Complete Document / HAWAU-Y-85-002

PISHERY FEDElkALISN»' -INRRRGOVERNNmNTM DECISION@AXING IN PISSERY NMNhQENENT IN MWAII

NATIONAI. SEA GRANT DEPOSITORY, PELL LIBRARY 3~JlLDING URI, NAi H~ i:iNSETTBAY CAMPUS NARRAC iNSETT,R I 02882

Rose T. Pfund B.A., University of Hawaii, 1951

H.Ed., University of Hawaii, 1978

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

1985 c! Copyright by Rose Toshiko Pfund l985

Rose T. Pf und, Ph. D.

University of Pittsburgh, 1985

Regional f ishery management councils RFNCs!, composed of federal and state fishery administrators and f ishers, were established under the Nagnuson Fishery Conservation and Man- agement Act MPCMA! of 1976 to operationalize this newest f orm of intergovernmental administration "f ishery f ederal- ism.' This study on the implementation of the NFCMA in Hawaii was centered on two aspects of organizational behavior: ! the pervasive influence of historical antecedents and organizational norms on the operations of the Western

Pacific RPNC and ! the sociology of fishery decisionmakers'

information sources and their ability to use new information for problem solving.

Federal and state laws and congressional and archival documents provided background data on the formulation of the

NFCMA, legal origins of state and federal fishery agencies,

and Hawaii-United States relations. Six classes of f ishery

influentials were characterized by their openness-closedness

profile, a psychological index which was developed as one

part of this study. The inf ormation network of administrators was used to develop a map of the information sources and

flow for one state and two federal fishery agencies.

Results indicated that the process of decisionmaking is

not enhanced by structural changes to provide voting parity

because operational knowledge is not transferred with such

changes and decisionmakers are influenced by organizational

norms and historic antecedents. Zn addition, the socio-psy-

chological dimension of f ishery influentials revealed inhe-

rent differences in their capacity to utilize information for

problem solving> hence the information needs of these classes are not compatible. Moreover, risk-taking should probably be

indexed to a decisionmaker's ability to use new information for problem solving rather than to its availability.

Pinally, because Hawaii's geomorphology and f isheries

preclude the state fram 'measuring up" to national standards,

a federal-state compact, the Hawaii Pishing Authority, is proposed f or the management of Hawaii' s f ishery resources. PREFACE

In 197S af ter hearing a chance remark that less that l0%

of all academic research results were actually applied to societal needs, I conducted a survey of federal agencies which fund academic research. I was disturbed to find that

these agencies did not evaluate the societal impact of the

research they had funded. Moreover, except for two agencies,

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the

Department of Agriculture, none of the agencies had had technology transfer projects as a programmatic component. In other words, little or no effort was made to disseminate research results to users.

Because of my position at that time as the coordinator of publications and information services of the University of

Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, my first thought was that there was a need to institutionalize channels for disseminat- ing technical and scientif ic inf ormation. Accordingly, I wrote a research proposal to characterize the information channels of fishery agencies and decisionmakers in Hawaii.

The proposal, "Institutional Policymaking on the Management of Resources of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands," Project

No. NI/R-lS, was funded by Sea Grant for two years f.y. 1982 and l983! . The results of this research provided the empirical data which characterize the information sources of the administrators of two federal and one state fishery agencies and enabled me to develop the openness-closedness indices, which characterize the ability of six classes of fishery decisionmakers to use information for problem-solving.

Throughout the period of data gathering and analyses and writing and re-writing of this dissertation, the encouragement of Dr. Jack Davidson, Director of the University of

Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, was unwavering. I especially appreciate his well-timed prodding.

No doctoral dissertation can ever be completed successfully without the conviction of the dissertation advisor that the work of his or her student is a diamond in the rough and that its brilliance will shine through with editing and re-writing. For his patience and forebearance and the intellectual challenges he posed, which forced me to learn what discipline really means, I express my gratitude to Dr.

Frederick C. Thayer. His suggestions, criticisms which I sometimes took unkindly!, questions, and more questions have been the catalysts which precipitated new thoughts and relationships. Xf any part of this dissertation rises above the ordinary, it is in large part due to Dr. Thayer's remorseless and unceasing prodding and questioning. lt was my good for- tune that he agreed to chair my dissertation committee.

And finally, I express my deep appreciation to my husband, Roy, and family Leona, Eric, Frederick, Laurel and

Patricia for their support and ecouragement. ACKNHMIHKNEHT

The author was the principal investigator of a two-year project entitled, 'Institutional Pol icymaking on the Manage- ment of the Resources of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands,'

NI/R-15, funded by the University of Hawaii Sea Grant College

Program under NOAA Institutional grant no. NASl-AA-D-00070.

This project enabled the author to carry out the empirical field surveys and complete the data analyses.

I am also indebted to the following individuals who reviewed drafts of various sections of this dissertation<

Herbert Weaver, Dean Neubauer, Rober t Skillman, Richard

Uchida, Henry Okamura, Paul Kawamoto, Allan Katekaru, Abraham

Piiania, Karen Tanoue, Brooks Takenaka, Karl Samples, Jerry

Leinecke, Henry Sakuda, Howard Yoshida, Gertrude Nishihara, and Alexander Spoehr. TABLE OP CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ e ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ v

Chapter l. INTRODUCTION...... ,...... l

PART I THE INSTITUTIONAL NEXUS

Chapter 2. THE MGNUBON FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACZ: The National Mandate...... 21 Chapter 3. THE STATE OF HAWAII AND XTS FISHERY RESOURCESi~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ F 0 ' 68

Chapter 4. "MANIFEST DESTINY' s THE UNITED STATES- HNAZI ZNTERACTXONI e .. o i i... e . s . i e s . e e . i o.... e 101

PART II+ THE INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS THEIR MISSION AND INTl9kESTS

Chapter 5. THE V. S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE...... l36

Chapter 6. THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE...... l62

Chapter 7. THE HAWAII DZVISXON OF AQUATIC RESOURCES...... 186

Chapter 8. THE HAWAIIAN COMMERCIAL FISHERS...... 21l

PART XII. THE HUMAN ELENENT OP iPISHY FEDERALISM'

Chapter 9. THE WESTERN PACIFIC RBGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT OOUNCXL. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 233 Chapter 10. THE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF DECXS XON-MAKERS AS XNPORMATXON PROCESSORS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ e o ~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 26 2

PART m. mSCLUSIOSS AND RaaOMmNDATIOSS

CHAPTER 11 ~ THE CONCLUSION: A SUMMARY OF TH E RESULTS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 84

CHAPTER 12. THE HNl'AII FXSHING AUTHORITY. ~ ~ ~ o ~ o e o ~ i ~ o ~ ~ o304

MRT V APPBNDZCES

APPENDXX A. SURVEY OF HAWAIIAN FISHERS... ~.... ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ .321

APPENDXX B ~ THE DOGMATIS& RXG XDITY ATTRIBUTES OF FISHERY-SECTOR DECXS IONMAKERS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~333

APPENDIX C INFORMATION NETWORK OF FEDERAL AND STATE FISHERY-SECTOR ADMIN XSTRATORS e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 52

MR% VX BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CITED WORKS ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~~ ~i ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~374 LIST OF TABLES

2.3, Poreign f ishing vessels operating off U.S. coasts during 1973...... 27

2.2 List of damaged or threatened species...... 29

3.1 Landings of same commercially significant species: 1960t 1970' 1980...... 83

3.2 Actual and potential landings of commercially valuable f isheries in Hawaii o t ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~e ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 8 9

8,1 Fishery representatives and their consti tuenci es...... 226

9.1 Composi tion of the WPRFNC...... 241

10.1 High-low matrix of dogmatism and rigidity scores...... 267

10.2 Prof ile of f ishery influentials...... 268 l2 ~ l Landing tax schedule...... 310

12.2 Number of undocumented vessels...... 311

12.3 Proposed annual fees..... ~...... 312

A. 1 Distribution of survey population...... 321

A.2 Survey population reached by telephone.....322

A. 3 Classes of the sample population...... 323

A 4 Percentage of fishers who are captains on the five main islands...... 324

A.5 Distance traveled to fishing grounds by commercial fishers...... ,.....324

A.6 Commercial fishers on the five main slandse~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 325

A.7 Work status of commercial fishers...... ,.326 A.8 Work status of commercial fishers on the five main islands...... 327

A.9 Age of commercial f ishers...... 327

A. 10 Percentage of fishers on the main islands between 31 and 50 years...... 328

Ao ll Percentage of vessels on five main islands...... 329

A. l2 Numbers of f ishers using selected f ishing methods...... 329

A. 13 Fishing methods used vs distance from shore...... 331

A.14 Percentage of vessels which f ish 4-30 miles off the five main islands...... 331

B. 1 Percentage of questionnaires returned...... 338

8,2 Mean scores of decisionmakers...... 340

8,3 Bi-serial correlation coeff icients...... 344

8,4 Spread of respondents by class below and above the rigidity and dogmatism score median of the sample group...... 345

B,5 Respondents by government/non-government grouping, above and below the rigidity and dogmatism score medial of the sample g r oup...... 346

8,6 Rigidity-dogmatiaa prof ile by class and level of government...... 347

B 7 Distribution of decisionmakers above the 66 percentile of the rigidity and dogmati sm scor'est o ee e~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~ 349

8.8 Distribution of deci sionmakers above the 75 percentile of the rigidity and dogmatism scores...... 350

Xi LIST OF FIGURBS

Research Design...... 3

3.1 The Hawaiian Archipelago...... 70

3.2 Statewide fish aggregation buoy system..... 85

5.1 Organizational chart of the Department of the Interior. ee~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ el52

5.2 Organizational chart of the Regional Office of the USFWS: Portland, Oregon...... 153

6.l Organizational structur e of the NMFS...... 171

6.2 Regions of the NMFS...... ~ ...... ~ ~~ .172

6.3 Organizational chart of the NMPS: 1982.....173

6 ~ 4 Organizational chart of the Honolulu Laboratory, Southwest Fisheries Center.....178

6.5 Organizational chart of the Western Pacific Program Office, NMF8...... 180

7.1 Organizational chart of the Department of Land and Natural Resources...... 201

7.2 Evolution of the Division of Aquatic Resourcese~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~~ ~o ~~ ~o ~~ ~~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 204

B. 1 Range of the dogmatism scores...... 342

B.2 Bi-serial correlation coef f icients...... 343

C. 1 Sources of inf ormation f or general agency decisionmaking: NMFS...... 356

C.2 MFCMA-related inf ormation network: NMFS....359

C 3 Sources of information for general agency decisionmaking: USFWS...... 361

C.4 MFCMA-related information networK: USFWS...362

xii C.5 Sources of information for general agency decisionmaking: DAR...... 364

C.6 MFCMA-related inf ormation network: DAR.....364

C.7 Tri-agency network for general agency deci si onm aking...... 366

C.8 Tri-agency network for NFCNA-related deci sionmaki ng...... 370 'Jhe Research Problem

The Magnuson Fi.shery Conservation and Management Act of

1976 MFCMA!, PI 94-26S, is the most comprehensive public policy to date for the management of the nation's fishery resources. Xt altered extant institutional structures and established a new species of intergovernmental administration

--"f ishery federalism' an innovative tripartite organizational structure which includes representatives of the fishing industry and state and federal fishery agencies. In an unprecedented action, Congress legitimized the participation of private-sector fishing interests as co-equals with state and f ederal administrators in decisionmaking.

This research explores the structural relationships created by 'fishery federalism' and its operation in Hawaii.

More specifically, the threefold purpose of this research is:

at the theoretical level, to explicate the effect of norms of established institutional organizations and historicaL, environmental, and human factors on new decisionmaking processes and procedures initiated by 'f ishery federalism' under the MPCMA;

at the applied level, to characterize and evaluate the implementation of the MPCMAin Hawaii; and

as a result of this study output of 1 + 2!, to propose a new management option. The inter-relationship of these three purposes and the

influence of history are shown in Figure l.l. The five fac-

tors, which comprise the parameters of the crass-sectional

analyses of 'fishery federalism,' are given under "Research

Parameters' l.! . These factors affect decisianmaking proce-

dures ! > in turn, both the factors and the decisionmaking

pracedures affect the implementation of the MFCMA in Hawaii

! . Finally, as a result of this study, a new decisionmak-

ing structure, better f itted to Hawaii, is proposed.

'The Conceptual Framework

This study was centered on three propositions. The first is that measurement of "risk' in decisionmaking should

be indexed to the psychological prof iles of decisionmakers.l

The second proposition is that information redundancy will always exist because decisionmakers perceive a need to

control access to information which they consider necessary

for decisianmaking.2

The third proposition is that legislated structural

changes, like RPHCs, group individuals who often have

This proposition does not agree with what is now generally accepted that risk is directly related ta the amount and type of information available. It is widely believed that information use is contingent on the "packaging' of information, e.g., re-writing technical tracts to non-technical articles. The present study indicates that the psychologi- cally-conditioned receptivity af an individual may be a critical factor which needs to be considered. 2 The assumption madehere is that all information, including scientific information, is biased. Thus, "good" data is a relative phenomenon, at best. INTERGOVERNMENTAL DECISIONNAKINQ IN FISHERY MANAGEMENT IN HAWAII

Figure l.l. Research Design incompatible personal and/or organizational values and goals and too little or no experience with the "rules of the road" to enable them to perceive their positions of strengths and weaknesses in the new structure.

Operational Hypotheses

The following operational hypotheses guide this study:

l. Decisionmaking within an agency is governed by internal organizational priorities

2. Technical and/or new information is not readily utilized by decisionmakers, especially if generated by others

3. Historical U.S.-Hawaii interactions influence in important ways present relationships in f ishery management

4. Historical mandates embedded in the agencies charged with the implementation of the MFCMA influence the behavior of the agencies

5. Hawaiian fishermen, who hold commercial fishing licenses, know very little about the MPCMA These are the 'commonsensical" propositions which were ex- plored in this research.

Public Policy Formulation and laplementation

The study of public policies on resource allocation and management, as is true of public policy analysis in general, requires the observation of human involvement in processes which are used to formulate and then subsequently to implement the policy. Most studies are ex post and yield cross- sectional descriptions and/or evaluations by utilizing selected variables to depict the universe of the intervention.

As shown in Figure l.l, the present study is of this nature. The typical scenario of public policy formulation and implementation involves human interaction in which authority, vested in various loci of government, is influenced by power-

ful public and private special interest groups. This is a

significant given in public policymaking which produces two outcomes. The first is the application of some sort of

'equity calculation" of costs and benefits. The second is an end-product which is f uzzy and non-specif ic. Thus, acts of

Congress cannot be implemented without the writing of regulations by executive agencies that presumably reflect congressional intent through a legally established procedure known as the Administrative Procedures Act.3 As reported in studies by the Advisory Commission on Xntergovernmental

Relations, national public policies are usually implemented

! through state governments by providing rewards in the form of funds! or punishment by the withholding of funds! or

! by the outright usurping of state prerogatives by the federal government. These two approaches have dominated federalism in recent times.

While this research is not one which is primarily concerned with model development, for example, in the manner of Graham Allison,4 the succinctness of an equation is useful in def ining the pre-MFCHA and NPCMA-mandated f ishery manage-

This act outlines procedures for the conduct of the activities of federal agencies [5 USC, 551-559]. 4 Graham Allison, Boston: Little 6 Co., 1971! . ment paradigms. Hence, the equations presented here are used only as heuristic tools to explicate t,he essence of the structural changes made by the MPCMA.

Mrfmc ~ F + S + U!I ! where M Pre-MPCMA management which occurred without formalized interaction

Mrfmc MPCMA-mandated management by regional fishery management councils rfmc! as the formal fora for interaction of the two governmental sectors, F and8, andU

P ~ federal agencies

8 ~ state agencies

U ~ User publics: fishers, fishery experts, seafood processors

I Intervening variable

Equation l! represents the uncoordinated pre-MFCNA participation of the federal and state governments as actors in managing fishery resources prescribed in various separate legal mandates. In equation !, the intervening variable,

I, is the interaction effect of the intervention, the regional fishery management councils RPMCs! . Instead of carrying out discrete activities, the actors, F, S, and U, are bound within the confines of a RPMC. The simple additive relationship shown in equation ! is altered by the multiplicative ef f ect of the intervening variable. Beyond illustrating the truism that the total is greater than the sum of its part.s, equation ! shears the potential for cooperative behavior among the three classes of actors.5 The

MFCMA-mandated intervention, RPMCs, al ter ed existing institu-

tional decisionmaking structures to formalize this coopera-

tionn.

Signif icance of the Research

This is the first study to examine the effect of the

MFCMAon private and public f ishery influentials in Hawaii.

Moreover, it is one of the few studies to evaluate the fit of legislative intent and the actual implementation of fishery pol ici es.

Although standard social science and historiographical methodologies were used to gather information, they were applied in new ways to improve the process of analyses. The openness-closedness profile and the mapping of intra- and inter-agency inf ormation 1 inkages of f ishery administrators are new applications of well-established social science methodologies. awhile the use of archival search is conventional, discovery of obscure correspondence of the Navy

Department heLd in the National Archives yielded new insight into federal activity in the Hawaiian Islands. The departmental dispatches suggest motivations for the involvement of

Theodore Roosevelt in the acquisition of the Northwestern

Hawaiian Islands MifHI! which have not been previously documented in the literature on the Hawaiian Islands.

5 H. C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, eds., {Bath, England: Management Publications Trust, 194l!, p. l94. Furthermore, various parts of this dissertation have

been used by the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management

Council WPRPMC!, members of the State Legislature, the U. S.

Fish and Wildlife Service USPWS!, National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS!, the Division of Aquatic Resources DAR!, and fishers. Research results have also been presented at national meetings of the American Fisheries Society Ithaca,

New York: l984!, the American Society for Public Adainistra-

tion Indianapolis, Indiana: 1985!, and at the Symposium on

Resource Assessment of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Honolulu, Hawaii: 1983! . Two papers have been published.

Rjesearch Design Overview

The principal conceptual constructs of the research, fully discussed in the text to follow, are summarized here.

Prohlea Identif ication

Because knowledge of the formulation of a policy is critical to the understanding of its implementation, the political process surrounding the enactment of the MFCMA was considered to be a significant aspect of this study. As a reflection of the motivations and desires of Congress, the

MFCMAis a curious phenomenon. If the usual criteria for congressional action, such as the developaent of a major revenue source or a widespread organized national constituency, are applied, the probability that the MFCMAwould be enacted into law was low.

Additionallyg the MFCMAfaced formidable opposition f rom the Department of State and the National Security Council NSC! because it departed from an old tradition by establishing a fisheries conservation zone PCS! which extends 200 miles seaward f ran U. S. coastlines. The Department of

State's opposition was linked to the United Nations j;aw of the Sea negotiations which had begun in 1973. The Department was opposed to any unilateral action to extend the seaward boundaries of the United States for any purpose because it was afraid of the potentially negative impact of such an action on the ongoing negotiations. The NSC appears to have supported the Law of the Sea convention because American negotiators had been able to secure guaranteed passage of warships and submarines through critical straits and territorial seas without surfacing.

There were, theref ore, considerable obstacles f acing the passage of the MFCMA, any one of which could have been a maj or blockage. However, the depletion of commercially val u- able coastal fisheries was undeniableg the proponents of the

NPCMA successfully presented this fact as a national problem.

The Formulation of 'Fishery Federalim

Despite ample documentation of difficulties in eliciting cooperation among f ederal agencies, e. g., the Federal Region- al Councils, Congress created RFNCs to implement the NFCHA--a tangible commitment to management, by committee. Evidently,

Congress saw the positive values of regionalization and local participation in fishery management to be greater than the negative aspects of establishing a national network of RPNCs. The inclusion of local user input into the decisionmaking process speaks to congressional recognition that there is value in decentralizing and allowing the participation of those who have 'local" knowledge. The principle illustrated is "all the brainpower is not located in the center.' "Fish- ery federalism' is, at least in theory, cooperative federalism in the truest sense. However, not surprisingly, the f it of theory with reality is less than ideal.

The Mylementation of. Fishery Pederalisa'

The MFCMAis operationalized by the WPRFMCin Hawaii and seven other RFMCs in other U.S. coastal regions. RFMCs are composed of the two federal fishery agencies, VSPWS of the

Department of the Interior and NMFS of the Department of Com- merce, the Coast Guard, and the Department of State. The

Coast Guard is responsible for monitoring fishing activity in the FCK, and the Department of State allocates harvesting quotas to foreign governments who have governing international fishery agreements GIFAs! with the United States.

The only federal voting member of the RFMC is the NMFS representative. The head of OAR, Hawaii's f ishery agency, is a voting member of the WPRFMC.

Other voting members of the WPRFMCare fishery agency heads of American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mari- anas Islands, and Guam and six fishers and fishing industry representatives who are appointed by the Secretary of Com- merce from a list provided hy the Governors of the state and territories. There are basic problems which were not considered by Congress in its haste to enact the NFCMA to save America' s depleted fisheries. Although control of foreign fishing, as one means of mitigating overfishing, is addressed, the MPCNA lacks cangressional vaice on how U.S. coastal fisheries were ta be ultimately "saved.' The RPMCs have been left with the burden of attempting to balance the various contending interests both within their own boundaries and those within adjoining regions with the limitations of the fisheries resources under their jurisdiction.

Although Hawaii does not have the lateral boundary conflicts faced by continental states, there are other problems.

The insular environment and the nature of its fisheries do not lend themselves to the developnent of fishery management plans PMPs! which are based an continental norms. A 1984 evaluation of the WPRFMCclearly established this anomaly.

The performance of the WPRFMC was rated sa poorly that the recommendation was to dissolve it.

Furthermore, historic antecedents of economic and political colonialism are sa fundamental in nature that they color all state-federal relationships with distrust. The behavior of Hawaii's f ishery influentials vis-a-vis federal fishery administrators is na exception.

methodologies

A summary of methodolagies and instruments used to obtain information for this research is presented here.

Detailed descriptions are given in Appendices A, B, and C. 12

Research parameters

The discussion on the five parameters of this study, shown in Figure L.1< "Research Parameters,' are presented in thi s disser tation as f ol low s:

l. The political factors Chapter 2

2. Environmental factors Chapter 3

3. Intergovernmental relations factors Chapter 4

4. Insti tutional and normative factors Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8

5. Human factors Chapter 9, 10 The proposed new structure for fishery management is described in Chapter 12.

Chapters 2 through 8 provide a cross-sectional analysis of the contextual background to comprehend the nexus between historical antecedents and current events and their influence on the implementation of the MFCMA in Hawaii see Figure

L.L!. This information is needed to understand the motivations and behavior of the actors and their organizations.

Chapters 9 and 10 discuss the decisiomnaking structure created by the MFCMA and the socio-psychological characteristics of the decisionmakers. Overall, the methodological problem was to establish boundaries around the essential data requirements for the present study.

Congressional reports and documents provided information on historical events as well as the background on the enactment of the MFCMA. The formulation of the MFCMA is a text- book case of a well-organized effort to nationalize an issue, 13 which is essentially regional or even local in nature, Lind- blam and Jones explicate this process very well.6

Political Pactors in the Mrmulation of the NPl3Q,. The political skills of some NetN England f ishers are evident, in their use of emotionally charged information such as sigh't- ings and encounters with Russian trawlers fishing in waters less than lGO miles offshore and in the Chesapeake Bay. The verbatim transcript of the emotional on-site hearings of the

House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and ot.her congressional documents, including the were used as primary sources and proved to be fascinating reading. Conference and professional papers were also used to obtain a wider picture of the formulation of the MPCMAas a public policy.

Enviromental Pactors: Geography and Pishery Resources of the Hawaiian Archipelago. As another part of the background, a synoptic view of the geography and fishery resources of the Hawaiian archipelago was obtained f ram state and federal documents and research reports. Hawaii's dispute with the federal government over the 5urisdiction of its channel waters and federal attempts to extend the seaward boundary of the Northwestern Hawaiian islands wildlife refuge has caused the state to take a cautious approach in fishery- related deci sionmaking.

6 Charles E. Lindblomg , 2nd Ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980!; see also, Charles 0. Jones. g 2nd Ed. Belmont, Californiai Duxbury Press, 1977! . 14

Intergovernmental Ralatj.ons Factors. The diplomatic

history of the interaction between the United States and

Hawaii and the underlying ideologies and motivations for an-

nexation are discussed in some detail in this dissertation.

Basic texts on Hawaiian history and other recent works

provided an analytical framework for explicating American-

Hawaiian relationships which began with the arrival of the first U.S. minister to Hawaii in 1820. Congressional

documents were primary sources used in this research.

Institutional and Noraative Factors. A legal history of the missional mandates and evolvement of the USPRS, NMPS, and

DAR provides the genesis of the organizational functions, values, and precedents which influence the behavior of the administrators who are affiliated with these agencies. U. S.

and Hawaii Codes and Statutes were used as primary data and

reports and publications of the agencies as secondary data.

Because extant data was lacking, a tele+one survey was

conducted to characterize Hawaiian fishers. The survey group

includes the "true" fulltime commercial fishers as well as

recreational and sport fishers who sell their catch.

IIuaan factors. A significant aspect of this study was

the human actors and their capacity to process information

for problem solving because the MFCMAmande,tes the gathering

of new data for the development of PMPs. Given an abundance

of information, what is the human capacity to utilize itP Two survey instruments were used to answer this question by

characterizing decisionmakers as inf ormation processors: l. A rigidity-dogmatism questionnaire

2. An information network questionnaire

The rigidity-dogmatism questionnaire was a composite of

tested instruments developed by Milton Rokeach7 and Elizabeth Wesley.8 Rokeach's instrument measures dogmatism; Wesley' s measures rigidity. These two psychological attributes vere

used to develop an openness-closedness profile of six classes

of f ishery-related decisionmakers. The survey sample was

further categorized into governmental affiliation/non-affili-

ation< i. e. < f ederal, state, county, and non-governmental,

and residence of the respondents.

The second field study centered on key administrators of

NMFS, DAR, and USFWS. They were interviewed to determine the

difference between their inf ormation-seeking behavior for

general decisionmaking and MPCÃA-related decisionmaking. Ad-

ditionally, because the national, regional, and local-level

administrators of NMPS and USPWSwere interviewed, a compo-

site picture of intra-agency information linkages was ob-

tained for these agencies by merging the administrators' in-

formation network. As a third iteration, the intra-agency

netvorks of the three agencies were plotted as a single com-

posite inter-agency netvork to define the information link-

7 Milton Rokeach, New York:The Free Press, 1979! . 8 Elizabeth Wesley, 'Preservative Behavior in a Concept- Formation Task as a Function of Manifest Anxiety and Rigidi ty 48 9S3!: 129-134 i 16 ages of the major actors under MFCMA and non-MPCMA related si tuations.

Decisionaaking Procedures

The RPMCs were examined as the fora established for decisionmaking under the MPCMA. Congressional intent relative to the RPMCswas evaluated by analyzing the composition of the WPRPMCand the report of the Inspector General of the

Depar tment of Commerce.

%he Proposed Option: The Hawaii Pishing Authori+

Because Hawaii can never fit norms which are based on continental geomorphology and resources, an alternative to management under the NPCNA is proposed. The establishment of a public authority, the Hawaii Fishing Authority HPA! to integrate vertically the management and economic development of Hawaii's f ishery resources is attractive for a variety of reasons. The most significant of these is that it is a time- tested design, economically and politically independent of the vagaries of legislative f unding and political pressures.

Although the concept of public authorities is not new, the proposal presented here as a joint federal-state management structure for fishery resources is new. As proposed, the HPA will allow Hawaiian fisheries to be managed in full recognition of the state's insular character. PART X THE XhfSTITUTXONAL HRXUS Public policy is the road map which directs the course

of public institutions and defines their operational norms.

As such, the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act

NFCNA! of l976 coordinates the activities of the federal and state governments and the private fishery sector in the management of the nation's coastal fisheries. Among other provisions, it. established a 200-mile j urisdictional boundary to restrict foreign access to domestic fisheries and eight regional fishery management councils to develop management plans far non-migratory coastal species.

The significance of the MFCMA can only be understood in the context of the historical and contemporary political environments which led to its enactment. An unlikely coalition of coastal commercial and sports fishers and conservationists managed to bring about a relatively speedy adoption of the MPCMA. However, each actor supported the MFCMAas the management vehicle to mitigate overfishing for different reasons. Additionally, there was widespread acknowledgement that because the nation's coastal fisheries were being overfished, there was a need to manage these fisheries.

Hawaii was not caught up in the controversy over coastal fisheries because tunas, which are migratory species and its principal coastal fishery are excluded f rom the NFCNA. How- ever, the MFCMAaffects Hawaii in a unique way because its insular geography and morphology make it unlike any other

state. Along with the difference in its geography, Hawaii's

relationship with the federal government has historical ante-

cedents which profoundly affect it to this day. As a weak monarchy astride Pacific Ocean commercial and military

routes, the Hawaiian Islands depended on the United States

for protection. The United States, in turn, needed a mid-Pa-

cific coaling station, which the Hawaiian monarchy provided

in the Reciprocity Treaty of 1884 by turning over the use of

Pearl Harbor to the V.S. Navy.

After the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in 1898,

two subsequent actions initiated by Theodore Roosevelt

secured U. S. jurisdiction over the entire archipelago. In 1903 the United States established a naval outpost on Midway

Islands and, in 1909, the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands were

designated a national wildlife refuge. These two acquisi-

tions occurred without protest from the territorial government. It should be noted, however, that the territorial

government was not in a position to protest the actions of

the United States.

Until national interest in fishery resources development became important in the early 1970's, federal jurisdiction over more than two-thirds of the Hawaiian archipelago was not

a federal-state problem. With the establishment of a 200-

mile fishery conservation zone, the state's perspective has

changed. As is true of all insular environments with limited

land mass, Hawaii's most abundant exploitable natural resource is the vast ocean and its f isheries and crustal

minerals. Of the two, fish can be directly exploited by the

state's residents. Any revenue from crustal minerals is only

a long-term possibility, and likely to be realized by

out-of-state firms. Xn the three chapters of Part I that follow, the politics of the formulation and the national policy direction promoted by the MFCMA Chapter 2!, the fishery resources of the Hawaiian archipelago Chapter 3!, and the current and historical relationship between the

United States and Hawaii Chapter 4! provide the background for understanding the environment in which the present day

institutions manage the fishery resources of the state. UULPTER 2

THE MGEUSM FISHERY CORSRRVATIOE AIID MANAGEMENT ACTI The National Mandate

Five years after the enactment of the Nagnuson Fishery

Conservation and Management Act NFCNA! of l976, PL 94-265, it was the judgment of Lee Anderson that the MFCMAwas no more than a promise of a potential for management because

...of difficulties of managing a marine fishery and the unresolved conflicts over the proper objectives of management... l Although the problems raised by Anderson can probably be raised for the management of any public resource, the 'cal- f licts over the proper objectives of management" take on added significance because fishery resources have a long tradition of being common goods subject to an open access regime. Often called the 200-mile Extended Jurisdiction Act, the MFCMAessentially changed these traditions by institu- tionalizing controlled access and national management standards within a 200-mile fishery conservation zone FCZ! .

Moreover, it created eight regional fishery management councils RPMCs! to manage the fisheries within the PCZ.2

l Lee Anderson, "Marine Fisheries, in ed. Paul R. Por tnoy Washington, DC: Resources of the Future, l982!, p. l65. 2 The organizational structure and operation of the RFNCsare discussed in Chapter 9. 22

This chapter is concerned with the political factors of

'fishery federalism,' particularly as they affect the policymaking process and the enactment of the MFCMA, the politics of f isheries develogaent, and the circumstances and processes which enabled a small number of fishers and other special interest groups to secure passage of the MFCMA.

These aspects of the formulation of the MFCMAare important to an understanding of its institutional implications as a national policy for managing f ishery resources. Of particular significance to the present research, therefore, is the establishment of the RFMCs.

Theories of the Policyaaking Process

According to public policy theorists, the enactment of federal public policy requires the aggregation and channeling of a critical mass of nationally dispersed interest groups which have access to, and influence over, decisionmakers.

Lindblom recognized that interest groups are useful in providing diverse information and analyses to policymakers and that interest, groups are a source of political inequality. For example, businessmen constitute an elite interest group which is very influential in the policymaking sphere.3 Heclo identified three levels of interest group action as issue networks and shared-action and shared-bel ief groups. The first group is loosely drawn together by a common information

Charles E. Lindblom, , 2nd Ed. Englewood Cl if f s: Prentice-Hall, Inc., l968!, pp. 83-94. 23 base, the second is a coalition of individuals or groups, and the last is the conventional interest organization.4

Charles 0. Jones identified conditions which get problems to government policymakers:5

l. Events themselves: scope, definition and intensity of the problem

2. Organization of groups: number, structure, leadership of groups

3. Access: representation, empathy, and support of pol icymake r s

4. Pol icy process: relation, responsiveness, and leadership linkages between policymakers and those affected

Although there are more ways than one by which issues and problems can get the attention of policymakers, only a few succeed in getting through the policymaking process to emerge as public policies. House points out that, in general, issues emerge and get the attention of policymakers because of heavy overtones of emotions, crisis, or political postures rather than through analyses or the formal information processes.6

Hugh Heclo, 'Issue Networks and the Executive Establish- ment, ' in ed. Anthony King Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Resear ch, 1978!, p. 104.

Charles 0. Jones, g g 2 nd Ed Be1mont, Cal if orni a: Duxbury Press, l 977 ! g pp. 2-83 .

Peter House, Beverly Bills: Sage Publications, 1982!, p. 161. Weiss expresses a similar view in her assertion that 'those who look to evaluation [as a method of analysis to take the politics out Footnote continued! Indeed, the MFCMA appears to be a near perfect, illustra-

tion of these observations, if Brewer's commentary is cor-

rect:7

Much decisionmaking activity in marine affairs during the last decade appears to have been conducted without benef it of suitable or adequate information and intelligence about the nature of the problem being conf rented. For example, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act P.L. 94-265! mandated revolutionary changes in policies Ip g, b Ch ~ Ly

gh i dd ll ~ As House observes, policymakers do not represent "the

public." Any response is at the political level; rhetoric announcing response to an issue in the name of 'the public'

is really a response to a special interest group. Since a11 policies are segmented by issues, their supporters and de-

tractors are similarly segmented into special interest groups. Xt is the formation of coalitions of enough of these groups at several levels in the executive bureaucracy as well as in the legislative branch of government and among public and private interest groups that aggregates the required

6 conti nued! of decisionmaking are bound to be disappointed." Carol Wei ss, Englewood Cl if f: Pr entice-Hall, Inc., 1972!, p. 4. 7 Garry D. Brewer, "Decision-making Process and the Formulation of Marine Pol icies, " ed' Francis W. Hoole, Robert L. Friedheim, and Timothy Hennessey Boulder: Westview Press, 1981!, p. 136. concentrations of political power and influence to initiate and successfully carry out an advocacy role on an issue.8

The Enactment of the MABEL

Ptobl~ Def inition

l. Limited contribution to national revenues Unlike agriculture, coastal fisheries are important as a revenue source to only a few states and make only an insignificant contribution to the gross national product GNP!. For example, the 1972 domestic landings of all species totalled

4.9 billion pounds valued at 8765.5 million of which coastal species constituted 82.5% of the total landings or 4.03 billion pounds worth $522.1 million.9 Eight years later, in

1980, commercial fishery products generated $7 billion in national revenues, but this added less than one-third of one percent, to the GNP. Enterestingly, the ratio of the GNP to national fishery revenues approximates that of Hawaii's gross state product to its fishery revenues.l0

However, coastal fisheries are an important revenue generating resource in individual coastal states. For example, revenues f ran fishery resources account for 13% of

8 House, g p. 161. 9 U.S., Congress, Committeeon Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 15. Hereaf ter ref erred to as Committee on Commerce, .! 0 Hawaii's gross state product for 1981 latest available figure provided by the state statistician! was $12.95 billion; annual gross revenue of the fishery sector is about $14 million. 26

Alaska's gross state product. But the significance of these statistics of U.S. fishery revenues is that the tenfold increase in value over the last ten years has been reaLized by onLy a 50% increase in weight of the catch. During the same period, world landings increased more than 300%.LL

2. The Rising Interest in Preserving Atlantic Fisheries

Aside f rom border conflicts with Canada, problems with foreign fishing stress on U.S. fisheries were, until 1960, largely conf ined to the Pacific coast where the Japanese distant-water fleets were concentrated in the North Pacific

see Table 2.1! . Although the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean was signed on May 9, 1952, especially to conserve and manage salmon, halibut, and herring stocks, the limitations of the agreement soon became evident. The Japanese, for example, could harvest the salmon, one of the regulated species, in unregulated waters just beyond the 175 degrees Nest Meridian abstention line, ef f ectively circumventing the agr cement.

Fishing pressure exerted by foreign fleets began to be felt all along the At1antic coast in the early 1960s. The

United States had been harvesting 92.9% of the Atlantic coastal fisheries until the late l950s. By l972, the U. S. share had dropped to 49.1%.12

ll Anderson, "Marine Fisheries,' p. 150.

12 Committee on Commercef p. 5-6. 27

Table 2.1. Foreign fishing vessels operating off U. S. coasts during 1973.13

Of f Pacif ic coast: Off Alaska: Japan 579 Soviet Union 62 Republic of Korea 12

Total 653

Of f Pacif ic %f: Soviet Union 62

Total 62

Of f Calif ornia: Soviet Union 22

Total 22

In the Gulf of Mexico: Cuban

Total 22

Off the Atlantic coast: Soviet Union 131 Poland 17 East Germany 9 Bulgaria 4 Spai n 4 Japan 3

Total 168

Grand Total 927

3 Source: Committee on Commerce, p, 8 ~ 28

3. International Agreements Fail

The 1974 report of the Committee on Commerce of the U. S.

Senate on S. 1988, outlines the failure of international

fishery agreements. While the United States was party to 22 international agreements reached by 1974 to conserve depleted or threatened species, these agreements had not achieved timely and effective arrangements for the protection of fish stacks.>4 The failure of these agreements was perceived to be inherent in the mechanism of self-enforcement, a weakness noted in the committee report:15

I]t is difficult to imagine that a nation with a long distance fishing fleet which can pick up and move to any part of the world would ever be strongly concerned about conserving f isheries in any one particular area ... [T]he coastal nation has a much greater stake in preserving stocks of fish within 200 nautical miles of its shores and anadromous species of fish spawned in its waters. In 1974, the prevailing feeling was that the United

States would sign the Law of the Sea Treaty but that there would be a time lapse for ratification.16 Hence, the MFCMA

14 S. 1988, introduced in 1974, was one of the earliest attempts to extend U.S. jurisdiction to 200 miles. Like the other bills, it was principally concerned with limiting foreign fishing in U. S. coastal waters until an international agremaent could be reached through the Law of the Sea LOS} negotiations. While several hearings were he1d, S. 1988 was not passed by the Senate. Ibid., p. 8. » Ibid t p 16. 16 As noted by John Norton Moore, chair of the National Security Council's Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, the LOS treaty included provision to give "preferential right to that portion of the allowable catch it could harvest" to the adjoining nation state. Ibid., p. 46. 29 was proposed as an emergency interim measure to stop the

continuing depletion of U. S. coastal fisheries by foreign f ishing because the existing international agreements had f ailed to prevent depletion of economically important species. Threatened speci.es included many of the most valuable fisheries see Table 2.2! . Expert witnesses testified that some of these were in danger of imminent collapse and that preservation could not await ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty.17

Table 2.2. List of damaged or threatened speciesl8

Fisheries Loca ti on

Haddock Atlantic Herring Atlantic Macker el Pacif ic Menhaden Atlantic Sablef ish Pacif ic shrimp Pacif ic Yellowtail flounder Atlantic Halibut Atlantic and Pacific

There was a sense of urgency about the undeniable fact that major U.S. coastal fisheries were depleted and in danger of being decimated. No one disagreed that coastal fisheries were in trouble. Xn the discussion which follows, it is clear that the disagreement among the major actors centered on how the problem was to be solved, not on whether or not there was a problem.

The overall approach of the United States, then, recognized that the global fishing industry was to be treated as

Ibidi ~ p~ l 8 ~ >8 Xbid., p. 7. 30

something of a cartel. Each coastal nation state was to have primacy in its area, with the precise boundaries to be determined by some combination of domestic legislation and international agreement, the latter ultimately to be embodied, perhaps, in the Law of the Sea Treaty. The "emergency" nature of the RFCNA was not clearly perceived by U.S. fishers.

If fishery resources were to be preserved, it would not only be necessary to turn away from traditional American notions of unrestricted competition by "dividing the business' among coastal countries, but it would be equally necessary to restrict the amount of fish which could be harvested and probably the nmber of fishers within each country's coastal mone.

Because this approach was and is so foreign to American economic traditions, it should not be surprising that so much conf usion has surrounded the formulation and implementation of f ishery management policy. The Foraulatioa of the NFCNA: The NOAA NNPS! Proposal

The impending extension of fishery management jurisdiction was reflected in a staff report of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Aduinistration NOAA!:l9

Sometime in l975 or early 1976, either by treaty or by unilateral action, the United States will probably assume some form of extended jurisdiction

19 Department of Commerce, NatioIMLl Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Staf f Report Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 197S!, p. ii. {Hereafter referred to as Department of Commerce, .! over the coastal fisheries resources out to 200 nautical miles from its shores.

The same report made certain recommendations:20

l. Establishment of the primacy of the f ederal government in the PCS in control of access and allocation of both domestic and foreign users under the concept of optimum use

2. Involvement of the most localized political entity in the develognent and implementation of management programs

3. Facilitation of access of U. S. distant-water fleets to the economic zones of other countries

4. Assistance to displaced U. S. distant-water fleets

5. Establishment of new international agreements

6. Creation of a new national fishery management regime, featuring 'strong and active state cooperation and partnership'

The report also saw as benefits l! national control over domestic coastal fisheries the largest and most valuable f isheries in the world, ! conservation of recreational and commercial fishery stocks and achievement of maximum benefits f rom them for domestic users, ! improvement of the economic position of the U. S. fishing industry, including its ability to attract new investment capital, and ! realization of net economic gain from the reduction of excess fishing effort.>1 These notions constitute the values to be maximized in the MPCMA.

Ibid., p. ix-x. 2l Ibid., pp. x-xii. 32

In addition, the National Marine Fisheries Service

NIPS!, the agency which prepared the NOAA report, attempted to strengthen its role in fishery management by providing staff for the four regional councils Alaska, Pacific, Atlan- tic, and Gulf!, composed of voting state fishery officers and non-voting NMPS administrators, and also for the proposed national advisory board. Other mechanisms were proposed to insure NMFS' position of influence. For example, there was to be an elaborate hierarchical classification of fisheries to be managed by the councils, presumably established by NMPS.22 The fishing industry and fishers were to have opportunities to provide input through advisory councils.23

Under the NOAA proposal, as the single federal agency involved in the management of U. S. fisheries, the centraliza- tion of control in NMPSwas an easily perceivable objective.

Congress altered this aspect of the proposal in two major ways:

l. Establishment of eight RFMCs instead of four24

2. Inclusion of f ishers and industry representatives as voting members of the RPMCs in addition to NMPS Department of Commerce! as a voting member and the Departments of State and Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard as non-voting members

22 Ibid., pp. l 4-l 8 g 63-67. 23 Ibid., pp. 62-7S~ 24 It is interesting that no one commentedon the RPMCsat the an-site hearings. Evidently, concern about the depletion of the fisheries and the desire to drive out the foreign fishing vessels aver-shadowed all other issues. 33

The Actors

Based on the usual evidence for predicting support for a policy issue, the enactment of the MFCMA in 1976 was a re- markable achievement because the optimum conditions for passage were not evident. Most coastal fishing interests, except for unionized cannery workers, the distant-water tuna fishers, and recreational fishing clubs, are not well organized. Moreover, centered only in coastal states, fishing interests lack the broad-based constituency usually thought necessary to gain national political attention and support. While fish consumers constitute a broad interest group, they are too diffused to influence public policies on fishery management.

l. The Coastal Fisher-Eaviroaaentalist Coalition

When the first of ten on-site hearings began on May 10,

1974, in PortLand, Maine, an impressive cast of actors ste~ ped forward to center stage. A coalition of fisher groups, fish processors, and environmental advocates had come together. This unity is reflected in the statement made by

Wayne Cobb, the coastal consultant for the Natural Resources

Council of Maine:25

U. S. ~ Congress, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisher ies,

, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 125. Hereafter referred to as Committee an Merchant Marine and Fisheries, .! 34

In my work, I have come to see a growing recognition on both sides that a natural alliance is forming between environmental ists and f ishermen. Again, and again, fishermen appear in support of environmentalists at regulatory hearingsg opposing the kinds of unwise coastal develognent that would result in serious damage to their livelihood. And, at the same time, Maine environmentalists look to the f ishermen to exemplify, through wise steward- ship of fisheries resources, the attitude of conserving, not wasting, the natural systems which must sustain man in the f uture.

The immediate alliance was apparently built not so much on agreement on the question of exploitation of the f isheries, but on common opposition to oil Leases on the continental shelf. The larger threat of the giant offshore oil drilling rigs over-shadowed the usual perception held by conservationists that fishers are unwise exploiters of fishery resources. The coalition's target was the oil companies which were attempting to obtain more leases, especially in Georges

Bank, one of the richest f isheries in the United States.26 2. Bxecutive Agencies The executive branch was not united behind a single solution to the nation's fishery problems, but there was no question as to the existence of those problems. The dis-

26 The support of fishers was considered to be essential by the environmental groups who were then waging a court battle over Lease Sale No. 42, which was consumated in 1981. Howev- er, in a subsequent attempt by the federal government to sell leases totalling over 2.8 million acres over Georges Bank and the adjoining shelf, coalitions of environmental groups and fishers have been successful in convincing the court to enjoin the lease sale. Anne W. Simon, New York: Franklin Watts, 1984!, pp. 74-75> Margaret Dewar, Phil adel phia: Temple Univer si ty Press!, p. 16S. agreement centered on the mechanism for mitigating the problem. Indeed, in a 1974 commentary on the 200-mile FCZ proposal> the Department of State expressed very strong opposition through the National Security council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea LOS7 to the unilateral extension of the 12-mile fishery zone28 to 200 miles because it felt that the negotiations of the Law of the Sea Treaty, then underway, would be jeopardized. The spokesman for the executive branch at the hearings held in 1975 on H.R. 200 and S. 961 and other identical and similar bills was John Norton Moore, chair of the National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the

LOS and Deputy Special Representative of the President to the

Law of the Sea Conference. His statement to Congresswoman

Leonor R. Sullivan, then chair of the House Committee on

Merchant Marine and Fisheries, opposed the enactment of all bills on extended jurisdiction and essentially conveyed a view opposite that of NOAA's, the agency charged with the administration of the nation' s f ishery resources. Moore reasoned that any unilateral action would be damaging because

...the world community is seeking a new regime for international f isheries through international

27 The Department of State deferred to the National Security Council Interagency Task Force report on the LOS which was prepared to present a single unified position of the administration on all bills to extend f ishery jurisdiction. Com- mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, ~kiCf;~, p. 11. 2+ On October 14, 1966, the United States unilaterally established a fishery zone which extends nine miles seaward f rom the outer limits of the 3-mile territorial sea [80 Stat. 908' U. S. Code 1091-4] . 36

agreements. Such unilateral action, in our opinion, runs counter to established f undamental principles of international law. It is the view of the United States that, under existing international law no State has the right unilaterally to extend its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles, and we do not recognize such claims. A departure from this principle by the United States could encourage similar claims by other countries....

In the Iaw of the Sea Conference, the United States has introduced a fisheries proposal which is based on acceptance of a 200-mile economic zone and which offers a rational management system for the U.S. fishing industry, as well as the diverse interests of the international community.29

The Department of State expressed a view grounded on the international implications of a unilateral 200-mile FCZ. It wished to pursue the opportunity to develop a multilateral agreement through the Law of the Sea Treaty and to minimize the risk that other nations would extend their seaward boundaries to include national control of overflight, passage through straits, and scientific research, in an extended exclusive economic zone.30

Although the Department of Commerce does not appear to have submitted a separate comment on H.R. 200, the NOAA staff

report cited earlier, despite a disclaimer that it had not been formally approved by the Department, was based on a

29 U. S., Congress, House, Committee an Merchant Marine and Fisheries, , 94th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D. C.: GX6, August 20, 1975!, pp. 86-87. Hereafter referred to as Committee on Merchant Marine and Pi sher ies, . !

30 Committee on Commerce, pp. 44-46. 37

200-mile FCZ.3> Hence, the federal executive agencies did not speak with one voice.

3. Distant-water Fishers

Finally, distant-water f ishing interests, particularly

the West Coast tuna fishers and Gulf shrimpers, and some

Northwest salmon fishers opposed the legislation because they had serious questions regarding its effect on their ability

to have continued access to foreign fishery zones. With the

unilateral extension of U.S. national boundaries, the dis-

tant-water f ishers were af raid that the United States would be forced to recognize the extended !urisdictions of other nations and, in doing so, free access to the fisheries and exclusive economic zones, particularly those of Latin Ameri- can countries, would be denied to U.S. fishing vessels.32

The fishers were not yet prepared to acknowledge that

depletion ultimately would require comprehensive regulation.

The Congressional Rearingsa East vs Nest

Interest Group Opponents

One of the more articulate representatives of the West

coast fishers, John Royal, Executive Secretary-Treasurer of

the Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, International Long-

shoremen and Workers Union ZLWU!, who testified before the

3l The report on the H. R. 200 hearings does not include a formal comment f rom the Department of Commerce among those printed f rom other executive agencies.

tlallcUm, pp. 70|-842. House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on October

18, 1974 in San Pedro, California, typified those with concerns related to distant-water f ishing:

I am speaking against the passage of H.R. 866533 and will do everything within my ability and power...to defeat its passage as well as the passage of any and all similar types of legislation...34

He further stated,

A unilateral 200-mile zone by the United States would severely damage the interests of the V. S. distant water shrimp, and the tuna fishermen who fish within 200 miles off the shores of other nations...

