .
44 . A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable . Furthermore, a s the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individuall y redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.
45 . Purchasers of Nokia ADRs on the NYSE and stock on the foreign exchanges ar e appropriately included within a single world-wide class because the price of these securitie s moved in tandem as disclosures were made by Defendants and disseminated throughout the world-wide market . In addition to filing false and misleading statements with the SEC and 16 2498821 foreign exchanges, Nokia issued press releases that were published world-wide and posted on its
website. Defendants held conferences in the United States and elsewhere for market analysts ,
and otherwise held interviews with market analysts, so that Defendants' comments about Nokia' s products and performance were disseminated throughout the world-wide community in analysts ' reports.
SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATION S
Background
46. In the early 1980s, Nokia began to strengthen its position in th e telecommunications and consumer electronics markets through a series of acquisitions o f companies in Sweden. By the late 1980s, through the acquisition of Ericsson's data system s division Nokia became the largest Scandinavian information technology company . In 1987,
Nokia produced the original hand-portable mobile phone . In 1989, Nokia significantly expanded its cable operations into continental Europe by acquiring the Dutch cable company, NKF . From
1987 through 1991, Nokia worked closely with operators to create a "wire-free" world by developing the technology for the Global System for Mobile Communications ("GSM"), th e digital standard adopted throughout Europe . Since the early 1990s, Nokia has concentrated on its core telecommunications business . In addition to developing manufacturing and marketing cel l phones throughout the developed and developing world, over the last 15 years, Nokia worked with phone systems operators (such as AT&T) to plan, deploy, integrate and operate thei r networks and mobile servers .
47. Originally Nokia so dominated the industry that the company could dictate which products operators could incorporate with their phone services . However, as new phone 17 2498821 manufacturers entered the market and competition escalated in both the United States and
Europe, phone service operators, as the gateway to the primary cell phone market, began t o
exercise their power to pick and choose among the models offered by Nokia and the other cell
phone manufacturers that would, as a practical matter, become widely available and sold through
their thousands of retail outlets to consumers . These operators also invested vast sums to
advertise, promote and subsidize the costs of the cell phones as part of the service contracts the y
marketed to consumers .
The Development and Shift in Operating System s
48 . Today, mobile phones generally operate on the TDMA, GSM and CDM A
systems. While Europe gravitated to GSM in the late 1980s, the Cellular Telecommunication
Industry Association chose TDMA, which became widely used in the United States . Nokia overwhelmingly dominated the cell phone market for this TDMA technology, with more than
75% market share. The flexibility to add new features to TDMA, however, is limited, and a growing technology competition began to replace TDMA by Qualcomm in favor of CDMA versus the GSM standard used in Europe . AT&T and Cingular replaced their TDMA syste m with GSM, where Nokia retained a strong market share of 35-40%, but Verizon Wireless an d
Sprint, who together provide service to approximately 50% of United States cell phone consumers, shifted over to CDMA technology . In 2002, Nokia had a paltry market share i n
CDMA phones, and by 2003 its share had risen to only about 11 .4%. Shifts away from the
TDMA technology accelerated sharply in 2003, and by 2003 the share of the worldwide cel l phone market using CDMA technology had risen to 21 % . The increasing shift away from
TDMA to GSM, and particularly to CDMA, greatly eroded Nokia's overall market share of the 18 2498821 world-wide cell phone market . Thus, in 2003, while Nokia often proclaimed its major strides in
improving its CDMA share, it failed to disclose that the on-going and accelerating market shift
from TDMA (where Nokia ' s share was 75%) to CDMA was severely harming its sales, ASPs
and market share.
49. The CDMA chip set developed by Qualcomm was licensed to many of the majo r
cell phone manufacturers that marketed phones in the United States. Nokia, however, refused t o
enter into a license agreement with Qualcomm, and for years attempted, with limited success, to
develop its own chipset . Nokia's chipset was generally considered to be inferior to the on e developed by Qualcomm, and, as a result, Sprint and Verizon refused to purchase Nokia CDM A phones . The United States operators relented in 2003, when Nokia obtained a CDMA chip from
Texas Instruments. By 2003, however, Nokia had fallen far behind other manufacturers, such a s
Samsung, in developing CDMA phones . The ongoing joke in Nokia's Irving, Texas product development office was that, when it came to CDMA technology, "instead of twelve months , they were on a twelve year cycle."
50. Throughout 2003, Nokia had managed to develop and market only low-en d
CDMA phones in its traditional "candy-bar" design, which often became the phone that United
States operators gave away in their promotions, or the "penny" cell phone. Business trailed off, however, when the promotion was dropped, and consumers switched to the Samsung phone which listed at the same price as Nokia but had substantially more features. Nokia's delay in developing well-designed CDMA phones with color and imaging features (i.e., camera phones) degraded its brand, depressed its market share, and reduced its ASPs. As Nokia finally admitte d
19 2498821 at its "Capital Markets Day" in New York in November 2004, Nokia would not have a fill range
of CDMA phone products until the second halfof 2005 .
Nokia's Refusal to Develop a Clamshell Phon e
51 . Throughout 2002 and 2003, the "flip" or "clamshell" design developed b y
Motorola gained increasing popularity, particularly in the United States. Several former Nokia
employees in the United States, including a former head of United States operations and a head
of United States marketing and sales, recounted repeated requests to senior management i n
Finland for development of a clamshell design phone, citing to repeated customer surveys
showing 15% or more customer demand for this design . The response from Finland? We're
Nokia and they will buy what we sell .
52. For example, in a meeting in Dallas in May 2003, attended by sales personnel and
Tim Eckersley, a Senior VP of Sales, Eckersley stood up and adamantly stated that "there is no way that Nokia will ever make a silver folding phone ." The reaction of many in sales was disbelief that Nokia's senior management so deliberately and continuously rejected th e preferences of Nokia's consumers shown by their market research . For years, Nokia's senior officers in Finland, including Matti Alahuhta, proclaimed their unwillingness to develop a clamshell design, despite repeated customer demand for the product, because the widely accepte d and marketed silver clamshell had originally been designed and popularized by Motorola, for years Nokia' s closest competitor.
Nokia's Refusal to Customize Phones For Operator s
53 . Historically, outside of the United States and Asia, phone consumers typicall y first chose a phone brand and then selected the service operator or provider . In the United States, 20 2498821 service operators have always controlled the major segments of the cell phone market, and increasingly exercised their power to pick among various manufacturers' models that would b e offered through their thousands of retail outlets. Control over the distribution of major segments of cell phones in Europe has, however, steadily shifted from major phone distributors to majo r service operators, such as Vodafone, the world's largest operator, headquartered in London, an d
France, Telecom S.A. Orange, ("Orange S.A.") Europe's third largest operator . Vodaphone purchased tens of millions of cell phones from phone manufacturers, and historically turned t o
Nokia for more than 50% of its purchases . Operators in the United States controlle d approximately 90% of cell phones sales; in Europe, operators controlled about 50% of th e market.
54. Until recently, Nokia jealously guarded its brand, often refusing United States an d
European operators' requests for customized phones, including phones bearing the operators ' logos. As more Asian phone manufacturers, such as Sharp and Samsung, developed and improved their phone portfolios, the operators that had been spurned by Nokia, includin g
T-Mobile, Verizon, Vodafone, and Orange S .A., increasingly turned to them to provide th e customization that Nokia had refused .
55 . For example, as recently reported in the press, in the fall of 2001, Thomas
Geitner, then Vodafone's head of global products and services, approached Sharp to make cel l phones with built-in cameras for Vodafone to sell in Europe . In the fall of 2002, as part of a program called Vodafone Live, Geitner offered to buy Sharp models but only on the condition that they would be specifically designed to support Vodafone's launch of a picture-messaging and video games service. 21 2498821 56. When Vodafone approached Nokia to outfit Nokia camera phones with Vodafone
Live services, Nokia refused to meet Vodafone's specifications, such as putting Vodafone's re d
logo on the front of the phone, as Sharp and Mitsubishi had agreed to do . As Juha Putkiranta,
head of Nokia's imaging unit explained, "If the product is Nokia-branded, it needs to feel like a
Nokia product or the brand is worth nothing ." Nokia, as a compromise , agreed to post the
Vodafone logo on the back of its phone . Vodafone launched "Vodafone Live" in Novembe r
2002 with Sharp as the centerpiece of its advertising blitz, and as a result, the Sharp phon e
gained more than 50% of the market for all phones sold with Vodafone Live.
57. Thereafter, in early 2003, Vodafone obtained concessions by Motorola and Sony
Ericsson to customize their phones to meet Vodafone demands . In late 2003, Nokia began to
supply Vodafone with some mid-priced phones that met some, but not all, of its requeste d criteria -- e.g., Nokia continued to refuse to carry the Vodafone logo on the front of its phone .
58 . Also, as recently reported in the press, in late 2002, Orange S.A. asked Nokia to create a handset that connected to the internet at the push of a button . Nokia refused. In October
2002, Orange purchased fully tailored phones from companies such as High Tech Computer
Corp. of Taiwan .
59. In February 2003, Orange S .A. officials met with cell phone suppliers to set out the features they wanted in their cell phones . Orange wanted midrange phones to include, amon g other things, high resolution color screens, and special keys and software to access Orange' s services. Defendant Vanjoki told Orange S .A. that Nokia would not be able to introduce those features at midrange prices until 2004. Orange then turned to Motorola and other suppliers .
22 2498821 60. Unlike Nokia, phone manufacturers in Asia actively courted the key phone servic e
operators. For example, LG, a Korean mobile phone manufacturer, aligned itself with Verizo n
by stationing fifty of its engineers in the United States for weeks to help tailor its phones to
Verizon's requirements .
The Weaknesses in the Product Portfoli o
61 . Even beyond the issues described above, Nokia's product portfolio began t o
seriously deteriorate in 2002 . According to a former Nokia employee working in Irving, Texa s
as a liaison between Nokia's research and development and manufacturing divisions, wit h
visibility into Nokia's product roadmap, there is generally a two-year development lag to produc e
a new phone . Nokia's marketing unit would develop the idea for a new phone, its research an d development group would develop the schematics, and then this employee, as part of th e mechanical sourcing group, would reach out to suppliers to meet the manufacturin g requirements. In 2002, there were few products under development, so that it was well know n that, by early 2004, Nokia would be caught short in its product portfolio.
62. Another former Nokia employee, a Nokia chief hardware engineer in Irving,
Texas, further explained that they were permitted only nine to twelve months to design and develop new phones, so that the product quality of Nokia's phones began to deteriorate .
According to this source, Nokia "cut corners" on the Model 6100 so that many of the phone s experienced display problems and were returned by carriers . At least two Nokia high end phone s would stop working altogether if dropped . Problems in producing the mid-tier TDMA color phone (Model 6265) were ignored and delayed its introduction . In 2003, it was well known that many of Nokia's phones sold in the United States had technical problems, and chipsets and 23 2498821 displays were frequently defective. According to a former technician for Cingular Wireless i n
Tampa, phones supplied to Cingular were often returned because of problems in the phones ' chipsets.
63. By mid-2003, in Irving, Texas, weekly project meetings were held among members of Nokia's engineering, software, programming, mechanical, field services and fiel d repair offices with the phone service operators' technical account manager to discuss operators ' concerns with Nokia's products . Each week, the technical account manager would convey th e operators' "top ten" list of "field failures" or return issues . Cingular was most vocal i n complaining about quality issues with Nokia phones .
64. Starting in 2002, rather than developing truly new phone products, Noki a continued to rely upon the same series 400 platform and simply recycled its existing products by putting different faceplates on them, or modifying minor features like changing the screen to blue, to make them look different . At the same time, Samsung and Kyocera were beginning t o capture large shares of the market with more robust, higher quality and better phone technology .
At one point, developers in the Nokia office in Irving, Texas took apart and examined the features and technology of a Samsung phone and realized that Nokia's product roadmap for ne w products could not match Samsung's current model, that, e.g., Nokia lacked the miniaturizatio n of Samsung's existing phone .
65 . Another former Nokia employee sent from Finland to correct perceived problem s at Nokia's Marketing and Development office in Irving, Texas confirmed that Nokia's produc t portfolio and roadmap deficiencies dated back to 2002 and continued into 2003, and that Noki a issued too many versions of each kind of phone . This source reported viewing at least two 24 2498821 separate and confidential reports in Irving, Texas, describing significant flaws in the Symbian
Systems technology used in Nokia's cell phones . Nokia owned a substantial stake in Symbian, and while this operating system was widely used for "smart phones" marketed to consumers, i t was inferior to Microsoft's operating system for business applications, such as Symbian' s weakness in supporting corporate e-mail. As a result, despite Nokia's enormous research and development investments , Nokia sold only 5 . 5 million smart phones in 2003, well below it s target.
66 . Others familiar with the failures and quality of Nokia's phones, e .g., from
Prismark, an electronic consulting firm, and at Bell Systems, confirmed that, in 2003, the feature s of Nokia's phones did not match its competition . For example, Bell Systems over-inventoried the Nokia 6010, even though Bell had provided it as the "free" phone, because consumers ha d rejected it.
67. Many of the weaknesses in Nokia's phone portfolio such as the small screens o n its camera phones, or their poor color resolution due to the failure to provide mega-pixel phones , and their monolithic "candy bar" shape, were well-known by senior management in Finland a s the weaknesses had resulted from management's own calculated decisions to sacrifice innovatio n to preserve Nokia's cost structure . As Ben Wood, a mobile analyst at market researcher Gartne r
Research, near London, explained in May 2004, "Nokia is focused on running a tight ship at th e expense of a wow factor." Moreover, for years, much of Nokia' s success in maintaining high phone profit margins was attributable to production of the phones in manufacturing facilities tha t had become highly automated . Growing demands from operators for highly customized phone s would force Nokia to retool its m anufacturing to accommodate smaller production runs . Major 25 2498821 design changes would thus significantly drive up manufacturing costs and reduce Nokia' s operating margins .
68. Although as of March 25, 2004, Nokia's CEO was still publicly hawking to its shareholders and investors the "record" forty new phones Nokia had released in 2003 as proof o f
Nokia's "strong" and "competitive " product portfolio, by April 2004, he had dropped these pretenses and finally admitted that Nokia's product portfolio had been deficient since early 2003 .
The N-Gage Games Product Failur e
69 . While in 2003 Nokia did little to improve the quality and competitiveness of it s high volume phone business, in early 2003 Nokia wasted enormous sums of research an d development dollars on its "smart phones," including on a new but ill-conceived combinatio n phone and gaming device referred to as "N-Gage ." N-Gage was heavily pushed and promoted in
2003, and was even prominently displayed in every corner of every lobby in all four Nokia buildings in Irving, Texas . According to a product marketing manager working in Finland an d
Singapore, the marketing department did product research before launching the N-Gage . Despite
Nokia's hype of this product, the research showed that the N-Gage price was too high and th e design was faulted as not being ergonomic . The device was a physically large phone which had to be turned on its side for use as a phone and which, because of its small screen, was no t attractive for playing games. N-Gage was so ill-designed that its batteries needed to be removed when changing games. Because of its unattractive design, the N-Gage was derisively describe d throughout the company (in Finland and the United States) and at customers, such as at
GameStop, as the "taco phone." Despite its high retail price (300 Euros), the N-Gage device
26 2498821 could not begin to compete with other popular gaming devices such as Nintendo's "Pla y
Station."
70. Nokia launched the N-Gage device with great fanfare to 30,000 outlets throughou t the world on October 7, 2003 . From the beginning, the N-Gage was sold with $100-off promotions and rebates at outlets such as GameStop . As described by a product marketing manager for this product, within a month of its launch many employees within Nokia's sales an d marketing departments in Finland learned the product was unsuccessful . Anssi Vanjoki was the key backer and cheerleader for the N-Gage product.
71 . Because of the N-Gage's unpopularity, the channels to which it had been delivered remained "stuffed" after the Christmas season, and the product was either returned or heavily discounted in 2004. For example, one account manager in Nokia's Fort Worth plant in
Texas cited a $23 million credit to Target Stores for the return in 1Q04 of unsold N-Gag e products and accessories.
72. As reflected in Nokia's Form 20-F for 2003, filed on February 6, 2004, it was
Nokia's revenue recognition practice to report sales revenue on its financial statements whe n delivery occurred, assuming the price was fixed and collectibility was probable . At the same time, the impact on sales revenues for the rebates and other promotions of its delivered products was "estimated" based on other past programs :
Nokia records estimated reductions to revenue for customer programs and incentive offerings, including special pricing agreements, price protection and other volume based discounts, mainly in the mobile phone business . Sales adjustments for volume based discount programs are estimated based largely on historical activity under similar programs . Price protection adjustments are based on estimates of future price reductions and certain agreed customer inventories at the date of the price adjustment . 27 2498821 73 . Thus, the high-priced (but unsuccessful) N-Gage product that was first released in
the fourth quarter of 2003 ("4Q03"), and remained in retail channels well after the Christma s
rush, served to increase Nokia's year-end 2003 revenues, as well as its ASP, while the actual
high returns and discounts experience by Nokia on the N-Gage served to decrease Nokia's ASP
of Nokia's phones in 1Q04 .
74. In an October 7, 2004 market research report, RBC Capital Markets noted that i n
2004 Nokia's market share in Europe had been impacted by correction in channel inventory .
The Manipulation of Quarterly and Year End Revenues
75 . In 2003, Nokia manipulated and over-repo rted phone sales in violation of the
revenue recognition practice reported in its Form 20F by shipping phones to phone service
operators with the understanding that Nokia would accept the return of the phones that failed to
sell. This practice also violated International Accounting Standards ("IAS") and United States
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), particularly Statement of Financia l
Accounting Standard ("SFAS") #48, and the SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin ("SAB") 101 .
76. A former Nokia program manager working at Irving, Texas in 2003 reported that , in 2003, he had observed a wide-spread and common practice whereby, each month, sale s personnel would deliver mobile phones to AT&T, and the other service operators, with the understanding that unsold phones would be returned to Nokia .
77. Because phones sold to one se rvice operator, e.g. AT&T, could not be resold t o another, e.g. Cingular, the returned phones were disassembled at Nokia's factory in Texas . The process to break down a phone was a time consuming job, requiring about ten minutes per phone ,
28 2498821 because the pallet had to be taken apart. The parts would then be returned to Nokia's supply inventory.
78. Another former Nokia employee, an account manager in Nokia's Fort Worth plan t in Texas described Nokia's long-held practice of billing a customer (and recognizing th e revenue) while continuing to hold the units at the dock in order to manipulate end-of-quarte r sales numbers . Richard Wooldridge, Nokia's United States National Operations manager, originally came up with the dock-holding policy, but after the Enron scandal, the undelivered goods were moved onto trucks where they were held . This practice also manipulated revenue s and violated the revenue recognition practice reported in Nokia's Form 20-F,1AS and GAAP , including SAB 101 .
79. This source related a particularly outrageous example where Brightpoint, Nokia' s largest United States distributor, specified a significant shipment to be delivered to Indianapoli s around January 5, 2004. Nokia shipped out these goods in mid-December 2003, about three weeks early even though the usual required shipping time was 2-3 days .
80. For 4Q03, in order to make Nokia's numbers, Wooldridge and Barbara Carroll , another Nokia manager in Texas, also ordered that units known to be defective, including th e
Model 5165 that had significant problems with its LCD displays, be shipped out to customers .
Both managers commented (while the source was present) that 100% of the product would need to be taken back in 2004 . Wooldridge, in particular, kept saying that, "we're going to be takin g big hits in the first quarter of 2004," and "we're screwed for first quarter '04 ." Millions of dollars worth of the Model 5165 was shipped out . Similarly, another model popular in th e
United States, the Model 3285, was shipped out at year-end while Wooldridge and Carroll knew 29 2498821 it had contained a bad component, the "saw filter" which was inserted in the phone to filter out
electrical spikes. Millions of dollars of the defective Model 3285 were shipped out to
Brightpoint in Indianapolis, U .S . Cellular in Chicago, and Alltel in Alpharetta, Ga . This source
then observed the crediting of customers' accounts as the products came flooding back durin g
I Q04.
Nokia's Trends in Market Share and Sales
81 . As described in a July 16, 2004 analyst report by Morgan Stanley, until 4Q03 when the sequential phone average selling price, ASP, rose by 2.7%, to $128 .70, Nokia' s mobile phone ASP had been steadily dropping since 1999 :
Sequential Quarterly Nokia Phone ASP Decrease in ASP 1999 179.6 1 2000 176 .50 2001 168 .74 2002 154 .1 5 1Q 2003 147.75 .8% 2Q 2003 136.46 7.6% 3Q 2003 125.32 8.2%
In 1 Q04, Nokia's ASP resumed its decline -- by 9 .3 %, or to $116 .69.
82 . Besides the 4Q03 release of certain high-priced (but unsuccessful) new products , such as the N-Gage, the other factor that momentarily broke, in 4Q03, the steady fall in the AS P for Nokia' s phones, and also temporarily increased Nokia's market share, involved a sudden industry-wide surge in demand for cell phones. Demand in developing nations, such as China,
India and Latin America, for first-time and low-priced cell phones significantly increased, but s o did demand in the phone replacement market in the United States and Europe for phones with new features, such as for new camera and color phones . This sudden jump in demand outr an 30 2498821 supplies for phone components, particularly for such items as new camera screens, causin g
significant shortages at Motorola and among Nokia's less-established Asian competitors .
Because of Nokia's long-lasting and superior relationships with its own vendors, Nokia was abl e
to exploit these shortages to improve its 4Q03 performance, despite the relative inferiority of its
mid and high-priced phone portfolio .
83 . In May 2004, Morgan Stanley reported the following shifts in market share
between Nokia and its two largest competitors :
3Q03 4Q03 1Q04 Nokia 33.7% 34.7% 29 .2% Motorola 15.0% 14.1% 16 .5% Samsung 11 .0% 9.7% 13 .1%
84. The change in Nokia' s market share translated into a loss in sales volume o f approximately nine million phones for a single quarter. Even Nokia's supply chain advantages, however, did not serve to fully stem its decline in market share in its most important an d developed market, Western Europe . Again, as reported by Morgan Stanley in May 2004, Nokia' s market share peaked in 1Q03 at 52 .5% and dropped steadily throughout 2003, with a muc h sharper 5 % drop in 1Q04, to settle at 40% .
1Q03 2Q03 3Q03 4Q04 1Q04 Nokia Western Europ e market share 52.5% 51 .2% 47.2% 45 .4% 40.0%
85 . At the close of 1 Q04, the full consequences of Nokia's deteriorating produc t portfolio could no longer be concealed . With the strongest increase in demand in history for the cell phone industry, Nokia's overall market share fell an astounding 5% in a single quarter , including, as described above, another 5.4% in Western Europe . Despite galloping demand ,
31 2498821 Nokia's mobile phone sales for 1Q04 dropped 15% year over year for a loss in phone sales o f
$880 million . The drop in phone operating profits was even more dramatic -- a 25% decline, o r
$300 million. Nokia' s 1 Q04 overall operating profits declined 17 % during l Q04. As the causes
of this negative performance were structural and were long in the making, the newly admitte d
inadequacies in Nokia's product portfolio continued to sharply depress its performance in late r
quarters .
Nokia's False Statements and Misleading Omission s
86. On October 16, 2003, Nokia issued a press release announcing that it had met its
Third Quarter Sales and earnings per share (`BPS") targets . The release contained the followin g
statements that were attributed to its CEO, Jorma Ollila:
Following an announced commitment two years ago to strengthen our position in the global CDMA handset market, I am very happy to say that we have now doubled our share to the mid-teens from the same quarter last year . We expect to see continued momentum in CDMA going into the fourth quarter as we increase shipments to China, India and all major U . S. CDMA operators .
Recent months have marked our entry into a number of new and exciting areas of mobility. We have introduced several camera phones, begun shipments of games devices and announced half a dozen phones for new growth markets .
The Nokia N-Gage has just gone on sale at 30, 000 stores around the world to a very positive initial consumer response. Many outlets sold out of the device during thefirst day of release. Following on f •om this, we are seeing strong order intake from distributors and retailers.
87 . The statements attributed to Ollila about Nokia performance and "momentum" in
the CDMA market were materially false and/or misleading and omitted mate rial facts needed to make the statements not misleading because the market shift from TDMA (where Nokia had a
75% share) to CDMA (where, in 2002, Nokia held only a nominal share and, even in 2003, held
32 2498821 less than a 15% share) was harming Nokia's sales performance and market share . Moreover, by
2003, Nokia had developed only low end CDMA phones and was far behind its competitors i n development of high quality and competitive mid-tier and high end CDMA phones because of its refusal to license the Qualcomm chipset . Nokia's CDMA phone sales performance and prospects were also being depressed by its refusal to customize its CDMA phones to operators ' specifications .
88 . The statements about new product releases, particularly regarding the N-Gage , were materially false and/or misleading and omitted material facts needed to make the statement s not misleading because consumers' immediate response to N-Gage was highly negative an d those sales that were made relied heavily on promotional discounts .
89. On October 16, 2003, Defendants Ollila and Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, Nokia' s
Executive Vice President and General Manager of its Mobile Phones division, hosted a conference call with the market analysts following Nokia's stock to discuss Nokia's third quarter
2003 ("3Q03") financial performance . During this call, Ollila described the benefits flowing t o
Nokia from its supposed strength in CDMA, and the success of Nokia's distribution strategy, it s supposed competitive and "feature-rich" product offerings, and its ramp-up of several significant new products, including the N-Gage and new camera phones :
Of the various technologies, GSM, CDMA, and PDC grew basically in line with overall year-on-year market growth, while CDMA volumes continued to decline . Nokia's market positions strengthened in the Americas across all the technologies . We have achieved major market share gains in Latin America, where our market share currently exceeds the global 39% level. In the USA, we are the clear market leader and we are well-positioned to make further gains during the holiday season . The strong momentum in CDMA continued, with our CDMA market shar e doubling from a year ago to the mid-teens . Going into Q4, we see an opportunity for a major increase in our CDMA volumes in India, China, and the U.S. We 33 249882_9 have now achieved the number one position in the Chinese GSM market . Our distribution strategy is bearing fruit and Nokia brand is stronger than ever, supported by competitive product offering from low-end to localized feature-rich devices like the pen-based Nokia 6108 . . .
I expect Nokia volume growth in Q4 to exceed the overall market growth . Our offering is being strengthened by the ramp-up of several significant new products, such as the Nokia N-Gage, the new imaging phones Nokia 6600, Nokia 3660, GSM wideband CDMA-based Nokia 7600 and the highly competitive entry-level camera phone, the Nokia 3200 series . I am looking forward to a quarter that is expected to bring Nokia new volume and market share record .
90. In response to a question by analyst Mike Walkley, Ollila elaborated upon Nokia' s
success in CDMA:
Yeah, I think, if we look at the CDMA market, we really are pleased with a very steady progress that we have made in CDMA now in the last three quarters . So it's really a consistent good progress, having some of these key operators, Sprint and Verizon in the U.S., Unicorn in China, as well as Reliance in India, as our customers, all of them in volume, shipping in volume as we speak . So we really are pleased with how that has worked out. The business model, the dynamics as it is in the CDMA has slightly lower ASPs as our average, has a slightly lower margin, but it is good business, we are getting a good healthy margin . And we just love to get that business and really make progress in that segment .
91 . In a question regarding demand for CDMA clamshells in North America an d
Asia, Ollila touted the broader product roadmap for enhanced CDMA phones :
First of all, we want to be present in all the key segments of the CDMA market . And we have introduced our first CDMA camera phone, our imaging product as we would say, and that phone will be shipping initially in Latin America in Q4 and is a good indication of how we will be moving . Then if we look at the phone factors, we will be moving to a broader set of phone factors also with CDMA, including clamshells . . .
And if we look at the broader set of products and opportunities in CDMA, we are working with number of multimedia segment products, which will hit the markets in 2004 and 2005. So, the product's road map is a very exciting one .. .
34 2498821 Ollila also explained that Nokia's product mix was improving as a result of its new higher-end
offerings:
Yeah, so if you look at the high end, what's the proportion of that in the total, the share of color in terms of value now accounts for about 50% of the total, and that we expect to grow significantly in Q4 . And if you look at the value of camera phones, we expect that to be in the range of 20% of the total in Q4 . We are well on our way to that as we speak, so we feel good about that, and that just shows that the change towards the higher-end offerings is happening.
92. And finally, in response to a question on growth in Asia, and Nokia' s overall corporate ASP profile, Ollila emphasized the strength of Nokia's margins in its entry level, middle and high-end portfolio :
I think if you are looking at two markets like China and India, these are two markets where it is even more pronounced than in some others . That taking an average ASP of any other factor really distorts the picture because you have a very strong high-end segment, but most of it obviously is low and middle, entry level and middle range phones . So you really have to look at how the segments are performing. We are getting a healthy margin and that's our main driver . A healthy margin from both of those markets and that's coming from both the high- end and middle range, as well as entry .
93. The above-referenced statements in the conference call about Nokia's CDM A performance and the success of its distribution strategy were false and misleading, and omitte d facts needed to make the statements not misleading because the market shift from TDMA (where
Nokia had a 75% share) to CDMA (where, in 2002, Nokia held only a nominal share, and, eve n in 2003, held less than a 15% share) was harming Nokia's sales performance and market share .
By October 2003, Nokia had developed only low end CDMA phones and was far behind it s competitors in the development of high quality and competitive mid-tier and high end CDMA phones because of its refusal to license the Qualcomm chipset . In particular, sales to key Unite d
States CDMA operators, Sprint and Verizon, had only begun recently with Nokia's use of the 35 2498821 Texas Instrument chipset, and these sales continued to be depressed by Nokia's refusal to
customize its products to their specifications .
94. With respect to the purported strength of Nokia's mid- and high-end offerings,
and its product road map, including for clamshells, the statements were false and misleading, and
omitted facts needed to make the statements not misleading because :
a. By 3Q03, Nokia's product portfolio had sharply degraded and Nokia wa s
simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors, and minor
cosmetic changes. There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-priced offerings,
including for high resolution color and camera phones, and those high-priced phones (such as the
N-Gage) that were released were ill-designed and were being rejected by consumers .
b. By 3Q03, products in Nokia's "road map," i.e., that were planned and in development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate and noncompetitive and lacked form designs such as clamshells that Nokia's customer surveys had indicated were in high demand.
95 . On November 24, 2003 and continuing into November 25, 2003, Nokia hosted a conference in Dallas, Texas which it termed its "Capital Markets Day" for market analysts covering Nokia's stock. The event was well-attended by stock analysts from around the world, many of whom published reports summarizing the representations made by Nokia's officers .
The following Nokia officers attended the event and gave presentations to analysts on Nokia's behalf: Jorma Ollila (Chairman and CEO), Pertti Korhonen (Senior Vice President and CTO),
Rene Svendsen-Tune (SVP Marketing and Sales Networks), Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo (EVP and GM
Mobile Phones), Niklas Savander (SVP Terminals Business Unit Enterprise Solutions) and Anss i 36 2498821 Vanjoki (EVP and GM Multimedia). A webcast of the first day's presentations at the conferenc e was posted on Nokia's website .
96. In kicking off the conference, Ollila first reiterated Nokia's 4Q03 outlook o r
guidance, and cited to the significance of the positive growth in Nokia's sequential ASPs o f
Nokia's phones during the quarter as proof of "how our strategy is working," noting Nokia' s
"restructuring has really paid off."
97. Ollila continued, stating that Nokia, "will continue to offer a unique global range
of highly competitive mobile phone products to a large consumer segment," and that Nokia will assure, "that we get the lowest cost structure and that we get the fast product renewal to ensure product competitiveness which has been our strength in the past . . . ." He then stated that, "we
have know-how where we can bring mobility to many of these areas, particularly the games ,
imaging, media products, and we have the concepts to make it happen . "
98 . In summing up his introduction to analysts for the first day of the Capital Marke t
Day event, Ollila emphasized that Nokia's supposedly strong product portfolio was the mos t
important reason for Nokia's competitiveness :
First of all, it's all about product. We are a product company. It's all about product range, the segmentation . The product cycles are being accelerated. That's the push for the market, how we can respond to that and the fact that industry is becoming highly competitive . We feel this area is number one among the competitive factors for us.
99. Ollila's statements about the significance to Nokia's business prospects of th e
4Q03 growth in Nokia's phone ASP's ; Nokia's product portfolio and "fast product renewal" ; and
Nokia's "know-how" in games, were false and misleading or omitted material facts because :
37 2498821 a. The growth in Nokia's ASP was attributable to the component shortage at
Nokia's competitors, and to other non-recurring factors, as described in 11169-80.
b. By November 24, 2003, Nokia's product portfolio had sharply degrade d and Nokia was simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors, and minor cosmetic changes . There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-end offerings , including for high resolution color and camera phones .
c. By November 24, 2003, products in Nokia's "road map," i.e., that were planned and in development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate an d noncompetitive and lacked form designs such as clamshells that Nokia's customer surveys had indicated were in high demand. Nokia's direction to its engineers to accelerate its "produc t renewal" had also resulted in defective and inferior new products that were returned to Nokia i n
I Q04.
d. By November 24, 2003, consumer response on the N-Gage product t o
Nokia marketing and sales personnel was already highly negative.
100. As the day continued, Kallasvuo made a presentation to analysts on Nokia' s mobile phone business . He began his presentation by explaining the extreme importance o f
Nokia's cost leadership, and the folly of focusing on the different priced segments of Nokia' s phone portfolio :
Cost leadership will continue to be of extreme importance and I think we really need to continue to be cost leaders in all categories . So the thinking, okay, let's leave the low end, if you will, aside and concentrate on mid-end, if there is -- mid- end, and the high-end and really escape to that direction . I don't think it is a winning strategy. . . and this low-end, mid-range, high-end thinking continues to be overly simplistic.
