DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI missions |Islamist groups |Conflict mediation | | Military of political agreement among theparties. that none of them can realistically work unless based on some kind possible alternatives of external intervention, concluding however be themostinterested in peace.Finally, thedocument considers the security sector; d)more room for civil society actors, who seemto of General Hafter’s role aspartof acredible reform of thenational in theconflict andgive themhope for victory; c)areconsideration powers –particularly Egypt andTurkey –who support thetwo parties in Security Council resolution 2174; b)adequate pressureon regional tighter application of the sanctions and other instruments called for be found. For more effective backing, this paper recommends: a) though they aretheones who insistthat apolitical solution hasto because it isnot sufficiently supported bywestern countries, even detailed look at all of them,concluding that mediation isweak between thetwo mainparties totheconflict. Thispaper takes a and regional powers, andtheevolution of civilian-military relations fragmentation of Libyan forces, the role of neighbouring countries up opportunities, but isstill hinderedbythreemainfactors: the In Libya, theUNmediation among theparties inconflict has opened Abstra by Roberto Aliboni Intervention or Mediation? What toDoAbout Libya: ct keywords DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI 2 * other, more radical Islamist groups, inaprominent but notleading position. entered therevolutionary front alongside groups that were politically secular and Libyan Muslim B B clientelistic networks, andthetribes. Whentherevolution broke out, theMuslim of one anotherwho emergedspontaneously from thetowns, thefamily and from theregime, but wasthen conducted by a plethora of local forces, independent The revolution of 17February 2011 inLibya wastriggered byagroup of defectors 1. Aconflict among fragmented forces within thetwo major parties totheconflict. leading powers intheregion; theevolution of thecivilian-military relationship fragmentation of Libyan forces; theinterference of neighboring countries andthe also been some opportunities andsuccesses. Therearethreemainobstacles: the UN effort hasrunandiscontinuing toruninto many obstacles, but therehave and violent, how canthismediation beassessedandwhat areits prospects? The As of thebeginning of March 2015, with the crisisbecoming ever more complex view toopening theway eventually totheintervention of UNpeace-keeping forces. government of national unity in the framework of a “cease-fire” agreement with a Bernardino Léon. Themediation isaimedat fostering theestablishment of a Mission inLibya) led bythespecial envoy of the SecretaryGeneral, Ambassador a diplomatic mediation within theframework of UNSMIL(United Nations S The international community responded totheoutbreak of warinLibya byinitiating Introduction by Roberto Aliboni* Intervention or Mediation? What toDoAbout Libya: What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? . T Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), March 2015. T 2015. March (IAI), Internazionali Affari Istituto for the prepared Paper Roberto Aliboni is scientific advisor at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Internazionali Affari Istituto the at advisor scientific is Aliboni Roberto onne. rotherhood wastheonly organized political force. However, unlike inEgypt, the rothers didnottake over theleadership of therevolution. They ranslated by Gabriele Gabriele by ranslated upport DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI 3 the military andpolitical leaders of bothareinduced tobelieve theycanwinand, training –have notprovided any decisive advantage toeither of thecoalitions. But S powers. another of the“proxy wars”that continue toembody theconflict among regional Thinni government) sidedwith Egypt andSaudi Arabia –intheframework of yet Representatives (HoR) that resulted from theelections of 25June 2014,andtheAl- government) sidedwith Qatar andTurkey, theconservatives (with theHouse of the Post-Qaddafi C Post-Qaddafi the Papers Carnegie the former Parliament, the General National taking placeintheregion: therevolutionaries andIslamists (with theremainsof In sparking thecivil war,thetwo coalitions ipso factomergedinto thevasterclash and Kuwait tosidewith theLibyan conservatives. developments inEgypt induced Saudi Arabia, theUnited Arab Emirates, Bahrein dislike for theMuslim B Qatar and ideologically andpolitically closest tothem.In particular, support wasprovided by countries intheregion provided support for theLibyan parties considered From thevery beginning of therevolution, thegovernments of theneighboring 2. Regional interference andits impact the Libyan forces aremore similar tolocal andpatron-related centers of power conservatives andrevolutionaries/Islamists –arevague andincoherent coalitions: Because of theirlocal andfragmented origin, thetwo opposing sides– conflict underway. defeated regimefrom having accesstopolitical life, wasamajor trigger of the the Political Isolation Law of 14May 2013,designed toprevent membersof the the political scenerather thanbyany joint specific political project. Thisiswhy regime andarebrought togetherbythedesiretoexclude themaltogether from revolutionary. and military that rebelled againstGaddafithus triggering therevolution) and of theconflict isbetween forces that wecancall conservative (senior officials Consequently theconflict isnotbetween Islamists andnon-Islamists. Thecore What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? 1 important: interference byregional actors andthedynamics of thesecurity sector. out thepossibility of acompromise. Right now two otherobstacles aremuch more conducive todialogue. However, while abasic problem for Libya, it does notrule than tostructured national movements or parties. It isevident that thisisnot Frederic Wehrey and Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Legitimacy C Legitimacy “Libya’s Lacher, Wolfram and Wehrey Frederic