We, the American tuna f ishermen, know full well and better than anyone else what the effects of unilateral action of extending j urisdiction to 200 miles would do. The truth of the matter is that over the many years since the end of World War II we have been the victim of the unilateral actions of extended j urisdiction by Ecuador, Peru and others.

Our people have been chased on the high seas by these countries, shot at, wounded, physically crippled, our vessels seized, our fishermen placed under foreign armed guards armed with machine guns, rifles with f ixed bayonets, our personal properties stolen, our fishing gear sabotaged and forced to pay blackmail in the forms of illegal fines and penalties which runs into the millions of dollars....

Our government has told us repeatedly that we would get relief, justice and protection through the Law of the Sea Conference. Now after all these years of being the physical victims and pawns of the International Political chess game we are not

H.R. 8665 was only one of more than 30 bill introduced in the House. H.R. 200, which was enacted into law as the NPCMA, was among these. Since the final bill passed as H.R. 200, future text references will be to H.R. 200. 39

going to sit idly by and see that Law of the Sea Conference fail or be destroyed by any unilateral action what-so-ever by the Congress of the United States. We have suffered far too long and too much in order to protect the U. S. jurisdictional position on the high seas by being its first line of defense and vanguard by refusing to purchase foreign licenses, permits or pay other forms of blackmail to fish the high seas outside of 12 miles. 35

Royal's statement elicited a sharp retort f rom Congress-

man Peter Kyros of Maine:

...I don't think it is very helpfu1 to ever suggest that anyone here or in the House does things for purely political reasons....E am sure you certainly do not mean to question the motives of the people who feel that the 200-mile limit is a good idea.

Royal replied:

At this time I certainly do.

Kyros ~

Oh, you question the motives2

Royal ~

I certainly do. I think that I will maintain the questioning until such time as the current Law of the Sea Conference is concluded.

The verbal interchange between the congressmen from

Maine Kyros! and Massachusetts Gerry Studds! and other witnesses at the San Pedro hearings was not limited only to questions on the substance of the witnesses' statement but dropped to personal attacks in some instances. Particularly adversarial. were the interactions of August Felando, general

Ibid. g p. 721. 40 manager of the American Tuna Boat Association, and Congress- man Kyros, as indicated in the excerpt:36

Kyros: ...But, let me ask you this: What would you propose in the interim that we do, having a good knowledge of the [fishing] industry, to end the depletion of East Coast fisheries2 I think that you would concede that some have been hurt. What would you do2

Felando: Well, I honestly believe that it would be proper, and I think it is a shame now that we are this late in the session, but I honestly believe that an implementation of article VII of the [international] Convention on Fishing Conservation would have been the right move.

... [WJe are still going to be running into problems of enforcement, and I don't think this Government has really faced up to that problem.

Ryros: Well, of course we haven' t. But we can't just sit like you are now. What are the alternatives2

Pelando: Well, I told you what the alternatives are--

Kyros: You told me to act, you told me to-

Felando: I told you to act under [the Convention on Fishing Conservation] that this country has ratified, a convention that has been in existence for a long time.

Kyros: How many nations have ratified it Augie?

Pelando: I think 34 countries~ but that is immaterial.

Ryros: Wait a minute. How many of the nations that fish off the east coast have ratified it2

Pelando: And I answered that that is immaterial. That is

Kyros: Now, wait a minute

Felando~ That is evading the question because what I am saying is that the fact is that that convention can

6 Ibid., pp. 793-795. be justified internationally, it is implementing a concept that was declared way back in 1945 by Presi.dent Truman, and it is in effect implementing a treaty, the highest law of the land. So, why not move in that direction?

But, you know, this 200-mile bi.ll, which in effect suggests in itself that negotiation is going to lead the way, is really to a great extent a hoaxt as suggested by Charlie Carry [an earlier witness]....You are not going solve any problems...You are going to create more of them....And, you have asked me a question and I suggest that that is the course of action.

Kyros: One of these days and not in the so distant future, you are going to be faced with precisely the same problems aa the east coast with foreign fishing fleets. And when those days come, Augie, you are going to come to this committee, and you are going to sing a different, song, I promise you.

One witness openly complained that the hearing on the West Coast was adversarial. Congressmen Studds and Kyros made no bones about their positions and can be said to have harassed witnesses who disagreed with them. Only one witness, representing recreational fishers, supported the

200-mile fishery zone at the San Pedro hearing.

No one from Hawaii testified at the San Pedro hearing.

However, John Royal submitted a letter f rota Senator Dani,el

Xnouye opposing H.R. 200.37 The absence of state or

This letter and several other letters opposing B.R. 200/ submitted by John Royal as part of his testimony, are not included in the hearing transcript and no explanation is given for the omission. When told that the letters were not a part of the recorded transcript of the San Pedro hearing, John Royal was surprised and could not think of any reason for their omission. John Royal, 198S: personal communi ca ti on. 42 industry response from Hawaii indicates that the bill was perceived as having little ar no significance to Hawaii at that time, especially because the tunas important to Hawaiian commercial fishers were excluded from the bill. However,

Hawaii's commercial fishing fleet, like the East coast fleets, is composed of coastal fishing vessels which f iah well within the 200-mile zone. The absence of Hawaiian distant-water vessels probably accounts for the absence of competition with foreign fleets in the state's FCZ. As a matter of fact, it even appears that Hawaii ultimately would benefit from a 200-mile PCS because this would keep foreign fishers at a considerable distance. Considered in this light, Senator Inouye's opposition to H.R. 200 may have reflected interests other than those of the state. Indeed, according to John Royal, the letter supporting the California distant-water fishing industry was probably obtained by the late Harry Bridges, at that time the head of the XLWUin Hawaii and a powerful political force in the state.38 The senator's letter appears to have been written in response to a request f rara an influential political supporter.

Thus, the conditions surrounding the congressional attempt to extend the fishery zone to 200 miles appears to have been less than ideal. They are summarized below:

1. Fisheries are an insignif icant component of the national income, contributing less than one-half of one percent to the gross national product

John Royal, l985: personal communication. 43

2. Gulf shrimpers and West Coast distant water tuna fishers were opposed to any extension of the fishery zone because they were afraid they would be denied access to foreign fishery zones

3. TWo pOWerful voiceS, the NatiOnal SeCurity Council and the Department of State, strongly opposed the extension of the domestic f ishery zone because of the ongoing Law of the Sea negotiati,ons however, the Department of Commerce perceived the extension of i i iii ii iii i ~ii 1976!

Xnterest Group Supporters

Given these reasons for not. enacting the legislation to extend the fishery zone from 12 miles to 200 miles, what reasons were compelling enough to override the formidable opposition2 The report of the Senate Committee on Commerce gives two reasons s 39 1. Depletion of coastal fisheries by foreign fishers

2. Failure of international fishery management agr eements

Eastern coastal fishers especially believed that stock depletion was being caused by the sophistication and efficiency of foreign factory ships and that the problem would be solved by controlling foreign access to coastal fisheries.

Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts spoke to this point during the Senate debate on S. 961:40

While [yellowfin sole, Alaska pollock, Atlan- tic and Pacific halibut, haddock, yellowfin flounder, Atlantic sea scallops, northwest Atlantic shrimp, and Atlantic bluef in tuna] continue to be

Committee on Commerce, g p. 1. 40 The text of S. 961 was substituted ~~q for that of H.R. 200 and was enacted into law as the MFCMA with minor amendments. 44

depleted, the number of foreign fishing vessels off our coast increases each year, and the American fishing industry continues to decline. Massachu- setts fishermen in 7S-foot fishing vessels are watching 400-foot f actory-trawlers f rom other nations take 70 percent of the fish within 200 miles of the North Atlantic coast.41

Much of the pressure which led to the enactment of a

200-mile PCS was initiated on the East Coast, where the

Soviet Union's fishing activity was focused see Table 2.1! .

Because of the harvesting range of the Soviet fleets and the cold war tensions, the presence of Soviet and other foreign vessels in U.S. inshore waters at the edge of the 12-mile f ishery zone was especially troublesome. Foreign f ishing, often described as 'vacuuming' the fish, was mentioned repeatedly during the East coast on-site hearings held by the

Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the

Environment of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and

Fisheries. The statements of fishers and representatives of the fishing industry at the hearings gave credence to the stati sties on f orei gn harvests and the Russi an threat.

Charles Fischett, representing a sportf ishermen' s club in Long Island, New York, provided a graphic description of an encounter with a fleet of Russian vessels:42

~ ~~ I would say, maybe 40 or 50 t,domestic] commercial boats and maybe about 30 to 40 sport fishermen [were] fishing of f Pire Xsland Light, approximately

41 94th Congress, 2d sess., January 28, 1976, p. l 294. 488 tt 8 92 8 8 88. 183 184. about 12 miles off the beach. And fishing was pretty good mackerel, co df ish and al so whiting.

And all of a sudden over the horizon we saw this big ship coming in it was a big Russian boat. Of tremendous size, I would say anywhere in the category of 350 to 400 feet. He came in the area and we seen him drop his nets down, and I would say the nets must have went 3 to 4 miles. About a half hour passed. He filled his nets his nets got so filled, they could hardly pull them in, they were slaw coming in and you could see the fish going over the side.

And after this half hour passed over the horizon you could see a fleet of ships coming in. Well, in total, when these ships all got. in there and every one of them when they got in there all dropped their nets-- ...they stood there all that night, the following morning those ships were still in that area and they must have completely wiped out the bottom, because that fallowing day we couldn' t catch one fish and I don' t think any of the other boats in the area got any.

Basically, the Bast Coast fishers saw the MFCMAas the means for instituting a regime of fishery management, which, by protecting fish, ultimately would protect American fishers as well. Hugh O' Rourke, president of the New England Fisher- ies Steering Committee, Boston, Massachusetts, spoke in support of extending the fishery zone and noted the drastic reduction of fish stock in the Georges Bank area. He further stated:43

It is certainly incongruous, that our well known haddock, flounder, and cod, close to our shores in many instances finds its way to foreign ports and is returned to the U. S. market as an import item. 46

...The need for

...Xt is grossly unfair that our fishermen must bear [the] burden [of foreign f ishing vessels seeking protein in distant waters]. Time and again, members of

emphasis added! .

These sentiments, repeated many times during the Massa- chusetts and New York hearings, indicated that the fishers apparently perceived that the problem of depleted stocks would be solved by banninq foreign access. The "protection' they refer to was thought of as open access for domestic fishers. They did not see that the basic intent of the

MPCMA, to limit access to coastal fisheries, did not exempt domestic fishers, and ultimately would require that even domestic fishers would have limited access.

The statements presented at the ten on-site hearings were divided; the East Coast fishers were generally in favor of the extended PCz proposed in H.R. 200 and other bills! and the West Coast and Gulf distant-water fishers opposed it.

The Congressional Znf ormation Service CIS! summary of these hearings provides a synoptic overview of the testimony of witnesses emphasis added!:44

44 g X a ' S ...~S January-December l975!: 354-357. Portland, Maine Varying views on proposed legislationg review of fishermen' s problems in competing with foreign, subsidized fleets for dwindling fish supplies off the New England coast; Coast Guard concern over costs of enf or ci ng a 200 mile limit.

Islip, Hew Tort Generally strong support for proposed legislation~ importance of fish supply to commercial and sport f ishermen; Coast Guard concern over costs of enforcing the 200-mile limit.

~ River, Sew Jersey General concern over foreign inf ringement on U. S. coastal ' waters and over environmental considerations g varying views on and levels of support for proposed legislation.

Hampton, Virginia General agreement on importance of an adequate fish supply to sports and commercial fishermen, and to the State' s economy; support for propsed l egi sl ation.

Biloxi, Iississippi General support for proposed legislation; depressed economic condition of the f ishing industry and need f or Government loans and other aid.

New Orleans, Louisiana Shrimp industry concern over low wholesale prices, imports< increased operating costs and other factors alleged by contributing to current, industry depressiong recommendations for Government remedial action; varying views on extension of the territorial fishing limit. 48

New Bedford, Strong support for proposed Massachusetts legislation; importance of f ish supply to entire Massachusetts economic structure as well as the fishing industry g questions regarding U. S. authority to extend territorial fishing limit, and opposition to pr oposed legislation.

Panama City, Plorida Varying viess on proposed legislation; review of current problems within the seafood and fishing industries, including increased imports, low wholesale and retail prices, decreasing catches, and excessive retailing costs.

Corpus Christi, Texas Varying views on proposed legislationt review of shrimp industry economic problems and suggestions for Government remedial action.

San Pedro, Calif oraia Sif f or ing views on pr opose d legislation due to possible loss of tuna fishing rights in foreign waters with legislation, and dwindling State and pr ivate s por ts f ishing revenues without legislation.

Nashlngton, D.C. General support for proposed le gi sl ati on.

The CIS summary shows that support for the MFCMA was

centered at four of the ten on-site hearings and the hearing

in Washington, D.C. Of these only two sites Islip, New York and New Bedford, Massachusetts! are classified as showing

strong support. However, the summary also reveals the

diverse interests of V. S. f ishers "the fishing industry'--

cannot be aggregated into a single group. Even when fishers and other fishery influentials supported the MFCMA, they were 49 motivated by different reasons. Clearly absent was a "single voice" which spoke for fishers and the fishing industry.

Furthermore, the full implications of the MFCMAwas not known until the Act was implemented, because it was so foreign to

U.S. traditions. The CIS summary, however, would have given anyone who bothered to read it a good insight into potential f uture conflicts.

Zn the discussion which follows, the differences in pre- ferences on management approaches and rationale among fishers, members of Congress, and f ishery agency administrators are evident. The behavior of fishers is typically that of the economic man How can I protect. my interests to maximize prof itsP!. The congressional behavior essentially reflected 'back home" interests, evident in the establishment of eight

RFMCs rather than the four RPMCs and a national advisory board proposed by NMPS. The broad national perspective of

NMFS administrators who provided the management philosophy undergirding the MPCMA! can be seen in the inclusion of Na- tional Standards for management and the requirement that the

Secretary of Commerce approve all fishery management plans

FMPs!. These provisions were seen by fishing interest as the NMFS/NOAA administrators' attempt to centralize control of f ishery management within their own agency.45

45 John Royal, Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, and August Felando, American Tuna Boat Association, 1985: personal communi ca ti on. 50

The Rites of Passage: B.R. 200 Becomes Law

The Ninety-third Congress failed to enact the 200-mile

extended jurisdiction bill into law because the Senate did

not act on the measure. However, action was rapid in the

Ninety-fourth Congress. Senator Warren Magnuson introduced

S. 961 on March 5, 1975. On January 28, 1976, H. R. 200, which had crossed over from the House, was amended in the

Senate by substituting its text in toto for that of S. 961.

The House objected to the Senate action and requested a

conference. The Committee of Conference was convened on

February 19, 24, and March 17. Conference reports were filed

in both the House and Senate on March 24, and the measure which emerged as H. R. 200 was agreed to on March 30 in the

House by a vote of 346 to 52 and on March 29 in the Senate by voice vote. With the signing of the bill by President Gerald

Ford on April 13, H.R. 200 became Public X,aw 94-265. The vote of Hawaii's senators on S. 961 was split with

Inouye voting for a reversal of his earlier opposition in the letter suhaitted to the House Sub-committee on Fisheries! and Hiram Pong voting against the bill.46 The split vote re-

flects general party alignments Pong, a Republican, probably

supported President Ford's position. Because the conference

report on H.R. 200 was passed by voice vote, the voting re-

cord of the two senators is not documented. Zn the House,

46 , 94th Congress, 2d sess., January 28, 1976, p. 1309. 51 the vote was 346 yeas and 52 nays.47 The two Hawaii representatives voted against each other on the conference report with Matsunaga voting 'yea' and Mink voting "nay."

Mink's negative vote appears to reflect her support of the Law of the Sea and her pacifist bias in international relati ons. 48

Provisions of the lfPCIIA

The ma!or purposes of the MFCNA are provided in Section

2 b! ~

1. The establishment of exclusive management authority over all fish within a 200-mile FCZ and over anadromous species and continental shelf fishery resources beyond the FCZ

2. The support and encouragement of international agreements to manage highly migratory species

3. The developaent and implementation of fishery management plans in accordance with national standards which will achieve optimum yield

4. The establishment of regional fishery management councils to prepare, monitor, and revise FMPs under such circumstances which will enable the states, the f ishing industry, consumer and environmental organizations, and other interested persons to participate in, and advise, on the establishment and administration of PMPs which will include social and economic needs of the states

47 94th Congress, 2d sess., March 30, 1976 p. 8SS8. 48 The author is a personal acquaintance of former Congress- woman Patsy Mink and knows of her long-standing interest in the Law of the Sea and other avenues through which the United States can peacefully interact with foreign nations. She served briefly as an assistant, secretary, with ocean and ocean resources as her portfolio, in the Department of State under President Jimmy Carter. 52

The act specifically states under Section 2 c! ! that the MFCMA is not to interfere with "recognized legitimate uses of the high seas.' The management program is to be based on the best scientific information available, responsiveness to needs of states and affected citizens, and promotion of ef f iciency in the. capabilities of f ederal, state, and academic institutions in carrying out research, administration, management and enforcement [Section 2 c! ! ]. Foreign fishing is permitted if there is an existing governing international fishery agreement GXFA! [Section 2 c! ! ]. These agreements include provisions for inspection as well as boarding of observers on foreign fishing vessels.49

Congressional directions for the implementation of the purposes defined in the MFCMAare stated in the following ti tl es:

Title Z. Fishery Management Authority of the United States

Title ZZ. Foreign Fishing and Znternational Fishery Agr eements

Title ZZZ. National Fishery Management Program

Title ZV. Miscellaneous Provisions

4~ The MFCMAwas amended to extend monitoring activity to domestic tuna vessels as well. NMFS administrator, William Gordon, is presently suggesting that observers should be place aboard all domestic commercial fishing vessels to obtain accurate information on fishing efforts. He recognizes the potential consitutional challenge of unreasonable sear ch. 53

Title I defines the PCZ as a zone contiguous to the territorial sea. The inner boundary is coterminus with the coastal boundary of the U. S.; the outer boundary extends 200 nautical miles from the inner boundary.

Regulations pertaining to foreign fishing are defined in

Title IX. Generally, foreign fishing will be allowed under a permit system establishing national quotas negotiated by the

Department of State. Under Section 201 d!, the total allowable level of foreign fishing TALPF! is computed as "that portion of the optimma yield of such fishery which shall not be harvested by vessels of the U. S.' The allocation of TALPP is contingent on traditional harvesting practices, cooperation in research, enforcement, and conservation Section 201

e! l!-! ]. In actual practice, TALFFs are used as negotiating chips by the Department of State. Present policies limit use of TALPPs to enforce ocean-related international sanctions such as refusal to conf orm to whaling quotas.

The details of the permit application and approval procedure are given in Section 204. The RPMCs are required to comment on all applications. A fee is required, but the amount charged cannot exceed the cost of administering the

MFCMA.

Title III contains the def inition of National Standards

[Section 301 a! l!-!]. Optimum yield, which includes species recruitment and social and economic factors, is the object of conservation and management. Pur ther, any allocation will be fair and equitable to all fishers, promote conservation, and no single entity or individual can acquire an excessive share of privileges.

Section 302 a! establishes eight regional fishery management councils:

Councils State or Territory Included

New England Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. 7 voting members!

Mid-Atlantic New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvani a, Maryland, and Virginia 9 voting members!

South Atlantic North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida 3 voting members!

Caribbean Virgin Islands and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico voting members!

Gul f Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida 7 voting members!

Pacif ic Cal if ornia, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho 3 voting members!

North Pacific Alaska, Washington, and Oregon ll voting members!

Western Pacific Hawaii, American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, and Guam 1 voting members!

Voting members of the councils are:

Marine fishery officer from each state

Regional Director of NMFS

Varying number of members, representing f ishing interests and expertise, appointed by the Secre- tary of Commerce f rom a list of qualified persons provided by the coastal state governors [Section 302 B!] . 55

Non-voting members of the councils are:

Regional Director of the USFWS

District Commander of the Coast Guard

Executive Director of the Marine Fisheries Commission for the geographical area

Representative of the Seer etary of state Section 302 c! l!] ~

Congress has weighted power in favor of the states and territories in the composition of the RFMCs. For example, of

the ll voting members of the WPRFMC, seven members are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce from a "list of qualified individuals who represent fishing interest or

expertise! submitted by the Governor" [Sec. 302 b! ! C! ] .

The MFCMA does not give the Secretary any other options.

Moreover, only one of the four fishery agency officials who are voting members is a federal administrator, the regional

director of NMFS. The other three are the fishery managers of the state of Hawaii and the territories of Guam and

American Samoa. However, other factors such as the veto

power of the Secretary of Commerce essentially negates the weight of numbers of non-federal members on the councils.

Content of PMPs and conservation and management measures

developed for a given fishery are outlined in Section 303.

Required provisions [Section 303 a! ], include measures ap-

plicable to both domestic and foreign fishingy description of

the f ishery, including gear, number of vessels invo1ved, cost of management, actual and potential revenues, extent of fo-

reign fishing, and other interests, such as Indian treaty 56 rightsg access and present and future conditions of maximum sustainable yield MSY! and optimum sustainable yield OSY!; and information on type and quantity of gear used, catch by numbers and weight, fishing areas, time of f ishing, and number of hauls. Among the kinds of discretionary information which can be included in the PMPs are historic and sociocultural data as well as details of control mechanisms

[Section 303 b! ] . State j urisdiction within the three-mile Territorial Sea is not to be either extended or diminished in the implementation of the MPCMA [Section 306 a!]. A state may not regulate any fishing vessel outside its jurisdictional boundaries, unless the vessel is registered under the laws of that state [Section 306 b!]. If a state fails to implement or if it carries out actions which can adversely affect the implementation of an PMP, the Secretary of Commerce is empowered to assume responsibility for the regulation of the fishery [Section 306 B! ]. Upon application for reinstate- ment to the Secretary of Commerce, the state may regain responsibility provided that, the Secretary is satisf ied that the adverse conditions have been rectified.

Enf orcement responsibilities of the Secretary of Com- merce and the Coast Guard are defined in Section 3ll. The

District Courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases under the MFCMA [Section 311 d! ]. Penal- ties which can be assessed are provided in Section 308. De- 57

finition of criminal offense and civil forfeitures are given

in Sections 309 and 310, respectively.

An Analysis of the Xepact of the NPi2lA

Impact on Hawaii

Governor George Ariyoshi noted in his preface to the

state's 1979 development plan that it was a "systematic ap-

proach to optimal utilization of Hawaii's f ishing resources"

and that although 'the market for seafood products continues

to increase in these islands, it is the foreign fleets who

are harvesting the substantial off-shore fisheries resources.'5o The 'foreign fleets' referred to by the Governor

are the Japanese and Taiwanese who fish the migratory tunas

beyond the 12-mile fishery zone in Hawaiian waters. However, he notes that because of the implementation of fish aggrega-

tion devices, the successful experimental albacore fishing

trials, and the then ongoing state, federal, and university

research on the state's fishery resources, there is 'consid-

erable optimism over the future of Hawaii's fishing indus-

try

While there was unmistakable knowledge among the state' s

political leaders that foreign fleets were harvesting tunas within the PCZ as noted by the Governor above!, no

George R. Ariyoshi, 'Message from the Governor,' in ~~ Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1979!, unpaginated pref ace. 51 Ibid. 5B effort was made to initiate federal regulation of tunas.52

One reason is the generally held perception that aku are an underfished species. A second reason is that the large tunas being harvested by foreign f ishers mostly occur beyond the

200-mile FCZ. Finally, the state is reluctant to encourage initiation of f ederal regulation of any activity in Hawaiian water s. 53

Although Hawaii has no distant water fleet, the present study assumed that the MFCMA does not enhance the state' s position in fishery management because it has diminished the state's 4~~ jurisdiction of its coastal fisheries by instituting the 200-mile FCZ and placing 197 miles under f ederal jurisdiction. There are significant differences in the implementation of the MFCMA in Hawaii, an insular state, and in any other coastal state. Geological differences and non-contiguity of the Hawaiian Islands to the continental United States impose

There was, however, a protest from the state to the Department of State that all foreign fishers within the state's FCE should restrict their take of non-migratory species as incidental or by-catch.

The state refused to cooperate with the federal government in establishing a humpback whale sanctuary in Hawaii. The author was present at a meeting of the Hawaii Fisheries Coordinating Council, an advisory body to the Hawaii Depart- ment of land and Natural Resources, in 1984 when this subject was discussed. The members expressed fears that once the federal agency established a sanctuary, they could extend their jurisdiction to dictate fishery regulation in state waters. Similar views were expressed by the Council with regard to a critical habitat designation for Hawaiian monk seals see Chapter 3 for a description of the Council! . 59 unique environmental and ecological conditions in managing the state's f isheries. For example, the recently completed five-year assessment of the living resources of the NWHI waters, the state's undeveloped fishing grounds, revealed that while there are sufficient stocks for economic development there are no large standing stocks of any single species of the magnitude of those found on U. S. continental shelves.54 The size of the harvestable standing stock pre- cludes new capitalization of the state' s f ishing fleet. The dozen or so large vessels already home-ported in the state have the capacity to harvest the available standing stock of lobsters, one of two species which are presently managed by an FMP, to OSY levels. Precious corals, the other FMP-managed species, have not been harvested since 1979.

The Japanese have permits to harvest alphonsins and armorheads, which are not, harvested by U. S. fishers. While there are no surplus lobsters, there is a 1000-kg foreign quota for precious corals, predominantly pink corals ~i~~ AlhghthkdJp fth are eligible to obtain permits to harvest precious corals, they have not done so, apparently because the small quota makes it uneconomical.

Richard W. Grigg and Karen Y. Tanoue, Eds. f

, Vol. 1, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, 1984! ~ 60

In addition, because there are no lateral boundaries to contend with, the state has had no adversarial relationship with other RFMCswhich manage Pacific Ocean f isheriesf namely, the Pacific and North Pacific RFMCs its nearest neighbors! or adjacent coastal states see Figure 3.l in

Chapter 3! . The state's f isheries managers have, therefore, been free of at least two frustrations faced by others foreign fishing and lateral boundary disputes with neigh- boring states on the management of coastal species.

However, the tripartite composition of the council pits the public and private interests of the State of Hawaii against the federal government. This relationship has historic antecedents related to the state's unresolved claims of its maritime boundaries and mutual distrust. The long-standing dispute with the federal government over the state' s claim to its channel waters, the more recent disagreement over the seaward boundaries of the RfHI wildlife refuge, and the involvement of the United States in the overthrow of the

Hawaiian monarchy, are discussed in the next chapter.

Federal encroachment on land in the Hawaiian Islands has a lSO-year history beginning with the need for a coaling station for the U. S Pacific fleet. A significant ingredient in this complex scenario is Theodore Roosevelt's driving aspiration to establish United States hegemony in the Pacific through seapower, which required the acquisition of the

Hawaiian archipelago. All of his actions related to Hawaii, including the establishment of the NWHI wildlife ref uge, appears to have been motivated by his desire to control the Pacific Ocean. The legacy of these incidents is the suspicion with which state officials and native Hawaiians view the federal government and its agents.

Xapact on the United States The MFCMAwas declared 'potentially the most significant institutional change in the history of U. S. f ishery management" by the Office of Technology Assessment.55 Xt is without question the most comprehensive single public policy for the management of the nation's coastal fisheries and provides the framework for unified management, both biologically and j ur isdi ctionally, through controlled acce ss. The most far-reaching domestic effects under the MFCNA can be succinctly summarized as two institutional changes:

1. The creation of regional fishery management councils

2. The extension of the federal government'8 authority over a 200-mile PCZ--an enclosure of an international commons

The first change is a significant altering of institutional structures to enable private-sector users to participate in the developnent of public policy. Earlier versions of the

NFCMA contained variations of the NNFS/NOAA recommendations

55 Office of Technology Assessmentg hl OC: t g* 1977!, p. 61> also Lee G. Anderson, 'U. S. Fisheries: A New 0 ktF L C k ~ Beg~ 1, No. 2 Center for the Study of Marine Policy, University of De1aware, 1977!, p. 1. 62

an indication that Congress took them seriously. However, vesting of policymaking authority in eight regional councils, which include users, was a congressional initiative. A detailed discussion on RFMCs is presented in Chapter 9.! The second change was federal control over the 200-mile PCZ, which essentially is an extended economic zone.56

Conclusion

The most significant aspect of the MFCMA is the legal- ized participation of the state and federal governments and the fishing industry and/or fishery experts in the development of the FMPs for coastal non-migratory fisheries. The federal government assumed management of the nation' s fisheries which had essentially been under ~~ state management, in the absence of explicit federal laws, by placing all resources in waters beyond three miles in an extended

FCZ.57

The establishment of the RFMCs is a unique exercise in federalism. In one of the few studies on the RFMCs,

Hennessey notes that the objective of the NFCMA to achieve optimal fishery yield is constrained because decisions are made under "conditions of imperfect information, uncertainty,

President Reagan proclaimed the FCZ as an exclusive economic zone in March 10, 1983.

Off ice of Technology Assessmentp jJQLQ g pe 56 ~ 63 and risk. "58 And, indeed, the MFCMAmandates the Department of Commerce to provide information to the RFMCs to enable them to develop FMPs, based on the best available scientific data. While questions may be raised as to how well it works, the RFMCs have been provided with the mechanism to obtain information to fulfill their responsibility through the research capability of NMFS.

The new tripartite decisionmaking structure is always in danger of being a three-way bottle-neck because of divergent interests of the coastal states, the federal government, and the fishing industry. Anderson views the RFMCs as 'questionable items' in the MFCNA. His objection is based on the inef f iciency of management by committee.59 As Hennessey observes,60 there is

considerable bargaining and interaction among the regional councils themselves insofar as they have adj oining f isheries. Finally, there is interaction between the regional councils, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of State, insof ar as foreign policy issues related to fishery management are concerned.

The implementation of the MFCMA is, therefore, a function of human interaction, since bargaining' and "interact-

ing' are done by human beings who represent organizational

Timothy Hennessey, 'Toward a Positive Model of Fishery Management Decision-making, ' in ed. Francis W. Hooley, Robert I.. Friedheim, and Timothy Hennessey Boulder: Westview Press, 1981!, p. 239. 59 Anderson, 'Marine Fisheries," p. 3. 60 Hennessey, 'Toward a Positive Model," p. 240. 64 entities. In addition, decisionmaking must occur under conditions of imperfect knowledge because 'perfect knowledge' is only a theoretical assumption in mathematical models of decisionmaking. Fur thermore, decisianmakers need to cope with externalities over which they have little control and which have little to do with the management of fisheries for local benefit, e.g., foreign policy which uses f ishery allocations as sanctions to elicit the cooperation of other countries. From the standpoint of the present study, which is focused on the decisianmaking structure established by the MFCMA, the most significant aspect of the MFCMAis the establishment of RFMCs.61 The MFCMAimplements congressional intent to bring fishery management as close to the user public as possible so as to democratize decisionmaking by empaweringunequally endowedparties with voting parity. What cannot be legislated away are the historical antecedents, the institutional constraints which influence bureaucratic decisionmakers, and the values and personal

characteristics of the individual actors, particularly their ability to use new information in problem salving see Chapter 10 for a discussion on this subject!. This chapter began with Anderson's observation that the MFCMAwas only a promise of a potential for managementbe- cause it had been formulated without 'proper objectives of

61 However, in a broader context, the global significance of the 200-mile extended FCZ is undeniable. management." The decentralized management structure pre- cludes universal application of "proper objectives. " Hence, the criticism appears to be unfair. Puthermore, even with "proper objectives,' however "proper" is defined, there is no guarantee that management will proceed smoothly. The unknown variable is human behavior, an important aspect of this study.

Xf the MPCMAis flawed, the flaw lies in the differing perceptions of the various actors and their expectations of the outcomes to be derived f rom the implementation of the MPCNIA. The federal fishery agency administrators expected to implement nationally consistent management procedures for coastal fisheries being depleted. The fishers and representatives of the f ishing industry perceived that the

MPCMA would deny foreign vessels access into the FCZ and enable domestic fishers to harvest and process the stocks which had previously been taken by foreign f ishers. The state f ishery officers were concerned w i th what they perceived to be potential federal jurisdictional creep over the state's resources and ocean boundaries. All of these expectations were realized, some with enexpected side-effects, when the MPCMAwas implemented in 1977.

Overall, at least for the first round, it appears that the coastal fishers were the 'winners.' However, their vic- tory appears to be hollow because neither the expected economic gain nor the reversal of stock depletion has been realized. There is growing awareness among fishers that more 66 stringent access and harvesting controls are required if stock depletion is to be alleviated. Interestingly, apparently acknowledging the end of free access to foreign fisheries, distant water fishers on the west coast have begun to establish their own linkages with Western Pacific island governments and have consummated fishery agreements without the help of the Department of State or other government age nci es.

As the waffling and split votes of Hawaii's congressional delegation indicate, the MFCMAwas not of great interest to the state. Zn the pre-MPCMA period, except for introduction of r eef f ish and crab i n near shor e waters, the state fishery agency had little to do with pelagic f isheries.

The NMPS and its predecessors conducted the research and develognent of of f shore commercial f isheries, particularly tunas. See Chapters 6 and 7 for a discussion on this point.! However, the implications of the NPCMA soon became evident to the state when the precious coral fishery was designated as a species to be managed under the MPCMA. The threat of federal encroachment in managing the state's black coral and other fisheries motivated the preparation of a comprehensive fisheries developnent plan in l979 for Hawaii's reef, inshore, and pelagic species. The state was able to keep black corals f rom being included in the precious coral

FMP only pink and other deepwater corals are managed by this 67

Chapter 3 provides a summary of the state's fishery resources and its efforts to develop these resources. There are problems inherent in the fisheries themselves, which are unique to Hawaii. In addition, there are institutional constr aints af f ecting f ederal and state relationships which have roots in an earlier time and external uncontrollable changes, such as the closing of the local tuna cannery. All of these factors could have a profound effect on Hawaii's fishing industry and the state's projected develoyaent plans. CHAPTER 3

THE STATE OP HAWAZZ AND ZTS PZSHERT RESOURCES

Thi.s chapter turns away from the discussion on the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act MFCMA! and

national mandates f or the management of U. S. f ishery resources the political factors--to environmental factors related to Hawaii's fishery resources. The discussion is centered on the state'8 unique geologic features and the pr pbl em of being atypi cal both in terms af its geomorphol ogy and the makeup of its fishery resources. The policies set in motion by the MFCMAand the Department of Commerce do not readily fit the uniqueness of insular f isheries great diversity and small populations of individual species! nor

the fact that Hawaii's principal coastal fisheries are tunas.

The Hawaiian archipelago spans an amazing l400 miles, and is slightly under 2,400 air miles f rom California, the nearest state. Besides its geographical isolation, Hawaii' s

coastal fishery resources are unlike those found along the

continental coasts of the United States. Perhaps most impor-

tant to the present study is the discovery by the S-year re-

s+arch program on the resources of the Northwestern Hawaiian

NRHX! that, in addition to being tightly inter-re- »«d through their food web, the habitat of many species of 69 marine fauna encompasses the entire archipelago.l This provides some basis for the argument that the Hawaiian

islands are indeed a single marine ecosystem and that management of Hawaii's fisheries should be based on the total ecosystem, rather than on a species approach or on artif icial

pol itical boundaries. The Geology of the Hawaiian Archipelago While Hawaii is known largely for its world-renowned

Waikiki Beach and the eight "high' islands,2 these constitute less than one-third of the Hawaiian archipelago see Figure 3.1! . The islands are located near the center of the Pacif ic Ocean between approximately 19 and 29 degrees North latitude and 155 and 179 degrees West longitude. There is clear relation of the age of the islands to their geologic state

with the oldest the NWHE! at the northwestern end and the youngest the island of Hawaii! at the southeastern end.

Richard Grigg and Karen Tanoue, eds.,

Vol. 1 Honolulu- Vniversity of Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, 1984!; also, Richard Grigg and Rose T, Pfund, eds. g

Honolulu: University of Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, 1980! . 'High' islands are the eight islands at the southwestern «d of the Hawaiian archipelago, which have topographic differentiation ranging f r~ rolling hills of several hundred «et to mountains which rise more than 12,000 feet. above sea evel t "low' islands are nearly flat and rise only a few feet ~bove sea level. The NWHI are low islands. 70

Figure 3.1. The Hawaiian Archipelago3

3 Source: Adapted from Department of Land and Natural Resources, Honol ul u: State of Hawaii, 1979!, p. 5. 71

The several dozen "islands" beyond the last inhabited island of Kauai<4 most of which are no more than coral atolls, add only about nine square miles including Midway Islands! to the 6,435 square mile area of the inhabited high

Hawaiian Islands.5 The great length of the archipelago places the northernmost islands, Kure and Midway, within the temperate rather than the tropical zone, but research has shown that the unity of the Hawaiian oceanic ecosystem is not divided by "high-low" morphological di f ferences or latitudinal zones. Although the windswept low islands are not hospitable to the establishment of human habitation, for hundreds of years they have been the habitat of sea birds which now number about 14 million!, sea turtles, and indigenous Hawaiian monk seals. Even before laws and regulations limited access to the NWHX, the remoteness of the islands and lack of naturally available life support necessities for humans i.e., edible vegetation, water, etc.! preserved them as possibly the most pristine natural laboratory in the world. Longer than the

"Inhabited" is defined here as an established community which has permanent residents and formal political and socio-economic institutions. Although two islands of the ~HI, Midway and Tern, are inhabited by human beings continuously, they are excluded by this definition because they are peopled by a small number of transients who reside there for short periods of time.

5 Jean M. Grace, Honolulu< University of Hawaii Sea Grant College Progr j974! p. 145. 72

Galapagos, the NWHIhave been the natural repository of unique Hawaiian endemic genetic strains.6

Political Boundaries of the State The political boundaries of the state of Hawaii encompass the entire Hawaiian archipelago, with the exception of Midway Islands which are under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy. There are four county sub-divisions: The County of Hawaii composedof the island of Hawaii The County of Maui composed of the islands of Maui, Molokai, Lanai, and Kahoolawe Can uninhabited island used for target practice by the U.S. Navy! The County of Kauai composed of the islands of Rauai and Niihau The City and County of Honolulu composedof the island of Oahu and the NWHI, excluding Midway Islands The NWHI have been a part of the National Wildlife Refuge System since 1909. As such, with the exception of the state-awned Rute Island, they are under the jurisdiction of the federal government< hence, the City and County of Honolulu has made no serious attempt to exercise political

control over this region. The NWHI are a federal enclave

contained within the bounds of the state.

Hawaii's Claias Beyond the Territorial Sea The mid-Pacific location of the Hawaiian Islands has been simultaneously a boon and a bane--a boon because of its

6 From time to time, since the mid-l800s, human incursions have had devastating effects on wildlife in the NWHIrefuge, e~ g.i the introduction of rabbits to Laysan Island decimated t~e wildlife on the island; an on-going problem is the introduction of rats which prey on bird eggs on Midway Islands. 73 near ideal geographical location and a bane because of its historic attractiveness to the maritime powers af the world.

As a weak kingdom, the protection sought by and granted to the Hawaiian monarchs by the United States allowed the

Hawaiian Islands to survive in the anarchical international arena. But the "protection,' was motivated by the desire af the United States to acquire the islands as a strategic necessity. Now, nearly 100 years af ter annexation and almost

30 years af ter statehood, the morality of the American takeover is being questioned.

Recent Pederal-state Boundary Disputes

Specific to the present discussion is the dispute centered on the boundaries of the NWHI. Federal j urisdiction was established in the 1909 Executive Order 1019, when the

NWHI was designated the Hawaiian Islands Reservation.

In 3,967 and 1971, the federal government designated 204,935 acres of the NWHI as a "Research Natural Area," and prohibited "disruptive uses, encroachment or development" in the area. Although the designation of a 'research natural area" has not been disputed by the state, it questioned the area's boundaries in 1973. In response to an inquiry from the Department of the Interior, the state defined the boundary of the research natural area as being "only the f ast lands, lying above the upper reaches of the wash of waves or 74

the upper line of debris left by the wash of waves. "7 The emerged or fast lands, using the state's definition, total

1,765 acres. Present federal claims include 302,171 acres of submerged lands and the fast lands as well, or a total of

303,936 acres which includes the lagoon waters and submerged lands of Pearl and Hermes Reef, French Frigate Shoals, Maro

Reef, and Laysan Island.8 However, while the USPWS' final management plan for the NWHI denies the state permission ta

establish a facility on Tern Island, the agency will allow

the state to use the island to transfer fishers for emergency

medical airlift to Hanolulu. The boundary issue has become a paint of contention primarily because of its effect on the authority of the state

over its submerged lands and internal and coastal waters. In

a detailed study of the conflict over baundaries and jurisdiction between Hawaii and the federal government,

Dennis Yamase concludes that 'there exists a historical

pattern of federal acquiescence to territorial and later

state control and management of the islands' internal waters.

The recent about-face of the federal government as to the boundaries of the refuge cannat erase this history.">

Dennis Yamase, "State-Federal Jurisdictional Conflict over the Internal Waters and Submerged Lands of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, ' 4 982!: 16o-161. Also, Yamase provides the boundary designation proposed by the Dept. of the Interior in Assistant Secretary ~eed's letter to Governor Burns in note 107 on p. 162.

8 Ibid-. p. 142, see note 8. Ibi d,, p. 180. 75

Yamase asserts that the "critical legal question in the jurisdictional dispute centers on the intended scope of the boundaries of the wildlife reservation established under Executive Order 1019."1o Although Yamase notes that the NWHX wildlife refuge was administered by the state until the 1950's, he is in error because a 1960 memorandum from A,V. Tunison, Acting Director of the USEWS, to wayne Collins, State Director of Agriculture and Conservation, conf irms state management of the refuge until at least 1960 and provides the first inkling of the change in federal position. The memorandumstated that "the State of Hawaii has no right ta administer or manage the ref uge or to interfere with activities being conducted thereon by the United States. "ll The j urisdictional dispute could have serious impact on the commercial developnent of the nearshore f ishery resources of the NWHI because of possible conflict with food requirements of the refuge wildlife. Restrictions on entering the lagoon and inshore waters would preclude harvesting of baitfish a necessity for exploiting the aku and other fisheries, particularly if an extended-stay fishing method, such as the use of a mother-ship< is used. More important to the state government, however, is the possibility af losing additional

territory to the federal government.

10 Ibi d., p. l 44 ~ Ibid., p. 160. 76

Hawaii's commercial fishing industry was begun in the early l900's by Japaneseimmigrants as a coastal fishing operation off the main high islands. Until very recently, there was no concentrated commercial effort whi,ch impacted the fisheries off the NWHIFCZ. Hence, the wildlife had no sustained human competition for the nearshore f isheries. But with the enactment of the MFCMA,the state has publicly claimed ownership of its channel waters under the archipelagic regimeand has included the waters off the NWHIin its fisheries development plan. While the state government long had considered itself the logical owner, the first formal boundary declaration was madeby the Director of the Departmentof Landand Natural Resourcesat a public heari.ng held on March 23, 1979 by the NMFSon the preliminary plans for managingthe precious coral fisheries:l2

... I am compelled to formally inform the Secretary of Commerce,via the [Western Pacif ic Region Fishery Management]Council, that the Constitution of the State of Hawaii, as amended, vests the Board of Land and Natural Resources! with the power to manage and control the marine, seabed, and other resources located within the boundaries of the State, including the archipelagic waters of the State. ... The basic issue at stake is the integrity of this State's jurisdiction over our territorial waters... Unlike its sister coastal states, Hawaii is unique as a matter of historical origins and as a

This statement was excerpted f rom a xeroxed transcript of the l979 public hearing, which was held in Honolulu. The transcript was obtained f rom the Western Pacific Programs Of f ice of NMFS. 77

matter of its island geography. Hawaii' s territorial position is also essentially consistent with the archipelagic concept of jurisdiction embodied in the most recent articles of the ongoing Law of the Sea negotiations. I believe that Hawaii has a substantial case for sovereignty over the waters adjacent to each of the Hawaiian Xslands and the i nte rv eni ng channel s. This position has consistently colored the state' s actions, sometimes to the f rustration and consternation of federal agencies. However, federal agencies have not responded to the state's declaration of ownership of its channel waters except in unoffical verbal suggestions that the state should take its case to court. And the state has not made any effort to litigate the expansion of federal boundaries beyond the fast lands in the NWHI, nor does it plan to.13 Noreover, based on the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in U. S. v. California,>4 international law does not influence decisions of the Supreme Court. Zn U. S. v. Cali- fornia, California used the straight baseline method of delimiting its seaward boundary, using the f ringing islands off its coast as the base from which to draw its seaward boundaryand declared that the intervening waters between,the islands and the continental coastline are internal waters of the state. California cited the 1951 decision of the Enternational Court of Justice ZCJ! ruling on the fishery boundarydispute betweenNorway and Great Britain. Norway's

Henry Sakuda, Director, Division of Aquatic Resources, >984: personal communication.

381 U. S. 139, 1965, 78 use of the straight baseline method for drawing its seaward boundary for its irregular northern coastline was upheld by the ICJ. The California case underscores two precedents:

l. A state cannot maintain a claim to historic waters unless such a designation is endorsed by the United States 2. Because domestic laws on property rights require "definiteness and stability, ' relying on international understanding could alter the def inite- ness of expectations and would place the United States in a position of carrying out its foreign relations by making its "ownership vis-a-vis with foreign nations." Therefore, the existence of methods of del imitations in international conventions does not give states the right to use them to extend their boundaries or for any other purpose without the consent of the f ederal gov er nment Is Hawaii's position materially different from that of California2 It is suggested here that Hawaii's position is indeed different f rom California's, based on 1,000 years of use of the channels between the islands as corridors of trade and transport which was diminished with the advent of Western dominance of the islands. The 1SO-year relationship between the United States and Hawaii was a relationship in which Hawaii was always the object of federal manipulation and, hence, vulnerable to the vagaries of federal whims.

Federal Activities in the NWHI At the time of Western contact with the native Hawaiians in l778, the NWHIwere uninhabited. The islands remained unpopulated by humans until a contingent of marines was sent to MidwayIslands under an Executive Order issued by .:esi-

«nt Theodore Roosevelt on January 20, 1903: 79

Such public lands as may exist on the Midway Islands, Hawaiian graup, between the parallels of 28 degrees 05' and 28 degrees 25' North latitude, and between the meridians of 177 degrees 10' and 177 degrees 30' West longitude, are hereby placed under the j urisdiction and control of the Navy Depar tment. 15

The killing of the sea birds for their feathers, especially by the Japanese, which had begun in the mid-1800's, gave

Roosevelt an excuse to send 20 U. S. Marines to Midway Islands.16 The Japanese hunters had been periodically put ashore to kill the seabirds to supply feathers to the mi3.1 inery trade.

A dispatch of September 1, 1903, from the Navy Depart- ment, Washingtan, D.C., to the Commandant of the Naval Sta- tion in Hanolulu indicates that the federal government' s interest was not solely centered on protecting birds. The

Navy' s communique transmitted the views of the State Depart- ment:17

The fallowing is an extract of a letter received by the Navy Department f ram the State De- partment dated August 15, 1903, relative to the destruction of birds on Midway and Other islands of the Hawaiian group by Japanese subjects.

Excerpt f rom unpublished correspondence in the Navy Department f iles at the National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Midway Islands were claimed for the United States in 1867 by the USS LACXANANMA. Ironically, this trip was made as a face-saving measure when KamehamehaV protested the vessel' s ii . i "i New York and Landon: W.W. Norton a Company, 1981!, p. 35 ~ 17 Excerpt f ram unpublished correspondence in the Navy Department f iles at the National Archives, Washington, D. C. 80

"In response to your request for an expression of the Department's views, I have to say that as to Midway Island, the circumstances under which it was taken possession of by the U. S. S. T.ACKAWANNAon August 28, 1867, and the fact that its dependence upon the United States has been uniformly recognized since that time, appear, even in the absence of specific legislation< to confer upon the United States Executive the discretion to prevent the depredations repor ted,

"It seems especially desirable that the nuisance arising from the slaughtered birds should be suppressed on hygienic grounds. This Department would gladly enlist the offices of your Department to this end. If it be found that the objectionable practices of the Japanese cannot be stopped by any means short of deportation, the Japanese Government can be approached by this Government with a view to effecting such deportation with as little hardship as possible.

The aid of the United States Commanders in the Hawaiian waters towards enforcing such action wou1d be highly appreciated, and it is not doubted that they would be ef ficiently rendered' emphasis added! . The use of Midway as a cable landing site is apparent and in fact, the "middle section [of the cable], from Guamto Mid- way, was laid by the Co1onia, which put the end of a 2,600 mile cable ashore on Midway at 4 P.M., June 27 [1903] .'18 Also worthy of note is the State Department's recognition of jurisdiction of the Hawaiian government over the other NWHI in the last paragraph see underscored sentence!.

Russell A. Apple and Gerald Swedberg, Pearl Harbor: U. S. Navy, Pacif ic Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 1979!, p. 12. 81

The fortification of Midway began in the late 1930's, and it was an important naval base during World War ZZ. The contemporary significance of Midway to United States security interests appears to have diminished considerably. The naval station is currently manned by a small contingent of navy personnel and Sri Lankans under contract with ZTT Base Ser- vice. Hence, at this writing, the U. S. Navy' s continuing f uture need for Midway Zslands remains to be resolved.

During the 1984 session of the State Legislature, officials of the state's Department of Land and Natural Resources testif ied that the development of Midway Zslands as a transshipment station for tunas harvested in the North Pacific is a back-burner issue because canning operations now sited in Hawaii are being shifted to American Samoa and Puerto Rico. Beca use this devel opnent has diminished the si gnif icance of the role of the U. S. Navy in the developaent of the NWHZ fisheries, it will not be considered any further in the present discussion.