38 2498821 101 . Kallasvuo's dissembling about the insignificance of the different priced segment s
of Nokia's phone business was false and/or misleading and omitted material facts becaus e
Kallasvuo concealed that, in fact, Nokia had significant holes in its mid-range and high-range
phone portfolio, as well as in its roadmap for these higher-priced phones ; and that these
deficiencies had affected and would in the future severely and adversely affect Nokia' s sales
performance , operating profits, market share and phone ASPs.
102 . Kallasvuo then made a presentation on Nokia's CDMA performance, explainin g
Nokia's past development problems and assuring market analysts that these problems had bee n
solved with competitive higher end CDMA phones currently in development :
Now, before moving to the cost leadership I want to tackle CDMA briefly . Not other segments of this business . I will simply make some comments on the CDMA that -- there are many questions here . I'm sure there will be more during the course of today and that obviously especially when you are in the U .S. CDMA attracts a lot of attention . So obviously we've got -- we've made some very good progress in CDMA this year and we are making that progress right now as we speak. We have doubled our market share and we really can in a very realistic way target even higher market shares here . So why is this happening now? I think it's very simple . For a long time I think we were under-investing in CDMA when it comes to R&D . We basically did not necessarily completely understand the complexity there is in CDMA market . And really didn't seem to get there how hard we always tried . In the summer of 2000 we made important decisions to increase our investments in CDMA, really made a commitment saying that now we simply need to pay more by investing more to get the sustainable process and really catch the other players in the industry . And I think this -- what we are seeing now is simply a consequence of that decision. Money being spent, invested -- of course there again that's expense while doing so, and we are seeing the results.
I think we are now in a situation where we really are competitive when it comes to CDMA engine. And the engine really it's well performed . And now really it's time for us to make the expansion based on that engine to other -- to more categories of the market, cover more segments, more high-end if you will . The possibility to that is right there and we are doing it right now. And then of course also drive CDMA to conversions and push, for instance, Symbian to CDMA . And 39 2498821 the beauty here is that when doing so the commonality between different standards, between CDMA markets and GSM markets will increase. When you move to the higher layers of software and application platforms, you really can benefit more from the commonality there between CDMA and GSM . And I think that will increase our competitive position here.
103. Later, in responding to an analyst question that suggested that Nokia should buy a
CDMA network capability, Kallasvuo stated:
So -- but to be quite honest, you know, this time we are getting closer, because this we have really worked on and thought about . And, you know, now we are getting into situation that there probably would be benefit, because we are getting into new areas, different complexities, there are other service platforms, et cetera, et cetera. And, you know, not to go anything deeper to it, but this is something that we have worked on . Let's leave it at that .
104. Kallasvuo' s statements about Nokia's CDMA history was false and/or misleading and omitted material facts because the market shift from TDMA (where Nokia had a 75% share) to CDMA (where in 2002 Nokia held only a nominal share and, even in 2003, held less than a
15% share) was harming Nokia' s sales performance and market share . Moreover, by November
2003, Nokia had developed only low-end CDMA phones . The statements were also false and/o r misleading because Nokia still had been unable to develop a competitive CDMA chipset and ha d only been able to sell low-end CDMA phones to major operators in the United States b y purchasing a chipset from Texas Instruments . Nor did Nokia then have competitive mid-tier and higher end CDMA products in its "roadmap," i.e., that were planned and in development for release over the next several quarters. Finally, Nokia's progress in sales of CDMA phones continued to be stymied by its refusal to customize its CDMA phones for its major U.S. operators, including Verizon and Sprint .
40 2498821 105 . Anssi Vanjoki, Nokia's Executive Vice President and General Manager fo r
Nokia's new Multimedia Unit also made a presentation to the assembled market analysts .
Vanjoki first lauded Nokia's success in camera phones, including for higher end cameras :
If you look at the current camera industry, which equals about hundred million devices, why should we not count this industry to be the addressable market for Nokia as well? I have at least started to count it as my market . What's special in making a camera? After all in two years we became world's largest manufacturer of cameras.
Right now we see our cameras are exactly what's there . There are a number of mega pixels and multiple mega pixel cameras available in the market, but first of all are they affordable to the consumer? The answer is no . Secondly, is the whole imaging chain to take use of these cameras existing and in balance? The answer is again no. But next year this is not going to be so anymore. The whole imaging chain is able to support this kind of cameras . And Nokia's early selection of technology to go with fima sensors in the cameras is really starting to pay off for us in a big manner. And in this way we can make the right cost balance for sophisticated imaging devices .
106. Vanjoki' s comments about Nokia's camera phones were false and/or misleading and omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading because Nokia then had significant holes in its current product portfolio and product roadmap for competitive mi d and higher quality camera phones .
107. Vanjoki also represented that the initial response to Nokia's new N-Gage product was "very good," "hot," "as planned," with repeat orders coming in:
Games are hot. Christmas is coming. And this year we participate to that market in a grand scale. We have brought the first N-Gage unit to the market and we have started to gain business also in the publishing side . If there are hook areas in games, it's online, and it's mobile . What N-Gage does, it puts these two hook areas together and makes it truly hot . It's not going to be one Christmas phenomenon . Now, we are not expecting that the first Christmas is going to make it for us. But when we have gone through three cycles, i.e. three Christmases -- 41 2498821 because game industry peaks to the tune of Christmas -- then we can say whether we have this market in the pocket or not . The starting is very good. We are attracting this business, we are seeing repeat orders come in, and in certain mnarkets, which are more attuned for this, we see the whole thing starting to work just as we have planned.
108. In response to an analyst question about N-Gage product limitations and th e success of the first 400,000 units shipped, Vanjoki acknowledged only that consumers had provided valuable "feedback" and reiterated the product's initial success and "endorsement" by key industry players:
Yeah, those 200,000 people who up to now have bought the unit are really c ritical for us because they are the first true consumers who have paid their own money for these devices and they want to give a feedback. They are giving us feedback and the great thing in comparison to many other devices that have been brought to the games market is that we have the N-Gage arena. We have an on-line connection with these people and we are getting a lot of feedback. This feedback is converted already today into activity into our R &D, and I expect that when the next cycle, i.e. Christmas 2004 comes, we have fixed any of those things that the consumers today are not liking in this product . So definitely we are taking action in this area, and like I said, you know, we are here for the long haul with the games industry. The starting is really very good and the endorsement of the key players in this business gives us good feeling that the long haul will actually pay Off
109 . Vanjoki's statements about N-Gage were false and/or misleading because consumers' immediate response to N-Gage was highly negative and those sales that were mad e relied heavily on promotional discounts . The N-Gage was also negatively received by ke y distribution outlets, such as Gamestop, where it was derided for its poor design as the "Tac o
Phone."
110. Another analyst asked Vanjoki to elaborate on Nokia's relationships with operators and market share and how Nokia might need to change its operator relationships in light of the threat of Nokia's brand : 42 2498821 Yes, I think that it is the same for anybody in any business . That if you have a strong partnership with somebody and that represents a majority in your business dealing with the partner, you start to sort of suspect that, you know, is this right? And then it is very much a behavioral question . If the other party behaves in a way that is encouraging to cooperation, other than in a way that is all the time shifting it in question, then I think through partners it can be found . This is what we have found with the big operator groups around the world where the main driver in fact is the trustworthiness of the partners and the behavior that you show. If we would behave in a way that would give reason for operators to shoot for something else then I'm sure that, you know, they would use their power much stronger than what it is today. I think it is only natural for any operator or any other business where you are a part of the chain that you want to sort of hedge your bets and you want to enable other people as well to play in the equation . And as such we have nothing against this as long as we always have the same chance. And so far I can only report that we've had the same chances as th e newcomers.
111 . Vanjoki's dissembling statements about Nokia's relationships with operators an d
its impact on Nokia's market share were false and /or misleading and concealed material facts .
Major operators, such as Vodaphone, Orange S .A., T-Mobile, and Verizon were purchasing significantly fewer phones from Nokia, and providing less promotional and advertising support because of Nokia's refusal to customize its phones to their specifications, including prominently showing their logos on the phones .
112 . Ollila, in making his closing comments to the assembled market analysts made th e following comments about expected growth in the burgeoning replacement market, and the significance of Nokia's supposedly stabilizing ASPs :
We are seeing a replacement market, which is at the level today than what we thought it would be a few years back, or a little higher . Share of the total industry we estimate to be -- total industry volume shift we expect to be well over 60% this year and somewhat bigger in 2004. So when we look at the percentage of phones replaced from the subscriber base, we can see that this renewal rate is changing . It's not a curve which does go down. It's actually recovering and the renewal rate has experienced .a turning point, seems to be stabilizing at 25%, and really does represent a significant and interesting, and sort of an annuity, of what a compan y 43 2498821 like ourselves with a kind of customer loyalty, brand recognition that we have . So growing customer base -- a growing base of subscribers providing through the renewal rate, an interesting opportunity for a company like ourselves .
When we look at the market we are back on the growth path . After a disappointment in 2001 and not much of a recovery to write home about in 2002 . But this year growth of more than 10% -- 460 million units . Perhaps a bit stronger, you might say. Yes, perhaps a bit stronger . And in 2004 growth of more than 10%, allowing an interesting opportunity that is giving a little bit of a hint also from the stabilization of the ASPs in the fourth quarter, as I noted first thing at noon when we kicked off
113. Ollila also stated that Nokia was approaching a 40% mobile phone market share ,
and represented that the reason for that improvement was Nokia's purportedly "vastly improve d
product portfolio," including in CDMA phones :
This 40% target was very well set, I feel, because it was not an easy one but at the same time attainable, and we are getting very, very close in the fourth quarter . So let's revisit that topic in January, February when we'll be able to communicate to you more.
So we look at gaining share, continuing to do that also in 2004 . That's the way we set our business goals . Then if we look at our strategic areas this year, early this year in January and February we were quite explicit that there are three areas where we want to set our sights and make sure that we will do better towards the year-end.
First of all the -- it was the issue of the U .S. We did not have much fun in terms of our market position, evolution in the U.S. But now with the vastly improved product portfolio, greatly improved share in CDMA, and first time ever in all the major U.S. carrier quarter four campaigns, us being included, it means that we are now in a very strong position in the U.S. In China our market share has improved during the last four of five months with our China specific products and distribution, and we have gained our number one position back in GSM and we have entered the CDMA market . So our position in China is well stabilized and Colin Giles who has done a great job in a very challenging marketplace will be available for you tomorrow and he has some pretty good story to tell . And then finally in CDMA, I think Olli-Pekka already told about that. We have doubled our sham. We, you know, when we set our sights on something we get results .
44 2498821 And I think that -- I think our CDMA effort is a good testament for that. And you'll hear more about all this treatings tomorrow.
114 . Ollila's statements regarding the facts underlying changes in Nokia's market
share, its "vastly improved" product portfolio, "greatly improved" share in CDMA improve d
operator relationships, and the importance of its current uptick in ASP were materially fals e
and/or misleading and omitted material facts because :
a. The growth in Nokia's ASPs and market share was attributable to th e
component shortage at Nokia's competitors, and to other non-recurring factors, as described i n
IT 69-80.
b. By November 24, 2003, Nokia's product portfolio had sharply degrade d
and Nokia was simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors
and minor cosmetic changes . There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-price d
offerings, including for high resolution color and camera phones.
By November 24, 2003, products in Nokia's "roadmap," i.e., that were planned and in development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate an d noncompetitive and lacked form design, such as clamshells, that Nokia's consumer surveys ha d indicated were in high demand in the United States .
d. The market shift from TDMA (where Nokia had a 75% share) to (CDMA where, in 2002, Nokia held only a nominal share, and even in 2003, held less than a 15% share) was harming Nokia's sales performance and market share . By November 2003, Nokia had developed only low end CDMA phones and was far behind its competitors in the development of
45 2498821 high quality and competitive mid-tier and high end CDMA phones because of its refusal to
license the Qualcomm chipset .
Sales to key United States CDMA operators, Sprint and Verizon, had only begun recently with Nokia's use of the Texas Instrument chipset, and these sales continued to be
depressed by Nokia' s refusal to customize its products to their specifications.
115 . On November 25, 2003, Nokia continued its "Capital Markets Day" for marke t analysts in New York, with nine topical breakout sessions.
116 . In a Press Release dated January 8, 2004, and filed with the SEC as an attachment to a Form 6-K, Nokia stated:
Nokia's Mobile Phones sales in the fourth quarter of 2003 increased to approximately EUR 7 billion, up 4% year over year (versus the previous guidance of flat to slightly up) due to better than expected market development leading to strong Nokia unit volumes . Due to this and a favorable product mix, Nokia Mobile Phones 'pro forma operating margin continued at the excellent level of between 24% and 25% for the quarter.
117. The following statement was attributed in the press release to Ollila:
The strong seasonal development in both Nokia Mobile Phones and Nokia Networks exceeded even our own expectations . High volumes and an excellent mix in Nokia Mobile Phones delivered healthy sales and an average selling price that was up sequentially.
118. The statements in the press release were materially false and/or misleading an d omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not false and misleading because th e
4Q03 growth in volumes and phone ASPs was not attributable to the acceptance and success o f
Nokia's mix of products, but rather to an aberration caused by a short-term component shortag e at Nokia's competitors and other non-recurring factors described in ¶¶ 69-80.
46 2498821 119. On January 22, 2004, Nokia held an earnings call in conjunction with the releas e
of its fourth-quarter and year end results for 2003 . Ulla James, Nokia's Vice President o f
Investor Relations, and Defendant Rick Simonson , Nokia's CFO, also participated on the call .
During this call, Ollila proclaimed that 2003 had been "a great year" for Nokia Mobile Phones , and that Nokia's mobile phone sector had delivered "record volume" and "record sales and profits," along with an increase in sales growth of 12%.
120. During the call, Ollila stated that, "For the first quarter [2004], we currently d o expect, first of all, that Nokia net sales will grow between 3% to 7%. And secondly, that the diluted reported EPS will range between €0 .17 and €0.19." In projecting Industry and Nokia' s own phone growth in 1 Q04, Ollila emphasized that his projections of Nokia's 1 Q04 performanc e were predicated on the products currently in its "line-up" or "pipeline" :
The good momentum of the handset industry is expected to continue also in the first quarter. We project the market volumes to grow somewhat over 20% year- on-year versus 11 % market growth a year ago in the first quarter . With our current product line-up gaining momentum, we expect to grow volumes faster then the market . I also feel encouraged by our products pipeline for the rest of the year.
121 . During this call, Ollila also touted Nokia's ability to forecast consumer demand
"with a high degree of accuracy," its "fact-based" market understanding, and stressed th e company's "exceptionally good visibility throughout the channel" (while noting that its forecast s still remain "estimates") :
Nokia deploys an internal, bottom-up process in market forecasting. Our aim is to have a fact-based market understanding, both globally and on a country level, in order to support our internal planning. I believe our market estimates historically have been pretty accurate for several reasons . We have exceptionally good visibility throughout the channel, as we are present in most of the country markets distribution channels, as well as in most of the technologies . In most of 47 2498821 them we are also the market leader. With our performance, we have demonstrated that we have been able to forecast demand with a high degree of accuracy and our view of the market size is also shared by the other leading mobile phon e manufacturers . I also believe that any attempt to measure a truly global market of several hundreds of millions is always an estimate, even at its best . Several factors add into the complexity. . . .
122. Ollila also explained that he personally monitored the segment volume an d
development of his competitors . During the Q&A portion of the conference, Ollila also
acknowledged that he received "reports weekly on revenue and on how we feel we are doin g
against our competition and how our share is evolving. " Thus, Ollila represented that h e
personally received hard facts about Nokia's sales and market share versus its competitors, an d
that Nokia's guidances on sales and market share were based on these hard facts .
123. During the call, Ollila discussed the supposed reasons for the uptick in Nokia's phone ASP in 4Q03 :
A shift to color and to more feature-rich devices, together with an increase in the newness ofour productportfolio, were the drivers for the 2% sequential ASP development in the fourth quarter.
124. Ollila also asserted that Nokia's annual gross margins in the mobile phone secto r had exceeded 40%, "driven by newness of the portfolio [and] improving quality and continuing efficiency gains ."
125 . Ollila asserted that he expected Nokia's market share to improve in 1 Q04 becaus e
Nokia' s own sales had been limited by vendor shortages :
The higher than expected robust indust ry demand during the fourth quarter resulted in a very healthy level of channel inventories at year-end. In spite of some tightness of supply in the market, we were able to deliver according to plan, but our ability to capitalize on the upside during the biggest sequential volume ramp-up in history.of mobile phone industry was limited.
48 2498821 126 . In response to an analyst question, Ollila reiterated that "we're very relaxed abou t
the 40%" targeted market share percentage because, "we have a situation where we, as I noted i n my opening comments, we, in the fourth quarter, we were constrained in shipping more than w e
actually did. "
127. In response to an analyst's question on the European market and his expectation s regarding Nokia's market share in Europe, Ollila stated that, based on Nokia's strong product position in Europe (particularly in the "high-end") and 4Q03 sales "momentum," he expecte d
Nokia to gain additional market share in Europe in 1 Q04 :
On Europe, we expect to gain share in Ql in Europe . It's a major market for us . Our product positioning was really well in the fourth quarter, particularly in the high-end, and our -- some limited availability in the low-end and also unwillingness then to move price, meant that share was not what we had in mind in the fourth quarter, but we did very well there. Now there is scope to do a bit better. And when I commented earlier on the momentum of the final quarter of last year continuing to the first quarter, I think that's really Europe which one can refer to more than into any other region .
128 . The statements made by Ollila regarding the current status of the product portfoli o and pipeline underlying the 1Q04 guidance and expected gains in market share (including in
Europe) and the reasons for the 4Q03 change in the trend in ASP and market share, were materially false and/or misleading and omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not false and misleading because :
a. During 2003, Nokia's product portfolio had sharply degraded and Nokia was simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors, and minor cosmetic changes . There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-priced offerings ,
49 2498821 including for high resolution color and camera phones, and those "smart" phones (such as th e
N-Gage) that were released were ill-designed and were being rejected by consumers .
b. By 4Q03, products in Nokia ' s road map, in the "line-up" or "pipeline" that
were planned and in development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate
and noncompetitive and lacked form designs such as clamshells that Nokia's customer survey s
had indicated were in high demand .
c. Nokia was losing, and would continue to lose, sales because of the refusal
by its senior management to customize phones for major operators, particularly in Europe.
d. In terms of relative market share, Nokia had benefited at the expense of it s
less established competitors from the 4Q03 component shortages because of its long-standin g relationships with component vendors . Thus, once the component shortages became alleviated ,
Nokia's relative market share would worsen .
129. In Europe (even with the advantage of component shortages at its competitors )
Nokia's market share had steadily fallen through 2003 because of the deficiencies in Nokia' s product portfolio, particularly in the mid- and high-end products, and the refusal by Nokia senio r management to customize phones for major operators, including Vodafone and Orange S .A.
Moreover, for Europe, Nokia had reported sales of high-priced products that remained in the channel going into 2004, that would depress sales in 1 Q04 .
130. On February 6, 2004, Nokia filed with the SEC its Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003. In the section of the 20-F entitled "Risk Factors," the company laid out several factors that could negatively . affect Nokia's business, including "risks" that had already come to pass: 50 2498821 a. Changes in the mobile communications industry require us to develop complex, evolving technologies to use in our various businesses, some of which are new to us. If we fail to develop these technologies or successfully commercialize then as new advanced products and solutions that meet the demands of the market, or fail to do so on a timely basis, or if the evolution of our operation environment is slower than anticipated leading to delays in the deployment and acceptance of new services, it may have a material adverse impact on our business , our ability to meet our targets, and our results of operations.
b. Despite our recent reorganization, we may not be able to commercialize new products and services successfully or profitably, or respond fast enough to the changes in the industry.
c. The technologies, functionalities and features on which we choose to focus may not achieve as broad customer acceptance as we expect . This may result from numerous factors including the availability of more attractive alternatives or a lack of sufficient compatibility with other existing technologies, products and solutions.
d. In our mobile device business, we seek to maintain healthy levels of sales and profitability through offering a competitive portfolio of mobile devices, growing faster than the market, working to improve our operational efficiency, controlling our costs, and targeting timely and successful product introductions and shipments . For us a competitive portfolio means a wide and balanced mix of commercially appealing mobile devices with attractive features, functionality and design, covering all major user segments and price points .
e. We may experience difficulties in adapting our supply to the demand for our products, ramping up or down production at our facilities, adapting new manufacturing processes, finding the most timely way to develop the best technical solutions for new products, or achieving manufacturing efficiency and flexibility, whether we manufacture our products and solutions ourselves or outsource to third parties . Such difficulties may have a material adverse effect on our sales . . .
f. [A] failure could occur at any stage of our product creation, manufacturing and delivery processes, resulting in our products and solutions not meeting our and our customers ' quality, safety and other corresponding requirements, or being delivered late, which could have a material adverse effect on our sales, our results of operations and reputation and the value of the Nokia brand .
51 2498821 g. Should wefail to implement the new organizational structure effectively and smoothly, the efficiency of our operations and performance may be affected, which may have a mate rial adverse impact on our sales and results of operations during 2004, and possibly also thereafter.
131 . The statements made in the Risk Factors section of the February 6, 2004 For m
20-F were false and/or misleading and omitted material facts necessary to make the statements
not false and misleading because each of these purported "risks" had, by December 31, 2003 ,
already materialized and had become adverse historical facts -- they were not merely "risks" that
might or might not occur in the future. Thus, as defendants would later admit, by December 31 ,
2003 :
a. Nokia had already failed to develop the new technologies and products
necessary to compete effectively in the modern mobile phone market, particularly in the mid-tier .
b. Nokia had already failed to develop a competitive portfolio, meaning a
"wide and balanced mix" with "attractive features, functionality and design" covering mid-tie r
and high-end phone products. This included Nokia's failure to develop clamshells, mega-pixe l
phones, phones with high color resolution and mid and high level CDMA phones.
Nokia had already failed to meet customers' quality requirements, as in
the case of products that had been rushed to market by cutting corners and delivered to customer s
with known defects.
d. Nokia had already failed to meet the requirements of its key operators b y
its refusal to customize products to their specifications .
132. Nokia's February 6, 2004 Form 20-F also included a section entitled "Cor e
Business Strengths ." In this section, Nokia identified several core "strengths" that .according to
52 2498821 management, differentiated Nokia from its competitors and that would enable the company t o maintain a leadership position in its industry. Among the "strengths" listed were :
Strong product offering: Our strongproduct offering goes beyond voice-centric mobile phones to include entirely newfunctional categories of mobile devices, such as enhanced communicators, entertainment and gaining devices and media and imaging phones.
133 . The statements made in the "Core Business Strengths" section of the February 6 ,
2004 Form 20-F were false and/or misleading and omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not false and misleading because :
a. In 2003, Nokia's product portfolio had sharply degraded and Nokia wa s simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors, and minor cosmetic changes. There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-priced offerings , including for high resolution color and camera phones .
b. By 4Q03, products in Nokia 's "road map," i.e., that were planned and in development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate and noncompetitiv e and lacked form designs such as clamshells that Nokia's customer surveys had indicated were i n high demand.
c. By February 2004, Nokia's customers had flatly rejected N-Gage .
134. In the Business section of its Form 20-F, Nokia continued to tout the competitiv e strength of its mobile phone business, stating that, "We consider our mobile phone and devic e manufacturing to be a core competence and competitive advantage ."
135 . In the Management Discussion & Analysis ("MD&A") section of the 2003 Form
20-F, Nokia went on to attribute its improvement in gross margin (from 39.1% to 41 .5% year
53 2498821 over year) to an improvement in Nokia Mobile Phones . "In 2003 the clear improvement in th e
quality ofour mobilephones resulted in a lower quality cost per phone than in 2002 ." The
section continued:
Net sales of Nokia Mobile Phones reached their highest level ever at EUR 23 618 million in 2003, representing an increase of 2%, compared to EUR 23 211 million in 2002, driven by the consumer uptake of color-screen and camera phones, Nokia's growing presence in growth markets, and Nokia's increased share of the US, and CDMA markets. . . . Sales growth in Europe, Middle-East and Africa was to a large extent offset by lower sales in the Americas and Asia-Pacific .
Nokia Mobile Phones launched 40 new products during 2003 with an emphasis on more advanced devices, CDMA technology, entry level phones and market localization. Of the new products launched, 31 models had color-screens, 14 models had cameras and 24 models were MMS-enabled.
We strengthened our position in three strategic areas by attaining the number one market position in the United States and the number one position in GSM in China, as well as significantly increasing global CDMA market share .
136. Nokia also remarked that the Symbian Operating System, in which it would soo n
seek to acquire a controlling share, "has wide support from the mobile industry as well as a ver y
active and large group of applications developers and operators ."
137. The statements made about Nokia's "Core Business Strengths" and otherwise in
the MD&A section of the February 6, 2004 Form 20-F were materially false and/or misleadin g
and omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not false and misleading because :
a. By 4Q03, Nokia's product portfolio had sharply degraded and Nokia wa s
simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors, and minor
cosmetic changes . There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-priced offerings ,
including for high resolution color and camera phones, and those high-priced "smart" phone s
(such as the N-Gage ) that were released were ill-designed and were being rejected by consumers . 54 2498821 b . By 4Q03, products in Nokia's "road map," i.e., that were planned and i n
development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate and noncompetitiv e
and lacked form designs such as clamshells that Nokia's customer surveys had indicated were i n
high demand.
c. The Symbian Operating System lacked strong business applications, suc h
as for corporate email, necessary to support business sales.
138 . Nokia's 2003 Form 20-F also contained a certification, pursuant to Section 302 o f
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which attested to the veracity of the statements containe d
therein by Defendants Jorma Ollila and Richard A . Simonson, under penalty of perjury or simila r
threat of punishment, as follows :
I, Jorma Ollila, certify that :
I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Nokia Corporation ;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report ;
3 . Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly represent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.
Date: February 6, 2004 /s/ Jorma Ollila Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
I, Richard A. Simonson, certify that:
55 2498821 I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Nokia Corporation;
2 . Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fac t necessary to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report ;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly represent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.
Date: February 6, 2004 /s/ Richard A. Simonson Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Office r
139. The Company's 2003 Form 20-F also contained a certification pursuant to Sectio n
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which attested to the veracity of the statements contained
therein by Defendants Jorma Ollila and Richard A. Simonson, under penalty of perjury or similar
threat of punishment, as follows :
In connection with the Annual Report of Nokia Corporation (the "Company") on Form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned hereby certify that to the best of our knowledge :
1 . The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ; and
2 . The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
Date: February 6, 2004
/s/ Jorma Ollila Chairman and Chief Executive Office r
56 2498821 /s/ Richard A. Simonson Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Office r
140. The certifications made in the February 6, 2004 Form 20-F were materially fals e
and/or misleading and omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not false an d
misleading because :
a. By 4Q03, Nokia' s product po rtfolio had sharply degraded and Nokia was
simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors, and minor
cosmetic changes . There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-priced offerings ,
including for high resolution color and camera phones, and those high-priced "smart" phone s
(such as the N-Gage ) that were released were ill-designed and were being rejected by consumers .
b. By 4Q03, products in Nokia's "road map," i.e., that were planned and i n development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate and noncompetitiv e
and lacked form designs such as clamshells that Nokia's customer surveys had indicated were i n high demand.
c. The results of operations, including Nokia's sales and earnings, were misstated for the matters described in IT 69-80.
141 . On or about February 6, 2004, Nokia also issued its 2003 annual report to shareholders. In the section entitled, "Review by the Board of Directors 2003," the report
emphasized, under the heading "Nokia Mobile Phones in 2003," the purported strength o f
Nokia's phone portfolio :
For the full year 2003, Nokia volumes reached a record 179 million units , leading to an estimated market share slightly above 38% . 5 7 2498821 Nokia Mobile Phones broadened and revitalized its product portfolio by launching 40 new products during 2003 with an emphasis on more advanced devices, CDMA technology, entry-level phones and market localization . In addition to focusing on innovation and design in the portfolio in 2003, Nokia also made good progress in improving the quality of its processes and products, leading to concrete results .
142. The statements made in the Directors' section of the annual report were materiall y
false and/or misleading and omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not false an d
misleading because :
a. By 4Q03, Nokia's product portfolio had sharply degraded and Nokia was
simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors, and minor
cosmetic changes . There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-priced offerings , including for high resolution color and camera phones, and those high-priced smart phones (suc h as the N-Gage) that were released were ill-designed and were being rejected by consumers .
b. By 4Q03, products in Nokia ' s "road map," i.e., that were planned and i n development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate and noncompetitive and lacked form designs such as clamshells that Nokia's customer surveys had indicated were i n high demand.
143. The annual report to shareholders contained a section on "Risk Factors" whic h included "risks" that had already come to pass :
Changes in the mobile communications industry require us to develop complex, evolving technologies to use in our various businesses , some of which are new to us . If we fail to develop these technologies or successfully commercialize them as new advanced products and solutions that meet the demands ofthe market, or fail to do so on a timely basis, or if the evolution of our operating environment is slower than anticipated leading to delays in the deployment and acceptance of new services, it may have a material adverse
58 2498821 impact on our business, our ability to meet our targets, and our results of operations.
Reaching our targets depends on numerous factors, such as our ability to offer products and solutions that meet the demands of the market and to manage the prices and costs of our products and solutions, our operational efficiency, the pace of development and acceptance of new technologies, our entry into new business areas, and general economic conditions . Depending on those factors, some of which we may influence and others of which are beyond our control, we may fail to reach our targets and we may fail to provide accurate forecasts of our sales and results of operations .
Our sales and results of operations could be adversely affected if we fail to efficiently manage our manufactu ring and logistics , orfail to ensure that our products and solutions meet our and our customers ' quality, safety and other corresponding requirements and are delivered in time.
• If we are unable to effectively and smoothly implement the new organizational structure effective January 1, 2004, we may experience a material adverse impact on our operations, sales and results of operations.
144. The statements made in the Risk Factors section of the annual report were fals e and/or misleading and omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not false and misleading because each of these purported "risks" had, by December 31, 2003, alread y materialized and had become adverse historical facts -- they were not merely "risks" that might or might not occur in the future. Thus, by December 31, 2003 :
a. Nokia had already failed to develop the new technologies and product s necessary to compete effectively in the modem mobile phone market, particularly in the mid-tier.
b. Nokia had already failed to develop a competitive portfolio, meaning a
"wide and balanced mix" with "attractive features, functionality and design" covering mid-tie r and high-end phone products. This included Nokia's failure to develop clamshells, mega-pixe l phones, phones with high color resolution and mid and high level CDMA phones .
59 2498821 c. Nokia had already failed to meet customers' quality requirements, as i n
the case of products that had been rushed to market by cutting corners and delivered to customer s
with known defects .
d. Nokia had already failed to meet the requirements of its key operators b y
their refusal to customize products to their specifications .
145 . On February 23, 2004, Nokia hosted a press event at the Cannes World Congres s
in Cannes, France, which was attended by more than 30,000 participants . At the press event,
Jorma Ollila described three business areas where Nokia expected to see important development s
in 2004, including in "voice," purportedly building on Nokia's "strong" 2003 cell phon e
development base:
The third area ofopportunity in today's mobile industry continues to be voice where there is tremendous growth as well as innovation in sight . We move into 2004 building on the base of strong development in 2003, last year.
146 . Ollila then went on to discuss Nokia's purportedly "high quality" camera phones :
Imaging is today the most important application in the mobile multimedia . Camera phones became a huge success last year with the global market volumes exceeding 70 million units . Nokia has been in the forefront in bringing high quality imaging devices to the market and the Nokia 6600 is the greatest example where we have combined high quality camera and advanced smart phone functionality into an easy to use package . I'm happy to share with you today that the Nokia 6600, after its introduction to the market last October, has become the world's best selling smart phone where volumes to date exceed two million units .
147. Ollila' s statements at Cannes were materially false and/or misleading or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not false and misleading because :
a. By 4Q03, Nokia's product portfolio had sharply degraded and Nokia wa s simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors, and mino r
60 2498821 cosmetic changes. There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-priced offerings ,
including for high resolution color and camera phones, and those high-priced "smart" phone s
(such as the N-Gage ) that were released were ill-designed and were being rejected by consumers .
b. By 4Q03, products in Nokia 's "road map ," i.e., that were planned and in
development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate and noncompetitiv e
and lacked form designs such as clamshells that Nokia's customer surveys had indicated were i n
high demand.
148. At the Cannes press conference, Ollila also made a point of welcoming as Nokia' s guest speaker, "my friend Arun Sarin, CEO of Vodaphone ." Both Ollila and Sarin, who also referred to Ollila and "our friends" from Nokia, talked about a collaboration between Nokia an d
Vodafone for moving to a future platform .known as 3G. When questioned about past problems between Nokia and Vodafone in providing 2%2G handsets, Sarin explained that, in connection with Vodafone Live, Vodafone had used Sharp because, "at that stage Nokia was not that far along." Ollila then elaborated on Nokia' s purportedly changed relationships with its operators:
I'll be brief, because the nature seems to talk as well . So, the, I think we're very pleased with the dialogue we have had with Vodafone relating to the 2%2G Vodafone Live implementation, particularly the success of 6600 as well as the 3/4 other phones that are, brought about Vodafone Live, are a good omen going forward because we have some very good, very interesting, exciting discussions under way as Arun indicated, about how we can get new products, 3G products particularly, into the market as part of the Vodafone offering and we will work very well with a number of our operator customers because that's the way the collaborative approach needs to work going forward and I think the Vodafone and Nokia collaboration has been really exemplary in that respect .
149. Ollila's presentation and statements with Arun Sarin were materially false and/o r misleading or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not false and misleading
61 2498821 because throughout 2003 and 1 Q04, Nokia's phone sales continued to be depressed as a result of
Nokia's refusal to customize existing phones to its operators' requirements, and because o f
deficiencies in Nokia's phone portfolio. Often Nokia's phones were the operators' "free" o r
"penny" phone and Nokia was engaging in weekly meetings to discuss quality issues plaguin g
Nokia's phones that had been raised by operators .