upport from regional powers – supply of weapons, bombings by their air forces, Frederic Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s C Libya’s Wehrey, “Ending Frederic Turkey to the Muslim , No. 223 ( , No. 223 The latter perceive the conservatives as descendants of the former Foreign Affairs Snapshots Affairs Foreign haos”, in S eptember 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=56741;eptember rothers, personal andpatronage ties, andfinally ivil War. Reconciling Politics, Rebuilding S Rebuilding War. Politics, ivil Reconciling B rothers and other Islamist groups. , 6 October 2014, http://fam.ag/1s6Xo2G. 2014, , 6October Congress (GN risis. T risis. he Danger of Picking S of Picking he Danger C), and the Al-Hassi ecurity”, in in ecurity”, S ubsequently, ides in in ides 1

DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI 4 the political forces andcivil society. development in the Libyan crisis concerns the relationship between the military, Alongside theimpact of regional andinternational dynamics, theothersignificant 3. Civilian-military relationships in theT solution. the Libyan conflict isthat themoderate Islamist forces must beapart of thefinal and make them lose sight of the fact that one of the main conditions for resolving would weaken Western neutrality within theframework of theUNSMILdialogue groups together–from IStoAnsar al-Sharia totheLibyan Muslim B or sidewith theLibyan conservatives and–asthelatter aredoing –lump all Islamist expand toinclude Libya, thiswould encouragetheWestern countries totilt towards the ones that support theconservatives. Therefore, iftheanti-I SI coalition wereto most of the countries of the region that belong to the anti-ISI coalition are also coalition, thus makingit difficult toaskthem to keep out of Libya. Furthermore, encourages Western countries tostrengthen ties with thecountries intheanti-ISI easy topredict but must certainly notbeunderestimated. Indeed, thisdevelopment UNSMIL mediation isthefactthat IShaslandedinLibya with effects that arenot One thingthat makes it difficult for Western positions tobe fully consistent with the necessary. of theWestern countries). Amore consistent stancebytheWestern countries is a severe obstacle tothemediation fostered byUNSMIL(which istheofficial policy interference by“neighbors” isareal threat totheintegrity andstability of Libya and and, more importantly, arenow membersof theanti-ISI coalition. Nevertheless Arabia andtheotherconservative Arab countries have long beenallies of theWest have with mostof theseregional powers: Turkey isamemberof NA diplomatic “hypocrisy” canbeexplainedbythealliances that Western countries of theregional powers intheinternational andregional diplomatic initiatives. S No Western country has openly objected thus far to the interference and ambiguities conflict. Turkey andotherparties participate insome of them,asiftheywereneutral inthe collaboration of theAfrican Union with theArab League. Countries like Egypt, Group for Libya”, bothestablishedinthepan-African settingandasaresult of the regional ones, such asthe“Political Working Group” andthe“International Contact Besides themany UNandinternational initiatives, mention must bemadeof some – asregardstheneighboring countries –preventing aspillover of theconflict. statements aimed at encouragingreconciliation andstabilization inLibya and At theinternational andregional levels, therearenumerous initiatives and through international mediation. consequently, thereislittle or nopropensity towork towards political reconciliation What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? obruk coalition … rothers. This TO, Saudi uch DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI 5 Libya’s C Libya’s Wehrey, “Ending Frederic org/about-us/highlights/highlights-2014/highlight-sana-wp20.html; rs/1Eigt5r. According to other sources the officers are 129: Nizar S 129: Nizar are officers the sources to other According rs/1Eigt5r. 3 2 armed forces, hasled toa“hybrid” the state, insteadof integrating themintheframework of arenewal of thenational policy by which the militias were put on the payroll and inserted in the ranks of and structuring of theirrespective security sectors. Thewretchedpower-sharing between thecivilian andmilitary components of thetwo coalitions istheevolution current balance betweenthetwo, thestartingpoint for assessingtherelationship transition have given the military no little sway over political leaders. Whatever the The state of warandthepower that themilitias gainedduring thepost-revolutionary What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? Hafter, togetherwith 108officers, were formally brought back into service. Between the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, the controversial General an appropriate institutional relationship betweenarmedforces andthe state. Al- T to beinfavor of therevolutionaries andtheIslamists. above, but also toupset themilitary balance that at thebeginningof thewarseemed It should beaddedthat it wasadopted notonly for thepolitical reasons mentioned This led theconservatives toadopt apolicy promoting thenational armedforces. Arabia, theEmirates) and,like Hafter,hostile totheMuslim B and ideologically close toHafterandtheircommon regional patrons (Egypt, Saudi induced theconservatives toshiftstrongly towards aposition that waspolitically 25 June elections andthestartof hostilities bytherevolutionary-Islamist camp way any less intense thantowards Hafter.Later, therejection of theresults of the conversatives towards the Muslim B 2013 andthePolitical Isolation