NATO Goes East. NATO-Japan Cooperation and the “Pivot to Asia”

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

NATO Goes East WP NATO-Japan Cooperation and the “Pivot to Asia”

Michael Paul S

Europe should not fear the rebalance to Asia, Europe should join it, said former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in January 2013. One step in that direction is NATO- Japan cooperation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will not become a global policeman, but it has increasingly acquired a global perspective – stabilization through consultation and cooperation. Accordingly, Japan does not expect NATO to play a direct military role in the Asia-Pacific region. But it expects a partner with shared perceptions and approaches. Thus, the Joint Political Declaration, signed by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on April 15, 2013, should be interpreted as a foundation to build political partnership and as a starting point for further initiatives embedding other regional actors.

In the past, the NATO-Japan relationship proliferation. Beyond that, NATO Europe was limited to infrequent and loosely must be concerned about maritime secu- focused dialogue, with little concrete co- rity. operation. This changed substantially when As export nations, Japan and Germany NATO engaged in international security have an eminent interest in open sea lines beyond its traditional geographical area of communication and free trade. Trade and became involved in Afghanistan, which and economy hinge on security and stabil- was a catalyst for NATO and Japan for co- ity. But maritime East Asia is becoming operation. Now, jointly tackling new emerg- increasingly dangerous. ing global security challenges is one of the priorities for NATO-Japan cooperation identified in the Joint Political Declaration. Dangerous waters What does this cooperation entail beyond The past months have seen a series of crises sharing perceptions and approaches? in the East China Sea and South China Sea Clearly, NATO countries are interested in that threaten to get out of control. Unani- enhancing cooperation with Japan in the mously shared by regional security policy area of defense science and technology. experts is the belief that one of the main The cooperation will cover such areas as sources of danger is the way regional actors cyber defense, counter-terrorism and non- conduct maritime operations to assert or

Dr. Michael Paul is Senior Fellow at the SWP International Security Division SWP Comments 33 October 2013

defend claims to territory as well as their of the Carnegie Endowment in 2013, if rights to natural resources. Additionally, this challenge remains without effective all parties demonstrate a weak capacity to reaction from Tokyo and Washington, conduct crisis management under domestic “China’s growing offshore military capa- nationalistic pressures. In strengthening its bilities could eventually increase the like- ties with Japan, would NATO risk becoming lihood of serious political-military crises entangled in Asian conflicts? in East Asia, weaken the US-Japan alliance, In April 2013 NATO Secretary General and undermine overall regional stability.” Rasmussen declared that the alliance’s The future peace and prosperity of the global perspective does not mean that whole Asia-Pacific region could be endan- NATO seeks a military presence in the Asia- gered. Some problems are already evident Pacific region. Rather, it means NATO seeks in relations between China, Japan and the to work with the Asia-Pacific region to en- United States – the standoff over the sov- hance security and stability. And Japan is ereignty of the Senkaku Islands in the East a key partner for this endeavor. But what China Sea is but one example. does that mean for maritime East Asia? China’s emergence as a major regional The military build-up of the Chinese and – in some aspects – global power poses People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially as many opportunities as threats to Tokyo its naval modernization, clearly has impli- (and there is a clear understanding among cations for the security of the neighbors Japanese elites that China is seeking to in the Asia-Pacific region and allows it to become Asia’s new hegemon). People in challenge the existing maritime status quo Brussels see many opportunities, although in a way that was inconceivable even a European NATO members such as the decade ago. Now the PLA has so-called Baltic states and Poland might view a new anti-access and area denial capabilities – focus toward the “Far East” with skepticism centered on ballistic and cruise missiles, in view of lingering doubts about Russia’s capable air forces, submarines and surface intentions in the “Near East.” combatants, long-range radars and sophis- Supporting both NATO-Japan coopera- ticated C4ISR (Command, Control, Com- tion and dialogue with China is one way to munications, Computers, Intelligence, proceed. Twenty years of dialogue with Surveillance and Reconnaissance) networks. Russia’s armed forces (the “Deutsch-Russi- Combined with its growing military and scher Streitkräftedialog” has existed since paramilitary presence along the East Asian 1993) has demonstrated that an open dia- littoral and beyond, those capabilities logue about threat perceptions can make provide China with a greater capacity to a difference – although there still exists influence the security environment in the Cold War thinking in military and political Asia-Pacific region. Although China must circles in Europe and Russia. avoid a direct confrontation with the In the Asia-Pacific region – and Russia is United States and its allies, it can probe the part of that region, too – capabilities and strength of the US and allied commitment actions must not only deter truly threaten- to peripheral issues, such as the Senkaku/ ing behavior. There is also the need for Diaoyu islands. In the long term, China’s confidence-building measures to reduce growing military capabilities could even distrust and strengthen cooperation. weaken Japanese confidence in America’s Beijing must be assured that its most vital security commitment and increase support interests are not imperiled – such as for a much larger and offensive-oriented Chinese sea lines of communication. The military in Japan – and perhaps even for PLA’s buildup of a blue water navy is one a nuclear deterrent (although the latter of the reasons for the United States’ “pivot remains a highly hypothetical issue). Thus, to Asia.” But how else should one expect as concluded in a strategic net assessment Beijing to protect its vital sea lanes?