150. On March 17, 2004, several Nokia officers attended a trade show in Hannover ,
Germany, known as CeBIT. Nokia's Pasi Polonen, head of N-Gage publishing activities, made a presentation on the supposed "success" of N-Gage :
It's been five months, or actually five months ten days to be exact that we introduced the N-Gage game deck to the market . Our expectation at the time was that it will be hard, it will be challenging and it will be interesting . And we certainly received what we expected . . . .
And clearly we've broken the ice on the online area with the rich games of N-Gage. But ensuring on the mobile online story is the fact that N-Gage is also the number one device on downloadable games as you can see from the statements of some of our stockholders . Whether it's Java games, or Symbian downloadable games, you can always say that has been a success . For us again, that's very assuring because the N-Gage device is actually used for what it was intended to be used for, mobile gaming. It's the right track and we're building on it.
151 . Later, when asked why the price of N-Gage had dropped so rapidly since its introduction to the market, Nokia's presenters merely reported that, "concerning the price point , the first price point was obviously too high, so that's why it was changed ."
152. The statements made at CeBIT about customer reaction to N-Gage wer e materially false and/or misleading or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements no t false and misleading, because N-Gage had been a failure from the first month of its introduction.
62 2498821 The device was ill-designed as a phone or for playing games, and the devices delivered in 4Q0 3
remained stuck in retail channels to 2004, and only sold after they were highly discounted.
153. At the CeBIT conference, Nokia representatives described the purpo rted success
of 3G devices and series 60 "smart" phones . When asked whether the success of these products
would have any sustainable impact on Nokia's selling price, the following evasive answer on
Nokia's phone ASPs was given :
The average selling price is for this device is being 3G or being the series 60 devices are clearly above our normal mobile phones, so the more we sell there, it has a positive impact on Nokia's average selling price, if that's what you want me -- I mean, definitely we see new functionality adding also value to the terminal so people will buy new mobile devices with higher price in the future, because they provide more.
154. The statement about Nokia's ASPs, and the impact of sales of its higher end products on the phone ASPs, were materially false and/or misleading or omitted material fact s necessary to make the statements not false and misleading because by March 17, 2004 Nokia' s phone ASPs were sharply dropping as a result of the absence of mid-tier and high-end competitive products in its phone portfolio.
155. On March 25, 2004, Nokia held its annual shareholders meeting in Helsinki ,
Finland. Chairman Ollila began his speech by describing 2003 as a "record year for the mobil e handset industry and for Nokia Mobile Phones," which "reached not only record profits, but als o higher than ever sales and volumes ."
156. Ollila described the factors that impacted positively on net sales as, "high sales volumes of Nokia Mobile Phones and a favorable product mix ." Ollila also claimed that Noki a had been able to reach "several important strategic milestones" in 2003, and expected simila r
63 2498821 success in 2004, as a result of Nokia's purportedly "strong" and "very competitive" produc t
portfolio:
[W]e attained the number one market position in the United States in mobile phones and the number one position in GSM mobile phones in China. We also significantly increased our global CDMA handset market share . We reached these goals in part due to our strong product portfolio . As we have earlier stated, we launched 40 new products last year. This was a record number of mobile device launches for Nokia during one year. This year, we expect to launch a similar number of products . I strongly believe that our product portfolio continues to be very competitive.
157. On March 25, 2004, Nokia also issued a press release again emphasizing th e
strength and competitiveness of its phone product portfolio :
"`Nokia launched a record 40 new mobile devices last year, and we expect to launch a similar number in 2004,' said Jorma Ollila. `Our product portfolio will continue to be very competitive . . . "'.
158 . Regarding Nokia's multimedia operations, Ollila claimed that Nokia was one of the first companies to bring high-end imaging devices to the market . Ollila claimed that the N-
Gage brand and "ways of mobile gaming it offers are already well recognized," according to several surveys conducted by Nokia.
159. Finally, Ollila painted a promising picture of Nokia's future, claiming that :
[w]ith our strategy and our new organization , we are well positioned to take advantage of the next growth phases in our industry as well as offer the benefits of mobility to consumers , businesses and the global community. Even in a challenging environment, we have built a strong basefor the next growth phase.
160. The statements made by Ollila during the March 25 annual meeting wer e materially false and/or misleading and omitted material facts necessary to make the statement s not false and misleading because :
64 2498821 a. By March 2004, Nokia's product portfolio had sharply degraded an d
Nokia was simply recirculating the same series 400 phone with different face plates, colors, and
minor cosmetic changes . There were major holes in Nokia's mid-tier and high-priced offerings ,
including for high resolution color and camera phones, and those high-priced "smart" phone s
(such as the N-Gage) that were released were ill-designed and were being rejected by consumers .
b. By March 2004, products in Nokia's "road map," i.e., that were planned
and in development for release over the next several quarters, were also inadequate and noncompetitive and lacked form designs such as clamshells that Nokia's customer surveys ha d indicated were in high demand .
The Truth Begins to Emerge
161 . On April 6, 2004, Nokia shocked the market with the news that rather tha n increase 3%-7% as previously projected, its net sales had actually decreased by 2% during th e first quarter of 2004 .
162. On the single day following release of this news, Nokia ADRs, which had closed at $21 .15 on April 5, 2004, fell 16% to $17 .73 in midday trading on volume in excess of 7 1 million shares -- a single day market capitalization loss of $17 billion .
163 . Analysts stated that the big discrepancy between Nokia's sales guidance an d actual results raised questions about its credibility. On April 6, 2004, Bloomberg News, with the quote of a major investor, captured the sentiment of the market :
"This is a big disappointment," said Frank Heise at Union Investment in Frankfurt, which oversees $133 billion, including Nokia shares . "The company runs the risk of a credibility problem because until very recently Nokia's comments regarding phones were quite upbeat ."
65 2498821 164 . In Nokia's First Quarter Update Call on the same day Defendants largel y
attributed the reason for Nokia's disappointing results to "gaps" in its phone product portfolio :
Due to some gaps in our product portfolio, mainly in the midrange, we were not able to maintain our market position and fully capitalize on the positive market development in Europe and the U.S. Sales of the Mobile Phones Business Group were below expectations . Sales declined in Europe and Asia year-on-year . In Europe, as the decline was driven by somewhat lower than expected volume and a product mix more weighted towards the low end . In Asia, Nokia's volume development was positive, but sales were negatively impacted by the mix shift towards the low end . . . [OJur product por folio in the first quarter was not at its strongest. . . .
165. Later in the Update Call, in response to a question from Tim Luke of Lehman
Brothers, Ollila admitted he had been aware since early 2003 that Nokia was not competitive in
either its mid-range or high-priced phones :
I think if we look at the - particularly at the midrange, you know, we saw early on last year that what - what might be happening is that we are not fully competitive . So certainly, we have started to take measures . . . .
But in the early part of the year [2004], we will not be quite as competitive in those segments that we did - that - then we have been earlier and that we will feel that we will be towards the end of the year . It's particularly GSM - clamshell midrange classic and some of the high-end `must have' areas .
166 . As to Nokia's substantial decline in market share, Ollila again attributed the
decline to an inadequate product portfolio:
Our strength in Asia, including China, as well as Latin America, has compensated somewhat, but the way in which we have not been able to grow with the market in Europe and the U.S., where our share has been very, very strong incidentally . U.S . has been impacted by the shift from CDMA (sic) to GSM, and Europe, we have a very high share in many of the countries . And the gap really comes from the midrange. It's - that's where it is coming from and I think I would hold on to that when we have analyzed and what's happening in the market ."
66 2498821 Ollila also disclosed that the market for TDMA phones (where Nokia's share had been strongest )
was "continuing to decline pretty rapidly ."
167. Not surprisingly, analysts wanted to know how Nokia intended to reclaim th e
market share it had lost. In response to a question from Tim Boddy of Goldman Sachs, Ollil a
admitted the long-existing "quiet spell" in Nokia's roadmap :
It's really that the product portfolio, which is in the product roadmap, which will make a difference. You know, there's no trick. We have certainly had a quiet spell in our product roadmaps. We will improve and there will be a better coverage of the key segments in that midrange . . . . And that's some of the issues which we have addressed in the roadmaps which are in place . So it's not that we start tomorrow and then get something out in 12 to 18 months . It's something which - things being in the roadmap already and we'll feel we will be covering the ground a lot better.
168. On April 16, 2004, Nokia issued a press release containing more bad news .
Specifically, Ollila announced that Nokia mobile phones sales volumes had grown a full thir d
lower than the mobile device market as a whole . Ollila attributed this to Nokia's inability to
exploit the usual seasonal market surge in March . As a result, Ollila admitted, Nokia's market
share had fallen to 35%.
169. A decline in market share was not the only bad news coming out of Nokia' s
mobile phones business group . Although the April 6, 2004 press release had announced that
Nokia's overall net sales had decreased by 2%, the financial statements included in the April 16 ,
2004 press release revealed that net sales of Mobile Phones (i.e., volume times ASP) had
decreased by 15% year on year from EUR 4.989 billion in 1 Q03 to EUR 4.251 billion in 1 Q04
(about $880 million). The financial statements also disclosed that Nokia's Mobile Phone
67 249882 1 operating profits had plummeted by 25% from EUR 1 .449 billion in 1 Q03 to EUR 1 .089 billion
in 1Q04 (about $300 million) . The financial statements also showed that Nokia's overal l
operating profits had fallen by 17% .
170. The press release explained that ,
Net sales in all sales areas , except for North America, were impacted by a product mix more weighted towards the low end . In addition, net sales in Europe and the United States were impacted by gaps in the mid-range of the portfolio.
The release also warned of expected declines in sales in later quarters .
171 . The news was similarly bad for Nokia 's highly touted N-Gage gaming system.
The April 16, 2004 press release finally admitted that the sales of N-Gage were "disappointing."
172. On April 16, 2004, Nokia held its I Q04 Earnings Conference Call, in which it
continued to explain its poor performance . Ollila remarked that mobile phone sales in Asia ,
including China, had declined due to a "product mix weighted more towards the low-end . Sales
development was weakest in Europe and associated with certain weakness in the current mid-
range product offering."
173 . Ollila attempted to reassure investors by explaining the changes Nokia had been
making over the last year to correct deficiencies in the current product portfolio and roadma p
(thereby again admitting that he had known about the inadequacies in Nokia's product portfoli o
since 2003):
I would now like to end by making a few comments regarding our handset portfolio. As mentioned, we have made many changes over the last year to improve our product portfolio. Over the coming months , you will see the results of this work in number of new products but, more impo rtantly, in the variety of features and form factors. We are not satisfied where were are today, but we are seeing steady improvement in our product road map and expect to again have the leading portfolio in the months ahead . . . . 68 2498821 By the end of the year, we expect to have around half a dozen clamshell handsets together with other form factors shipping. And, of course, a vast majority of these will have color screens and cameras . With the enhanced product portfoli o gradually coming into place, with our new organization focused on customer and market operations, as well as the global operations ensuring the timely delivery, we should be in a position to see the benefits of this improved portfolio in sales, market share, and margins towards the end of the year .
174. Ollila again admitted that he had long known about the inadequacies in Nokia' s
product portfolio (which Ollila referred to as "legacies"), including with respect to its "for m
factors," when, during the Q&A session of the Earnings Call, Ollila responded to a questio n
posed by Wojtek Uzdelewicz of Bear Sterns regarding mistakes Nokia had made. Ollila
explained that the weakness in Nokia's product portfolio was due to ,
"a lot ofarchitecture issues which we have had, which one would call `legacies. . . And this includesform factors . This includes a number of things. So there are architecture issues which have led into some [] execution delays, so that we have liked to be a sort of 6 months ahead ideally with some of our product lines and some of our product introductions . But it' s not that there was a glitch which put a brake on everything. It's just a transition that is very much underway, and which I suppose could have been that for somebody who is there without the legacy could have addressed somewhat differently.
175. Ollila further commented that "there is a major mid-tier market which have kind of, since we have those holes, not enabled us to move from low-end to mid-end in the upgrade market and that then hits the ASP and the total revenue line ."
176. Later in the Earnings Call, one analyst commented on Nokia's weakness in markets where the mobile phone value chain was controlled largely by operators, and inquired as to what had happened with Nokia's relationship with operators . Ollila conceded that Nokia' s problems with operators had adversely affected sales and that this problem was neither new o r unknown to Defendants -- that Nokia's relationship with operators was "continuing to improve in
69 249882_) terms of how we are working with them and on a practical level . But, obviously, that is not immediately or short-term necessarily reflected in the purchasing decisions. So there will be a lot of fluctuation ."
177 . On April 28, 2004 , the Morgan Stanley Equity Research Group in London me t with Defendant Pekka Ala-Pietila. Throughout the course of the meeting, Ala-Pietila candidly admitted that the inadequacies in its mid-range portfolio had surfaced during the third quarter o f
2003 . Ala-Pietila further explained that Nokia had over-invested in its new Multimedia and
Enterprise business groups, while underinvesting in mid-range mobile devices .
178. Finally Ala-Pietila revealed information about Nokia's long-standing, adverse relationship with operators . He admitted that Nokia had not been willing to comply with operator demands in the past, particularly regarding customization, and had recently spent tim e
"clearing the air," with some operators.
179. In a 2Q04 Earnings conference call with analysts, Ollila again admitted that long- existing deficiencies in Nokia's product portfolio, including in its color and integrated camer a phones, continued to suppress Nokia' s sales, profitability and market share . He also admitte d that there was a direct relationship between actual products currently in the roadmap, and future sales over the following two quarters :
While our productportfolio is gradually improving, we are still not in where we want to be. Therefore, we have taken certain specific actions. First, we have spent a great deal [of] time and energy in owning our product roadmaps. The product portfolio will continue to gradually improve throughout this year and I strongly feel, based on what we have in the pipeline, that we will make a huge improvement starting in the fourth quarter. Secondly, we have heightened our ambitions in the technology roadmaps and product specifications , which means greater emphasis on best-in-class technology implementations like Wideb and
70 2498821 CDMA, displays, and cameras . We are also paying special attention to our ability to support the operators in their differentiation needs .
180. On or about August 9, 2004, market analysts from Handelsbanken Capita l
Markets met with a Nokia vice president of marketing for mobile phones . As reflected in th e analysts' report dated August 9, 2004, "Nokia admits that its portfolio has been weak since Q 3
2003, and that its success in Q4 2003 was from the weakness in competition ." By this comment,
Ollila also acknowledged that Nokia's earlier refusal to "support the operators in thei r differentiation needs" had harmed sales.
181 . In a conference call held with analysts on September 9, 2004, Richard Simonson,
Nokia's CFO, suggested that Nokia' s higher earlier repo rted sales in Europe may have been a result of deliveries into the channel that had not then been sold to consumers -- i.e., the difference between "sell-in" and "sell-out":
Going back to second quarter, specifically to your question on Europe and the sell in, sell out, we have said there had been a sequential decline in sell in, but our sell out we had very good positive signs there, indicating that we have had a 3 .5 million additional clearing of the inventory, i.e., sell out. So that is where we were in second quarter.
182. On November 3-4, 2004, Nokia held its annual "Capital Markets Day" event fo r market analysts in New York City. During that conference, Ollila admitted to a sea change that had occurred at Nokia in terms of its relationships with its key customers, "the mega operators" :
When we speak about operators and especially key or mega operators, big operators, we had a done a fair, a bit of soul-searching how we can find a way to work together and how we can find a way to configure to their business success. It's a bit funny to use the following words in front of this audience but internally we use that and we say that the results of the outcome from that soul-searching is actually that, it's -- we have to love and care for our key customers .
71 2498821 And, as Ollila explained, this change was apparent in Nokia's long-evolving willingness t o
customize its phones for operators:
Customization is something which has been part of the discussions for long with operators. In some areas, it has been easier for us to respond to the requests but there has been many areas which have been quite challenging for us to b e responsive .
183 . And, as Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo explained at the conference, "We have recognize d
the needs for operators to differentiate more than in the past . . . to the mega-operators we don' t
say `yes,' but we say `yes, and . . .?"'
184. The extraordinary scope and the materiality of the impact on Nokia business and
sales of its operator relationships was reflected by Ollila' s announcement that, for products to be
launched in 2005, 90% of the products will be "software customizable" and "almost one quarte r
will be having this dimension of exclusivity or hardware customizability for the key operators ."
185 . On the second day of this two-day conference, Nokia finally admitted that not
until the second half of 2005 would it have a full range of CDMA phone products . It also
admitted that its business with Verizon was still not what it should be.
Additional Scienter Allegation s
186. As alleged herein, Nokia and the individual defendants acted with scienter in tha t
they knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated on behalf of the
Company were false and misleading or acted recklessly in not determining their truth often wher e
they themselves personally made the statements to market analysts following Nokia stock . With
respect to many of the false and misleading statements alleged to have violated the securitie s
laws (such as with respect to the deficiencies in Nokia's product portfolio and roadmap), and a s
72 2498821 further described herein, Ollila and other of the individual defendants actually admitted in Apri l
2004 and thereafter that they had known the truth since early 2003 .
187. As Ollila described in his January 22, 2004 conference call with market analysts ,
he and others at Nokia received detailed sales information on a global and per country level in
the course of Nokia's "internal, bottom-up process" to support Nokia's internal planning, an d
that they had "exceptionally good visibility throughout the channel ." Ollila himself receive d
"reports weekly on revenue and on how we are doing against our competition and how our shar e
is evolving." Projections of 1Q04 sales and market share were purportedly based on Ollila's ow n
knowledge of what was then in Nokia's product "line-up" and the "momentum" of the know n
sales that had already occurred .
188. The individual defendants, in making their detailed presentations to marke t
analysts at the Capital Markets Day conference and on conference calls with analysts, professed
to have the necessary business knowledge to discuss the products and issues on which they wer e
presenting. The individual Defendants well knew the problems with Nokia's portfolio an d
roadmap, because decisions about what phone products and designs would be developed an d
included in Nokia's roadmaps were made at the highest corporate levels in Finland, as wer e
decisions about whether to customize products for operators.
The False and Misleading Statements and Omissions Caused Plaintiffs' Losses
189. The market for Nokia's securities was open, well-developed and efficient at al l relevant times. As a result of these materially false and misleading statements and failures t o disclose, Nokia's common stock traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period .
73 2498821 Plaintiffs and other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired Nokia securitie s
relying upon the integrity of the market price of Nokia's securities and market informatio n
relating to Nokia, and have been damaged thereby .
190. During the Class Period, defendants materially misled the investing public ,
thereby inflating the price of Nokia's common stock, by publicly issuing false and misleadin g
statements and omitting to disclose material facts necessary to make defendants' statements, a s
set forth herein, not false and misleading. Said statements and omissions were materially fals e
and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and misrepresented
the truth about the Company, its business and operations, as alleged herein .
191 . At all relevant times, the material misrepresentations and omissions particularized
in this Complaint directly or proximately caused or were a substantial contributing cause of the
damages sustained by plaintiff and other members of the Class . As described herein, during the
Class Period, defendants made or caused to be made a series of materially false or misleadin g
statements about Nokia's business, prospects and operations . These material misstatements and
omissions had the cause and effect of creating in the market an unrealistically positive
assessment of Nokia and its business, prospects and operations, thus causing the Company' s
securities to be overvalued and artificially inflated .
192 . Defendants' materially false and misleading statements during the Class Perio d
resulted in plaintiff and other members of the Class purchasing the Company's securities a t
artificially inflated prices, thus causing the damages complained of herein .
74 2498821 Applicability Of Presumption Of Reliance: Fraud-On-The-Market Doctrin e
193 . At all relevant times, the market for Nokia's securities was an efficient market fo r
the following reasons, among others :
a. Nokia's ADRs met the requirements for listing, and was listed and actively
traded on the NYSE, a highly efficient market ;
b . Nokia's stock met the requirements for listing on the Helsinki, Stockholm ,
Paris and London (until November 2003) exchanges and was listed and actively trading thereon ;
c. As a regulated issuer, Nokia filed periodic public reports with the SEC and
the NYSE and regularly filed its press releases with a Form 6-K with the SEC;
d. Nokia regularly communicated with public investors via established market communication mechanisms, including through regular disseminations of press release s
on the international circuits of major newswire services, through their webpage, and through
other wide-ranging public disclosures, such as communications with the market analysts in broadly attended conferences in the United States, and in other communications with th e
financial press and other similar reporting services ; and
e. Nokia was followed by securities analysts employed by major brokerag e
firms who wrote reports, which were distributed to the sales force and certain customers of thei r respective brokerage firms . These reports were publicly available and entered the public marketplace.
194. As a result of the foregoing, the market for Nokia 's securities promptly digested current information regarding Nokia from all publicly available sources and reflected suc h
75 2498821 information in the price of Nokia's ADRs and stock trading throughout the world . Under these
circumstances, all purchasers of Nokia's securities during the Class Period suffered similar injur y
through their purchase of Nokia's securities at artificially inflated prices and a presumption o f
reliance applies .
NO SAFE HARBOR
195. The statutory safe harbor provided for forward-looking statements under certai n
circumstances does not apply to any of the allegedly false statements pleaded in this complaint .
Many of the specific statements pleaded herein were not identified as "forward-looking
statements" when made, or were in fact disclosures of historical facts . To the extent there were any forward-looking statements, there were no meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the purportedl y forward-looking statements. Alternatively, to the extent that the statutory safe harbor does appl y to any forward-looking statements pleaded herein, defendants are liable for those false forward- looking statements because at the time each of those forward-looking statements was made, the particular speaker knew that the particular forward-looking statement was false, and/or th e forward-looking statement was authorized and/or approved by an executive officer of Nokia who knew that those statements were false when made .
FIRST CLAIM
VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(B) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND RULE IOB- 5 PROMULGATED THEREUNDER AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
196. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 76 249-88,21 197 . During the Class Period, Nokia and the Individual Defendants, and each of them , carried out a plan, scheme and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the
Class Period, did : (a) deceive the investing public, including plaintiffs and other Class members , as alleged herein ; (b) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of Nokia' s securities; and
(c) cause plaintiffs and other members of the Class to purchase Nokia' s securities at artificially inflated prices . In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, defendants , and each of them, took the actions set forth herein .
198. Defendants (a) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud ; (b) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading ; and (c) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business whic h operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of the Company's securities in an effort to maintain artificially high market prices for Nokia's securities in violation of Section 10(b) of th e
Exchange Act and Rule 1 Ob-5 . All defendants are sued either as primary participants in th e wrongful and illegal conduct charged herein or as controlling persons as alleged below .
199. Nokia and the Individual Defendants, individually and in concert, directly an d indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about the business, operations and future prospects of Nokia as specified herein .
200. These defendants employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud, while in possession of material adverse non-public information and engaged in acts, practices, and a course of conduct as alleged herein in an effort to assure investors of Nokia's value an d performance and continued substantial growth , which included the making of, or the 77 2498821 participation in the making of, untrue statements of material facts and omitting to state materia l
facts necessary in order to make the statements made about Nokia and its business operations and
future prospects in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, as
set forth more particularly herein, and engaged in transactions, practices and a course of busines s which operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of Nokia's securities during the Clas s
Period.
201 . The Individual Defendants' primary liability, and controlling person liability, arises from the following facts: (a) the Individual Defendants were high-level executives and/o r directors at the Company during the Class Period ; (b) the Individual Defendants were privy t o and participated in the creation, development and reporting of the Company's internal operations, plans, projections and/or reports ; and (c) the Individual Defendants either personally made th e false and/or misleading statements in presentations to market analysts or elsewhere or were present or otherwise aware of the Company's dissemination of information to the investing publi c which they knew or recklessly disregarded was materially false and misleading.
202. The defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions o f material facts set forth herein, or acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed t o ascertain and to disclose such facts, even though such facts were available to them. Such defendants' material misrepresentations and/or omissions were done knowingly or recklessly and for the purpose and effect of concealing Nokia's operating condition and future busines s prospects from the investing public and supporting the artificially inflated price of its securities.
As demonstrated by defendants' overstatements and misstatements of the Company's business, operations and sales performance throughout the Class Period, defendants, if they did not have 78 2498821 actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions alleged, were reckless in failing t o
obtain such knowledge by deliberately refraining from taking those steps necessary to discove r
whether those statements were false or misleading .
203. As a result of the dissemination of the materially false and misleading informatio n
and failure to disclose material facts, as set forth above, the market price of Nokia's securitie s
was artificially inflated during the Class Period . In ignorance of the fact that market prices o f
Nokia's publicly-traded securities were artificially inflated, and relying directly or indirectly o n
the false and misleading statements made by defendants, or upon the integrity of the market i n
which the securities trade, and/or on the absence of material adverse information that was know n
to or recklessly disregarded by defendants but not disclosed in public statements by defendants
during the Class Period, plaintiff and the other members of the Class acquired Nokia securitie s
during the Class Period at artificially high prices and were damaged thereby.
204. At the time of said misrepresentations and omissions, plaintiffs and othe r
members of the Class were ignorant of their falsity, and believed them to be true . Had plaintiffs
and the other members of the Class and the marketplace known of the true financial condition
and business prospects of Nokia, which were not disclosed by defendants, plaintiffs and other members of the Class would not have purchased or otherwise acquired their Nokia securities, or , if they had acquired such securities during the Class Period, they would not have done so at th e artificially inflated prices which they paid.
205 . By virtue of the foregoing, defendants have violated Section 10(b) of th e
Exchange Act, and Rule 1 Ob-5 promulgated thereunder.
79 2498821 206. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' wrongful conduct, plaintiff and th e
other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and
sales of the Company's securities during the Class Period.
SECOND CLAIM
VIOLATION OF SECTION 20(a) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
207. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully
set forth herein.
208. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Nokia within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein . By virtue of their high-level positions, and their ownership and contractual rights, participation in and/or awareness of th e
Company's operations and/or intimate knowledge of the statements filed by the Company with the SEC and disseminated to the investing public, as well as the statements otherwise made o n behalf of the Company to investors, the Individual Defendants had the power to influence an d control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Company , including the content and dissemination of the various statements which plaintiffs contend ar e
false and misleading. The Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access t o
copies of the Company's reports, press releases, public filings and other statements alleged by plaintiffs to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued or made an d
had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected.
209. In particular, the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in
the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, are presumed to have had the power t o
80 2498821 control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as allege d
herein, and exercised the same .
210. As set forth above, Nokia and the Individual Defendants each violated Sectio n
10(b) and Rule l Ob-5 by their acts and omissions as alleged in this Complaint . By virtue of thei r
positions each as a controlling person, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Sectio n
20(a) of the Exchange Act . As a direct and proximate result of Nokia's and the Individua l
Defendants' wrongful conduct, plaintiffs and other members of the Class suffered damages i n
connection with their purchases of the Company's securities during the Class Period .
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, as follows :
a. Determining that this action is a proper class action, designating plaintiffs
as Lead Plaintiffs and certifying plaintiffs as class representatives under Rule 23 of the Federa l
Rules of Civil Procedure and plaintiffs' counsel as Lead Counsel ;
b. Awarding compensatory damages in favor of plaintiffs and the other Clas s
members against all Defendants, jointly and severally, for all damages sustained as a result of
defendants' wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon ;
Awarding plaintiffs and the Class their reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in this action, including counsel fees and expert fees ; and
d. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDE D
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.
Dated: January 7, 2005
81 249882_1 MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD & SCHULMAN LLP
a-r-- anford P. D ain SD-8712) Beth Kaswan (BK- 264) One Penn Plaza New York, NY 10119 Telephone: (212) 594-5300 Facsimile: (212) 868-122 9
ENTWISTLE & CAPPUCCI LLP
J Vincent R . Cappucc' ( C-6864) Robert N. Cappucci (RC-2193) William W. Wickersham (WW-5501) 299 Park Avenue , 14th Floor New York, NY 10171-1400 Telephone : (212) 894-7200 Facsimile : (212) 894-7672
Lead Counselfor Plaintiffs
SCHIFFRIN & BARROWAY LLP Three Bala Plaza East, Suite 400 Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004 Telephone: (610) 667-7706 Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
Counsel for Gerald Hoberman
MURRAY, FRANK & SAILER LLP 275 Madison Avenue, Suite 80 1 New York, NY 10016 Telephone: (212) 682-1818 Facsimile: (212) 682-1892
Counsel for Martin Bergljung
82 2498821 m x cr -175 Madi son Ati:enu4 [22) 6s?-rsz s New York- NY 10016 Tel _ (800) 49. I-SO76 C$R l1ICAMON
I. Martin Ber ijung; do hereby cert-if that
I have reviewed the complaint and hive authorized its filing .
I did not purchase secunti.es-ofNokiaT,that are the subject ofthe. oMpla t at,the. dire ction of my counsel or in : f :ord r o panic at arty privat act on isn g under h Secu ties Act o 1933 or:Secur~ties xchar ge pct-of 1934 gas amended by thevate' Se rities Litigat on: Reform;"At t bf,I.: 5 I aria willing to-'Servea rep a entatx ~ party t b alf of a class; inch .ding:
52
Oil 2a:3
rgu iro;a i ``i t{i 'federal Seyeuri s pt~r y 4i , , aw tf~s cat+ :
I: vi]1 not: cc t ;
. xjurytj* s * otrxg treeand correct
Ex ut d:on 4129/2Q04- izp.,47 16% •--Yr -'fir"- t N, _ _ AM t v - 7~a¢~itosr~ltr, `u rox~se~; trs3~cct a~ ,find +j io« {~rJei?k +~~' _
3~. 3~ b tl rs cc rsepla~utvr t u~►avc c1tp did ~st#aqs [ 1 rat tncTw i~t1' vwaanclaat} tj t4 a #Ujt
~urfr -?CSUlbracrria~do&tc 9h,sf' ttr:P~~r~ ,ix~au sb ry ~y.,~ +si r C1xc~~Ath T~ol{aWi ;3dI ~qs Cfs}ftlc E~?t- utih i 1Cr44ii s iz <#t t'J
2~Id *1 CERTIFICATION OF PROPOSED LEAD PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Daniel G. Viola declares the following as to the claims asserted, or to'be asserted ; under the federal securities laws :
1 . My name is Daniel G . Viola and I am the General Counsel of Generic Trading o f
Philadelphia, LLC ("Generic Trading'.').
2. As General Counsel of Generic Trading, . I have been duly authorized to designate
Entwistle & Cappucci LLP as counsel for Generic Trading in this action for all purposes, to pursue appointment of Generic Trading as lead plaintiff in this matter, and to seek approval of
Generic Trading,'s selection of Entwistle & Cappucci LLP and Milberg Weiss Bershad &
Schulman LLP as lead. counsel .
3 . 1 have reviewed the complaint ("Complaint") filed on April 6, 2004 by Michael
Devine in .this action. Generic Trading did not acquire any of the relevant securities at the direction of plaintiff's counsel or in order to participate in any private action under the federa l securities laws.
4 . Generic Trading is willing to serve as a lead plaintiff in this action and i t recognizes its duties as lead plaintiff to act on behalf of other class members in monitoring an d directing the action, and, if necessary, testifying at deposition and trial .
5. Generic Trading will not accept any payment for serving as a representative part y beyond its pro rata share of any recovery, except reasonable costs and expenses, such as los t wages and travel expenses, directly related to the class representation, as ordered or approved b y the court pursuant to law.
6. Geiieric Trading has not sought to serve or served as a representative party for a
class "in an action under the federal securities laws within the past three years, except .that: (a) it is currently serving as a lead plaintiff in the action,'caption:ed In re Royal Ahold N V. Securities
Litigation, 1 :03-m.d-1539 (D . Md.); (b) it sought to serve as lead plaintiff, but was not appointed a lead plaintiff, in Zn re Healthsouth Corp. Sea Litig., No. 02-AR-2105-S (N . D. Ala.); and (c) it
Sought to serve as lead plaintiff in Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Medical Benefits Trust v_
LaBranche & Co.. Inc. et al.. No. 03-CV-8264 but withdrew its application to be appointed lead plaintiff, in order to support the application of the California Public Employees' Retirement System in that action .
8. Generic Trading'.s transactions during the proposed Class Period, January 8, 2004 to April 6, 2004, in Nokia securities, which are the subject of this l .i.tigation, are described in the chart attached hereto as Schedule A.