law hadalready generated strong hostility inthe nascent democratic institutions. Nevertheless, theharshpolitical contrast in2012- Dignity” inMay, even theconservatives perceived thistobeathreat tothe and anarrative that equated Islamism with terrorism, andlaunched “Operation armed forces, appeared on thesceneinFebruary 2014with ananti-Islamist agenda However, when former General Hafter, in alliance with some sectors of the national have beenmore pragmatic andcollusive. system (themilitary of thepastregime)from theirarmedwing,theconservatives militias. However, while the revolutionaries have excluded theformal security In thisframework, bothsideshave more or less opportunistically favored the undermining theinstitutions. formal sector, thus depriving thestate of its monopoly over theuseof force and sector, that issubject tostate authority only on paper, competes with aweak S

Small Arms Survey Working Papers Survey Arms Small ector”, in oday therearedoubts that thispolicy hasachieved thegoal that theHoR and “Libya recalls former general Haftar for army duty”, in Reuters duty”, in for army Haftar general former recalls “Libya Wolfram Lacher and Peter C Peter and Lacher Wolfram Thinni presumably aimed at, namely astrengthening of the military within ivil War”, cit., p. 6 and ss. War”, 6 and p. ivil cit., ole, “Politics by Other Means. C Means. Other by “Politics ole, 2 or two-tier systemwhereby apowerful informal rothers andtheotherIslamists that wasinno , No. 20 (October 2014), http://www.smallarmssurvey. , No. (October 20 onflicting Interests in Libya’s S in Interests onflicting , 19 January 2015, http://reut. 2015, January , 19 arieldin, “ arieldin, rothers. T he B attle forattle ecurity ecurity 3 In In DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI 6 by thearmedforces andtheirnewArmy Chief of Staff, Abdelrazzak Nadhouri B His agendaof fighting against Islamism andindiscriminately lumping the Muslim appears tobeasevere hindrancetothenegotiations andapeaceful settlement. T required for victory over theopposite camp. manage therelationship betweencivilians andmilitary while rousing theforces conservative camp isdivided over this,andthat Al- Eljarh/status/565769191169736704; https://twitter.com/Eljarh/status/565765755451736065. government”, in Reuters in government”, the beginningof March. to what ishappening tovarious otherArab states. It isevident that there isalso astrong thermidorian tendencyinLibya –similar armed forces). bear pressure on a HoR not totally convinced of his appointment as head of the Monkey Cage Monkey http://wpo.st/oI660; Yezid S 8 7 6 5 4 http://www.middleeasteye.net/node/8994. 2014, November 25 Eye fold”, into army Middle East back in welcomed general’ ‘renegade “Libya’s Atkinson, Mary also S swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/libya_stabilization_by_military_means.html. B on 1stFebruary 2015because hisauthorization role, somuch sothat hetried tokeep Al- framework of thestate, thedivisions remain,andHafterhasprobably expandedhis share of power. No chain of command hasbeen set up within theinstitutional Hafter, theofficers andthe leaders ofthe militia have all firmly held ontotheir The truth of thematter isthat noreal reform of thearmedforces hastaken place: mid-February, according tosome tweetsbyblogger Mohammed Eljahr What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? 9 Reuters 2808p062-063.xml0. Jeune Afrique in jihadistes”, middleeasteye.net/node/34495. officially propose the appointment. that theS Chief of Staff).” At theend of February thespokesperson of the HoR announced lower than Commander in Chief – the speaker of the leaders): “Haftarmust benamedGeneral Commander of armedforces (apost following thesuggestion byMahmoudJibril (one of theforemost conservative well informed), theHoR waspreparingtoput Hafterinchargeof thearmedforces,

SWP Comments SWP enghazi”, in oday more thanever, aHafternotduly integrated into theinstitutional framework rothers togetherwith local aswell astrans-regional jihadists–aview shared Ayman Al-Warfalli B Ayman Feras and Ayman Al-Warfalli, “Libyan parliament proposes Haftar, a divisive figure, as head of army”, in army”, of as head figure, adivisive Haftar, proposes parliament Al-Warfalli,Ayman “Libyan Youssef Aït Akdim et Joan T Joan et Akdim Youssef Aït Eye Middle East in chief’”, ‘army as Haftar HoR names “Libya’s Robert S Robert 11 February 2015: https://twitter.com/Eljarh/status/565765501956411392; https://twitter.com/ https://twitter.com/Eljarh/status/565765501956411392; 2015: February 11 , 25 February 2015, http://reut.rs/1JLGiRY. 2015, February , 25 pringborg, “ pringborg, peaker, Aguila Saleh (who isalso headof thearmedforces), decidedto , 8 December 2014, hhttp://wpo.st/FK660. 2014, , 8December T The Monkey Cage Monkey The in militaries”, of Arab he resurgence , 2 February 2015, http://reut.rs/1tXRMd 2015, , 2February ayigh, “Militaries, civilians and the crisis of the Arab S Arab of the crisis the and civilians “Militaries, ayigh, , 7 novembre 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2807- 2014, , 7novembre 6 , 8 February 2015, p. 6, http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/ 6, p. 2015, , 8February ilouine, “Libye: Abderrazak Nadhouri, sabre au clair contre les les contre au clair sabre Nadhouri, Abderrazak “Libye: ilouine, osalum, “Libyan troops try to block PM visit, may signal rift within within rift signal may PM visit, to block try troops “Libyan osalum, 5 Theappointment wasbrought into effect at Thinni from visiting theBenghazi troops 7 hadnotbeensought (probably to 8 Thinni failed inhisattempt to It isequally evident that the , 2 March 2015, http://www. 2015, , 2March S . Chamber – & higher than , 5 December 2014, 2014, , 5December The The in tate, 4 (usually ee ee , 9

DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI 7 18 November 2014, http://t.co/ 2014, November 18 to-ghadames-as-misratan-option-fails. Libya-Analysis.com Qadhafi’s side at thetime of therevolution andpunishedbyMisrata bysending and terrorism. Theythenendorsed therehabilitation of thetown of T towards national reconciliation andout of concern for thespreadof extremism They showed adeepandconcrete interest inthedialogue, with bothaview facilitation meetingorganized bytheUNSMIL. terminals, thedelegates of the Municipal Council of Misrata attended thedialogue was heightening theintensity of theclashesbyattacking theRas Lanuf andElS military leadership, fully supported bythe political leadership basedinT and custodianof therevolution of 17February. Indeed, inearly 2015, while the has highlighted significant dissent inthetown of Misrata, taken tobe the heart Unexpectedly, byinvolving civil society, thedialogue promoted byUNSMIL between themilitary andcivil society rather thaninstitutions andgovernment. revolutionary-Islamist coalition, even though more with regardtorelationships The warhasalso led todevelopments incivilian-military relationships within the 4. …andinthecoalition of “Libyan Dawn” “simple, beautiful andamiable idea”. with of Libya, of which OmarAl-Hassi sungthepraisesinanunforgettable interview There arecertainly affinities betweenthe MuslimB to theUNSMILmediation. one of thebiggest obstacles torapprochement betweenthetwo warringcamps and exacerbation of thepolitical struggle during thefirstsixmonths of 2014andisnow (Hafter’s comrade-in-arms in the revolution) – was already a main factor inthe What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? 11 10 T appointment) “Haftar should be isolated before he causes the isolation of the whole saying on 9February (probably also inview of thediscussion underway about his and reconciliation. TheMinisterof theInterior, OmarAl-Zinki wasright in with theGulf countries andEgypt make himathreat for thepeacenegotiations agenda, hisagitated personal history andtheall-too-close relationships hehas Hafter may notbethe coup leader he ispurported tobeby“Dawn”, hisextreme severed theirties with it byfighting intherevolution of 17 February. Even though the officers and military rankand file ofthepastregime who sever or have already the otherhand,revolutionaries andIslamists needtoleave room, inturn, for for thoseIslamists that setthemselves apart from jihadismandterrorism, andon solution presupposes that, on theone hand,theconservatives needtoleave room

obruk block.”

Quoted by Jason Pack, “ Pack, Jason by Quoted Quoted by B by Quoted The Times inNovember 2014,inwhich hedescribed theAnsar al-Sharia asa el T el 11 rew, “ , 9 February 2015, http://www.libya-analysis.com/talks-to-pay-symbolic-visit- 2015, , 9February T The Times The authorities”, in Libyan with negotiations rejects leader ripoli T alks to Pay S alks B ZfPOAp6kd. ymbolic Visit to Ghadames as Misratan Option Fails”, Option in Misratan as Visit to Ghadames ymbolic 10 But it isequally self-evident that apolitical rothers andtheAnsar al-Sharia awergha (on ripoli, idr , DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI 8 new opportunities for peace. strong movement of civil society that ispushing,instead,for dialogue andoffers are noless uncompromising thanthegroup inT leaders and “hard-liners” of the revolution and of Islamism have the power and (construed asIslamist rather thanrevolutionary). In theothercoalition, themilitary powers of theregion andanuncompromising approach toward theothercoalition led toarelationship infavor of themilitary, astrong alliance with theanti-Islamist and have hadastrong impact on it. Developments intheT In conclusion, civilian-military relationships have evolved during thecivil war, town cangetbackon its feet economically. represent thedesiresof acivil society that iseagertofindasettlement sothat the the initiative of theMunicipal Council of Misrata therearepeople like Maetiqwho was more arepresentative of Misrata thanof the Islamists. It islikely that behind the rival government inT favor of Maetiqandtheotherinfavor of Al-Hassi confused session, theopposition inparliament broke down into two groups, one in press presented Maetiqasthecandidate of theIslamists. In actual fact,at that his election invalid, thus proving himself tobeamoderate. At thetime,Western session inParliament, acceptedtostepdown when theS a businessmanfrom Misrata who, appointed toreplaceAli Zeidaninaconfused S UN Geneva the in participants January 2015, http://t.co/q55D0bs 2015, January Commence to Geneva Wednesday in Office at RoundNew UN of Libyan Political Dialogue sister this standpoint, given theLibyan societal context, thepresenceof AhmedMaetiq’s probably feel theyarenotrepresented bytherevolutionary “hard-liners”. From of war.Misrata isanindustrial town with animportant businesscommunity who 13 12 Various recent observers with noway out. crumbling of the extremism of the revolutionary camp as a consequence of a war please the unyielding hard-liners of the coalition, but which bears witness to the number of support andreadjustment measures–agesturethat certainly didnot all the inhabitants of the town into exile), accepting the return of its citizens and a What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? 14 Affairs Letters From Letters Affairs http://reut.rs/1zf8Vy 2015, January musulmani/62773. Online