Pisheries Resources of the Hawaiian Islandsa All Zs Not Well The most recent and comprehensive information on the fishery resources of the Hawaiian archipelago was compiled by

the state in its 1979 fishery development plan.19 Without

extensive historical catch data, especially of the NWEZ

fisheries, such as is available for the U.S. continental

19 Department of Z,and and Natural Resources, 3QLKLii 82 fisheries, the management of the resources can only proceed on 'best estimates" extrapolated f rom data obtained f rom the

National Marine Fisheries Service and foreign catch repor ts. 2o The development plan identifies the f ishery resaurces off the NWHZ as the major target for future commercial developnent because nearshore non-migratory f isheries of f the high islands are overf ished and cannot now sustain further large commercial harvests. The snappers and groupers and reef fish which find their way to retail fresh fish outlets and restaurants are caught in small quantities of several hundred pounds only. The limited standing stack of these fisheries and the unreliable supply of baitfish to fully exploit migratory species, such as aku and other tunas found in inshore waters off the high islands, preclude capitaliza- tian to upgrade the aging fulltime commercial fishing fleet.

Furthermore, about 75% of Hawaii's commercial license holders estimated to total approximately 2,600 in l982! are parttime fishers who catch and sell both non-migratory and migratory species, particularly aku skipjack! and ahi yellowfin tuna! .21

As indicated in Table 3.1, unlike other coastal states, which have large non-migratory species, tunas constitute the

Ibi d., p. 41 ~ 21 This statistic was derived from the survey conducted for he present study. See Chapter 8 for additianal data. 83

Table 3.1. Landingsof somecommercially signif icant species:l960, 1970, 19S0.22

1980 1940 1970

Landinga Value LaadingaValue Landings Value Selected epee ice 81000! Hawaiian naaea! NT! 81000! NT! 81000! NT! 1001 3334 1497 2484 4314 Skip5ack'tuna aku! 3338 582 214 S10 20 83 Sigeyetuna ahi! 588 152 320 499 1241 3351 Tallow! in tuna ahi! l41 90 101 69 203 195 Slue marlin au! lii 207 445 3SS 232 476 sigeye ecad akule! 135 67 154 218 31 72 Striped eaklin au! 99 82 79 98 223 524 Nacketel acad opelu! 87 50 35 55 Ill 469 dolphin aahiaabi! 41 44 24 40 104 484 tink anappec epakapaka40 4 20 12 121 454 Wahoo ono! 11 3 9 ll 71 127 hlhacoee ahipalaha! 2705 5127 3902 5359 12255 Total 5051

Source:Thomas Hida and Robert A. Skillman, 'A Noteon the CommercialPisheries in Hawaii,' SouthwestFisheries Center HonoluluLaboratoryr National M rine FisheriesService, 1983, p. 5. 84 major inshore commercial fishery in Hawaii. This fact cannot be over-emphasized. Aku, a small-tuna fishery, is the most valuable Hawaiian commercial species, representing between 40 to 60 percent of the total catch within 20 miles of f the high islands, but its landings also have been declining. The lack of a reliable supply of baitf ish is given as the cause for the declining catch. To enhance the depleted f isheries off the high islands, fish aggregation devices23 or FADs were emplaced in of f shore waters off these islands see Figure 3.2! in 1978 by the state' s Division of Aquatic Resources DAR! . These buoys have increased landings over the declining long-term average catches for tunas as well as for other finfish species. ln particular, the PADs have had a significant impact an yellaw- fin tuna. Table 3.1 shows that it is the only tuna species which has shown an increase in. landings. Troll-caught yellowfin tuna landings are offsetting the drastic decline of bigeye tuna in the aggregate landings of all species of tunas, according to a recent HMPS administrative repart.24 Zn addition to existing FAD sites, Figure 3.2 also shows projected sites for future buoy emplacement ofi the high islands, Although one of the objectives of the f ishery de-

The terms "buoys' and 'fish aggregation devices FADs!" are used interchangeably in this dissertation. 24 Hida and Skillman, "A Note on the Commercial Fisheries," P. 1, 85

Pigure 3.2. Statewide fish aggregation buoy system25

25Source: Department of Landand Natural Resources,3hhxaii p. 47 ~ 86 velopment plan is the emplacement of buoys in NWHI waters, the implementation of this objective is a mid-range priority. since only a small number of Hawaiian fishers now fish in the

NWHI, limited budgetary resources have been used in connection with waters off the high islands which are within reach of most f isher s.

A significant attribute of FADs is their ability to attract and hold aku, which is the single most significant fishery in Hawaii, during 'low abundance" periods of f the high islands.26 Hence, buoy technology presents a potential for revitalizing the production of the aku f ishery by reducing dependence on the favored but fragile baitfish, nehu a

Hawaiian anchovy! . However, this potential is as yet only specul ation.

Aku fishers prefer nehu for chumming because of its bright silvery coloring and its 'homing' behavior which leads the aku to the fishing vessel. Nehu has the ability to induce a school of aku into a state of 'feeding f renzy." In this condition, aku bite the bare barbless hook used by the fishers. But nehu has a high mortality rate 5% per day! in ship baitwells, and wild stocks have noticeably decreased in recent years. Stocks were nearly non-existent in 1983 and

Division of Aquatic Resources, Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1983!, p. 3. 87

l984. Thus, the expansion of the aku fishery is limited by an inadequate supply of nehu.27

In addition to the lack of baitf ish, there is another problem that the state alone cannot solve: the probable negative effect of Japanese and West coast distant water fleets' harvest of the large tuna species, e.g., albacore, to the north and west of the high islands in international waters beyond the current l2-mile f ishery zone. A highly migratory species, tunas are not included in the MFCMAand must be managed by international agreements. Under the present management regime, recognized by the United States, vessels flying any flag may harvest tunas in waters beyond the l2-mile fishery zone.28 These realities are recognized by the state in its f ishery developaent plan.29

Moreover, the state's planning efforts must now be consistent with national standards imposed by the MFCMAfor all coastal fisheries within a 200-mile FCZ, off both U. S. coasts, Alaska, Hawaii, U. S. terri tories, and the Trust Territory of the Paci.f ic Islands. Five f ishery management

Efforts to culture nehu have, thus f ar, been unsuccessful. Alternative cultured species such as togninnaws, have not performed well enough to win the acceptance of the aku f ishers.

As noted in the previous chapter, the state has previously protested the presence of Japanese distant-water vessels within its FCZbecause of incidental by-catches of non-migratory species.

Department of Land and Natural Resources, ~~ ~Les> p. 53. 88 plans FNPs! have been or will be developed for Hawaii and the Western Pacif ic under MFCMA guidelines:

Precious corals FMP was implemented in 1983!

2. Spiny lobster FMP was implemented in 1983!

3. Billfish FMP completed, but not approved!

4. Bottomf ish FMP completed; review stage!

5. Deepwater Herterocarpus shrimp Presently in data gathering stage!

There is consonance between the state's major f isheries and the developed and proposed FMPs under the NFCNA except far tuna, its largest fishery but not now included in the NFCNA! .

In addition, the state sees a potential f or inshore f isheries

such as akule and opelu, sharks, and Kona crab which do not necessarily limit their range to the 3-mile territorial sea

under state jurisdiction!, but are not of sufficient economic significance ta warrant a FMP. Table 3.2 shows species which have been identified as potential candidates for developnent. The projected harvest levels, based on optimal conditions with an ideal mix of private and public investment in vessel construction and support systems, constitute a long-

term potential.

Although the state fishery developnent plan is based on these and other optimistic projections, the diminishing har-

vest, of tunas and the unlikelihood of establishing a trans-

shignent station in the NWHI in the near term on either Nid-

«y or Tern Islands render moot for the immediate future the

q«stion of long-term sustainable yield of the fisheries at 89

Table 3.2. Actual and potential landings of commercially valuable fisheries in Hawaii30

197 4 lrh! f tioaal Tousl Cyecfes or Croup Lasr!f e9s 9otes tial 9oteetfal ilbl Ib! 8 lb!

Skfyjacb tusa~u Cr796r044 20r004,004 2C ~ 5 albacore tuse surface! 569r400 10 20r004,040 14 6-20.6 llbacore subsurface! 125r400 Cr000r044 C.l 0 f9e7 ~ tuba 6COr400 14-20,000,OOD 14 5 20.5 telloeCfs tuse 2rl22r400 1 5,400,044 3 lW 1 SottoaC f sb {r!eeysea! 770r 000 1 2rCOOr000 1 7-3,3 bettooCfsb fasbore! I ~441r400 900 ~044~1 r3aar 000 1.9 3,3 Oeasouut 9rou445 ish 6 10raaar000 6 0-14.0 Ri9eye scarf~hule 615 ~ 000 ~ 50' 404 lriaar404 ~ 4-1.4 Rouo4 scarf mpelu 299 F 000 1 Xr40oraoo lr3-1 7 Chacbs 21 ~000 CODD004 2r404raaa 6 2 4 $1115ish 741r000 1-2r504rOOO 1 7 3 ' 2

Syiay lobate! 36r000 700 r 004-lr 644,040 7-1.4 Chrfay 2r000 6 lar000r040 6 ~4-14 0 rooa crab 25r040 54-75,040 ~ 45- 1

13r423r000 64r700 ~044 104r475 ~004 74 a ll7 4

Source5 Department of Land and Natural Resources, fK~ p. 42. 90 the levels given in Table 3.2. The state's developaent plans, which include fishing facilities in the NWHI, suffered a major setback when Hawaiian Tuna Packers ceased operations in late 1984, Coupled with this, because the state fishery agency perceives that there is no indication that mor-

Hawaiian fishers want to participate in the harvest of NWHI fisheriesg all plans for establishing facilities on Midway or

Tern Islands are on 'hold."

The Tripartite Assessment of the Resources of the NWHI

The first scientific exploration of the marine resources of the NWHI was done in l902 by the U. S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries. It was followed by a second study in the l930's by the U. S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries. Af ter these efforts, not much was done by way of scientific investigation until the early 1970's, when the Honolulu Laboratory of the National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS! ini tiated some preliminary work.3> With the enactment of the MFCMA, the need for information on the variety and size of the populations of the f ishery resources, particularly of f the NwHI, by the western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council WPRFMC! made that area the prime site for research by the NMFS. Because of the spatial expanse of the research

Richard S. Shomura, "Introduction of Tripartite and Sea «ant Research Programs in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands<" in

Richard W. Grigg and Rose T. pf und, Honolulu: University «Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, 1980!, p. 10. site and his agenCy's limited resources, the Director of the

Honolulu Laboratory of NMPS initiated discussion in 1976 with the heads af the USPNS and the state DAR to coordinate research ef forts and pool personnel, shiptime, and equipment. The result was the Tripartite Cooperative Agreement, signed in l977, which delineated areas of research focus in the NWHI for each agency.

Under the Tripartite Cooperative Agreement, the USEWS was responsible for the investigation and assessment of

"possible effects of commercial and recreational fishing on the fishery resources of the NWHI in relation to the purpose and objectives of the islands as a national wildlife ref uge."

The state MR's goal was the formulation of "a resource management plan that addresses both the protection of the terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems and organisms and the rational use of the commercial and recreational fisheries resource." The NMFS's goal was to determine the "distribution and relative abundance of the exploitable stock and inventory

the physical and biological characteristics of the waters overlying the insular, pelagic and seamount zones. "32

Zn fiscal year 1978, the University of Hawaii Sea Grant

College Program joired the three agencies with the f irst project of a major five-year research program to "provide the scientific basis for the development of area fisheries and

32 TheTripartite Agreement. A memorandumof agreement among USPWS, and DAR!, 1977, Appendix I, F, I, unpaginated. 92 provide a context for preserving and managing wildlife by contributing toward the developaent of an ecological model of the NWHI."33 The funding for the Sea Grant projects alone was about $2 million over the five-year period, including matching funds from non-federal sources. The NMPS funding was more than $3 million.

The purpose of the Tripartite study was to develop a scientific basis for the management of the NWHI fisheries.

In addition to consideration of the recruitment of the exploited species, socioeconomic and institutional studies were also included in the -.-ipartite research program to obtain data to satisfy requirements for PMPs, based on optimum sustainable yield OSY! criteria.>4 Under OSY criteria, predator-prey interactions predators being not only the top carnivores of the refuge, the birds, mammals, large fish and sea turtles, but human fishers as well! are significant in the developuent of the PMPs. The management plans for the

NNHI, therefore, must resolve the question: how can economic developaent, the harvesting of fish by human fishers for human consumption be made compatible with the preservation of the wildlife and the ecological balance of the NWHI?

To provide decisionmakers with management guidance, an ecological model was developed by the NMPS as part of the

33 d g Appendix addendum, unpaginated. 34 The research results presented in Chapter 10 was funded by the University of Hawaii Sea Grant Collee Program as a project under this NWHI tripartite research program. 93

Tripartite research program to better understand the inter- relationship of species as a function of a complex food web.35 Themodel is basedan predator-prey relationships at the various trophic levels. Management of the f isheries and wildlife must consider haw many of the lower order animals are required to sustain the economically valuable higher orders and, conversely, the impact upon the ecosystemof diminished numbers of these predators is also an important consideration. Such inf ormation, if available, can provide an understanding of the ecological interaction amongall sectors, land, sea, and air, in the NwHI. Hawever, the MMFs madel, like others, is anly a limited approximation af the complex ecosystem. As such, its utility has thus far been more in its contribution to theory than in its applicatian ta FMP development. A study on the abundance and species af coral, which could have an impact on future policy, has discovered the "Darwin point' of the NWHX,the lacatian at which the growth af coral equals the rate af land subsidence and thus prevents the land mass f rom submerging or drowning This knowledge explains the submergence of the old islands as a function of

Jeffery J. Polovina and Darryl T. Tagami, "Preliminary "esults f rom EcosystemModelling at French Frigate Shoals," in RichardW. Grigg and RaseT. Pfund, Honolulu: Universityed. af HawaiiSea Grant CollegeProgram, l980!, pp. 286-298. location and reef formation. The Darwin Point of the Hawai- ian archipelago occurs at Kure Island at the northwestern terminus of the NWHI. Beyond Kure Island lies a string of seamounts, known as the Emperor Seamounts, which are the submerged remains of former islands. Core samples support the theory that these seamounts are volcanic formations which formed at more southerly sites and "drifted" to their present locations. 36 Grigg and Dollar,3> who studied coral reefs along the entire archipelago, also found that the presence and variety of coral reefs were greatest near the mid-point of the archipelago at Maro Reef and French Frigate Shoals see Figure

3,1! . Overall the di str ibuti onal di f f er ence throughout the archipelago was in the dominance of certain varieties at different sites. Grigg and Dollar noted that habitat preference of marine animals appears to be related to the "successional stage [of the reefs! which in turn may be due to differences in the f requency and magnitude of [environmental] disturbance'.38 I ike the distributional patterns of corals, except for monk seals and green sea turtles, other

Richard W. Grigg and Steven J. Dollar, 'The Status of Reef Studies in the Hawaiian Archipelago, ' in

ed. Richard W. Qrigg and Rose Pfund, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Sea Grant College program. 1980!, pp. 107-108, 37 Ibid., p. l15. 8 Ibid ~ p 11 95 marine faunae are found throughout the archipelago, but of ten with large differences in numbers of given species at particular sites.

The temperature differences between the warmer inhabited high islands and the uninhabited low or NWHI is about 1.2 degrees centigrade, and the difference between summer and winter temperatures is about 2.5 degrees centigrade.39 Thus, thermal differences do not present a barrier to colonization for most species of marine flora and fauna along the entire archipelago, The small temperature differential adds still another reason for regarding the Hawaiian archipelago as a single complex ecosystem. Marine faunae in Hawaiian waters appear to be deterred f rom migrating to another area mostly by the distance they must travel and the severity and f requency of disturbances which may aid or deter mobility.40 However, from the standpoint of economic developnent, the more significant result of the tripartite scientific research completed in 1983! in the NWHI is the discovery of exploitable quantities of commercially valuable f isheries in the NWHZ waters. Of ecological significance is the f inding that the archipelago is essentially a single ecosystem.

39 J. Hirota, S. Taguchi, R. P. Shuman, and A. K. Jahn, "Distribution of Plankton Stocks, Productivity, and Potential Fishery Yield in Hawaiian Waters," in

ed. Richard W. Grigg and Rose Pfund, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, l980!, p. 194 40 Grigg and Dollar, "The Status of Reef Studies," p. ll6. The Management and Development of the NWHI Resources Historically, two uses, military and preservation, have been dominant in the NWHI. These uses have co-existed without user conflicts because military activity has taken preservation into account and does not require 3.arge-scale harvest of the fishery resources in competition with the wildlife, However, there has been recent USFWS concern over rodent control, accidents involving birds and aircraf t, and disturbances to nesting activity on Midway.4l On the other hand, the state's desire to exploit the resources of the NWHI introduces competitive consumption of the same resources harvested by wildlife and may lead to introduction of pests as the number and f requency of human activities escalate in or near the refuge. Unlike the military-pr eservation combination, the f ishing-preservation objectives are in conflict.

Hence, the complexity of the biological system is but one aspect of the management of the 3.iving marine resource of the %EH', since resource management really means the management of human beings and their activities. Laws and regulations are formulated to do this. Furthermore, to exploit the fisheries of the NWHI efficiently, new support facilities and iaafrastructure are required. Although the state's 1979 fishery developnent plan identif ied Tern and Midway Is3.ands,

4l U. S. Fish and Wi3.dlife Service, 1&: ffk 2>-p,4. under the jurisdiction of the USPWSand the Department of

Def ense U. S. Navy!, respectively, as proposed si tes f or developaent of the necessary support facilities,42 the closing of the cannery in Honolulu has completely ruled out any further consideration of a Midway facility in the near f utur e.

More recent public statements by the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources identify a mothership/barge support station near Tern island for the developaent of a multi-species fishery in the NWHI rather than the island itsel f. 43

The 1982 report of the Hawaii Fisheries Coordinatinq

Council HFCC4 states: [In reply to inquiries made by the state], [t]he Interior Department subsequently responded to the State, through [state j Senator Yee, [Chairman of the Western Pacific Regional Management Council], with an of fer to consider a cooperative shared use agreement with the State in establishing a fisheries base at Tern. As a result the Department of Land and Natural Resources with input and guidance f ram the Hawaii Fisheries Coordinating Council, began preparing a Tern Island f isheries support station use proposal.

Department of Land and Natural Resources, ~~ pp 7 ~ Division of Aquatic Resources, "Proposal for a Multi- resource Fishery Support Base at Tern Island, French Frigate Shoals," Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1983!, pp. 14-17. The HFCC was established in 1980 by Act 282. It is an advisory body to the DLNR. Its members, consisting of voting and non-voting classes, are appointed by the governor. The ~FCCserves as a. forum for discussion of issues put on the genda by the members and DLNR. See Chapter 8 for the compo- »«on of the HFCC. 98

Although the NWHI fisheries issues involve different perspectives in terms of Federal laws, State's interests, and expectations of the fishing industry, the key issue nevertheless is essentially one of multiple use of the NWHI fisheries resources. This is a complex and formidable issue requiring cooperation and understanding among the various resource user groups. The [Hawaii Fisheries Coordinating] Council intends to play a major role in coordinating activities to help resolve the NWHI issues. The ultimate objective is to allow the rational developnent of the f isheries resources in the NWHI and to assure the continued protection and preservation of the unique wildlife features found there.

The report concludes that in fiscal year 19S3, HFCC will participate 'in the formulation of a proposal to establish a fisheries support station at Tern Island. "45 At this writing, the proposal has been completed, but there are no plans for implementation in the near term because of the fishing industry' s lack of interest in expanding their activities in the NWHI.46

Concl usion

The unique oceanic character of the state of Hawaii will make it difficult for it to fit national norms in the management of its f ishery resources. This difficulty is inherent in the differences between insular and continental attributes, particularly the characteristic coral reefs and narrow shelves encircling each island in the former environment and

Hawaii Fisheries Coordinating Council. Department of Land and Natural Resources, State of Hawaii. pp. 10, 15. Alvin Katekaru, fishery biologist, DAR, 1984: personal communi ca ti ons. 99

the broad continental shelf in the latter. Moreover, continental fisheries are fewer in variety with very large standing stocks of each. Insular f isheries are diverse in species but with small standing stocks of each. In addi,iOn,, the isolation of the archipelago has enhanced the inter-relationship of the aquatic and terrestrial wildlife to such a degree that the l400-mile string of islands and the surrounding waters are essentially a single ecosystem. Aside f rom these environmental aspects, the institutional and legal framework within which fishery resources are managed recognizes the roles of the federal and state governments and the necessity for cooperation. But such cooperation occurs in relation to the political jurisdiction and authority the federal and state governments have over the state's coastal areas. For example, to whatever extent Mid- way Islands remain a significant military base, that federal interest must be respected. Similarly, the role of the USFWS, as the agency which manages the NWHI wildlife refuge, is important in Hawaii. These interests and roles, however, seem not to constitute by themselves sufficient reason for denying the ecological unity of the marine resources of the archipelago and, ultimately, its political unity. If a sound arrangement for 'partnership management" is to be implement-

full recognition of the state's position and needs would seem in order. Thus, a mutually exclusive dual regime of governance is suggested: 100

1. The political state wherein the presently established boundaries for the administration of the state under the United States and Hawaii constitutions and their institutions are recognized

2. The ecological state wherein resource management boundaries are established to fit wildlife habitats

The establishment of non-political resource management boundaries will become significant in the future as diminishing natural resources are removed f rom a traditional commons management regime and placed under private or public-private management regimes. The rationale for imposing management boundaries, based on biological and ecological needs of resources which are unrelated to political boundaries, is not without precedent. For example, soil and water conservation districts of ten are bounded by natural contours rather than political boundaries and administered as independent entities. 47

In essence, the argument here is that the biological and ecological requirements of Hawaii's fishery resources can only be respected if the boundaries used in establishing a federal-state management regime are those defined for an ecological state rather than a political state. The proposed management structure, the Hawaii Fishing Authority which is described in Chapter 12, is based on this argument.

47 Francis C, H. T.um, State Conservationist, U. S. Soil Conservation Service, 1985: personal communication. MAIIPBST DESTIHY: THE HISTORIC INTERACTION BETWEEH THE UNITED STATES AND HAWAII

lt is Friday noon August 12, 1898. On a platform in front af the executive building, U. S. Minister Sewall briefly addresses President of the Republic of Hawaii, Sanford B. Dole, on the text and purpose of the Newlands Joint Resolution no. 55, which annexed the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. The President formally tenders the sovereignty and all public proper- ti es of the Republic to the Uni ted States.

Two battalions of the Hawaiian National Guard and four companies of American infantrymen and two sections of artillerymen stand at attention. Spectators respect- fully remove their hats as the Royal Hawaiian Band plays 'Hawaii Ponoi," the national anthem of the Hawaiian kingdom. The colors are sounded and the shore batteries fire a 21-gun salute, joined by the guns of the Philadelphia, the flagship of Rear Admiral J. N. Miller, Commander in Chief, Pacific Station, and the Mohican. The Hawaiian flag is slowly lowered.

Upon the request af U. S. Minister Sewall, Rear Admiral Miller rises to signal the playing of the "Star Spangled Banner" by the naval band. As the anthem ends, the American flag is solemnly hoisted on the flagstaff on the central tower of the executive building. The flag raising ceremony ends with the firing of a final 21-gun salute.l

The narrative was reconstructed from dispatches sent to the Navy Department by J. N. Miller, Rear Admiral, U. S. N., «mmander-in-chief, Paci f ic Station. J. N. Miller, Bureau of Naviga ti on, Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, l 898!r pp. 144-147 ~

3.01 102

With the exchanging af flags, the kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands2 passed into history and was no more. This ceremony brought a legal closure to more than 40 years of effort much of it covert diplomatic negotiations! by the

United States to acquire the Hawaiian Islands. But the demise of the indigenous Hawaiian society began long before the 1898 annexation. The introduction of Western technology, diseases, and New England Calvinism, which followed the discovery of the Hawaiian Islands by the English explorer, Captain James Cook, in 1778, destroyed the social foundation of the native Hawaiians, The native social structures were replaced by a new social and economic order, supported by a plantation economy which excluded the natives from positions of authority.3 This chapter focuses on the history of the political and economic relations between the United States and the Hawaiian

Islands. Without this knowledge, it is not possible to understand the latent forces operating in present intergovernmental relations in Hawaii, a curious interplay of dependence and independence, which have historic roots in the monarchy. For despite its nominal status as an independent

2 The name of the island nation during the monarchy was the Hawaiian Islands. Donald Funayama, Assistant State Archi- visti 1985: personal communication. Puchs' work on the social history of Hawaii is the classic text on this subject. See Lawrence H. Fuchs, 4 1961! . l03 kingdom,Hawaii has beenessentially little more than a colony of the United States. Theplantation economy,founded by the descendantsof the missionaries, usedthe land and imported labor to accumulatewealth benefitting their small group. They formedan oligarchy which controlled the economy and political power structure of the islands for more than a century. They only began to lose their economicand political hold in the 3.960s,after Hawaii becamea state. Thus, although the bondbetween the United States and Hawaii was strong, the non-white population did not benefit from these linkages.4 There is a history of covert diplomatic probes initiated by the United States beginningin the mid-l840s, to test the monarchy's interest in annexation and to prevent colonization by other Western powers. Hence, annexation was not, as popularly believed, somethingthat was initiated by the coup that deposedqueen Liliuokalani. The seedshad quietly been sownearlier. The coup only brought matters out into the open and to a head. Except for a short summaryon the early Polynesian settlers in Hawaii, the discussion which follows in this chapterwill mainly be concernedwith the politics and geopolitics of intergovernmentalinteraction. It will show that the manipulation of the Hawaiiangovernment by the U~i~edStates was primarily motivated by geopolitics and the

?bi d,, pp. l 53-448, 104 historiography of "manifest destiny." But no less significant was the driving personal ambition of Theodore Roosevelt to achieve naval supremacy in the Pacific. He was ultimately responsible for bringing the entire Hawaiian archipelago under U. S. control.

The history of Vni ted States-Hawaii interaction, therefore, has been that of colonizer and the colony--manipulator and the manipulated. While U. S. imperialism and colonization in and of themselves are not the direct concern of the present discussion, these issues are nevertheless the historic antecedents which color present-day intergovernmental relationships between Hawaii and the federal government. It is also the legacy of fishery management--the newest arena for federal-state cooperation. Although the MFCMA created a. new management structure, the regional fishery management councils RFNCs!, the influence of history has been transmitted in f ishery decisionmaking by the present-day institutions and their agents. This study of the relationship of Hawaii and the United States showed the pervasiveness and presistence of historic antecedents even though structures are changed.

Hawaii's Bar3y Settlers

The first migrants lived on at least two of the NWHI,

Nihoa and Necker Islands see Figure 3.l in Chapter 3! .

~ased on radiocarbon dating, campsites found on these two islands seem to have been abandoned between 500 and 750 A.D. 105

Nordyke' s conjecture is that these settlers may have come f rom the Marquesas:5

In the ancient Hawaiian legend of Kumuhonua and his decendants, the Folynesians are called ka po'e Meaehme, or the "Menehune people." A Marquesan legend also refers to a group af people with a similar name, and in Tahiti the same Naaahune referred to the laboring class, or commoners. Xt is possible that the Manahune of Tahiti were in the employ of early chiefs who settled the Hawaiian Islands. Later legends described the meaehune as mythical, elflike creatures who built a heiau temple! or fish pond in a single night and performed other superhuman feats. The Polynesians who came f rom Tahiti the present day

Hawaiians! are thought to have arrived between 900 and 1300

A.D. They established colonies on all of the high islands and regularly traversed the channels to carry an trade and to fish. Hence, prior to Western contact, the Hawaiians appear to have used the channel waters extensively as corridors of transport to link the high islands. This system broke down with the arrival of Western warships and whaling and trading vessel s.

5 EleanorC. Nordyke, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press' 19>7!i p 7 ~ 106

A Contingent Necessity': the American Policy on the Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands6

With the appointment of John C. Jones as the resident agent on "commerce and seamen" on September 19, 1820, the

United States entered into a relationship with the Hawaiian

Islands which eventually resulted in statehood in August 1959. This summary wil l orQy br ief ly di scuss those occa si ons during which cession or annexation was considered either by the United States or the Hawaiian government or when the

Uni ted States intervened as the pr otector of the mall and weak Hawaiian monarchy.7

Great Britain and Prance sent ships to the Hawaiian islands f rom time to time, following their discovery in 1778. The hopes of these countries to acquire the islands were thwarted, however, by the f irm entrenchment of the United

States in the affairs of the Hawaiian kingdom. The American

6 The term "contingent necessity is contained in the letter written by John W. Poster, Secretary of State, on February 15, 1893 to transmit to President Benjamin Harrison a report compiled by Andrew H. Allen, Chief of the Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State. See V. S., Congress, Senate, "Report Upon the Official Relations of the United States with the Hawaiian Islands from the First Appointment of a Consular Officer There by This Government,' compiled by Andrew H. Allen, 52d Cong., 2d sess., 1893 g pp. 8-28. Hereaf ter ref erred to as U. S. Senatep "Report Upon the Official Relations ~ ! The summary of the American-Hawaiian diplomatic chronology Presented here is largely based on Andrew Allen's documentation of diplomatic correspondence between the succeeding resident U.S. ministers in Hawaii and officials in the ,epartment of State in Washington, D. C. Allen compiled the 'nformation at the request of the Senate of the Fifty-second ~ongress. Ibi d,, pp. 8-2 8. 107

position was formalized on December 19, l842, when the United States recognized the independence of the Hawaiian government and declared that it would not tolerate interference by foreign powers. This was contained in the form of a special policy message transmitted on December30 to Congress by U. S. president Tyler, it was also sent to all maritime European nations.

The English Incident The first active intervention by the United States occurred on July ll, 1843. Conunodore Kearney, U. S. Navy, protested the deed of cession which Lord George Paulet had forced King KamehamehaIII to sign on February 25 shortly after seizing the Hawaiian Islands in the name of Queen Victoria. Kearney also protested the acts of the Commission established by Lord George to rule the islands. Evidently,

Lord George had acted on his own initiative. An official note to the United States from Great Britain stated that the occupation of the San@rich Islands8 was an act entirely unauthorized by Her Majesty's govermnent. "9 This occupation ended when Rear Adairal Thaaas, Royal Navy, interceded> the Hawaiian monarchy was restored on July 31, 1843 with the signing of an agreement.

8 Captain James Cook, the English explorer, namedthe islands >e Sandwich Islands in honor of the Earl of Sandwich. Senate, 'Report Upon the Official Relations/ p 9. 108

On November 28, 1843, a convention was secured between France and Great Britain "reciprocally to consider the

Sandwich Islands as an independent state, and never to take possession, either directly or under title of protectorate, or under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed. "10 The independence of the Hawaiian government was re-conf irmed by U. S. President Tyler on J uly 1844,11 but this action was not incorporated in a United states-Hawaii treaty until November 9, 1850. Two general conventions were entered into between the Hawaiian government and France and Great Britain on Narch 26, 1846; but they did

not recognize Hawaiian independence.12 The first European recognition of independence was contained in the treaty

concluded on October 19, 1846 with Denmark.13

The French Incident

The convention of 1846 created conflict rather than

peace between France and the Hawaiian Islands. Continuing

disputes between the Prench consul and the Hawaiian govern-

raent, particularly regarding the make-up of juries, erupted in an armed seizure of the islands by France on August 25, I849. While the French destroyed considerable property, including the dismantling of a fort, they did not haul down

Ibi d., p 11. I bi d. p. 12 I3 Ibid. 109

the Hawaiian flag, apparently in recognition of the 1843 agreement with Great Britain.>4 Whennegotiations dragged on for nearly two years, the Hawaiian monarch KamehamehaIII, fearing the worst, executed a deed of cession to the United States and delivered it to the U. S. Commissioner at Honolulu. The terms of the deed provided for the holding of the Hawaiian islands by the United States until a satisf actory agreement could be reached with Prance; failing to achieve such an agreement, the islands would be permanently transf erred to the Uni ted States.15 The American response was issued by Secretary of State

Webster on July 14, 1851. The U. S. Navy was ordered to be in sufficient strength and preparation to preserve the honor and dignity of the United States and the safety of the government of the Hawaiian Islands. A conf idential dispatch to the U. S. Commissioner from Secretary Webster on the same day directed that the deed be returned to the Hawaiian government.l6 The

French withdrew shortly after the United States intervened. Initiation of the Pirst Annexation Treaty

Correspondence between the U. S. Commissioner in Hawaii and the Department of State continued to discuss the question of annexation af ter the Prench incident. A dispatch of April 4< 1854, authorised the negotiation of a treaty to annex the

Ib1d» g p» 13 ~

Ibid,, p. 14.

I bi d. 110

Hawaiian Islands.17 By mid-September of the same year, a draf t treaty, approved by Kamehameha 1II, was received by the Department of State, However, it contained two provisions which were objectionable to the United States:

l. Annuities totalling three times the sum which had been offered

2. Admission of the islands as a state

This proposal was laid aside when the King died suddenly and was succeeded by Kamehameha IV who was opposed to annexation.

Diplomatic Probes on Annexation Continue

A treaty of reciprocity was concluded by Kamehameha ZV on July 20, 1855, but the U, S. Senate did not appove it, even though the Committee on Poreign Affairs had reported it out favorably.18 KamehamehaIV died on November 30, l863 and was succeeded by Kamehameha V. During the latter's reign, an update of the 1855 treaty, more favorable to the United States, was concluded and approved by the King and the

President of the United States on May 21, 1867, but it, too, was not approved by the U. S. Senate.>> The treaty was ratified by the Hawaiian government on July 30, 1867, but the

Senate failed to approve it a second time when it was put to a vote on June 1, 1870.20 While the reciprocity treaty was

l7 Ibid

?bi d.

19 I bi d., p. 1 4-15. Ibid, p, 15, being negotiated, there was an ongoing official interest in annexing Hawaii.

A particularly unsavory aspect of the United States interest in annexation, often referred to as "battleship diplomacy," is the extended stay of the 088 Lackawanna in Hawaiian waters in l866. KamehamehaV was in ill-health and there was concern that his death was imminent. It was suspected that the battleship was positioned to take advantageof the unfortunate circumstance. Indeed, the King disliked the ship's commandingofficer, Captain William Reynolds, who openly opposedthe reciprocity treaty in favor of annexation.2l The Lackawanaafinally lef t the islands after the King protested i ts presence. During this unsettl ed period, which continued into the l870s, one or more American varships were always anchored of fshore. For more than 20 years, following the USS Lackawanna incident of l867, the United States exercised 'battleship diplomacy" to secure American position in Hawaii. The diplomatic dispatches f rom the U. S. ministers in Hawaii to the Department of State during these years record a continuing involvement in the affairs of the Hawaiian government to ensure the election of monarchs who would be friendly to the United States.22

Xerze Tate, d d: I Y Press, l965!, p. 29. Ibid., pp. 27-37- 112

In the fall of 1867, Secretary of State Seward instructed the U.S. Minister in Hawaii to "sound the proper authority on the large subject [annexation] mentioned in your note and ascertain probable conditions. You may confiden- tially receive overtures and communicate the same to me. "23

In a note to the U. S. Minister, Seward wrote:24

Circumstances have transpired here which induce a belief that a strong interest, based upon a desire for annexation of the Sandwich Islands, will be active in opposing ratification of the reciprocity treaty. It will be argued that the reciprocity will tend to hinder and defeat an early annexation, to which the people of the Sandwich Islands are supposed to be now strongly inclined... [I]

emphasis added!, Thus, there is clear evidence of strong American interest in annexation. Henry Pierce, U. S. Minister, summariz-

ed the status of the United States-Hawaiian relationship in a long dispatch of February 25, 1871 to the Secretary of State.

The Minister assumed that the annexation of the Hawaiian islands by the United States was the foregone political destiny of the Hawaiian kingdom. The strategic position of the Hawaiian archipelago and its value as a "naval depot and coaling station...to shelter and protect our commerce and

navigation' were cited.25 Two years later, on March 25/ 1873, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish wrote to Pierce,

U-S. Senate, 'Report Upon the Official Relations," p. 15. 24 Ibid

Ibi d,, p. 17 ~ 113

It is very clear that [the United States] government can not be expected to assent to [the] transf er [of the Hawaiian Islands]... to... any powerful maritime or commercial nation.><

Pierce was instructed to

... [W] ithout committing the [U. S. ] government to any line of policy, not discourage the feeling which may exist in favor of annexation to the United States;...cautiously and prudently avail of any opportunity...of ascertaining the views of the Hawaiian authorities on this question,... and the terms and conditions on which ... [annexation] can be carried into execution.27

The 'Cession' of Pearl River and Harbor

Kamehameha V died on December ll, 1872 and was succeeded without incident by Lunalilo, who only reigned f or eight months. He succumbed to tuberculosis, but lived until Febru- ary 3 1874. With the death of Lunalilo, David Kalakaua was elected by the cabinet as provided under the Hawaiian constitution! . He directed the negotiation of a reciprocity agreement which was signed on January 30, 1875 in Washington,

D.C. The treaty went into effect by proclamation on Septem- ber 9, 1876. Re-negotiation of this agreement, begun in 1883 and concluded on December 6, 1884, provided for the first acquisition of territory by the United States in Hawaii with

the exception of the uninhabited Midway Islands! in Article

Ibid., p. 19. 2' Ibid. 114

His majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government of the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vesseL s of the Uni ted States.28

This territorial acquisition by the United States did not go unnoticed. Sir Lionel West, minister of Great Britain, delivered a memorandum to Secretary of State T. F. Bayard in Washington, D.C. that. England, Germany, and the United States join in a formal declaration to "guarantee the neutrality and equal accessibility of the islands and their harbors to the ships of all nations without preference."

Secretary Bayard' s reply typically pointed to the economic ties between Hawaii and the United States and, as such, denied that there was a need to provide guarantees of neutrality or equal accessibility of all nations to Hawaiian ports, The formal protest of the British Commissioner in Hawaii, stated in part, "that the article in question no. II! does not subtract f rom Hawaiian jurisidiction; that [the treaty] gives no right of property in the harbor or cession of territory[.] '29 Even with the concession of exclusive use of Pearl River Harbor the present Pearl Harbor!, the treaty was not approved by the U.S. Senate until 1887.

28 Ibi d,, p, 23. 29 Ibi d., pp. 24-26. 115

The Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands The long standing question of annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the intense public debate sparked by editorials in nearly every major newspaper in the United States is documented in Osborne's comprehensive study on American diplomatic history between 1893-1898.30 He uses the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands as the issue for examining the maturation of American imperialist and anti-imperialist move- ments. He sees the acquisi tion of Hawaii as the f irst br eak with United States anti-imperialistic tradition.

Events came to a head with the accession of Liliuokalani to the throne with the sudden death of Kalakaua in San Fran- cisco on January 20, 1891. The American-engineered coup was triggered when the Queen introduced a new constitution ta the Legislature on January 14, 1893 to restore the power of the monarchy, which KaLakaua had been forced to abdicate under threat of force in l887.31 The coup and her deposition as Queen followed swiftly on January l7, 1893. The Americans, backed by U. S. warships and armed troops, seized the government building and placed the Queenunder house arrest. She sealed her own fate by refusing to grant amnesty to the perpetrators of the coup.

30 Thomas J. Osborne, Kent, Ohio. Kent State U~versity press, 1981! .

IN' Yorkand London: W,W.p.: Norton d a Co., 1981!< p. 37~ 116

The Decisive 1890s: The End of an Era

The Annexation Debate

Hoyt and Osborne give different causes for the annexation of Hawaii. The former sees the overriding cause to be the desire of the American Asiatic Squadron to expand, especially under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt as Assis- tant Secretary of the Navy.>> Ironically, the anti-imperialist Grover Cleveland appears to have inadvertently provided the impetus for the naval build-up in 1893 when he ordered the expenditure of $12 million for the construction of warships to alleviate a national economic depression.33 Hence, when McKinley became president, the ships needed f or expanded fleet operations were already in existence.34 The value of Hawaii as a Pacific outpost, therefore, was increased greatly because of the need for a coaling station to sustain expanding naval and maritime operations. Osborne concluded that the significant arguments which overcame opposition to annexation were the desirability of ! Asian markets for American manufactured surplus goods, ! the concern about the partitioning of China by European powers, and ! the desire to sustain the increasing American trade both in Hawaii and the East.>> Expansionists believed

2, ~ . 42. Ibid., p. 42 ~

ibid,, p, 45 ~ 3S Osborne, Empire can Wait, p. 134. 1 17 that acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands wo ul d give the Uni ted States - !mmercial and mil i tary control in the pacif ic. Osbor ne ci te s compel l ing a rguments provided by anti- an- nexati oni st s. U. S~ Minister George Merrill, for exampl e, noted tha t Hawaii was al ready pr ov idi ng a harbo r and serv ing as a coal ing station with the addi tional possibi 1 ity of becoming a cabl e station in the f utur e without annexation. 36 These conce ssi ons were al ready a part of the Reci pr oci ty Treaty of 1 876, as amended in 1 884 ~ As for greater commerce, charl es Nordof f stated in the on July 22, 1 893, that al ready more t.han 89 perce nt of the total val ue of

Hawai i ' s impor ts came f rom the United States. The opposi ti on of the anti- annexa ti oni s t s t o any form of aggressive f orei gn pol icy whi ch supported a large navy "to pr ot e ct ' domestic commerce w a s the f ea r of ev e nt ua 1 evolution of commerci al expansion to mi 1 i tar i sm . Th ey felt that s uch a move would s ubve r t the ba si c i nsti t uti ons of the Amer i can republic. 37 I nter esti ngl y, Osbor ne observes that even anti- imperialists had a sense that the f utur e of the Hawaiian

I sl ands was somehow inter- twined w ith that of the Uni ted States. 3 8 What they hoped was that the incorporation of

Ibid., p. 47 ~

Osborne notes that w ithin seven months af ter the annexati on of Hawaii, the U. S. aequi red Guam, the >hil ippi nes, Puerto Rico, and WakeIsland. Ibi d., p. 4 5. Ibid g p, 42. Hawaii inta the Union could be postponed if it could nat be aver ted.

While Osborne argues convincingly, American geopolitical diplomacy produced the chain of events which tied Hawaii to the 'manifest destiny" of the United States in the Pacific.

These included:

The building of coal-fueled naval ships by President C3.eveland which made a mid-Pacific coaling station an absolute necessity for the operation of those ships 2. The expansion of the U. S. Navy ta include a North Pacific Squadron in 1866 3. The continuing presence of U. S. military force in Hawaiian waters with the replacement of the Lackawanna by the Mohoago and other warships 4. The campaign conducted by American Minister Henry A. Pierce immediately upon his arrival in Hawaii to secure a naval base

5. National interest in Far East trade

Moreover, civil unrest which resulted f rom the deaths of

Ki,ng Kamehameha V in 1872 and Lunalilo, his successor, who died in l874, was used by both Britain and the United States to station warships in Hawaii. In addition, continuing expansion of the Germans and the English in the Pacific induced the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to take a hard stand

by the United States as a concession f or the renewal « the Reciprocity Treaty in l884. This 'temporary" use agreed to by Kalakaua was never made permanent and, as noted e»ewhere, Great Britain pointedly stated that no property 119

rights or cession was granted by the Treaty. However, the seizure of the government by Americans in 1893, the subsequent establishment of the Republic of Hawaii in 1894, and the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in 1898 apparently rendered the question moot. Historically, then, Hawaii was significant in actualiz- ing the credo of "Manifest Destiny' in two ways:

l. As a territorial buffer and naval base 2. As a coaling station for the operation of American warships in the Pacific The establishment of the inf rastructure to support military fueling and operations also madethe islands useful in promoting a brisk trade route between California and the Far

East, beginning about 1840.39 Grover C1eveland3 The Anti-haperialist President Grover Cleveland, an anti-imperialist, abhorred American involvement in the coup. But he was placed in an untenable position because the Provisional Government40 refused to vacate the government building which they occupied. If the President were to support the Queen, he would have to turn American guns on Americans. He had no choice but to back off. On March 9, almost immediately after

Ralph S. Kuykendall. g Vol. 2i >854-1874.Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press. pp. 139/ 189-197. The Committeeon Safety, which staged the coup, late» established itself as the interim Provisional Government «til the establishment of the Republic of Hawaii in 1894. 120 his inauguration, he withdrew from the Senate "for further study" the treaty which had been initiated by his predecessor, William Henry Harrison. Two days later, he sent James H. Blount, a former congressman f rom Georgia, as his representative to the Hawaiian Islands to study the allegations of impropriety which had been made by the Queen through her personal envoy, Paul Neumann.41

Upon his arrival in Hawaii, Blount ordered Admiral

Skerrett to lower the American flag at Honolulu. The Admiral complied under protest. Thus, on April l 1893, the protectorate, established by former U. S. Ninister John Stevens over the Provisional Government< was ended. Blount' s action was based on the assurance by President Sanford B. Dole that the provisional Government was capable of preserving order, and Blount's own conviction that he could not make an impartial investigation under the protectorate.42

Osborne notes that the appearance of Neumann in Washington probably helped delay an early Senate vote, which could have occurred during the last few weeks of the Harrison administration. Neumann met with individual senators to impress upon them that the native population of Hawaii had not been given an opportunity to voice their opinions on annexation and Queen Liliuokalani deserved a hearing. He also was able to have the Queen's letter of appeal and the he had written delivered to the then President-elect Cleveland prior to the President' s meeting to discuss the 'Hawaii. an problem" with two of his cabinet designees, Walter Q. Gresham and John C. Carlisle, Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury, respectively, on February 22. Neumann also sent a copy of his ~a~ to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and managed to have the publish his version of the annexation issue. Osborne, @ggj~ pp. 3, 11.

42 Tate, g ppa 232 233 ~ 121

A letter written in March 1S93 by president Cleveland to Carl Schurz, the prol if ic and influential anti-annexationist

opposition to Hawaiian annexation.4> Osborne concludes that until Blount' s f inal report was received and reviewed thoroughly by Secretary of State Gresham in Pall 1893, the president held off any decision on the Hawaiian issue.44 Blount's report supporting the allegations made by the Hawaiian groups that officials and military forces of th American government were involved in the coup, and that .iere was a lack of native support for annexation, was a significant. influence on Cleveland' s f inal decision. The report

concl uded:

The leaders of the revolutionary movement would not have undertaken it but for [U. S. Minister] Stevens' promise to protect them against any danger f rom the [HawaiianJ government... Had troops not been landed no measures for the organization of a new government would have been taken.4S Cleveland was undoubtedly also strongly influenced by Gresham's idealism and his own aversion to imperialism.

Gresham's instruction to U. S. Minister Albert S. Willis in

Honolulu on October 18 is the first indication that the

Osbor ne f f p. 14. 4 Ibid., p. 16. Blount's conclusion was quoted in an article by Westlake. "ayne K. Westlake, "The Overthrow of =he Hawaiian Monarchy," September 29, 1981!, p. A-19. 122

president would not resukmit the annexation treaty to the Congress,46 In late 1893, Cleveland sent an Executive Nessage to the Senate informing them of his intent to withdraw the treaty, citing among his reasons the intervention of American military forces in the deposition of the Queen and the opposition of the native Hawaiians to annexation. The Executive Message on his permanent withdrawal of the Treaty of Annexation was transmitted to both President Dole of the Provisional Government and Queen Liliuokalani, through Commissioner J.O. Carter on Decemberl9, 1893 by U. S. Minister Willis.47 CleveLand requested that the leaders of the Provisional Government restore to the Queen her constitutional authority. This request was accompanied by a written assurance f rom the Queen that she would accept the conditions r eque ste d by Cl evel and in gr anti ng a chesty to the "r evol u- tionists' and would sustain the constitution of 1887 as well as assume the obligations of the Provisional Government.

These concessions by the Queen consituted a reversal of her former position. She had steadfastly refused to grant amnesty to the perpetrators of the coup during prior private interviews held on November 13 and December 17.48

46 Osborne, ', p. l4. 47 U.S. g Congress,House,

Ex. Doc. No. 76, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 1894, p. 2, 4-5. Hereafter referred to as U.S. House, ~ !

" Tate, g pp. 2 42-2 45 123

President Dole's reply to Willis was contained in an l8-page letter which the President personally delivered at midnight on December 23. The ProvisionaL Government refused to surrender its authority to the Queen and stated that it regarded the intervention of President Cleveland as interference in its domestic affairs.49 The Provisional Govern- ment added that it was prepared to defend itself to sustain its position; if the United States wished to reinstate the

Queen, it would have to use physic. force.50 Because Willis considered these to be charges of potentiaL aggression against the President of the United States, he sent Dole both written and verbal inquiries directly and through a third party.51 These efforts elicited only a short unsigned note f rom Dole stating that he did not intend to withdraw any of his statements. On January 23, l894, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations adopted a resolution which concurred with the President's actions that "f ram facts and papers laid before the Senate it is unwise and inexpedient, under existing conditions to consider at this time any project of annexation of the Hawaiian terrritory to the United States. "52

?bi d., pp. 2 45-246 ~

50 U. S. House, p. 4-5 . I bi d., p. 5-8,

52 U. S., Congr ess, Senate g I Mis. Doc. No. 46, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 23, 1894, n.p. 124

The Newlands Joint Resolution WhenWilliam McKinley assumed the presidency in 1897, a strategically placed group of expansionists came into power. Among them was Theodore Roosevelt, who had been appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Prodded by Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and Assistant Secretary of State William R. Day, Roosevelt persuaded McKinley to sign the Annexation Treaty with the Republic of Hawaii53 on June 16< 1897.54 1n spite of the lobbying efforts of Roosevelt and his circle of expansionists, however, the Senate did not approve the treaty and it was laid aside on March 17, 1898.

Nearly four months later, on July 7, 1898, Hawaii was annexed by the United States, not through the usual vehicle of a treaty> but by the hotly debated Newlands joint resolution.

According to Fuchsia

[t]he annexation treaty could not muster a two-thirds vote in the Senate, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee circumvented the treaty procedures by favorably reporting a joint resolution of annexation, needing only a majority vote in each House, which it obtained in July 1898.

The Republic of Hawaii succeeded the Provisional Government which was established by the Americans after the deposition of Lilioukalani in 1893. The Republic was instituted when the hoped for annexation treaty failed to be approved by the U. S. Senate in 1893 and continued until annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in 1898. Puchs notes that the oligarchy legitimized its power upon establishing the Republic with a constitution which came into effect without P f 1 ~ 6 ~ P

Howard K. Beale, New York: Collier Books, 1973!, pp. 65-66.