9. 1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct
Executed this tk day of June, 2004
By: --- Daniel G. Viola General Counse l Genetic Trading of Philadelphia, LLC
2 lUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Tradin g
TradeDate SELL ;Amount ,Symbol Price :Proceeds ...... TradeDate...... BUY...... :Amount Symbol Price Cost ...... 1/8/2004P...... 25,000INOK...... $20:670; $517,291 .95 1/8/2004 S { 1,000 NOK $20...... }...... 84...... $20...... 817...... 3....2... 1 /8/2004 : P 20,000 •; NOK $20:670: $413,833_.56...... 1/8/200...... 4... ..S...... 2,000.<...... :...... NOK...... $20...... 80...... ;...... $41,554...... 6.....4.. 1/8/2004':,'P .. 15,000iNOK $20.670. $310,375.17 1/8/2004 S 2000!NOK...... a...... $20...... :...... 66...... ;...... $41,274...... 6....4... 1/8/2004 P ...... 8,500•;NOK ...... • $20 .670; $175,8792..6...... 1/8/2004...... S...... 1...... 000...... !...... }.NOK...... $20...... 65...... ;...... $20,627...... 3.....2.. $20,627.32 1/8/2004 P 2,000 NOK $20:660...... $41,363...... 3....6...... 1/8/200...... 4. .S...... 1...:...... 000•...... NOK...... $20.>...... 65...... }:...... 1/8/2004 P 2,500 ;NOK $20540 $51,404.20 1/8/2004 .S...... 100'...... :NOK $20.62 ; $2,059.83 1/8/2004 .3,OOOkNOK ;470 .$61,475,03 .1/8/2004 S 1 000 .: NOK $20.60 $20 .577.32 . P...... $20 ...... : ...... 1/8/2004 P 1,000!NOK $20:470 $20,491 :68 1/8/2004 4- 0 NOK $20.59• 20,567.32 ...... :. :...... ;...... $40,93 . 6 1/8/2004 P ...... 2,000'...... ¢;NO...... K...... :...$20...... 450...... ; ...... 1/8/20...... 4. S 500...... NOK $20.55 ...... $1...... 2.....6....3....6....6...... 1/8/2004 4 .P...... 500...... NOK...... $20...... 450...... ;...... $10,235...... 84...... 1/8/200...... 4.. .S...... •...:.. ...950...... NOK...... } ...... $20...... 54 ;...... $19,493...... 4....6... 1/8/2004!P ...... 1,000...... } ...NOK...... $20...... 44...... 0...}...... $20,461...... 6....8...... 1/8/200...... 4... S 1,000iNOK 1. .$20. .54': $20,517.32 1 /8/2004 P 500' NOK . $20...... 430...... :...... $10...... 225...... :8...4...... 1/8/2004...... S...... '•...... 1...... 000!NOK...... !...$20...... 52...... :'...... $20...... ,.497...... :.3....2.. 1/8/2004 1/8/2004 P ...... 1,000...... } NOK...... ; . . .$20...... 410!...... }...... $20,431...... 68...... S...... 50...... NOK...... $20...... 52!...... $1,024...... 8. . .7. . . 1/8/2004'P 1,0001 NOK $20 .400: $20,421 .68 1/8/2004 S 3,0001NOK $20.49 ! $61,401 .97 ...... 1/8/2004 P 1,000INOK $20 .400! $20,421 .68 : ; 1/8/2004 S 1,900!NOK $20.49 : $38,887.9 1
/8/2004 . P 1,000; NOK $20 .380 . $20,401 .68 s 1/8/2004. .S 2,000. . NOK...... $20. . . . .471...... $40,894...... 6.. ..4...... 1/8/2004 .P...... 1,000 NOK ...... $20.380:...... $20,401...... 68...... 1/8/2004. S ..... 1,000 NOK...... $20.47 ...... $20,447.32 1/8/2004 P 1,0001NOK $20.370 $20,391 .68 1/8/2004 S 3,000 NOK $20 .46 $61,311 .97 : $4,087.46 1/8/2004P 1,000iNOK $20:370 $20,391 :68 1/8/2004...... S...... 200NOK...... 1...... $20...... } ...... 46...... Y ...... 1/8/2004 P 1,000 NOK $20.3701...... $20,391 :68 ...... :1 /8/2004 S...... 200 NO ...... :46...... $..... 46 1/8/2004. .:P. P...... 1,000...... ;-NOK...... $20...... 370!...... $20,391...... 66...... 1/8/2004...... S 1001NOK $2045 $204273 1/8/2004 ' P 1,000 ' NOK $20.350 . $20,371 .68 1/8/2004 S...... 200...... NOK...... $20...... 44...... :...... $4,083...... 4.....6.. 1/8/2004: P 500`NOK $20.350•: $10;185.84 1/8/2004 S 1,5004NOK $20.40; $30,565.98 ...... 1/8/2004!P...... 500NOK...... :._$20.350.:...... $10,185.84 £' ...... 1/8/2004...... S...... i. 1,5001...... NOK...... $..20...... 40...... :...... $30,565...... 9.....8.. 4 ...... 1/8/2004!P...... 500...... NOK...... $20. . . .350 ; $10,185:84 1/8/2004/8/200 '§"*S 500.. ...NOK...... ;...... ;....$..20...... 40!...... ;...... $10...... ,..188...... 6....6... 1/8/2004P 400tNOK $20 .350 ; $8,148.67 1/8/2004 S 1,000!NOK $20 .36 ; $20,337 .3 2 1/8/2004 P 400 NOK $20.350 : $8,148.67 1/8/2004 S 1,0001 NOK $20 .36; $20,337.32 1/8/20041 P 600NOK $20.330 : $12,211 .01 1/8/2004 S 500 1 NOK $20.34! $10,158.66 1/8/2004P ...... 2,600NOK...... $20.300.;...... 52,836.36 ...... 1/8/2004 S...... i...... 200aNO K...... !.. $20.31•: $4057.46 1/8/2004 P 500 NOK $20.280 ; $10,150.84 1/8/2004 S 500!NOK $20.30•, $10,138.66 1/8/2004 P 2,000 NOK $20.270 $40,583.36 1/8/2004 S 5001NOK 20.30 $10,,138.66 ...... $ .:...... :...... ; 1 /8/2004 . P 1,0001.. _ ..NOK...... 1. $20...... 270...... ' $20,291 .68 1/8/2004 S 400 NOK $20 291 $8 106 .93 1/8/2004P...... 1,00 . 0NOK...... $20.270.;...... 20,291:68 1/8/2004 S 500 NOK ! $20 .28: $10 128.66 1/8/2004 ! P 1,000:! NOK $20.270 $20,291 .68 1 /8/2004 S 1 5001 NOK $20.26: $30,355.98 ...... ~ ...... j . . . .4 ...... ; ...... 1 ...... ' ...... }...... : ...... : ...... : ...... 1/8/2004 ;P 1,000 NOK $20.270; $2b,291 .68 S 1000 NOK $20.26; $20,237 .32 ...... 1 ...... ; ...... 1/8/2004...... i ...... }...... ;...... 1 /8/2004 ; P 1,000 NOK . $20:270 } $20;291 .68 1 /8/2004 S 1,000; NOK...... ti$20...... 25...... }'...... ,...... $20,227...... 3....2... 1/8/2004:! P ' 0,1 00 NOK $20 2.70: $20,291 .68 1/8/20 04 S 4 0 NO0 K $20.25 ; $8,090 .93 1/8/2004 P 1,0001NOK $20.260; $20 281 .68 1/8/2004 S i 500. ...NOK...... :$20...... :..------.23 ...... $10,103...... 6....6... 1/8/2004 P 1,000 NOK $20.260; $20 281 .68 1/8/2004 S 1 500 ...... NOK...... $20...... 20...... ;:...... $30,265...... 9...8... : 1/8/2004 .P...... 1,000.... ; NOK ...... $20.240.,1 ...... $20,261 .68.5...... 1/8/2004 .5S...... 1,000!NOK...... $20...... 20 !...... $20,177..$2 .32 P ...... 1/8/2004...... Y:;...... 500 ! NOK ...... $20...... 240...... $10,130...... 84...... 1.. . ./8/2004...... 100!...... NOK...... $20...... 20'...... 017...... 7....3... //200! 1,000!NOK $20.230: $20,251 .68 1/8/2004 S 500 NOK $20.19! $10,083.66
Page 1 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Tradin g
TradeDate ;BUY Amount !Symbol Price ;Cost TradeDate SELL Amount •.Symbol !Price iProceed s 1/8/2004 P ...... •••1,000 NOK ! $20 .2301 $20 251;68 1/8/2004 S 500'NOK !..$20.191 $10 083 6 6 1/8/2004 P 500 NOK $20.230 ; $10,12,4 1/8/2004 S .2,500iNOK .$20.14' $50,293.31 ...... ------...... --.--.------.------.------..- 1/8/2004. P...... 500'NOK------..$20:230;...... $10,125:84...... 1/8/2004. S...... !...... 5,000NOK ...... $20.12.1...... $100,486 .61.. 1!8/2004 P 200 NOK $20 230 $4 050 34 1/8/2004 S 5. 000 NOK $20 .12. $100,486...... 6....1.. S 5,000 NOK $20.11 $100,436 .61 1/8/2004'P.P...... 100 NOK...... :. $20.230'...... $2,025.17 :...... 1/8/2004 ...... ,. .'...... $20.224 .$201245.68 .1/8/2004 S ...... 5,000'NOK. .$20.11 .$100,436 .61 1/8/2004 .1,000'NOK ...... 1...... •-- ••--- .-• ...... • ...... ------• -•----•• ...... 1/8/2004 ;P 1,000 NOK $20.220 ; $20,241 :68 ...... 1/8/200...... 4... .S...... 1,000...... NOK...... $20...... 11...... 1...... $20,087...... 3....2... 1/8/2004~P ...... 1,000 NOK • 20.210 $20,231.68 1/8/2004 S 1,000INOK $20.11 $20,087 .32 ...... -- ...... ;...... i -•- . . .------•--- .-:----•------•------•------. -----•- --•--•------••------:-• ------1 ------1/8/2004P 500 NOK $20.210'; $10,115.84 1/8/2004 S 5,000NOK $20.09 ; $100,336 .61 ...... •-----• .•-•-----•• ------•-••----- .-•------•-• . .•-•-----••- ----•--•---••-•-•- . ------•-- .---- . S ...... 5 000'NO K • $20.08 : 1/8/2004 P ...... 500NOK $20.210 ; $10,115.84 1/8/2004 :- . . $100 286 6.. . .1...... I ...... • --•-• ----• ----••----...... ---••------••----••- ...... ?...... ;------: ...... :...... 1/8/2004 ;P 1,000NOK $20.204. $20,225.68! 1/8/2004 S 3,500 NOK $20.08 ! $70,200 .63 ------1/8/2004`P 2,500INOK $20 200 $50,554. 20 1/8/2004 S 5,000 :NOK 1 $20.06 ; $100,186.61 1/8/2004 P 1,000•NOK $20,200: $20,221 .68 1/8/2004 S 5,000 NO K $20.06 ; $100,186.61 ...... ,..------.---.....------.------.------.,....------.------.--.------..--..---...------.--- ...... ------...-.------1-...--..-. .--. ... . 0 22 1 8/2004 S 5 00 .NOK 20.05 : $100,136.61 .....1/8/2004...... P...... s...... 1,000•;..N...... •$20.200- ...... $20,...-..1:.-68. •' 0 $ 1/8/2004'P./20 .P...... 5 500 NK...... ;. $20.200.}...... $10,110.84...... 1/8/2004 S...... ;...... 5,000 NOK ...... i' . $20.05 :...... $100,136.61 1 1%8/2004 :z ,OOOjNOK .$20.180 1 .$101,008 .39 ...... 1/8/2004...... S...... 5,000'...... :NOK...... $20...... 04...... $100,086...... 6...... 1/8/2004 P 1,000(NOK $20 .180 ; $20,201 .68 ; 1/8/2004 .S 5-000 NOK $20.04 : $100,086.61 ---.. . . -... --- 66 - - ...... 1/8/2004 P 1,000 . NOK...... $20...... 180...... $20,201...... 68...... 1/8/2004...... :...... S...... 5,000NOK...... $20...... 031...... $100,036...... 6.....1.. 1/8/2004'.P '. •1,000 NOK $20 .170 . $20,191 .68 1/8/2004 S 5,000 NOK $20.02 . $99,986.61 i ...... :...... 4) 2004 : P 1000 NOK $20:130 ; $20,151 .68 1/8/2004 S ...... 20,000...... NOK...... :$20...... 01...... :...... $399,746...... 4....4... 1/8/2004 :P 1,000iNOK $20120: $20,141 :68 1/8/2004 S 5,000 NOK $20.01 : $99,936.6 1 1/8/2004 P 1,000 NOK $20 .110 : $20131 .68 1/8/2004 S 15,000 NOK $19.99 ; $299,509.83 ...... -...... 1 --..----...--... ----.----..--.-----...-.----- ...... ;...... 1/8/2004 P 1,000INOK $20 .100 ; $20,121 .68 1/8/2004 S 5,000 NOK $19.99' $99,836.6 1 1/8/2004 P..••...• 1,000 NOK $20.100 ; $20,121 .681 1/8/2004 S 5,000 NOK $19,99 ; $99,836.6 1 1/8/2004 P 1 ,000 NOK $20 .090 $20, 111 .68 1/8/2004 S 500 NOK $19.95 $9,963.66 ...... :...... >...... ,...... ,...... 1/8/2004 ;P 1,000!NOK $20 .070 : $20,091 .68' 1/8/2004 S 1,000,NOK $19.73 ; $19,707.32 1/8/2004 P 1,000 :NOK $20 .050 : $20,071 .68 1/8/2004 S 1,000!NOK 1 $19.47 ; $19,447.32 1/8/2004 P 1,000 NOK 1 $19 .040 $19,061 .68 1/8/2004 S 10,000 1NOK $19.301 $192,773.22 1/8/2004 P 2,000 NOK $19------.010 ------$38,063 ------.36 ------1/812004------S ------1 -000 NOK------$19.23 : ------$19,207.32- 1/8/2004 P 1,300 NOK $19 .010 : $24,741 .18 1/8/2004 S 1,000_NOK $19.10 : $19,077.32 1/8/2004 P 1,000 NOK $19 .010 : $19 031 .68 1/8/2004 S 1 000!NOK $19.10 : $19,077.32 ...... ,-....--.---.------...------. ------, ...... ------. ------...-----.-----..---.------. .--.- ..-----...--...... - ...... -...... 500 NOK $19.06 : ...... 1/8/2004...... ;P...... - ...... ; . .-$19...... 010...... $9,515...... 84...... 1/8/2004...... S 1000iNOK.; ...... -- ...... $19,037 ..3.. . .2. . . . .-- . .. .----- . .--.-- . 4 . . --.- .-- -- ...... ;------.. . ..- . .-----.---- .-- .------.-- -- .s------.. . .-- .---.s--- .. .-- .-- ...... ------..--. .----- 1/8/2004P 200• NOK ------19.010 : ------$3,806,34 ------118/2004------S ------...... 2,000`...... :NOK...... $19...... 00•...... :...... $37,954...... 6.....4.. 1/8/2004 P 1,000 NO K $18.680 $18,701 .68 1/8/2004 S ...... 1a0001NOK. $18.64': $18,617.32 ...... ------'-.--- .--..--- .-.------.-.---..--.-...... -.------...... --- ...... ---- .1---.--.------.------.-.-°------..------...... -..-...... ------...---- ..------..- ...... -- 1 . /00P ...... 1,000.. . ..NOK...... :1"... 18...... 680...... ;...... $18,701...... 68...... 1/8/2004...... S...... 1,000'NOK...... >...... $18...... 33...... ;:...... $18,307...... 3.....2...... 1/8/2004~P...... : .. . 1,000NOK . ..$18. . .640 : $18,661 .68 1/8/2004 S 2,000 NOK $18 .30: $36,554.64 . . .•--•----- . . .-•------...... : ...... ------•-•--- ...... -1...... •...... 1/9/2004 P 3,000NOK $21 .040 ; $63,185 .03 1/8/2004 S 2,000'.NOK $18.27 $36,494.64 a...... t...... -...... ---- ..---.--.---...... ----..---- -..------.------.. 1/9/2004 P 1,000 NOK $21 .020 ; $21,041,68 1/8/200 4 S 1 ,000 NOK $18 .25 : $18,227.32 ...... :...... '-.------.-----....s...... -.-:---.:----.::.---.---.-.;...... -...... ,...... $21 .03•; 1/9/2004 :P 300NOK $21010: : .$6;309;50 1/9/2004 S .. 5000NO K $105,036.61 ...... 1- .•------...... • ...... ---•-••- - ...... 1 .------•- ---• •--•----•---•-1•-•--•------' ...... - :.-----. . ..- ...... 1/9/2004 P 2,000, NOK $21 000 $42,043 36 1/9/200 4 S 2,000 NOK $21 .02'• $1,99 .6 ...... : . . .. :...... 1 ...... s ...... ------• ••--•---••----- •------•---,--•-•---•----•------...... --- ...... ---21 ...... 1/9/2004 : P 1,400i NOK $21 .000 $29 ....- 1./9/2004 S 1 .00N $21.:02 $20,997.32 ...... ------...... ------...... -.. .. € ------..---- ....-.--- ..--. 1/9/2004 ;P 2,000' NOK 21 .000 : $42,042.36 1/9/2004 S ,NK $21 .02! $20,997 .32
Page2of24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Tradin g
l Price .Proceed s TradeDate BUY ;Amount !Symbol...... Price...... Cost...... TradeDate...... SELL...... Amount...... `..::Symbo...... ;...... :...... 1/9/2004'P 200NOK $20 .970; $4,198.34 1/9/2004 S 300NOK $21 :00i $6,293.20 1%9/2004 P 100 NOK $20 .880; $2,090.17 1/9/2004 S 100 NOK $20.99 : $2,096.73 .' P...... , . .. . . , ...... 1 /9/2004 ...... 1,0...... 00..... NOK...... $20:870 ...... $20,891 :fi8 ...... 1/9/2004. .S...... :...... 000 ;NOK...... $.20...... :.9...... $62 871 .97 : 1/9/2004 P 1,000 :NOK 1.. $20:830.:1...... :..$20,851:68...... 1/9/2004. 5...... 1...... 3,000 1NOK ...... ;.....20:98;...... 62,871 :97 $20.98 $52,393,3 1 1 /9/2004 : P 1,500 : NOK $20.8271 . $31,273 .52 1/9/2004 S 2 500 NOK...... :...... 004 9,000NOK $20.730; $20,751 .68 1/9/2004 S 1,000NOK $20.98•: $20,9 7.3 1/9/2004 .P ...... 1,500 NOK ...... ,...... $20 .700.,;...... $31,082...... 52 ...... 1/9/2004 S...... ,...... 1,661NOK. ..-..-...'l ..-t-20 .981 ...... $2,095.73 1 /9/2004 1 000' NOK $20.680 $2 .68 1/9/2004 S 100 : NOK $20.97 $2,094.73 ...... s ...... !...... i...... 1 ...... ; ...... , ...... 1/9/2004. P 1,000 NOK...... $20:650 ...... ,...... $20,671:68` 1/9/2004 S 2 000 NOK $20.96'...... $41 874.64 ...... 1/9/2004...... P...... 10O...... NOK...... i....$20...... 630...... $2,065...... 1.....7...... 1/9/200...... 4... ..S...... i... ..1'0001NO...... y...... K...... ;...$20...... 96...... :...... $20,937...... 3....2.. 1/9/2004 P 1,000NOK $20:620 : $20,641 .68 1/9/2004 S 300'NOK $20.95 . $6,278.20 ...... : ...... y ...... 1.. ./9/20...... 0 4'•....;.P...... 1. ..0;.. .N..oK...... ,.....::...... $20...... 600...... ;:...... 2... .062...... 17...... 1/9/2004...... S.:...... 2...... 50...... 0... .NO...... K...... $. ..20...... 90...... :...... 5.2.., ..193...... 3.....1.. 1/9/2004 P 2,000NOK $20.550 ; 41,143.36 1/9/2004 S 300'NOK. $20.881 $6,257.20 ...... y ...... 1/9/20041P 800 N0l~ ...... $20...... 550...... $16,457...... 34...... 1/9/2004...... S...... 1...400(NOK...... $29,186...... 2.....5.. 1/9/2004, P 200 NOK $20.550 : $4,114.34 1/9/2004 S 100•:NOK ' $20.87: $2,084.73 ...... t ...... : ...... ; ...... ,...... { ...... 1/9/2004 :P : 200 : NORC $20.550 $4 114.34 . 1/9/2004 S 800 •: NOK . $20.85; $16,661 .86 ...... y ...... ,...... , ...... i...... 5...... y ...... ; ...... 1/9/2004 P 300FNOK .$20.540, $6,168.50 ...1/9/2004...... S...... 2...... 000NOK...... $20...... 80'...... $41,554...... 6....4... S 1,000 ::NOK $20.75: 1/9/2004 P...... 200~N...... $20...... 520...... ;...... 4,108...... 34...... : ...... 1/9/200...... 4...... $20...... ,.727...... 3.. . ..2...... a .1 1 /9/2004 P 200 : NO $20.508 ; $4,105.94 1/9/2004 S 1 000' NO K $20.741 $20 717.32 ...... : ...... ; ...... y ...... '...... 1/9/2004 P 5,000 NOK $20:500 : $102,608.39 .1/9/2004...... S...... 1,000...... NOK...... :. .$20...... 74`•...... $20,717...... 3.....2.. 1/912004.P 5,000 1 NOK $20 500 $102,608 39 1. /9/2004 S . 400. NOK $20.72; $.8 ,27. 8.93 ...... y ...... : ...... , ...... : ...... I...... 1/9/2004 P 1,900 NO ...... $20...... 500...... ;...... $38...... 1991...... 1... .9...... 1/9/200...... 4. . .S...... 1,000...... NO...... y...... K...... $20...... 69...... :...... $20,667,3...... 2. . 1 /9/2004 P 300 NOK $20.500 $6,156.50 1 /9/2004 S 1,000 NOK $20.63: $20,607.32 $20.490 ...... 1..../9/2004iP.... I...... r...... 2,000...... NOK...... : ...... ;...... $41,023...... ,...... 3....6...... 1/9/2004...... S...... 1,000....;...... NO...... ,...... K...... $20...... 62...... ;...... $20,597...... 3.....2.. 1/9/2004 :P 2,000 NOK $20.490 $41,023 .36 1/9/2004 S 500 :NOK $20.61 ; $10,293.66 1/9/2004 P 5001KOK $20.490. $10,255.84 1/9/2004 S 1,000 NOK $20.60; $20,577.32 1/9/2004 P 100;;NOK $20.490: $2,051 .17 1/9/2004 S 950 NOK $20 .60: $19,548.46 1/9/2004!P 2,000 NOK $20.480: $41,003.36 1/9/2004 S 50iNOK $20 .60: $1,028.87 1/9/2004 P...... 4,0001...... ;. .NO...... K...... ,...... ,•... . $20...... 470...... ,:...... $81,...... 966.....,....71...... 1 ...... 1/9/200...... 4.. .S...... 2,000'NOK...:...... i...... 20;...... 59...... ,:...... $41,138...... 6...4... 1/9/2004 P : 1,000 NOK $20.470; $20,491 .68 1/9/2004 S 200 NOK $20.56! $,1074 .46 1/9/2004 P 1,000 NOK $20.460: $20481 :68 1/9/2004 S i 000'NOK...... $20.551 $20527.32 ...... :...... i...... : 1,004 NOK $20,471 S 1,000 NOK ...... 1/9/2004 P s ...... $20.4501 ...... 68 . .. . 1/9/2004 ...... 1 . ..$20...... 54...... a1 ...... $20,517...... 3. . ..2. .. 1/9/2004 P 500 NOK `..$20.450 $10,235,84 1/9/2004 S 1 1,000iNOK $20 .52 ; $20,497.32 1/9/2004 :P ...... 500...... NOK...... $20.450i ...... $10. ,235.84 ...... 1/9/2004 .S...... 000iNOK...... ~. $20.51 x...... $20,487.32 1 9/2004 P .OK ...... s ...... 000...... : ..N...... :. . .. •: 20 430 ...... $...20,451...... 6.....8...... 1/9/2004...... S...... 00...... NOK...... ;...... 20...... 48...... ,:...... $. . . . .091...... 4.. .6.. . 1/12/2004 P ...... 5,000 NO K $21 .060: $105,410.49 1/9/2004 S .. 5,0001NOK $20.41 : $101,936.61 ...... :...... :...... :...... :...... 1/12/2004 : P 2,500 NO K '• $21 .000; $52,554 0 1/9/2004 S 50NOK...... 20.37 1 $10.173 .66 ...... 2 ...... 1...... $ 1/12/2004 P 2,000 NOK ...... $20...... 870...... :...... $41,783...... 36...... 1/12/2004...... S...... 100`NO...... i K ...$21...... 02...... :...... $2,09...... 9....7....3... 1/12/2004 P 5,000INOK $20.750; $103,858.39 1/12/2004 S 100'NOK $21 .01 ; $2,098.73 1/12/2004rP y 5 000 NOK $20 750 $103,858.39 1/12/2004 S S00 ;NOK $21 .00 $10,488.66 ...... I ...... y ......
.... 1/13/2004 P .. •500NOK $21 .200; $10,610.84 1/12/2004 S ! ~NOK .$20.99 : $2,096.73. 1/13/2004!P 200 :NOK $21 .200: $4,244.34 1/12/2004 S 500 NOK '• $20.98 1 $10,478.66
Page 3 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS ° Damage Analysis For Generic Tradin g
TradeDate BUY:...... Amoun...... t..... :Symbol Price...... Cos.. .. t TradeDate SELL ..Amount...... ;....Sy mbol !Price ;Proceeds 1/14/2004P 200 NOK $20 $4,196.34 1/14/2004 ...... 964...... r . ...' ...... i ...... S...... j ...... 100NOK...... r .. .$20...... 92...... : ...... $2,089...... 7. .3...... 1/14/2004...... ; .P...... 100'...... , .NOK...... 20...... 9x0...... ;...... $2,097...... 1.....7'...... 1/14/2004.../14/200...... 4... .'§'***.S...... '...... 20.....0... ..'N-...0-...... , ...$2...... 0....9.....1...:...... $...4,177...... 46... 6 .. 1/14/2004 P 2,500 NOK ..! $20...... 940...... $52,404 .20 1/14/2004 S 1,000! NOK $20.90 $10$20,877 ..36. .2...... 1/14/2004...... ::?> ...... ,...... 1,000NOK...... i..$20:940;...... $20,961 :68 ...... 500 NOK...... $20:.W90...... $1,43838.:6 1/14/2004 P ...... 1,000 NOK . .20.940 ...... 20,961 .68 1/14/2004 S 500 NOK $20.90 ...... $10,438.66 1/14)2004 P 500':, NOK $20.9x0 $10,480.84 1/14/2004 S I,O00!NOK $20.89 ; $20,867.32 { ...... 1/14/2004P 50 1NOK $20:930 $10,475.84 € 1/14/2004 S 500'NOK •. $20.89 : $10,433.66 1/14/2004 P 5000 NO K $20.930 1 $10,475.84 1/14/2004 S 100INOK ` $20.89 ' $2,086.73 ...... :...... 5 ...... <...... 1 /1 4/2004 ; .P...... :...... 200...... f:. .NO...... K...... :...... •'.. $20:930 :'. $4,190:34...... 1/14/20004 4. S5...... 500 NOK...... $20:87 ...... $10,423:66 1/14/2004. . ..., P ...... 1001NOK...... : .$20.910.1 ...... $2,093.17 1/14/2004 S 500 NOK t26.86 $10,418.66 1/14/2004: P 500 NO K $20.900 : ...... :...... :...... $10460...... 8....4...... 1/14/2004...... S...... 100...... NOK...... $2,082...... 7....3...... 1/ 0 . /0 ...... 200iNOK...... 20.890 ; $4,182.34 1/15/2004 S ...... 500NOK...... ;...... $20...... 79...... ;...... $10,383...... 66 1 /14/2004 1,000; NOK, 20 880 $20,901 1/15 . P...... : ...... :68...... /2004. 5...... :...... 300NOK...... i..$20:75.s...... :..... 6,21.8.20. 1/14/20041P 1001 NOK ...... $20 880 $2,090 .17 1/15/200...... 4. .S...... ,...... 2,500...... NOK...... :$20...... 6....7...... $51,618...... 3....1.. 1/14/2004 P 5001 NOK .. $20...... 850...... :...... , $10,435...... 84...... _....1/16/2004 S 1,500NOK...... i..$20...... 96...... :... $31,405.98 1 /15/2004; ...... 250.... . ; NOK...... $20.... .770...... :...... $5,197.....!...... 9....2...... _..1/16/2004...... S...... ,...... 3,000...... ,;. .NOK...... $20...... 92...... :...... $62...... ,691...... 8....7.. : 111 5/2004...... ::!'l..-5-...... -...*-...... 250!...... NO...... K...... 0770.. ' ...... $5,197....92 1/16/200...... 4... .S...... 2,200...... •.:. ..NOK...... •'... .$20...... 7....8...... $45...... ~666..... 6..1....1... 1/15/2004 ; P 300; NK $0.550: $6,171 .50 1/16/2004 S 800•' NOK $20.78' ...... r ...... t...... $16,605.86 1/16/2004 P 2501 NOK 20.900 : .$5,230.42 1 116/2004 S 600: NOK $20.781 $12,454.39 ...... ~...... r...... 1 /16/2004 P ...... 250!...... NOK...... 0...... $5.225.42 1/16/2004 S ...... 4001NOK...... $20.781 $8,302.93 1 /16/2004 P 250 NO K $20:850 .217:9 1/16 4 ...... 1...... $5 ...... /2(0 . 5...... _ .::...... 400 NOK...... $20:78 ...... 8.. 30293 1 / 16/2004 P 2 250 NOK $20 820: 210 42 1 /162004 S .300'...... NOI<...... $20...... 78...... $6 227 2. ..0 1/16/2004 P 1,500iNOK $20.720; $31,112.521 1/16/2004 S '•; 300'NOK $20.78 : $6,227 .20 1/16/2004 i P 600: NOK $20:720; $12,445...... 01...... 1... ./16/200...... 4.. .S...... 2001...... NOK...... $20...... 75...... 1:'...... $4,145...... 4....6...... 1/16/2004.:P .... '...... 6001.. NOK $20,720.:...... :. $121445 ;0 1...... 1/16/2004. 5...:...... 1...... 300; NOK...... $20.74 ...... $6,21 5 ,20 1/16/2004P 600 NOK $20.720: $12,445.01 1/16/2004 S 300 :NOK $20.741 $6,215 .20 1/16/2004P 500?NOK $20.720; $10,370.84 1/16/2004 S 200NOK $20.74 $4,143 .46 1/16/2004';P 4001NOK $20.720; $8,296.67 1/16/2004 S 200 NOK $20.74 $4,143.46 1/16/2004 ;P 400 NOK $20.720 $8,296.67 1/16/2004 S 500'NOK $20.69 $10,333.66 ...... s ...... { ...... 1/16/2004P 400 46K $20.720 : $8,296.67 1/16/2004 S 500NOK $20.68 : $10,328. 6 1/16/2004...... P 400.. .. . NO...... K.. $20120; $8,296.67 1/16/2004 S '• NOK $20.67 : $99,107.1 5 1/16/2004. P...... 300 NOK ...... :.....:.:...... 1..$2...... $6 222 .50. ....,.1/16/2004. ` ...... :.. 200 NOK $20.67 ; $4,129.46 ...... 1/16/2004...... P...... 300.... NO.. ...K...... <.. 20 720.:...... $6!222.50 1/16/2004 S 600'NOK $20.65 $12 376.39 1/16/2004 P 2001NOK $20,720 : $4,148.34 1/16/2004 S ...... :...... 600...... NO...... K...... s...$20...... 65...... >:'...... $12,376...... 3....9... 1/16/2004P 200NOK $20 : ...... 720...... $4,148...... 3...4...... 1/16/200...... 4... .S...... 600'NOK...... ,...... $...20...... 65...... ;...... $12376...... 3.....9.. 1/16/2004P...... 200NOK $20.720 ; $4,148...3....4...... 1/16/200...... 4.. .S.. 500NOK 20.65 $10,313.66 1/16/2004 P 4 000 NO K 20.710 ! $82,926.71 ...... ,,...... 1/16/2004 .5S ...... NOK...... $20 .65;...... $8,250.. .93 1/16/2004,?P ...... 3,000'NOK.. .. . $20.710 :; $62,195.03 .1/16/2004 .400 NOK .$20.65 .8250 .93 h ...... l ...... : ...... j...... i ...... 1/16/2004 P 1000; NOK $20.710 $20,731 .68 1/16 ...... /2004...... S...... 400'...... NOK...... :...$20...... 65...... ;...... $8...... ,..250...... 9...3.. 2,5'N.....O...... 20...... :700?...... $51,804.20 1/16/2004 S 400iN OK .$...20...... 65...... >:...... $8,250...... 9...3. . /16/2004 P 1 000 NOK ...... t20.700..1...... x.20,721:68 ..... 1/20/2004 S...... NOK...... $2 1:.15 ...... $6,.338.2 .0 1/16/2004?P 7001NOK . $20.700? $14,505.17 1/20/2004 S 188 NOK $20.90 ; $3,924.94
Page 5 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Tradin g