Ms Nehad Maetiq represents a Women Association in Libya; her name is on the list of list on the is name her Libya; in aWomen Association represents Maetiq Nehad Ms Ulf Laessing, “Misrata feels economic pinch as Libyan infighting spreads”, in Reuters spreads”, infighting Libyan as pinch economic feels “Misrata Laessing, Ulf Limes Limes in emusulmani”, laici non ètra Libia in battaglia vera “La Mezran, eKarim Pedde Nicola 13 , 5 giugno 2014, http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/la-vera-battaglia-in-libia-non-e-tra-laici-e- at asession of theUNSMILdialogue isquite significant. AhmedMaetiq is , 2 February 2015, http://fam.ag/1 2015, , 2February 12 obruk aftertheoutbreak of thecivil war).In fact,Maetiq MIL dialogue session in January 2015. S 2015. January in session dialogue MIL arepointing out that thetown istiredafterfour years S S Yb. ; Frederic Wehrey, War-Weary “Libya’s ; Frederic Peace?”, Foreign in Make C rP1V4. 14 obruk. However behindthemisa (who wastobecome thehead of upreme Courtdeclared S UN ee obruk coalition have MIL press release, release, press MIL , 29 , 29 , 13 , 13 DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI 9 2014, http://wpo.st/Gh660. 2014, 15 localized.” Like theotherforces, theLibyan jihadistsare“highly fragmented andhyper- 5. Thirdphaseof thecrisis:ISandEgypt appear on thescene “moderates.” At thispoint, bothcamps appear tobe“fractured”between“hard-liners”and What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? 17 16 intervention of several Arab states into theterritory of otherArab states: Jordan’s the threat wasimmediately perceived andwasjustasrapidly translated into the several Arab powers opposing ISandotherregional powers. Thisextension of represents anexpansion of its threat intheregion andof theconflict that finds levels. As stated earlier, in the regional perspective, IS’ infiltration into Libya causes on theLibyan crisis,bothdomestically andat theregional andinternational The mosturgent matter, however, isthepolitical impact that theinterference of IS funds). has already setup asuccessful racket intheareaof illegal emigration for raising damage it may produce inthemeantime arenotunderrated (inall likelihood IS than athreat inLibya, its ruthlessness make it essential that theprospects andthe and divisions of theiradversaries. Even though ISstill remainsariskrather strategic useof terror inthe framework of this propaganda, andintheweaknesses com/?p=41967. C opened up major opportunities. developments have posedobstacles todialogue andmediation but theyhave also racking for everyone andmakes leaders fundamentally unsecure.Onthewhole, there isnosign of themilitary balance tipping ineither direction. Thisisnerve- strength, which lies inits clever and professional propaganda, countries inwhich ISdecidestooperate. This meanswemust notoverestimate its This rapidity isdue tothefragmentation andpolitical andmilitary weaknessof the previous propagation inS actions andpresence of IS have spread with the samesurprisingrapidity astheir State inLibya: T and later there was news of theestablishment of threeprovinces of theIslamic Saudi emissaries of IS. In November, Al- the support of Libyan fighters backfrom the Fertile Crescent andYemenite and characteristics. In October,afirstjihadistgroup inDernaswore loyalty toISwith groups operated on domestic turfwithout displaying any trans-regional or global edmr. , 17 December 2014, http://www.lawfareblog. 2014, , 17 December Lawfare in Dilemmas”, ounterterrorism s

Jason Pack, “Libya’s power blocs are fracturing”, in Al-Jazeera in fracturing”, are blocs power “Libya’s Pack, Jason Frederic Wehrey, “Mosul in the Mediterranean? T Mediterranean? Wehrey, the in “Mosul Frederic tathis N. Khalivas, “ Khalivas, N. tathis 16 Up until October2014,Ansar al-Sharia andtheotherLibyan jihadist 15 Thissplit within thetwo camps isfurtherexacerbated bythefactthat ripolitania, Barqa(Cyrenaica) andFezzan. As of early 2015,the T he logic of violence in the Islamic S Islamic the in of violence he logic yria andIraq. Baghdadi received their pledge of loyalty he Islamic S he Islamic The Monkey Cage Monkey The tate’s in war”, tate in Libya and U. and Libya tate in , 13 February 2015, http://aje.io/ 2015, February , 13 17 intheruthless and S . , 7July 10 DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI declarations (andstop toying with interventionist rhetoric). seriously and ensure that it is successful rather than limiting themselves to issuing is precisely for thisreason that theynow needtosupport themediation effort regional allies, confirming theneed for dialogue andmediation. However, it response. For thetimebeing,they have rejectedtheadvances of Al-S which, at thispoint, areobliged tobemore transparent andaccountable intheir and on the other hand, of openly and directly calling on the Western countries strengthening the“hard-liners”who intend tocontinue until victory isachieved, had theeffect, on the one hand, of stepping up themilitary confrontation and this phase,theexplicit military intervention of an important regional patron has those held in June 2014, and then the civil war from July 2014 tothe present. In characterized bytheharshpolitical confrontation betweenthe2012elections and With thismove, Egypt opened athirdphaseintheLibyan crisis,afterthefirstphase of dialogue andmediation. and anti-terrorist effort. If thisweretohappen, it would put anendtoany chance West tosupport theT to theanti-ISI coalition toinclude Libya, but it went much furtherbyaskingthe not only pleaded for intervention bytheWest, henceextendingthecommitment on 18February 2015,requested byEgypt itself andFrance, theCairo government side of T was above all anattempt toinvolve Western powers inthearmedconflict on the decision to intervene openly in the Libyan crisis with air strikes and ground attacks Besides responding todomestic considerations, theunprecedented Egyptian the background. Africa come togetherwith thoseof Southern Europe, with theEuropean Union in from regional tointercontinental asthepowers of theMiddle EastandNorthern “Barkhane Operation.” on preciseresponsibilities regardingits political andstrategic interests with the undermines stability intheSahelregion andEgypt. Indeed, Paris hasalready taken for it isIS’possible connections with jihadismandthetrafficking that emigration racket, asmentioned earlier, isarather disconcerting development; more concrete threats: for , thefactthat ISseemstobepresent intheillegal on public opinion that governments cannotignore; on theotherhand,thereare Italy. Ontheone hand,propaganda like IS’threat toconquer Rome hasanimpact be notonly ariskbut areal threat for other Southern European countries, above all In addition, theinfiltration of ISinLibya aggravates theperception that it could for IS’execution of 21EgyptianCopts. and recently theairstrike launched bytheEgyptian airforce on Dernaasrevenge the anti-ISI coalition; Kurdish support at thetimeof thesiege of Kobane inS air force, supported bytheairforce of theEmirates, inIraq within theframework of What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? 18 Afrique