S Fuchs, g p 36 ' 125

These events mark the end of a sovereign nation and its incorporation into another political entity. The history of United States-Hawaii relations is significant to the present study on the management of Hawaiian fisheries because the behavior of state officials still reflects mistrust of federal intent a feeling shared by the non-white people of Hawaii. Nowhere is this mistrust more evident than in issues related to the status of ceded lands and to the disputed jurisdiction of the state's coastal and channel waters.

The Geopolitics of Seapower

The historical motivations which established and maintained the relationship between Hawaii and the United States depended on the interests of the parties involved. Strategic military position and economics motivated the federal government. The American private sector saw Hawaii as a market for manufactured goods as well as a fueling stop for trading vessels sailing the Asiatic routes. On the other hand, the Hawaiian government saw the relationship as one of colonization, whatever other labels might have been used. Although this study is not primarily concerned with the political geography of the Hawaiian Islands, the influence of geopolitics is clear. Norris and Haring5< note that spatial distribution of oil fields, for example, can be analyzed to determine their effect on future political actions. Hence,

56 Robert E. Norris and L. Lloyd Haring, ~«lumbus:Charles K. Merrill Publishing Co., 1980!, p. 7. 126

political geography can explain much of the actions of the United States during its long historical relation with Hawaii. There can hardly be any question that had the Hawaiian archipelago been located elsewhere, e. g., farther south, it would have been by-passed by the United States as a necessary component in its quest to establish itself as the world leader in seapower in the Pacific. The Influence of Mahan's GeopoliQ.cal Ideologies The ideologies, which fueled United States interest in acquiring the Hawaiian Islands and generally set the stage for expansionism, are derived f rom the theories of geopolitics of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan,57 He influenced the shift from earlier global interest in land-based power to seapower. 58 Mahanfocused on the Pacific Ocean primarily because he saw the land based power of Russia and China as being impene- trable. If and when the two nations were to unite, they would be a formidable threat to the rest of the world. He believed that the Western powers, Great Britain, Germany,and the United States, and Japan had a common interest in con- taining Russia and China. He contended that naval supremacy offered a way to achieve a balance of power. Whenconsidered

7 Alfred T. Mahani Boston: Little, Brown a Co., 1897!; Alfred T. mahang Boston: Little, Brazen a Co., 1890! .

Norris and Haring, p P. 27. l27

in this context, the st ~tegic importance of the Hawaiian archipelago becomesvery clear. Nahan identified six conditions which influence the military power of nations:59 I. Geographical position: land-locked vs access to the sea 2. Physical conformation of the land 3. Extent of territory: availability of land area which can be used to re-group troops 4. The number of population: important as a resource for arms production and military force S. National character: the strength of the state 6. Governmental character: the will of the l cade r shi p The interest of the United States in the Hawaiian archipelago was and is related to the islands' strategic mid-Paci- fic location, ideal as the base for supporting major naval operations and commercial shipping. It is ironic that most accounts of Hawaiian history overlook the far-reaching influence of geopolitics and Theodore Roosevelt on United States-Hawaii relationships. United States Territorial Sxpansion Influenced by Mahan,Roosevelt viewed global poweras sea power and recognised the singular value of the Hawaiian Islandsto his schemeof maritimeand naval leadership in the Pacific Ocean. Roosevelt's long-term interest in the HawaiianIslands as the outpostfor a strongPacific fleet,

59Norris and Haringg p. 28. 128 even before his appointment as Assistant Secretary of the

Navy, reflects the depth of Nahan's influence.

Beale60 provides three fundamental theses which influenced Roosevelt' s expansionist motives:

l. Strong nationalism and national pride

2. Belief that the United States would never act unj ustly or wrongly~ hence, American expansion is a crusade for "the right"

3. Anglo-Saxon superiority gave Americans the right to rule as a part of territ,orial acquisition

These are reasons given by Alfred Nahan, . enry Cabot Lodge, and Theodore Roosevelt to explain the significance of Hawaii to the United States. They saw Hawaii as the operational base for the United States to share in 'the vast trade and commerce of the Pacific.'61 Because Americans "civilized and developed' the islands, it could be rationalized that there was an obligation for Americans not to allow Hawaii to be swamped by the Asians who emigrated to Hawaii as contract laborers in the sugar plantations.62 On the other hand, the native Hawaiians were considered to be incapable of self-governance> hence, white Americans were entitled to rule over the islands.63 Finally, Roosevelt felt that Hawaii

HoWard K. Beale, New York: Collier Books, 1973! g pp. 38-42 ' l Ibid., p. 66.

Ibi d. 3 Ibid. 129 could either be a strong defense base or a "perpetual menace" to the United States.64 Hence, the ideologies, which could justify imperialistic expansion beyond the borders of the continental United States, were held by influentials. Mahan likened the position of the United States to that of Rome on the threshold of expanding its power beyond the Italian peninsula to occupy messina.65 A proponent of 'manifest destiny", Mahan saw the Hawaiian archipelago as the last line of defense, i.e., the "extent of territory," for the continental coast and as a coaling station to support U. S. naval fleet operations in the pacific.<< Nahan' s f riendship with Theodore Roosevelt did much to incorporate these ideas into the domestic and foreign policies of the United States.

Within the first decade of the Twentieth Century, Roosevelt established U.S. authority over the entire stretch of the Hawaiian archipelago. The first of his actions was the deployment of marines to Midway in 1903, ostensibly to "protect" seabirds f rom the Japanese hunters who were after feathers f or the millinery trade. Subsequently, in 1909, he established a wildlife refuge in the NWHE an action which was viewed as altruistic and, thus, has never been question-

Zbi d., p. 67 ~ Alfred T. Nahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," The 15 March 1893!: l.

Zbid,, p. 8, 130

ed. When federal control of the refuge was added to that already exercised over the high islands, the entire archipelago was f irmly under the jurisdiction of the United States. Saae Concluding Thoughts The federal government's historical presence and influence in Hawaiian affairs has been long and intense. The forging of strong links between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands was the outgrowth of synergistic needs the need of the United States for a coaling station for its commercial and naval fleets and the need of the Hawaiian Islands for protection. Disputes related to the state' s boundary delimitations between the federal and state governments have historical antecedents stemming f rom the coup instigated by Americans and the subsequent annexation of the islands by the United

States. These points of contentions include the ceded lands and channel waters of the archipelago. In addition, in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife's proposed extension of the boundaries of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands wildlife refuge, more than 300,000 acres of submerged lands and lagoons have been added to the disputed claims. Based on political and juridical precedents, however, the state's claims may be empty since the authority of the federal government stands paramount over questions of ownership and j uridiction, unless Congress explicitly sets other conditions.67

67 U. S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3 l! ] . 13l

In this regard, the federal governmentrefuses to accept the channel waters as the internal waters of the state of Hawaii68because of implications affecting its foreign policies, e.g., free passsage for U.S. vessels through straits of other countries which may have been unilaterally declared to be internal waters. Although a claim can be made that the seabed and the fishery resources within the Territorial Sea are the jurisdiction of the state, the channel waters beyond three miles are high seas, unless they are declared to be internal waters by the federal governmentin delimiting the state' s boundaries. The long history of manipulation by the federal government is manifested in the guarded behavior of the state memberson the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council WPRFMC!.69 The state's latent and overt hostility vis-a-vis the federal govermnentand its agents preclude or makevery difficult the development of meaningful inter- goveramental cooperation. Although all states have argued free the standpoint of states' rights on various issues from the inception of the republic, at issue in Hawaii are fundamental discrepancies, which have roots in federal-state relationship, unlike those found in any other state:

The juridical ruling on which this federal position is basedis CABv. Island Airlines, 235 F. Supp. 990 964! ~ TheU.s. Circuit Court ruled that the inter-island airf lights are governed by the Civil Aeronautics Board because the ~anneL waters between the islands are international waters. 69 See Chapter 9 for a discussion on this argument. 132

l. The refusal of the federal government to recognize the physical unity of the state and, hence, denial of channel waters as the state's internal waters 2. The refusal of the federal government to recognize the actions of its agents in the 1893 coup, which ended the monarchy, as being inappropriate even though Grover Cleveland admitted the impropriety of the Americanintervention in the l 893 co up! 3. The federal claim, possibly legitimate under federal preemptive rights, that the submerged lands and lagoons in the NWHZare federal jurisdiction, although contradictory to state jurisdiction established under the suhnerged Lands Act These issues make any real openness in relationships betweenthe state and federal governmentsdifficult. The historiography of colonialism is still very muchalive, no longer in the sugarand pineappleplantations, but in the equallystrongly felt oppressivenessof federal-state reIa- tionship relative to the ownershipand jurisdiction of the state's land and ocean. Becausethe state has no jurisdiction over its channelwaters, the state's geological configuration is that of discrete islands surroundedby high seas. Thestate is denied legal and morphological unity becauseof an accident of geology a situation which negates the sovereignty of the state, particularly, in the managementof its ocean resources and inter-island transport and commerce. lt is not surprising that state' s fishery officials and fishers are suspiciousof federal intent andare careful that

related to maritime boundaries, historic influence of federal-state relationship on the managementof fisheries is direct and strong. The creation of the Western Pacific Region- al Fi shery ManagementCouncil WPRFMC!merely re-grouped actors; these decisionmakers brought their personal biases and values with them to the WPRFMC.'Ihey also brought their historically conditioned behavior. PART XI THE ACMRS: THBIR MISSION AND INTERESTS Three institutional actors, U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service USFWS!, National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS!, and the Hawaii Division of Aquatic Resources DAR!, and representatives of the private-sector fishing interests play dominant roles in implementing the Magnuson Fishery Conserva- tion and ManagementAct MPCMA!. They have the responsibility for developing managementplans for fishery resources within the fishery conservation zone of the state. Just as the framework and background of the policymaking process provide clues to understanding policy implementation, institutional values and goals help in understanding the environment which influences decisionmakers. In the first three of the four chapters that comprise Part II Chapters 5-7!, the legal history of USPWS, NMPS, and MR and their organizational missions are discussed. The fourth chapter Chapter 8! is a description of Hawaiian commercial fishers and their representatives. Part II examined the historic events and institutional influences that affect public and private-sector decisionmakers who implement the

MFCMA in Hawaii. CR~,'BR 5

TEB 0 S PISH AND WILIKIFB SBRVICB

Although this chapter is on the history of the V.S. Pish and Wildlife Service USPWS!, it is also much of the history of the National Marine Pisheries Service NMPS! . Both have common roots in the Commission on Fish and Pisheries. The Commission was launched in 1871 with a charge to support the developaent of the fishing industry and to alleviate the depletion of coastal f isheries.

In time, the conservation of wildlife was added to its other responsibilities. Because the Department- of the Inte- rior adminstered wildlife and national parks, it became the conservation advocate and the Department of Commerce assumed economic developaent responsibilities when the two agencies were established in 1913. Hence, when the USPWSwas placed in the Department of the Interior in 1940, there was already a well-established agency mission.

Recent events seem to have changed the role of the

Department of the Interior as the wildlife advocate in the federal government because of the notoriety of the oil exploration and coal mining lease sales. However, the Department still retains its historical responsibilities, the preservation and conservation of wildlife, in its administration of national parks and wildlife refuges.

136 137

This chapter begins with the history of the first federal fishery agency, the Commission on Fish and Fisheries, and its evolution inta the present structure and functions of the USPWS. The second branch of the Commission which evolved into NMPSwill be discussed in Chapter 6. NMFSassumed the economic develoynent f unction of the Commission.

Xn essence, these two agencies administer the nation's fisheries and wildlife as resources to be utilized for commercial and recreational use or preserved for their esthetic and cultural values. Generally, the j ur isdiction of the agencies is divided into land and sea categories; NMPS has jurisdiction over marine resources and USPWS over terrestrial and f reshwater resources. Because Hawaii does not have anadromous species such as salmon- which spend a part of their- life in f reshwater streams!, the involvement of USPWS in Hawaiian f isheries is limited. Rather, the agency is significant to fisheries develogaent in Hawaii because it administers the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands NfBX! National Wild- life Refuge, the waters off which are the only undeveloped fisheries in the state. The state's commercial fishing deve- loplent plans are largely centered on these fisheries.

There is another aspect of the state-USPWS relationship which has not as yet come to a head. They are involved in a dispute concerning the seaward boundary of the wildlife refuge. The details of this dispute were discussed in Chapter

3 and will be only summarized here. In essence, the state' s position is that the refuge consists of only the fast lands> 138 the USPWS contends that the refuge includes the reef flats to a depth of ten fathoms. At risk are over 300,000 acres of su beer ge d 1 ands.

The Evolution of Pishery Management in the United States Over their long evolution, the prevailing public attitudes of the time are ref lecte& in the changing mission of the agencies which evolved into the USFWS and NMPS. The explosive period of industrialization in the 18GOs, with its emphasis on production, was reflected in the procedures used to manage fish and wildlife. No attempts were made to ban industrial pollution of habitats or to control the harvesting of wildstock. But by the mid-1800s there was growing public concern about the depletion of the nation's natural resources.l This public concern launched fish -and wildlife culturing programs and established the Commission which ultimately became the USPWS and NMPS.2

Government intervention began as a state initiative, but it was soon bypassed by that of the federal government. The first publicly financed fisheries research was funded by the

1 Susan Plader, "Scientific Resource Management:Fart II Preservation of the System, ' 82 August 1976!: 49. 2 According to Plader, while the Lacey Act of 1900 is looked upon as the lanhaark law for the protection of birds, especially from the millinery trade, in fact, the original version of the bill expanded the duties of the U. S. Pish Commission to include propagation of game birds. This provision was included to keep f rom offending the hunting and millinery interests, but it was deleted from the bill because of objections raised by private interest groups. Ibid. 139

state legislature of Massachusetts in 1856 ~ The Vermont legislature appropriated $100 in the same year to enable George P. Marsh to study the causes of stock depletion and produce two reports which set the direction for federally- funded f ishery research for the next one hundred years.3 His solution to the problem of stock depletion was the

propagation of f ish. Marsh's recommendation was at least partly responsible for bringing together about 200 private fish culturists who formed the American Pish Culturists' Association the present-day American Pishery Society! . As an organized special interest group, the Association undoubtedly did much

to influence the direction and sustain the continued focus of the federal government on f ish propagation research. The

Association was f irmly in place when the U. S. Commission on Pish and Pisheries was established by Congress on February 9, 1871 under Joint Resolution 22 6 Stat. 594! ~4 While the earliest concern of Congress was the commercial developaent of f isheries, there was a parallel concern for conservation clearly evident in the authorization legislation for the

establishment of the Commission

3 The two reports cited are entitled "On Artificial Propagation of Fish' and "Man and Nature, Or, Physical Geography as Modif ied by Human Action. ' Susan L. Plader, "Scientif ic Resource Management: Part I--An Historical Perspective,' 82 July 1976!: p. 3l ~ 4 Ibid., pp. 28-31, 57-58. 140

The U.8. Commission on Fish and Fisheries

Joint Resolution 22 authorized the President to appoint a Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 'f rom among the civil officers or employees of the government ... to serve without additional salary.' The Commissioner was to be 'one of proven scientific and practical acquaintance with f ishes of the coast." The Joint Resolution further specified that he investigate food f ish stocks off the coasts and in the lakes of the United States to ascertain any "diminution in the number of the food f ishes' and develop "protective, prohibi- tory or precautionary measures.' A specific provision, Sec- tion 3, required that heads of Executive Departments assist in these investigations. In the first assertion of federal authority in fisheries management, the Commissioner also was granted authority to take fish from any coastal waters regardless of other laws or customs. With the appointment of Commissioner Spencer Fullerton Baird, the U.S. Commission on Pish and Fisheries was firmly established.5 Baird recognized the widely-held appeal of fish culturing.6 When the American Pish Culturists' Association obtained an appropriation in 1872 to develop hatcheries for salmon and shad, he joined the Association's efforts and launched the Commission on a course that was to be its principal focus until World War II. These hatcheries,

I bi d., p. 57 ~ 6 Ibid' e p. 31. which were also supported by state fishery commissions, managed to culture more than 70 species of fish. However, this effort has been criticized by McHugh.7

In the years following the establishment of the U. S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries, appropriations bills tell the story of the Commissioner and his work. A special appropriation in 18868 provided him with $7,500 for fitting out the Albatross ta investigate Pacific coast fisheries.9 The appropriations bill of 1887 provided 8130,000 to the

Commission ta introduce into and to 'increase in the waters of the United States...food-fishes and other useful products of the waters, including lobsters, oysters, and other shell- fishes, and tto continueJ the enquiry inta the fisheries of the United States and their subjects." In addition, the Commission was granted 010,000 for a salmon hatchery on the

7 McHughnoted that "fish culture as practiced until recently was largely a sheer waste of energy and funds." His comment refers to the failure of the combined efforts of state and federal agencies to do little beyond stocking streams and lakes with fish which were caught just downstream from where they were dumped. J.L. McHugh. 'Trends in Fishery Research" in ed. Norman G. Benson Washington, D.C.: American Fisheries Society, 1970! .

8 U. S., Senate, , 49th Cong., lst sess. > 1886, p. 63670.

Xn 1902, the Albatross called on Laysan Island, one of the unpopulated islands of the Hawaiian archipelago. Dr. Walter Fisher published a complete inventory of the birds there the following year in the Fish Commission Bulletin. Bryan provides a summary of the early history of the NWHXrefuge. See E.H. Bryan, Jr.. Honolulu: U. S. Pish and Wildlife Service, 1978!, p.l7. 142

Columbia River, provided the laws of Washington and Oregon were adequate for the protection of salmon in the Columbia

River and its tributaries. Other appropriations included

$45 «0 00 f or the maintenance of f i sh ponds «$45 0 00 f or the maintenance of vessels, $5,000 for restoring drainage of fish ponds in Washington, and $11,500 for repair and refitting of the steamer, Pish HaNR.10

On January 20, 1888, the statutes were amended to provide for the appointment of a fulltime Commissioner.ll He was to be paid a salary of $5,000 and could not "hold any other office or eaployment under the authority of the United

States or any State'.12

With the establishment of the Department of Commerce and

Labor on Pebruary 14, 1903, the Commission was placed under this newly created department and its name was changed to the Bureau of Fisheries.13 Subsequently, a 1911 law,l4 allowed the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to designate an officer of the Bureau to be the Acting Commissioner in the absence of

10 U.S., vol . 2 4 ~ Enacted on March 3 « 1887. ! llUS Sec. 4395. 12 U S , vol. 25. Enacted January 20, 1888.! The budget document of 1911 indicates that the salary of the Commissioner was raised to $6,000 af ter more than 20 years [U.S., , vol. 36. Enacted March 4, 1911. ! J . 13 U.S. ««vol. 32. Enacted February 14, 1903.!

14 U S vol. 36. Enacted March 4, 1911.! 143 the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Fisheries. The

1911 budget shows that the Bureau had greatly expanded; it had more than 3S fish culturing stations along the East

Coast, New England, the Gulf, Great Lakes, and West Coast, and in inland states such as Montana, carrying out its policy of culturing and stocking lakes and rivers and man-made structures such as reservoirs. In addition, the Bureau had six vessels for research of marine species.l5

On March 4, 1913, with the enactment of H.R. 22913,16 the Department of Labor was created and the Department of

Commerce and Labor was renamed the Department of Commerce. The fisheries functions of the old department were assumed by the Department of Commerce. Three years later, an additional function was mandated in apparent response to complaints f rom fishermen on damages to commercial fisheries by predator

1> Bryan relates an interesting bit of little knownhistory. Pearl oysters were discovered in 1927 by Captain William G. Anderson, an enterprising f isher, in the lagoon of the Pearl and Hermes Reef in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands while he was fishing for Hawaiian Tuna Packers, a cannery in Honolulu. When applications for f ishing rights were received f rom not only Captain Anderson, but also from Hawaiian Tuna Packers, the Hawaiian government, at that time a territory of the United States, requested assistance f rom the Bureau of Fisheries to develop management plans for the oysters. The Bureau conducted a survey and recommended in 1933 that the oysters not be harvested commercially for at least five years. The dreams of the entrepreneuers apparently quickly vanished. Bryant pp 23-24.

16 V. S vol. 37 Stat. Enacted March 4, 1913.! l44 species. The Congress enacted S. 440l F17 which di rected the Commissioner of Fisheries to 'conduct ...investigations and experiments for the purpose of ameliorating the damage wrought to the fisheries by dogf ish and other predacious fishes and aquatic animals." The priority given economic developaent of fisheries is apparent in this 1916 legislation which further directed that research be conducted to find

"the best and cheapest means' for taking the predators and to develop markets for them. Congress appropriated $25,000 to carry out the study.

Specific wildlife management responsibilities of the

UPS emerged as an activity secondary to economic development, and were related to birds and terrestrial wildlife.

The interest of Congress in economic develogaent is evident in the establishment of the Division of Ornithology and

Mammalogy, also known as the Division of Economic Ornithology and Mammalogy, in the Bureau of Entomology of the Department of Agriculture on July 1, 1886 to control agricultural pests.l8 Almost as an afteLthought, the Division was given regulatory authority over migratory wildlife and the national ref uge system.l9

17 U.s., vol. 39. Enacted J une 2l, 1916. !

18 U S vol. 24. Enacted July 1, 1886.! 19 Flader, 'Scientific Resourcemanagement: Part XX," p. 50. 145

The Division of Bialogical Survey The Bureau of Biological Survey! In 1896, the Division of Economic Ornithology and Mammalogy was renamed the Division of Biological Survey.20

By this time, the Division consisted of the Chief of the Division and four assistant, biologists.21 In 1900, the Congress expanded the duties and powers of the Department of

Agriculture to include

... the preservation, distribution, introduction, and restoration of game birds and other wild birds...and to purchase such game birds as may be required theref ore, subject, however, to the laws of the various States and Territories. The object and purpose of this Act is to aid in the restoration of such birds in those parts of the United States ... where [the birds] have become scarce or extinct, and also to regulate the introduction of American or foreign birds or animals in localities where they have not heretofore existed.22

The strong conservationist tendency credited to

President Theodore Roosevelt may to some measure reflect his political astuteness and sensitivity to the tenor of the times rather than an overriding concern for wildlife. Flader notes that the late 1800s were "the golden age of citizen conservation associations' with over 300 sportsmen' s clubs organized in the 1870s alone.23 Indeed, such prestigious

20 US,, , vol. 29. Enacted July 1, 1896.! 21 Xbi d.

22 U. $., vol. 31. Enacted May 25, 1900.! 3 Flader, "Scientific ResourceManagement: Part II, ' p. 49, 146

organizations as the Audubon Societies, the American Ornitho-

logists' Union, and the Sierra Clubs were all launched be-

tween 1870 and 1900. Thus, the conservation orientation of a

sizable sector of the American public was clearly evident.

Plader notes that,24

[i]n contrast to the production oriented, non-threatening approach of the earlier fish and timber culture programs, the new conservation associations hJJ the 1880s became more concerned about protecting the remaining resources f rom exploitation...They shaved a new willingness to circumscribe individual f reedom and entrepreneurial activity by praaoting restrictive state fish and game laws, supported at the federal level by the Lacey Act of 1900. 25

...To the early conservation groups we also owe most of the impetus for the reservation on national forest lands, parks, and wildlife refuge, beginning in the 1890s.

Flader correctly states that establishing of federal wildlife parks and refuges marked a departure from earlier notions that all public lands would finally be placed under private ownership.26 But in spite of public interest in conservation, governmental policies were anything but constant in conserving wildlife. The Division of Biological

Survey, renamed the Bureau of Biological Survey in 1905,27

24 Ibid. 25 The Lacey Act prohibited the interstate shipnent of birds taken illegally for the millinery trade.

Plader, "Scientif ic Resource Management: Part II," p. 49. 27 John L. Adriat, Ed. g vol. 2, Document Index Washington D.C.: Goverrment Printing Office, 1980!, p. 2. 147

had its professional staff reduced to one biologist who

served also as the Chief of the Bureau! and f ive clerks by

1906. The Bureau was provided with $52,000, which was to be

used to pay staff sa3.aries and to conduct biological

investigations of the

geographic distribution and migrations of animals, birds, plants, and for the promotion of economic ornithology and mammalogy; for an investigation of the food habits of North American birds and mammals in relation to agriculture, horticulture, and forestry.28

Hence, the principal mandate of the Bureau was still centered on economic developaent.

The research activities of the U.S. Bureau of Biological

Survey included a survey of the wildlife of the Hawaiian

Islands Refuge, which consists of all of the islands of the

NWHI, excluding Midway and Rure Islands. In cooperation with

the Bishop Museum, located in Honolulu, and other scientific institutions, the Bureau sent an expedition to the NWHI in

1923 aboard the USS Tanager. A study of the bird 3.ife in the

NWHI refuge was made by Dr. Alexander Wetmore for the Bureau.

Other objectives of this expedition were to kill off the rabbits on Laysan Island29 and collect specimens of wildlife f rom Midway Islands.

28 U. S., , vol. 34. Enacted July 1, 1906.! 29 Rabbits had been introduced to Layaan Island about l903 by a Captain Schlemmer to augment his food supply as well as to start an ill-fated rabbit canning venture. 148

After more than 50 years of failure of management by

production fish propagation!, there was growing realization

among fishery managers that fish propagation alone could not

provide the answer to stock depletion. A policy shift

occurred in the l920s, using such measures as the Lacey Act,

to regulate harvesting of coastal fisheries so that natural

recruitment could occur. This became the permanent focus of

the Bureau with respect to marine fisheries, but the stocking

of inland lakes and streams continued.30

The political support for regulation was enhanced by the

increasing productivity of f ish canneries which accelerated the decline of fish stock.31 The 1930's, therefore, was a

decade in which research attempted to measure fluctuations in fishery stocks so that fishery managers could understand the

dynamic relationships of total ecosystems.32

Ihe l939 Reorganixa&oa Plan Ro. II

This shift in the facus of research to the relation of fish to their habitats was reflected in the 1939 Reorganiza- tion Plan No. II,33 which transferred to the Department of the Interior the Bureau of Fisheries f rom the Department of

Commerce and the Bureau of Biological Survey from the

30 Flader, "Scientif ic ResourceManagement< ' Part II, p. 51.

Ibi d g p. 51. 32 Ibid., p. 53.

U,S.~ , vol. 53. Effective July 1< 1939.! Also see, Paragraph 4 e!, f!, 4 Federal Register 2731. 149

Department of Agriculture. The earlier focus on economic developnent appears to have diminished somewhat in the placement of the two Bureaus under the Department of the

Interior, which traditionally was oriented more toward conservation than economic developaent.

Reorganisation Plan No. IXI

The Bureau of Fisheries and the Bureau of Biological

Survey were consolidated into a single agency, the Pish and

Wildlife Service, under the 1940 Reorganization plan No. III.34 This merger apparently was aimed at coordinating the develogaent of both game and commercial f isheries. In addition, Reorganization Plan No. III provided for a director and assistants to head the new agency and assume the functions of the of fices of the Commissioner and Deputy

Commissioner of Fisheries and the Chief and Associate Chief of the Bureau of Biological Survey.

The Fish and Nildlife Act of l956

The Pish and Wildlife Act of 1956, PL l024<35 established the principal mission and organizational structure of the USPWS as it. is today. The Act had the followinq objectives:

to establish a sound and comprehensive national policy with respect to fish and wildlifeg to strengthen the fish and wildlife segments of the national economy~ to establish within the Department of the Interior the position of

34 U+Seg , vol. 54. Effective June 30, 1940.! Also see, Paragraph 3, 5 Pederal Register 2108.

35 Ch. 1036 956!, pp. 1325-1327. Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife; to establish a United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

The national policy under the Fish and Wildlife Act placed equal importance on wildlife and f isheries as recreational and commercial resources. The reorganization established two high-level positions in the Department of the Interior, an

Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and a Commissioner of Pish and Wildlife, which were to be appointed by the

President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.

To provide equal balance in implementing the conservation/preservation and economic develoyaent f unctions of the

Pish and Wildlife Act, two bureaus, the Bureau of Commercial

Fisheries and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, were created; the former to carry out the commercial -fisheries developaent and the management of whales, seals, and sea-lions and the latter to manage the wildlife and f reshwater recreational fisheries under the jurisdiction of the U.S.

Pish and Wildlife Service.

Reorganization H.an No. IV

In 1970, Reorganization Plan No. IV36 created the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOAA! in the

Department of Commerce and abolished the Bureau of Commercial

Fisheries in the Department of the Interior. Underlying the creation of NOAA vas the notion that the scientific, techno-

36 U,S,, , vol. 84. Effective October 3, 1970.! Also see, 35 Federal Register 15627. logical, and administrative resources related to oceans and

the atmosphere, which were scattered throughout many federal bureaucracies, could better address the nation's needs by

being brought together in a single agency. Specifically, NOAA assumed most of the functions of the

Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, including the dual roles of the Bureau for the strengthening of the f ishing industry and promoting the conservation of fish stocks. It also administers a fleet of oceanographic vessels and laboratories. The marine sport fishing program and several vessels and laboratories were transferred f rom the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife to NOAA. These functions were placed under a new agency within NOAA, the National Marine Fisheries Service. Wildlif e management, however, remained under the purview of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in the

Department of the Interior.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the position of the Assistant

Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks within the Depart- ment of the interior. He has line oversight of the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The office of the Regional Director of

Region 1, which includes the state of Hawaii, is located in

Portland< Oregon Figure 5.2! . The Pacific Islands Ahninis- trator is a Region 1 line officer whose jurisdiction includes the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Guam' and

American Samoa, in addition to Hawaii.

Although the involvement of the Pish and Wildlife Service in other Pacific regions is acknowledged, the present Figure 5.l. Organisation chart of the Department of the Znterior37

37 Source: USPWS,Office of the Pacific Xslands Adainietrator, Honolulu 985! . 153

Figure 5.2. Organizational chart of the Regional Office of the USPWS: Port1and, Oregon38

38 Source: USPHS, Regional Office, Portland, Oregon 982! . 154

interest lies in its role as administrator of the national wildlife refuge in the NWHI because the neaxshore and offshore waters of the NWHI constitute the state' s undeveloped f ishing grounds. The Northwestern Iasraiian Island Refuge

The legal mandates which bear on the regulations of human activities in the Northwestern Hawaiian Island Refuge isLands are contained in several federal Laws~

1. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918

2. The Wilderness Act of 196539

3. The National Wildlife Refuge System Act of l966

4. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1971

5. The Endangered Species Act of 1972

These laws provide the basis for the USFWS to manage the ref uge. However, Yamase' s review of the management of the refuge see Chapter 3!, indicated that the USFWS and its predecessors were not directly involved in managing the NWHI refuge until after the mid-1960s. In spite of USFWS Acting

Director Tunison's letter to the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources in 1960, informing the state that it had no authority over the NWHI refuge, the Hawaii Division of

Pish and Game continued its annual survey and patrol trips to the refuge beyond the mid-1960s.

39 The Wildexness Act will have a strong influence on the management of the refuge if proposals to change the designation of the refuge from 'research natural area" to a 'wilderness area' are adopted. It will make entry into the NWHZ refuge more restrictive. l55

While the authority of the Department of the Xnterior appears to be absolute, as noted by Kurata,40 there is clear delimiting of the authority of the Secretary of the Interior in the National Wildlife Refuge Systems Act, under a "savings clause:'

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Secretary to control or regulate hunting or fishing of resident fish and wildlife, including the endangered species thereof, on ~~ emphasis added! .41 The establishment of the seaward boundary of the NWHX refuge is important because the savings clause restrains federal interference on non-federal "lands,' which in the NWHZ are the 'submerged lands.'

Furthermore, commercial means of disposing of surplus resources has been upheld by the U. S. Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia in Humane Society of the U.S. v. Morton

I:No. 73-1566 974! J. The harvesting of fish is, therefore, presumably not a forbidden activity in the NWHT refuge.42

There is still an undetermined issue on the revenues derived

40 Colin Rurata, 'Analysis of Northwestern Hawaiian 1slands Jurisdictional issues" Honolulu: Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii, 1978!, p. 61. 41 16 USC688dd c!, 42 However, according to the Refuge Manager, Jerry Leinecke, because the NWHX refuge ie the habitat of several endangered species, including the Hawaiian monk seal and indigenous birds, no permits are currently outstanding to fish within the nearshore waters of the refuge. This does not prohibit fishing in offshore waters surrounding the refuge seaward of approximately the 10-fathom depth. Landing on the islands is prohibited. Jerry Leinecke, 1985: personal communication. 156 from the disposition of "surplus" resources in refuge waters.

While the National Wildlife Systems Act provides that 25 percent of the net receipts be paid to the county in which the refuge is situated, under the Organic Act Section 91! and the Achaission Act, as amended, Section 59 f! !, all revenues must be turned over to the state. This provision has not been implemented by the state or City and County of

Honolulu presumably because no hunting has been allowed in the refuge. Even though the nanber of birds has increased to an astonishing 14 million, no effort has been made by the USFWS to cull the stock. Moreover, to request payment, particularly for the harvesting of fish in the nearshore waters of the NWHZ, would be tantamount to acknowledging federal jurisdiction over the waters> hence, the state' s reluctance to test its privilege to do so is understandable.

Overall, with regard to the management of the NWHI f isheries, two f actors are signif icant:

l. There is currently no law that forbids the harvesting of 'surplus' fish in waters off the NWHZ43

2. Such surplus is to be harvested by domestic fishermen under the regulations of the state and applicable federal Laws or regulations44

However, entry into the refuge waters is controlled by a permit system. A holder of an economic use permit is

43 50 Code of Federal Reference 3l.2 hereafter referred to as CFR! .

44 50 CPR 3l.l3. 157

required to make a public annoucement that he or she has such a permit45 as well as to comply with discharge and abandonment regulations, use of f irearms, and artificial lights.46 These special use permits have been issued several times since 1951, but none is in force presently.47

Kurata discusses the boundary issues at great length, citing not only the organic and admissions acts, but the historic claims which date back to the days of the Hawaiian monarchy. See, Chapter 3 for additional discussion.! He concl udesr

...Hawaii's claim to exclusive internal waters within atolls and reefs in the refuge is conclusory based upon historically continuous and effective exercise of authority with the knowledge of maritime nations prior to territory status and the federal government during territory and statehood. 48

While it will not be within the scope of the present study to examine native rights, the study commission established hy the Congress in 1980 has produced a report, which, at this writing, denies that the Native Bawaiians have any rights to reparations based on historic claims. This report and the commissioners have been criticixed by leaders

45 50 CPR 27 32.

These regulations are found in 50 CPR 27 ~94' 27 ~93' 27.41 d!, and 27.73, respectively. 47 Kurata, 'Analysis of Northwestern Hawaiian Islands,' P. 56.

Xbi d., p. 74. 158 of the Native Hawaiian community and others. But parts of the wildlife refuge appear to be ceded lands. At this time, the legal status of the Native Hawaiian claims is not clear.

Also unclear is the effect, if any, of such claims on the management of the refuge.

Historically, the Department of the Interior, the parent organization of the USBfS, has been, except for the military, the most visible federal presence in Hawaii. The territorial government operated under the aegis of the Department af ter annexation in 1898, a relationship that ended only with

Hawaii's admission to the Union in 1959. Presently, the influence of the Department is perpetuated through its line agency, the VSPWS. While its role was unclear before statehood, the USFWS has firmly established federal authority over the refuge and, for the past 20 years, it has been in contention with the state over the boundaries of the NWHI refuge.

The USPWS continues to assert the adverse effects of human presence in the refuge areas, a supportable argument.

The NWHI refuge is the habitat of four endangered endemic bi,rds, the endangeLed Hawaiian monk seal, and the threatened green sea tur tie. The management responsibility over these animals is shared with NMFS. The USFWS has jurisdiction over the birds, the Hawaiian monk seals, and the green sea turtles when they nest or haul out on landg NMPS has management jurisdiction over the animals when they are in the water.

This split in responsibilities between the two agencies requires a willingness to initiate and maintain interagency cooperation a human action. A survey on the information network of these two agencies indicated that there was a one-way linkage with the Pacific Islands Administrator of

USPWS initiating the contact. Hence, the communication channel appears to be weak.49

The policies which govern the USFWS in its relation to the state and the WPRFMCare of most interest in the present study. The VSFWS sees the following as guidelines for its activities in the Pacific basin which includes Hawaii!:

1. Support the preservation and maintenance of existing populations of f ish species subject to fishery management plan impacts

2. Support the develognent of data to adequately manage Pacific Islands Area fishery stocks

3. Support harvest levels that allow recruitment of sufficient numbers to sustain the fishery

4. Support develogaent of ocean f ishery management plans by contributing information on terrestrial populations needs e.g., migratory bird forage needs for baitfish!

Thus, the agency views its non-voting membership on the

WPRFMC as an advocate for the wildlife in the NWHI and other

49 According to Leinecke, the two agencies operate independently. At the f ield-level, routine coordination of activities occurs between the Refuge Manager and the NMPS researchers. The VSFWS special use permit system ensures communication between the two agencies at this level. Jerry Leinecke, 1985: personal communication. 160

Pacif ic region ref uges.50 However, the also places some import on economics in decisionmaking:5l

The FWS is oriented ta a national perspective, and we can offer valuable support or advisory assistance. As a result, cooperation and compromise may be a necessity when different species ar interests are in competition for the same resource. Our goal is to focus upon and to support those decisions that contribute significantly to our nation's economy and also provide recreational values ta all citizens. The statement may reflect the Reagan Administration's bias toward exploitation of natural resources as opposed ta conservation. This fact is not lost on the state and is partly the reason for its current interest in developing the

Tern Island support f acility. However, the environmental impact statement for the Hawaiian Islands Wildlife refuge will prohibit a land-based f-ishing station on Tern Island, but the island will be available for emergency use, e.g., accidents or need for repair parts, etc. This restriction would not prohibit a "mother-ship" for storage and processing to be sited off Tern island.52 The state's interest has been held in check because of an apparent lack of interest an the part of fishers to utilize such a facility.

50 Dale Caggeshall, USFWSarea administrator, 1982: personal communi ca ti on.

U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Part I - Strategy Plan Honolulu: U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1984!, pp. 60-70. 52 Jerry Leinecke, 198': personal communication. Conclusion

While the role of the USFNS in the management of

fk h k k JltC1a10, 1th

WPRPMC, its real and long-term impact may exceed that of the Department of Commerce which has a legally mandated role in fisheries developnent under the NPCMA. Although the use of

Tern Island as a transshipment-storage facility is denied, thus reducing the direct participation of the USEWS in the develoyaent of the HWHI fisheries, the larger impact of the USPWS-state relationship lies in the boundary dispute which is as yet unresolved. Any final juridical decision will have a significant effect on the state because an adverse ruling will mean the Loss of more than 300,000 acres of submerged lands. The signif icance of the boundary conflict between the state and USEWS is probably exacerbated because of Hawaii's land-poor geography and history of manipulation by the federal government. So far, no one has challenged the USPWS jurisdiction over the Lagoons and waters shoreward of the

10-fathom depth. But it appears that the 10-fathom restriction will not impede develogaent of the NWHI fisheries.

The USAGESis currently not actively working to formalize its claim to the submerged lands and lagoons of the HWHI. However g i t i s a 'back bur ner ' issue, which the agency recognixes will eventually probably require juridical decision, if either government chooses to pursue its claim.

The position of the USPNS has been that the state should initiate legal action to deny the federal claim. CHAPTER 6

THB NATIONAL NARZNB PISHERIBS SERVICE

The National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS! and its predecessor, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries BCP!, have significantly influenced the commercial fishing industry in

Hawaii. The early research and developaent efforts which supported Hawaii's commercial fishing industry were conducted by f ishery scientists at the Honolulu Laboratory, establ ished in 1949 under the Department of the Interior, rather than by the state fishery agency. This early interaction welded a strong bond between the commercial fishers and the BCP. How- ever, more recently, the retirement of many of the 'old-time' fishers coupled with changes in NMFS' internal policy direction away from research and develogaent activities has weak- ened the f ederal-commercial f ishing industry relationship. l

Under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management

Act MPCMA!, NMFS was designated to provide the best available scientific information to the eight regional fishery management councils RPMCs! to enable them to develop fishery management plans PMPs! . It is this role of NMPS that is of concern to the present. research on fishery decisionmaking in

Howard Yoshida, fishery biologist, NMPS, l985: personal communi ca ti on.

162 163

Hawaii under the MFCMA. NMFS researchers, who are primarily biologists, and members of the Western Pacific Fishery Man- agement Council WPRFMC! have not seen eye-to-eye on amount and type of data required to develop FMPs. The widespread nature of this difference was revealed in the 1984 evaluation done by the Department of Commerce's Office of the Inspector

General. 2

The description of the development of NMFS which follows provides the legislative background of the agency' s raison d' etre as well as its national and local goals and objectives. These reflect the historical focus on economic developaent of f ishery resources which has guided NMFS' predecessors and which continue to guide NMFS today. However, the role of NMFS in the management of non-migratory fisheries within the 200-mile fishery conservation zone FCZ! has been curbed somewhat by the RFMCs. Although the agency has a vote on each council, the establishment of RFMCs in essence mandates a shared authority over domestic fisheries. Part of the tension between the RFMCs and NMFS may be caused by the constraints imposed on the agency.

However, Congress also curbed the authority of the RFMCs by giving the Secretary of Commerce veto power over their actions. Management of the nation's coastal fisheries, therefore, must balance the competing and of ten conflicting interests of fishers and NMFS administrators, which are

2 Office of Inspector General, "Opportunities for Cost Reduction" Washington, D. C. I Depar tment of Commerce, 1984! . 164 influenced by historic experience and the personal and institutional gaals and values of the actors who represent these sector s on the RFMCs.

The Origins of the National Marine Fisheries Service

As its name indicates, the Department of Commerce was establ ished to promote economic developaent. However, when the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOAA! was placed in the Department of Commerce, an anomaly was created by giving it the management responsibility for protecting endangered marine mammals and threatened sea turtles while they are in the ocean. This responsibility was assumed by NMPS, a newly created line agency. As indicated in Cha~ ter 5, the U. S. Pish and Wildlife Service USPWS! has authority over these animals when they beach to lay their eggs

turtles! or pup marine mammals!. Hence, while its historical and present mandate is to support the developnent of commercial fisheries, NMPS must also protect marine mammals, e.g., porpoises of ten travel with schools of fish and are trapped by seiners. The dual role is not always compatible.3

This chapter continues the discussion on the evolvement of NMPS begun in Chapter 5. A creature of Reorganization

Plan No. IV, NMPS arose out of the ashes of the Bureau of

Commercial Fisheries. Over its 15-year life span, the rais-

~ NMFSis often subjected to two-way criticism. Wildlife groups castigate the agency for allowing kill quotas of porpoises to tuna fishers and f ishers complain that the quotas are too restrictive. 165 sion of NMFS has changed in response to the needs of the commercial fishing industry and congressional mandates.

Reorganisation Plan Ho. 1V

The monumental document, ,4 published in l969 by the Commission on Marine Science,

Engineering and Resources COMSER!, also known as the

Stratton Commission, was instrumental in creating NOAA under

President Nixon's Reorganization Plan Ho. XV of 1970.5

Major marine-related activities were transferred to NOAA from other agencies:

Bureau of Commercial Fisheries from the Depart- ment of the Xnterior The Great lakes Survey from the Army Corps of Engineers National Weather Service from Environmental Science Services Administration Dept. of Commer ce ! Oceanographic Data Center from the US Navy Oceanographic Instrumentation Center f rom the US Navy Sea Grant Program from National Science Po unda ti on Coast and Geodetic Survey from ESSA ESSA Corps from the Dept. of Commerce Environmental Satellite Service f rom ESSA

These activities were organized into:

National Weather Service National Mapping and Chartering Service National Environmental Satellite Service National Marine Fisheries Service Environmental Research Laboratories

4 Commissionon Marine Sciences, Engineering, and Resources, Washington, D. C. ~ Government Printing Office! g l969.

January 25< l982!, pp. 6333-6336. 166

Environmental Data Service Environmental Satellite Service Office of Sea Grant NOAA Corps

While the birth of NNFS is a recent event, its functions, inter-twined with those of the U. S. Pish and Wildlife

Service, span more than 100 years. Even with this long history, government has not learned from experience that fish do not divide neatly into bureaucratically functional categories. According to Abel,6

i]t was the creation of NOAA and its placement in the Department of Commerce that really played havoc with f isheries administration. Commercial fisheries became a part of NOAA, and hence part of the Department of Commerce~ sport fisheries remained in the Department of the Enterior.7

Moreover, Abel, who served as the first Director of the

National Sea Grant College Program under Robert White, the first Administrator of NOAA, notes that "NOAA was to have

6 Robert B. Abel, "The History of the United States Ocean Policy Program,' in J ed. Fr anci s W. Hool e p Robert L. Priedheim, and Timothy Hennessey Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1981!, p. 30. 7 Although the ongoing conflict between commercial and sport or recreational fishers is a widespread problem, these disputes over harvesting are presently not being addressed by either the state or federal fishery agencies. Current regulations do not differentiate between the harvesting activities of commercial and recreational fishers when both fish the same species; regulations are pranulgated for specific species. Hence, Abel's comment points to an unsuccessful attempt to separate the two types of fishing activities by assigning administrative responsibilities to two different agencies even as the same fisheries are harvested by both recreational and commercial fishers. 167 centralized ocean planning and management, and reduced f ragmentation of author i ty. "8 However, a consultant' s report9 found that in 1975, there were 54 public and quasi-public organizations involved in fisheries management.

Abel cites two reasons which serve to explain the inability of NOAA to "get its act together." The f irst is the allocation of only eight percent of the federal marine budget to NOAA, and the second is the passage of nearly a dozen major laws in the l970's which spread implementation functions for these laws throughout. the federal government.10

A graphic example of the overlapping jurisdiction created by the plethora of uncoordinated legislation is the management of anadromous species, e.g., salmon, which spend part of their life cycle in fresh-water. Similar to the ocean-land division in the mangement of marine mammals, during the marine phase of their lives, anadromous species are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce; during the inland f reshwater phase, management authority shifts to the Department of the Interior. Because these species also cross the 200-mile FCZ into international waters, the Department of State is also involved. Thus,

8 Abel, "The History," p. 37. 9 Kirk Junda,

Washing- ton, D.C.: Cooper and Lybrand!, 1975. 10 Abel, 'The History<' p. 38. three cabinet-level agencies have management responsibilities far anadromous species.ll

As noted in the NMFS annual report of 1970-1971, the executive message indicated the administration's desire to effect efficiency and coordination by combining related offices under the super air and sea agency' NOAA

We face immediate and compelling needs for better protection of life and property from natural hazards, and for a better understanding of the total environment--an understanding which will enabl e us mor e ef f ectiv ely to moni tor and pr edi ct its actions, and ultimately, perhaps to exercise some degree of control over them. We also face a compelling need for exploration and developaent leading to the intelligent use of our marine resources. The global oceans, which constitute nearly three-fourths of the surface of our planet, are today the least-understood, the least-developed, and the least-protected parts of our earth. Food f rom the oceans will increasingly be a key element in the world's fight against hun- ger. The mineral resources of the ocean beds and of the oceans themselves, are being increasingly tapped to meet the growing world demand. we must understand the nature of these resources, and assure their development without either contaminating the marine environment or upsetting its balance.

Establishment of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration--NOAA--within the Department of Commerce would enable us to approach these tasks in a coordinated way. By emplojjing a unified approach to the problems of the oceans and atmosphere, we can increase our knowledge and expand our opportunities not only in those areas,

11 Robert E. Bowen, "The Major United States Federal IdI I I I

d. I . I. I . Iddd,d Timothy Hennessey Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1981!, p. 52. 12 National Marine Fisheries Service, Annual Report of 197 0-1971. pp. 2-3. l69

but in the third major component of our environment, solid earth, as well.

Xn 1971, as part of the general agency reorganization under Reorganization Plan IV, and in part, to answer criticisms of the organization of its predecessor, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, several changes were made in the organizational structure of the NMFS:13

1! The primary functions assigned to NMFS were grouped into three divisions: Resource Research, Resource Utilization, and Resource Management. Each area is headed by an Associate Director.

2! A small number of fishery research centers was created by combining the administrative and program functions of similar biological labora- tor i es.

3! The research centers, concerned more with national oceanic programs, report to the Associate Director for Resource Research, rather than to a Regional Director.

4! The research centers and laboratories, concerned chiefly with local inshore programs, report to the Regional Director concerned. 5! The marine game fish laboratories, which came to NMFS from the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlif e, were integrated into this system.

6! The fishery products technological laboratories are under the Associate Director for Resource Util izati on.

7! The basic regional structure, with the Regional Directors continuing as the key NMFS representatives in their geographical areas, was retained. The Directors of Centers report to the Centra1 Office and serve as senior scientific advisors to the Regional Directors.

I bi d., p. 5. 170

These changes, shown in the 1971 organizational chart of

NMFS Figure 6.l!, respond to two major criticisms of the

Bureau of Commercial Fisheries: ! there were too many small laboratories which were non-functional and ! the regionalization of research programs hampered the implementation of national programs. Four major laboratories which primarily focused on "high-seas research" were designated to solve national and international problems. These are in Seattle,

Washington; La Jol3.a, Calif ornia; Miami, Florida; and Woods

Hole, Massachusetts. The five regions of NMPS are shown in

Figure 6.2. Hawaii is a part of the Southwest Region along with American Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the

Pacif ic Islands.

Under the 1971 arrangement, the expectation was that the line components will be better coordinated within NOAA. How- ever, Figure 6.3, the organizational chart for the NMFS offices of 1982 updated to the present> shows that such coordination is not structurally induced. Xf coordination exists, it would be at the discretion of the directors of the laboratories or the administrators of the fisheries resource management office at the state and regional levels.