radeDate !BUY ':Amount66 Symbol . Price . Cost TradeDate 'SELL !Amount 'Symbol Price ; Proceeds 1/16/2004 P...... :. ,,,,,,,,,,8 NOK ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$20 680 ... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$16,561,,,,,,,,,,,.34, 1/21/2004,,,,,,,, ,,,,S,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,•: 800 NOK , ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$20.97 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,$16,757,,,,,,,;,,,,,,,,,.86, .1/20/2004P...... 200 NOK $21 .210 ...$4246...... 34.. . . 1/21/2004...... S...... 800NOK...... $20...... 97...... !:...... $16,757...... 8.....6.. 1/20/2004P .300INOK $21 .200 : ...... ;. .. $6.366.50...... 1/21/2004. S...... :...... 800; NOK...... :.. ..$20:97 ...... $16,757:86 1/20/2004 P 100'NOK ...... $21 .080 .$2,110 ;17 1/21/2004.. .S...... 800'NOK...... $20...... 0...... $16,757...... 8....6.. , . 1/20120041P 100 NOK $20 500 ;...... $2...... 052...... 17...... 1/21/2004.... S. ....800...... NOK. ..$20...... 97...... >: ...... $16...... ,.757...... 8...6... 1 /20/2004 •>.P...... 100 ; NOK ..$20.500.;...... $2.....! .052...... 1...7...... 1/21/2004 S 800 IVOK $20.97 $16,757. 1/20/2004 P 100 :NOK $20.500 $2,052...... 17...... 1/21/200...... :...... 4... .S...... 800...... !:NO...... K...... $20...... 97...... >:...... $16,757...... 8....6... 1/20/2004 P 100 NOK ...... $20...... 500...... ;...... $2,052.....l...... 1...7...... 1/2112004...... S...... 800NOK'...... i...... $20...... 97...... ;...... $16,757...... 8....6... 1/20/2004 P 100 NOK $20.500 ...... $2,052...6...... 17...... 1/21/2004...... S...... 800...... ;NOK...... $20...... 97'...... ,...... $16,757...... ,...... 8....6... 1/21/2004IP 800 NO...... K...... $20.920 ;...... $16,753...... 3....4...... 1/21/2004...... S...... 800...... ;NOK...... $20...... 97...... :...... $16,757...... 8....6... 1/21/2004P .800vNOK ...... :...... :..$20:920 ...... $16.753.34...... 1/21/2004 ...:...... 300 NO K...... ' ..$20:97 ...... $6,284.20 1/21/2004 .P 800 NO K $20,920 j ...... :...... ,3 1/21/2004 S ...... -.500.... NOK...... $20...... 94...... ,:...... $10,458...... 6....6... 1/21/2004...... P...... 800'NO...... K $20,910...... : . $16,745.34 1/21/2004 S ...... 500...... NOK...... >...$20...... 78...... >...... $10,378...... 6....6... 1/21/2004P 800NOK <.. .$20. •..910...... ;...... $16,745...... 3. . 4...... 1/21/200...... 4... ..S...... :...... 500N...... O.....K...... $20...... 69...... ;...... _ . $10,33...... 3.66 1./21/2004!P ...... 100...... tNO...... K...... w .900 : $2,09217 1/21/2004 S 500iNO:...... K...... ,...$20...... 681...... ,;...... $1...... 0,328...... 6....6... 1121'/2004iP ' ...... 800 N ...... $20....890.. . ..;...... $16,729.34..... 1%21%2004 S...... ;...... 200 NOK...... $20:68...... $4,. 31:46 1/21/2004.P...... 800NOK...... :....:...... :..$20.890• $16,729 34 1/21/2004. S...... 100 NOK ... $20.68•: ...... $2,065.73 1/21/2004P ...... 800 NOK $20.890 ; $16,729.34 1/21/2004 S '• 700 NOK $20.67: ...... :...... t ...... j...... $14,453...... 1.. . ..3. . 1/21/2004!P ...... 800.}NOK ...... _ :..$20:890 $16,729...... 3....4...... 1/21/200...... 4... .S...... 1 .000'NO...... K...... $20...20...... 65...... :!*.. $20,627.32 1 /21 /2004 P ...... 8NO..9q:...... K...... $20:890 ...... $16,729.34 .....1/21/20'04 ...... 3121 NOK...... $20.62 .:...... $6,426.36 1/21/2004 P 300! NO K $20870,...... $6,267...... 50 1/21/2004...... 1,000...... NOI<...... ;...$20...... 60...... ,! ...... $20. 577 32 1/21/2004 P 1,000 NOK $20.790 ; $20,811 .68 1/21/2004 S 1 000':NOK •; $20 .60; $20,577.32 ...... ;...... $...... 1/21/20041P 500'•NOIC .$20.760 .$10,390.8.4 .1/2.1/200.4 .1,000 NOK...... $20 .54j .$20,517.32 1/21/2004 P 1,0001NOK 1 $20 .720 N ...... : . 1...... $20,741...... 68...... 1/21/2004 S ...... 1,000`NOK...... $20...... 54!...... $20...... ,..517...... 3....2.. 1/21/2004P 51900 : $20:705 $122,287:40 1/21/2004 1,000!NOK ;.$20:50 ; $20,4773 2 1/21/2004!P 700NOK $20.680; $14,491 .17 1/21/2004 S 1,00011 NOK $2049 $20,46732 1/21/2004 P 200 NOK $20.680: $4,140.34 1/21/2004 S 1,0001NOK $20.48 : $20,457.32 1 /21 /2004 P 1,000 ; NOK $20.660; $20,681 .68 1/21/2004 S 1,000' NOK $20.48 : $20,457.32 1/21/2004 P 5001NO K $20 ...... :620; $10,320:84 1/2'x/ 004 S 600iNOKt...... $20...... ,...... 47...... ;...... $12,268...... 3....9... 1/21/2004 : P 1,000iNOK $20 .530 ; $20,551 .68 1/2'1/2004 S 400 NOK $20.44 : $8,166.93 1/21/2004P 900NOK 20.51 0 ...... $184785...... :....1...... 1/21!200.,...... _ ...... 4... ..S...... 20001..r...... NO...... K...... $20...... 42...... ,;...... $40786...... !...... 6.6.. 4 1/21/2004 P 1,000 NOK 1.$20.500 ; $20,521 :68 1/21 004 S 5:90 NOK :• $20 .41 : $120,285.2 0 1/21/2004 P •000 NOIC ...... $20. 50...... 0...... $41 043.26 1/21/004 S...... ;...... ,...... $20:...... 101,936.61 1/21/2004 P 100 NOK...... : $20.490 ; $2051 .17 ...... 1/22%P004 .S...... K ...... $21. .341 ...... 1$4,263...... •.....4....6... 1,000 NOK ...... $20...... 460...... $20,481...... 68...... :...... 1/22...... //200...... 4...... ,...... 500...... > .NOK...... •...... $.21...... 33...... $...0,651 :66 1/21/2004 P 100:NOK $20.460 : $2,048.171 .1/22/2004...... :...... S...... : 1,000;NO...... K...... $21...... 25...... : $21,227...... 3....2... 1/21/2004 F 1,000 NOK $20 ...... 450...... :...... $20!471...... :6. 8. . 1/22/2004 S ...... 1,000...... NOK...... !...$21...... 25...... :...... $21,227...... 3...2... 1/22/2004P 9,000 ANOK $21 .480: ...... $193,515...... 1. .0...... 1/22/200...... 4... .S...... 1. .000NOK...... ;. .$21...... 25...... >;...... $21,227...... 3....2... 1/22/2004 P 9,000.NOK1 $21:480 193,515 0 ...... 1 ...... 1/22/2004 .S...... ,.;...... 600iNO K i $21 .25 ; $12,736.3....9... 1 /22/2004 • P 600 : NOK $21 .380: $12 841 ...... :...... :...... ,...... :....:...... ,...... 0....1...... 1/22/200...... 4...... NOK 300 ...... $21...... `~i...... $6,368 20 1/22!2004 • P 000 NOK ..370: $21 ,391:68 1 /22/2004 S 1,000 : NOK 1: ...... $2 ...... 1...... i..$2 23 ...... :..$2 1 !.207...... 3.. . ..2. . 1/22/2004P 5001NOK $21 .370; $10,695 .84 1/22/2004 S 100NOK $2,117.73
Page 6 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Tradin g
TradeDate ;BUY ;Amount „Symbol Price Cost TradeDate SELL Amount Symb ol... . Price...... Proceed...... s...... 1/22/2004...... P 200'NOIt ...$21. .360 ! ...... $4 276 1/22/2004 S f 1.. ...000,...... t OK '• $21 .19 ; $21,167 .32 1/22/2004 ' P ...... " ...... $21...... : ...... $21,271...... 1 /22/200 4 ...... 1,000 ...... 21 :.1 ...... 113...... 2... . .P...... 2,000.. 2- 0'-66" NO:'Nb NOKi<...... : $211.2 200...... $42...... ,. .43.3 1/22/2004 ...... 000 $21 : 16 ...... 7...... 4... 1/22/2004P 500'NOK ': $21 .200 ;...... :...... $10610...... r...... 8....4..< ... 1/22/200...... 4... ..S...... ,...... 800NO...... 3...... K...... ;...$21...... 1....6...!...... $16,909...... 8.....6.. 1/22/2004 P 5001NOK $21 .200 $10,610.8.4 ...1..'*/2.....'2/200...... 4... .S...... 2,000INOK...... $21...... 14'...... $42,234...... 6....4. 1/22/2004 P 800'NOK .. .._ 1 .190:...... 16,969.34 ...... /22/2004 S...... ;...... 2,000 NOK $21 .12 ; $42, 194.64 1/22/2004 P ...... 1,700!NOK .$21 .170 $36,025 :85 1/22/2004 S ...... 6.. ..000...... NOK...... $21...... 09...... ;...... $126,403...... 9....3... 1 /22/2004 P 300 NOK $21 .150 : 6 ...... $.....~..3515~ .. .1/22/2004 S...... :...... 6,000 NO...... !...... $.126 343:93 1/22/2004 P . . 2,000 NOK 21 100 : $42,243.3 /22/2004 S . 6,0001NOK 6 1 :...... $2$21.....07...... $126,283...... 9....3... 1 /22/2004'• P . .000 .'• . NOK 21 :062 ; $632500. 4 ...... s...... 1/22/2004...... S...... 2..r.0...00...... ! .NOK...... ;....$2...... 1.: .00...... ;...... 41.... ,954..6...4.. 1 /22/2004; P 2,000 : NO1 $2 .05 0 $42,143 .3 6 1/22/2004 S ...... 100'...... :. .NOK...... $20...... 99...... >:...... $2,096...... 7....3... /22/2004 P 00N0K--' 1 .000 $2,102 ...... 17 ...... 1/22/2004...... S...... NO...... K...... 98...... !:...... $62,861...... 9....6.. ,.1 /23/2004. P 100: NOK ' $21 .270': $2,129 .17 ...... ,...... ;...... 1 /23/2004 S !...... 100...... ;. .NOK...... ii. ...$21... 1 ..26...... '...... :...... $2,123...... 73 1/26/2004 P 4,000 NO K '• $21 .230 1 $85,006.71 1/26/2004 S 500 NOK $21 .20 : $10,588 .66 1/26/2004P 2,000 •.NOK $21 .230 : ...... $42,503...... 3....6...... 1/26/2004...... S...... :...... 500... NO...... K...... $21...... 201...... $10,588...... 6.....6.. 1/26/2004 P 100'1 NOK $21 .230; ...... ,...... ,...... $2,12. 5:17...... 1/26/2004 S...... 500...... NO K...... $2120...... $10,588 :66 1/26/2004 .100 NOK .$21 .230; .82,125 17 .P...... :...... :..:...... 1/26/2004. S...... 500!NO K.... $21 20 ...... $10,588...... 6....6... 1 /26/2004 P 100WOK .$21 230 ...... $2,125...... 1....7...... 1/26/200...... 4... ..S...... 500...... NOK ...... $21...... 20!...... ,...... $10. . .588.66 /27/2004 P 1,000!NQK : ...... $21 .320 ...... $21...... 341...... 68. .. . . 1/26/2004 S 1 . 5 .00 NOK •• $21 .20 : $10 588.66 ...... : ...... , 1/27/2004 : 1,000 ,... . NOK :...$21...... 3101...... $21,331...... 68...... 1/26/2004...... S...... 500(NOK...... $21...... 20'...... $10...... 588...... 6...... 6.... 1/27/2004 ;P 1,000!NOK $21 .0.90...... ; $21,111 .6 8 ' 1/26/2004 S 500!NOK $21 ...... '...... 20...... ; ...... $10,588...... 6. .. .6.. . . 1/27/2004 ;P 1001NOK $21 .080 $2,110 ;. .17 1/26/2004 S ...... 500NOK...... $21.:...... 20...... ;...... $10,588...... 6....6.. 1/27/2004 P 100`•,NOK $21 .0801 $2,110.17 1/26/2004 S 100 NOK $21,19 : $2,116 .73 1/27/2004!P 100NOK 1 $21 .070: $2,109.17 1/26/200 4 S ...... :...... 500...... NO...... K...... ,.:...$21.... 1..18'...... ,:...... $10,578...... 6...6... 1/27/2004 P 1,000 NO K $21 .040. : ...... ,...... $21,061.....,...... 6....8...... 1/26/200...... 4... .S...... 5001...... NOK...... $21 .17 ; $10,573.66 1/27/2004 1,000 NOK $21 .030; $21,051 .68 1/26/2004 S 500 NOK $21 .17 : $10,573.66 1/27/2004P 1,000'••NOK _ $21 .030: $21,051 .68 1/26/2004 S 100NOK $21 .16 ; $2;113.73 1/28/2004P 1,500NOK $21 .198 ; $31,829.52 1/26/2004 S 100NOK $21 .16; $2,113.73 1/28/2004 .`P ...... 1,500 NOK $21 .150 ; $31,757.52 1/27/2004 S 1004NOK $21 .25; $2,122.73 1/28/2004 P 1'566146,500 NOKk- $21 .000 : $31,532.52 1/27/2004 S 2,000 NOK $21 .21 ; $42,374.64 1/28/2004.. .. P 3,000 NOK $20.620: $61,925.03 1/27/2004 S ...... 1,000. ti .NOK...... ;...$21...... 07...... ,;...... $21,047...... 3....2.. 1/28/2004; P 100: NOK 0 620 ...... :...... $2 .. . .$2;064.17. ... .1/27/2004. 5...... '...... 3.200' NOK...... $21.:0fi ...... $67,319:43 1/29/ 004 ;P 400;NOK $20 600 ...... $8,.248.... 67 1/27/2004 ..S...... NOK...... ;...$21...... 04...... ,; ...... $10...... 508...... 6....6.. 1/29/2004P 1,500 NOK $20:420' $30662.52 1/28/2004 S 100I NOK ...$21...... 17!...... $..2...... 1/29/2004 P .1 000 NOK .220 $20,241 ...... :.....:...... $20 ...... :68 ..... 1/28/2004 S...... 1,000 NOK ...... $20.81.•... .. $20, 789.32 1/30/2004 P 400 NOK $20.520; $8,216.67 . 1/28/2004 S 500 :NOK $20.62 :...... $10,298...... 6....6... 2/2/2004 . P „•,, ,,,•, .•.•,.,.,,••,..300.,.,..• :-• NOK. ` $20.880 : $ •1/28/2004 S 6,270...... 5. . ..0...... : ...... :...... 500...... t:. .NO...... K...... ! .. .$20...... 62...... 1 $10,298.66 2/2/2004i. P b00sNOK $20.798 : $10409.84 ...... 1/28/200...... :...4 S ...... 500NOK...... $20...... 62•...... $10,298...... 6....6.. 2/2/2004 P 500 NOK $20.796 ; $10,408.84 : ...... :1/28/2004...... -..§-'-...... **"..<...... 500'...... :NO...... K...... ;....$20...... 621...... $10,298...... 6....6.. 2/2/20041P . : ...... 200iNO...... K...... $20.790 $4,162 .34 1/28/2004 .5 ...... : S 500 NOK $20.621 $10,298.66 2/2/2004 P 100 NO K J .. .'...... 8. . .. 6 i $20.790 ; $2 .081...... :1...7...... 1/28/200...... 4.. .S...... 500 NOK $20.62 1 $10,298 .66 2/2/20041 P ...... :...... 500: NOK 7 $20.770: $10,395.84,1 1/29/2004 S 1,500 i NOK $20.60 : $30;865.98
Page 7 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE .A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Trading
TradeDate BUY ;Amount !Symbol Price...... Cost...... TradeDate...... SELL...... :Amount...... :.Sy.... mbol Price :Proceeds 2/2/2004 ;P .NO...... K...... $20...... 770...... ;...... $10,395:84 ...... 1/29/2004 S...... 500NOK...... $20:52.s...... $10,248:66 2/2120041P 200 NOK ...... $20.770;...... $4,158.34 ..... /29/2004 .S 1 000!NOK ...... $20...... 461...... $20. ,437.3.....2.. 2/2/2004 P 200 ` NO .$20 .760 : ...... ;...... $4,156...... 34...... 1.... ./29/200...... 4...... ,...... 1...... NOI<...... :..$.202...... 0...38.3....8...>.....,...... $.20....., 357..... 7.32 2/2/2004 P ...... 100 NOK $20.760! $2,078.17 1/29/2004 . S : 1,000 NO ...... K...... $20...... 34...... ;...... $20,317...... 3....2.. ..2/2/2004 P 1,000 NOK $20 750: $20,771...... 6....8...... 1/29/2004...... S...... 1,000...... NOK...... $20...... 30...... :...... $20,277...... 3....2... 2/2/2004 P 500NOK :750 .385.84 2/2/2004 S 1,6001NOK : ...... :..$20 ;...... $90 ...... : ...... :...... :...$20...... 89...... $33,387...... 72.. 2 2/2/2004 100: NOK 20.750 ...... :...... $ .;...... $2,077:17...... 2/2/2004. 5...... 500 : . NOK...... $20.. .87.>...... $10, . 423 .66 2/2/2004 P ...... 2 .000 1 NOK...... :...... :...... $20 740...... $41,523.36 ...... 2)2/2004. 5...... 800'NOK . . . ..$20.81. . . $16 629 .86 2/2/2004 ; ...... 1...000...... NOK...... :. .'...$20t20...... 740....4...0...... $20.761 :68 ...... 5...... :...... 400...... NO K...... ' $20 ...... $8.... .314...... :.9...3... 2/2/2004 : P 1,000: NOK . $20 :7.. . $20,761 .68 2/2/2004 S ...... :...... :...... 1001NOK...... :...$20...... 81...... $2...... 078...... 7....3... 2/2/2004 P 500!NOK . ; .$20.740 ; $10,380 4 4 ...... 8...... ; 2/2/200...... S...... : ...... 1,300...... NO...... K...... $20...... 75...... :...... $26,945...... 5....2... 212/2004 P 200' NOK „ $20740 : $4,152.34 ...... 2/2/2004...... S...... 700NOK...... $20...... 75...... $14,509...... 1.....3.. 2/2/2004 P 100 I NOK $20 .740 : . 2,76 1 2/2/2004 S ...... t...... ,...... ;...... 300'...... NO...... K...... $20...... 75...... >:...... $6,218...... 2....0...... 2/2/2004 P 1,000: NOK $20:730 .$20.751 .68 2/2/2004 S 2,000 NOK $20.73 : $41,414.64 1.,000yNOK $20 730: $ ...... 4 .P 20,751 68...... 2%2/200...... 4. :S...... 1. .000NO...... K...... ;•. ..$20...... 7....3...>...... $20,707'3...... 2... 2/2/2004 P 1,000NOK $20.730 ; $20 751 68 2/2/2004 S .1 .OOO NOK ...... : ;...... 5...... 20...... 73...... :...... $20707..20,...... 7.3.3.2 2/212004' P 500 NO K $20.730 , ...... :...... $10...... 375...... 84...... 2/2/200...... 4...... 1.. .000...... : .NOK...... :..$...... 3: $20,707.32 2/2/2004 :P 500 NOK $20.730 ; ...... $10,375...... 8....4...... 2/2/200...... 4.. ..S...... 500...... NO...... K...... :...$20...... 73...... ;...... $10,353...... 6.....6.. 2/2/2004 . P 500 NO K t20.730 : $10,375.84 :...... :...... ,...... 2/2/200...... 4... .S...... 500...... NO...... K...... $20...... 73...... ,:...... $10,353...... 6....6... 2/2/2004 P 100 NO K . P...... ,...$20.730;...... $2,075.1 7 ...... 2/2/2004 .S...... ,...... 5500...... ,;NO...... K...... ,...$20...... 73...... ,;...... $10,353...... 6....6.. 2/2/2004 ...... 2,400...... NOK $20.720 ...... $49 780.03 2/2/2004 : : .,...... ,...... 00;NOK ...... :; $$20...... 733 : ...... $..10 .335.....6....6.. 2/2/2004 P 600 NOK . $20 ...... 0..72... $12,445.01 2/2/2004 S 500!NOK $20...7...... :...... $10,353...... 6....6... 2/2/20 b4!P 500•NOK $20 .590 ; $1 0,305.84 2/2/2004 S 500NOK $20.73 : $10,353.66
2/3/2004 P 2,000 NOK ...... $21...... 050...... : .. . . . $42,143.36 2/2/2004 S 500 NOK 1 $20 .73 $10 ...... , ...... , ...... 353...... 6. .. .6.. . 2/3/2004 P 300 NOK $21 :020 : ...... _...... ;...... $6.... 312...... :.5...0...... ,....2/2/200...... 4... .S...... :...... 500...... ;NO.. K...... $20...... :.73...... $10. .. . 353...... 6. .6. 2/3/2004:P 5,000 NOK ; $20 .990 : $1.05,058 .39 2/2/2004 S 5001'N** OR* $20.73 10,353 .66 2/3/2004 .P 1,000 NOK $20.970 $20,991 .68 2/2/2004 S 500 NOK $20 .73. $10,353.66 2/3/2004 P 300'NOK $20.9501 $6,291 .50 2/2/2004 S 500iNOK •: $20 .73: $10,353.66 2/3/2004 P...... 50'NOK ...... i. $20 :930;...... $1,047:58 ..:.....2/2/2004 S...... 500 NOK $20.73: $10.353.66 2/4/2004 i P 1,000 NOK $20.410 : $20,431 .68 2/2/2004 S 500: NOK $20.73 :`• $10,353 .66
2/5/2004...... P ...... 500...... NO. . K $20.720: $10,370.84 2/2/2004 S ...... : ...... !...... 500!NOK $20.73 $10,353 .66 ...... ti...... ~...... 2/5/2004! P 3,( 00 NOK .560 "' ...... :...... T...... $20 :...... $61,745 03 ...... 2/2/2004. ,...... :...529' NO K...... 1..$20:73 ...... $10,353:66 2/6/2004 :P 1,000 ' NOK 21 .290 , :...... :. $21,311 .68 2/2/2004 S ...... 200...... NO...... K...... ,•... .$20...... 73...... ,:...... $4,141...... 4....6... 2/6/2004 .1,000 NOK ..$21 .290 :; .$21,311 ...... !...... ;...... :...... :...... '.: . ..66 ...... 2/2/2004. 5...... 200 :NOK...... $20.73.>...... $4,141 :46 .....2/612004 .,P ...... ,500,NOK $21 290 :...... 10,655,84 2/2/2004 _...... S 200'NOK...... :.;...$20...... 73...... ;...... ,...... $41414...... 6.. 2/6/2004?P 2,800 NOK $21 .280 : $59,644.70 . 2/212004 ...... >...... S...... 200iNO...... K...... '. .$20...... 73...... ;...... $4,141...... 4....6.. 2/6/2004 P 1 000' NOK :280 ... ..:...... $21 .:...... $21,301...68...... 2/2/200...... 4... ..S...... 100...... NOK...... ;...$20...... 731...... $2,070...... 7....3.. .1 NOK .280 P ...... :...... :..$21 ...... $ 2/2/2004. 5...... 100; NOK...... $20:73 ...... :...... $2,070 .73 2/6/2004}P 1,000 NO K ! $21,280 1 $21,301 .6 ...... 8...... 2/2/200...... 4.. .S...... 100'NO1...... $20.73 1 $2,070 .73 ;P 1,000!NO K $21 .280 $21,301 .68 ...... ,...... :...... 2/2/200../2/2004...... 4... .'§S....**-.....**...... 100...... ''NO...... >...$20...... 731...... $2,070...... 7....3... 2/6/2004 P 1,000' NOK $21 :280 $21,301 .68 2/2/2004 S 100lNOK ! $20 .73 : $2 070.73 2/6/2004 P 500'NOK $21 .280 $10,650 .84 2/3/2004 S 500!NOK $21 .01 . $10,493.66
Page 8 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTION S Damage Analysis For Gene ric Trading
TradeDate...... ;.BUY...... >Amount. :Symbol ..Price...... Cos...... t...... sITradeDat...... e...... SELL...... nount...... iSymbol...... :Price :Proceed s c 2/6/2004.: P...... •...... 1,000, NOK ...... , $21 .270.x...... $21,291..68...... :.2/3/2004. S...... 50 • NOK 20.94:: 045 87 2/6/2004 P 1,0001 N OK $21 .270 :...... $21,291 .68 2/3/2004 S 500 NOK 1 $20 .931 $10,453 .66 ...... :...... 2/6/2004 '•.P...... :.....:...... 200 1 NOK...... , .:..:::.: .. 21 .270.:...... _$4258.34 ...... 2/3/2004. S...:...... 300 1NOK i $20 :93' ...... $6,272...... 2....0... 2/6/2004 P ...... '...... 1 .000 'NOK...... 21 .260i $21,281 68 213/2004 ...... 300,NOK...... $20 93.!...... $6 272.20 2/6/2 004 ...... ,500; NOK $21 .240 53,154 P ...... :...... ;...... $ .20...... :. 2/3/2004 S'..:...... 4,500!NOK...... $20...... 91•...... :,...... $93,992...... 9....5... 2/6/2004 P ...... :...... 5001.....O...... $2. .220...... $10,620 .84 ...... 2/3/2004 S ...... 500 NOK...... $20.91...... $10,443 .66 2004 1 000 a N OK ..$21 200...... $21,221 68 ...... 2/3/2004 S 500 NOK : $20 .91 ~ $10 443 6 .;. P...... s ...... 6.. 2/6/2004...... P...... 400...... ;. .NO...... K...... $21 .180]...... $8...... ,.480...... 67...... 2../.4/2004...... S...... 66500.6111.NOK...... $20...... 64!...... ;...... $10,308...... 6. . 6.. 2/6/2004 P...... 50.... .NO...... K...... 1 $21...... 180...... 1: . $1,060.08 214/2004. S ...... NOK $20.57 : ...... $10,273.66 2/6/2004 '.P...... 500!...... $21 :170 ; $10,595.84 2/4/2004 S .500 . NOK...... $20:57 ...... $10,273.66 P 200 K .$21170 : $4,238 34 714/20 0 S ...... i...... 2 000 NOK...... 20...... 4....6...... $40,874.. .64 2 6/2004• P 500 NOK 1 .160'...... $10,590.84 2/4/200 S 2,000 . NOK $20.46 : $40,872.64 ...... I...... j...... 3...... ,8...... x/6/2004 ; P 5NO...... K...... 21.....160...... >!...... $1,059...... 08...... 2.../..5/2004...... ,.. .S...... 1 , 00 :NOK $20.56 0 05.98 2/6/2004 P 1,000 ; NOK 1 .150 : 21 171 .68 2/5/2004 S 1,000 NOK ...... $20.51...... $20, 487 .32 2/6/2004 .P ...... 1,000! NOK...... $...21. ....150...... 1:. $21,171:68 2/5/2004 S 500' NOK $20.49 j $10,233.66 2/612004iP 1,000 NOK .150 : $ ...... $21 21,171 .68 2/5/2004 S ...... 0....; ..NOI<...... ,. .$20...... 47...... $20,447...... 3.....2.. 2/6/2004 ...... 1,0001. NOK ...... : ...... $21 .150.>...... $21,171.:68...... 2/6/2004 S...... 500 NOK $21 .27. $10,623:66 2/6/2004 P 3,800 NOK $21 130 1 .$80,376.38} 2/6/2004 S 500 NO K $2120] $10,588 6 6 ...... 1...... 2/6/2004 P 500 NOK $21 .130 : $10,575.84 2/6/2004 S ...... 2,500NO K $21 .19: $52,918.31 ...... p...... 1 .. 2/6/2004 P ...... ;N OK..:...... :... . :::..... $21 .120 ; ...... :..$4,228.34 2/6/2004 S 2,500 NOK ...... $21 ..19...... $52 .918...... 3....1.. 2/6/2004 P 500 j NOK ...... $21 $10,560:84 2/6/2004 . .. . 600NO...... K. $21 .18: $12,694.39 . . : . .: 1.00...... S..:...... : ...... y.. 2/9/2004 P 6,005 . NOK $21 .680: $141,060 91 2/6/2004 S 500 NOK $21 ...... ,...... : ...... V ...... :.17.:...... $10,573.66 2/9/2004P 1,000 NOK $21 .620: $21,641 .68 2/6 2004 S 100 NOK $21 .17! $2,114.73 : ...2/9/2004...... :.P...... 1,000...... :.. ..NO...... K...... :...... { $21:520. $21,541 .68 ....:... 2/6/2004...... S...... 1,000 NOK $21 .16: ...... $21,137...... 3...2... 2/9/2004.. ..! .P...... 1,0001NO K $21...... 520.. . $21,541 .68 2/6/2004 S 1,000NOK . $21 .16...... $21,137.32 2/9/2004 'P 1,000 NO K $21 .520: $21,541 .68 .2/6/2004 S 1,000 :NOK $21 .16 ; $21,137 .32 2/9/2004 P 9001NOK $21 .510: $19,378.51 2/6/2004 S 1,000 1 NOK $21 .16 . $21,137.32 2/9/2004P 900!NOK $21 .510: $19,378.51 2/6/2004 S 1,000jNOK $21 .16 : $21,137.32 .2/9/2004...... P...... :...... 5001...... NO...... K ..$21 .510.:...... $10,765.84 ...... 2/6/2004 S...... 2,500 NOK...... $21.. . . .14... . .;. $52,794.3 1 2/9/2004 P 100 : NOK $21 .510 1 $2, 153.17 2/6/2004 S 1,000NOK $21 .13 : $21,107.32 2/9/2004 !P ...... :...... j.. ...100NO...... K...... $21:510 . $2,153.17 216/2004 S :...... 1,000 NOK ...... 1 $21 .12 ...... $21,097.32 2/9/2004' P 50 j NOK 1 : ...... :...... _...... :.... :,....,...... $021 5 ...... !...... $. .1.. .076...... 5.... .8...... 2/.... .6%2004...... S...... 500: NOK...... $21 .12 :i...... $10,548:66 2/9/2004P 100; NO :...... K..:.:...., :.. ;;:;.. ... 21:460...... _.. $2,148 .17...... 2/6/200...... 4.. .S...... 3,800 :NOK $21 .09': ...... $80,055...... 8....2.. 2/9/2004: P i 500 j NOK $21 .450 ; $ ...... 3...... 10,735...... 84...... 2/6/2004...... S...... :1 .000; NOK...... $21 .09.1...... $21,067...... 32 2/9/2004 P ...... 100...... NO...... K... $21...... 450...... ;...... 2,147...... 17...... 2/6/200...... :...:...... 4.. .S...... 1..r.00...... 0..;NOK• ...... $21 : 09...... $21,067.32 2/10/2004 . P .1,000 FNO ...... K ..$22.170 $2...2,..1...9...1...6.8. ....2/6/2004...... S...... NO.K...... i..$21 .09*.:...... $21,067.33* 2 2/10/2004 P...... 1,300,NOK .$22.1651: $28 842.19 . 2/6/2004 S...... 500,...... NOK $21 .08! $10,528.66 2/10/2004 : P 2,000 1 NOK .$22.160: .$44,363,36 .2/6/2004 S 200iNOK ...... ~...... >...$21...... 061...... >...... $4,207...... 4....6... 2/10/2004 P 1,000 : NO K $ : ...... 22.160 ...... $22,181. . ..68. . . . 2/9/2004 S: ....1,000!...... 1 ..NOK...... 21 :61...... $21 5877.32 2/10/2004 : P 1 000 NO K $22.160: . $22,181 .68 ..19/2004 S .1,000 NOK ...... $21.60 : $21,577.32 2/10/2004 :! P 1,0001NO K $22.160:...... $22,181 ...... : ...... 68...... 2/9...... /..2004...... S...... 1001.1 ..NOK...... 0.. .f. !...... $2,157...... 7.....3.. 2/10/2004 ; P 1,0001NOK $22.160 $22,181 .68 .2/9/2004 S 50NOK $21 .60' $1,078.87 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Trading
