Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion __________________________________________________________________ Volume 2 2006 Article 4 __________________________________________________________________ The Market for Martyrs Laurence R. Iannaccone* Koch Professor of Economics George Mason University *
[email protected] The Market for Martyrs* Laurence R. Iannaccone Koch Professor of Economics George Mason University Abstract Injury-oriented sacrifice is a market phenomenon that is grounded in exc hanges between a relatively small supply of “martyrs” and a relatively large number of “demanders” who benefit from the martyrs’ acts. Contrary to popular perception, it is because of limited demand rather than limited supply that such markets rarely flourish. Suicidal attacks almost never profit the groups that are best equipped to recruit, train, and direct the potential killers. Once established, however, the markets are hard to shut down from the supply side because so few martyrs are required and because terrorist “firms” can readily substitute across different methods and recruits. On the other hand, relatively small changes in the political and economic environment can combine to undermine the market’s demand side. * This work was supported in part by grants from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and the Project on Religion, Political Economy, and Society at Harvard University. Early versions of this article were presented at the 2004 Meetings of the American Economic Association and at workshops at Stanford, George Mason University, the University of Washington, the Australian Defence Force Academy, and the Virginia Modeling, Analysis and Simulation Center. I have benefited from the suggestions of numerous colleagues and workshop participants, including Eli Berman, Bryan Caplan, Roger Finke, Marion Goldman, Eva Meyersson Milgrom, Charles Rowley, Todd Sandler, Rodney Stark, Carolyn Warner, Rhys Williams, and many others.