The functions of NMFS are divided into two components: resource management and research, which are managed by two separate of fices at the regions and in Washington, D. C. The

Southwest region consists of the Office of Fisheries Re- sources Management on Terminal Island and the Southwest 171

Figure 6.1. Orgard.zational structure of the NMPS14

14 Source> Zbid., p, 9. 172

ALASKA REGION

* REGIONAL OFFICE

Pigute 6.2. Regions of the MMPS15

15 Source: Ibid., p. 6, 173

Figure 6.3. Organizational chart of the NNPS: 198216

1~ Source: National Marine Fisheries Service, "Contribution to NMPS Annual Report' Honolulu: Honolulu Laboratory, 1982! . Fisheries Center in La Jolla, California see Figure 6.3! .

This Center oversees laboratories in Tiburon, Monterey, and

Honol ul u.

The mission of NNFS is to 'achieve a continued optimum usefulness of living marine resources for the benefit of the nation.' The present thrust of NNFS activities is directed toward the restoration and maintenance of living marine resources and their emrironment and toward increasing the commercial and recreational fishing industry's contribution to the QNP. Critical national problems are identified by the

NNFS:l7

l. Thirty percent of f ishery resources harvested in United States waters are taken by foreign fleets

2. Lack of markets for incidental by-catch fish caught along with target species! 3. High production costs due to lack of information about resources, technological impediments, and institutional factors

NNFS recently has been faced with changes in the commercial fishing industry in its Southwest Region. The most critical one is a restructuring of the tuna industry.l8

17 National Marine Fisheries Service/ Washington, D. C.: National Marine Fisheries Service, l983!, pp. 1-1.0. 8 Several canneries have completely or partly shut down in Southern California, Hawaii, and American Samoa becuase they cannot compete with foreign imports f rom Asia and Latin America. Parts of the tuna fleet have been idled by the significant drop in tuna prices which are so low that the catch cannot generate enough revenues to pay for labor and vessel operation. In addition, price competition f rom such tuna substitutes as hamburger and chicken have dampened the retail market. Ibid., pp. 28-29. L75

While tunas are now excluded from the MFCMA, NMFS has a major

responsibility to provide research and developnent support to the tuna industry as a part of its mandate to respond to high-seas research.

Nationally, NMFS projects greater state-federal cooperation in building an information pool on U.S. fisheries. In the Pacific, the aqency is committed:l9

1. To participation in and support of the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Managment Council WPRFMC! planning teams and scientific committees "when requested by the Council" 2. To anticipate "major management questions in the national interest'

3. To promote 'international management regimes for highly migratory species'

4. To involve members of the industry and state agencies so that programs are sensitive to Local customs, attitudes and languages

5. To be the advocate for endangered species

6. To protect and rehabilitate, in cooperation with other groups and agencies, critical habitats of marine and anadromous species

These goals are applicable to the total Southwest region, which includes California, Hawaii, the Trust Territory

of the Pacif ic islands, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana

Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

Role of NMFS in Xaplementating the &KNL in Iiawaii The MFCMA directs NMFS to provide RFMCs with the infor-

mation required to develop fishery management plans FMPs! .

l9 Ibid' p pp. 72-74. 176

For the Western Pacific regiont the Western Pacific Program

Office WPPO! and the Honolulu Laboratory have this responsibility, although most of the burden for developing information falls on the laboratory. Both offices are located ad!a- cent to the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

As a direct response to information needs of the WPRFMCin the develognent of FMPs for the fishery resources of the Northwestern Hawaiian

Islands NWHI! g a Fishery Management Research Task Force was organized at the Honolulu Laboratory in 1977. Its proposed activities included:21

1. Providing background documents, technical inf ormation, and expertise for management planning teams of the WPRFMC

2. Making scientific assessments of fish stocks targeted for management by the WPRFMC

3. Determining fishing research requirements and developing statistical systems for improving fishery management performance in the Western Pacific region

4. Developing the theoretical basis and practical methodology for fishery management policy analysi s

20 The Honolulu Laboratory was established in 1949 under the Department of the Interior's program, "Pacific Oceanic Fishery Investigations." In l958, the research program was placed in the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the laboratory was named the Hawaii Area Laboratory. The laboratory remained under the Department of the Interior until l970. The laboratory was placed under NMFS when Reorganization Plan No. IV was implemented. Richard Yoshida, Fishery Biologist, NMFS, 1985: personal communication. 21 National Marine Fisheries Service, "Contribution to NMFS Annual Report" Honolulu: Honolulu laboratory, 1977!, unpaginated. 177

The director of the Honolulu Laboratory was instrumental in developing a Tripartite Cooperative Agreement that was signed in l977 by the three agencies which have jurisdiction and/or management responsibilities in the NWHX. The Tripar- tite Agreement established guidelines for pooling personnel and funding for 'delineating and assessing the resources of the NWHX." The cooperating organizations were the USPWS,

Hawaii Division of Aquatic Resources DAR!, and NMPS; the

University of Hawaii Sea Grant College program was also a participant. This cooperative f ive-year 977-l982! research effort surveyed the economically valuable fisheries, endangered and threatened species, and the ecosystem of the NWHX.

About $5 million was spent to conduct these studies.

The current research programs of the Honolulu Laboratory are divided into two parts: ! insular resources investiga- tionss and ! pelagic resources investi ga tions see Figure 6.4! . These two research components are composed of three sub-groups each. Zn addition, two other on-going research programs are focused on marine mammals and f ishery management. The Honolulu Laboratory projects the continuation of

the major emphasis it has placed on research to support the

WPRFMC's need for scientif ic and technical information and assistance in the preparation of FMPs.22 However, the Execu-

tive Director of the WPRFMC has criticized NMFS for the type

22 National Marine Fisheri.es Service, Honolul u: Honolulu Laboratory, 1979! f p 178

Figure 6.4. Organizational chart of the Honolulu Laboratory, Southwest Fisheries Center23

23 Source~ Honolulu Laboratory< 1983. 179

of information it provides to the WPRPMC. The 1984 investigation of the Inspector General of the Department of Com- merce, while critical of the performance of the WPRPMCand all RFMCsgsupports her criticism on this point.24 The Western Pacific Program Office. The WPPO is one of

three components of the Southwest Region Office, headed by a

Regional Director. Figure 6.5 shows the details of the entire regional organisation. The Developaent Division assists

the domestic f ishing industry in harvesting, processing, and marketing fishery productsg the Management Division develops

policies and guidelines for resource management, f isheries

law enforcement, environmental assessment and tuna/porpoise management. 25 The WPPO coordinates field operations in Hawaii, Guam,

American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific

Islands, an area which covers approximately 1.5 million square miles the spatial boundary of the WPRPMC. The WPPO is also responsible for the ongoing coordination of activi-

ties of the WPRPMC and the administrator serves as a voting

member of the WPRPMC, when the regional director does not

attend a meeting. The enforcement responsibilities of the

local office include protection of endanqered monk seals and

humpback whales and monitoring of importation and sales of

24 See Chapter 9 for a detailed discussion on this point~ also, Office of Inspector General, 'Opportunities for Cost Reduction" Washington, D. C.: Department of Commerce, 1984! . 25 National Marine Fisheries Service, "Brief ing Material' Honolulu: Honolulu Laboratory, 1983!, unpaginated. 180

Figure 6.5. Organizational chart of the Western Pacif ic Pxogram Of f ice, NMF826

2< Source: National Marine Fisheries Service, "Brief ing Material' Honolulu< Honolulu Laboratory, l983!, unpaginated. 181 illegal ivory pr oducts and of f oreign tuna f ishing traf f ic.

Reef, estuaries, and habi tats of threatened and endangered species are of particular concern to the WPPO. In administering the Marine Nammal Protection and Endangered Species Acts, the WPPO works cooperatively with other federal and state agencies.

The WPPO acts as the liaison for the Southwest Regional

Office on plans and activities related to fisheries develo~ ment in Hawaii and the Western Pacific territories. The

Saltonstall-Kennedy grant program, which provides monies for commercial fisheries development to the state and Western

Pacific region f ishers, is administered through this of fice.

%he NNFS-WPRFNCRelationship NMFS has the potential for being the single most influential agency in the fishery sector through two avenues:

l. Under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Manage- ment Act, it is the agency which is designated to develop data required by the regional fishery management councils for the deve3.opaent of FMPs.

2. It is a voting member of the RFMCs.

Although these functions provide NMFS with the opportunity to set the stage for a position and to lobby for it in the

RFMCs, this does not occur. The two distinct sub-components of NNFS which carry out the two functions do not always agree. However, when there are differences of opinion an 182 effort is made to develop and present a unified position to the WPRFMC, according to NMFS personnel.27

As the source of data required to develop PNPs, NMFS

continues to exert significant leadership in the operation of the WPRFNC. However, under strong staf f leadership/ the

WPRFNCis now beginning to assert its priorities more strongly to NMFS both in Hawaii and in Washington, D.C. Because the NFCNA explicitly places responsibility on NNFS to provide

data to the RFMCs, it may appear to place NNFS at the beck and call of the RFMCs. But this has not been the case. In reality, NMFS has and continues to establish its own priorities and research focus, through two obvious authorities:

1. The authority of office the Department of Commerce!

2. The authority of technical knowledge

The influence and power of NMFS in Hawaii lies mostly in the latter authority, which is largely lodged in the Honolulu Laboratory rather than the WPPO, in matters relating to fish-

eries, although the latter office represents the agency on

the WPRFMC.

State-NNFS Relationship

NNFS has been influential in setting fishery policy

directions in the state through the Honolulu Laboratory and

its predecessors. Far example, it was instrumental in

establishing fish aggregation devices PADs! as a high

27 This information was provided by a NNFS administrative staff person in the Honolulu office who reviewed this chapter anonymously. 183 priority in f ishery developaent in Hawaii. The feasibility of utilizing PADs in Hawaii was tested by NMFS and the results of the research were given to state legislators whop then, mandated the Department of Land and Natural Resources to install FADs in nearshore waters off the high islands.28

See Chapter 3 for a map of the location of the PADs which have been installed!.

The historic relationship between NMFS and its predecessor, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, and the state' s fishing industry has been closer than the industry' s relation to the state's fishery agency. This is related to the research support provided over the years by the federal goverrment to aku f ishers. However, the industry-NMFS relationship will probably not be as close in the future because NMFS is winding down its tuna research activities.

The state f ishery agency, the Division of Aquatic Resources, has been expanding its research on pelagic species and may well fill any void NMFS leaves.29

A. Katekaru, MR, 1984: personal communication. 29 WhenNMPS was involved in f isheries developnent work@ there was a mutually supportive relationship between NMPS and the f ishing industry. Over time, the focus of research has shif ted f rom developnental, which involved NMPS in the administration of grant and loan programs, to its current activity, which supports the WPRPMC'8 management efforts. The NMPS-fishing industry relationship, theref ore, has changed. This observation was provided by an anonymous NMFS staff reviewer of this chapter. Conclusion

The dual role as a voting member of the RFMCs and as the source of technical and scientific data for the developnent of fishery management plans PMPs! of ten places the NMFS representative in an awkward position, Because of its MPCMA-mandated responsibility to provide information to the

RPMCs, the regional director may be required to defend the research arm of NMFS, the laboratories, aver which he has no control. The recurring complaint of the WPRFMC, for example, has been too much information which cannot be used and too little which can be used. This problem may be partly related to the bifurcated structure of the agency. Under the present structure, the feedback of the needs of the RFMC is often not given directly to the local and/or regional laboratory directors, who have the knowledge of available resources and the authority to commit funds and personnel to do the research.30

But regardless of the localized power struggle between

NMPS and members and staff of the RPMCs, including those of the WPRFMC, the power vested in the Department of Commerce to

Veto any FMP eSSentially diminiSheS the adVantage Of numbers

30 There are obviously other internal organizational factors which hamper NMPS response to the needs of the RFMCsg such as budget and manpower constraints, review processes, etc. However, the lack of long-term planning by the RFMC and "rushing to the fire syndrome' also contribute to the overall problem of appropriateness and timeliness of the information being generated by NMFS. This observation was made by an anonymous NMPS staf f reviewer of this chapter. 185 the non-federal members of the council might have. This aspect of the decisionmaking process established under the

NFCMA is one of the contradictory provisions of the Act;

Congress provided for the active involvement of state and industry in management decisionmaking, but forced conformity to national standards and oversight by the Department of

Commerce. The proposed Hawaii Fishery Authority HFA! mitigates this troublesome aspect of the MFCMA. The HFA is vested with power to act on all aspects of fishery management. CHAE~ 7

THE MNAII SIVISIOII OP lhQUATIC RESOURCES

The responsibilities of state wildlife agencies are threefold: they have an ~~ tt h d 'ldl 8 'heal resident in the state, a as described by state statutes, and a mezz!, I+ perpetuate wildlife emphasis added! .l

This chapter traces the evolvement of the state' s

fishery agency, the Division of Aquatic Resources DAR!,

which, not surprisingly, has been influenced by the U. S. Fish

and Wildlife Service USFWS! and the National Marine Fish- eries Service NMFS!.2 Among other mitigation methods used,

DAR's predecessors emulated federal methodology by propagat-

ing fish and introducing non-native species to augment

indigenous species. The results of these efforts have been mixedg hence, the agency lives with both praise and blame for

its predecessors' decisions.3

John E. Phelps, 'States' Responsibilities f or Fish and Wildlife," 82 December l976!:43. 2 This chapter was thoroughly reviewed by the Director and staff of DAR and most of their excellent suggested additions and comments were incorporated into the present version. 3 For example, Taape, the blueline snapper, introduced nearly 30 years ago, has been regarded as detrimental to more favored indigenous species such as the opakapaka or pink Footnote continued!

l86 187

Since 1977, the Director of MR has represented the state as a voting member of the Western Pacific Regional

Fishery Management Council WPRFMC!. As such, he occupies a categorical seat, mandated under the Magnuson Fishery Conser- vation and Management Act MFCMA!, on the WPRFMC. In this capacity, the Director represents the state's interests in the development of fishery management. plans FMPs! in the

200-mile f ishery conservation mone FCK! of the Hawaiian arch ipel ago. Research conducted on the information sources of fishery administrators indicated that the DLR is a significant link in the information network of federal fishery administrators who can directly or indirectly affect the management of Hawaii's fisheries. The study also found that the director of DAR does not reciprocally seek out and include federal administrators in his information loop.4 The significance of

3 continued! snapper and other more valuable bottomfish. See, Raymond S. Tabata, ed., "Taape: What Needs to be Done,' Transcript of a Workshop, UH Sea Grant Working Paper No. 46 Honolulu: Sea Grant College Program, 198l! g Raymond S. Tabata, "Taape in Hawaii: New Fish on the Block," A Bulletin of the UH Sea Grant Marine Advisory Program, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, l98l! . While Samoan crabs are a valued introduced species, according to OAR staff, these crabs are considered to be a nuisance to fishpond operators because the crabs dig holes in and around the f ishpond walls. 4 See Chapter 10 for a summary of this study; for a full description see Rose T. Pfund, "Institutional Policymaking in the Management of Fisheries: Case Study State of Hawaii," in JgLLgLagg, vol. 1, ed. Richard W. Grigg and Karen Y. Tanoue Honolulu: University of Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, l984!, pp. 427-457!. 188 this network is that it puts the OAR in a position of "broker" for information pertaining to Hawaii a powerful position which can be used to control access to information related to the operation and politics of Hawaii's f ishery sector ~

DAR enunciates the position of the Department of Land and Natural Resources DLNR!, af which it is a line agency, and has the responsibility for interfacing with other federal, state, and county agencies as well as community groups in all matters related to fisheries.5 Its director is cognizant of the position of the state as enunciated by the head of DLNR and considers the state's position in its response to issues which may have a bearing on federaL-state boundary di Bputes. The di rector, a long-time employee who rose from the ranks, has wide personal knowledge of the historical federal influence on the state's commercial fishing industry. He is critical of federal research and management activities.

State Responsibilities in Wildlif e IIaaagement

The federal government was not given specific powers to control wildlife by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787.6 The states manage wildlife within their boundaries through their reserved powers. However, aver the years, Congress has enacted laws giving federal agencies

~ Henry Sakuda, Director, MR, 1982: personal communication.

Phelps, "State' s Responsibilities, " p. 43. authority to manage migratory species which cross state

boundaries, and to protect endangered species. The federal

government is also party to many bilateral and multilateral

treaties involving wildlife and f ish which migrate beyond

national boundaries.

According to Phelps, the historic role of state wildife

agencies has been to resolve conflicts stemming f ram the

"varying economic, social, and esthetic needs demanded f rom

the same land, air, and water utilized by fish and wildlife."7 He suggests the following as areas of state

responsibility: 8

1. Maintain numbers of and accessibility to those species of wildlife necessary to perpetuate the traditional sports of hunting, fishing, and trapping as principal uses of wildlife while providing f or recreational, educational, scientif ic, esthetic, therapeutic, and economic uses

2. Protect all species of wildlife from waste, exploitation, deterioration and extinction

3. Maintain the state's jurisdiction over wildlife, but support wildlife programs within or outside the boundaries of the state which are in harmony with its departmental programs

4. Enhance the state's wildlife heritage through use of scientif ic techniques 5. Generate a public awareness of wildlife values and public conf idence in the state's wildlife pr ogr ams

7 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 8 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 190

This, however, outlines only one part of the inter-related conservation and developaent functions of most public- sector natural resource agencies. Because of its roots as the wildlife and f isheries managing agency, MR and its predecessors have had a historical bias toward stock enhancement and introduction of exotic species as methods for the conservation and augmentation of wildstock. The state' s conservation role was emphasized in Hawaii because the primary concern of the state agency was not tunas its most important commercial f isheries. Until recently, expert personnel, equipuent, and ocean-going vessels for the research and developaent needed to support the tuna fishing industry were housed only in federal agencies, particularly NMPS and its predecessors. Except for the cultivation of baitf ish, the state deferred to federal leadership in research and development of commercially exploited pelagic f isheries.

The role of the state fishery agency must also include regulatory authority over the actions of the human beings who harvest the resource. The state MR has not received high maxks f rom federal agencies for exercising proper controls to insure conservation.9 The reluctance of the state to develop and enforce stricter conservation measures, such as the limiting or restricting of the harvest of depleted f isheries off the main islands to enable stock recruitment to occur,

9 Alan Ford, former regional director, NMPS,l982: personal communi ca ti on. has been seen as 'not doing their job' by its critics, among whom are fishers.10

Zronically, contrary to the perception of federal agencies that the state is pro-developnent, DAR was constrained in that regard because state laws on its scope of responsibility has been unclear until the late 1970s. The MR has seen the conservation and management of f isheries and wildlife! as its historically defined role and that of the Department of Planning and Economic Developnent DPED! as the f isheries developnent advocate, e.g., DPED administers the vessel loan program.ll zf DPED and MR were both confused as to their respective role in f isheries developnent, it is not surprising.

The develogaent of Hawaiian fisheries is only a very recent perception. There was no request to state government for intervention except help in developing a substitute for the popular baitfish, nehu, a Hawaiian anchovy which is in short supply.

The tuna fishing industry in Hawaii is vertically integrated with the marketing structure and the auction houses; the fishing vessels are awned jointly by these major industry participants, namely, the f ishers, dealers, and the auction

10 Gertrude Nishihara, sportsf isher, memberof WPRPNC,1985: personal communication. ll Department of Land and Natural Resources, Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1979!, p. 220. 192 managers.l2 Historically, tuna predominantly aku! f ishers have had two markets to dispose of their catch the f resh fish market and the cannery for all surplus catch, including off-grade f ish. Because the f ishers did not demand help, the state paid scant attention to the commercial fishing industry beyond searching for a baitf ish substitute, an activity which began as a federal research initiative. The state's search for a dependable supply of baitfish to augment nehu, like the efforts of the federal agencies, has been unsuccessful.! More recently, this picture has changed. The state is now aware that the industry can be an income-generating sector which could be enhanced by planning and developnent. Besides the

1979 fishery development plan, parts of the state's functional and ocean resources managment plans are tangible evidences of the state' s awareness of the revenue potential.l3 There is also an awareness that the socio-economic structure of

Hawaii's f ishing industry has changed within the last 10 year s.

2 Susan B. Peterson, "Decisions in a Market: A Study of the Honolulu Pish Auction, ' Ph. D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1973. 13 State of Hawaii, Honolulu: State of Hawaiig 1978! J State of Hawaii/ Honolulu: Department of Planning and Economic Developnent, 1985! ~ l 93

Act 262, enacted in 1984, placed the responsibilities for the planning aspect of fishery resources develognent in the Ocean Resources Office in DPED and the responsibilities for fishery management and developaent responsibilities in

DAR in DLNR. With this focus in DAR, a large part oK the institutional structure to support the developaent of the states f isheries has been established.

EAR's past attempts to develop the state's fisheries have been centered mostly on the introduction of exotic freshwater game fish. The adoption of the 1979 fisheries development plan by the governing body of DLNR, the Board of Land and Natural Resources,14 provided DAR with guidelines for the developaent of the state's marine fishery resources and involvement in resource assessment of inshore f isheries.

A recent study conducted for the State Legislature on the implementation of state f ishery policies, reviewed the acts of the Legislature between 1980 and 1984. The results indicated that the State Legislature has supported the DAR's

14 The five-member Board of Land and Natural Resources, chaired by the head of DLNR, is composed of representatives of the four counties and an at-large-member. The membership of the BLNR is appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the State Senate. The jurisdiction of this decisionmaking body includes allowing zoning variances and leasing and sale of all state lands and management of the territorial sea. Hence, fishery resources constitute only a small part of its total responsibilities. The Board is not an 'actor' in the present study because which it is the governing body of DLNR> the EAR handles the operational aspects of fishery management under the direction of the head of DLNR ~ 194 efforts to implement the f isheries developaent plan by funding programs which were identified as high priority.l5

Fisheries Management in Hawaii Historically, fishery management in Hawaii is embedded in the common laws of the Hawaiian people. It was first codified in the Laws of 1842, Section 8, by King Kamehameha

III. He established ownership of f ishing grounds by taking 'the f ishing grounds f rom those who now possess them, from Hawaii to Kauai, and [giving] one portion of them to the common people, another portion to the landlords, and a portion [the King] reserve[d] to himself.'16 The same section of the Law provides a detailed description of the taboo system and penalty which could be imposed on any landlord who might "lay any duty on the f ish taken by the people on their own f ishing ground.' 1n this early codification, there is no explicit, statement on the boundaries of the f ishery jurisdiction of

the Hawaiian Islands.

In the Laws of 1845, management of the "rights of pis- cary" was given to the Land Commission.17 The 1872 Act to Prevent the me of Explosives Substances in Taking Fish was

surprising evidence that such illegal activities were preva-

15 Rose T. Pfund and Jan Auyong, "An Assessment of Fishery Policy Implementation in the State of Hawaiii 1980-84" Honolulu: University of Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, 1984! .

16 g Laws of 1 842< Section 8, 1, p. 21. 17 Ibid., Laws of 1845, Section 7, p. 139. 195

lent even when the population of the islands was relatively

small. This act was amended by King Kalakaua in 188818 and Queen Liliuokalani in 1892.19 Kalakaua def ined "possession" of fish killed by explosives as prima facie evidence of illegal behavior and instituted f ines ranging from $50 to

$200. Liliuokalani reduced the f ines to a $25-100 range.

Kalakaua was also concerned with the protection of "the young of fish known as the mullet and the awa under four inches in length in any of the bays, harbors, waters or streams of [the

Hawaiian] kingdom. "20

The rights of konohikis, averseers of f isheries, were

clarified by the Queen in 1892. They were to be

considered in law to hold...private f isheries for equal use of themselves and of the tenants on their respective lands, and the tenants shall be at liberty to take f rom such fisheries, either for their own use, or for sale or exportation, but subject to the restrictions imposed by law.21

Under the Organic Act which went into effect upon annex-

ation of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States, the

Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries of the United States was

"empowered and required to examine...the entire subject of

fisheries and laws relating to the fishing rights in the

18 Ibid., Laws of 1884-88, Chapter XXX, p. 69. 19 Ibid., Laws of 1892, Chapter X< p. 13. Ibid., Laws of 1884-1888, Chapter LVEEE, p. 132. 21 Ibid.r Laws of 1892r Chapter XVEEEI p. 2l. 196

Territory of Hawaii."22 The Organic Act also opened all fisheries, except those in fishponds or artificial enclo- sures, to "all citizens of the United States, subject/ however to vested rights." But, such rights were repealed three years after the Organic Act was instituted.23

In 1917, a Commission on Game and Fisheries was authorized by the Territorial Legislature to examine the 'protection and propagation of game and fish... [and to] ascertain what steps are necessary to secure federal aid 1to do so]."24 The Commission's report to the Legislature at its

1918 session caused the enactment of Act 121 in 1919, which created the Board of Fish and Game Commissioners of the

Territory of Hawaii. The Board was granted broad powers to enforce laws related to the management of fish and wildlife, fish hatcheries, and the importation and distribution of fish and game and to compile and disseminate information. The

Board also was empowered to request the cooperation and assistance of the U.S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries and other agencies. 25 Two years later, fish and game wardens were authorized under Act 215. The act established the duties of the wardens

The Organic Act, Section 94, Investigation of Fisheries. 2> Ibid., Section 95. 24 Laws of the Territory of Hawaii, Regular Session of 1917 f Act 120.

Ibid., Act l21, Sections 1, 3, and 7. 197

"to enforce the laws of the territory, relating to the pr otecting, taking, kill ing, hunting, pr opaga ting or increasing of fish or wild game within the Territory of

Hawaii, and the waters subject to its jurisdiction. 26

Subsequently, a number of laws were enacted to regulate fishing activities. The Legislature authorized the licensing of commercial fishermen by the Board of Fish and Game in 192527 and required that fish dealers report amounts of fish bought and sold.28 The former act provided detailed regulations on use of nets and for fines to be turned over to the treasurer of the county in which they were collected.

In 1927, the Pish and Game Commission was abolished by the Territorial Legislature and its powers and duties were vested in the Division of Fish and Game under the Board of

Commissioners of Agriculture and Forestry.29 The new

Division was 'to provide law enforcement, expand the importation program for shellfish and f ish, and experiment with mullet production, along with efforts to increase game bird distribution."30 walker notes that the 1930's were years of expansion, with emphasis on game farm and fish

Session Laws of Hawaii, 1921, Act 215, Section l. 27 Ibid., 1925, Act 201. 28 Ibid., Act 202.

Ibi d g 1 927 g Act 264 ~ 30 Ronald L. Walker, "A History of the Division of Pish and Game' Honolulu: Division of Fish and Game, 1978!, p. 1. 198 hatchery approach to management.3> Mullet culture received some focus during this period, and streams on the major islands were stocked with salmon and trout hatched from eggs, a methodology which still dominates management practices of wildlife in the United States. Clams and oysters were also studied for introduction into state waters. The introduction and mangement of Samoan crabs began in 1932.32 During the 1950's the fisheries section of the Division continued to emphasize a conservation role and expanded its research activities to the recovery of nehu, pollution problems affecting fisheries, fishing techniques, and t,he biology of commercially valuable species, such as aku and ahi, and indigenous species of fish and shellfish. The first Dingell-

Johnson grant., received by the state in 1951, allowed it to accelerate its culturing and stocking efforts. Bluegill sun- fish, large and smallmouth bass, channel catf ish, various species of groupers and snappers f rom Tahiti, and threadf in shad were all introduced during this period.33

31 Propagation of fish and wildlife rather than regulation of human actions was the methodology used to manage wildlife in the United States beginning in the mid-1870s see Chapter 5 for a discussion!. This practice persisted until the 19SOs when regulatory measures began to be enacted. The state has been slow to adopt such management regimes as zonal closures to ban all fishing for a period of time, even though an experimental closure has been successful in replenishing the standing stock of f ish. 32 Walker, "A History," p. 2. 33 Dingell-Johnson funds are used to enhance as well as monitor fish stocks for sports and recreational fishing. 199

A marine f ishery experiment facility was established in the 19SO's. However, the state efforts were still largely conf ined to inshore f isheries and laboratory studies. Xn cooperation with the U. S. Pacific Oceanic Fishery Investiga- tion group, fishery surveys and baitf ish experiments were conducted with tilapia as an alternate baitfish for the aku f ishery. However, results indicate that the long-term value of tilapia lies in its ability to control noxious vegetation in private ponds and as a food f ish for some ethnic groups than as a baitfish.34 The baitfish problem is far from being salved, even after nearly 40 years of research by federal and state agencies and the University of Hawaii. The commercial aku f ishing industry still lacks a dependable supply of bai tf ish.

Reorganization Af ter Statehood

The reorganization of the executive departments, after statehood in 1959, renamed the Board of Commissioners of

Agriculture and Forestry as the Board of Agriculture and

Conservation. 35 The authority for the management of f ish and game was transferred to DLNR when it was created in 1961 and a new unit, the Division of Fish and Game DFG!, was estab-

Walker, "A History," p. 4.

I 8 d ~ Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1962!, 200

lished to assume this role.36 Figure 7.l shows the

organizational chart of the DLNR.

The DLNR, composed of seven divisions, administers all

of the exploitable renewable natural resources of the state,

including land, forests, water, and f isheries. Because of

the small land mass of the state, forest resources are limit-

ed to sporadic exports of wood chips to Japan, mostly har-

vested on the island of Hawaii. There is also a limited market for specialty woods. But the conservation of the

state's forests is important because they are an integral

part of the watershed catchment system which channels runoff

into the groundwater aquifers beneath the islands.

The most abundant natural resource Hawaii has is the

ocean and the living resource within the Territorial Sea,

which are administered by DLNR. Prior to the enactment of

the MFCMA> the state enjoyed ~~ jurisdiction over the

f isheries without regard to federal-state boundaries. Be-

cause the principal fisheries for the large tunas were beyond

the distance travelled by Hawaiian fishers, there was no per-

ception of competition for these f isheries.

Until the mid-1960's, DLNR managed the Hawaiian Xslands

National Wildlife Refuge, under an agreement with the USFNS,

necessitating annual survey and patrol trips to the NWHI.37

Hence, the U.S. Pish and Wildlife Service has been directly

Session Laws of Hawaii, 196l, Act 132. 37 Walker, "A History," p. 5. 201

Clcescsl~ ~ Serrtces

lscesccel Cerecess

cawss cses Olccrccs Clssrrcs

cseecrress 1 e1C11resecceecy Cemaccsee sesceesrcol Coeeeceescm1 Ceeeescee Corese~c Dcscscoe rotesccs1 ec1411feesesecoe Cselesoesr SeeeclcCeseeccee

Pigure 7.1. Organ.zational chart of the Department of Land and Natural Resources38

Source: Reproduced f ram Department of Land and Natural Resour ce s, Honol ul u: State of Hawaii, 1962!, pe 6. Updated until 1984. 202

involved in the management of the refuge for less than 30 year s.

The baitfish research facility, which had been estab-

lished earlier, was expanded in the 1960s to enable f ish and

shellfish rearing and it was named the Keehi Fisheries Sta-

tion. The state's exemplary work with

the giant Malaysian prawn, was begun during this

time. 39

Ar tif icial reef s f or aggr egating f ish were f irst estab-

lished off the islands of Oahu and Maui by DPG as an experimental effort initiated during the 1960's to enhance reef

f isheries. The rather short-lived artif icial reef sg coll

structed with discarded automobiles, either disintegrated in

the saltwater or could not withstand the strong surges and

storm waves prevalent in Hawaii' s of f shore waters. Pur ther

experiments using other media, such as concrete structures,

are presently being continued. Stock enhancement programs

for recreational fishing were also instituted for reservoirs

and streams on the major islands during these years.

The enforcement efforts of the DFQ were supported by Act

265, enacted during the 1967 session of the State Legisla-

tur e. Enf or cement of f ice r s w e r e author iz ed to issue ci ta-

39 This pioneer effort resulted in Hawaii's becoming the world center for the culturing technology related to this species and in developing the state's aquaculture industry. lt d U 203

tions for violations of fishing and hunting laws.40 Two new

patrol boats were purchased to aid this effort.

Three major program areas were assigned to the MG in

the 1970's: culture and outdoor recreation, environmental

protection, and economic developaent of commercial f isheries.41 However, because the DPG had wildlife management and enforcement responsibilities in addition to fisherieag

the activities of the agency were diffused and little effort was expended to promote pelagic commercial fisheries, espe-

cially because of federal activities in this area.

The Keehi fisheries station, one of the research units

of the DEG, was moved to Sand Island in March 1973 and named

the Anuenue Fisheries Research Center.42 During this period,

commercial fishing was enhanced by the construction of modern

fishing vessels with federal and state guaranteed loansg

administered by DPEDt and studies and field testing of fish-

ing technology.

The 1978 Legislature separated the enforcement branch

from the DPG and created the Division of Conservation and

Resources Enforcement to consolidate the enforcement func-

tions of all divisions in DLNR see Figure 7.2! ~43 Three

40 Malker, "A History," p. 6 ~ 41 Ibid. 42 A second research station was located in Kewalo Basin near the NMFS facility. State personnel were allawed to use the NMFS equipment to carry out tagging trials, etc. Paul Kawamoto, Fisheries Chief, MR, 1985: personal communication. 43 Session Laws of Hawaiig 1978 Act 171. 204

Figure 7.2. Evolution of the Division of Aquatic Resources 20' years later, the DPG was again divided. Fishery management responsibilities and authority were placed in the MR, estab-

lished by Act 8S for that purpose, and wildlife management was placed under the Division of Forestry, renamed the Divi-

sion of Forestry and Nildlife.44

The DIRI the State's Lead Agency for Fishery Management

The "family tree' of the Division of Aquatic Resources,

Figure 7.2, shows the historic merger of f isheries with game.

Until 1970, this was the administrative organization for fish

and wildlife management in the state. Present functions and responsibilities of the MR include:4S

l. Establishment and maintenance af aquatic life pr opagatinq station s!

2. Zmportatian of aquatic life far propagation and distribution in the state

3. Distribution of aquatic life, either f ree of charge ar for a price, for the purpose of increasing the food supply of the state; such distribution may include the private sector

4. Advisory services and information on the best methads for protecting, propagating, and distributing aquatic Life within the state to increase the food supply and to reduce the cost of the foad items to consumers

The MR exercises influence over the direction and

funding of fishery research programs in the state through the

administration of the Dingell-Johnson, NMFS grants for com-

mercial fishery research and development PL 88-309 funds!,

44 Xbid., 1981, Act 85. 4> Xbid., Sections 13, 187-1. 206 and state funds. The agency also has management responsibilities for all state f isheries, which include stocking of freshwater streams and reservoirs. In addition, the EAR staff provides guidance to NMFS on research priorities for the Saltonstall-Kennedy S-K! funds46 through the Pacif ic

Fisheries DeveloptLent Foundation PFDF! .47

The staff of the DAR provides support services to the

Hawaii Fisheries Coordinating Council HFCC!, which is chaired by the Director of the DLNR. The establishment of HFCC in 198048 implements one of the recommendations in the

1979 The HFCC advises the

Board of Land and Natural Resources on "matters related to fisheries developaent in the State and [to coordinate] fisheries activities among f ederal, state, and county agencies and private industry.'49 The composition of the membership includes both recreational ! and commercial fishers !, two of whom are members of WPRFMC, and agency representatives ! as voting members; non-voting members include county government representatives !, the director of the University of Hawaii Sea Grant College Program !,

46 S-K funding is a source of federal monies to enhance commercial fisheries developaent in the state. 47 The PPDPis a private foundation which coordinates the developnent of commercial fishing in the Pacific region. It was formerly the Pacific Tuna Developaent Founation. 48 Session Laws of Hawaiig 1980' Act 282. 49 Hawaii Fisheries Coordinating Council, 1 N : t t' '', 1222! ~ . 2. 207

National Marine Fisher ies Service !, chair of the Western

Pacif ic Regional Fishery Management Council l!, Marine

Affairs Advisor to the Governor !, and Pacific Basin

Develogaent Council l! . Only the term of office of the seven fishers is limited to four years. All other appoint- ments are ex officio and, hence, indefinite.

Thus far, among other things, the HPCC has served as a project review body for S-K funding. Xt ranks its priorities and submits them to the DLNR through its chair for consideration in the establishment of the state's priorities. HFCC has only acted as a coordinator of the state's f ishery-related activities in a limited sense. The members are briefed by researchers or state and federal agencies on their activities on an "as requested" basis. HFCC directs the coordination of fishery research in the state by establishing guidelines and priorities f or the developaent of projects. The likelihood that the HFCC will expand its role to direct the activities of its member agencies is small because those agencies would resist extra-agency interference in their activities as would the DLNR.50 HFCC's value will probably lie in its ability to influence the State Legislature to support the state' s f ishers.

The author has represented the University of Hawaii, in the absence of the regular representative, at several meetings. The members of HPCC did not seem to fully understand their roles or the boundary of the authority of the HFCC. However, it was responsible for the adoption of legislation which allowed fishers to obtain fuel tax credit in 198l Act 210! . 208

Conclusions

With the divesting af monitoring and enforcement responsibilities and the transfer of terrestrial wildlife to the

Division of Forestry and Wildlife, the function of the DAR has become sharply focused on fisheries management and development. This honing of the agency's role appears to reflect the state administration's focus and commitment to commercial fisheries development. Although there are existing and potential areas of conflict among the four state agencies51 which have functional responsibilities that overlap in the management and developnent of the state's fishery resources, a recent study by the Legislative Reference Bureau of the

State Legislature found that the 'duplication and overlapping functions and activities are not necessarily signs of waste and inefficiency.'52 However, it appears that most of the fishery research and develoguent functions are now firmly ensconced in the DAR.

As federal funding cuts curtail the activities of NMFS, the interest of the present Governor in the developaent of marine resources will probably enable DAR to occupy those

The ocean-relted responsibilities of the agencies are:

DLNR: Ocean resources, sutxaerged lands DPED; Ocean resources planning, energy developnent Dept. of Transportation: Ocean transportation and recreational facilities Dept. of Health: Ocean water quality, pollution control 52 Ann N. Ogata, , Legislative Reference Bureau Report No. 3 Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1982!, p. 35. 209 areas which the state considers to be significant. However, this focus may change when the Governor's term of office ends in 1986.53 He is ineligible to run for another term.

The evolution of the MR has paralleled the awakening of the state's political leadership to the potential value of fisheries as a source of revenue. Similar to the development of NIPS, the predecessors of MR began as the fish and wildlife management unit with emphasis on introducing and stocking exotic species. Dingell-Johnson funds were used to introduce marine species to enhance reef populations. Most of the research and developeent of commercial tuna f isheries were done by the federa3. government under the direction of

NMFS' predecessors. With the adoption of the state f ishery developaent plan in 1979, triggered by the NFCMA, the state has begun to assert its priorities in research and development of pelagic species and has obtained funding from the

State Legislature to initiate projects on its own or cooperatively with federal agencies and the University of Hawaii.

Xn the near term, MR is prepared to focus its activities in support of the commercial fishing industry in Hawaii by enhancing fisheries in state waters through such means as fish aggregating devices and artificial reefs. The 198S update of the 1979 fishery developaent plan reflects this thrust.

S3 The closeness of the present head of DLNR,Susumu Ono, to Governor Ariyoshi is common knowledge among those who are knowledgeable about island pol itics. 210

Although its full potential is as yet unknown, the HPCC appears to be a potential vehicle for developing political support for DAR. HPCC has not clearly defined the boundaries of its involvement as the "advisor' to DLNR on matters related to fishery resources, but its political strength was evident in the enactment of a fuel tax credit for fishers. How- ever, as a creature of the present lame-duck administration, it faces an uncertain future after 1986. CHAPI.'SR 8

THB MNAIIAN OONNBRCIAI PIBHERB

The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act

MPCMA! provides fishers an opportunity to participate in the management of f ishery resources of their region through their

'representatives" on eight regional fishery management councils RFMCs! . Prior to the establishment of RFMCs, fishers had the same prerogative to advise or react to regulatory proposals as any other interest group or individuals. Now, for the first time, fishers and fishing interests have an opportunity to participate as decisionmakers in the development of fishery management plans FMPs! which will directly affect them.

This chapter presents a discussion on the third class of actors who comprise 'fishery federalism"--Hawaiian commercial fishers and those who officially speak for them. The discussion will be limited to Hawaiian fishers who hold commercial fishing licenses. In 1982, this group numbered about 2,600 when a survey was done in conf unction with the present study.

Zn Hawaii, anyone who holds a commercial fishing license costing $25 classifies him or her as a commercial fisher. Ho distinction is made between fulltime and parttime fishers; the latter group includes recreational fishers.

211 2l2

The significant question in terms of this study is the representatives of fishers who speak to government. Do they tr uly r epr esent the f ishing industry? Who are their constituents? Ia the intent of Congress to give fishers a voice in the management of f ishery resources being f ulf illed? These questions become important because those who are appointed to serve on the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management

Council WPRFMC! and other legally constituted bodies, related to fishers and fishing, speak for 'the fishers.'

Commercial Pishiags A Trouhled Industry

When humans first. began to fish in the coastal seas and inland streams and lakes, they did so to supply their own immediate needs for food. This was essentially the purpose for f ishing until relatively recent times. Since the advent of industrialization, fishing has become a mechanized operation on vessels which freely traversed and harvested fish in the oceans of the world. No longer tied to the limitations of human physiology or the traditional coast-hugging f ishing vessels, the newest fishing vessels are virtually self-contained islands. Where once a fisher struggled to land one fish, seiners with miles of net now reel in hundreds of fish in a single setting. The influence of economics in fueling the maintenance of high levels of productivity cannot be underestimated, especially when fish and f ish products are international trade commodities.

Inevitably, such productive capacity has outstripped the ability of the fisheries to sustain their standing stocks> 2l3 mechanization wreaked havoc on the naturally occurring predator-prey balance. Overf ishing became a troublesome reality.

As Flader indicated see Chapter 5!, the outgrowth of a pr~ duction-oriented time was the optimism of fishery biologists who believed that depleted fisheries could be replenished by enhancing wildstocks with cultured f ish. Theoretically, this approach appeared to have merit, but the biologists vastly over-rated their abilities and under-rated the complexity of the marine biota and fauna. After over a century of attempts to culture marine fish, the solution still eludes fishery sci enti sts.

The emphasis on replenishment simply failed to take into account what free market economics often has failed to take into account. In the case of any depletable resource, even if it is naturally or artificially renewable in part, unrestricted exploitation of the resource will totally deplete it,.

The ability to harvest fish, relative to the ability to re- plenish them, is virtually limitless. It should have occurred to policymakers long ago, but. unfortunately it did not, that just as wildlife is protected somewhat by such devices as time Limits on hunting seasons, it would ultimately be necessary to regulate the harvesting of fish if the commercially valuable species were not to be extinguished. 214

The Hawaiian Coamercial jI'ishing Xndustry

Some data on the state's commercial fishing industry are summarized here:1

Prior to World War IZ, Hawaii's commercial fishery was relatively stable. During the war years, fishing activities were curtailed. But immediately following World War IZ, the number of commercial fishers peaked to over 3,500. An all-time low was reached in 1965. The estimated number of fulltime commercial fishers today is 800 there are nearly three times as many parttime commercial fishers! g a considerable number are immigrants working on aku and ahi vessels.

The total annual landing has been relatively stable, especially if the wildly fluctuating aku catch is excluded. However, the price of the fish has increased. Hence, even though the number of tuna vessels has declined over the past 20 years/ the real gross revenue per vessel has increased. Over the thirty year period, from 1948 to 1977, aku boats declined f rom 32 to 14.

The commercial fishing industry currently contributes in excess of $14 million to state revenues or less than one percent of the gross state product. The state's fishery developaent plan projects potential additional landings valued at about $53 million. The plan calls for infrastructure and vessel investment of 890 million over a 20-year period 980-2000}.2 However, there are some basic problems f acing the industry, such as the insufficient supply of suitable baitfish and the distance of potential new fresh fish mar-

1 Department of Land and Natural Resources, Honolulu: State of Hawaii: 1979!, pp. 6-9.

Ibid. t p. 36. 215 kets. Although the development of new technology, e.g., fish aggregation devices FADs!, may minimize the effects of the lack of an adequate baitfish in the future, current knowledge does not allow firm projections of alternatives, based on any known innovation, including experimental efforts to develop cultured baitfish. Given the current state of technologyf the projections of revenues and available capital to f inance inf rastructure processing plants, harbors, etc.! and vessel construction may be unrealistic.

Any expansion of Hawaii's fishing industry requires new markets outside of the limited local fresh fish market. Al- though the local market could be stabilized if consumers would accept. traditional fresh species as frozen products, this would require modification of their buying habits. - Xn addition, a flash freezing plant would be needed to insure a high quality product. However, because there are species which do not maintain a high enough quality when f rozen, flash freezing is not a panacea for all marketing problems.3

A very recent developnent is the wide-ranging acceptance of sashiai raw fish! by urban Americans. This demand has expanded the f resh fish markets to the mainland United States>

Japan is also a potential market for air-flown fresh Hawaii- caught fish, but present storage and handling procedures require upgrading to meet the high standards of quality imposed

3 Brooks Takenaka, Assistant Sanager, United Fishing Agencyf l983: personal communication. 216 by the Japanese. While these potential markets exist, a public-sector f inanced inf rastructure for market developaent is yet to be built, a shortcoming recognized by the state. The fishery developaent plan includes a few options for market expansion totalling more than $16 million with about $2.8 million to be borne by the public sector.4 The public funds have not been expended because there has been no initiative on the part of industry to risk venture capital in the building of such facilities as cold storage and processing plants which are presently lacking and which are perceived as needed if the industry is to operate at optimum levels projected in the fishery development plan.

The types of vessels used for commercial fishing are identifiable through mandatory- vessel registration The core of the traditional Hawaiian commercial fleet consists of about 12 old aku fishing vessels "haole sampans"! with limited ice-holding capacity, which allows them to remain at the fishing grounds for only a few days. Nore recently, however, the state fishery agency, the Division of ~uatic Re- sources DAR!, has noted the changing composition of the commercial fleet with the addition of large lobster and shrimp- trapping vessels, albacore trolling vessels, and increasing numbers of small boats in the tuna handline fisheries.5

4 Department of Land and Natural Resources, pp. 2 09-211. 5 Department of Land and Natural Resourcesg ~I l9JQ. Draf t Report! Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1985!, p. 13. 217

Originally, the state's plan was to develop a transshipment station at Midway Islands to facilitate out-of-state fishers in supplying albacore to Hawaiian Tuna Packers, the state's only cannery, which is located in Honolulu. The closing of the tuna cannery in 1984 has forced a re-assessment. of the state's fishery development plans.6 An optimistic future is projected in the state fishery developnent plan, based on the following activities:7

l. Twelve new vessels, equipped to harvest tunas and other pelagic species, were added to the Hawaiian fleet in 1979> ten more are project,ed by the mid-1980's

2. Almost $2 million has been invested in fish handling and processing facilities in the past two years 3. Fish aggregation devices have been deployed by the state 4. Feasibility studies have been done for the developaent of the fisheries in the waters of f the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands HWHI!

5. Presidential declaration of a National Fisheries Policy Carter administration executive declaration!

Even though governmental intervention has provided significant support to the fishing industry in Hawaii, according to a state fishery official, the willingness of fishers to

The MR is presently updating the state's fishery development plan. 7 Department of Land and Natural Resourcesf p. 9. 218 invest in the future develogaent of the fishing industry is not clear.8

Tbe Hawaiian Commercial P5.sher: A Legal Definition

In 1982, when a telephone survey was conducted in con- junction with the present study, there were approximately

2,600 commercial fishing license holders in the state.9 The legal definition of a commercial fisher in the state is anyone who pays the annual $25.00 fee $50.00 for non-residents! for a license which allows the catch to be sold.l0

Commercial fishers must file a monthly catch report to the

State Division of Aquatic Resources.ll However, a more restrictive definition of fishers is used in the harvesting of nehu, a Hawaiian anchovy which aku fishers prefer as baitfish. Only those fishers employed on bonaXide aku- fishing boats can use small-mesh nets more than 50 feet in length. All others are restricted to nets which are no longer than 50 feet.12 Although the restriction imposed on nets appears to muddy the definition of a commercial fisher,

8 Alvin Katekaru, OAR, 1984: personal communication. 9 The results of the survey are given in Appendix A. Parts of the survey on fishers are included in the state's fishery developaent plan. See, Department of Land and Natural Resour ce s, 10 Hawaii Revised Statues, Sec. 189-1. The 1985 session of the Hawaii State Legislature has raised the in-state fees from $3.0 to $25 and out-of-state fees from 820 to $50. 11 Hawaii Revised Statutes, Sec. l89-3. 12 Hawaii Revised Statutes, Sec. l88-45. 219 since the taking of nehu is not universally practiced by all recreational fishers, the only real distinction between a commercial fisher and a recreational or sport fisher is that the commercial fisher has a license to sell his or her catch.

Under present Hawaiian law, a parttime fisher is legally recognized as a commercial fisher just as one who earns most, or all, of his or her income from fishing, if he or she has a commercial fishing license. The net size limitation, which gives preferential treatment to aku fishers, has been upheld by the State Supreme Court.13 Although there are many marine recreational fishers in

Hawaii, as in other states, they are not required to purchase f ishing licensesg recreational fishing licenses are requi.red only for freshwater fishing. But the large-number of recreational fishers, estimated at 149,400 by the Office of the

The constitutionality of this pref erential treatment given to aku fishers was challenged in 1979 in Maeda v. Amemiya [60 Haw. 662-674 979! J in the Supreme Court of Hawaii. In rendering its decision the Hawaii Supreme Court, recalled its opinion in an earlier case, [Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Company, 52 Haw, 327, 329, 475 F.2d 679, 681 970! t, and stated that the

guarantee of the equal protection of the laws, found in both the Hawaii and Federal Constitutions, was not intended to interfere with the power of the State to prescribe regulations to promote the general welfare of the people. State Statistician,14 probably accounts for a substantial harvest of coastal fisheries. Xt is also suspected that they contribute to the underground supply to retail outlets as well as to direct. sales to friends and relatives. Since recreational fishers are not required to report their landings, there are no catch statistics on recreational fishing.