TradeDate BUY ;Amount ;Symbol .. . Price :Cos...... t...... TradeDate...... S. .ELL...... ;Amount...... ;Sym.... bol Price .Proceeds 2/10/2004P 1,000TNOK ; $22.160 ...... $22,181 .68 ...... 2/912004 S...... 1,00...... NO0 K ...... ,.... 21 .47'...... 21,447...... 3....2... 2/10/2004 P 1,000 :NOK $22 . ; ...... 160...... $22,181...... 68...... z...... 2/9/2004...... 5...... 500'NOK...... ;..$.21...... 47...... $10,723...... 6....6.. 2/10/2004 P 500yNOK 1 $22.160 $11,090 4 ...... 8...... 2/9/200...... 4... .S...... :...... 500...... :...... :...$21...... 47...... :...... $10,723...... 6....6... 2/10/2004yP 500 NOK $22.160'. $11,090 : ...... <...... 84!...... }>...... 2/9/2004. 0 /200... .S...... 500NOK...... ;...$21...... 47...... ;...... $10,723...... 6....6.. 2/10/2004 P 50 NO K ...... $22...... 160...... 1...... ,$1 . 109 .08...... 2//9/2 4 .S...... 500: NOK ...... $21 .47 1...... $10,723 :66 2/10/2004 P 00; NOK ...... 1. $22.150•: $11,08. ... . ~. .. .8. ..4 8 . . 7J9/2004 100 NOK $21 .47 : ...... 1 ...... ,.. ... $2,144.73 2/10/2004 P ...... 500...... :. .NO...... K...... '..$22:150;...... $11,085:84. . ...:.. ti9/2004. :5...... :...... :...:1,000 . NOK .$21 .46 i 21,437.32 2/10/2004yP 1 ,000 NOK 4 ...... $22.930 ; $22,151 .68 2/9/200 S . 1,000'•.NOK $21 .46 .1 ...... $. ..21...... 437...... 3.. . ..2. . 2/10/2004 P ...... 700.... NOK 22.130 : .$15,5 0 .1 4 S : ...... ;...... 219/2 ...... 500... . ; NOK $21 .46 $10,718.66 ., ...... 2/10/2004 P 500 NOK $22.130 S ...... 1 ...... : : . . ..:i...... ~...... $11...... ,.075...... :8. ..4...... 2/10/2004...... 1.. ?. .000iNO...... K. $22 14 ; $22 117.32 2/10/2004' P ; ...... ; ...... ~...... : ...... 500...... a: ..NO...... K...... $22.130! } $11,075.84 .2/10/2004 S 17001 NOK 1 $22 .131 ...... ! ...... o...... $37,582...... 4. . ..5...... 2/10/2004...... : .P...... 1,000' NOK :• $22 .070 : $22,091.68 .1 . .. . .Y ...... , ...... :...... 1 ...... 2/10/200...... 4. .S. . 1 000! NOK $22.12 1 $22,097.32 ...... 1 ...... 2/10/2004 ;P 500NOK .$22.070 ; $11,045.84 2/10/2004 S 1,000 OK $22.1 $22,097.32 2/10/2004 P .500 NOK 22.070 $11,045.84 2/10/2004 S .500 NOK : .$22..12: $11 ,048.66 2/10/2004 P ...... 500'NO..... K $22 060 . $11,040 84 2/10/2004 S : ...... 1.. .000'NO...... K...... :....$22"...... -1-1-...... 1.:...... $22...... ,.087...... 3....2.. 2/10/2004 P 200 : NOK .060 ...... :...... :....::.. ..:...... i..$22 ;...... $4;416.34 :2/10/2004 S ...... 1,000 NOK...... $ 22 .aI .. $22,087.32 2/10/2004 100' NO K :060 .: P...... '...... ::...::...... $22 ;...... $2,208 17 . .... 2/10/2004. .S...... :...... 500' NO K...... '..$22:1 1.x...... $11,043 .66 2/10/2004 .P...... 100 NOK $22:060 : $2.208.17 2/10/2004 S 500iNOK 22.11 $11 043.66 2%10/2004 ...... : ...... 1...... P . .. . 100 NOK 22.060i $2,208.1 7 ...... 2/10/200...... 4.. . .S...... 500 ;NOK $22.09 ; $11,033.66 ...... Y ...... 2/10/2004rP 100 N 6K $22.060 ; $2208.17 2/10/200 ...... r ...... 4 .5S...... '•...... 3,000...... 1 ....0 ...,:NOK...... $22..2.2..08...... : ...... $66,171...... 9....7... 2/10/2004 : P ; 500NOK $21 .990: $11 .005.84 2/10/2004 ...... :.. .0... .0.... :NO...... K...... I...$22...... :0....8...;...... $22,057...... 3....2... 2/10/2004P 500NOK $21 .930 ; $10,975 ...... 84...... 2/10/200...... 4... .S...... 100NOK66.N 6k $22.08 : $2,205.73 2/10/2004 P 500; NOK $21 .900 . $10,960.84 2/10/2004 S . 1 •: $22 .08'•. $2,205.73 2/10/2004 P 500 NOK 1 $21 .900; $10,960 ...... 84...... 2/10/2004...... S...... ;...... 501NO...... K...... $22...... 08...... :...... $1...... ,..102...... 8...7.. 2/10/2004iP 200 NOI< ...... :. . : $21 :900; $4,384.34 2/10/2004 S 100N9K $22.07 ; $2,204 .73 2/11 /2004 : P 500 ; NOK $22 540: $11,280.84 2/10/2004 S 100: NOK $22.07 $2,204 .73 2/11/2004 P 2,000 .NOK $22.500i $45,043.36 2/10/2004 S 500 NOK $22.06] $11,018 .66 2/11/2004 P 1,000iNOK $22.500 ; $22,521 .68 2/10/2004 S 400 NOK $22.06 ; $8,814 .93 2/11/2004 P 1,000 NOK . .' :. $22.500 ...... $22,521...... 68...... 2/10/2004...... S 100•.NOK 1 $22.06 $2,203 ...... 1 ...... i ...... 6 ...... 7. .. .3.. . 2/11/2004P 600 NOK ...$22...... 4...... 0...: $11,215.84 2/10/2004 S 3,200NOK $22.05' $7487 .43 2/11/2004 .P 500NOK $22.400 $11,210.84 2/10/2004 S ...... ::...... 6300NOK.. .1...... $21 .961...... ;...... $6,581...... 20... 0 . 2/11/2004 P { 1,000 NOK ; $22.340 $22,361 :68 ...... 2/10/2004 S 2 .0 ;NOK $21...... 93...... : ...... $4...... ,.381...... 4...6... 2/11/2 6.641E 2,000 NO..K.... $22 330 $44 703 .36 ...... 2/10%.... S...... 1... .000'NO...... K...... $21...... 90...... _...... $21,877...... 3....2.. .2/12/2004 ...... ,0 : NOK :930 : ...... P...... 1 :...... ::...... 1..$22 ...... $22,951.:6$...... 2/9.0/2004. 5...... 500•: NOK .' $21 .90 . $1.0.,.938 .66 2/12/2004 P 1. .0000... NOK .$22 920 $22,941;68 .,._ 2/10/2004 S 1 500 ...NOK...... :...$21...... 90...... :...... $10...... 938...... 6....6... 2/12/2004 : p ...... 001. . . NO K I $22 .910 : .1...... $22,931 .68 2/10/2004 S 500 • NOK $21 .8 .6 ; ...... ,...... $10...... ,.918...... 6. .. .6.. . 2/12/2004P 1,500 ;N OK . $22 .770 ; $34 187.52 2/10/2004 ...... :...... S...... 5001...... NOK...... ,$21...... 85...... ;:...... $10...... ,.913...... 6....6.. 2/12/2004 P 1,000 NOK $22.7301 $22751 .68 2/11/2004 S ...... i...... 500iNO...... ,...... K...... $22...... 71'...... /...... $11,343...... 6....6... 2/12/2004 P 1,000NO K .22:710 ...... ::.. :...... :...... $22,731:68 2/11/2004 5...... :...1...:...... 2,000 i NOK ...... i.. $22 .61 . $45,174.64 2/12/2004 : P 500; NOK 22.710 1 $11,365.84 2/11/2004 S 100' NOK $22.45...': .. . $2,242.73 2/12/2004 P .2,000 NOK .1...... :: '; ...$22...... $45,443.36 .....2/11 /2004 S...... 500 NOK 2:42 1 ,198.66 2/12/2004 ...... $2 ...... $1 : P 1,0001 NOK $22.690: $22,711 .68 2/11 /2004 S 100: NOK $22.42 $2,239.73
Page 10 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Tradin g
TradeDate BUY :Amount Symbol ...... :Price...... Cos...... t...... TradeDat...... :...... e...... SELL...... Amount...... ,::Symbo...... l...;..Price...... ,!..Proceed...... s...... :..... 2/12/2004 P 500NOK $22:420; $11,220.84£...... 2/11/200....,..1 /...... 04 S 100 NOK $22.42 $2,239.73 2/13/2004 P ...... x...... :....8,000.' NOK.•...... : ...... $22.590...... $180893:42 ..:..2/11/2004 S...... I...... 100. NOK ...... ;..$22:42 ...... 73 2/13/2004 : P 8,000 NOK ...$22.590 : $180 893 42€ 2/11/2004 S ...... :...... 500...... NO.K...... $22...... :.37...... ; ...... 11 173'66 2/13/2004 P 8 0001 NOK $22.• $ 590 : $180 893 42 2/11/2004 S ...... 100...... ;.NOK...... $22...... 35...... :...... $2,232...... 7....3.. 2/13/2004 P ...... :...... 500 NOK...... :..$22.51.0 ...... $11,265:84...... 2/11/2004. 5...... 1,000NOK...... $22.33 ...... $22307 .32 2/13/2004 P 2,000 NOK $22.2501 $44,543 36 2/11/20041.1 /20...... S...... ;...... 500...... NOK $22.33 $11 153 66 2/13/2004 500: NO K 22.1 90. ,: $11105.84 .P...... :...... :...... :...... :..$ ...... 2/91/2004...... S...... 500NOK...... •...... 22...... 331...... >...... $11,153...... 6....6... 2/13/2004IP 1,000 NOK ...... <...$...22...... 180...... ;...... $22...... 20...... 1....6...8...... ?J.....1...1/2004...... S...... ,000...... NOK...... 22...... 29...... :...... 111,336...... _...... 6.....1.. 2/13/2004 P 500yNOK ...... 1. .$....22...... 170...... • ...... $11,095...... 8....4...... 2/12/200...... 4... .S...... 2...,.000...... :NOK...... $...22...... 79...... >1...... $..45,53...... 4....6....4... 2/17/2004 P .2,0001 NO K .690: $ ...... :...... i. 1..$22 45,423.36...... 2/12...... /..200...... 4... ..S...... <...... 4,500iNO...... ,-...... K...... :...$22...... 78...... :...... $102,407...... 9.....5.. 2/17/2004 ; P ...... 1,000 NOK ...... :' :.:: :...... i..$22.680;...... $22,701 :68. .:... 2/1212004 5...... 500 ; NOK...... $22.72 ...... $11,348.66 2/17/2004 P •, 5001NO K $22 66 0 r...... $11,340...... 84...... 4.. 2/12/2004...... S...... 500...... NOK...... $22..72...... 1...... $11,348...... 6.....6.. 2/17/2004 ; P 200NOK $22. 630 : $4,530.34' 2/12/2004 ...... ,...... S...... 1.~ ..000`NO...... '. K .•:. .$.22...... 72...... :...... $. .22,694...... 3....2... 2/17/2004 P ...... is...... 1.. 00...... 0.. ..NO...... K...... $22.600 1 $22,621...... :6... 8.. .2/12/200...... 4... ..S...... 500...... :.NOK...... $22...... 71...... ;...... $11,343...... 6.....6.. 2/17/2004 : P 1,0001NOK $22.580 : $22,601 :68 2/12/2004 S ...... >.,...... 500 ..NOK...... $.22...... 71...... : ...... $11,343...... 6....6... 2/18/2004 P 1,000 NOK $22 810 : $22,831 .68 2/12/2004 S 500 ;NOK $22.68; $ 11 328.66 ...... 4...... ,...... 2/18/2004 500kNOK . .P...... ,:..:.::...:...... 1..$22:620.>...... $1.1.,320.84. ..:,.2/12/2004 . 5..:...... '•...... 5001...... 22.6..81...... $...1...1...,.328...... 6....6... 2/18/2004 P 1,000, NOK $22 5001 ...... $22...... 521...... 68...... 2113...... 2004...... S...... 500...... ~...... $22...... 18...... $...11,078...... 6....6.. 500'NOK 22.500 $11,260:84 2/13/2004 S.. 500.'•NOK $22.18! $,0 .8.66 2/19/2004 ! P ...... 8,000...... NOK ..$22..820:...... $182,733.42 .....2/17 /2004 S...... 3~000FNOK ...... $22:69...... $68,001 :97 2/19/2004 50D NO . P...... K ...... :....::...... $22 800 ...... $11,410 84 .. 2/17/200...... 1,000iNOK •. .$....22...... 68...... :...... $22,657...... 3....2.. 2/19/2004 ; P 500iNOK $22.750; $1 1 385 .84 2/19/2004 ...... 'S'*...... :...... 500...... NOK...... •.1.. ..$22...... 75...... :...... $11...... ,.363...... 6....6.. 2/19/2004 ; P 500 i NOK $22.750; $11 ,385.84 2/'19/2004 S 1 ,000 : NOK $22.69! $22,667.32 2/20/2004 P 3,000 ;..NOK...... : ...... $22...... 540...... ;...... $67,685...... 03...... 2/19/2004...... S...... 3,000...... NOK...... •. $22 .58 ; $67,671 .97 2/20/2004 P 200 ' OK :540 ...... !..$22 : ...... $4,512.34...... 2f20/2004. 5...... :...... 100 : NOK ..$22:46 ...... $2.243:73 2120/2004 : P 9,000 ; $22 510. $202;785. 10 2/20/2004 S 100 ; NOK ...... $22.46 ; $2,243 .73 2/20/2004 P 100 NOK $22. 330! $2,235.17 2/20/2004 S 1,0001NOK $22.34! $22,317 .32 2/20/2004 : P 1,000 NOK $22.240 ; $22,261 .68 2/20/2004 S 1 ,0001NOK $22.33 : $22,307 .32 2/20/2004P 100 ':.NOK ' $22. 170 ; $2219.17 2/20/2004 S I 1 000'NOK $22.33 ; $22307.32 2/20/2004 ; P 100; NOK $22.150 $2,217.17 2/20/2004 S 100 ; NOK $22.33! $2,230.73 2/23/2004P 2,000NOK $22.770 : $45,583.36 ...... 2.../.20/2004...... S...... 500•NOK.....b ...... ,....$..22...... 29...... ; ...... $....11,133...... ,....6.....6.. /23/2004 P 00 NOK 22.770 : $11395 ...... _...... ::...... 395...... 8....4...... 2.../.20/200...... 4... .S...... 5...0...... NO...... K...... $22...... 29...... ;...... $11...... 133...... 6....6... 2/23/2004 P i 9,000; : NOK s .s...... $22...... 760...... !...... $205...... 035...... 10...... ,...... 2/20/200...... 4.. .S...... <...... 1001...... NO...... K...... ;...$22...... 16.....;...... $2...... 3 .2/23/2004 ...... P...... 6...... 0 K...... 22:750 :...... :...... $136,630 :07...... 2/20 /2004. 5...... 100 NOK. . .. $22.07! $2,204 .73 ; 2/23/2004.....;p...... 1,000...... NO...... K...... $22.730 ; $22,751 .68 2/23/2004 S 500' NOK $22.83; $1 1 ,403.66 2/23/2004 P 1 ,000NOK .. : . . : $22.730' .$22,751 : ...... 68 .2/23...... /.2004...... S...... 1. .500...... NOK...... ;...... ,...$22...... 82...... >:.....:...... 9-...... 2/23/2004...... P...... 1 000!NOK .... $22710 ....$22,731 .68 ..... 2/28/2004 S...... r...... 500.INOK...... $22.78 ...... $11 ,378 .66 2/23/2004 ; P 1,200 NOK $22640 $27.19401 2/23 ;...... / _2004...... S...... 8001NOK...... j. .$22...... 77...... ; .$18...... ,..197...... 8....6... 2/23/2004 P 200 1 NOK $22.640. .$...4532...... 3...4...... 2/23..._...../..200..._...4... ..S...... 500NOK $22.77 $ 11,373.66 2/23/2004 ; P 1,5001 NOK ...... :.....:...: ..:.:..:...... $22:635;...... $33,985.52. :....2/23/2004. 5::.....:...'...... 2,500 '...... $22:76 ...... $56,843.3 1. 2/23/2004yP 1,200 1NOK $22.6301 $2,182 01 2/23/2004 S 300 ...... :...... :..i...... :...... , ...... '...... $6...... 821...... 2....0.. 2/23/2004 ;P 1,500 ''• NOK $22.570! $,87.52 2/23/2004 S ! 100' NOK $22.76 $2,273.73
Page 11 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Trading
TradeDate .BUY :Amount ;Symbol Price Cost TradeDate SELL :Amount Symbol ...... : ...... i ...... <...... :...... i ...... :Price...... 'Proceed. ..i ...... s...... 2/23/2004 P 1,500 NOK $22.570 ...... $33,887.52 2/23/2004 S •;.. ...100iNOK...... $22.76:1 $2,273.73 : ...... 2/23%2004 ; P 1,500: NOK $22.570 ; $33,887...... 52...... 2/23/2004...... S...... :...... NOK...... $22...... 75...... :...... $34,090...... 9.....8.. 2/23/2004 P 1,2001 NOK $22.570' ...... $27,110...... 01...... :.2/23/2004...... S...... :...... 1,500...... ':.. ..NO.....K...... •...... 22...... 75...... :...... $34,090...... 9....8... /23/2004 P 200 NOK $22.570 27,110.01 /23/2004 S 1 000 NOK $22 75 $22 727 3 2 2/23/2004 P :...... 1,200...... NO...... K...... $22.560 :• $27,098.01 2/23/2004 S 1,000•NOK...... $22...... 75...... >...... $22,727...... 3....2... 2/23/2004 P 1,200 NOK $22.560 : $27,098.01 .2/23/2004...... :...... S...... 100'NOK...... $22...... 75...... $2,272...... 7....3...... 2/23 2004 P 200 NOK $22.5501 $4,514.34 2/23/2004 S 1,500 NOK $22.74 : $34,075 .98 2/23/2004 0 1,500 NOK . $22.530 ; $33,827...... i ...... 5.. .2...... :2/23/200...... 4. . . ..S...... 1,000...... NO. . .. .K. . . $22. .74 $22,717 .32 ...... ;...... 2/23/2004 P...... 1,500 NO. . .K. $22.530; $33,827.52 2/23/2004 S 100 NOK $22.74 $2,271 .73 2/23/2004 P 1,5001 NOK ...... $22.530; $33.. . . .827...... 52...... : 2/23/200...... 4 .S...... 100...... NOK...... ;. $22...... 741...... ;...... $2,271...... 7...3... 2/23/2004 400 : NOK $.22:630 $9, ...... 020 :6....7...... 2/23/200....,...... 4... .S...... 100...... ; .NO...... K...... $22...... 74...... >:...... $2,271...... 7....3... 2/23/2004}P 500 NOK . $22 .520 $11,270.84 ...... 2/23/2004 S .1,000...... NO...... K...... i...$22...... 72...... :...... $22,697...... 3....2... 2/23/2004 P 1,500 NOK $22 .517; $33,807:52 2/23/2004 1,000 NOK $22.721 $22,697 ...... :...... S...... s ...... s ...... ~...... 3.. . .2.. . 2/23/2004 y P 300 : NOK $22.510 : $6,759.50 2/23/2004 S ...... s...... '...... :...... , .. .1.. 000...... ; .NO...... K...... $22...... 71. . .. :...... $22,687.32 2/23'2004 P 1,000':NOK $22.500 ...... :...... ;...... ,...... $22,521.:68...... 2/23/2004. 5...... 500...... ::NOK...... $22...... 67...... ,:...... $11,323...... 6...6... 2123/2004? P 200' NOK $22.460 : ...... $4,496.34 .... 2/23/2004 S.... _...... 500NOK...... ,$22...... 2..65...... ;;...... $11...... 313...... 6....6... 2/2312004P...... 100ANOK $22.460: .$2,248.17 .2/23/2004 .S 2,000 ; NOK $22.53 : $45 ,014...... 6....4... 2/23/2004 P 600':.NOK $22.450 : ...... $13,483...... _.01...... :2/23/2004...... S...... ;...... 700...... :1NOK...... $22...... 48'...... $15,720...... 1.....3.. 2/23/2004 .100 NOK .450 . $2,247 .P...... :...... 1..$22 :...... 17. ....:2/23/2004 . 5...... 1.. . ..000.. ;.. .NOK...... $22...... 47...... ' ...... $22,447...... 3....2... 2/2 70 3/ 04;2...... 3..00...... N. O. K $22:430! $6,735:50 2/23/2004 S 600 NOK...... $22...... 42...... ;...... $13,438...... 3.....9.. 2/23/2004 300 NOK $22:340 .. 2...... $6,708:50...... 2/23/2004. 5...... 6,000 i NOK ...... '..$22.20:...... $133,063.93 2/23/2004 P 1,000: NOK $22 320 .$22,341 68 2/24/2004 S 1 0001 NOK $22.30: $22,277 .32 2/23/2004 :2 500 NOK $22.310 ; $11,165.84 2/24/2004 S 1,000'NOK $22.271: $22,247 .32 2/23/20041: 2 5001NOK ...... 22...... 310...... ;...... $11...... , .165...... :.8...4...... 2/24/2004...... S...... ;...... 500...... NO...... K...... ;...$22...... 25...... $11.....1,11.1...3....6....6.. 2/23/2004 ;2 NOK $22.300: $8.,928 .67 2/24/2004...... S...... 500NOK...... : $22 .24 ; $11,108 .6 6 2/23/2004 :2 500!NOK $22.290; $11,155.84 2/24/2004 S .500 NOK $22.24 $11,106 .66 2/23/2004•. P 1,000 NOK $22.250; $22,271 .68 2/24/2004 S 500! NOK $22.23 '; $11,103 .66 2/23/2004 P 500 NOK $22.250. $11,135.84 1, 2/24/2004 S 1,000!NOK $22.22! $22,197 .32 2/24/2004 P 500 NOK $22.330 ...... $11 175.84 . .... 2/24/2604 5S ...... 5001NOK ...... $22.22 :...... $11,098 .66 2/24/2004'2 500NOK .$22 .270 . ._ $11,145.84 .2/24/2004 .500 NOK .$22.22 .$11,098 .66 2/24/2004P 500 ;NOK . $22.270 : $11,145.84 2/24/2004 S '• 500NOK $22 .21 ...... v...... i...... , ...... $11...... 093...... 6.. . ..6. . 2/24/2004 .P . .500 ;NOK ...... $22:260 11,140.84 .2/24/2004 S 100 NOK $22.15 $2,212.73 2/24/2004 ;2 ; 500;NOK ...... $22...... 260...... !...... $11,...... 140...... 8...4...... 2/24/2004...... S...... r...... 100...... NO...... K...... ;...$22...... 13!...... $2,210...... 7....3... 2/24/2004 :2 500}NOK $22.250 $11,135.84 /24/2004 S ...... :...... 1... .,000...... NOK...... 22...... 06...... 22037...... 3....2... 2/24/2004 P •. 500NOK i $22 r...... 250...... ;. $11,1358: 4 .2/24/2004 S 1,000iNOK ....$22...... 06...... ,:...... $22,037...... 3....2.. 2/24/2004 ; P 400; NOK $22.250; $8,908 .67 2/24/2004 S ...... 1,500...... :1.. .NO...... K...... $21...... 96...... $32...... 905...... 9....8... 2/24/2004 P 100 NOK 22.250:: $2,227 .17 2/25/2004 S 500: NOK $22.101 ...... s ...... $11,038...... 66...... 2/24/2004!2 ...... 200 ...... $22...... 240...... : ...... $4,452...... 3....4...... 2/25/200...... 4... .S...... ;...... 500!NOK...... 22...... 10...... :...... $11,038...... 6....6... 2/24/2004 P 100 ...... $22.240: $2,226.17" 5/2004 .S...... 500...... NOK...... $22...... 10...... ;...... $11...... ,..038...... 6.....6.. 2/24/2004 P 100 IVOK $22 .240 $2,226.17. 2/25/2004 S i 500 NOK $22.10 : $11,038 .66 2/24/2004 P 300 NO K $22.230 ! 4 ...... 6,675...... '5....q .....:.....,..5/200...... S...... «...... 500...... ,:NO:...... K...... $22...... 10...... ;...... $11,038...... 6....6... 2/24/2004 P 200 •'NOK $22.230 : $4,450 .34 . 2/25/2004 S 500 NOK $22.10 ; $11,038 .6 6
Page 1.2 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A' SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Trading
.... . Price Cost TradeDate Amoun t .S mbo l Pnce Proceeds TradeDate. . . .1BUY :Amount .Symbol : . .SELL .4/004 • P 200 NOK $ $4,450 :34 2/25/2004 S 300NOK $22 06 $6 611 20 $2202 $10 99866 2/24/2004P 100 NOK 1. $22230 $222517 2/25/2004 S 500NOK 2/24/2004 P 500'NOK $22 180 $1110084 2/25/2004 S 1 000NOK $21 88 $2185732
2/24/2004 P I,000NOK' $22.130; $22,151 .68 .2.. .94. .. .. S 1 , 2/24/2004P 100NOK $22:060 $2,20817 2!27/2004 S 500NOK $21 .80 $10,888.66 2/24/2004 ; P 100NOK $22050 $220717 2/27/2004 S 100 NOK $2180 $217773 2/24/2004 P 1,000NOK $22.010 $22,031 .68 2/27/2004 S 300 ; NOK $2179I $6 530 .20
2/24/2004P 500 NOK $21.950 $10,985.84 2/7/2004 S 200NOK : $21 .791 $4,353.46 2/24/2004jP. 500 NOK $21 .950...... $10,985.84 2/27/2004 S 1,000NOK $21 .78 $21,757:32 /P 500 :NOK $1 .900; $10,960.84 2/27/2004 S . . 1,000NOK $21 .78 $21,757 .32 2/25/2004P 500 NOK $22.100 $11,060.84 2/27/2004 S 1,000 NOK $21 .78' $21,757 .32
2/25/2004 P 1,000NOK $22.090 $22, 111 .68 2/27/2004 S 1,000 NOK . $21 .78 $21,757 .32
2/25/2004 P 1,000 NOK $22.090 $22, 111 .68 2/27/2004 S . 1,000 NOK $21 .78 $21,757 .32 2/25/2004 P 500 NO K . $20.. ;...... 2/200...... 4...... '•O. K...... $21 .78 ' 2/25/2004 P 500 I NOK $220201 $11 ,020.84 2/27/2004 500 NOK $21781 $10, 878 .66 S...... L ...... L ...... 2/25/2004P 500NOK $22020; $11,020.84 2/27/2004 S 200NOK $21 .78 ; $4,351 .46 ...... 500 :NOK $2 .950: $ 10,985 .84' 2/27/2004 S 200 NOK ,$21,78 ; . $4,351 .46 ...... 2/25/2004...... :P...... : ...... ,. : .. :...... ::...... :...... : ...... , ...... , ...... : ...... 2/25/2004 : P 1,000 NOK $21 .847 1 $21,868.68 2/27/2004 S . 200iNOK $21 .78 . $435, .1 .46 .. . .i ...... , ...... 2/26/2004 :;. .P...... :...... 300...... :.N...... K...... : .$22. . .050. . .>'...... $6...... ,621...... 50...... /27/2004:...... S...... 1...... 200 ; NOK...... ;.. 21....8 ...... $4,351 :46 2/27/20041 P 500 NOK $22.200 ; $11,110.84 ..2/27/2004 S 100 ;NOK $21 .78 . $2,175.73 ...... :...... ::...... ::...... 2/27/2004P 5,000'';NOK $21 .770 1 $108,958.39 2/27/2004. S. . 100~NOK '• $21 .781 $2,175.73 ...... ::...... i ...... , ...... i...... 2/27/2004 P 500!NOK $21 .770 ; $10,895.84 2/27/2004 S •. 100''NOK $21 .78 ' $2,175:73 .. . i ...... _ ...... L ...... 2/27/2004 P 500INOK $21 .770 ; $10,895.84 2/27/2004 S .100 NOK •, $21 .78 1 $2,175.73 2/27/2004 P 500NOK $21 :770 : $10,895...... 84...... 2/27/2004...... S...... 100iNOK...... $21,78'...... $2,175...... 7.....3.. 2/27/2004 P 500iNOK $21 .770 ; $10,895.84 311/2.004 S 500iNOK $22.241 $11,108.66 ...... :...... : ...... , ...... ,...... q ...... 2/27/20041 P 5001 NOK . . $21 .770 1, . $10,895.84 3/2/2004 ,S 2,000 : NOK $22.10'; $44,154.64 2/27/2004 P 500iNOK $21 .770 1 $10,895.84 3/2/2004 S 500 NOK $22.101 $11,038.66 2/27/2004 . P 100i NOK $21 .770 $2,179.17 3/2/2004 S . 1 2,000 NOK ,$22.08; $44,114.64 ....,... 3/1/2004 P...... ,000: OK $22.280 ; $22,301.68 3/2/2004 S 500: NOK $22.08i $11,028.66 ...... j ...... L...... ; ...... ; ...... 3/1/20041P 5 0 K •; $22.280 : $11,150.84 3/2/2004 S 2,0001NOK . $22.07; $44,094. .64 3/1/2004 P 500•NOK $22.270 $1.1.,1.4.5...8.4 3/.2./20.0.4. .S . 2,000':NOK i $22.071 $44,094.64 .200 ; ,221 3 4 $11,023 3/1/2004 P 1,000. . . . NO...... K...... 1.. . $22...... $22...... 6. .. .8...... /2/200...... S...... 500...... NOK...... $22...... 07...... 1 ...... 6. . ..6. .. : . . . : .L . 3/1/2004 P 500'NOK $22.190 ; . 11,105 .84 3/2/2004 S 500`NOK : $22 .07':. $11,023.66 ...... < ...... L...... ;...... 3/1/2004 P 500 NOK 22.190 : $11,105.84 3/2/2004 S 500•NOK $22.07 : $11,023.66 .P...... ,...... L...... 3/1/2004 .200~NOK .$22.150 .$4,434 .34 .3/2/2004 S .500'•.NOK .$22.07' .$11,023 .6. 6 ...... i ...... : ...... ;...... 3/1/2004 P...... 300¢NOK ,...... $22:140 $6,648.50' 3!2/2004 S 500; NOK $22.07 : $11,023 .66 3/2/2004 F 2,000 NOK $22.070 : $44,183.36 3/3/2004 S 25 NO K $22.341 $557.93 ...... 1 ...... :...... 3/2/2004...... P...... 2,000...... NO...... K...... :. : ...... : ...... $22...... 070...... ;...... $44,183...... 3.. . .6...... 3/3/200...... 4. .. .S...... :1,800...... NOK...... i.. .$22...... 30...... 1 ...... $40,099...... 1. .. .8.. . 3/2/20041P : $22 $44, S 2,000INOK :070 183.36 : . 3/3/2004 1,000INOK...... :. ..$22...... 30...... 1...... $22,277...... 3.. .2.. .
3/2/2004 P 2,000 : NOK $22 070 $44,183.36 3/3/2004 S ...... 5001NO...... K...... $22...... :30...... : $11,138 .66 : .L ...... 3/2/2004 P 2,000 NO K $22.070; $44,183.36 313/2004 , S 300 NON. K $22.30 . $6,683.20 ...... ::...... 1...... ;...... 3/2/2004 . P 500 1NOK $22.0701 $11,045.84 3/3/2004 S 2,000 : NOK $22.30 : $44,548.64
Page 13 of'24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTION S Damage Analysis For Generic Trading
;Cost TradeDate SELL Amount . (Symbol ! Price {Proceed s .TradeDate...... 'BUY.. . . iAmount...... iS..:.. ..mbolX...... 1Price ...... $4,453.46 3/2/2004...... P. 500: NOK $22.070 ;! $11,045:84 .....3/3/2004...... S...... i...... 200...... ;. .NOK...... ,...$22...... 29...... :...... 3/2/2004P 00:NOK 22.070: $11,045.84 .... 3/3/2004...... S...... 1... .OOOiNO...... K...... ;•. ..$22...... 2....6...... $22,237...... 3....2... 1,000:NOK $22.26 $22,237.32 ...... 3/3/2004...... P...... 1...,.000...... _; ..NOK...... $22.300...... ,...... $22,321..68 ,.::.... 3/3/2004. :5...... ;...... 1...... 1 3/3/2004 P 1,100 NOK ...... $22.251 $24 499:85! 3%3/2004...... S...... 900'...... NOK...... $22, ...... 26...... $..2...00. .3 .59 3/3/2004 P 1,000 NOK ...... :...... $22.250; ...... $22,271.:68. .:... ..3/3/2004 S..:...... 100; NOK.....:..;..$22.26.>...... $2 .223.73 25'NOK ' $22.26 ; $555 .93 ...... 3/3/2004P...... 1,000...... ;NOK...... ! $22 .250; $22,271...... 68 f . 3/3/2004...... S...... <...... ;...... 3/3/2004 :'P 1,000NOK $22:250: $22,271:68 3/3/2004 S ...... 800NOK $22.15! $17,701 .86 3/3/2004':, P 400 NOK ...... $22.250.:',...... :...... $8,908 67...... 3/3/2004 S...... :...x...... 600 NOK ...... ;..$22:15 ;...... $13,276 .39 3/3/2004 P 400iNOK : $22 250 ` $8,908 67 3/3/2.. ..04...... 600•N...... O.....K...... $22...... 15...... !...... $13,276...... 3....9...... P...... s...... 400'...... NOK...... $22.250:', $8,908.67 3/3/2004 S 600! NOK ;!. .$22...... 15...... $13,276...... 3...9... $13,276.39 ...... 3/3/2004.;P...... 400iNOK ...... $22.250 ...... _...... $8,908.67 . 3/3/2004 S ...... 600iNOK...... $2..r...... 2....15...... ,...... 6,681 :50 3/3/2004 600 NOK .$13,276.39 ...... 3/3/2004~P...... :...... 300!NO K...... :...... •' $22.250...... $ ...... ,` . .5...... :...... '•..$22:...... 3/3/2004 :P 300}NOK .$22. .250! ...... $...6. .681...... 50...... 3/3/2004...... S...... 600...... :NOK...... :...$22...... 15...... :...... $13,276...... 3...9... $22.250 ,681 . 3/3/2004 S 300 NOK .$6,638.20 3/3/2004 P...... :...... 300iNOK...... :...... $22:.15 ...... 3/3/2004 ; P 200 NOK . 22.50: $4,454 ...... 3/3/200...... 4... .S...... 300...... ;. .NO...... K...... :...$22...... 15...... !...... $6,638.. .20 300 NO K $22 $6,638 .20 ...... 3/3/2004...... P...... '...... 200!NOK...... :.. .:....:...... !..$22.250.:...... $4,454.34 . ....:... 3/3/2004. S...... ;...... :...... 15...... 4 S 500 ;. NOK '• $22 .74 : $11,358 .66 ...... 3/3/2004...... P...... 200N...... OK...... $22 22.250! ...... $4,454...... 34...... 3/4/200...... 3/3/2004...... P...... 200 NOK .... $22.250 : $4,454.34 ;:3/412004...... S...... 200...... NO...... K...... ,1... .$22...... 40...... ;...... $4,475...... 4...6... .17 .3/5/2004 S 1,000 NOK $23.371 $23,347 .32 3/3/2004 P 100 NOK...... : $22. ...250. .. .. ; ...... $2,227...... :...... :...... $23,347 .32 313/2004. P...... :...... 100 NOK...... :...... $22.250...... $2,227.17 ..:....:3/5/2004 S...... :...... :.1,000 NOK...... $23.37 ...... ; ; NO .37 ; $23,347 .32 ...... 3/3/2004.. . .P 100 NOK $22 250 $2,227 17 3/5/200...... 4... .S...... 1,000...... ;...... K...... $23...... }...... $22.250 $2,227.17 3/5/2004 S 1,0001NOK $23.37 23,347 .32 3/3/2004 ! P ...... ,•...... :....100 : NOK...... :...... :...... ,...... ;.. :...... 3/3/2004 P 50 NOK $22.230; $1,112.58 . '3/5/2004 S 1,000 NOK $23.32' $23,297 .32 .220 3/5%2004 S 200 NOK 1 $23:32 $4,659 .46 3/3/2004...... P...... 500 NOK...... $22 .:...... t.6 .:...... :...... ;...... 3/3/2004 : 400 i NOK ...... :...... !..$22.190:...... _$8,884.67...... :..3/5/2004 S....:...... i...... 500; NOK...... •• $23 :1.1...... $11 543 66 3/3/2004 P 600 NOK $22.180: $13,321 .01 3/5/2004 S _ 1,300:NOK $22.981 $29,844 .52 3/3/2004P 1,000NOK $22.150: $22,1 71 .68 3/5/2004 S 100NOK $22.94 ; $2,291 .73 3/3/2004 P 400:1 NOK $22.150; $8,868.67j . 3/5/2004 S 100 NOK $22.94 ; $2,291 .73 ...... 3/3/2004P...... 3001...... NOK...... ' $22.150; $6,651 :50. 3/5/2004...... S ...... !...... 500..66I...6 NO.Ki5...... k.K.. . $22.88 :...... $11,428...... 6....6.. 3/3/2004 : P 300; NOK $22.150 $6,651 50.1 3/8/2004 ..S.. 1,000; NOK $23,457.32 $22.1301 $8,860.67 3/8/2004 S 1,000: NOK 1 $23.48 $23,457.32 3/3/2004: P ...400...... ;. .NOK...... ,...... ;...... ,:!...... 3/3/2004 100 NOK . , $22 20 .$2,214.1 7 3/8/2004 S 100 i NOK ! $23 .48 $ 2,345 .73 : P .1 ...... 4...... :...... 3/3/2004'...... P...... 100; NOK...... $22:.1 :0.'...... _$2,213.17 ...... 3/8/2004. 5...... :.,...... :...... 1,000 NOK...... $2347 ...... $23,447 .32 313/2004 ; P 200vNOK ...... :..::...... $22.100- ...... $4424 34 .3/8/2004 S ...... 1.. . 000. .. NOK.. $23.... .46...... $23437...... 3....2... 2 3/3/2004 P ...... ,. 00; NOK...... :.:...... :...... 1 $22 .100.:...... 24,34 318/2004 S ...... 1 ,000 NOK...... $23 45;....:...... $23,427 .3 ...... 3/3/2004..P...... 100,NOK ...... $22 100 ...... $2.212 171.... 3/8/2004 S 1 000 NOK $23.45 ...... $23 427 32 $23.44 : $11,708 .66 ...... 3/3/2004`•...... P...... 300; NOK •: $22 .090.. ..; ...... $6,633:50 3/8%2004 S, 500':N0K 3/3/2004 : P 300*NOK $22:090 $6,633.50, ...... 200...... 4... .S...... 3,000...... ;. .NOK...... $23 I...... 4....2...... $70,191...... 9...7...