Rémi C Rémi , 19 juillet 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/AR 2014, juillet , 19 arayol, “Hollande prépare le lancement del’opération B le lancement prépare “Hollande arayol, obruk’s conservatives. In fact,at themeetingof theUNSecurity Council obruk government andits related forces inananti-Islamist 18 Thus, the“neighbors” of theLibyan crisisareexpanding T arkhane à N’Djamena”, in Jeune in àN’Djamena”, arkhane JAWE B 20140719135338. isi andhis yria; 11 DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI s-descent-into-chaos-abductions-summary-killings-and-other-abuses. Killings and Abuses Other Summary into Abductions, Chaos: Descent ’s International, http://bit.ly/1sIVtN7; Amnesty of Libya: the Gun’ ‘Rule militias Libya), byrival amid mounting crimes war western (A/HR needs and in capacity-building of human Libya technical andon rights the support on situation related 19 have incontrovertibly documented recently. are involved intheatrocities that theUNand non governmental organizations they beapplied totheleaders and representatives who obstruct dialogue or who previous ones have tobeenforced mosturgently; inparticular it iscompelling that 1) Thesanctions envisaged byResolution 2174 of theSecurity Council andthe recommended: must bedone with resolve andeffectively. T prove difficult tosustain.Therefore thedialogue must notonly besupported, it this response isunderpressurefrom ISandifdialogue wereunsuccessful, could be draggedinto theconflict andbyconfirming its support for mediation; however The Western world didwell torespond totheEgyptian provocation byrefusingto Libyan crisisandhow should it bearticulated? Against thisgeneral background, what response should begiven totherampant between Western countries andRussia. dubious results and negative repercussions on international relations, for instance of thewilling. Finally, it could even disregardlegality altogether, but would have intervention basedon theresponsibility toprotect or on an international coalition with theEgyptian intervention, or would beof doubtful legality, aswould bean intervention would lie outside the bounds of international legality, as was thecase for theSecurity Council toapprove apeace-enforcing intervention. Therefore, an be thetargetof anintervention. Secondly, theredo notappear tobe the conditions enforcing. In thecurrent state of affairs,moreover, it isnot at all clear who should UN legality, interventions madedisregardingmediation could only aimat peace- pave theway for peace-keeping interventions intheframework of international and displayed wisdom and realism: while asuccessful outcome of thedialogue would any mediation look less workable. In opting for dialogue, Western countries have making it legally andpolitically feasible while interventions notstemmingfrom mediation does notrule out theoption of intervention, on thecontrary it aimsat focused on thealternative betweenintervention andmediation. In actual fact, The flurry of debate prompted bythe Egyptian airstrikes inmid February 2015has 6. How should theWest respond? What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? examined. sanctions wereconsidered, but thelistshould have beenenforced andnotmerely Foreign Affairs Council on 9February 2015,listsof Libyan representatives liable to

UN Human Rights C Rights Human UN C /28/51), 12 January 2015, http://undocs.org/A/HR 2015, /28/51), January 12 Report of the United High Report Nations for Commissioner Human Rightsouncil, , January 2015, http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/benghazi- 19 o that end,thefollowing policies are At themeetingon Libya of theEU C /28/51; Amnesty International (on International /28/51; Amnesty , 30 October 2014, 2014, October , 30 12 DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI instead, while thegoal of theT can bebrought into theframework of aserious plantoreform thearmedforces; Thinni government so that its alliance with Hafter becomes less conditioning and 3) Western andEuropean governments needtobringpressure tobearon theAl- to at least limit theinterference of theseplayers. may, adiplomatic effort isneededtofind some kind ofpolitical convergence and whose support toits Libyan protégés iscurrently essentially political. Bethat asit Egypt, which hasalready taken thepath of directarmedinterference, thanTurkey, Kurdish issue andtheconflict inS security interests (armedIslamist uprising inEgypt andthe intertwining of the the maininterfering countries sincebothhave concrete national anddomestic conditions will bedifficult with the two countries –Turkey andEgypt. Theseare stabilization of Libya through negotiations. It must berecognizedthat settingsuch anti-ISI goals inIraq andS of thecoalition should beinduced toacknowledge andacceptthat thecommon political solidarity that supports theanti-ISI coalition: inotherwords theallies (transferring weapons andresources totheLibyans); it hastobeembeddedinthe not belimited todiscouragingspecific actions bythe allied regional