The distinction between commercial and recreational fishers is blurred in Hawaii as it is elsewhere because of the many recreational fishers sell their catch to pay for vessel operating expenses. l5 These f ishers hold commercial fishing licenses and are interchangeably referred to here as recreational or parttime commercial fishers. Recreational fishers who hold a commercial fishing license are required to file the same monthly catch reports as a~ f<ime- commer- cial fisher. Fishers who are affected by fishery management plans FMPs! promulgated under the MFCKA either ovn a boat large enough to fish in the FCR or are crew members on such a boat. The latest data indicate that there are fewer than

2,000 registered commercial fishing vessels.16 Hence, most of the nearly 150,000 recreational fishers are not directly

14 Robert Schmitt, state statistician, 1983: personal communi ca ti on. 12 kl kk 2 ~ I 12 2 North Carolina State University!, p. 4g Nancy Davis Ill 121,'~, l. 12, . 2. pp. 5-6 g Sarah Friday, "Buoys, Bait, Boats--Big Business, " I ~ 12., ~ Pl» -3 ~ 16 Department of Land and Natural Resources, P. 12 221 affected by the MPCKi. The present study is focused on licensed recreational fishers who fish in the FCZ.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Based on the results of the l982 telephone survey, the typical Hawaiian commercial fisher has the following prof ile:17

Age: 42

Work status: parttime; boat owner/captain

VesseL size: LS to 30 feet

Fishing distance fram shore: 4 to 30 miles

Fishing methods most of ten used: handlining, trolling

Residence: Island of Oahu

When this profile is translated into hunting behavior, the Hawaiian fisher's top preys are tunas, as well as other . species attracted by FADs, such bottomfish, which are found in the 4 to 30-mile band of water off the main Hawaiian

Islands. With the recent deployment of FADs, all within the

30-mile perimeter, there have been increased landings of large tunas, especially ahi yellowfin! . Because all tunas are highly migratory species, they are not managed by any domestic government agencyg presently the non-migratory species, managed under the NFCMA, are spiney lobsters and precious corals. Plans are being developed for bottomfish and billfish, two fisheries which have been designated as

The description and methodology of the survey and details of the statistical analyses are given in appendix A. 222 requiring management, based on biological and socio-economic factors. The FMPs for billfish and bottomfish have not been approved at this writing. With the implementation of these two FMPs the major fisheries harvested by Hawaiian fishers with the exception of tunas, will be regulated. There is growing support for the management of the bottomfish fishery, which is popular with both commercial and recreational f ishers.18

The results of this survey on Hawaiian commercial fishers indicate that three aspects of the small tunas aku and ahi! and bottamfish fisheries are important to policymakers. First, these are the most impacted f isheries because they occur within the 4 to 30"mile zone. It has been observed that the fish aggregating devices are enabling f ishers to harvest small ahi. At present, without a firm knowledge of the habitat of the ahi being harvested in Hawaii's nearshore waters, it has not been determined whether the fishery is composed of resident or transient populations. If the f ishery is composed of a resident school or schools of ahi, the harvesting of juvenile members would have a damaging long- term effect on the recruitment of this fishery.

Second, it was noted in a recent Department of Land and

Natural Resources DLNR! report that there is a trend toward mechanization in the harvesting of bottomfish, which has

18 Gertrude Nishihara, fisher representative on WPRFMCg1985: personal communication. 223

traditionally been a manual handline fishery.l9 The increas-

ed efficiency of mechanized harvesting will accelerate the

catch levels of bottomfish. While technology may foster

increased productivity and promote greater economic returns,

the near and long-term effects of this technology on the affected fisheries may well be adverse. How will the impact of this added stress on the fisheries be monitored2 What are

regulatory measures which can react to regulate harvesting with timely interventionP These are questions which have yet

to be addressed by MR and the WPRFMC.

Third, although most Hawaiian commercial fishers are parttime workers, this fact does not, appear to be recognized

in the state's fishery developaent plan. Infrastructure to aggregate and market the catch on each major island Hawaii,

Maui, Molokai, Oahu, and Kauai! is needed if the revenues projected in the state's fishery development plans are to be realized. The parttime fishers should be considered as the

'fleet" for a centralized statewide marketing system. Three

options for the establishment of the required support systems are suggested below:

l. The two auction houses in Honolulu and Hilo! can expand their operations to provide storage and marketing services to parttime f ishers

2. Cooperatives on each of the five main islands, supported by the state and/or the federal government can be established, if they are not

19p t f ddIK1 Draf t Report! Honolulu: State of Hawaii, l985!, p. l5-17. now in place, to carry on the necessary f unctions of handling, stor age, and mar ke t i ng

3. A f ishing authority, with taxing and captial- raising power, can be established to coordinate the storage, processing, and marketing functions See Chapter 12 for a proposal of the Hawaii Fishing Authority! In general, the condition of the traditional Hawaiian fulltime commercial aku fishing fleet is dismal. The vessels are old, and so are most of the old-time" fishers. The number of local youth getting into this traditional fishery is small because the work is difficult and profits uncertain.

Crew members are mostly Japanese nationals. There are, however, new entrants, handliners and trollers, getting into the industry who are not aku f ishers. Their success will depend on substantial expansion of the f resh f ish market.

The 'Voices' of the Hawaiian Qaeaercial Fishers

A few individuals who testify before legislative and other governmental bodies and occupy positions on advisory boards are generally regarded as representatives of Hawaii's fishers, whether or not they have a legitimate organized constituency. These individual s incl ude:

Prank Goto: He is the manager of the United Fishing Agency, the Honolulu f ish auction house which essentially controls the fresh fish market of the tuna fishing industry in Hawaii. He is well-connected to the state's political influentials and has been appointed to both national and state-level fishery-related committees and boards. He is a member of the Hawaii Fishing Coordinating Council HPCC! and a former member of the WPRFMC.

Rex Matsuno: He is the President of Suisan, the Hilo fish auction house, and is a principal of the group which includes Goto! which has purchased the 225

Hawaiian Tuna Packers cannery. Although not visible as a spokesperson beyond the island of Hawaii, he will predictably become more visible in the future.

Gertrude Nishihara: She is a teacher by profession and a avid recreational parttime commercial! fisher. As a representative for licensed recreational fishers or parttime commercial fishers! on the WPRFMC, she is one of the few who raises questions at meetings. She is also a director of the Hawaii Fishing Coalition HFC! and, hence, is a representative of the organization along with her husband, Glenn.

Glenn Nishiharas One of the founders and the President of the HFC, a 2,500-member organization of f ishers and f ishing interests its members are predominantly parttime commercial or recreational fishers!, he is a frequent testifier at official hearings on behalf of his organization.

John Robey: He is the manager of the Tuna Boatowners' Co-op, which is composed of 80 fishers and 7 fishing vessels. Although he is recognized as a legitimate spokesperson, he is not one of the "insiders' of the political circles in the state. He often takes adversarial positions at meetings.

Louis Agard:20 One of the 'old guard' and recognized spokespersons for fishers, he is a member of the WPRFMCand HFCC. However, he has no formal organizational constitutency. Once an active fisher in Hawaiian waters, he presently has business interests and investments in the f ishing industry.

Alika Cooper: He is a member of the WPRFMCand HFCC. An outspoken critic of both state and federal fishery agencies, he is regarded as a Hawaiian activist although he does not formally represent any of the Hawaiian groups. Until very recently, he owned several fishing boats. He is now a consultant on Hawaiian f ish cultivation.

Wadsworth Yee~ The first and continuing chair of the WPRFMC, he has investments in fishing operations. He does not represent a fisher group. As president of a state-based insurance company, he is f inancially independent. Brookes Takenaka: He is the Assistant Manager of United Fishing Agency and owner of BT and Associates, which

20 He resigned his seat on the HFCCin fall 1985. 226

has a Saltonstall-Kennedy grant to implement a marketing system for fish and fish products in Hawaii. The two year old pro!ect has not taken off as yet.

Kitty Simonds: As the Executive Director of the WPRFMC, she is an employee of the council. She represents the WPRFMC in negotiations with the National Marine Fisheries Service and the National Oceanic and Atmos- pheric Administration See Chapter 9 for additional details! and, hence, is the official who represents all fishers in the Western pacific.

The status of these individuals is summarized below:

Table 8.l. Fisher representatives and their constituencies

Fisher Representative~ Consti tuents

Busi. interest Fisher Rec. Fishers Aku Fishers Sel f

Notes on abbreviations used:

busi. business rec. reer cation

~ Kitty Simonds is not included in this summary because she serves a unique role as Executive Director of the WPRFMC in representing region-wide f ishery interests.

When the personal interest of the individuals and their constituents are analyzed, five out of the nine do not have an organized constituency. Hence, it can be assumed that these individuals speak largely for themselves. The number 227

of f ishers represented by the four spokespersons who have

bonaf ide constituencies is tabulated below:

G. f G. Nishirara 2,500

J. Ro bey 8G

F. Goto 80*

2 g660

Estimated number of personnel on 5 aku boats

About 160 of the approximately 6SO fulltime f ishers, or

approximately 25% are formally represented by a spokesperson.

Zt is assumed that the 2,500-member HFC includes a few corn- mercial fishers who are not represented by Robey or Goto, but

not enough to make a statistical difference. There are near-

ly 150,000 recreationa3. fishers, according to state estimates. Based on this number, only slightly more than 1.6% of

that population is represented in governmental bodies. The epact of the NPCNA on Hawaiian Fishers

There are presently two FMPs in effect for Hawaiian FCK

fisheries: precious corals and lobsters. The former f ishery

has not been harvested since 1979> the latter is currently

harvested by an estimated 12 to 14 boats, mostly in the NWHZ

FCK. Most of these boats are home-ported in Hawaii, but

several to 5! are transients f ram the West Coast.21

21 Paul Kawamoto, Chief, Fisheries Branch, DLR, 1985: per senal communi cation. 228

Hence, most Hawaiian fishers are not presently affected by the MPCNA.

Of the approximately $l4 million in revenue generated by the fishing sector, about a million dollars constitute revenue from an PCZ fishery lobster!. The balance of the revenues is principally obtained from tuna fisheries which are not currently managed under the NFCMA. With the implementation of the bottomfish and billfish PMPs, the MPCMA will affect a larger number of both commercial and recreational fishers.

Conclusion

Any future policies and plans for developaent of the commercial fishing industry in Hawaii must consider the limitations inherent in Hawaiian commercial f ishers particularly the magnitude of the numbers of parttimers! and in the characteristics of insular fishery resources which differ mark- edly from those on the continental shelves!. Zf Hawaii's parttime fishers are to contribute productively to the state's economy, their operational mode and obvious venture capital limitations need to be considered. The underdevel- oped commercial fishery resource may well be parttime f ishers.

Developaent, however, is a two-edged sword. Pol icyma- kers need to understand not only the biology of the fishery resources, but the behavior of the human fishers who are the most intelligent top carnivores which prey on the various trophic levels of the complex Hawaiian marine ecosystem. The 229 importance of understanding the behavior of fishers does not appear to be fully appreciated. Until wildstocks can be domesticated, only the human component of the intricate ecosystem of fishery resources can be managed. The of t quoted, 'wise management of natural resources" is in actuality, wise management of the human exploiters of the r esour ce s.

The state has not, as yet, attempted to regulate fishing activity by limiting access to popular species which will not be managed under an FMP mostly because of their population size!. ln the discussion which follows in Chapter 9, fishers themselves are voicing a need for more stringent harvesting r egul a ti ons. max zzr. ma sums ar.zeav os '~zsaaav moaaar.zsm» Fishery-related institutions and their history were examined in the preceding eight chapters. We now turn to the human beings who operate through these institutions. Xn the final analysis, the study of public policy is the study of the mutual interaction of those who influence and are influenced by the institutions which are created to keep social order and perpetuate the values of a society.

The Nagnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act ignored old established fishery-management structures with historical roots dating back more than a hundred years and created a new federal-state-private sector structure, regional fishery management councils, to manage the nation' s fisheries. These structures and the behavior of Hawaii's fishery-sector influentials are discussed in Chapter 9.

Of particular interest to this study was the ability of fishery decisionmakers to use new information for problem solving an important trait because of Congress' concern that fishery management plans be based on the best available scientific information. The dogmatism-rigidity prof ile provides some empirical evidence to explain decisionmaking behavior, e.g., the synoptic view of agency professionals and the strategic view of f ishers. These psychological dimensions and the sociology of the information sources of key administrators of the three agencies which manage the state' s fishery resources are discussed in Chapter l0. Key administrators of three fishery agencies were interviewed to obtain some insight into their personal information sources for decisiormaking. These networks provide a picture of information flow within a single agency and among the three fishery agencies and other f ishery-related private-sector individuals and groups.

In essence, an inf ormal organization operates among fishery influentials in Hawaii, and central to their information networks is the Western Pacific Regional Fishery

Management Council. Its powerf ul position was demonstrated in the successful counter-attack against congressional and

Department of Commerce attempts to eliminate it and consolidate the management of Western Pacific fisheries under the

Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council. CHAIT%8 9

THE WESTERN PACIFIC RHRIOSAL FISHERY NAIAGBNENT COUNCIL: Fishery Federaliaa' At Work

Regional Fishery Management Councils RFMC! operationalize 'fishery federalism," which was described in Chapter l as

! r Mr fmc P + S + U! I ~ Congr essional expectations for the RFMCs were high in l976. Xn the final floor debate on H. R. 200, the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and

Management Act MPCMA!, on March 29 and 30, l976, the elimination of foreign fishing in the U.S. fishery conservation zone FCZ! was seen as the means for ushering in an era of prosperity for the domestic fishing industry as well as the alleviation of averfishing of the nation's coastal fisheries. Congress established eight RFMCs to implement management procedures to bring about these changes. This chapter examines the slippage between congressional expectations and the actual and the unintended outcomes which have occurred during the nearly nine years in which the MFCMAhas been in force.

The Western Pacif ic Regional Fishery Management Council

WPRFMC! is responsible for the developaent of PMPs for a marine area in excess of a million square miles--an area double the size of the continental U.S. FCZ. This spatial expanse includes the FCZ of the state of Hawaii and American

233 234 territories in the Pacific, American Samoa and Guam. The

Commorwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands has protested its inclusion in the MPCMAand at this writing participates as an 'observer' to give itself more flexibility for negotiating fishery agreements with foreign nations.

The operation and structure of the WPRPMC are examined in detail here because it is responsible for managing the fisheries in the PCK of the Hawaiian archipelago. As such, it is the organizational structure in which state and federal cooperation must occur if the integrity of the f isheries and their habitats, which more often than not extend beyond the

Territorial Sea into the PCZ, is to be respected. The common occurrences of trans-jurisdictional habi tats of commercially valuable fisheries motivated Congress to create regional intergovernmental f ishery management bodies. It was also

Congress' expectation that these RPMCs have a vital role in the development of PMPs for their regions.

However, the l984 evaluation of the Department of

Commerce's Office of the Inspector General IG! would reduce this critical role of the Council and centralize fishery management within the Department of Commerce's line agency, the National Marine Pisheries Service NMPS! .l The IG also recommends such cast-cutting measures as the elimination of the Western Pacific and Caribbean Regional Fishery Management l Office of Inspector General, "Opportunities for Cost Reduction, " Washington, D. C. > Department of Commerce, l984! . 235

Councils. Yet another recommendation of the IG, which could only further enhance federal control over the management of fishery resources, is the elimination of the RFMCs' research funds. These proposals further fuel the antagonism which has characterized United States-Hawaii relationships for more than a hundred years.

State members of the WPRFMC enter into negotiations with the federal government cautiously because of the historical legacy of distrust, discussed in Chapter 4, which has roots in the manipulation of the Hawaiian monarchy by the United

States and its agents. Moreover, the state' s representatives on the WPRFMCare frustrated by the inability or unwilling- ness of the federal government to recognize Hawaii's insular environment and geography. Interestingly, all non-f ederal members of the WPRFMCrepresent insular jurisdictions. The state has been supportive of the Pacific island territories represented on the NPRFMC.2 Although non-federal members outnumber f ederal representatives, the advantage of numbers has not overridden the effective veto power of the Secretary of Commerce. These conditions and their influence on the behavior of fishery influentials on the WPRFMCare discussed here.

The Legislative Xateat Underlying the MFCNA

Statements of congressional members recorded in the

and committee reports constitute the

2 Henry Sakuda, Director, BAR, 1984' personal communication. 236 legislative history of congressional intent which becomes important when an act is being implemented and later when standards are defined to evaluate its "effectiveness' or when a legal definition is required, for example, to render a j uridical opinion. The legislative history of the MPCMA indicates that Congress' concern was the alleviation of overfishing by curtailing foreign fishing and the establishment of RPMCs to allow fisher participation in decisionmaking. In introducing the conference committee report on H.R.

200 to the full House for debate and vote on March 30, 1976,

Missouri' s Congresswoman Leonor Sullivan, Chair of the House

Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, summarized the intent of the bill:3

~ ~~ 8 R 200 I . has as its main thrust the conservation and management of the f ishery resources of the Vnited States.

... [T]he members of my committee and I have long been concerned about the serious plight of American f ishermen and the progressive deterioration of our f ishery resources.

...H.R. 200 reflects an effort on the part of the conference committee to protect all segments of the U. 8. fishing industry...

The two main concerns identified by Sullivan are the protection of American f ishers and the depletion of United States

94th Cong. 2d sess., 1976, p. 8550. 237

fishery resources, presumably by foreign f ishers. Congress-

man Robert Bauman of Maryland waa even more explicit:4

This legislation serves notice on foreign nations and their fishing interests that America will no longer tolerate the continued depletion of our fishery resources and that we intend to act forcefully in the best interests of our citizens.

Overall, this major thrust. of the MFCMA, to control

direct foreign harvesting in the fishery conservation zones

FCK!, has been realized. The number of foreign vessels fishing in the FCZ has been drastically reduced. But neither

the mitigation of the overfishing problem nor the hoped for

bonanza for domestic f iahera haa occurred. Instead, the

problem of overfishing appears to have worsened because new

domestic entrants into the industry have more than filled the vacuum created by the departure of foreign f ishers.5 Hence/

only the perpetrators of the stress on coastal fisheries have

changed. Foreign fishers have now been replaced with

domestic f ishers, and the regulation of the total fishing effort has yet to be implemented because policymakers have

chosen not to take up the question of placing severe

restrictions upon domestic fishers in an era when

"regulation' is perceived as being unpopular.

In addition, there are new voices within the industry

asking for new forms of regulation. Shore-based processors

4 Ibid. i p. 8552. 5 Margaret Dewar, Phil adel phia: Tempie University Press, 1983!, pp. 107-193. 238 are protesting the burgeoning numbers of lucrative at-sea joint ventures, which allow V.S. fishers to offload their catch on the high seas to foreign factory ships. Congressman

John Breaux of Louisiana has proposed amendments to the MFCNA to regulate these activities.6

COngreSSional intent On the rale Of RFMCS Was Summarized by Senator William Hathaway of Maine during the final floor debate in the U.S. Senate on March 29, 1976, on the adoption of the conference committee report on H.R. 200:7

~ ..[W]e now have a management program that will consider regional and State interests in conj unction with overall national policy obj ectives, through the regional f ishery management councils.

He envisioned that intergovernmental coordination would occur through the RFMCs.

In the U.S. House of Representatives, Congressman Edwin

Forsythe of New Jersey saw the RPMCs as fulfilling an even more comprehensive role:8

...H.R. 200 accomplishes [the protection and restoration of overfished f isheries] by creating ei gh t r egional f ishery management council s whose f unctions is [sic] to prepare f ishery conservation and management plans for every fishery within 200 miles of the Q.S. coast and for anadromous species and Continental shelf fishery resources beyond 200 miles.

11 Mar ch 1985!: 3.

, 94th Cong., 2d sess., l976, p. 8385.

, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 8551. 239

Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts provided other

insights, particularly on the role of the f ishers:9

...Our fishermen should have the opportunity to formulate and suggest their own innovative and responsible management plans and regulations rather than responding to regulations adopted hastily and with inadequate and narrow input.

In summary, Congress had high expectations for RPMCs:

l. National, regional, and state interests in the management of U. S. coastal f isheries should be involved in RPMC decisionmaking

2. Fishers should be given the opportunity to formulate and suggest innovative and responsible management plans, rather than merely respond to r egul ations

3. RPMCs are to prepare FMPs for every fishery within the 200-mile PCZ and anadromous and continental shelf fisheries beyond the PCKl0

There is no question that Congress viewed the participa-

tion and involvement of local fishers in the developnent of management strategies through the RFMCs as being important.

Kennedy did not explicitely cite RFNCs as the fora for the

developaent af management plans in his floor comments on H.R.

200, but the implication of being in the decisionmaking loop rather than "responding to regulations adopted hastily" can

only refer to fisher participation in RPMCs.

Ibi d., p. 83 86 .

The requirement for PMPs for every fishery was modified in subsequent amendments to the MFCMA. The Act now requires PNPs only for those species which are economically significant and need to be managed because of overfishing or danger of overf ishing. 240

Composition of the WPRPNC The members of the RFMCs are constituted according to

Section 302 of the NFCNA. Two classes of membership, voting and non-voting, include mandatory state and federal agency administrators and representatives of the fishing industry who are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce f rom a list forwarded by the governor see Table 9.1! .

Non-governmental members constitute a majority of the voting members eight out of l3! . Only one voting member represents the federal govermaent the NNFS regional director. The prof iles of the four Hawaii f isher representatives,

Louis Agard, Wadsworth Yee, Gertrude Nishihara, and Alika

Cooper, were given in Chapter S.ll

These four individuals represent the undetermined number of unl icensed recreational f ishers who f ish in the state' s

FCK and about 2,600 licensed commercial fishers. Most recreational fishers fish in the Territorial Sea, which is excluded from the jurisdiction of the WPRFNC. Hence, using a population base of 2,600, the ratio of representation on the

WPRFNCto fishers is 1:6SO approximately!. The question is, do the politically appointed members of the RFNCs truly represent their constituents2 The same question was raised at the national level by the former counsel of the Fisheries

ll Only the Hawaii members of the WPRFNCare considered in detail in this study. General ized socio-psychologicaL prof iles of f ishery-sector influentials are discussed in Chapter 10. 241

Table 9.L. Composition of the WPRPMC

Pishery officers Hawaii !, Guam !, American Samoa !

Fisher representatives f rom Hawaii Commercial interests ! Recreational interests !

Pisher representative from Guam Commer ci al !

Pisher represenatives f rom American Samoa Commer ci al ! Educator !

NMPS Regional Director

Observers f rom CHEMI Pishery of ficer ! Pisher representative !

Total voting members 13

USPWS administrator

Department of State administrator

Commander of U. S. Coast Guard

Total non-voting members Subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Com-

mittee in reference to the 10 or 12 lobbyists who speak to

the federal government even fewer to the state government!,

on fishery policies. He wondered whether the fishers had honest, representation on a consistent basis.l2

The fisher representative from Hawaii who best repre-

sents the f isher prof ile described in Chapter 8 is Gertrude

Nishihara. As indicated in her prof ile, she is a recreation-

al fisher who also holds a commercial license. She is,

therefore, a parttime commercial fisher. Both she and her

husband sell their catch to defray operational expenses for their boat and supplies.13 The other f isher representatives

are tuna f ishers who "represent" that industry. Tuna fishers

are therefore, over-represented on the WPRFMC in terms of the

number of participants in the fishery; furthermore, tunas are

not now managed under the MFCMA. In fairness to these repre-

sentativesp however, it should be noted that many, if not

most, of Hawaii' s commercial f ishers are multi-species

f ishers. But, nonetheless, their primary interest is small

tunas.

There are about 650 fulltime commercial fishers in

Hawaii and about three times as many parttime commercial

fishers. If representation is based on the revenue contribu-

«2 William H. MacRenzie. "Thoughts on U. S. Fishery Policy." , Vol. 11, No. 1. January 1985. p. 6. 13 Gertrude Nishihara, 1985: personal communication. 243 tion of the tuna fishery in proportion to that contributed by the entire fishing sector, the representation is probably in proper proportion. Revenue contribution, however, is not the usual basis for apportioning public representation in government organizations. But the appropriateness and numbers of tuna fishers on the WPRFMChave not yet been challenged by other fishers.

Fisher Rating of the WPRPNC

As a follow-up on a telephone survey conducted in 1982, a questionnaire was sent to a culled sample of fishers who indicated that. they had knowledge of the MFCMA. Of this group of 37 fishers, 16 returned their questionnaire.l4

Hence, only about 24% of the fishers who were contacted by telephone n! knew anything about the MFCMAand only about 10% knew enough to be able to respond to the questionnaire.15

The rating of the effectiveness of the WPRFMCby the respondents was as follows:

14 Out of the total sample population N! of 300, 157 fishers n! were reached by telephone. The 16 fishers are, therefore, a subset of the subset, 7 fishers! of n. 15 Non-respondents to the questionnaire were reached by telephone to encourage them to return the questionnaire. They indicated that they did not know enough about the MFCMA to respond. A few returned the questionnaire with a note attached apologizing for non-response because they did not have sufficient knowledge about the MFCMAta respond to the questionnaire even though they had indicated knowledge about the Act during the first telephone contact. 244

High

2 3 4 5 6 7 no response

2 2 2 3 1

The rating of the benefit derived by the state from the

WPRPMC was as follows:

High

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 no response

2 4 1 1 1

With about 60% of the respondents 6 fishers out af the 37

who returned the questionnaire! rating the WPRPMC, the

following statistics can be derived from the data:

mean~

Ef f ectiveness 2 ~ 9 1.4 Benef it 4.1 1 ~ 6

+Mean of the scale ~ 3.S n~ 16 **Standard deviation

The low rating of the effectiveness .6 below the mean

of the scale! of the WPRPMC corroborates comments made by

academics and bureaucrats alike. The mean score of the

fishers' rating of WPRPMC's benefit .6 above the mean of the

scale! to the state was more positive. The low SD score

indicates that the margin of error in the relation of the

score distribution to the mean is relatively small for both 24S attributes. Although the number of respondents is small, the

response of these knowledgeable fishers is significant. The fact that only l6 fishers knew enough to respond may be an

indication that the MFCMAis perceived as irrelevant by most fishers.

The Work of the WPRFNC

ln carrying out its mandated duties, the WPRFMCand other RFMCs are assisted by NMFS for data collection. Most

RFNCs, like the WPRFMC, have their own staffs and scientific advisory committees, plan developaent teams, and advisory panels, which supply the 'outside technical and scientific

information required for the development of FNPs. The

WPRFMC's paid staff includes the Executive Director, an

economist, a f ishery biologist, and two clerical personnel ~ All of these employees are paid with funding authorized in

the MFCMA, which is about $5S0,000 in fiscal year l984 for

the WPRFMC.

The WPRFNC members review and revise draf t plans

developed by the council staff, based on both maximum

sustainable yield and optimum yield standards. The f inal

management plans must be consistent with the national standards given in the MFCMA:l6

l. Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield f rom each f ishery.

MFCMA, Sec. 30l a! l 7! ~ 246

2, Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best sci entif ic i nf ormati on available.

3. To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.

4. Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between residents of different States. Xf it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among various United States f ishermen, such allocation shall be A! fair and equitable to all such fishermen; 8! reasonably calculated to promote conservation~ and C! carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such pr ivilege s.

5. Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, promote efficiency in the utilization of fishery resourcesi except that no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose.

6. Conservation and management measures shall take into account and allow for variations among, and contingencies in, f isheries, f ishery resources, and catches.

7. Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary dupl ication.

Since the WPRPNC now meets four times a year for one and a half days per meeting, the members rely heavily on staff to analyze issues and summarize data. Hence, the RPNC members are required to do a considerable amount of 'homework" if they are ta effectively use their meeting time. 247

To date, besides the precious coral and lobster FNPS which have been implemented, three more are in various stages

of preparation for submittal to the Department of Commerce:17

-Billfish and other pelagic species!: the FNP is being redrafted to be submitted for approval in 1985

-Bottomfish: the proposed FNP will be submitted in 1985

l hkp ~ pp.!: h p I FMP will be submitted in 1985

The Decisioneaking Process

The 13-members of the WPRFNC, like other RFNCs, make

decisions by a ma!ority vote. The procedure for the

development and adoption of FNPs can be outlined as followss

Identification of the fishery to be managedg obtain biological and socio-economic data data collection is the responsibility of the NNFS with support from other federal and state agencies and universities!

Analysis of the data data analysis is the responsibility of the RFNC members; in practice, analysis is done by NMFS and RFMC staff or by consultants in addition to the scientific and statistical committee and the planning teams> these comments are incorporated in subsequent drafts!

Developaent of the preliminary FNP actual writing and 'legwork' are most often done by RFNC staff with advice from the scientific advisory committee and the FMP develognent sub-committeeg RFNC members review and provide commentary!

17 Western Pacific Regional Fishery ManagementCouncil, Undated, unpaginated! . 248

Holding of public hearings the public is given an opportunity to voice concurrence or objection to the FMP or to suggest changes! Revision of the PMP the public's concerns and suggestions are considered, although not necessarily included in the revision!

Approval of PMP for suhaittal to the Department of Commerce the voting members of the RPMC vote on the PMP!

Submission of the PMP to the Department of Commerce through the Department of Commerce, the FMP will be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget and i ts relevant line agencies! No matter how well-devised, any process which attempts to control the behavior of human beings is fraught with unexpected loops and gaps. Xn his study on the issues related to the implementation of the Coastal Zone Act,

Goohnan marveled at the opposing views which were derived from a common set of data. Be concluded that "one obvious answer is the existence of a totally different set of values" and "a fundamental lack of understanding of the feasibility and credibility of [the] plans. 'Ls

And, indeed, in addition to the problem identified by

Goodman on interpretation of data, the perceived need of

types and quantity of information also confounds a decision-

making system. In addressing a conference on state and in-

terstate f ishery problems, Virgil Norton voiced his exaspera-

l8 Joel M. Goodman, 'The Delaware Coastal Zone Experience," 5 The Lewis and Clark Law School--North- western School of Law, L975! ~ 727-738. 249 tion on the lack of action beyond the determination of 'data requirementss"19

...[S]ome of you may have expected me to talk about suggesting moratoriums on fishing effort and limited entry and so forth: I think really the only moratorium that I would suggest today, because X think the other is well laid out and available in many, many publications, is that maybe we should have a moratorium on new studies. Zn fact, it is these new studies that I think also often give us, whoever is involved, an excuse for no action.

Norton's observation is not new. ln essence, he is saying that new studies should not be substituted for management action; he underscores the point made by Goodman that there is a need to understand institutional and personal values which influence decisionmaking. The ever-expanding demand for more information by fishery agency administrators is discussed in Chapter 10 in relation to their openness- closedness prof ile. Hennessey suggests that the 'types and levels of information twhich] would satisf ice for different council decision-making strategies is one of the most important general avenues of inquiry in understanding council behavior. 20 He

Virgil Norton, 'Economic Consideration of State and Interstate Fisheries Management, ' ed. Janet Caudle, Raleigh: North Carolina State University Sea Grant College Program, 1980! < p. 32. 20 Timothy Hennessey, 'Toward a Positive Model of Fishery Management Decision-making, ' in ed. Francis W. Hoole, Robert L. Priedheim, and Timothy Hennessey< Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1981!, p. 251. 250 assumes that RPMCs will minimize data acquisition costs to reduce the level of costs associated with decisionmakingt hence, they will concentrate on data which is immediately

required. Hennessey also suggests that decisionmaking related to complex fisheries will be based on a narrow range of informational concerns while decisions for a less complex fishery will be based on a broader range of informational concer ns. 21

Significant to the present discussion is Hennessey's observations on the differences in viewpoints of the NMPS representative and the fisher-dominated RPMCs:22

This orientation assumes clear technical criteria for judging the correctness of a management decision. Such decisions are seen as turning on questions of fact calling for scientif ic diagnosis...

lb 92. da d!.

This difference can be illustrated by the discussion on the billfish PMP during a meeting of the WPRPMCin 1983.23

21 Ibid. < p. 252 ~

Ibi d. ~ p. 254-255 23 The author was an observer at this meeting in Honolulu. 251

The FMP, at that point in time, had been in the planning and development stages for about five years. The section of the

FMP which was being discussed had been a point of contention from the initial stages of its development. The dispute involved the seaward boundary of the FCZ that would be reserved exclusively for the domestic harvest of billfish, a migratory species which is, however, included as a species to be managed under the MFCMA. The WPRFMC chair stated that the position of the majority of the council was to designate the

200-mile FCZ off the high islands exclusively for domestic fishers, rather than the 50-mile boundary proposed by NMFS.

The boundary surrounding the NWHl was proposed at 100 miles.

The NMFS Regional Director, Alan Ford, countered by asking the chair for the scientific basis of the WPRFMC's position.

The Chair admitted that, he could point to no scientific study which could justify the position of the WPRFMC. The conflict over the boundary of the billfish fishery for domestic fishers was f inally resolved in 1985 by a compromise--150 miles off the high islands and 100 miles off the NWHI which was agreed to without new scientific data to justify the bo unda ry.

This type of interchange is significant on at least two levels. While the NMPS, as Hennessey observes, appears to indicate that it is relying upon scientific data, it really had no more scientific support for its advocacy of a 50-mile boundary than the fishers had for their advocacy of the 200- mile boundary. The knowledge of such fisheries is not yet 252 advanced enough to strongly support arp particular boundary.

At the same time, the interchange highlights the conflict of interest inherent in the NMFS representative's dual role as both the agent of the Secretary of Commerce and the designated information source for the WPRFMC.24 The representative's advocacy of a 50-mile boundary could have been interpreted, and doubtless was so interpreted by non-federal members of the WPRFNC, as an attempt to increase the role of the federal government at the expense of state government and domestic fishers. With the latter given only 50 miles as an exclusive fishing zone, waters beyond 50 miles would have been accessible to foreign f ishers.

The 1984 Report of the Office of Inspector General

In October 1984, a devastating evaluation by the Office of the inspector General IG! of the Department of Commerce on the work of the RFMCs was circulated among RFNC members and state and f ederal fishery-related administrators. At this writing, the report has not been formally released for general circulation. The IG's report summarizes the work of the WPRFNCthusly,>>

The Western Pacific [Regional Fishery Management] Council has only implemented two FNPs since 1977, and both were for f isheries which have minimal or no fishing activity. Noreover, about 88 percent of the catch reported was taken in waters

Hennessey considers this dual role a persistent cause of conflict between state and federal fishery management agencies. Ibid., p. 245. 25 Office of Inspector General, "Opportunities for Cost Reduction," p. 9. 253

that are within state or territorial jurisdiction. As a result, the Western Pacific [Regional Fishery Nanagementj Council has had little or no fishery management impact during its seven years of operation, and it is doubtful if the Council will ever be effective.

The IG's report cites several reasons for its judgment of the ineffectiveness of the WPRFMC:26

1. The need for the two FMPs which have been implemented on spiney lobsters and precious corals is questionable because only S to 10 boats harvest the former fishery and the latter is not harvested

2. The billfish FMP, submitted for review, was not based on the best scientific data available2'7 and it is deficient in providing sufficient analytical tools for assessing impacts 3. Eighty-eight percent of reported fish landings were harvested f rom waters less than three miles from shore

4. The FCZ in the Western Pacific is too large to be effectively managed with current resources and could be handled by state agencies and others

S. There are unenforceable provisions in the spiney lobster FNP, which were included inspite of the Coast Guard's objection

6. In f iscal year 1984, the council received $5S0,000 in administrative costs to manage two fisheries

26 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 27 This assessment agreed with the NMPS'sconcern about the scientific quality of the data used in the FNP. However, as noted earlier, the NMF8 data were not necessarily more valid than any other data. 254

The ZG's audit used PMPs as outputs to evaluate the inputs, administrative costs, e.g., $550,000 for fiscal year l984, for the operation of the WPRPMC. This methodology, in wide use to evaluate programs, essentially relies on a single utility function costs--to measure the effectiveness of an activity. 'Lhis simplistic evaluation, motivated by the search for programs to be eliminated to cut government costs, does not consider the differences between Hawaii's geology and f i sher i es and continental norms.

While not as severely criticized as the WPRPMCand the

Caribbean RPMC, in general, all RPMCs received adverse criticism. Aa a result of reviewing the operations of selected

RFMCs, the XG made the following recommendations:28

L. Council activities be consolidated by eliminat- ing two councils the Western Pacific and Caribbean RFMCs

2. Use f ederal employees to perform administrative f unct i ons for co unci 1 activ i ti es

3. Make greater use of existing technical resources to support the developaent and modification of plans rather than hiring technical staffs

The report triggered immediate reaction in the Congress.

Congressman Breaux, chair of the Fisheries Subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, developed a detailed proposal to implement the IG's recommendation, including the elimination of the two RFMCs.

8 Office of Inspector General, "Opportunities for Cost Reduction," p. 7. 255

In line with the IG's recommendations, Breaux proposed placing the management of Western Pacific fisheries in the

Pacific RFMC and that of the Caribbean in the Gulf RFMC.

In addition, NOAA administrator-designate, Anthony

Calio, called for a comprehensive two-year study on fishery management in the United States to assess 'the effectiveness of the current system of federal fishery management and recommend organizational, regulatory, and legislative changes where needed."29 Noting the failures of FMPs to prevent stock depletion as well as those which have been promulgated for non-existing fisheries, he is proposing a reduction in the number of fisheries being managed federally to those "in critical need.'30 Conceptually, this would shift the focus from long-term planning, designed to prevent crises, to short-term efforts to recover from crises.

However, in the political tug-of-war, for now, at least, the will of the eight RPMCs has prevailed and the WPRFMCand the Carribean RFMC have survived the adverse evaluation of the IG's of f ice and the administration' s ef forts to implement

Recommendation l. How did the RFMCs accomplish this7

Much of the timely and well-managed efforts were orchestrated by Kitty Simonds, the Executive Director of the

The perception of Washington observers is that Calio' s proposal is the death knell of the RFMCs if not for all, at the least, for the Western Pacific and Caribbean RFMCs. 11 March 1985!: 2. 256

WPRPMC.31 She used the meeting of the RPMCchairs and

Executive Directors held in Hilo, Hawaii in late February

1985 to include a session with the incoming Administrator of

NOAA, Anthony Calio, just after she arranged a meeting between Calio and Hawaii's Senator Daniel Znouye.32

There was a prior concurrence among the eight RPMC chairs that they would be unified in opposing the elimination of the two RFMCs. Zn evaluating the successful political maneuver which bought some time for these RPNCs few expect the two vulnerable councils to be permanently spared!,

Simonds credits the strong evidence of congressional interest and the unified stand of the RFMC chairs as key factors which caused Calio to back off and Breaux to drop his proposal to eliminate the Western Pacific and the Caribbean RPMCs.33

The 1G's Recommendation 2 disregards congressional intent in its eagerness to cut costs. The present procedure for the developaent of FMPs requires final approval by the

Simonds spent nearly 10 years as a staff person for former U,S. Senator Hiram Pong. This connection was instrumental in her appointment as the administrative assitant to the first executive director of the WPRPMC. She is also close to Wadsworth Yee, the chair of WPRPMC, who is a former State Senator and a nephew of Senator Pong. 32 Senator Xnouye is a member of the Committee on Commerceg Science and Transportation, which has oversight of the Department of Commerce. He is also a member of the Committees on Appropriations, Rules and Administration and several others, which makes him powerful enough for even high-level Washington bureaucrats ta take seriously. 33 Kitty Simonds, Executive Director, 1985: personal communi ca ti on. Secretary of Commerce, al ready an onerous procedure. Recom- mendation 2 would further cut into the independence the RFMCs may have in the developaent of the PMPs. The Executive

Director of the WPRFMC has stated on a number of occasions that NMFS does not provide the WPRPMCwith the kind of data it needs,34 but the Department of Commerce apparently seeks to make the WPRFMCa prisoner of whatever information NMFS provides. Simonds was particulary critical about the insufficient amount information provided by NMPS on bottomfish and stated that the WPRFMC was forced to hire a consultant to obtain information needed to complete the FMP.

The Department of Commerce and its line agency for fisheries, HMFS, would control the PMP developmental process and content to an even greater degree than is the case at present, if Recommendation 3 is implemented. Xn spite of the requirement that all PMPs must be approved by the Secretary of Commerce, the RPMCs presently appear to have considerable fiscal and programmatic latitude. The proposal that data be obtained f rom universities, state agencies, etc. in Recom- mendation 3 appears to infer that there is a storehouse of appropriate scientific data in these institutions, which can be easily obtained. The reality is that unless contracted to

'sell" their services, the activities or the priorities of

34 Kitty Simonds, l985: personal communication. Zn addition/ the lG's report, supporting Simonds' position, discusses this point in great detail. Bee, Office of Inspector General, 'Oppor tunk ti es f or Cost Reductions, ' pp. 21-28. 258 these institutions cannot be captured to consider the needs of the RPMCs on a timely basis. Thus, Recommendation 3 contradicts the IG's own requirement that RPMCs use the best available scientific data in developing PMPs unless it is assumed that only NMFS can produce such data or that the information is readily available. Because these assumptions are not true, RFMCs must satisfy their particular requirement for data by their ability to sponsor research with the f unding they contLol.35

Moreover, the replacement af the RFMC-hired staff with

NMPS personnel will constrict any independent extra-agency information inflow which might influence the development of PMPs.3< Hence, without its own staff, any real control over the develogaent of PMPs will be lost to the RFMCs and captured by NMPS. The Executive Director of the North pacific RPMC notes that because the staff boils down all the information and analyzes the issues considered by the council <

[ift's very easy at this point to let staff or other agency input bias the presentation. That can be done either through omission, stress on particular facets of the problezL, or other methods. Xt becomes particularly difficult when the Councils ask the staff for their recommendations on a course of acti on.

3S Xbid. < p. l4. This organizational behavior, which ie closed to extra- agency input, is predicted in the study on the information network of fishery administators described in Chapter l0. 259

Sot we ' re coor di nator s, anal yzers, and pr e- senter s. 37

Therefore, staff influence on the developaental process of

any PMP is significant. With NMPS personnel staffing the

RPMCs, the predictable behavior of RFMC members would either

be sharply polarized impasse or docile rubberstamping of

agency developed FMPs. Either of these outcomes would make

the RPMCs inef f ective.

The problem, of course, is that hardly any source of

scientific information can pass a comprehensive test of or-

ganizational or political 'neutrality." As an agent of the

Department of Commerce, NMPS always is suspect in the eyes of

state agencies, fisher representatives, and, in all probabi-

lity, other federal agencies as well. Similarly, the information assembled by the staff of the WPRFMC, whether inter-

nally or with the assistance of outside consultants, is

suspect in the eyes of NMFS and the Department of Commerce

because the latter reasonably can assume that the WPRFMC assembles information that will best support the positions of

the state and/or fisher interests. Without a detailed analy-

sis of the operations of other RFMC's, something beyond the

scope of this study and something not yet undertaken or com-

pleted by other researchers, no def inite conclusion is pos-

sible as to whether the long history of mutual suspicion in-

volving the federal government and Hawaii makes the operation

Jim H. Br anson, Eze cutive Director, l 984: personal communi ca ti on. 260 of the WPRFMCmore conflict-ridden than the operation of other RFMCs. The author's judgment is that the WPRPMCis probably a bit more conflict-ridden than the others, but only time will tell.

Conclusions

The WPRPMCwas used as a window to observe the operation of fishery federalism.' As the intervention devised by Con- gress to manage the fishery resources of the Western Pacific region, it is clear in the first evaluation conducted by the

TG that economic indicators applicable to continental f isheries cannot be used to judge the work of the WPRPMC or that of the Caribbean RPMC! . The vastness of the FCZ of the

Hawaiian archipelago and the small populations of its coastal f isheries are characteristic of insular environments. Be- cause these are negative factors under present evaluation standards, the WPRPMC will continue to be poorly rated unless the MPCMAis amended to allow exceptions for Hawaii.

Zn addition, in its eagerness to cut costs and centralize management within the Department of Commerce, the IG's recommendations disregard congressional intent regional intergovernmental public-private management. Without some flexibility and control of funding for data gathering, the

RPMCs would lose their ability to obtain information which they perceive is needed to develop or amend FMPs independently. At present, in spite of the Secretary' s veto power over their activities, the RPMCs enjoy some independence perhaps, too much from the federal perspective! in their operations 26l because of their ability to go to non-NNFS sources for data.

This avenue of flexibility would be lost if all, or part, of their project funds were eliminated and NNFS became the sole source of data.

Hennessey noted that, in general, the prof essional training and positions held by individuals who influence the management of fisheries differ in their perception of the type and quantity of information required for decisionmaking.

This raised a gnawing question. Is there a way to explain this difference? Can information use levels be quantified?

The f ield study which established openness-closedness profiles of fishery influentials, discussed in the next chapter, is the result of these questions.

Finally, assuming that the IG's audit is only the initial skirmish in the continuing war for organizational survi-

Val Or expanSion, a neW management StruCture, the HaWaii Fishing Authority HFA!, is proposed in Chapter l2. A self- supporting public corporation, the proposed HFA is an adaptation of the organizational and functional structure of successf ul port authorities. CHAEVRR l0

THB SOCIMPSYCHOLOQXCAX DIMBNSIONS OF DBCISIONMAIGBLS AS INFORMATION PKNCBSSORS

The literature survey revealed a lack of quantitative

information which characterizes decisionmakers as inf ormation

processors. Hence, two empirical studies were designed to

obtain a two-sided view of fishery decisionmakers. The first utilized two psychological indices dogmatism and rigidity--

as measures of the ability of six classes of decisionmakers

to use new information for problem solving.

In the second study, the information sources utilized by

the administrators of the three fishery agencies, IMPS,

USPWS, and DAR were analyzed for routine operational deci-

sionmaking and for decisions related to issues raised by the

Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act MPCMA!.

The former was considered to be the norm of the information-

seeking behavior of these administrators and was used as the

baseline for comparison of sources specifically identified f or MPCMA-related deci sionmaking.

Only the results of the research are discussed here.

The description of the methodologies for the two studies are

given in Appendices B and C.

The two empirical studies on decisionmaking behavior

revealed a paradox. Bureaucratic decisionmakers have an open profile which appears to explain the type of behavior noted

262 263

by Professor Norton for initiating yet another study see Chapter 9!, e.g., they are reluctant to act on a problem because of insufficient scientific information. In spite of this need for more information, revealed in their openness- closedness prof ile, there is virtually no inter-personal

linkage among administrators and scientific and technical information sources, such as the University of Hawaii. Hence, it must be assumed that key administrators rely solely on their own agency for scientific and technical information,

a behavior which was explained, in part, by the network analysis of administrators.

Pishers and fishing interest an the other hand are at

the closed end of the openness-closedness continuum. It is a widely held view that fishers are independent" and not open to changing their ways of 'doing business.' Purthermore, there is na disagreement that fishing is a high risk and uncertain venture. If f ishers have been successful in their endeavors, why should they add an unknawn element more risk! to the risk inherently present in fishing?

Observations of behavior of individuals under conditions of uncertainty have shown that new methods are not accepted readily. The dogmatism-rigidity study on the behavior of f ishers conf irmed these observations. The Dogmati~Rigidity Model of Decisionaakingl

In a series of experiments beginning in the mid-l950s,

Rokeach et al. found that intelligence had no bearing on rigid or dogmatic traits. High and low scorers on the rigidity scale differed significantly in their analytical thinking ability, but high and low scorers on the dogmatism scale did not. When tested for their ability to synthesize information, the findings vere not significant because the high and lcw dogmatic sub-groups were not sufficiently differentiated in all of the tests. Rokeach and others' conclusions are summarized below:2

l. Dogmatic or closed thinking and its operational measurement refer to resistance to change of total belief systems, as indicated by the difficulty high dogmatic subjects have in synthesizing or integrating beliefs into a new system which contradicts their everyday system. Dogmatic subjects did not differ with non-dogmatic subjects on their ability to analyze or break down individual beliefs.

2. There is a theoretical distinction between dogmatic and rigid thinking. High and low scorers differ on measures of analysis, but not of synthesis. 3. Information on personality organization can reliably predict outcomes of thinking in problem-solving.

Parts of this study vere presented at the national meetings of the American Fishery Society, August 12-16, 1984, at Carnell Universi ty Ithaca, New York! and the American Society for Public Ahuinistration, March 23-27, 1985, in Indianapol is, Indi ana. A complete description of the research, only summarized in this dissertation, is presented in an article entitled, "Analysis of Fishery Management Decision Making in Hawaii: The Application of a Dogmatism- rigidity Model, ' 45 985!: 593-601 ~ 2 Milton Rokeach, Warren C. McGovney,and M. Ray Denny, 0 1 gh k g 01 hl 1 g,' LJhSL4ld Mg 9000 k: ' 9 k, 1 ., 1900!, 99. 190-194. 265

Based on this study, they concluded that dogmatism and rigidity scales measure independent psychological dimensions, but the processes, however, are not necessarily independent.

Because dogmatic or closed-thinking individuals are concerned with the "preservation of ttheir] total system... rather than the preservation of a particular belief in

[their] total system, ' they can handle analyses and syntheses which do not affect their basic beliefs. Difficulty will arise when they see the process of specific problem solving threatening their belief system, according to Rokeach and others. They predict that at this point, the analytic and synthesizing processes will break down.3 Additional discussion on this point can be found in Appendix B.

Wesley defines rigidity as a 'tendency to persist in responses that may previously have been suitable in some situation or other, but that no longer appear adequate to achieve current goals or to solve current problems.' This attribute is characterized by difficulty in shifting f rom previously established conceptual seta.4

Rokeach's claim that rigidity and dogmatism are two related attributes is borne out, in the present study by the extremely high level of significance p<.01! of their

I bi d., pp. l 83-184.

Elizabeth L. Wesley, 'Preservative Behavior in a Concept- Formation Task as a Function of Manifest Anxiety and Rigidi ty, ' 48 953!: 129-134. 266 coefficient of covariance .3335!. Because the aggregate scores do not provide clues to details of the cross-sectional distribution of scores of the respondents, they were categorized into "class" and 'level of government' and analyzed. A third category, "residence,' is not discussed here because other data indicated that it does not make a significant contribution ta the understanding of the decisionmaking behavior af the fishery influentials surveyed.