3/3/2004 P 300•NOK $22.090 ; $6, 633.50 3/8/2004 S •. . . .. 1 ,000 , NOK 1 $23.42; $23397, .32 ...... :...... f ...... /3004...... :P...... 300 NOK ...... :..$22.090y...... , $6,633.50, '3/8/2004 S 2 0: NOK $23 40 $4 675 46 3/3/2004 P 300NOK $22090 $6,633.50 3/8/2004 S 100NOK $23.39 : $2,336.73 ; ...... 3/3/20041P 200iNOK . `: $22.090 $4,422.34 ' . 3/8/2004 S 3,000 NOK . $23 .381 $70,074.97
Page 14 of'24. ' BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For-Generic Trading
TradeDate ;BUY Amount Symbol •. Price Cost TradeDate SELL Amount ;Sybol, Price ;Proceeds 3/3/2004 P 100NOK $22:090 ...... •...... $2,211, 1 7 , 3/8/2004 S 1 000 NOK $23 34 $23 317 3 2 1 7 3/812004 S .300 NOK .31 .$6,986:20 3/3/2004P...... 100iNOK...... ,...... $22...... $2,211 : ...... ;..$23 ;...... 200 NO K $2330 ; $465546 3/3/2004!P...... 300iNOK...... $22080; .$6,630.50 3/8/2004 S ...... : 500iNOK . $23 :07...... $11,523 6 3/4/2004 P 50NOK ..$22:760; .$11,390 :84 : _3/8/2004 S ...... ;...... :6 ...... 3/4/2004 . P 100 IVOK $22 380, 2,240 17 3/8/2004 S 500; NOK [..$23..07.1 $11,52.3...6.6. $ .17 .•••.•.3/812 .04 500 NOK $23 .07 ; $11,523.66 3/4/2004•.P...... 100JNOK'...... • r $22...... 380...... ; ...$2,240 ..0...... S...... :...... 500 NOK :07 .1 .523:66 3/5/2004 : ..P...... 4,000'...... z NOK...... ::.:. ::::..:...... $23.3901.....,...... $93,646.71 ...... 3!$/2004. 5...... i...... i. $23 .1...... $1 : . .07 $11 523 66 3/5/2004 : P 1,2001N0K $23...... 296 : $27 981 01... .3/8/200...... 4... ..S'...... :....500...... NO. K ;..$23...... 1...... $11,518.66 3/5/2004 ; P 1 ,000'•. NOK . .$23.270i $23t ,291.68 . .;. 3/8/.. . . .2.00_ .4.. .S...... 500...... :. . ...NOK...... $23...... 06...... 1:...... 3/5/2004 P 500 NOK $23.270...... $11,645...... 84...... :..3/8/2004 S...... ,...... 500iN0...... ;..$23.06.;...... 11..518.66 j 3/5/2004 P 500 NOK ! .$23.27.0. $11 ., .6 .45.84 3/6/2004 S •: 5001NOK ...... $23...... 06...... 1:...... $11...... 518. . 6....6... $11,493.66 $22:950' $11,485..8. 4 3/8/2004 S 500 NO K . $23 .01...... : ...... 3/5/2004 P 500'N ...... 1...... 1 ...... ~ .. . .pis ...... , $22:930 $29,837.18 } . 3/9/2004 S 200 NOK...... $22...... 76...... $4,547...... 4. . .,6...... 3/5/2004P...... 4 : ...... 1. ..300...... i. .O...... :97 3/9!2004 S 3,400'•NOK $22.75: $77,272.89 ...... 3/5/2004...... }.P...... 100;OK .$22:880 ; $2,290 ...... ,...... , 1 22:880 $1,1445.08 : .3/9/2004 S 3,400iNOK $22.75': $77,272.89 3/5/2904 ...... 50..... NOK...... ,...... ,...... $ ...... 300 NOK .22.55 ..... 3/5/2004 . P ...... 50 NOK ...... i.. $22:880...... $11,145 :08 ...... 3/9/2004 S ...... 1...... ; ...... ;...... :...... 6 7..8:...... $6,611 .20 3/8/2004 P 500 NOK t23.510.0 $11,765 84 .3/10/2004 S ...... :...... 300'NOK...... :'•.. .$22...... 06...... -...... -...... $23:51 0 $11,765. /10/2004 .500 NOK :00 10 988 .66 3/8/2004 P 500iNOK ..:...... ::....:...... `.. .;...... 84 ...:. . 5...... $22 ...... $ $11,765 84 !10/2004 . 500 NOK .$ 10 938 6 6 3/8/2004.; P...... 500 NOK.:...... :.:.;...... ;..$23 51 0 ...... 3.. . S...... 1...... :...... $21.:90...... $21 .78 $10,878:66 3/8/2004iP ...... 500i N0K $23 510 $11. 765.84 3/10/2004 S ...... 500rNOK 3/8/2004 P 1 ,000ANOK $23.500...... $23,521 68 /102004 S 800INOK ;...$21...... 77...... ,:...... $17,397...... 8....6... $108,636.6 1 3/8/2004 P 1,000 ;NOK $23:500 . $23 .521...... 68...... 3/1...... 0!2004...... S...... 5,000...... NOK...... $21...... 75...... 3/8/2004,P 500 NOK $23.490 : $11,755.84 3/11!2.604 S.. 2,000 .!NOK $21 .42 ; $42,794.64 .500 NOK .$10 663:66 3/8/2004'•P • ...... 1,000...... NOK...... :...... i..$23.480...... $23,501 .68. ..:..3/1 1/2004. 5...... $21:35 ...... ,...... $23.470 ; $11,745.84 3/11/2004 ...... 500...... NOK...... $21...... 311...... $10. 643 6 6 3/8/2004. P ...... :...... 500 NOK ...... ; ...... r .v 3/8/20041P 500 NOK $23.470 ; $11,745.84 3/1.1/2004 S 3,000iNOK $21 .30 : $63,831 .97 3/8/2004 1 P 100 i NOK $23 .470 : $2;349.17 3/12/2004 S 300 i NOK $21 .46 $6,431 .20 $23,460 ; $93,926.71 3/12/2004 S 5001NOK $21 .44 $10,708.66 3/8/2004 P 4,000 NOK ; 3/8/2004 P 3,000 ; NOK $23 .440 ; $70,385....03...... 3/12!2004...... S...... 9...9... .NO...... K...... :i...$..2?:43.;...... $.1.0.70.3. ...6...6... 3/8/2004 P 500 :NOK ' $23.440 $11,730.84 3/1 2/2004 S 100•;NOK $2,140 .73 S 500 NOK 668 .66 3/8/2004 ..P...... 300. :NOK...... ::...:...... 1..$23 .440.:...... $7,038.50 ..... 3/12/2004 ...... $21.36...... :...... $10, 3/8/2004P 1,000 NOK $23 380; $23,401 68 ; 3/12/2004 S 200 NOK . $21 .361 $4,267,46 3/12/2004 S 1001NOK • $2134 : $2,131 .73 ...... 3/8/20041P...... 200INOK...... $23.380 ; $4,68034 ...... 1...... 3/8/2004 P 100iNOK $23:250; : $2,327:17 :...... 3/12/2004...... S'...... 400iNOK...... $21...... 33...... 1;...... $8,522...... 9...3... S : 100 :NOK $21 .33 : $2,130.73 3/8/2004 P 100INOK $23 .250 ; $2,327.17 3/12/2004 ...... ;...... ,...... $2,129 .73 ...... 3/8/2004 P ...... 100 i NOK ...$23 .210 ` $2,323.17 :•. ..3/12J2'0'-0-4--S ...... 100]...... NO...... K...... :...$21.... 1 ..32...... ,:...... 30 $4,255.46 3/8/20041P 4,000¢NOK 1 $23 .050 ; $92,286.71 3/12/2004 S...... 200INOK...... $21:...... 1...... 318/2004 :P 500. NOK $23.050 : $11,535 .84 3/12/2004 S 1 000' NOK $21 .27 : $21,247.32 3/9/2004' P ! 1 ,700NOK .. $22:780.:...... $38,762.85 ..... 3/12/2004 S...... ' 500 NOK $21 .27•; $10,623.66 6 3/9/2004•; P ...: ...... 700 NOK...... :..: ...... :..$22.780 ...... $38 762:85...... 3/1212004. 5.....:...... 500 : NOK...... $21 :27...... $10,623:6 3/9/20041P .1 300'NOK $22 770 ; $6 837 50 3/12/2004 S 1,000 NOK $21 .09 ; $21,067 3 2 3/9/2004 P ! 200 NOK $22 .770 $4,558.34 3/15/2004 S 500 NOK $20.53' $10,253.66
Page 15 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTION S Damage Analysis For Generic Trading
iPrice Cost TradeDate SELL ;Amount Symbol Pnce...... 'Proceed...... s...... TradeDate...... B. .UY...... ;Amount...... Symbol...... :.... : $38,694;85 . 3/1.5/2004 S 500 NOK . $20 :52 $10,248.66 3/9/2004 : P 1..,..70. .. 0.+: NOK...... $22 .740 ...... 500 NOK $20.49 $10,233.66 3/9/2004 P ...... 1,700 1NOK $22,740: ...... $38,694...... 8....5.. 3/15/2004.. ..S..._...... S 500NOK $20.49•; $10,233.66 3/10/2004P...... 300NOK...... ; $22.100 ; $6,636;50 3/15/2004 ...... ,...... :...... 500 : NOK $20.49 $ 66-- 3/10/2004 : P 5,0 ; NK $22:080 : $110,508.39 . ... .3/15/2004...... S...... 1 ...... ; ...... 17 3/15/2004 S 500.iNOK $20.49 $10,233.66 ...... 4.. P ...... 700...... NK...... $22.....050...... ;.. $15,450 ...... _...... $10,233 66 3/10/2004 !.P 100iNOK...... ::. `::.. $22.050...... $2,207.17. .:... 3/15/2004 S...... i...... 5001NOK...... '..$20.49 ...... : $4,412 34 3/15/2004 S „ . .5001NO K t20.491 .$10 233 66 3/10/2004 P 200 NOK $22 040 ...... _...... !...... 1 . $20.49 $4,093.46 3/1 0/2004 P 200 ; N0K .$22.040 ; . $ 412.34 ...... /15/2004...... S...... 200...... :. .NOK...... ;...... 1 ...... : ...... 3/10/2004': P 100' NOK. ,. . . . - - $22 040 .$2,206 17 3/15/2004 S 1251 NOK $20.49': $2,558.42 .6 ; :900; $10,960.84 3/15/20.04 S . . ..500iNO...... K...... 8.. . .;...... $10,228...... 6...... 3/10/2004...... P...... 500 NOK $21 ...... i...... 5 .1 .T 3/11 /204 ; P 2,000 ; NOK $21 :490 $43,023.36 3/15/2004 S - 500 ; NOK $20.48 ; $10 228.66 .66 ...... 3/11/2004...... P...... i. 2,000 NO K $21 .4901 $43,023.36 ...... 3/15/2004...... S...... !... ..500'•...... NO...... K...... 20...... 48...... i...... $10,228...... 48 1 $7,671 .50 3/11/2004'1P 1,0001NOK .$21 .490' .$21,511:68 .3/15/200...... 4... .S...... ; ...... : . .. . .375...... :NOK...... $20...... -0 ...... :...... 1 .45 ; $40,854,64 .. .. .3/11/2004, P...... ,..' ...... 1,000 NOK ...... :...... $21.480.:...... $21,501:68 .....3/15/2004 S...... 2,000 NOK ...... $20 ...... 3/15/2004 S 2,000 NO K $20.45 1 $40,854 .64 3/11/20041P ...... 3,000!NOK...... ,...... :..$21 .455: $64,429.03 i...... >...... 10,720 .84 3/15/2004 S 100 NO K $20:43a .$22,448 :05 ...... /11/2004...... P...... 500 NOK ...... :.:..:...... '..$21 :420;.:...... s...... :...... :...... 3/11/2004 P 200 NOK $21 400 .$4,284 34 „ 3/16/2004 S 500 NOK $21 .12 : $10,548.66 3/11/2004,P 300,NOK $21 .380; $6,420.50 3/16/2004 S ... .1,000 NOK $21:11! $21,087,32 3/11/2004P.P...... 500iNOK...... $21 .360 $10,69084 .. 3/16/2004 S...... 500NOK...... $21. .. .11 .,:...... $10,543.. .66 1 : S 200'NOK $21 .08 $4211.46 3/112/ 004...... : ...... 3007NOK ...... ,$21...... 320...... :...... $6,402...... 50...... 3/16/2004...... ,...... :;...... ;...... ,...... 3/12/2004 : P .500• NOOK :...... $21 .320 ...... :..... $10,670.84I ..... 3/16/2004. 5..::...... 200 i NOK...... $21 :06 ...... $4,207 ;46 6001NOK $21 :05 $12,616 .39 3/12/2004 P ...... 500'NO...... !...... K...... $21...... 320...... $10,670...... 84...... 3/16/2004...... S . ; 3/12/2004' F 500 : NOK $21 .3001 $10,660.84 3/16/2004 S 1,000 NOK $20.96' $20,937 .32 400NOK . $20 .96 1 $8 374.93 3/12/2004 P 600 NOK $21 .290 $12,787.01. ..3/1612004...... S...... : ...... 1...... ~...... I ...... 1 .I .1 .290; $12,787 .01 3/16/2004 S 500 NOK $20.87 ; $10,423 .6 6 3/12/2004P 6001NOK ...... t ...$21...... I ...... i...... , ...... :...... ,...... 3/12/2004 P 3001 NOK $21 .290: $6,393.50 3/17/2004 S 500 i NOK $21 .41 : $10,693.66 3/12/2004 ;:P 1,000 : NOK $21 .190: $21,211 .68 ..3/17/2004 S 200 NOK $21 .30 : $4,255.46 3/1.5/2004 :P 1,100 i NOK $20.5501 $22,628.85 3/19/2004 S 1,0001 NOK $20.37 $20,347.32 3/15/2004 ; P, 4,990, NOK $20.430: $81,806.71 3/19/2004 S 1,000 NOK $20.35 : $20,327.32 ...... 3/15/2004 ; P 2,000 ; NOK $20.430 $40;903.36 3/19/2004 S •: 2,000 i NOK $20.34 : $40,634 .64 3/15/2004 : P 2,0001 NO K $40,903.36 3/19/2004 S „ 400 : NOK $20.01 ; $7 994.93 ...... $20.430! ...... :...... 3/15/2004`P 500':NOK 1 $20 .430 $10,225.84 3/19/2004 S .600 NOK $19:98:' $11,974 .39
3/15/2004 :.P ...... 500 NOK $20.4301 ...... $10,225...... 84...... 3/19/200...... 4.. ..S...... 500...... 1 NO...... K...... ;. ..$19...... 88...... !:...... $9,928. .66 ...... 3/15/2004 :. .P...... 5...00...... N....O.. .K...... :...$20...... 430 $ 1 0.225:84...... 3/22/2004. 5...... ;...... 800x. NOK...... :$19:71...... $35.437 :1 8 .. 3/15/2004 : ...... 500 ; NOK...... I $20:430; $10,2...... 2' 84 .... 3/22/2004...... S...... 400...... NOK ;.. ..$19...... 69...... ;.....,.,...... ,...... $7,866 93 3/15/2004!P 200 :NOK . $20.4301 .$4,090.34 3/22/2004 S 15,000 NOK $19.43i $291,109.83 3/16/2004 P 500 NOK $21 :080: $10,550.84 3/22/2004 S 10,000 NOK $19.431 $194,073.22 ...... !...... : ...... i...... v ...... ;...... 3/16/2004 ; P 00 : NOK $21 080: $8440.67 3/22/2004 S 5,000 : NOK $19 .43 $97,036 .61
$4,218.34 3/23/2004 S 100NOK ..$19...... 7. .. .6...... $1,973...... 7.. . .3. . .3/16/2004,P...... 2001NOK. . : ...... 4. . ..$21...... 070...... ;...... ,...... ,...... ' ...... 3/16/2004 ; P 200 : NOK $21 .070: $4,218.34 3/23/2004 S 1 000 ; NOK $19.751 $19,727.32 ...... : ...... :...... 200!NOK $21 .070 $4,218.34 . 3/23/2004 S ...... 500iNOK...... $19 .751 $9,863.66 ...... 3/16/2004...... 1F...... n...... : . 1...... , ...... 3/16/2004 P 1,000 1 NOK $21 .0001: $21,021 .68 3/23/2004 S 4001NOK $19.75 : $7 890.93
Page 16of24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS ° Damage Analysis For Generic Trading
...... :.... Trade- Date : BUY ::Amount: SY..mbol...... ::...... rice...... Cos...... t...... TradeDat...... e...... SELL...... z'•.Amount...... mbol...i....Y...... Price...... Proceed...... ;...... s...... 3/16/2004 :! 'P ...... ; NOK...... $21 :000 1 $8,408:67 ...... 3/23/2004 S 2,000 ; .NK...... ; .$1916:.64 i $39,234.64 3/17/2004 P 500 NOK ..21...... 400...... ::...... $10...... a....10...... 8....4...... 3....23...... /..200...... 4.. ..S...... I ...... ,...... ~or.500..... 1 $ 19.57 : 107 510 .27 3/19/2004 P 1,000 NOK $20.370 : ...... $20...... 391...... 6....8...... 3/23/200...... 4. .S...... 1,000...... NOK...... $19...... 57...... ::...... $19...... 547...... 3....2... 3/19/2004 P 1,000 ..NO...... K...... 20...... 31...... 0.. $20,331 .68 .3/23/200...... 4.. S...... «...... 500iN...... 0....K...... ,...$19...... 55...... :...... $9763...... ,...... 6. ..6... 3/19/2004'p.. . 1,000 NOK 2 .300; 20,321 3/23/2004 500 ; NOK $19.5 $9,758 .66 ...... ;...... $ .:6 ...... 5...... :....!.. 4 ...... 3/19/2004yP . 1,000 NOK...... $. .20...... 29...... $20,311 8:68 3/23_. ./. .2004...... S _ ...... 2.. ..000...... , NOK...... ,...$...19...... 53...... ,.`...... $39,014.... .6 4 3/19/2004 ! P $20.290 3/23/2004 ...... 1 000 : NO K...... ,. : : :...... $20 311fi8...... 5...... ;...... 2,000 ; NO K...... $19:50,>...... $38.954 :6 4 3/19/2004 P ...... 600...... NOK...... $20 .220 . $ 12 145 .01 3/23/2004 S 400 NOK $19.23 : $7,682 .9 3 3/19/2004 P 200 ; NOK .... ? $20 21 0 $4,046 4 4 S ...... :...... 3...... 3..../.24/200...... 1,300...... 1..NOK...... $19...... 72...... !...... $...25,606...... 5....2... 3/19/2004...... P...... 400NO...... K...... :...:...... $20:060 : $8,032.67 3/24/2004...... S...... 1,000...... '•..NOK...... 1...$19...... 72.. .;...... $19...... ,.697...... 3.....2.. 3/19/2004 P ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,600 NOK ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$20.030 ; $12,031 .011 3/24/2004 S 400 NOK, , ,,,,,,$1,,,9,,.,72 >;...... $7,878...... 8..9...3 3/19/2004 P 1 1,000NOK ...... $20.000 ; $20,021...... 68...... 3./..24/2004...... S...... 700NO...... K...... ,! ..,$.....1..9....62...... :...... $...13,71...... 8...... 1...3.. 3/19/2004 P 500 NOK ...... :...... $1.9.950...... $9985, .84...... 3/24/2004 . 5...... 500 NO K ...$. .19...... 62...... :...... $9,798...... 6...6... 3/22/2004 : P 6,800 NOK $19.860 ...... : ...... :...... $135,195...... 41...... 3/24...... /..2004...... S...... 500'•...... NOK...... ;....$19...... 54...... :...... $9,758...... 66... 6 3/22/2004. .?...... 5.000 NOK ...... :...... :...... :... ..$19.760;...... $98,908.39...... 3/24/2004. 5...... 400 NOK...... $19:5 !...... $7,806:93 3/22/2004 ? P 2,600 NOK 1 $19.750 i $ 51,406 36 3/24/2004. S...... r...... N OK .$19:53; $ 753 66 9 3/22/2004.P...... 1,800ANOK...... :....:...... $19.740: ...... $t§0635,571 .0 ...... 3/24/2004. S...... :...... 200•:NOK $19.53 ; $3,901 .46 3/22/2004 P 5.000 . NOK...... $19 720:...... 8.39.....3%24/2004 S....,...... 1,000INOK ...... ` $19.481 .$....19,457...... 3....2.. 3/22/2004 600i NOK . 19700 $11,83301 3/24/2004 500 NOK ! $19.47' $9,723 .6 6 .;P ...... :...... : ...... S...... !...... 1...... ~...... 3/22/2004 P 5 000 N K 19 .690 $98 558.39 3/24/2004 S 500 NOK $19. : ...... :...... ~..... ; ...... :...... $ ;...... 1 ;...... 47...... $9,723...... 6...6... 3/22/2004 !P 5,000 ONOK $19.690; $98,558.39 3/24/2004 S 500 IVOK ! $ 19.45' $9,713 ...... : ...... :...... q ...... ,...... 6.. . .6.. . 3/23/2004 ;P 1,000 1 N OK $20.000 ; $20,021 :68 ...... 8/24/2004...... S...... 1...,.000'•...... ,.NOK...... $ 19.42 ' $19,397 .32 3/23/2004/23/2004 :P 1,000 NOK $19 .950 1 19,971 .68 . 3/24/2004 S . . 500 ;NOK $ 19.42 9,698.66- - 3/23/2004 P 1,000 NOK $19 .7601 $19,781 .68 3/24/2004 S 500 1 NOK $19.421: $9,698 .6 6 3/23/2004 P ...... t. 5 000 NOK $19.750 ; ...... $.. .98,858...... 3...9...... 3/24/2004...... S...... 500...... NO.. : .. . ..K...... , ...... , ...... $9,698...... 6.. . .6.. . /23/2004 P ,000 NOK 19.670 ' $19,691 .68, 3/24/2004 S 500NOK . ! $19.42 ; $9,698.66 3/23/2004P 1,000NOK $19.670 : $19,691 .6$ 3/25/2004 S •. 5001 NOK $20.16 : $ 10,068 .66 3/23/2004P 1,0001 NOK $19.650 ; $19,671 .68 3/25/2004 S 300 NOK $20.16 $6,041 .20 3/23/2004 P 100: NOK 1 $19.650 1 967. 7 :...... $1...... 1...... :3/25...... 200...... 4... .S...... 250NOK...... :.. .$20...... 16. ;... $5,034.33 3/23/2004P 100,NOK $19.650 ; $1,967.17 3125/2004 S 500•NOK •. $20.13; $10,053.66 3/23/2004 P 100 NOK 1 $19 .630 ; $ 1,965...... 17...... 3.../.25/2004...... S...... '•...... 500'NOK...... ;....$20...... 07...... ':...... $...10,023...... 6.....6.. 3/23/2004P ...... 1 ON01< $19.600 9 ...... : $ 1,962.17 3/25/2004 S ...... ;...... 500NOK ...... ;!.....20.07 ...... $10,023...... 6....6... 3/23/2004 1 P 100 NOK ...... :...... a....$...... 19...6...... M...... :...... S...... 500INOK...... ;..$.20...... 07...... ;...... $10,023...... 6....6.. 3/23/2004 P ! 1,000 .NOK $19.510 $19,531 .68 3125/2004 S ...... 500;NOK $20.07 : $10,023 .66 3/23/2004 P $19. 500` ...... 1.,000..~NO...... K...... $19...... ,.521...... 6. .. ..8...... 3.../..25/200...... 4.. .S...... • . 500NOK...... $20;...... 07...... $10023...... 6.. 66 3/24/2004 .: P 400' NOK $19.750: ...... 500: NOK ...... >...... $7,908.67 3/25/2004 S...... $...20...... 07...... ' $10,023 .66 3/24/2004 P 500 ;NOK $19.570; $9795.84 3/25/2004 S 500 NO K $20.07 ; $$10,02310, ...... L ...... :...... ;...... 66.. 6 3/24/2004 P 1000 NOK ! $19.5401 $19561 .68 3/25/2004 S 500iNOK ...... $20...... 0...7...t...... $10...... 023...... 6....6.. ..3/24/2004 P 00 ':,NOOK ...... 19...... 540...... :...... 9.;.780. . ..84...... /25/2004...... S...... <...... 500•...... :NOK...... ;...$20...... 07...... ;...... $....10,023...... 6....6... 3/24/2004 : 500 :N0K $19.540 ; ,$9,780.84 3/25/2004 S 500 ; NOK $20.07 1 $ 10,023 .66 3/24/2004 P 400NOK $19.540 ...... $7,824,67 ...... 3/25/2004 .5S ...... 500INOK $20.07 $10,023.66 : ...... , ..$ ...... $ 3/24/2004 P 5001.NOK $19 .530 .$9,775.84 3/25/2004 .500 NOK 20.07 10.023.66
Page 17 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For .Generic Trading
TradeDate ;BUY (Amount ;Symbol Price...... 'Cost...... TradeDate...... SELL...... iAmount...... •Symbol.....y.... .Price ;Proceeds 3124/2004P 1-,b0'0: $19:520 : $19,541 .68 3/25/2004 S 500iNOK $20 07 $10,023.66 3/24/2004 ; P 200: NOK $19.510 $3,906.34 .3/25/2004 S 500' NOK ! $20.07 . $10,023 .66 ...... :...... 3124/2004 P 1,000 ; NOK • $19.490: $1 9 $19,511 .68 3/25/2094 S 500; NOK $20 ..07...... '...... $10,023...... 6....6... 324/204'•...... P...... 1,0001...... NOK...... 19...... 490...... :...... $19,511...... 68...... 3/25/2Q4...... S...... 500NOK...... }...... $20...... 07...... :...... $10,023...... 6....6... /24/2004.!.P...... 2,000iNOK ...... $19.450;...... $38,943.36...... 3/25/20 4. S...... 500!NOK..i...... '•. .$19...... 9.7...... $9,973.66 3/24/2004 P _1,500...... NOK...... : .... ! $19 450 $29,207 52 ...... 3/25/20...... _. .4... ..S...... 1,000...... }... ..NOK...... ;$19...... 94...... ,...... 19,917...... 3.....2.. 124/2004 P 5001NOK $19.450 : $9,7' 5.84 .3/26/200.4 S 500 NOK $19.72 : $9,848.66 ...... r . : ...... : ...... } ...... : ...... :•...... ; ...... ;...... } ...... 3/25/2004 : P 500 NOK...... :...$20...... 190...... ;:...... $1101105...... rt...... 8....4...... 3129/20...... '. .4... ..S...... 1,000...... NOK...... $20...... 10...... ,:...... $20,077...... 3....2... 3%25%2004 ;P B OOO NO $20.130 : $161, 13 .42 3129/20'4 S 1,000iNOK $20.10 $20,077.32 ...... r ...... s ...... r...... i ...... }...... s ...... 3,000 i NOK 3/25/2004 P ...... •...... $20...... 130...... ;...... •...... $60,455...... 03...... 3/29120...... •....,...... o... .4... ..S...... 500...... NOK...... ,$20...... 10'...... :...... $10,038...... 6....6.. 3!25/2004 P ...... 500...... NOK...... $20...... 13.....0...... $10,075...... 84...... 3/29/2004...... S...... 2,000; NOK... ..$20...... 01...... }...... $39,974...... 6....4... ; NOK •: $20.130 : $6,045 3/29/2004 3/25/2004 . .P...... 300'...... 50...... S...... 1,000...... }.:.. ...NOK...... $19;...... 931...... ;...... ,...... $19,907...... 3.....2.. 3/25/2004 P 1,500-0N2K...... $20.080 $30,152.52 .. ...3/29/2004...... S...... 1,000...... NOK...... $19...... 92'. ....:...... $19,897...... 3....2... 3/25/2004 P .1 NOK...... $20...... 060•...... ;...... $20,081...... t.....68...... 3/29/2004...... , .S...... {...... 1,000...... }:'NOK...... $19...... 92...... :...... $19,897...... 3....2.. 3/25/2004 : P 500i NOK...... :...... :...... s.. 20:060 ; $10,040.84. .•...... 3/30/2004...... S...... _;!...... 2001...... ,...... NOK...... $20...... 011...... ,...... $3,997...... 4....6... 500 NOK : $20.060 ; 3/25/2004 P ...... 10a 040...... 84...... 3/30/200...... 4. . .S...... :...... 1...... OK...... •.. ..19...... 37...... ;...... $19,947...... 3...2.. 3/26/2004 P 500.NOK $19.710 : $9,865.84 3/30/200 4 S 1,000 NOK $ ~} 9.87: $19,847.32 ...... T ...... r. . .. . !s ...... , ...... 3/29/2004 : P .500NOK $20.100; $10,060...... 84...... 3/30/2004...... S...... :...... 500NOK...... $1`9.:...... 87...... :...... $9,923...... 6.....6.. 3/29/2004 : P 1,000 i NOIC $20.080 ...... $20,101...... 68...... 3/30/2004...... S...... 500.._.....;.. ...NOK...... 9. ...:87...... : ...... $9,923...... 6....6... 3/29/2004 P ...... 1,000...... N0K...... $20...... 060...... $20,081...... 68...... 3/31/2004...... S...... ,...... 1,000.,...... NOK...... $20...... :29.,...... $20,267...... 3.....2...... 3/29/2004 : P 2,000 NOK $20:000 ; $40,043.36 3/31/2004 S...... ,900...... NOK...... $20:28 ...... $40,514...... 6....4... 3/30/2004 P 700 NOK 19 910 ; 13,952.17 3/31/2004...... S OO NOK $20.28; $10,128.66 3/30./2004':P 5001NOK $19.900 ; .$9,960.84 3/31/2004 S SO0 NOK $70.28 $10,128.66 3/31/2004 P .3,000...... N. 0 K $20.280 : $60,905.03 • 3/31/2004 S '• 500 NOK $20.27; $10,123.66 3/31/2004/31/2004 :'PP - 5001NOK $20.280. $10,150.84 3/31/2004 S 500`NOK .$....20...... 26...... : ...... $10,118...... 6....6... 3/31/2004 ; P 500 ; NOK t20.280 : $10,150.84 3/31/2004 S 1,000; NOK $20 .25; $20,227.32 3/31/2004P 500NOK $20.280 : $10,150.84 3/31/2004 S 1,0001 NOK •; $20.24: $20,217.32 3/31/2004P 500 1 NOK $20.280 ; $10,150.84 3/31/2004 S 1,000;NOK $20.24; $20,217.32 3/31/2004P 500NOK...... $20. . ...280...... ;...... $10,150...... 84...... 3/31/2004...... S...... 500NOK...... $.....20...... 24...... ;...... $10,108...... 6....6.. 3/31/2004 .P 500':,NOK $20.280 ; $10,150.841 3/31/2004 S 500:NOK : $20.24; $10,108.66 3/31/2004 ; P 5001 NOK $20.280: $10 150.84 3/31 /2004 S 500 i NOK $20 .24 : :...... :...... }...... :...... $10,108...... r...... 6....6...... 3/31/2004'...... P...... 500'NO...... K...... $20...... 28...... 0...... $10,150...... :84 3/31/200 4 S 500!NOK...... •. ..i$20...... 24...... }: ...... $10,108...... 6....6...... 4/2/2004...... P...... :...... 600...... ;NOK...... :...$21...... 100...... :...... $12,673...... 01...... 3/31/2004...... :...... :...... S...... 500...... NOK...... $20.. .24 ; $10,108 .66 4/2/2004 P 500 :NOK $21 .100 $10,560.84 3/31/2004 S 300I'`NOK $20.24 $6,065 .20 ...... 4/5/2004...... P...... 300iNO...... K...... $21...... 10...... 0...... $6,336...... 5.....0...... 3/31/200...... 4... ..S...... •...... 2001NOK...... }...... $20,...... 24...... ,`...... $4,043...... 4...6... .4/5/2004 .700} NOK 4 ...... P...... $21 :000 ...... $14, 71.5.1 7...... 4/1 /200 . 5...... 1 ...... 500.;. .NOK...... $20. :77...... $10.373:66 4/6/2004....} P...... 500 NOK $19 250 ; $9,635 84 4/2/2004...... S...... i...... 400...... s NOK 1 .$21...... 061...... ,...... $8 414 93 4/6/2004 4001 NOK 18 .370 ...... $7,356:67 4/2/2004 S 0NOK $21 $10,51.3:6 6 .: P ...... :...... :...... :0`~ ...... ,...... 4/6/2004...... }.P...... 400.. .. . •.NO...... K...... ::...... x..$.18 310...... _$7,332.67 ...... 4(?J2004 S...... 2QO NOK...... $21.:05 ...... $ . 05 4 6 4/6!2004 : P ...... 1,000 : NOI< `..$18.200 >...... $18,221 :68...... 4/5/2004 S ..... 300 : NOK ..... $21 1.2 ...... $6.329.20 .I : 4/6/2004 P .2001NOK $17 800 $3 564....34...... 4/5/2004...... S...... r. 1,0001NOKa...... ;$21...... r.01...... ; ._ ...... $20...... 987...... 3....2.. 4/6/2004'P 1,000 NOK $17.760 : $17,781 .68 4/6/2004 S 9,000 ; NOK $22 .49. $202,205.90
Page 18 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A' SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis-For Generic Tradin g
TradeDate :BUY :'Amount ;Symbol Price...... ;..Cost...... TradeDate...... SELL...... !Am:...... o...unt...... :Symbol...... ;'iPrIce...... :Proceed...... s...... $5,334.50 ...... 4/6/2004'...... :..P...... 300...... ' NOK...... $17...... 76...... 0...... 4/6/2004...... S...... 8,000...... ':. .NOK:...... $22...... 47'•...... $179...... 578...... 5...8.. 4/6/2004P 3,000NOK $17.750' $53....;315...... 03...... 4/6/2004...... S...... 100'NOK...... $19...... 50'...... $1,947...... 7....3... 4/6/2004 P• . ... 2 0" i NOK $17.750' $35,543.36 4/6/2004 S 800 NOK $18.30 ; $14,621 .86 4/6/2004 P ...... s...... ,...... 2,000'~NO...... K...... $17...... 750...... ; $35,543.36, ...... 4/6/200...... 4... ..S...... 400'NO...... K...... $18...... 25...... $7..... ,.290...... 9....3... 4/6/2004iP 1,006N ...... 17 .750': $17,771 ...... 6....8...... 4/6/200...... 4... .S...... :...... 1,000'NO...... K...... $17...... 86...... $17,837...... 3....2.. 4/6/2004 P 1,000...... NO...... K...... $17...... 750...... $17,771...... 68...... 4/6/2004...... S...... ~...... 200...... NOK...... ,...... ;...$17...... 80...... ;:...... $3,555...... 4.....6.. 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17:7501 .$17,771 .68 4/6/2004 S 1 000 NOK $1775 : $17727.32 ...... n ...... : .. . .. '...... 4/6/2004 P 800 NOK $17.750 $14 , 21 7.341 4/6/2004 S 1,000 NOK $17.75 : $17,727.32 4/6/2004 P 500 NOK $17.750 : ...... $8,885...... 84...... 3)...... 4/6/200...... 4... .S...... ;...... 500...... :NO...... :.K...... ,!. .$17...... 75`...... :...... $8,863...... 6....6... 4/6/2004yP 500 NOK ...... $17. . ...750...... :...... $8,885...... 8...4...... 4/6/200...... 4... ..S...... 2,000...... , NO...... K...... $17...... 74...... ;...... $35,434...... 6.....4.. 4/6/2004P 500NOK .$17 ...... :...... 750•...... $8,88584 ...... 4/6/2004 S...... 800 NO K ...... $17. .74.; ...... $1. 4,173.86 4/6/2004 P 500 NOK ; $17 .750 1 ...... 4.;...... $8,885...... 84...... y...... 4/6%200...... 4... .5...... ,...... 3.., .0001NOK...... ,...... $.17...... 73...... ;...... $.53,121...... ,...... :.9...7... 4/6/20P0 200 NOK $17.750 $3 554.34 4/6/2004 S 2,000 NOK $17 .73: $35,414.64 4/6/2004 P 00 NO K $17 .750 ` $1,777.17 4/6/2004 S 2 OOO NOK $17 ...... >...... ---...... < .., ...... r...... t...... :...... 736...... $.3...5.. . .414...... 6. .. .4.. 4/6/2004 P 25 NOK .. : $17.750 : $444 .29 4/6/2004 S 2 000 NOK $17 .73! $35,414 .6 4 4/6/2004 P 2 000 FNOK $17.740. $35,523.36 4/6/2004 S 1000`NOK 17 .73 .' 17 707 .32 ...... :...... ± ...... :...... r...... 4/6/2004. P :...... 1,500INOK $17 .7401 .$26642:52 4/6/2004 S .1,000iNOK...... 1.. .$17...... 72•'...... $17697...... 3....2... 4/6/2004 : P ...... 1,000NO...... K...... $17740...... :;...... $17,761.68 ...... 4/6/2004 S...... 1,000 NOK ...:...... $17.72i ...... $17,697 .32 4/6/2004P 1,000ANOK $17.740' $17,761 .68 4/6/2004 S 850 NOK $17 .72 $15,042.72 4/6/2004 P 1 000 NOf< ..$17 .740...... $17761 68 ...... 4/6/2004 S 25,000 NOK ...... 1..7...... $442 .183 .05 4/6/2004 P . 500ANOK $17:740;: .$8,880 :84 4/6/2004 S :' . 1,000'...... NOK...... $7...... 71...... :...... $17,687...... 3....2... 4/6/2004 P 500 NOK $17 .740 : $8,880:84> ' : 4/62004 S 1,000 1NOK $17.70 ; $17,677.32 ...... 4/6/2004 P 50 4OK $17 .740 ; $888.08 .1[6/2004 S 800iNOK $17.70 ; $14,141 .86 4/6/2004 P 2,000'NOK $17.730 ; $35,503.36. 1(...... 4/6/200...... 4... ..S...... :...:...... 500iNO...... I...... K...... $17...... 70...... ;...... $8,838...... 6.....6.. 4/6/2004 P 1,000 :NOK $17.730 ! ...... ,...... ;...... $17,7...... 51...... 68...... '...... 4/6/200...... 4... .S...... 200iNO...... :...... K...... $17...... 70...... !...... $3,535...... 4....6... 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17.730 ; $17,751 .68 4/6/2004 S . . 600'NOK $17.69 ; $10,600.39 4/6/2004 P 800 NOK $17.730 ; $14,201 .34 4/6/2004 S 300INOK $17.69! $5,300.20 4/6/2004!P 1,000`NOK $17.720 ; $17,741 .68 4/6/2004 S 100INOK ':. $17 .69; $1 ,766.73 4/6/2004 P 800 NOK `• $17.720: $14,193,34 4/6/2004 S . 1,000 NOK $17.68; $17,657.32 4/6/2004!P . 1,000 NOK $17.710; $17,731 .68 4/6/2004 S 500 NOK $17.68. $8,828.66 4/6/2004 P'...... '...... 2,000 NO K ...... $17.700:...... $35,443.36 ...... 4/6/200 4 S ...... <...... 400!NOK...... ;....$17. .68:...... $7,062...... 9...73 4/6/2004 P 1,000'NOK : S' ; ...... I...... $17...... 700...... :...... $17,72968...... 4/612004...... ;...... 50'NOK...... ;...... $.17...... 67...... $.882...... 37 4/6/2004 : P 1,000 NOK $17.700: ...... $17...... 721...... 68...... r ...... 4/6/2004...... S...... ,...... K...... $17...... 66...... '818...... 6...6... 4/6/2004 P . 000 NOK $17 .700: ...... $17,721 .68 .... 4/6/2004 S :..:: i ...... 2,000 :NOK ... $17.65 ; ...... $35. 425 .64 4/6/2004 P ...... 1,000 NOK $17 .700; $17,721...... 68,•...... 4/6/2004...... S...... <...... 1,000...... NOK...... $17...... 65!...... $17...... 627...... 3....2... 4/6/2004 :P 500yNOK $17.700 ; $8 860.84? 4/6/2004 5 ,. , ; _ 1 000 NOK $17 ...... s ...... Y .:...... : ...... 65...... >: ...... $17,627...... 3.. ..2. . . 4/6/2004 P ...... 2,000!!...... NO...... K...... $17.690 : ...... $35,423...... a.. . . .3....6...... 4/6/200...... 4... ..S...... 100'•NO...... K...... $17...... 65'...... $1,762...... 7.....3.. 4/6/2004 P 1,000!NOK $17.690 : ...... $17,711...... 68...... 4.,.//6/200.,.6..,./20...... '.0. .'.4. .''. .S.. .*...... 5.. .000...... : NOK...... i' ..$17...... 60!...... $87,886...... 6.. ..1. . .4/612004 7,600' NOK ...... P...... :...... $.17.680.;...... $134,532 :75 ...... 476/2004. 9 ...... 1 !Ppp NOK...... i..$17.60...... $1 7,577.•32 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK .$17680 ; $17,701 68 4/6/2004 S ;...... 1 s.000...... NO...... K...... i. .$17...... 60...... : ...... $17.. 57732 4/6/2004 P ...... 10. ...00...... NOK...... :.. .$17...... 680...... ;...... $17,701...... 6....8...... 4/6/200...... 4.. .S...... 1,000'•NO...... K...... $17...... 60...... ;...... :...... $17,577...... 3...2... 4/6/20041P 1,000!NOK $17.680! $17,701 .68 4/6/2004 S 1,000 NOK $17.601 $17,577.32
Page 19 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A . SALE TRANSACTIONS ° Damage Analysis For Generic Trading .