governments that they stop or limit their interference in the Libyan conflict; the pressure should 2) Western diplomacy must findaway toexert pressure on theregional powers so they would have astrong polarizingeffect and would work againstmediation. political understanding among theparties (for instancetoprevent attacks byIS) nevertheless bevery challenging from amilitary point of view. In theabsenceof a oil facilities andharbourscould beauthorized bytheSecurity Council.This would and more recently of attacks andsabotage byIS.Interventions for protecting the Petroleum Defence Guards–who report totheCyrenaican “federalists” faction – because theyarepartly theobjectof clashesbetweenthefactions, of strikes bythe interventions toprotect theoil fields andexport terminals would bemore difficult accompanied byactions toensurehumanitarian interventions inLibya. External would have adisastrous impact on families andbusinessesaswell andshould be payments aremadefor energyimports, could befrozen. It istrue that thismeasure held locally bytheCentral Bank.However theassetsheldinbanksabroad, where competition tosecurethemthat beganinearly 2015.It ishardtoprotect theassets On theotherhand,it isimportant toprotect theresources from thedisastrous Arab governments andcertainly will notlead toapolitical settlement of thecrisis. dialogue rejectedinNovember 2014–ispartof thenarrative of theconservative recognized players (theconservatives of T non-state players (revolutionaries andthe“Dawn” Islamists) andinternationally T players andat thesametimelightening it towards therecognizedgovernment of submitted a draft resolution for prohibiting the transfer of weapons to non-state Council). At themeetingof theSecurity Council of 18February 2015,Jordan necessary, control measures if not naval blockades (with the approval of theSecurity It isalso important tostrengthenthebanon armstrafficking by adopting, where What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? obruk. Thedraftwasnotapproved. It isself-evident that thisdistinction between yria belinked tootherregional goals, such asthe obruk government tostrengthen theformal security yria for Turkey). It ismore difficult toinfluence obruk) –which theplatform for UNSMIL 13 DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI within theframework of theanti-ISI coalition; (c)asecond intervention within or coordinated among allies; (b)awideningof thecounter-terrorism operations could be: (a) direct counter-terrorism interventions by the West, either national government of national unity that cancall inpeace-keepers, thepossible options If themediation underway weretofail andit proved impossible tocreate a options andalternative plansbasedon outside interventions. For all thesereasons, thecurrent debate inWestern countries istrying toidentify the polarization that inamore recent phasehadbeenweakened bythemediation. Gulf countries). Finally, theEgyptian armedintervention revived andstrengthened supporters (from Hafter toIbrahimJadhran andhis“federalists,” from Egypt tothe Al- in theIslamist camp andthearrival on theLibyan sceneof IS,theweaknessof the but quite distant from theviews of theTunisian blindness of theLibyan Muslim B formidable obstacles: thenarcissistic paranoia of therevolutionaries, thepolitical Misrata. Above andbeyond theopposing, deeply-rooted interests, there arestill other hesitant. It doesn’t come asasurprisethat T by UNSMIL at the beginning of March in Morocco. accompanied byacease-fire,seemtoberemoteeven afterthemeetings organized uncertain. Its minimal goals, theformation of agovernment of national unity While theseefforts aredesirable, asuccessful outcome of thedialogue ishighly recognized andstrengthened. has emergedbecause people aretiredof war,and should therefore beencouraged, opendemocracy.net/node/90351. actually control.” undermining theperception that theyspeakfor alargerconstituency thanthey dialogue hashighlighted thefactthat civil society “sidelines hardline elements by the factions continue theconflict; asrightly pointed out by B constituency that hasthepotential todismantle thevested interests that make UNSMIL mediation hasundertaken; civil society inLibya isanemergingpolitical 4) Western governments should enhancethecontacts with civil society that the Hafter isworse thanQadhafi.’” in March 2014,there was‘nodifference betweenHafterand Qhadafi, and maybe reported that “As theheadof theMisrata Shura Council, S Hafter isparticularly hated byrevolutionaries andIslamists alike. Alison Pargeter possibility of progress inthedialogue with theothercoalition. Right or wrong, this –besidesthethermidorian risksmentioned above –isboundtoblock any Hafter andmakinghimthesupreme commander hastobediscouragedbecause sector istobeencouraged,theideathat thispolicy canbebasedon integrating What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? 21 20 2015, http://wpo.st/7r660. The Monkey Cage Monkey The in kingmaker?”, the be Misrata will Libya, “In McQuinn, brian