Fishery-related Znflieatials in Hawaii

Six classes of decisionmakers were surveyed to develop scores for influentials in the fishery policy field:

Class Camposi ti on

l. Fi sher s All major commercial f ishers

2. Special Xnterest Environmental groups, e. g., Lif e of the Land, Sierra Club, etc.

3 . K egi sl ator s Federal., state, and county legi sl ator s

4. RFNC members Western Pacific and Pacific RFNCs5

5. Administrators Federal, state, and county f ishery- related agency heads

6. Fi ah cry of f ice r s Western Pacific and Cal if amia af f icials

The Pacific RFNC was included in the survey because of the importance of the tunas ta Hawaii's cammercial fishing industry even though they are excluded from management under the NFCNA. Nore recently, the attempt by the Inspector General of the Department af Commerce to cansolidate the two RFNCs under the Pacific RFNC makes the inclusion of that council in the present survey fortuitous. 267

Because dogmatism and rigidity scores are strongly related, they were paired to develop a two-dimensional

hi gh-law! matr i x.

Table 10.1. High-low matrix of dogmatism and rigidity scores

Prof ile Ri gi di ty-Do gmati sm OPEN low-low low-high high-low high-high

As in any conversion of metric data to non-metric categories, arbitrary standards were imposed. Hence' a 10% differential between the percentage of distribution above and below the median was used to designate 'high" and 'low<' respectively. Additional details on the methodology are given in Appendix B.

The dogmatism-rigicU.ty matrix was used to define the openness-closedness prof iles of six classes of f ishery decisionmakers who can influence Hawaii's fishery policies.

The prof iles are based on two statistics, numbers of individuals above and below the median of the respondents' scores and the range of their scores in relation to the median. The data are given in Appendix 8 see Tables 8.3,

8.4, 8.6, and 8.7!.

The profiles of the six classes of fishery influentials are given in Table 10.2. 268

Table 10.2. Prof ile of f ishery influentials

Profile A

Federal administrator s Federal fishery officers Special interest group members Pacific island fishery officers County administrator s State administrators State fishery officers

Profile 8

Federal legislators County legislators State legislators

Profile C

Regional f ishery management council members

Profile 9

Fishers, f ishery experts, and f ishing interests

When the decisionmakers are categorized under the four

prof iles, the of t-heard truism that where an individual

stands is based on where he or she sits is now seen. There

is a clear difference between administrative decisionmakers

and representives of the user publics. The potential for

conflict, discussed in Chapter 9, is present in the prof iles of the two classes of individuals.

The prof iles of the decisionmakers, based on their posi-

tion on the openness-closedness continuum, suggests some em-

pirical evidence to support the behavior of fishery decisionmakers described in Chapter 9. The administrators, at the

open end, and the RPMC members and fishers and fishing inter-

ests, at the closed end of the openness-closedness continuum, 269

support Hennessey's conclusion that administrators look for mare and more scientific data to develop "correct' management plans which are 'consistent' nationally. In contrast, members of RFNCs do not look for 'correct' solutions but attempt to discover a position via competition.6

Because the term, 'correct," cannot be defined in absolute terms, a regulation which may be correct to a non-ocean going bureaucrat may be incorrect to a f isher whose behavior is being controlled by the regulation. Based on this argument, 'good' or "bad" information is also related to 'where you sit." Except for this brief note which recognizes the relative nature of the values which can be affixed to information, the philosophical nature of such discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, in the use of the term, 'information, ' here, the relative values of goodness or badness are external to the boundary imposed on the present research design. Those attributes were not factored into the test instrument.

The results of the present study indicated that most administrators have the ability to use new information for problem solving. This attribute, probably enhanced by their professional training, manifests itself in their insatiable appetite for information. But as noted by Hennessey, this

Timothy Hennessey, 'Toward a Positive Model of Fishery Management Decision-making, ' in 0 ed. Francis Hoole, Robert L. Friedheim, and Timothy Hennessey Boulder: Westview Press, 198l!, pp. 239-260. 270

trait is not compatible with the decisionmaking style of RFMC members. It may even be an impediment to the timely development of administrative rules and regulations, as pointed out

by Professor Norton.

On the other hand, RFMC members and f ishers can make decisions based on information bounded within a narrow field.

The behavior of these decisionmakers is explainable by their prof ile, which suggests inability to use new information for problem solving. For example, abundance of inf ormation will not cause fishers to ignore their own interests in favor of national consi stency.

The delicate balance of the position of the state and county legislators is evident in their profile Profile B! .

Caught between the private sector their constituents! and executive agency administrators, the probability of decisionmaking based on political expediency rather than other data is extremely high. While their profile indicates receptivity to change, regardless of the volume of scientific data which might be available to them, the Likelihood of making deci-

sions based on this information is very small, especially if

it impinges on their held values. They would be willing to risk small incremental changes because such changes would not affect their total belief set.

An interesting finding was the relatively narrow 50- point range of the dogmatism score of the administrators see

Figure B.L in Appendix B! . This indicates that their behavi- or would be very similar. Differences would lie in the indi- 271 vidual values held by the administrators and the limits or boundaries of their organizational authority and its geographical orientation. In other words, what are perceived as differences in bureaucratic decisionmakers' behavior may be overt manifestations of the institutional values held by the deci sionmakers based on where they si t, " i ~e., their administrative role, instead of differences in dogmatic or rigid behavior.

A construct which can be used to describe f ishery management is Forester' s 'Bounded Rational ity IV. ' Porester ' s typology suggests that actors are in political and economic structures which are unequally differentiated in terms of skill, resources, and states. These differences exacerbate inf ormation distortions, including the actors' perceptions of reality.7 Structural reform is a strategy to ef f ect political equality.8 The creation of the RFMCs can, theref ore f be considered as Congr ess' attempt to democratize the management process by altering the traditional decisionmaking structures. However, because the knowledge to effectively manipu- late the structure and the psychological characteristics of deci,sioamakers cannot be legislated, the conflicts and the

"malaise," which characterize the operation of the RFMCs are pr edi ctabl e outcomes.

7 John Porester, "Bounded Rationality and the Politics of Muddl ing Through, ' 44 984!: 26-28 ~

Ibido ~ pp. 28-29. 272

Thus, whether planned or unplanned, Congress has in fact created a new species of federalism fishery federalism which has empowered private-sector clients, who have not had the 'benef it" of bureaucratic socialization, and agency officials by giving both groups voting rights on the RFMCs.

Although high on democratic principles, the MFCMA-mandated decisionmaking procedure is low on efficiency, particularly, if efficiency is defined as number of FMPs implemented by

RFMCs. The Inspector General's report discussed in Chapter

9, bases its criticism of the NPRFMC principally on the number of PMPs in place, even though Congress placed as much importance on fisher participation in management decisionmaking as on the conservation coastal fisheries.

Hennessey suggested a decisionmaking process, Lindblom' s

'partisan mutual adjustment,' as an operational strategy for the RPMCs. Certainly, the strong tendency to rigidity pre- cludes 'optimization' and decisions will be developed within the bounds of Simon's now classic, "satisf icing." Even if there was perfect knowledge, the probability that it would be used is low at best, given the openness-closedness prof iles of the major actors.

Although this study did not attempt to determine the substance of f ishery decisionmakers' personal values, it can be assumed that, whatever they are, such values are strongly held and will interfere at some point with the ability to accept new information and to incorporate it into a problem- 273 solving f ramework. This characteristic is exacerbated by a tendency of all actors toward rigidity.

The administrator class requires some discussion because it has a significant role in the implementation of fishery management policies aside from participation on the RFMCs.

Although administrators are generally at the open end of the openness-closedness prof ile, about 34 percent of the class are in the upper one-third of the rigidity scale. In other words, within the generally open profile for the class as a whole, there are very rigid individuals. when this f inding is applied to decisionmaking in the fishery sector in Hawaii, the openness-closedness profiles indicate that there is a relatively significant neaber of administrators who apply standard operating procedures almost exclusively in decisionmaking.> Moreover, although most are open to new data for problem solving and are capable of using new data which may require behavioral changes, each agency will tend to use information selectively and may well reject externally generated information ~~i~.lo An obvious reason for the rejection is suspicion of any information that was not generated in-house, where parameters can be controlled.

9 These statistics, as is true for all statistics, cannot be applied to the behavior of individuals or a single agency. Statistics describe group tendencies. lo Carol H. Weiss, EnglewoodCliff s: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972!, Chapters l, and 2. 274

The results of the dogmatism-rigidity study indicate that the element of risk in decisionmaking should probably not be indexed to the availability or lack of information, but to the degree of threat an issue might pose to values held by a decisionmaker. Zf we assume the veracity of this statement, accumulating an abundance of scientific information and statistics may be an unproductive activity from the standpoint of cost-effectiveness to the decisionmaking process. For, if the openness-closedness prof iles are valid measures of the deci sionmakers socio-psychological make-up, the oft-heard statement uttered by decisionmakers that "There is insufficient data to make a decision," may be true for most administrators because of their insatiable need for information!, but for others, the inability or refusal to act is probably due to reasons other than lack of information, e.g., the adverse effect of the action on the decisionmaker.

As two socio-psychological measures, dogmatism and rigidity attributes can provide an index for characterizing the behavior of decisionmakers who are directly or indirectly involved in fishery management or harvesting in Hawaii.ll The significance of the results of the present study is in

ll A danger in statistical analysis is that what is true for the class may not, be applicable to individual members of the class. Statistics, however, allow the study of classes of subj ects and provide an understanding of the central tendencies of behavior which can then be used as the norm for a particular class of subjects. 275

establishing a measure of the differences in the information-

processing capacity of fishery-sector influentials for prob-

lem solving. The data suggest that it would be an exercise

in futility to demand that fishers promote national interests. Their intuitive re!ection of basing decisionmaking on

synoptic premises should be accepted.

The results of this study ask the question: Should new scientific research be conducted for the developaent of

fishery management plans PMPs!? Clearly the answer is 'yes.' If NMFS continues to be named in the MFCMAas heing

responsible for providing the RPMCs with scientific infor-

mation, the agency must be more sensitive to the RFMCs'

information requirements. Research should be designed to meet the councils' needs rather than NMPS' perception of data

needs. If NMPS cannot fulfil this requirement, the MPCMA

should be amended to remove NMFS as the agency from which the

RPMCs obtain data and the funds currently being expended for

domestic fishery research should be provided directly to the RPMCs. The latter is probably the more reasonable approach since 'good" or 'appropriate" information is a matter of per spective. The Information Network of Fishery AWinistratorsl2 The study on the information networks of fishery administrators is focused on the most significant class of fishery influentials. With the resources af their agencies at their disposal, administrators have the capability ta support or obstruct the implementation of public palicies. Although the RPNCs develop the FMPs a process in which federal administrators are heavily involved!, the FHPs are implemented by state and federal fishery agencies. Hence, the influence of f ishery administrators is significant.

The information networks of NNFS, USFWS, and DAR administrators were analyzed for day-to-day operations and for

MPCMA-issues to determine differences in the infarmatian- seeking behavior of the nine key administrators under twa scenarios. A description of the methodology used for the study is given in Appendix C. The information network developed for general agency decisionmaking see Appendix C, Figure C.7! was taken as the norm for the information-seeking behavior of the administra-

12 The results of this study were presented at the Second Symposium an Resource Xnvestigation in the Narthwestern Hawaiian Islands, Nay 2S-27, 1983, at the University of Hawaii Honolulu, Hawaii! . The paper, which provides the full description of the research, was published in the proceedings of the symposium. Only a summary of the research is provided in this dissertation. See Rose T. Pfund, 'Xnstitutional Policymaking in the Management of Fisheries: Case Study: Hawaii,' in the ed. Richard Grigg and Karen Tanoue, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Sea Grant College Program, 1984! 1: 427-457. 277 ters. MR and NMFS administrators each cited f ive external inf ormation sources, but only the Honolulu-based NMFS administrator cited the University of Hawaii, a source of non-political scientif ic and technical information. Other than this one exception, the sources cited by the administrators were those which provided information on the political ambiance rather than scientific and technical data.

The 1%R's single public interface on fishery-related matters is the director. He is also the sole source of fishery-related information for the head of the Department of

Land and Natural Resources DLNR! . Hence, the MR and its parent organization, DLNR, are essentially closed organizations, even though the director cites many sources. Similar to the information intake system of the MR,

UBPWSis essentially open only at the local level. Informa- tion flows upward f rom the local Honolulu office. There are no external information intake points at the regional and national of f ice s.

The NMPS administrators are open to external information at the three levels: local, regional, and national. This openness may be the cause of the disarray of the NMPS intra- agency communication linkages. 13

A probable reason for the difference in the informational channels of NMPS and USPWSmay be the age difference

That this is indeed the case was attested to by local administrators on more than one occasion. 278 of the two agencies. USPNS is more than 4D years olds NMFS is less than 15 years oLd. Age introduces rigidity because of standardization of procedures. As an organization closes off interface points with other organizations, initiated to protect itself from information overload, infarmation is reified through selective summarization! as it passes through several levels af the internal communication channel.

Hence, the upper levels within the USPYS bureaucratic hierarchy have no way of testing the data they receive f rom the interface nodes or the information intake point because they themselves do not have linakages at the state level. The

"streaaQ.ined' and closed informatian netwark of the USPNS administrators is a manifestation of routinization of procedures in an aging organization.

On the other hand, NMPS is a relatively young organization. The pearly linked internal informational channels of NMFS carry over into issue-related communication See Figure

C.8, Appendix C!. The regional affices are an enclave within the total network and could well have their awn goals and objectives and constituencies apart from those of the other components of the agency. The MFCMA-related information networks Figure C.8< Ap- pendix C! are composed of either intra-agency personnel or non-scientif ic sources. None of the administrators named external sources which provide scientific or technical information; hence, such information appears to be obtained f rom internal sources. If not generated within the agency, scien- 279

tific information obtained f rom external sources will have been summarized at least once, and possibly several times, as it is forwarded f rom one level to the next within these agencies. This analysis of the communication network of decisionmakers of the three fishery agencies, which are involved in the implementation of the MPCMA,suggests that the informal organization the personal information network of the decisionmakers can be a vehicle for promoting intergovernmental interaction. There is a high probability that the relationship between state and federal fishery agencies and the

WPRFMCin Hawaii is not unique see Figure C.8, Appendix C! . A similar central rale is probably assumed by other regional fishery management councils RPMCs!. What these RFMCsmay not realize is the presence of the informal social system which has developed to implement the MPCMA. In evaluating the policymaking process, it is not enough to define problems and alternatives based on costs and benefits. New configurations of the formal and informal organizations which evolve also need to be considered. Of equal importance is the knowledge of channels through which core actors act and interact, especially when intergovernmental or intragoveramental cooperation is requi red.

Conclusion These studies on the psychology and sociology of administrative decisionmakers indicate that information redundancy cannot be eliminated and probably should not be eliminated. 280

Fishery agencies will continue to do whatever research they can afford to satisfy a variety of perceived needs and organizational values and priorities. Lacking funds, they may not, and decisions may decline still further in quality. The receptivity of administrators to information does not trans- late to trust in information generated by other agencies. Xn other words, although NMFS and DAR are 'open' organzational- ly, they appear to be open only to obtaining information on the political ambiance, with a single exception. This exception may be anomalous a function of the tri-partite resource assessment project in which university researchers partici- pated with scientists f rom NMPS, IRR, and USFWS. The extra- agency sources which are cited by administrators provide information on the political nature of an issue and not to obtain substantive data.

Fishers and RFMC members, on the other hand, have their minds made up even before the question is posed. This may be an overstatement, but not by much. They do not require scientific data to vote "aye' or "nay" on an issue which somehow affects their livelihood--fishers often vote with their pock- etbooks. This was borne out in the conflicting positions of the WPRFMCmembers and NMFS regional administrator on the billfish FMP discussed in Chapter 9. No amount of "reasoned' information will change their position, if such a change affects their belief sets.

It appears that greater emphasis needs to be placed on obtaining socio-economic data. The traditional f ishery man- 28l agement regimen, which is based almost solely on biological information, will not be acceptable to private-sector fishers. Furthermore, NMFS needs to re-program its data gathering units to meet the needs of the RFMCs rather than its own, i.e., fishers need to have scientific information which is translated to 'How will it affect my income2" They are not interested in the niceties of scientific data or an elegant mathematical model, which NMFS scientists may consider to be important. What they want to know is how these data can be used to allow them ta harvest the f ishery to an acceptable level and ultimately how the FMP will affect. their personal income. PART XV CONCMSX088 hND RBCOHNEHDATIONS Chapter ll summarizes the findings of this study on the

Iiagnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act the most comprehensive fishery policy to date! and the decisionmaking behavior of institutional and private-sector f ishery influentials who affect or can aff ect the management of Hawaii' s f ishery resources.

This study would not be complete without suggesting the best option for decisionmaking, based on the knowledge gained. The public corporation, the Hawaii Fishing Authority, proposed in Chapter 12 is not a new concepts it is presented here as a conceptual proposition for fishery management for Hawaii. A public corporation removes the management of f ishery resources f rom multi-purpose agencies and creates an independent entity which has ties to government, but is not totally under its control. CHAXTER ll

THE CONCKU8IONs A SUMMARY OP TBB RESULTS

Strong feelings pro and con surrounded the MPCMAfrom the very beginning. Hailed on the one hand as the most comprehensive national policy, the MFCMAhas also been described as having been hastily contrived in response to strident demands. Whatever view one takes, several contra- dictions were deliberately incorporated into the MFCMA to insure its passage. Principally, these are the inclusion of one migratory species billfish! and exclusion of another tunas! s the imposition of national standards on a regional governance structure the RFMCs! which was established to enable coastal fisheries to be managed with local knowledgeg and the inclusion of detailed direction on the control of access of foreign fishing vessels in the 200-mile fishery conservation zone FCK!, but virtual silence on the control of access of domestic f ishers. These and other provisions of the MFCMAand fishery influentials and agencies and their impact on Hawaii's f isheries are summarized here.

Sumac of the Research

Fisher support for the MFCMAwas centered in the East coast with its wide continental shelf and rich coastal fisheries. Most Nest coast anadromous f ishers also supported

284 28S

the MPCMA. In a rare instance of consonance of interests,

conservationists and recreational fishers also supported

coastal commercial fishers in their lobbying efforts.

Opposition came from distant-water fishers Gulf

shrimpers and California tuna fishers and federal executive

agencies President Gerald Ford later changed his position

and signed the MPCNA into law! .

There was widespread agreement that the nation's coastal

fisheries were fast being depleted. This fact coupled with

the ignominy of Russian and other foreign vessels fishing

almost within sight of the U. S. coast, flaunting their pre-

sence and technological efficiency in harvesting, expanded a

regional issue concerning a handful of coastal states to

capture the interest of the nation.

Hawaii was awakened by the enactment of the MFCNA to the

economic potential of its f ishery resources in the Northwest- ern Hawaiian Islands Mi1HI!, the site of the only unexploited fisheries in the state. The motivation for establishing

state presence in the remote waters of the SNHZ was twofold:

the state was not inclined to allow the federal government to impinge on what it considered to be its jurisdictiony there was also some urgency to establish the state's own management

procedures for black corals off the high islands because

their habitats were adjacent to and just beyond the boundary of the Territorial Sea. The state's efforts to remove black coral from the precious coral fishery management, plan FMP! were successf ul. 286

Overall, the insular nature and geographic isolation of

the state, manifested in the unity of the marine ecosystem of

the Hawaiian archipelago and the nature of its fisheries, do

not fit the MPCMA norms established on continental characteristics. For example, the lobster f ishery, the second of the two fisheries currently managed under a FMP produces less

than a million dollars per year in state revenues. Deepwater

precious corals, managed under the second PMP, are not

currently harvested. Hawaii's major coastal fisheries are

tunas, which are not regulated under the MFCMA. Because of

their nature, when the productivity of Hawaiian fisheries is

compared with that of the U. S. continental coastal fisheries,

the state's annual income of $14 million f rom its f ishery

sector is insignificant.

In addition to being "disadvantaged' geographically and

geologically with the attendant resource limitations, the influence of historical antecedents was clearly evident in

the lack of openness and trust in federal-state interaction in the implementation of the MFCNA. Historically, as a weak monarchy, the Hawaiian Islands survived because of the pro-

tective wing of the United States. But there were strings attached to the protection. The United States' desire to annex the Hawaiian Islands, which began in the mid-1800sf ended only when the entire archipelago was under U. S. con-

trol. In this regard, the rale of Theodore Roosevelt is

significant as the driving force behind the legitimizing of

U.S. ownership of Midway Islands and the %fHI. Its geograph- 287

ical location made the Hawaiian archipelago a vital component of Roosevelt's strategy to establish U. S. hegemony in the Pacific through seapower. Pishery Pederalism' A Tripartite Cooperative Enterprise Because institutional actors are influenced by organizational values as much as bjj their awn personal values and

socio-psychological attributes, the evolution of the twa federal and one state fishery agencies was cansiderd to be important for the understanding of administrative decisionmaking behavior. The behavior of f ishers, the third component af 'fishery federalism,' also provided important in- sightss.

Pederal Agencies. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service USPWS! is historically the conservation-oriented agency.

Although the methodology for conservation has changed somewhat over the years, from relying solely on propagation of wildstocks ta regulating control of hunting and harvesting, the USFWS has retained its basic function. The second federal agency, the National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS!, has common roots with the USFWS. But f rom its beginning/ NMPS' responsibility was f ocused on the development of the commercial fishing industry. NMFS and the Bureau of Commer- cial Fisheries, its predecessor, have played a key role in supporting the tuna f ishing industry in Hawaii. State Agency. The state' s Division of Aquatic Resources

DAR!, has origins which are mare aligned to the functions of

USPWS than to NMFS. But in 1982, its terrestrial wildlife 288 management duties were divested f rom DAR to enable it to focus its attention on the management and developnent of the state ' s f ishery resour ces. With the f ur ther clar if ica tion of its function in 1984, the DAR is new unquestionably the state's agency for fishery research and development.

Fishing Interests. The third leg of the tripartite

'fishery federalism' structure is the f ishers. The dominant group of Hawaiian commercial fishers, in numbers, is the parttimers who harvest both tunas and non-migratory species.

However, it was found that superior numbers have not won parttime commercial fishers a proportionate share of representation on the WPRFMC. The importance placed upon the tuna fisheries by the state's political leadership is evident in the 'over-representation' of tuna fishers on the Hawaii

Fisheries Coordinating Council and the WPRFMC.

The Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council These three sectors--federal, state, and f ishing interests participate in the governance of Hawaii' s f ishery resources as members of the WPRFMC.

The MFCMAwas predicated on the notion that the nation' s non-migratory coastal fisheries should be managed not only by federal and state administrators, but also by the fishing industry and/or f ishery experts by legitimizing the participation of these interests as voting members of the RFMCs.

Such a tripartite policymaking body, which internalizes non-governmental users, who are normally external to formal 289

public-sector decisionmaking processes, is a new concept in

r eso ur ce management.

This study revealed that the WPRFMChas the potential

for promoting intergovernmental cooperation because it. serves as the source of political information for all agencies. This position of centrality gives the WFRFMCa 'bridging'

function among the actors of the fishery policy field as the

epicenter for information on the political issues related to

the MFCMA.

The council's chair and executive director can use their

influence to broker agreements within the council and with

federal and state government decisionmakers and other RPMCs.

Por example, the NMPS administrators are important to the

approval process as the f ishery line agency in the Department

of Commerce because he MFCNA requires that all FMPs must be approved by the Secretary of Commerce. The leadership of the WPRFMCwas named by NMPS administrators at all levels,

including the t.op administrator of NMPS in Washington D. C. g

as sources of inf ormation on MPCMA-related issues. The

WPRFMC's chair and staff, therefore, have the capacity to f acilitate intergovernmental interactions, because, in addi-

tion to its relationship with federal administrators, its

staff and chairman are information sources for the state fishery agency. The validity of the f inding that the WPRPMC occupies a position of power was borne out in the successful

counter-attack to recent attempts by the Inspector General' s

Office of the Department of Commerce and the chair of the 290

House S ubcommittee on Fi sheri es to scuttle the WPRFMC and the

Caribbean RFMC.

The WPRFMCis the crucible in which the laws, institutions, histories, personalities, ambitions, and intergovernmental relations churn and boil. Ts it equal to the task2

Basic problems were discovered in that three of the four fisher representatives on the WPRFMChave interests in the tuna fishing industry, and only one represents the parttime commercial/recreational fisher class which outnumber tuna fishers 3:l. Moreover, tunas are not now included for management under the MFCMA, a truly significant exclusion.

Results of the Research This is the first comprehensive study on the effect of the implementation of the MFCNAin a specific state. Al- though some attention was given to national issues which sur- round f ishery management, e. g., depletion of economically valuable coastal fisheries, the focus of this study was the effect of the MFCMAon Hawaii. As such, the research was scoped to provide data which were related to the management of Hawaii's fisheries and the individuals who influence f ishery management policies. Historic antecedents and institutional norms as well as socio-psychological attributes were assumed to be significant influences on the decisionmaking behavior of f ishery administrators and f ishing interests.

The major results of the research are summarized here under the following headings to organize the discussion: sociological and psychological dimensions, which describe the 291 attributes of f ishery influentials in Hawaii, the history and politics of state-federal relationship, and the constitutional standing of Hawaii's claims to its channel and NWHI water s.

The Sociological Dimension

The assumption underlying the use of network analysis for this study was that an administrator's communication channels constitute his/her agency' s internal and external communication linkages. Based on this assumption, the inf ormation sources cited by the adminstrators are signf icant and have a high probability of influencing that agency's deci si ons.

Network analysis of administrators' inf ormation sources revealed that there was little difference between their nor- mal data-gathering behavior, i.e., how information is channeled within the agency for agency operations, and that related specifically to NPCMA issues. What changed were the sources of inf ormation. For NFCMA-related decisionmaking, the state administrator cited only sources which provide political intelligence and the federal administrators cited intra-agency personnel, suggesting that scientific and technical data utilized for administrative decisionmaking is not obtained f rom external sources but from within the agency itself. Hence, if required f or problem solving, such data are generated internally. This explanation appears to be related to the difficulty which agencies have for 'getting 292 together" to develop long-term agreementa for pooling information for joint use. This new application of network analysis to define the universe of the influentials in an issue field by superimpos- ing their information networks offers a methodology for policy analysis. While it needs to be tested further, network analysis appears to be a promising tool.

The Psychological Dimension The statistical test of the relationship of rigidity and dogmatism corroborated the conclusion of earlier workers that the two attributes are related. Of theoretical significance is the finding that uncertainty or risk indices in decisionmaking should not be based on lack or availability of information. Rather, they should be indexed to the impact which the information will have on the held values or belief sets of decisionmakers and their ability to utilize new information for problem solving.

Although the a priori assumption underlying the MFCMAis that availability of information is critical to 'reasoned" decisionmaking, this study found that availability of inf ormation would probably not insure its utilization. While Simon's central argument is that satisf icing behavior ia bounded by readily available information as welL as resources and time!, such may not be the case. The decisionmaker can impose bounds which could deliberately ignore even readily available information because of ita potential effect on his belief set or sets. 293

The general openness of administrators Prof ile A! supports observed behavior, for example, as noted by Hennessey and Norton. They described administrative behavior as 'inac- tion," caused by an open-ended need to search for more and more information. When the characteristics of the administrators of NMFS, MR, and VSPWS, defined by network analysis, are combined with those identified by their openness- closedness prof ile, it appears that each agency will continue to develop data, which it considers important for decisionmaking, and not rely on extra-agency sources. This behavior may be caused by the perception of decisionmakers that the different mission of their agency is "different' and r~uires data which need to be developed and analyzed under unique conditions and assumptions. Furthermore, it appears that bringing together institutional administrators and user groups to implement public policy by creating a new organizational structure is ineffec- tive f rom the standpoint of pooling information. The expected economies of scale were not evident. Instead, the RFMCs developed typical self-serving and self-preserving organizational behavior patterns. Their demand for information tailored to their specific needs reflects this behavior. At the extreme closed end of the openness-closedness continuum, Hawaiian f ishers Prof ile D! can be characterized as a class which make decisions based on a priori assumptions and held values. Therefore, lack of information would not deter Profile D individuals f rom making decisions since they 294 do not have the ability to use new information readily for problem solving and, more important, the f ramework for their decisions is knowledge and contexts which support their strongly held values. Moreover, since their role on the

WPRFMCis not be scientific experts, but to provide user input into the decisionmaking process, this trait should not be used to deny or limit their participation. Xt was Congress' intent that f ishing interests be decisionmaking participants rather than reactors to the processes for developing fishery management plans FMPs! . Thi s study f ound that geographical loca ti on and level of government do not significantly influence administrators' dogmatism scores. The observable differences in decisionmaking styles among levels of government, therefore, appear to be manifestations of organizational values and not the ability of the administrators to process information. Finally, manipulation of institutional structures to effect political equality does not insure change in the behavi- or of the actors. The mitigation of unequal power appears to require socialization of the human elements in the new institutional structure and its operational procedures, a function of time. It is surmised, based on the present study, that aver time, the behavior of all participants will tend to ho- mogenize. The relative narrowness of the range of the dogmatism scores of administators suggests this tendency. 295

The Historic Antecedents of Hawaii-U.8. Relationship The AmeriCan politiCal historiOgraphy Of the WeSt, probably best embodied in the slogan, 'Go West, young mani/" describes the dynamic interaction between the federal govern-

ment and the state of Hawaii. The westward advancement of the V. S. territorial frontier did not stop at the Califorzd.a coast but continued on to the Hawaiian archipelago and beyond. The first official documentation authorizing the Uni- ted States minister in Hawaii to negotiate an annexation treaty is dated April 4, l854, 44 years prior to the actual annexation in 1898. Hence, there is a long history of Ameri-

can overtures to the Hawaiian government 4 years constituted about one-third of the entire life span of the United

States in 1898! .

The 'manifest destiny" thesis which linked Hawaii to the United States was largely based on the geopolitics of seapower. The Hawaiian archipelago was an integral part of Alfred Mahan's naval strategy for the Pacific as the last line of defense of the American continent against the land- rich giants of Asia Russia and China. His influence on

Theodore Roosevelt is well documented. The islands were necessary as a refueling and repair base for the V.S. Pacific Fleet, e.g., Pearl Harbor was a concession used as the gg~ ~~a in consumating the treaty of 1884 with the Hawaiian monarchy. In addition, the islands were important as the terminus of the Pacific cable. 296

The result of archival search gives some credence to the notion that the designation of the Northwestern Hawaiian

Islands hNHI! as a wildlife refuge appears to be part of the strategy used by Theodore Roosevelt to establish clear United

States jurisdiction over the vast stretches of water and the several dozen atolls, rocks, and islets beyond the island of Kauai. With the already existing U.S. control of Midway and Kure Islands at the northwestern terminus and the high islands at the southeastern terminus, any questions which might have arisen on United States ownership of the NWHI was laid to rest with the designation of the NWHX as a wildlife refuge. The seemingly altruistic protection of wildlife in the middle of the Pacific Ocean beginning in 1903, six years prior to the establishment of the national wildlife refuge in l909, required the expense of maintaining a contingent of twenty marines on Midway Islands. The credibility of this action merely to protect seabirds appears to be stretched thin for two reasons:

1. Theodore Roosevelt, as the Under Secretary of the Navy, leaned strongly tcward territorial expansion and strengthening of the Pacific Pleet and fully appreciated the value and necessity of the Hawaiian archipelago in the realization of his plans

2. Midway Islands, claimed by the United States in 1867 f was secured as the terminus of the Pacific cable and as a coaling station for the Pacific Pleet, but the islands would have been in a perilous position without the linkage with the high inhabited islands a condition which required assurance that no foreign power could claim the rest of the NWHI

Hence, the designation of the uninhabited NWHI as a wildlife refuge in l909, when Roosevelt was PresidentJ 297 appears to have been an inocuous way of securing for the

United States the control of a sea frontier which extended more than 1,400 miles. While hailed as an act of conservation, the federal 'seizure" of these uninhabited islands must also be regarded as having significance beyond the overt purpose. Because the designating of the NWHI as a wildlife refuge was fully in keeping with the national spirit of conservation, which enjoyed a ground-swell in the late 1800s, no questions were raised that this acquisition was an example of

U.S. imperialistic expansion, either before or after 1909.

One other aspect of the NWHI wildlife refuge, which has a bearing on the theory that Roosevelt had other motives in mind besides the welfare of seabirds, is the fact that the federal government had little to do with the administration of the refuge until the 1960s. If wildlife management had been the most important aspect of the 1909 declaration, nearly 60 years of sporadic monitoring expeditions by the federal government haxdly seems appropriate.

Constitutional Standing of Hawaii's Claim to its Channel and NfHI waters The politics of the dispute of the channel waters and the more recent claim of the USPWSover the submerged lands surrounding the NWHI have colored federal-state interaction in fishery management issues. Federal agenci.es are fully aware of the reasons for the cautious stance taken by the state where policy issues have direct or indirect bearing on the state's seaward boundary, and there is probably some jus- 298 tification for the exasperation of federal administrators re- garcU.ng what they perceived as foot-shuffling by state officials on matters which have bearing on the jurisdiction of the state's channel and nearshore waters. No state official will agree to explicit or implied boundaries which can be construed as acquiescing to the federal government's position on the ownership of these waters. Federal officals have privately and publicly stated that the boundary dispute should be settled in court to enable open discussion to be held on such issues as fishery management without the ever-present boundary-related filter. How- ever, the state is well aware that should it take its claims to the U.S. Supreme Court, the judgment is almost certain to be adverse to its interests. The state's position that it is an archipelago is weak because the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized an archipelagic regime within the national boundaries of the United States. Hence, it does not recognize Hawaii as such even though Hawaii's physical configuration stands the test of the commonly accepted geographical definition of the term, 'archipelago." There is some question as to the appropriateness of applying President Reagan's 1983

KEZ procLamation which accepts all provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty, other than those pertaining to seabed mining, as customary international law.

Although the sweeping scope of the proclamation can be construed to include the acceptance of the archipelagic regime by the United States, there are two problems which can 299 be cited. The first is that since the United States is not a signatory of the Law of the Sea Treaty, it may not be bound by the archipelagic def inition and other related provisions of the treaty, for a number of reasons, in spite of the Reagan proclamation. But the principal problem faced by the state is that the Law of the Sea Treaty definition applies only where the archipelago constitutes a nation state, e.g., Indonesia or the Republic of the Philippines, and not where the archipelago is only a part of a nation state. The central issue related to this complex question is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Nore serious because it has real rather than theoretical implications is the adverse 1984 decision of the U. S. Supreme

Court on state taxation of inter-island air carriers which was based on the legal point that the channel waters are international waters [Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of

Taxation of Hawaii, 104 U. 8. Sup. Ct., 291] . As such, the channel waters are high seas and, therefore, not under the jurisdiction of the state. This decision reinforces an earlier case [CAB v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F. supp. 990

964! ], which denied the establishment of a cut-rate inter- island air carrier, based on the constitutional point that inter-island air traffic constitutes inter-state rather than intra-state commerce because the channel waters between the islands are international rather than state waters. There- fore, all air flights, which cross channel waters, are under the purview of the Federal Aviation Act, administered by the 300

Civil Aeronautics Board. Deregulation has no bearing on the

state's position because the juridical decision is based on the more fundamental issue of geographical conf iguration and

not whether or not its inter-island air traffic should be

governed by the CAB.

While the state's boundary conflict appears to be a localized problem, it is troublesome because of its implications for U. S. foreign policy. Presently, U. S. ships, including warships, pass through designated lanes of the straits of the world under the tradi tional regime of "high seas. ' Hence, recognition of Hawai i as an archipelago could close off passage through foreign channel waters which the United States presently utilizes under the high seas regime, without regard to the coastal nation's designation of such waters or that given under the Law of the Sea Treaty. The

Hawaiian boundary issue could have repurcussions on United States foreign policy, particularly because the United States is not. a signatory of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Since U.S. Supreme Court rulings have a history of deferring to the federal government's 'need to speak with one voice" the uniformity rule! in effecting its foreign policy and its need to establish paramount authority the pre-emption rule! to pranote national interests, the possibility that the state could obtain a favorable juridical ruling is nil.

The issue of the state's channel waters and its conflict with the USPNSon the ownership of the inshore waters and lagoons surrounding the NWHI wildlife refuge will not be 301

def initive1.y settled in the near future. Hawaii can petition

Congress, but the likelihood of positive action by that body

appears to be as remote as obtaining a favorable ruling f rom

the U. S. Supreme Court.

Concluding Thoughts

The unexpected result of the implementation of the MPCMA

is undoubtedly the influx of domestic fishers as participants in the harvest of New England f isheries. Because the focus

of the MPCMAin 1976 was the removal of foreign fishers f rom

the coastal fisheries, little if any thought was given to the

consequences of such an action on the free market system which characterize the fishing industry. Without explict measures to control new access, the vacuum created by the de-

parture of foreign fishers was quickly filled by new domestic

entrepreneurs. The stressed f isheries of l976 are still

stressed in 1985, but the culprits are no longer foreign f ishers. This unexpected outcome of the MFCMAindicates that

open access can no longer prevail; however, a workable plan is yet to be devised for controlling the entry of domestic fishers into the market.

Perhaps the most amazing aspect of the MFCMAis the inclusion of users in the management of the resource they harvest. Thus, federalism in fishery management is a

three-way partnership a cooperative enterprise which has been operationalized in the RPMCs. Although the evaluation of the implementation of 'fishery federalism' by the Office of Inspector General used PMPs as evidence of productivity, 302

it may be other aspects of the MFCNAwhich provide long-term

social benef its, namely,

1. Democratization of resource management 2. Xmplementation of inter-governmental cooperation through structural changes rather than fiscal incentives and sanctions

Zndeed from the standpoint of the human elements in intergovernmental relations, 'f ishery federalism" is a test. in participatory management of a valuable national natural

resource. The RFMCs are the crucible for the test by fire water?! of 'f ishery federalism." within the close quarters of the RPMCs, the positive strengths of the interaction can be utilized to advantage. Dismissal of the RFMCs because they are sources of conflict, denies their potential for enhancing the interactive element I! in intergovernmental cooperation. The wisdom of the Congress was the recognition of the 'I" in the calculus that joined the efforts of bureaucrats and fishers and made them together stewards over the nation' s f ishery resources.

Because the ocean environment is governed by various jurisdictional boundaries for different purposes, e.g. g the surface of the fishery conservation zone PCZ! is international waters for purposes of vessel transport while fisheries are national resources, it is proposed that the Hawaii- an archipelago be designated a non-political "resource zone. Such a zone would be established solely for the conservation and exploitation of the living resources of the archipelago 303

as a single ecosystem. The FCZ would be jointly managed by

the state and federal governments.

This notion is developed further in the discussion on the Hawaii Fishing Authority BFA! in Chapter l2. As pre-

sented here, the HPA's powers have been expanded considerably from that of the RPNCs, particularly in fiscal matters and independence in f ishery management. CEAPTBR l2

HAWAII PIBRING AUTHORITY

Introduction

This chapter describes the conceptual organizational structure of the Hawaii Fishing Authority HPA! which is proposed for the management of Hawaii's fishery resources. The

HPA is a public corporation to be established under a feder-

al-state compact by Congress. Modelled af ter port authorities, the HFA will not be fiscally independent on the vagaries of legislative funding. This congressional action will require an amendaent to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, granting Hawaii an exception.

Fiscal projections, based on vessel registration and current fish landings in the state and the exvessel value of

these landings, indicate that the establishment of the HPA is fiscally feasible. A history of inadequate funding support from legislative sources and the recently espoused user fees for the maintenance of public facilities and services suggests the timeliness of discussing the establishment of the

HPA as a prototype organizational structure to administer the marine resources of the Hawaiian archipelago.

The HFA has merit for Hawaii because it is a non-contiguous state and essentially a single marine ecosystem. Zn

304 305

addition, the devastating evaluation by the Office of the

Inspector General IG! of the Department of Commerce was

mostly based on the insular geomorphology and resource limi-

tations of the state, which are different from those of the

continental coastal states. One of the XG's recommendations

was that the state manage its own fishery resources. If the

IG made the recommendation seriously, and there is no reason to believe otherwise, an initiative by the state to establish

a fiscally independent fishing authority would probably be

supported by the Department of Commerce and the Office of Management and Budget ONB!, especially since it offers a way

to terminate direct federal funding for administrative costs

for an activity they feel is not cost-effective.

%ae privatisation of Fiahery Resources

For hundreds of years, fishers in Hawaii and elsewhere have had access to fish as free common goods. Fisheries have been free-access common goods because they were easily har-

vested by anyone who wished to do so and were thought to be inexhaustible. In modern times, while access may not be prohibited, depletion of easily accessible stocks has imposed the requirement of boats and sophisticated equipnent capi-

tal! and license fees to exploit preferred species, thus

erecting economic barriers to f ree access. Ownership of the fish is still vested upon capture. The leasing of submerged lands for oil and gas drilling and the cultivation of oysters and anadromous fishes are recent occurrences, but to date, there is no precedent for 306

staking out the water column under a private ownership

regime.

Revenue Poteatial of Hawaii' e Pishery Resources

There is precedent, however, in the use of the marine counterpart of the severance tax, the landing tax. This is a type of physical yield tax which adds proportional rates of

use to current costs. Over time, it has the effect of shifting activity to areas which are not currently taxed.1 Hence, harvesting behavior can be directed by the tax structure, i.e., theoretically, an underf ished species could be taxed at lower rates to encourage harvest.

Because of the closure of the tuna cannery in Honolulu, the state has abandoned plans to pursue the developaent of albacore and other large tunas. With this decision, all plans to establish a transshipment station on Midway and Tern

Islands have lost their immediacy. The near-term prognosis is that without the development of transshipment bases and/or a distant;water fleet, the harvesting of the high-priced large tunas will largely be done by West Coast and foreign fishers. If this is indeed the case, the direct benefit accruing ta the state's f ishers and to the state in terms of taxes from the North Pacific tuna fisheries would be minimal and the resources will in all probability benefit non-resi-

S.V. Ci riacy-Wantr up, 3rd Ed., Berkeley: University of California Division of Agricultural Sciences, Agricultural Experiment Station, 1968!, p. 186. 307 dents. Although it is still a back-burner issue, a transshipment facility may be needed to harvest the bottomfish fishery in the NWHI more economically, especially if the fishing activity for these species escalates in the future. While it would be unconstitutional to prohibit the taking of f ish f rom the state' s 200-mile zone by f ishers f rom other states, the imposition of a physical yield tax would mean a charge for use in direct, proportion to the level of use. Hence, the out-of-state long distance fishers would pay proportionally higher fees based on their catch and size of their vessel. To provide a tax break for local fishers with smaller boats, a tax-exempt quota can be established for small boats. This tax provision is designed to win the support of the marine recreational fishers who do not own com- . mercial fishing licenses and are not taxed presently. They would be required to pay the basic annual vessel fee under the proposed HFA.

Revenue aside, the management of the fisheries will be ma'terially aided by the high grade catch data which will accrue from a well-managed system in which all catch is reported. Those who do not report their catch will have their license to fish revoked and/or pay a stiff fine. An inter-state cooperative enforcement system which closes off landing sites to violators of regulations will put economic teeth into enforcement procedures. 308

Qaveraance and Powers

The HFA is proposed as a federal-state compact. because the federal government will give up its jurisdiction over Hawaii's PCZ. The proposed managementstructure will require an amendment to the MFCMAto exempt Hawaii. The political impact of such a proposal is not considered in this conceptual proposal the purpose of which is to apply some of the results of the present research.! As part of the federal- state compact, Hawaii's FCZ will be designated a non-political fishery management zone. For all other resources, e.g. f polymetallic crusts, the existing regimes will prevail.

The proposed governing board consists of nine members with four being appointed by the President of the United States or his designee and four by the Governor of Hawaii. The ninth member, the chair of the HFA< will be jointly apponted by the Governor and the President. The President's appointees will include:

1. The Secretary of the Department of Commerce or his desi gnee

2. The Secretary of the Department of the Interior or his designee

3. A nationally recognised expert on insular f isheries

4. A consumer of fishery products The Governor' s appointees will include:

l. Director of the Department of Land and Natural Resources or his designee

2. Director of the Department of Planning and Economic Development or his designee

3. A Hawaiian commercial fisher 309

4. A Hawaiian recreational fisher

Among other powers, the HFA will be empowered to:

l. Bell capital bonds

2. Charge user f ees f or its f acilities

3. Sell fishing licenses

4. Impose and collect landing fees based on a percentage of exvessel value of catch

S. Impose fines on those who violate r egul ati ons 6. Sign off on inter-state commerce agreements

The functions of the HPA will include:

l. Develognent and maintenance of f acilities as approved by the HPA's Board of Directors

2. Implementation of management plans developed under the MPCMAand approved by the WPRPNC, incl uding GIPAs

3. Monitor domestic and foreign fishing activities in the waters off the Hawaiian archipelago in cooperation with the U. S. Coast Guard

4. Maintain catch and position data to monitor stock levels

5. Enforce domestic and foreign catch quotas

6. Fund on-going research to refine stock management technol ogy

7. Develop markets for fishery products 8. Conduct educational programs for industry and the general public

The public corporation will generate revenues for operational expenditures f rom a landing tax imposed on catch, license fees, and fees for facility use and services. potential revenues from the three sources are given below. 310

Souraes of Pundinq

Landing Tax. The 1982 state income from fish landings was $14.4 million 4.2 million lbs.! .2 Based on this figure, revenues projections at 5, 10, 15, and 20% are:

Table 12.1 Landing tax schedule

Landing Tax

5 $712,250 10 lp424g500 15 2gl36,750 20 2r849r000

The only direct tax imposed under Hawaiian law presently, on landed catch is a L/2 percent excise tax. The HFA will tax all landings, incuding those of recreational fishers who are not presently taxedg it is suspected that they- are an underground source of fish for many retail outlets.3 Landing taxes have been successfully imposed by other states. Alaska obtains the cooperation of fishers in paying landing taxes by imposing fines and revoking the fishing licenses of those who fail to comply.

License Pees. Boat sixe is proposed as the new basis for licensing f ishers, including recreational fishers. As noted in Chapter 8, in-state commercial fishers now pay a license

Department of Planning and Economic Developnent, Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1983!, p. 532. 3 An accurate record of fish catch will be obtained by imposing a physical yield tax on both commercial and recreational landings. Hence, better data will be available for statistical compilation and analysis an added benef it. 311 fee of $25 and out-of-state fishers pay $50~ the license gives the holder the right to sell his catch. The results of the survey on Hawaiian fishers Chapter 8! showed that size of boats limited the access of fishers to certain fisheries because of the sailing range of the boat. For example, it was found that 73% of the fishing in Hawaii is done in the 4 to 30-mile band of water and lS to 20-ft boats are the most popular size used for commercial fishing. The state' s statistics of registered vessels for 1982 are shown below:4

Documented vessels 1,225 Undocumented vessels 12g999

Total 14g224

The state defines documented vessels as those over five net tons, used for commercial purposes. Undocumented vessels are those which are mechanically propelled including those with auxiliary engines! and any boat powered solely by sail, if it is over eight feet. in length. The breakdown of undocumented vessel size is as follows:5

Table 12.2. Number of undocumented vessels

Length Number

Under 16 feet SgOOl 16 to less than 26 f t 6 p661 26 to less than 40 f t 1,118 40 to 65 ft 196 Over 6S ft 7

Total 12i999

4 Xbid., p. S00.

Ibi d. 312

The breakdown of the documented vessels is not given in the

state'8 data book. Based on the information obtained in the

survey of commercial f ishers, the approximate size distribution of commercial fishing vessels is as follows:

Length Number

15 to 20 ft lg030 31 to 70 ft 170 Over 70 ft 7

Other sizes total less than 2 percent of the total of

documented vessels.

A mandatory fee is proposed for all fishers, including

recreational fishers, using the schedule below Table 12.3! .

Table 12.3. Proposed annual fees

Length Annual Fee/vessel No. Vessels» Total Pee

Under 15 ft 25 5 g001 S 152t025 16 to 25 ft 200 7 ~691 lg538g200 26 to 40 ft 500 1,118 559g000 40 to 70 ft lg000 366 366g000 Over 70 ft 2,000 14 28i000

Total Revenues $2g616,225 *The figures in this column are a composite of the undocumented and documented vessels. Because the size breakdown differed for the statistics on the two types of vesselsf the numbers should be considered as "ball park figures."

Rental of Facilities and Service Fees. This source of revenue is an unknown quantum since presently there are no facilities other than those maintained by the state, such as boating slips managed by the Department of Transportation.

En addition, the HFA would derive rental income f ram f reez- 313 ers, storage reefers and canning, packing, and shipping facilities and service fees for marketing and training programs.

Summary of Pxoj ected Revenues. The establ ishment of the HPA to implement the management plans for the fishery resources of the archipelago will insure the balanced consideration of the interests of both the federal and state governments. The ability of the HFA to raise capital through issu- ing bonds, negotiating loans, and raising of venture capital will enable it to construct needed facilities. It will also be able to receive special legislative appropriations. The potential funding fram a 5% landing tax $7l2,250! and license fees $2,616,225! total $3,32B,475. These revenues are sufficient for administrative and other expenditures, such as upkeep of facilities and for research and monitoring activities. Rental income from facilities and service fees, not included here, will be additional sources of revenue.

Nanageeent Prohleas

Narket Develoyaent. The HPA will need to develop an alternate to the tuna cannery for processing surplus as well as under-sized and second quality fish which do not meet the high standards of the fresh fish market for aku and other species.< A feasible product is suriai, a fish paste, which is used in the manufacture of imitation crabmeat in Japan and

6 At this writing, a groupof local investors has purchased the cannery. They are expected to continue the canning operation, albeit at a reduced level. fishcake in Hawaii. Presently, fishcake producers are importing surimi to augmentthe local supply. A second

potential byproduct is fishmeal. Both surimi and fishmeal

production require further study as alternatives for long-term f easibil ity, e. g., to determine production

capability and availability of stable sources of fish to insure an adequate supply to keep production constant. Limited Sntry. The issue of limited entry has been bypassed in the proposed licensing procedure because any plan to restrict entry have difficulty gaining either legislative and user support in Hawaii. Instead, the proposed management utilizes the behavior of f ishers in developing management plans. These are: ! fishing in Hawaii is a day-fishing operation imposed by the size of most fishing boats and the turbulence of the channel waters! and ! the parttime status of about 75% of the commercial fishers.