SWP Comments 33 October 2013

The need for dialogue state shall enable America’s partners to There is ample room for misunderstandings operate together with US forces in order to and, therefore, a need for dialogue. Officials enhance stability in the region by ensuring from the United States and China met in interoperability. Furthermore, forward- September 2013 in Beijing for the 14th partnering would involve a division of Defense Consultative Talks. They discussed labor (and costs). how to enhance strategic trust and build But with the United States turning its upon opportunities to expand cooperation interest from the Atlantic to the Pacific, in areas of mutual interest, including security requirements in the Mediterranean humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, Sea will become more important to peacekeeping and maritime safety. They Europe’s navies. And there will be no re- also discussed ways to enhance communi- balance without the rest of Asia. If other cations to improve understanding and states in the region such as Australia and avoid misperceptions. Hopefully, there will Singapore do not buy into the brand of be similar positive momentum in China- partnership or leadership that the United Japan relations in the future. States is selling, the rebalance could die The economic success of China depends a very quick death, leaving its allies alone very much on a stable world order. A policy with a perceived hegemonic maritime that favors a rules-based approach must be advancement of China, ending US hege- backed by the capacity to counterbalance monic stability in the West Pacific. efforts to ignore, violate or unilaterally In principle it would be possible to rewrite existing arrangements. NATO can establish new multilateral structures and help to support the rules-based interna- institutions in the Asia-Pacific region to tional system, and eventually the European create more transparency, to promote Union will also support that in its future confidence-building and to help solve such maritime security strategy. But the very disputes, such as the one concerning the first line of action is bilateral dialogue Senkaku Islands. Although there is little between Beijing and Tokyo, which should hope for a resolution of the dispute in the be supported by European nations. In the near future, Tokyo and Beijing should work long term, some multilateral structures in toward establishing new bilateral commu- the Asia-Pacific region may be possible. nication mechanisms. Clearly, a high-level Europeans love to share their experience as political agreement is required before to how they have succeeded in creating a ministerial or military-to-military talks can Europe free and at peace, built on multi- begin. It will not be easy to restart a sub- lateral structures. But one always has to stantial dialogue because we have seen a remember that this was possible only general erosion of bilateral relations and a through a strong alliance with the United lack of trust. And the disappearance of States. back-channel diplomacy can be seen as a symptom of that. In the end, there should be a separate communication mechanism Pivot to reality or wishful thinking? involving several layers that include law In the end, it will be decisive how the so- enforcement agencies, militaries and called pivot to Asia will truly lead to a foreign ministries (as was attempted in rebalancing of US military capabilities that negotiations after the 2010 boat collision). strikes a delicate balance of reassuring both A permanent working-level security allies, such as Japan, and partners, such as dialogue forum – at the ambassador level, China. Instead of a strategy called “offshore including military representatives – is balancing” (which involves a degree of re- another approach, proposed by Prof. Takako trenchment), the strategy should be for- Ueta in Tokyo. It would be similar to secu- ward-partnering, assuming that the end- rity dialogues of the Organization for Secu-

SWP Comments 33 October 2013

rity and Co-operation in Europe and could ing both allies and partners in helping to also include a mechanism for compliance support a rules-based approach – and free- observation of international norms. Later, it dom of navigation in the West Pacific is could be integrated as an organ into the also in the interest of the European Union. East Asian Summit or the ASEAN Regional Forum. Such a mechanism could also lessen the burdens of the United States, ensuring security through deterrence on the one hand, and reducing risks on the other. The desire of China and Japan to avoid a military conflict and their bilateral economic relationship offer the incentive and com- mon ground to engage in substantial dialogue.

These Comments reflect ance in the future decades. Active coopera- solely the author’s views. tion with its major non-NATO ally Japan is

SWP an essential part of that. But to make the Stiftung Wissenschaft und East Asian Pacific more stable means also to Politik German Institute for start a new Sino-Japanese dialogue in the International and near future and to establish workable risk- Security Affairs reduction mechanisms. At the same time, Ludwigkirchplatz 34 there is a need to counterbalance China’s 10719 Berlin growing military capabilities through inte- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 grating and institutionalizing measures. www.swp-berlin.org The Asia-Pacific region is still in a very early [email protected] phase when it comes to multilateral secu- ISSN 1861-1761 rity and defense cooperation; the countries

in the region can profit from NATO experience on how to conduct multilateral plan- ning and operations. The Senkaku dispute is only a symptom of the much bigger problem of how to communicate effectively with Beijing and how China could become a responsible stakeholder in international affairs. One might argue that there is reason for some optimism because the islets in the East China Sea may be a priority of Chinese foreign policy, whereas a peaceful environment for sustainable economic development will remain the priority of Chinese policy in general. But from a Chinese point of view, the military build-up is a necessity because of its rapid economic development, which has given it many interests to protect. NATO-Japan cooperation, therefore, must maintain a careful balance of reassur-

SWP Comments 33 October 2013