t !ol 'Price !Proceed s TradeDate BUY Amount ;Symbol Price ;Cost TradeDate .§• • ...... ~ 4/6/2004P 1,000INOK $17.680 $17,701 :68 4/6/2004 200NOK $1760 $351546 4/6/2004P 1,000 NOK $17.680 $17701...... 6 8 ....4/6/004...... S . 200...... NOK...... '.. 4/6/2004 P 1,000NOK $17.680 $17,701 :68 4/6/2004 S 200iNOK $17.60 $3,515.46 4/6/2004P 1,000 NOK $17.680 $17,70 :8 ;4%004 S 200 NOK...... ;..$17:60;...... 4/6/2004 P .. 800 NOK i $1 . 1 5 4/6/2004 P 400NOK; 17680 $708067 4/6/2004 S 200NOK 1759 i$3 51346 4/6/2004 P 40Q NOK $17 670 $7,076:67 4/6/2004 5 NOK $17.55 $17.527.32 4/6/2004 P 100 NOK $17 650 $17671 68 4/6/2004 S 1 000LNOK $17 55 $175273 2 4/6/2004 P 100Q NOK $17650 $17,671 68 4/6/2004 1 000 NOK $1755 $175273 2 NOK $17.650 $17,671.681 4/6/2004 1,000NOK $17.55 $17,527.32 . 4/6/2004P 4/6/2004.IF 800NOK $17.650 $14,137.34 4/6/2004 S 1 ,000' NOK$17 55 $17 527 3 2 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17 640 $17 661 68 4/6/2004 S 800:NOK $17.55 $14 021 8 6 $17:640 $14,129.34 4/6/2004 S 200NOK $17 .55 $3,505.46 4/6/2004 ; P 800NOKs . . ..r 4/6/200 P 300 NOK $17.640 $5,298.50 4/6/2004 S ...... 200;NOK ' $17 .55: $350546 4/6/200$P 200 NOK $17 640 $3532341 4/6/2004 S 300NOK $1754 $525520 4/612004 P 100 NO K $17640 $176617 , 4/6/2004 S 100NOK.... $1754 $175173 4/6/200 P 25NOK $17610 $44079 4/6/2004 S 300: NOK $1752 $524920 4/6/20} 1,000 NOK $17.600. $17,621 .68 4/6/2004 .S...... 5,000...... ,NO...... K...... $17...... 51...... ;...... $87,436...... 6....1.. 4/6/20O R 500' NOK . $17.600' $8,810.84 4/6/2004 S 4,000 : NOK $17.51 ; $69,949 .29 ...... q...... !...... 4/6/2004 P $17.590; .85 4/6/2004 S 100,000NO0 K $17.51 ; $17,487 .32 ...... 1,700...... 1:..NO...... K...... $29939...... I...... ~...... 4/6/2004 P 200NO K $17.590; $3;522.34 4/6/2004 S ...... 1,000NO...... K...... $17...... 5....1...... $17,487...... 3....2... 4/6/2004'•P 3,000 NOK ` $17.550, $52,715.03...... 4%6/2004...... S...... 300...... NOK...... $17...... 51...... ;...... $5,246...... 2....0.. 4/6/2004 P 1,000NOK $17.550' $17,571 .68 4/6/2004 S 200 NOK $17.51 $3,497 .46 $17.550; $17,571 .68 4/6/2004 S 200NOK $17,51 ; $3,497 .46 4/6/2004'•P 1,000'NOK ...... ,...... , ...... 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17.550. $17,571 :68 4/6/2004 S 200NOK :..$17.51 $3 497 46 ...... 1 ...... ,...... ;...... :...... ,...... ; :...... 6/2004 .P .000 NOK .$17.550' .$17,571.68 .•_4/6/2004 S .1,000'NOK $17.501 .$17.477 .32 4/6/2004 P 2,500'NOK $17.540, $43,904.20 4/612004 S 1 .000 NOK $17.501 $17,477.32 4/6/2004'P 1,000iNOK $17.540: $17,561 .68 4/6/2004 S 1,000:1 NOK . 1 $17.50 . $17,477.32 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17.540 ; $17,561 .68 4/6/2004 S .. 1,000WOK ;$17.50 : $17,477.32 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17.540 $17,561 .68 4/6/2004 S 1,000 NOK •: $17 .50 $17,477 .32 ...... 4/6/2004P...... 1,000NOK...... $17...... 540 ; $17,561 .68 4/6/2004 S ...... 1,000...... NOK...... ,...$17...... 50...... ;...... $17,477...... 3...2... 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17 .540; $17,561,68 fs...... 4/6/2004 S- ...... 1...... 000 NOK ...... $17.50.'...... $17,477...... :3....2... .. 4/6/2004 P 25 ;IVOK $17 .540 . $439.041 .4/6/2004 S ...... 1,000'...... :NOK...... $17...... 50...... $17,477 .32 4/6/2004 P.P...... 2,000 NOK ...... :. ....::...... $17 .530 :...... $35,103.36 ...... 4/6/2004 S 1,000!NOK ...... $17.50 :...... $17,477...... 32 ' ~r ...... 4/6/2004 .1. 000.. . . :.NO. K ...... $17...... 530...... $17...... ,.551...... 6.....8...... ,4/6/2004...... 50iNOK...... $17...... 50'...... $873...... 8....7... 4/6/2004;P 1,000INOK $17 .530• $17,551, .68 4/6/2004 S 2 500 NOK $17.49 $43,668.3 1 ...... 4/6/2004 P...... 1,000 N ...... $17 :530.;...... $17,551 .68 4/6/2004 S• :• 00 2N0K $ 17.49 : $3 493.46 4/6/2004 P 4,000 NOK :..$17 .520 :...... $70,166.71 .....,...4/6/2004 S...,...... NOK ...... $17.47 ...... $10,468.. .39 . 4/6/2004P ': 1,000'NOK $17.520? $17,541 .68 4/6/2004...... 5...... <...... 500`•...... NOK...... $17...... 47...... $8,723...... 6....6... 4/6/2004 P...... :...... 1000...... NO...... K...... $17...... 520...... '...... $17,541...... 6....8...... 4/6/200...... 4... .S.:...... 5,000...... NOK...... $17...... 46...... ,1...... $87,186...... 6.....1.. 4/6/2004P...... 1,000 NOK ...... {...$17...... 520...... $17,541...... 68...... 4/6/200...... :...... 4... ..S...... 1,000...... NOK...... ;...$17...... 45...... :...... $17,427...... 3.....2.. 4/6/2004'P 1,000 NOK . . . $17.520 : $17,541 .681 4/6/2004 S 1,000 ;NOK $17.44 $17,417.32
Page 20 of 24 , BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS Damage Analysis For Generic Tradin g
. . TradeDate BUY. ..Amount...... St... Xm.....bo... .l. Price.. . . .Cos...... t...... TradeDat...... e...... SELL...... :...... :...... ;.... P r i c e...... roceed...... s...... 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17 .520 $17,541.681 4/6!2004 S ...... 3,000...... NO...... K...... $17...... 43.. .. ,: $52,221...... 9....7...... :.... 4/6/2004 ;P 200 NOK $1 7 .520;' 3,508 4/672004 000 NOK 17:43 $1 7,407.32 ...... ,...... :...... :34 ...... : I S...... r ...... }..$ ...... 4/6/2004 P 1,000':NOK $17.510 ; $17,531 4/6/2004. S 1,000 NOK $17:43 $17,407.32 4/6/2004P 100NOK .. $17.510'; $1,753,17 4/6/2004 S 3,0001NOK. . .;.. $17...... 42...... ,:...... $52,191...... 9....7...... :...... :...... :...... :...... „.,...... >...... 4/6/2004 :P 10,000...... NOK $17.500; $175,21678 .4/6/2004 S 1,000 NOK ...... $17.42 : $17,397.32 $17.42 ; $17,397.32 4/6/2004P...... 2,500iNOK ...... •. $17 500 ; $43,804 0...... 4/6/2004...... S...... •...... 1,000...... NOK...... 4/6/2004 ;P 1,000 NOK $17.500 : $17,521 :8...... 4/6/2004...... S...... I...... 1. 000•...... ,•..NOK...... $17...... 42.....>...... $17 397.32 4/6/2004 }P 1,000 NOK...... $17...... 500...... $17,521.6$ 4/6/2004 S ...... 5000..r...... ,NO...... K...... ;....$17...... 4....1..:...... $86,936...... 6....1.. 7 4/6/2004 P 1 ,000. NOK . .•$17.500 $$17,521.68 ...... 4/6/2004 S ...... 13,000...... NOK...... 1•.. .$17...... 7...41...... $17$52,161..387..9.3.2...... 4/6/2004...... P...... •:...... 1.. .,000...... 1.. ..NO...... K...... :...... $17...... 500...... 17,521...... _...68...... 4/6/200...... 4... .5...... : ...... 1. . 0 .0 .0.: NOK ...... $17.41...... x.17,387 .32 ...... 4/6/2004...... ;P...... 25...... :N... _.OK...... $17...... 500..... ; .. .$438 Q4 ...... 4/6/2004 S 2,000 ;NOK : .$17:40: $34,754.64 4/6/20045 P 1 ,700 NOK ; .$17480. ; $29,752. 85...... 4../6/2004...... S..... 100iNOK $17.401 $17,377.32 4/6/2004 P...... 1,000!NO...... K...... :..$17.480 :...... $17,50 :.1 68...... 4/6/2004 . S...... 1,000 NOK...... $1740.1...... $17,377.32 4%6/2004 P...... 1 000 NOK...... :..:..::...... 1 ..$17 480...... $17,501 :68 ...... 4/6/2004 S.:...... 1...... 1,000 NOK ...... :..$17:40.'...... :...... 17 377.32 . $17 480 : $17,501 .68 4/6/2004 S 1 400 NOK '• $17 .39. $24,314.25 4/6/2004 P 1 ,000 1NOK ...... 1...... 2 4/6/2004.. P...... 1,000'NOK.. ., ...... a .. .$17,480...... ;...... $17,501...... 68...... 4/6/2004...... S...... 1,000...... NOK...... $17...... 39...... :...... $17,367. . .3 4/6/2004•;P 3,000 NOK $17:440; $52,385.03 4/6/2004 S 300 NOK $17 .39. $5,210.20 4/6/2004 : P 3,000 NOK ;..$17:4401...... $52,385:03 ...... 4/6/2004 S...... ;...... 1,000• NOK...... $17 .38...... $17,357.32 4/6/2004 P 3,0001NOK 17.440 : $52,385 03 4/6/2004... .S...... 1,000. ... :..NO. .. . K...... $17,357...... 32 4/6/2004 P ...... 100...... NO...... K...... $17:440; $1,746.17 4/6/2004 S ...... 3.., .300...... ,.NO...... K...... ,...$17...... 36...... $57,213...... 1.....6.. $13,869.86 4/6/2004 P 700:NOK $17...... 420...... :...... $12,209...... 17...... 4/6/2004...... S...... 800...... NO...... K...... f...$17....:....36...... i:...... $51,981 97 ...... 4/6/2004...... P...... 10,000...... ~ .NOK...... $17...... 4101...... 174,316...... 78...... 4/6/2004...... S...... 3,000...... , NOK...... $17 .35 : 4/6/2004P 1,00&NOK $17.410 : $17,431 .68 4/6/2004 S 500iNOK $17.35 ; $8,663.66 4/6/2004 P...... 900...... NOK...... :...... ,...$17...... 410'...... $15,...... 688.51 4/6/2004 S ...... 3,000..., ...... •.,;. NOK...... ,...$17...... 34...... :...... $51,951...... 9....7.. 4/6/2004iP 3000 NOK .$17.400 $52,265.03...... 4/6/200...... 4... .S...... 500...... ':NOK...... _$17:...... 34...... ,;...... $8,...... 658...... 6....6... 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17.400;; $17,421 .68 4/6/2004 S 400:NOK 22.93 4/6/2004 P 8001NOK $17.4001 $13,937.34 .416/2004 S 100 NOK $17.33• $1,730.73 4/6/2004 P 2,4001NOK $17.380 $41,764.03 4/6/2004 S 2,400 :NOK 1 $17.32. $41,513 .57 4/6/2004 :F...... • ...... 1,000 NOK $-17.380; $17,401 . 68 4/6/2004 2,000 NOK $17 .32: $34,594.64 4/6/2004~P 200 NOK $17.380 ; $3,480.34 4/6/2004 S 1000;: NOK**'* $17 .32 ...... $17,297.32 $17,297 4/6/2004 P 10,000!N9 K $17.... .3701... . $173,916..78. ... 4/6/2004 S ...... 1,000iNOK...... ;...$17...... 32!...... 3.....2.. $1,729.73 4/6/2004 P ...... 2,000 NOK ...... ,.:...... _...... ;. $17.370..;...... $34,783. .36 .....: 4/6/2004 S...... ;...... 100;NOK ...... '•. $17 .32 ...... 4/6/2004 : P .....•...... 400... ,NOK...... $17...... 370...... $6,...... 956...... 67...... 4/6/200...... 4.. ..S...... 100...... NOK...... $17,32'...... $1,729...... 7....3.. 4/6/2004i P...... 2,000+NOK...... $17.360 $34763.36 4/6/2004 S 100 NOK $17.32' $1 ,729.73 4/6/2004LP...... :...... 1,000...... NOK...... :, ' $17.360: $17,381...... 68...... 4/6!2004 ..S...... 100•NOK...... :. .$17...... 32...... ;...... $1,729...... 7....3.. 4/6/2004 P . 100 NOK $17.32: 3 ...... 1,000INOK...... a...... $17.360 : $17,381.68, 4/6/2004 t ...... >...... $1,729...... 7...... 4/6/2004 P 1000NOK $17.360' $17,381 .68( ' 4/6!2004 S ...... 1000 NOK $17 .31 $17,287 .32 ...... r ...... ' ...... v ...... ,...... ;...... 4/6/2004 P 1 ,000NOK .i $17.360; $17,381 .68 4/6/2004. S 1,000 NOK ...$17...... 31...... :...... $17,287...... 3....2.. 4/6/2004 P 1,000 IVOK $17.360; $17,381 .68 4/6/2004 S 1NOK $17.31 : $17,287 .32 ...... 1 ...... :. . .: ...... 1 ...... t...... i...... 4/6/2004•P.P ...... 1,000NOK ...... ,...... ,...... ,. $17.3601.>...... $17,381 .68 ...... 4/6/2004 $...... 7001 NOK ...... 1. $17.31 .:...... $12,101. ;1 3 ; 4/6/2004 ...... 1.. .000...... NOK...... $17...... 360...... $11...... ,381...... 68...... 4/6/2004...... S...... 500INOK...... i...... $17...... 31...... $8,643...... 6....6... 4/6/2004P 1,000'NOK $17.360; .$17,381 .68 4/6/2004 S 500 NOK $17.31 : $8,643.66
Page 21 of_24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE "A SALE TRANSACTIONS il Damage Analysis For Generic Trading
;Amount S mbol Price :Proceed TradeDate ; BUY Amount !SymboY...... :...... l...... Price...... '. .Cos...... t...... TradeDat...... e...... SELL...... ;....Y...... ;...... :...... s...... 4/6/2004 P ...... 3,000 NOK ! $17 .270; $51,875:03 4/6/2004 S 1,000 NOK '• $17 .19 : $17,167.32 $17,167 2 ...... 4/6/2004...... P...... 2,000...... NOK...... : . .. .$17..270. .. . . ; .. .$34.. . .. ,583.36 , ...... 4/6/2004...... S...... 1. .,.000...... ::NOK...... ;.. . $17...... 19...... 3...... 1 . 4/6/2004P 500NOK $17.270 $8,645:84 Cg 4/6/2004 S .. 1,000 NOK $17 .19•' $17,167.32 4/6/2004.:i .P...... 4. 00 NOK...... ,...... $17...... 270...... ;...... 6,916.67sg...... 4.../.6 ...f2.....00...... 4.. .S...... _...... 1..r.0...00...... ;.NOK...... ;!. .$.....17...... 19...... :...... $1...... 7.....1...67...... 3....2.. 4/6/2004 : P...... 300yNOK ...... :...... $17.260 ;...... $5,184.50 t...... 4/6/2004 . 5 ...... :...... 1,000; NOK ...... $17.1 9 ...... $17,167 .3 2 4/6/2004' P ...... 5,000...... NOK...... ::...... $17...... 25...... 0...... $86,358...... 39...... (...... 4/6/200...... 4.. .S...... 229INOK...... $....17...... 19...... :...... $3...... ,..931...... 3...2...... ,4/6/2004 : P 3,000 : NOK 17.250 : $51,815.03 4/6/2004 S 5,000M OK $17 .18: $85,786.61 ...... 4/6/2004...... '.P...... 3000...... NOK ...... $17...... 250•...... ; $51 ,815.031 4/6/2004 S <'•...... 3..,. ..000...... NOK...... ;$17...... 18...... ;...... $51...... ,471...... 9....7 416/2004 ;P 1,000. NOFC . $17.250 4/6/2004 S .i ...... _ ...... $17,271...... 68...... 000...... NOK...... $17...... 18...... ;:...... $17,...... 157...... 3....2... 4/6/2004 P 1...,000...... NOK...... 17.240 ...... $. .17,261...... 6....8...... 4/6...... /..200....,....4.. ..S...... ,.<...... 1.., .000...... '.NOK...... $17.;...... 1:...8...:...... $17...17, .157...... :3..22 4/6/2004 P 1 000 ' NOK ._$17.240 17,261 .4/6/2004 1,OOONOK 7 $17,157 ...... :...... r...... ,...... :...... ; ;...... $ .:68 ...... 5...... ;...... $1 1.8.>...... 32 ! : 4/6/2004 P 2,000 NOK $17 230! $34,503.36 4/6/2004 S 1,000'Nt... .OK...... $....17...... 18...... ;...... $17j...... 57...... 3....2.. 4/6/2004 P 100„NOK $17.230! $ 1,725 .1 7 4/6/2004 S 771 1 NOK $17.18 ! $13,228.30 ...... I...... : ...... ; ...... 4/6/2004 P 5,000 ;NOK $17.220; $86,208.39 4/6/2004 S 4•• ...... 10,000!...... NOK...... $17...... 17...... :...... $171...... ;473...... 2....2.. 4/6/2004 P 5,000 NOK ...... $17 .220 ...... 86...... ,.2083...... 4/6/2004 S 10,000 NOK !..$17.16i• $171 373 2 2 $17.220 } 4552 4/6/2004 •P ..... 2 .700...... ;NOK...... :...... i...... :...... :...... /6/2004 iP ...... I. .,OOO :NOK...... : : : . 17.220 17,241 :68 .Total5oldl 1,107,400 ; Total:Proceeds $22,037,414.1 6 4/6/2004 'P ...... 1,000...... !.NOK...... :.:...... $17 .220 .:...... $17,24117,24 9 .68 ...... 4/6/2004 P 1,000 . NOK ...... '..$17:220.;..... $17.241 .68 ...... '• ...... 4/6/2004P...... 55.,000NO.. . . K :..::..y...... $..17...... 21.....0...... $86...... 158...... 39...... :...... ' : 4/6/2004 P OOO :NOK...... $ 17.21.0 : $86158.39 ...... •'...... 4/6/2004 :P 5,000 : NOK...... $17. ... .210 ! ...... $...86158...... ,...... 3..9...... ,...... ;...... 4/6/2004 P 4,400!NOK $17,210 : $75,819.38 4/6/2004P 3,000i.NOK...... $...17...... 210...... $51,695. .03 •• •...... : ...... :...... :...... 4/6/2004...... !..P...... •...... 1,000•...... ;NOK...... $17...... 210...... ;...... $17231...... :68...... i...... I...... ;...... 4/6/2004 P 1,000 NOK $17.210 : $17,231,68 4/6/2004 ':. P 1,000 1 NOK $17.210! $17,231.68 4/6/2004!P 500 NOK $17.210 ; $8,615.84 4/6/2004 P 500 NOK $17.210 . $8,615.84 ...... :...... :...... 4/6/2004 ' P 400' NOI< ` $17.210 $6,892.67 ...... 4/6/2004P...... 7,300 NOK $17.200...... $125,718...... 2....5...... 4/6/2004 P 3,0OO,NOK ; $17.200-• :' $51 665.03 ...... 4/612004; P.... 2,000 '..NO...... K...... :...... $17 .200...... $34,44.. 3 .36 ...... '...... i...... i...... /6/2004 : .: P...... 1 .000'• N K ...... :.:...... :...... 7.2001...... •...... 17,221 :68 ...... '•...... :...... _...... 4/6/2004 ! P ...... 1...... $.1 7.200: $17,221 .68 4/6/20041P 1,000!NOK ...... :...$...17...... 200...... :...... $17,221...... 6....8...... 4/6/2004 ' P ! 700 ;N: NOK OK ...... $17.200 f ...... $12,055.17 ...... '• 4/6/2004P 500iNOK ...... 3...... 1. ..$...17...... 200...... :...... $...8..610...... 84...... : ...... 4/6/2004 P 300NOK .$ 17 .200:...... :.. $5,166.50 ...... 4/6/2004 P 100 . NOK $17 .200 ...... >...... $1,722:1.7:f...... '•...... 4/6/2004 :P 5,000 ;NOK $17 .190': ...... $86...... 058...... 3....9...... :...... ;...... 4/6/2004 P 5,000 : O' $17 .190 ; $86,058.39
Page 23 of 24 BUY TRANSACTIONS SCHEDULE A SALE TRANSACTIONS . Damage Analysis For Generic Trading
TradeDate ;BUY 'Amount SymboY l IPrice Cost Trad_eDate .SELL Amount S .mbolY.. Price ;Proceeds . 4/6/2004 F 2,000 NOK . $17190 $34,423.36 : , 4/6/2004 P 1 000 NOK . $17,211 .68 4/6/2004 P 5,000 NOK ...$17...... 180...... ;...... $86 008.39 ...... 4/6/2004 P ...$17...... 180...... :...... $51,605...... 0....3...... :...... 4/6/2004 P t 9,000!NOK...... :...$17...... 180...... :...... $51,605...... 03...... 4/6/2004 P 1,000 1 NOK ...... :...... $17...... _..201...... 681....-.,...... 4/6/20041P 200 NOK $17.180 ; $3,440.34 `• 4/6/2004P i 5,000NOK $17.170 ; '• ...... :...... $85,958...... 39...... :...... :...... 4/6/2004; P 5,000 ; NOK $17.160 ; $85,908.39
Total Purchased 1,154,050 ; Total cost! $23, 197,516.61 Total Sold ; 1,107,400 : Total Proceeds : $22,037,414 .16
...... :...... $23,197,516...... ,..61...... 1,154...... ;0`50...... =.. ..$20...... 101...... per. . shar e...... _...... $22,037,414...... 16...... /. ..1,107,400...... =... $..19. .900.... per...... shar...... e...... • ...... :...... :...... DAMAGE ANALYSI S
...... :...... :...... :...... : ...... During the Class Period,. Generic Trading.purchased 1,154,050 for $23,197,516.61 ...... i...... i . During the Class Period, Generic Trading sold 1,107 ,400 for $22,037,414.1 6 ...... i...... Generic Trading lost $222 , 587 .4 0 o n its trades during the period .
Generic Trading held 46, 650 shares at the-end of the period which ...... cos. $20.101 per shard for...... a.. ..total...... cost...... •. ..of...... $937....,...... ,.711...... 65 i ...... 'e-r...... :...... :...... Generic Trading 's holdings at the end ofth' Z rind valued at the .median...... trading...... price sing April 7, 2004 of .$.1.4...389 per share is $671 ,246 85 ...... I...... Generic Trading paid $937 ,711.65 for shares...... Which... .. are...... wo...... rt...h. . .$671,246...... 85...... at...... $14...... 38...... pe share. a oss of $266,464.80 '•,
TOTAL LOSSES FROM TRADING DURING THE PERIOD -$222,587 .40 TOTAL...... LOSSES...... FROM...... SHARES...... FIELD...... A`(...... TffE...... END...... OF...... THE...... PERIOD...... -.....$266,464...... 8....0...... :...... :...... TOTAL DAMAGES EXPERIENCED...... BY.... GENERIC TRADING...... -. ..$....489,052... .20
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