Important to the proposed management plan is the enhancement of the coastal fisheries off the high islands by the deployment of sufficient numbers of fish aggregation devices FADs! within the 20-mile perimeter around the islands. Harvesting can be controlled by establishing fishing zones circumscribed around the PADs and rotating fishing within designated zones to allow the standing stock to recover. Por the fishers who only fish in the nearshore waters, artificial reefs can serve the same purpose as the PADs in aggregating pelagic and deepwater species. The same method used for the 315 management of offshore species the zonal approach! can be used for managing nearshore species around artificial reefs.7

Air and sea surveillance will be an effective means of monitoring fishing activity because all vessels will be concentrated in the open f ishing zone. Any vessel in a closed zone will be in clear violation since access is based on geographic zone and not to specific f ish species.

The fishers who have the capability of fishing in the

HWHI waters number about a dozen. Their vessels are highly mechanized with the latest gear. It is speculated that these vessels have the capability of exploiting all the resources in the HWHZ and may already be over-capitalized. Hence/ entry should be controlled by good financial counselling provided by HFA directly or indirectly through lending institutions to anyone who may be contemplating building or buying a new vessel when he or she apylies for a loan.

The 200-mile Resource Soundary. The HFA can establish unique procedures to manage Hawaiian fisheries because the large number of species and small population of each species do not conform to national norms. The HFA will manage the full extent of the 200-mile FCZ without negating the present political boundaries within the FCK by establishing a "200- mile fishery resource boundary." Lagoons and suhaerged lands contiguous to the NWHI wildlife refuge will be evaluated to

This system of stock enhancement and recruitment will be most acceptable to fishers because there is na "historic ownership" of the newly established fishing sites by fishers. 3l6 determine impact on the wildlife and a buffer zone can be established, where needed, and managed by the HFA to protect f ood sour ces for the w il dl if e.

Bstablishaent of the Hawaii Fishing Authority: Pros and Cons As a public authority< HFA, will need to be established by statute and agreed upon concurrently by the State Legisla- ture and the U.S. Congress. To maintain public accountability, the budget of the public corporation will be reviewed and approved by the Hawaii State Legislature and an oversight committee of Congress. The pros and cons of establishing the HFA are summarized below:

Pr obleal/Issue Positive Xapact Negative Impact

Insular Management will not None mor phol ogy be hampered by artificial state-federal bo unda ries.

Boundary By prior agreement the Management plans may issue s HFA. will be given ma- be hampered by the in- nagement authority over ability of state and the 20G-mile PCS; it federal members of the will also be exempt HFA board to act be- f rom national standards cause of the unsettled related to fishery ma- boundary issues. nagement procedures by prior agreement between the federal and state governments.

Inde pendent HFA is free of the There will be no f unding politics of both the accountability of state and federal expenditures as well governments' ability needs of the public. to obtain capital by negotiating loans or by selling bonds, etc. 317

Independent Management decisions Management plans may governance will not have to be not coincide with in agreement with national standards or national standards pr d'or i ties. which do not f it insular resource management.

Single Management plans There is no precedence eca ay stem can be holistic f or managing f i ah er i ea instead of speci es along a 1400-mile sea or iente d. f rontier.

Inf rastructur e HPA has the capacity Public access may be devel opnent to raise funds to limited or denied. build and maintain f acil ities independently without public funds or with partial public f unding.

Limited Entry to fisheries Uncontrolled access will be controlled by may cause overcrovd- opening and closing ind at FADs and zones ci rcumscribed artif icial reef a. circumscribed around PADs and artificial reef s.

License f ees Fees collected by HPA Fees do not benefit vill be used ta the general public. monitor and develop and facilities for f isher s g manda tory licensing will eliminate expensive mani- toring of individual vessels at sea.

Landing taxes Taxes will be used to Taxes do nat directly administer f isheries benefit the general and to develop faci- publ ic. lities such as PADs, reef exs, etc.

Fiscal HPA will enable Fiscal independence i nde pende nce f ishery develogaent may preclude public to be an independent participatian in operation vhich will the management of not rely on public fisheries. fundsy State Legisla- ture and a congressional oversight committee will monitor 318

HFA's f iscal and other activities.

Start-up Costs

Start-up costs for the establishment of the the HFA will require state and federal funding of about $300,000 per year for at least five years until the basic organizational structures and operating procedures are in place. About

8100,000 of this amount will be required for a small staff and the balance for travel for the board of directores, facility rental and office equipment and supplies, and consultant fees. Collection of fees can begin two years after the HFA is established to cover operational costs for services, such as licensing, etc. The establishment of the HFA is a step into the future in which natural resources, especially the primary harvest of food, will probably need to be managed for the public good.

CUNCMDlNG TBNJGIT8

Part of the rationale for the establishment of the HFA lies in the demise of such notions as 'world commons' and public ownership of the resources of these commons. Fish- eries are increasingly being "fenced' within management boundaries with the adjacent coastal nation states proclaim- ing preferred status within their extended exclusive economic zones, which include f isheries and other resources. Current international consensus supports this notion in the Law of the Sea LOS! Treaty. Most nations have unilaterally extended their seaward resource boundary to 200 miles as the United 319

States has done, first, as a conservation and management measure under the MFCMA and, later, as an extension of national jurisdiction under the exclusive economic zone proclamation in 3.983. The designation of the PCS as an exclusive economic zone has, in ef fect, formalized national privatization of the

200-mile FCs.

The Hawaii Fishing Authority, as a joint venture of the state and federal governments, harnesses the strengths of both governments, but it is an organizational structure which recognizes the capabilities of state and local interests to manage their own natural resources. Although there is a federal presence, and its interests in aspects of fishery management related to foreign policy must be respected, it operates on the same plane as do local interests because the actions of the board will not be subject to a federal agency veto. The HFA has the potential for initiating a unique brand of cooperative federalism fishery federalism. PART V APPENDICES APPENDIX A SURVEY ON HAWAIIAN COMMERCIAL FISHERS

The Survey Population

During June and September 1982, a telephone survey was made of 300 randomly selected commercial fishing license holders. The sample group was constituted by pulling every seventh name from the state's commercial fishers license file until a total of 300 subjects N! was selected. The sample consists of approximately 15 percent sample of the commercial license holders.

The distribution of N for the five major Hawaiian

Islands is given below.

Table A.1. Distribution of survey population

Jul~! LRLJ~C

Oahu 144 48 Hawaii 101 348 Kauai 23 Maui 30 101 Mol okai 2

Total 300 101*

*Does not add up to 100% due to rounding off

The contacts made by telephone on each island are tabulated in Table A.2. When compared to the distribution of

N Table A.l! over the five main islands, the differences in the distribution of the individuals who were interviewed n!

321 322

Table A.2. Survey population reached by telephone

Island Absolute No. Per cent

Dahu 79 48 Hawaii 568 34 Kauai 5 Maui l9 12 Mol okai 1 1

l63 100 deviates only slightly Table A.2! . The coefficient of covariance of N and n was statistically significant p

.Ol! . Thus, the analysis of n, a 53-percent sample, can be extrapolated for commercial fishers statewide with a high degree of conf idence. A note of caution is added here on statistics for Molokai. Because of the small number of n, which reflects the small number of fishers on the island as a f raction of the statewide total!, the discrete statistics for the island itself should not be regarded as having a high level of conf idence. The island is included in the statistics to complete the statewide data analysis.

The Survey

In addition to the information on the license form, all respondents were asked a specific set of questions to obtain

8hkh ldt ilddYd 1th

SPSS! .l

1 Norman C. Nie, Balai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Darin Steinbrenner> and Dale H. Bent, , 2nd Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1975!, pp. 218-248. 323

The survey questionnaire is attached as Appendix A-l.

A Statistical Prof ile of Haaraiian Commercial Pishers

Because no statistics were available on commercial fishers, the author conducted a survey in 1982 to develop a statistical profile of these fishers and their fishing behavior.2

The approximately 2,600 licensed Hawaiian commercial fishers are identified as: boat captain, crew member, or shoreline f ishers in of ficial license forms. The percentage in each class is tabulated in Table A.3. The 'others' category is ignored because of the small number.

Table A.3. Classes of the sample population

Posi tion Percent

Boat captain 69 Cr ew Shoreline f isher 236 2 Other

Total 100

The breakdown of the home island of boat captains who constitute about 69% of the commercial license holders is shorn in Table A.4. Boat captains are usually also the boat owners.

2 The results of this study is included in the 1985 update of the state's fishery developaent plan. See, Department of land and Natural Resources, Draf t Report! Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1985! . 324

Table A.4. Percentage of fishers who are captains on the f ive mai n i sl ands

Island % of Captains on the island

Oahu 63 Hawaii 73 Kauai 96 Maui 57 Molokai 50

The distance traveled f rom port to the fishing grounds

is shown below.

Table A.5. Distance traveled to fishing grounds by commercial f ishers

Distance traveled

Posi ti on 0-3 miles t%! 4-30 miles %! >30 miles %!

Captain 24 73 3 Crew member 18 71 12

According to responses in Table A.5, nearly one out of four boats fish almost within view of or just beyond the

coastline, most fish beyond the territorial sea but within easy reach of port, and only about 3% fish in more distant waters. This is corroborated by the Department of Land and Natural Resouces DLNR! in a recent report that most commercial fishing is done within 20 miles from shore.3

The extrapolated numbers see Table A.6! of commercial fishers on the main Hawaii, an Islands show that the numbers of fishers on the four less urbanized islands, Hawaii, Kauai,

3 Department of Land and Natural Resources, Draf t Report! Honolulu: State of Hawaii, 1984!, p. 13. 325

Table A.6. Commercial f ishers on the f ive main islands

Island Percent No. of f ishers*

Oahu 48.3 1~256 Hawaii 33.0 858 Kauai 8.3 216 Maui 9.3 242 Nolokai ~ 7 18 Unknown ~ 3 8

Total 99.3 2,598

*Population numbers were computed on a base of 2,600 commercial fishing license holders.

Maui, and Molokai, are disproportionate to the general

population distribution of residents of the state. About 78% of the state's residents live on Oahu, 10% on Hawaii, 4% on Kauai, 7% on Maui, and .6% on Nolokai.4 Data given in Table

A.7 indicate that most of the fishing activity of those who hold a commercial license appear to be parttime in nature.

Hence, by far, the state's commercial fishers are "weekend fishers." Recreational fishers were not included in this

survey because they are unlicensedg they are classified as

subsistence fishers by the state.>

When the percentages see Table A.7! are extrapolated for the approximately 2,600 commercial license holders statewide, about 1,950 are parttime fishers and 650 are fulltime

4 Robert Schmitt, State Statistician, 1983: personal communi ca ti on. 5 Subsistence fishing is defined here as small-scale harvesting for home consumption. 326

Table A.7. Work status of commercial fishers

Work status

Posi tion Par ttime ! Fulltime !

Captain 78 22 Crew member 65 35 Shoreline f isher 100 0

Total population 75

fishers. It is interesting to note that the state fisheries

development plan estimated 800 fulltime fishers. The discre-

pancy between the present survey results and the fishery mas-

ter plan estimate is 275 or about 34%. However, the plan

does not provide a definition for 'commercial fisher," hence,

the basis for the estimate is unknown.

The breakdown of fishers for each island Table A.8!,

shows the similarity in the percentage of parttime and fulltime status on Oahu, Hawaii, and Kauai which appears to follow the state ratio of about 3 to L. The percentage for

Maui is sharply skewed toward parttime fishers, a phenomenon which has not been noted or explained in any available literature. One explanation is the limited local market and

the dominance of bottomfish species in the waters off the

island rather than large tunas.6 The statistic for Molokai

should be considered only as part of the statewide population

because of the small number two individuals of whom only one was reached by telephone! representing the island. However,

Brooks Takenaka, Uni ted Fishing Age ncy, 1984: personal communi ati on. 327

Table A.8. Work status of commercial fishers on the f ive main islands

Work status

Parttime Fulltime Isl and

Oahu 77 23 Hawaii 71 29 Kauai 77 Maui 93 237 0 Molokai 100 the proportion of the number in relation to the statewide population spread of fishers is statistically correct.

The age range of Hawaiian fishers grouped by position is given in Table A.9. The median age of Hawaiian commercial fishers is 42.7, the mode is 31-40 years with 33% of the population in this range. About 20% are more than 50 years ol d.

Table A.9. Age of commercial fishers

Age range

Posi tion Below 20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 Over 71

Captain 4 31 68 53 29 16 4 Crew 6 21 25 10 0 5 3 Shorefisher 0 4 3 9 1 2 0

Total 11 56 98 74 30 23

Percent 4 19 33 25 10 8

The residence island! of the 31 to 50 age group, which constitutes 58% of the total population, is shown in Table A.10. The population as a whole is skewed somewhat toward the younger end of the age range. This does not bear out the 328 conventional picture of aging Hawaiian fishers except for

Kauai and perhaps Molokai.

Table A.10. Percentage of fishers on the main islands between 31 to 50 years old

Age range

31 40 years 4l 50 years Xsl and 8 for island! 8 for Island!

Oahu 37 19 Bawai i 29 27 Kauai 24 44 Maui 360 25 Molokai 50 Table A.ll presents the distribution of fishing vessels on five major islands. Slightly more than 90% of the fleets located on all islands other than Oahu are 15 to 20 feet in size. Oahu has more than 25% of the 31 to 70-ft vessels in the state and all of the vessels which are larger than 70-ft.

Cross-tabulation of types of f ishing with the residence of the fishers, shown in Table A.12, indicates that handlin- ing7 is the principal method used by nearly 618 of all fishers statewide. The percentage distribution of handliners on each of the four main islands are: Hawaii 28!, Maui

88!, Kauai 88!, and Oahu 18!.

7 Handlining in Hawaii is principally done from drifting boats in two ways. 'Palu ahi' is an adaptation of an ancient Hawaiian f ishing technique. When the hook, weighted with a stone sinker, reaches depths between 100-150 ft., mashed chum is released near the hook. The second method, known as "ika shibi,' utilizes squid-baited hook-and-line. Small fish is used when squid is not available. Ika shibi is a parttime night fishery which has expanded in the past five years. 329

Table A.ll. Percentage of vessels on five main islands

0 of 0 of Siz e of vessel Loca ti on Island fleet State fleet*

1S to 20 ft Oahu 79 39 Bawai i 89 31 Kauai 92 8 Maui 91 7 Mol oka i 100 .6

31 to 70 ft Oahu 20 10 Hawaii ll 4 Kauai 8 .6 Maui 9 .6

More than 70 ft Oahu ~ 6

«All sizes included.

Table A.12. Numbers of f ishers using selected f ishing methods

Island Handline Longline Pole a Line Traps Trolling Other

Oahu 641 251 95 60 632 208 Hawaii 615 87 269 0 511 77 Kauai 147 43 17 130 30 Maui 164 61 17 130 52 Mol okai 0 18 260 7 0 0 I/V* 7 0 0 0 0 0

Total 1,574 46 0 163 94 1,403 367

4 Fishers 60.5 17.6 6.3 3.6 54+1 14.1

Note: Percentage of fishers is based on method of fishing divided by number of commercial fishers ,600!

*Island unknown 330

Longline f ishers are concentrated on Oahu SS%! . As a class of fishers, they constitute only about 18% of the total population of commercial fishers. Ten percent of the f ishers on Hawaii and 13% on Maui are longliners. This fishery, however, produces the highest gross revenue.8

Pole and line fishers mostly aku fishers! constitute only about. 6% of all commercial fishers in Hawaii with nearly

60% of them on Oahu. Trolling is the second most widely used method of fishing in the state. About 50% of the trollers are on Oahu, 36% are on Hawaii, and about 10$ are on Kauai and Maui. These percentages are converted to numbers of fishers, based on a total of 2,600 commercial fishing license holder s. ! When 'fishing methods used' was plotted against fishing distance from shore, the-4 to 30-mile band of water off the main islands is the area in which most fishing activities occur, regardless of method of fishing. The data are shown in Table A.13.

Most of the fishing, 73%, is done beyond the territorial sea, 4 to 30 miles offshore. The percentage of vessels on each of the main islands which fish in these waters is shown in Table A.14. The proportion of vessels, which fish in the

4 to 30-mile band, on each island is very similar. This phenomenon is probably governed by the capability of the 15

Brooks Takenaka, United Fishing Agency, 1983: personal communi ca ti on. 331

Table A.13. Fishing methods used vs distance from shore

Frequency of occurrence in %,

Pi shing Aq uari um Hand- Long- Pole Tr ol- Distance Species Hand line line a Line Trap ling Other

0-3 mi 1.3 .3 6.7 2.3 ~ 3 .3 4-30 Hji .3 .3 24.3 3 ~ 7 2 ~ 3 2.3 0 mi 0 0 1.7 .7 0 1.0 Unknown* 2.0 2.3 28.0 ll. 0 3.7 4 ' 0

Total 3.6 2.9 60.7 17.7 6.3 3.7 54.0 7.7

«These data would not affect the known distribution because of the high correlation between the total sample population and the actual respondents.

Note: All percentages are equal to proportion of the statewide total for each fishing method shown.

Table A.14. Percentage of vessels which fish 4-30 miles off the five main islands

Xsl and 4 of Vessels on the island

Oahu 37 Hawaii 39 Kaua i 36 Maui 32 Nol okai 0 332 to 30-ft vessels, which is the typical vessel size in the state, and also bjj the fact that most commercial fishing is done by parttime fishers. When size of vessel was cross-tabulated with distance travelled to fish, about 72% of the 15 to 30-ft vessels fish within the 30-mile perimeter off the islands; 78% of the larger 30 to 70-ft vessels also fish in these waters. About 1.6% of the 15 to 30-ft vessels, 21.7% of the 31 to 70-ft vessels, and all vessels larger than 70 ft fish in waters beyond 30 miles. APPENDIX Bo THE DOGNATZSMRXGIDITY ATTRIBUTES OF FISHERY-SBCMR DBCIS ZONHllHGkS

Specifically> the rigidity and dogmatism attributes of six classes of fishery decisionmakers were studied as measures of their ability to utilize new information for problem solving.

Based on the literature, it was hypothesized that the rigidity and dogmatism scales of fishery decisionmakers would be related. Corroboration of this hypothesis would indicate that the two attributes are not independent measures and would be a rejection of the null hypothesis, namely that the two are independent.

Other questions naturally follow: !What are the dogmatism and rigidity scores of the sub-groups? ! What is the relation of the sub-groups vs their scores'? !What is the between-group relation to the aggregate scores?

OPBRliTIONiL DRFINITIONS

The dogmatism scale, as defined by its creator, Milton

Rokeach, is a 'measure of individual differences in openness or closedness of belief systems[;]...the scale should also serve to measure general authoritarianism and general intolerance. "~ Rokeach def ines "open" and 'closed" as the

9 Milton Rakeach, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960!, pp. 71-72.

333 334 two extremes of a continuum, based on which a person "can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received f rom the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising f rom within

[himself/herself] or from the outside. "1o Xn other words, one important manifestation of openness is that the more open an individual's belief system is, the stronger will be his or her ability to resist 'externally imposed reinforcements, or rewards and punishments" in evaluating information upon which action will be based.ll

Rigidity is defined by Wesley as a "tendency to persist in responses that may previously have been suitable in some situation or other, but that no longer appear adequate to achieve current goals or to solve current problems.'12 This attribute is characterized hJJ difficulty in shifting f rom previously establ ished conceptual sets.

%ER SURFEIT XNS'BNNIIT

Two separate instruments, developed by Rokeach and

Wesley, formed the single two-part instrument for this survey. The dogmatism questionnaire was the "f ront" of the machine-readable survey form and the rigidity questionnaire

Ibid. < p. 57 ll Ibid, p 58

Elizabeth Wesley, "Preservative Behavior in a Concept-Formation Task as a Function of Manifest Anxiety and Rigidity, ' 48 953!: 129-134. 335 was the "flip" side. The limitation of the machine readable form required a random selection of 24 items for the dogmatism questionnaire and 21 items for the rigidity questi onnai re.

No pre-test was done because the instruments used for this study were tested by their designers, Rokeach and

Wesley. Hence, it was assumed that the instruments were internally valid, i.e., the instruments actually measure the two attributes.

A 7-point interval scale was created for data analysis by re-calibrating the 6-point forced-choice dogmatism scale, ranging from +3 to -3 by including a constant 4.13 High on the new scale was 7 and law was 1. The sum of the scores of the 24 individual iten' constituted the. total dogmatism score of the respondent.l4 The rigidity portion of the questionnaire required the respondent to indicate whether the

21 items were 'true" or 'false." The sum of the 'correct' responses each correct item 1! constituted the respondent' s score.

THB SANK I GROUP

The 214 individuals who comprised the survey population

N! includes all decisionmakers who could influence fishery management in Hawaii. The six classes of decisionmakers are:

3 Rokeach, p. BB. 14 Forced choice scale is def ined as a scale in which there is no neutral choice. However, while a aero at midpoint in the +3 to -3 scale is not shown, it nevertheless is inferred. 336 f ishers, legislators, administrators, special interest group members environmental groups, e. g. Sierra Club, Greenpeace, etc. !, regional f ishery managment council RFMC! members, and fishery off icers. The Hawaii-based offices of the two federal agencies, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Pish and

Wildlife Service, were requested to identify the top administrators at the local, regional, and national

Washington, D. C.! levels to constitute the sample popul ation.

The state and county-level agency administrators and legislators were identified by consulting a directory. All heads of state and county executive agencies were included as were all members of the. f.our. co.un~ councils. Members of the marine resource and economic developaent committees of both houses of the Hawaii State Legislature and the four members of the state delegation to the U.S. Congress were also included in the exhaustive survey population.

The members of the Western Pacific Regional Fishery

Management Council and the Pacific Regional Fishery

Management Council and the fishery officers of the western region and the Western Pacific island governments, which are still under United States jurisdiction, comprised the fishery experts surveyed.

The survey questionnaire was pre-coded to identify respondents by class, residence as political-geographical jurisdictions!, and level of governmental affiliation or non- 337 governmental affiliation. The questionnaires were sent to a total of 214 decisionmakers in the six classes shown below.

Class Na.

Executive agency administrators 65 Legislator s 68 Special interest group members 7 Fishers/f ishing industry jexper ts 31 Members of regional f isheries management councils 35 Fishery officers Southwest region and Pacific islands!

214 These classes of respondents are residents of the following pol itical g urisdictions:

Residence No.

City and County of Honolulu 95 County -of Hawaii 27 County of Maui 17 County of Kauai 22 Mainl and, U. S. 476 Western Pacific island governments

2l4

The sample group represents the following levels of gover nment:

Level of Government Affiliation No.

County 42 State 51 Federal 81 No governmental affiliation~ 40

214

*This group includes Western Pacific island subj ects, The 75 questionnaires which were returned represent 32% of N. Tabulation of the number and categories of the respondents who returned the questionnaire is shown below: 338

Table B.l. Percentage of questionnaires returned

Percentage No. No. returned/No. sent!

Exec. agcy administrators 33 50 Legi slator s 19 28 Special interest groups 2 29 Fi sher s/f i ah. ind./exp. lo 32 Regional f ish. mgt. councils 6 17 Fishery of ficers 5 63

Reside nce

City and County of Honolulu 39 41 County of Hawaii 10 37 County of maui 6 35 County of Kauai 6 27 Nainl and, U. S. ll 23 Wester n Paci f ic i sl and gov ts 3 50

Level of Government Af f iliation

County 14 33 State 20 39 Feder al 24 30 Non-gov. af f il iati on~ 17 43

*This category includes the Western Pacific island gover nments.

The highest percentage of return was f ram the administrator category and the least fram members of the two regional fishery managementcouncils included in this survey.

A few questionnaires were returned unanswered. As a sub-group, legislators were the most 'vocal" in communicating their criticism of and hostility to the survey. The survey population for the present study is not a random samples it is a self-selected sample. However, the usual bias which may be attributable ta self-selection has been minimized in two ways in the present study. First, the results are being applied only to fishery-related decision- 339

making affecting Hawaii and are not being extrapolated to

apply to aLL populations of f ishery decisionmakers. Second, N is, as noted above, exhaustive. The possible bias of

non-respondents was not tested beyond obtaining a coefficient of covariance which showed a positive relation p < .05!

between N and the respondents n!, i.e., the distribution of

n is related to that of N.

IIETHODOMG Y The survey instrument was mailed with a self-addressed,

stamped return envelope. A self-addressed card was also included for respondents to request a copy of the results of the survey. Mo foLLow-up reminders were sent at approxi-

mately three-week intervaLs. The mean scores of the respondents were computed with

the SPSSX sub-program CROSSBREAK.L5 The correlation between the dogmatic and rigidity scores was analyzed with the SPSSX

sub-program, PEARSON CORR Pearson Product-moment Correlation

Coeff icient! . Percentiles and f requency statistics were

computed with the sub-program PRRQUENCXES. The distribution

of n above and below the 50, 66, and 75 percentiles was

determined with NPAR TESTS MEDIAN! .

DZSCMSION OP TIIB RESULTS The mean scores of respondents are compiled in Table B.2 below:

l5 SPSSInc., New York: McGrev-HiLL Book Company, 1983! . 340

Table 8.2. Mean Scores of Decisionmakere

Cl ass Dogmatic Score Rigidity Score

Exec. agcy adminstrator s 77.03 9.41 Legislator s 8le72 9.05 Special interest groups 75.00 8.00* Fisher/f ish. ind./exp. 85.40** 10.50»» Reg. fish. mgt council 74.83 9.83 Fishery of ficers 74.20* 9.00

Govt/Son-govt Af f il iation

County 81,08»» 8.57» State 80.80 9.95*» Federal 74.67» 9.29 Non-gov. af f il iati on 80.88 9.76

Mean 78.88 9.43

The administrators' score constitutes the approximate mean of the dogmatism 8.88! and rigidity 9.43! scores when the scores are compiled as classes of respondents. Fishers have the highest dogmatism and rigidity scores. The lowest dogmatism scores are those of fishery officers and regional f ishery management council RPCM! members. The dif ference between the mean scores of these two classes is only .63.

The least rigid is the special interest group class.

When the groups were categorized according to government affiliationjnon-affiliation, county of ficials had the highest and federal officials the lowest dogmatism scores. The highest rigidity score is that. of state officials and the lowest that. of county officials. The range of the 341 respondents' dogmatism and rigidity scores are given in Pigures B.3. and B.2, respectively.

%he Ana1ysis of Coefficients

Table 8.3 provides the results of a parametric test of correlation between the dogmatism and rigidity scores and the two categorical variables vs attributes. Xn general, the correlation coefficients of the latter relationship are low. The dogmatism coefficients of fishers/fishing interests and federal decisionmakers and the rigidity scores of fishers/ fishing interests and county decisionmakers are relatively high, but not statistically signif icant.

The most significant statistic is the coefficient of the aggregate dogmatism and rigidity scores of the total sample population which was significant at p<.01. The level of significance of the positive correlation between the aggregate dogmatism and rigidity scores of the total sample population bears out the research hypothesis that the two attributes are r elated.

Beyond the testing of the null, the distribution of the dogmatism and rigidity scores of the sub-categories above and below the group median of 'class" and "level of government aff iliation' was determined. Table 8.4 shows the distribution of n, grouped by class, below and above the median of the rigidity A! and dogmatism B! scores. Table 8.5 shows the distribution of n, grouped by governmental or non-governmental affiliation, below and above the median of the rigidity and dogmatism scores. 342

LEGEND 120 CLASS 1. Administrator 2, Legislators 100 3. SpeciaI Interest Groups w 80 4. Fishers 5. RFMC 0 6, Fish Officers 60 LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 1. County

40 2. State 3. Federa I 4. Non-Government 20 MEAN------2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 CLASS LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT

Figure B.l. Range of the dogmatiaa scores 343

20 LEGEND CLASS 010 1. Administrator 2. Legislators 3. Special Interest 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 I 2 3 4 Groups 4. Fishers CLASS LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 5. RFMC 6. Fish Officers LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 1. County 2. State 3. Federal 4. Non-Government MEAN

Figure B.2. Range of the rigidity scores 344

Table B.3. Bi-serial correlation coefficients

Class Bi-serial Correlation Coef f icients

Dogmati sm Ri gi di ty

Adaini strator s -.0758 .0082 t egi sl ator s . 0394 -.0806 Special Interest Group -.0367 .0862 Fi aher/Fi sh. Ind./Exp . 1863 . 1523 Reg. Fish. Mgt Council .0686 .0430 Fishery Of f icers .0735 .0420

Govt/Non-govt Af f il iation

County -. 0144 -.1501 State .1007 .1092 Federal .1672 .0352 Non-gov. Af f il iation . 0934 .0655

Dogmatism vs. Rigidi ty .3335*

*Significant at, p<.01 345

Table B.4. Spread of respondents by class below and above the rigidity and dogmatism score median of the sample group

A. Percentage of respondents above and below the rigidity score median

Rigidity score range: 5-16 Median~9

Class Bel ow 0! Above !

Actini str ator s 53 47 Legislator s 53 470 Special Interest Groups 100 Fishers/Fishing Industry/Experts 40 60 Regional Fishery Management Councils 33 67 Fishery Off icers 60 40

B. Percentage of respondents below and above the dogmatism score medi, an

Dogmatism score range: 36-113 Median 79

Class Below Above

Administrator s 55 45 Legi sl ator s 42 58 Special Interest Groups 50 50 Fishers/Fishing Industry/Experts 40 60 Regional Fishery Management Councils 67 33 Fi ah cry Of f ice r s 60 40 346

Table B.5. Respondents by government/non-government grouping, above and below the rigidity and dogmatism score median of the sample group A. Percentage of respondents below and above the rigidity score median

Rigidity score range: 5-l6 Mean 9.0

Level of Government Below ! Above %!

County 57 43 State 42 58 Federal 54 46 Non-governmental af f il iation 53 47 B. Percentage of respondents below and above the dogmatism score median

Dogmatism score range: 36-ll3 Median 79

Level of Government Below 0! Above !

County 43 57 State 45 55 Federal 63 37 Non-governmental af f il iation 47 53 347

Based on the distribution of the sample given in Tables

B 4 and B.5, a rigidity-dogmatism prof ile was developed f or n by class and level of government Table 8.6! . The prof iles

are based on two statistics, numbers of individuals above and

below the median of the respondents' scores and spread of their scores in relation to the median.16 As in any

conversion of metric data to non-metric categories, arbitrary

standards are imposed. Hence, a 10% differential between the

percentage of distribution above and below the median was

used to designate 'high' and 'low," respectively. 'Moderate"

is used where the 10% differential was not met.

Table B.6. Rigidity-dogmatism profile by class and level of government

A. Class Rigidi ty Dogmati sm

Ahninistrator mode rate-leer low Legislator moderate- 1m' high Special Interest Group low moderate Fishers/Fishg Interests high high Reg. Fishery Mgt Council hi gh low Fishery Of f icer s low low

B. Level of Government

County low high State high high Federal low low Non-gover nment low mode r ate- hi gh

6 Rerlinger gives a brief explanation of the theory of central tendency, which is the theoretical basis for the methodology used to develop the rigidity-dogmatism prof ile tl .5!. ~ . t ~ 2nd ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1973!, p. 144-145. 348

The low-low prof iles of fishery officers and federal decisionmakers indicate a high level of openness to change.

This profile is corroborated by the negative correlation coefficients of the two attributes for these categories see

Table B.3! . While not as sharply def ined, administrators are also open to change because their rigidity profile at the 50 percentile is skewed toward low. Legislators and non-governmental and county-level decisionmakers are able to utilize new information because of their tendency toward low rigidity, but their high dogmatism prof ile imposes bounds to their ability to use new information to modify their behavior.

Special interest group members are open to change. This trait is enhanced by their relatively low dogmatism scores

although not within the l0% differential! . Members of the regional fishery management councils high rigidity-low dogmatism!, would not be inclined to change traditional methodologies because of their inflexibility and resistence and/or inability to use new information for problem solving. At the extreme closed end is the high-high profile of fishers and f ishing interests and state-level decisionmakers. These individuals have strongly held belief sets, which exacerbate their inability to use new information. These decisionmakers can be expected to impose severe bounds on their information search because of their psychological attributes.

As a check on the stability of the rigidity-dogmatism relationship at the 50 percentile, a similar test was done for the 66 Table B.7! and 75 Table B.8! percentiles. 349

Table B.7. Distribution of decisionmakers above the 66 percentile of the rigidity and dogmatism scores

A. Class Rigidi ty 0! Dogmati ea 87!

Administrators 34 18 Legi sl ator s Special Interest Groups 260 420 Fishers/Pishg Interests 40 60 Reg. Pish. Mgt Councils 33 33 Fishery Of f icer s 20 40

Mean of 0 3l 39

B. Level of Government

Co unty 29 29 State 32 35 Pede ral 33 21 Non-governmenta1. 29 47

Mean of 8 33 350

Table B.8. Distribution of decisionmakers above the 75 percentile of the rigidity and dogmatism scores

A. Cl ass Rigidi ty ll! Dogmati sm 89!

Administrators 19 16 Legislator s 26 32 Special Interest Groups 0 0 Fishers/Pishg interests 30 40 Reg. Fishery Mgt Councils 33 33 Fishery Officers 25 25

Mean of 4 27 29

B. Level of Government

County 2l 29 State 26 25 Federal 2l 17 Non-governmental 24 29

Mean of % 23 35l

The distribution of n at the 66 percentile indicates a general low rigidity-high dogmatism prof ile of the total population. The higher percentage of administrators Part A! scoring above the rigidity score of l0 than those scoring above the dogmatism score of 87 makes it an anomalous class.

Similarly, the higher percentage of federal-level decisionmakers Part 8! scoring above the rigidity mean is a deviation f rom the profile of the total sample.

The general low rigidity-high dogmatism relationship of the distribution of n remains the same at the 75 percentile as at the 66 percentile. The within-class relationships are changed somewhat. However, the distribution of the f ishery officers at the 75 percentile is the same for both dogmatism and rigidity--a shift f rom low rigidity-high dogmatism. The percentages of the two attributes established at the 66 percentile for the other classes remain essentially the same at the 75 percentile.

When the individuals are categorized according to the level of government to which they are aff iliated, county decisionmakers shift to a low rigidity-high dogmatism profile

Table 8.8! from the even distribution of the two attributes at the 66 percentile Table B.7!. This fits the pattern established by these individuals at the 50 percentile Table

8.5! . The percentage of state and f ederal decisionmakers who scored higher than ll on the rigidity scale is greater than those who scored above 89 on the dogmatism scale. Hence, these categories show a continuing trend toward rigidity. ApmSOIX C. IlmameIOH HBTIIOIX Oe FmBIUa ASD STATB PISHBRY-SBC5!R MNIS ISTRATORS

Personal interviews were utilized to obtain data which were used to construct the information network of fishery administrators. A questionnaire was constructed to maintain unif ormity.

RRSMRCH DBSXQN

This study is based on the assumption that institutional decisionmaking is done by administrative heads, who are influenced by those from whom they seek information needed for decisionmaking under various conditions. This information- seeking behavior of fishery administrators was used in def ining their communication netvork. The top administrators at three levels of the federal agencies Hawaii, regional, and Washington, D.C.!, which are separated geographically, vere assumed to be the boundary interfacers and the intake point of inf ormation f rom extra-agency sources.

The hierarchical organizational structure of the agencies simplified the identification of the appropriate decisionmaker at each level. Since location within the hierarchy coincided with the level of authority, i.e., the top of the organizational chart was occupied by the top decisionmaker, location on the agency's organizational chart was used to select the administrative decisionmaker.

352 353

Using the interview data, the communication sources of the administrators were mapped to develop of the information linkages between and among agencies and their sources of inf ormation.

The Population

Three decision nodes were identified for each of the federal agencies: the head office in Washington, D.C., the regional offices on the West Coast NMFS regional of fices are located in La Jolla and Terminal Island, Calif orniag VSFWS regional office is in Portland, Oregon!, and the Honolulu of f ice.

An unsuccessful attempt was made to interview the head of the state agency, the Department of Land and Natural

Resources DLNR!, which is the organizational structure within which the Division of Aquatic Resources DAR! is a component. The explanation given to the researcher was that all information pertaining to fisheries is provided to the head of DLNR through the director of BAR; hence, the director of DAR was the only state administrator interviewed.

The respondents ares

1. Four administrators two in washington, D. C. and one each in Portland and Honolulu! from U.S. Pish and Wildlif e Service USPWS!

2. Five administrators one in Washington, D. c., two in California and two in Hawaii! from the National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS!

3. One administrator from the State Division of Aquatic Resources DAR! Tbe Instrument

An extensive survey instrument was developed by the researcher utilizing both seven-point interval scaled and open-ended responses. The questionnaire consisted of three parts: ! general information on the agency, such as organizational goals, perceived clientele, consonance of agency activity with societal values, etc., ! the inf ormation sources used by the decisionmaker, including general patterns of intra- and extra-agency communication, and ! the evaluation of the implementation of the MPCMA.

Only part 2, the communication network of the administrators, is utilized in this analysis. The two questions asked to obtain the basic data ta construct the information network of the administrators were:

1. When you make decisions on questions/ problems/issues related to the general function of your agency, name three to five persons you may actually consult to obtain inf ormation.

2. Name three to five persons f rom whom you get inf ormatian on MPCMA-related issues.

They were also asked to give the reasons for their choices as an open-ended question.

The Interview<

Personal interviews, requiring betwee~ one hour and fifteen minutes to nearly two hours each, were conducted.

Two exceptions need to be noted here. The USPWS identified two administrators who had expertise in fisheries to be interviewed in place of the agency head in Washington, D.C.

In Portland, the administrator in charge of general administration rather than the overall regional administrator was interviewed because of the health of the latter. The responses of the administrators are plotted as networks with arrows pointing to the contact persons cited by interviewees in response to the two questions noted above.

Separate networks were plotted for each administrator for each question. These individual networks were then combined for the information network for each agency. In addition, as the third iteration, a composite tri-agency network was plotted to obtain an overview of inter-agency information linkages.

Diacuasion of the Results Overall, the results of this study provide a description of the information channels through which agency heads seek data for decisionmaking. Bath micro- and macro-organizational behavior can be seen by examining the information network of organizational decisionmaking. The IIational Marine Fisheries Service of the U.S. Department of ~erce

Three clearly def ined central informational sources are identified for NNFS in Figure C.l:

l. The American Tuna Foundation APT!

2. The Director of MR

3. The Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council WPRFMC! Chairperson and Executive Director 356

Pigure C.l. Sources of inf ormation for general agency decisionmaking: NNPS 357

The two regional administrators, the directors of the South- west Region and the Southwest Fisheries Center have a strong reciprocal, indicated by a two-way arrow. While they cite their awn staff in the regional offices in Hawaii and Cali- fornia as sources, all administrators are in touch with extra-agency saurces with the Honolulu-based administrator having the mast diverse array of information sources. The citing of three University of Hawaii research- oriented faculty members, the directors of the Hawaii Enstitute of

Marine Biology and the Sea Grant College Program and the chair of the Northwestern Hawaiian Xsland Research CoorcU. nating Committee, probably reflects the cooperative efforts in a five-year fishery-related research program conducted by NMFS, US%IS, MR, and the University of Hawaii. This is the only acknawledged contact with the University of Hawaii as a saurce af information by any administrator.

The three extra-agency information sources cited above

ATF, MR, WPRFMC! can easily become information brokers and may to an extent assume that role for the Washington, D.C. office. Haw strong or weak the broker function is depends on what is being sent 'upward' concurrently along the hierarchical chain of command as standard reports. The well-connected intra-agency linkage among the four regional and Honolulu offices weaken the pasition of the WPRFNCand the state EAR somewhat as information brokers. However, the convergence on these two institutions and the APT is a strang indication of the importance of these saurces of inf ormation. But, perhaps 358 of greatest significance is the absence of direct intra- agency linkage among the three levels of the organization.

Decisionmakers at the three levels did not cite each other as sources of information except for the two-way information link between the directors of the Southwest Fisheries Center and the Southwest Region of f ice.

Figure C.2 is a plot of NMFS's information sources for

MFCMA-related decisionmaking. The f ocal points of extra- agency information sources remain essentially the same, i.e., they are still focused on MR and WPRFMC. The Washington,

D.C. and Honolulu offices are linked by these two information sources and there is a direct linkage between the Washington

D. C. administrator and the Honolulu Laboratory director. The regional administrators are not a part of the intra-agency network of the NMPS head in Washington, D.C. However, there is a strongly interlocked core group a clique'P! at the regional level. The laboratory director of the Southwest Fisheries Center does not solicit information f rom outside sources, but he is linked to Honolulu-based agencies indirectly through the Honolulu Laboratory director, his subordinate, who is the boundary interface with DAR and

WPRFMC. The three administrative levels [NOAA Assistant Ahninistrator head of NMPS!, Director of the SW Region, and NMPSAdministrator Honolulu! ] in the NMFS hierarchy obtain information f rom the next higher level, i.e., there is a downward flow of inf ormation for MFCMA-related decisionmaking among the offices of the organization in contrast to the 3S9

Figure C.2. MPCMA-related infarmatian network: NMFS 360 f ree-wheeling conf iguration for regular agency decisionmaking shown in Figure C.l. The U.S. Fish and Nildlife Service of the 9.8. Department of the Interior The information network for general agency decisionmaking of USPW'S, shown in Pigure C.3, is a contrast to that of HMFS. Information sources cited by interviewees at the Washington, D. C. and regional levels are all intra-agency personnel, with the exception of the contact with wildlife organizations at the regional level. The three administrative levels are linked by the lower level providing information to the level above itg hence, the information flow is upward. The boundary for the organization is the area administrator, based in Honolulu, who gathers information fram relevant state and federal agencies. The regional and area offices are brokers and can exercise a great deal of discretion in the kind af information which is sent upward. The upper level administrators in Washington, without independent outside contacts, as in the case of the NMPSadministrators, apparently have no way of readily testing the validity or accuracy of the information they receive.

ln the information network for MPCMA-related decisionmaking Figure C.4!, the regional of f ice becomes the broker which links the Washington, D.C. office with the local office. The regional office, however, has its own contact in the state through the Hawaii Division of Forestry and

Wildlife. The area and regional administrators are linked 361

Figure C.3. Sources of information for general agency decisionmaking: USPWS 362

Figure C.4. NPCNA-related information network: USPbTS 363

through the Office of Federal Assistance to Regional Councils

in Portland and the area administrator retains his role as boundary interfacer for the organization in MPCMA-related

matter s.

Division of Aquatic Resources of the Department of Land and Natural Resources, State of Hawaii The information network for general agency decisionmaking Figure C.5! includes not only federal agencies and MR's own staff, but, its principal constituents--fishers. The head of DLNR relies on the director of the MR, his sub-

ordinate, for reports and recommendations.

The OAR director's information network for MPCMA-related

issues, shown in Figure C.6, indicates increased contact with

NMFS by including the local administrator in addition to the

laboratory director, but does not include USFWS. The chair-

man and the staff of WPRPMC are additional contacts. For both regular and MPCMA-related decisionmaking, the director of DAR assumes both the boundary and broker positions vis-a- vis DLNR. This position is strategic since the head of the

DLNR looks to the director as the sole source of information, other than that which the former might obtain incidentally

from his other activities and contacts. Trf-agency Network for General Decisionaaking The reduction of intra-agency details in Figure C.7 cla- rifies extra-agency linkages but linkages or lack af linkages between geographically separated offices of a single agency are preserved. The administrators of DAR and NMFS obtain 364

Pigure C.5. Sources of Pigure C.6. MPCMA-related information for inf orantion general agency network: DAR de cist' ormaki ng: DAR 36S

pigure C.7 ~ Tri-agency network for general agency decisionmakinq 366

information from many extra-agency individuals. While the

Honolulu and regional offices of NMFS cite the director of

DAR as an information source, the linkage is one-way. The MR, however, has a strong link with USFWSthrough a two-way channel, although the person cited by the MR director is a staff member and not the area administrator. The Corps af

Engineers, however, is a common information source for MR and USPWS. Overall, in openness to information from extra- agency sources, NMFS is the most open on the basis of sheer numbers and variety of individuals contacted by the administrators. However, there are intra-agency channel breaks between the Washington, D. C. office and the regional offices.

The only intra-agency linkage cited was that from the regional to the Honolulu office.

Some observations can be made from these data concerning

NMFS. Apparently the young age of NMFS, established under Reorganization Plan XV in 1970, has not yet solidified com- munications processes into standard operating procedures

SOPs! which limit outside informational sources at all levels. However, this diffusion may be sacrificing a strong intra-agency linkage. The breaks in the communication linkages among the top administrators within the organization may cause conf usion< especially if extra-agency groups serve as brokers between two levels of the agency, e.g., the regional councils and the American Tuna Foundation serve as links between the regional and the Washington offices. The 367 use of extra agency brokers would be more beneficial to the agency if a strong linkage, i.e., a two-way channel, existed among the NMFS administrators also. The existence of a strong intra-agency link would weaken the power of an external broker, because of the multi-point sources of information.

The position of MR vis-a-vis the federal agencies is one of power, according to network theory. MR's power is based on its position as one of the core actors and the sole source of inf ormation about the state. Obviously, such information is required by federal agencies. The position of the director of MR is further enhanced if the extra-agency contact at the lower levels within its own hierarchy is can- stricted to such an extent that all information is channeled through the director's office. However, the negative consequences of such a constricted channel probably outweigh any possible gain, in terms of increasing institutional rigidity, etc.

As indicated in Figure C.7, the state agency is strongly linked to the USPWSand NMFS by a two-way tie. The Corps of

Engineers provides an indirect link between MR and the USPWS office in Honolulu. It is, however, probably safe to assume that DAR would not consider the Corps to be a bridge to the

USPWS

Finally, in this scenario, the information network of USPWShas interesting implications both for intra- and interagency or intergovernmental relations. Its neat communica- 368 tion channels are significant in several ways. Because the higher level administrator obtains information only from the immediate lower leveL, with the exception of the departmental solicitor in Washington and the regional office contact with wildlife interest groups, any data transmitted fram the area achinistrator's office to the administrator in Washington could undergo as many as three levels of abstractian. With- aut direct access ta extra-agency information sources, there is no way for the reified information to be checked with details of the raw data by administrators at the upper levels of the hierarchy.

Three possibilities of error may occur in the reifica- tion pracess: ! abstraction forces the deletion of inf ormation and interpretation may misconstrue inf ormatian~ ! bias enters in the abstraction process through the personal value system of the abstractor; and ! the interpretation of what may be perceived to be general departmental missional goals mary vary at the different hierarchicaL levels.

A possible skewing in the network needs ta be noted here. Since the persons interviewed for USPWS in Washington,

D.C. were nat at the same administrative level as the administrator interviewed for NMFS, it is unlikely that there would be communication between the persons interviewed in the two agencies. Hence, there is a passibility that there could be a two-way or strong linkage between the Washington offices of the two heads of the agencies, similar to that existing in the Honolulu offices of the two agencies. 369

Overall, there is a strong possibility, explainable by organizational theory, that the constricted inf ormation channels of the USFWSmay be an artifact of age since the placement of the USFWS in the U.S. Department of the Interior occurred under Reorganization Plan No. I1 939! and Reorgan- ization Plan No. III 940! . A case can be made for the setting of SOPs over a 40-year period, since it is well-recognized that organizations will tend to reduce uncertainty and increase 'eff iciency' by routinization. Tri-agency Network for NPCNL-related Decisionmaking

The tri-agency network of information sources for MPCMA- related matters Figure C.8! clearly shows the prominence of the chair and Executive Director of the WPRPMC. The MR also occupies a strong central position; however, the WRPFMC'spo- sition is probably stronger because it is also a source of information for the DAR. Within the year that data were being gathered for this study, the WPRFMC's Executive Direc- tor resigned and the position was filled by the former Achainistrative Assistant. It is noteworthy that even while occupying the position of Adninistrative Assistant, the present Executive Director was mentioned as a source of inf ormation by several administrators.

The Honolulu offices of NMPS and OAR are shown to be strongly linked in Figure C.8. The local NMPS offices are in a position of centrality with direct ties to both the region- 370

Pigure C.8. Tri-agency network f or NFCMA-related deci si oeaaki ng 371 al and Washington, D.C. offices. In addition, it is also the link with USEWS. In essence, it serves nearly the same strategic function as does WPRPMC. However, the NMPS intra-agency network falls apart at the regiona1 leve1. The regional administrators are ignored as a source of information by ally the linkage with the Honolulu offices is to the regional solicitor's office only. However, the regional of fices obtain information fram both the Washington and the Honolut.u offices. The direct linkage between the Washington, D.C and the Honolulu offices bypasses and creates an enclave at the regional level. The regional level, theref ore, does not appear to be a significant source of information for national-level decisionmaking. This was a puzzling finding because the voting representative of NMFS on the WPRFMCis the regional administrator.

The USPWS is totally ignored by the other two agencies, yet it is the legal administrator of all of the land mass in the NWHI, with the exception of Midway Islands and Kure

Atoll. The area administrator of USFWS cites the MRg NMFSg and WPRFMCstaff as sources of informationy hence, fulfilling pretty much the same kind of function in this scenario as for non-MPCMA operations Figure C.7!, i.e., he is the information intake point or boundary interface in Hawaii. The regional office is the source of information for both the local area and Washington, D.C. offices. It appears that for matters related to the FMCA, the regional office is the significant source of information for the USHiiTS. However, for 372

Hawaii, the citing of the state Division of Forestry and

Wildlife by the regional administrator underscores the primary concern of the USPWS the preservation of wildlife. Finally, the powerful position of WPRPMCis abundantly evident. While there are possibilities for a brokerage function which can be carried out by the Honolulu office of HOOFS or the BAR, they are not likely to be credible as being im- par ti al. PhRT VI BIBLIOGRAMT BIBLIOGRAERY OF CITED WORKS

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