Alison Pargeter, “Libya’s downward spiral”, openDemocracy in downward “Libya’s Pargeter, Alison Thinni leadership andthedependenceof theT 21 Theimportance of themunicipal level of political representation 20 rothers (rather like that of theEgyptian B obruk ismore hesitant thanT B rothers), thespread of extremism obruk government on its various The factions are divided and , 9 February 2015, https://www. 2015, , 9February uleiman Al-Faqih, asserted rian McQuinn, the , 24 February February , 24 ripoli and rothers, 14 DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI print/15247. Daily ColumnsWorld Review Politics from theravages of thewarbeingwagedby parties tosecurethoseresources interventions could beenvisaged toprotect theeconomic resources of thecountry prepare the ground for future conflicts. At the present time, limited protection up imposing political solutions that not only do not solve the conflict, but actually aim of protecting thecivilian population and,asoccurredprecisely inLibya, end It must be added that interventions to protect often go well beyond the limited more like something toreflect upon thanasubstantive option at themoment. transatlantic relations. In thissense,theideaof Russian cooperation on Libya looks issue. If it were,it would riskbecoming astrongly divisive factor inEuropean and though, on condition that cooperation in Libya is not linked to the Ukrainian help Libya andothercountries getbackon theirfeet. Thisargument canwork, core interests could be afirststepinthedirection of rapprochement, andmight cooperating inajoint mission tosettle acrisisthat isremotefrom bothof their is notagood moment for therelationship betweenRussia andtheWest. However, participation intheoperations soastogive its approval, might notbepossible. This likely, also byChina.In thisrespect,one canonly wonder whether Russia’s direct of a recognized “responsibility to protect” would be vetoed by Russia and, very A peace-enforcement mandate from theSecurity Council within thesphere escalating crisis. actions to manage restricted areas of Western interest against the backdrop of an exist, for instanceintheFezzan. But theseinterventions would benomore than racket or weapons trafficking) arepossible and, albeit ona very small scale, already to cooperate. Nevertheless, special missions (for instanceagainsttheemigration the lackof national counter-terrorism forces, betheypolice or military, with which of Western countries) ispossible but limited infeasibility andefficacy because of Western counter-terrorism interventions (by individual countries or byalliances between thetwo factions tocombat IStogether. in Libya. T most farremoved from theposition of neutrality that theWest intends tomaintain West with T intervention againstISinLibya would inevitably correspond toanalliance of the become involved inthenarrative that unites thetwo conflicts. In thisnarrative, an be extremely difficult for ittodraw adistinction betweenISandLibya andnot and theretaliation on Derna.In other words, once theWest intervenes, it would on 18February 2015,immediately afterthedecapitation of theEgyptian Copts the invitation Egypt presented to theWest at themeetingof theSecurity Council Widening theanti-ISI operations toinclude Libya istantamount toaccepting the “responsibility toprotect” framework. What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? 22

Richard Gowan, “Renzi’s B “Renzi’s Gowan, Richard o bepolitically sound,thisoption would requireaprevious agreement obruk andHafter.Therefore, such anaction would bepolitically the lunder: Libya Role for Putin Risks Dividing West on Ukraine”, in in West on Ukraine”, Dividing Risks Role for Putin Libya lunder: , 9 March 2015, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/ 2015, , 9March 22 15 DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI success. conclusion, all efforts must bemadetostrengthenthedialogue soastoensure its would not stop it; they could even perpetuate it inthemedium tolong term.In factions. they function without some kindof political understandingamong thewarring That said,such interventions arenotatrue alternative toapolitical solution nor can than asolution. for themselves. Beyond that, any external intervention would beagamble rather What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? They could contribute to containing or dampening the conflict, but they Updated 16March 2015 16 DOCUMENTI IAI 15 | 03E - March 2015 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2015 IAI Latest DocumentiIAI What toDo About Libya: Intervention or Mediation? www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo B and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects. (AffarInternazionali), two series of research papers (QuaderniIAIand Research Papers) publishes anEnglish-language quarterly (TheInternational S and theMiddle East;defence economy andpolicy; andtransatlantic relations. TheIAI in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean research sectors are:European institutions andpolicies; Italian foreign policy; trends and abroad andisamemberof various international networks. More specifically, themain that end,it cooperates with otherresearch institutes, universities andfoundations inItaly and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences andpublications. T economy andinternational security. Anon-profit organisation, theIAIaimstofurther Founded byAltiero S Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) 14 | 14 |15 15 |01 15 |02 15 |02E 15 |03 15 |03E 15 |04 14 |13 06 3224360 06 3224363 nell’addestramento delle Forze armate italiane Nones, Sfide e opportunità dell’innovazione tecnologica Alessandro R.Ungaro, Alessandro Marrone eMichele Challenges and Opportunities Technological Innovation and Italian Armed Forces Training: Alessandro R.Ungaro, Alessandro Marrone andMichele Nones, mediazione Roberto Aliboni, Chefare in Libia? L’Occidente fraintervento e Mediation? Roberto Aliboni, toDoAbout What Libya: Intervention or politica? Gabriele Rosana, Crisiin Libia. Intervento militare osoluzione missioni internazionali e“polizza di assicurazione” Giulia Formichetti eAlessandro Marrone, L’Italia elaNATO, tra and Private Sectors Development in Africa: Fostering Cooperation BetweenPublic Francesca Buratti andLorenzo Vai, Promoting Stability and Eve of the40thAnniversary of theHelsinki Final Act Monika Wohlfeld, OSCE’s Mediterranean Engagement on the Report Migration Governance in theMediterranean Region. Summary Istituto Affari Internazionali, Changing Migration Patterns and runetti, 9-I-00186 Rome, Italy pinelli in1965,does research inthefields of foreign policy, political pectator), anonline webzine o