Feminism, Epistemology & Morality
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Feminism, Epistemology & Morality Cathrine Holst Doctor Rerum Politicarum University of Bergen, Norway 2005 UNIVERSITETET I BERGEN i ISBN 82-308-0062-6 Bergen, Norway 2005 Copyright Printed by: Allkopi Bergen ii Feminism, Epistemology & Morality Cathrine Holst Doctor Rerum Politicarum Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences & Center for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities, Faculty of Arts University of Bergen, Norway 2005 iii Preface Funding from NFR’s theory of science project and the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Bergen, made it possible to write this thesis. Several people have read and commented upon previous versions of the thesis or parts of it. Their critique has been extremely valuable to me. I owe all of them something, and some of them a lot (more than they themselves are aware of). I thank them by name as I go along. None of these generous people are responsible for the many weaknesses of this thesis. Thank you, friends and loved ones, you who take care of me, stand by me, and share my commitments and worries. Without your presence, patience and encouragement, I could have done nothing. iv CONTENTS INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………...1 PART I Feminist Epistemology………………………………........................3 CHAPTER 1 SUSAN HAACK’S CRITIQUE OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY………4 1.0 A feminist epistemology?................................................................................4 1.1 “Confessions of an Old-Fashioned Prig”……………………………………6 1.1.1 Value-free justification of theories……………………………………………………….6 1.1.2 Feminist epistemology: Democratic epistemology, social epistemology and women’s ways of knowing……………………………………………………………………………….7 1.2 Defending value-freedom against democratic imperialists………………….8 1.2.1 The sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly true……………8 1.2.2 Whether a theory is justified depends, however, only on features indicative of its truth, not its significance……………………………………………………………………………10 1.2.3 A theory is most probably true if it can be demonstrated that it is best supported by independently secure and comprehensive evidence…………………………………………..11 1.2.4 Values express subjective wishes or desires……………………………………………17 i) Values as virtues……………………………………………………………………………18 ii) Values as justified moral standards………………………………………………………..19 1.2.5 The wish or desire that P provides no evidential support for P………………………...22 1.2.6 Thus, justification of theories cannot refer to values…………………………………...22 1.3 Countering radical interpretations of “science as social”…………………..23 1.3.1 Inquiry, theoretical justification and truth-seeking – wholly a matter of social negotiation?...............................................................................................................................24 1.3.2 Inquiry, theoretical justification and truth-seeking – partly a matter of social negotiation?...............................................................................................................................25 1.3.3 The good, sober sociology of science…………………………………………………..27 1.4 Escaping women’s standpoint……………………………………………...29 v CHAPTER 2 THE ARGUMENT FOR VALUE-FREEDOM: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT………………………………………………………………...33 2.0 Justification of theories – a value-free endeavor?.........................................33 2.1 Assessing the first premise…………………………………………………33 2.1.1 Separating significance from truth……………………………………………………...33 2.1.2 Haack’s notion of discretion……………………………………………………………34 2.2 Assessing the second premise……………………………………………...35 2.2.1 Significant theories – not only true……………………………………………………..35 2.2.2 Why inquiring about features indicative of truth confronts the inquirer with ought- questions………………………………………………………………………………………36 i) Is, can and ought……………………………………………………………………………36 ii) The value of theoretical virtues……………………………………………………………38 iii) Value-laden concepts and distinctions in factual propositions……………………………39 iv) Burdens of judgment………………………………………………………………….......41 v) Significance – a question of values………………………………………………………..42 2.3 Assessing the third premise………………………………………………...46 2.3.1 Supported by evidence. What does it mean in the human and social sciences?..............46 2.3.2 Apel reads Peirce: A realist discourse theory of truth…………………………………..49 2.3.3 Comparing Apel and Haack – elaboration, discussion and critique……………………52 i) Common features…………………………………………………………………………...52 ii) Epistemology with or without moral philosophy?...............................................................53 iii) Redescriptions and validity-claims……………………………………………………….55 iv) Tacit knowledge…………………………………………………………………………..57 The not-possible clause Tacit values Confirmation or truth? v) Truth and justification……………………………………………………………………...63 vi) The morality of truth………………………………………………………………………67 vii) Metaphysical realism……………………………………………………………………..69 2.4 Assessing the fourth premise……………………………………………….71 2.4.1 Haack’s notion of values as subjective wishes or desires………………………………71 2.4.2 Haack’s notion of values as virtues……………………………………………………..74 2.4.3 Haack’s notion of values as moral standards…………………………………………...75 2.4.4 The question of values in inquiry: A question beyond values………………………….76 i) Truth and morality………………………………………………………………………….77 ii) Morality and ethics………………………………………………………………………...79 iii) Ethical claims and theoretical justification………………………………………………..81 2.4.5 Representation, civility and democracy………………………………………………...84 i) Cognitive and intellectual authority………………………………………………………..84 vi ii) Tempered meritocracy in truth-seeking……………………………………………………85 iii) Equal respect in truth-seeking…………………………………………………………….86 iv) Democracy in value-laden inquiry………………………………………………………...89 2.4.6 What is the political?........................................................................................................91 2.5 Assessing the fifth premise…………………………………………………92 2.6 A different conclusion……………………………………………………...95 CHAPTER 3 SCIENCE AS SOCIAL AND THE ARGUMENT FOR VALUE- FREEDOM……………………………………………………………………97 3.0 Moderates – in favor of value-freedom?.....................................................97 3.1 Wholly a matter of social negotiation? A re-assessment…………………...98 3.1.1 Moderates among the radicals…………………………………………………………..98 3.1.2 Misconceived concessions……………………………………………………………...99 3.2 Partly a matter of social negotiation? A re-assessment…………………...100 3.3 A good, sober sociology of science: A different suggestion……………...101 3.3.1 Good science without good philosophy?.......................................................................101 3.3.2 The internal and external organization of science……………………………………103 3.3.3 Debating science as social: From camps to arguments………………………………..104 CHAPTER 4 FEMINIST STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY: A RECONSTRUCTED CRITIQUE…………………………………………………………………...106 4.0 Should epistemology embody some specifically feminist insight?.............106 4.1 Why stress the feminist case? Sexism in science and society…………….106 4.1.1 Haack’s general suspicion……………………………………………………………..106 4.1.2 Sexism in the natural sciences?......................................................................................109 4.2 Sandra Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology: An assessment……110 4.2.1 Harding’s good reasons………………………………………………………………..111 4.2.2 Why grant women epistemic privilege? Harding’s eight reasons……………………..113 4.2.3 Women’s different reasoning………………………………………………………….119 4.2.4 Should women’s different reasoning grant them cognitive privilege?..........................121 4.2.5 From unequal cognitive authority to unequal intellectual authority…………………..124 4.2.6 From women’s reasoning to women’s emotions?..........................................................126 4.2.7 When women claim different things…………………………………………………..127 4.2.8 From women’s standpoint to feminist standpoint……………………………………..128 vii 4.2.9 What is a woman?..........................................................................................................130 4.2.10 Women’s oppression as truth-functional?....................................................................131 4.3 Concluding remarks……………………………………………………….132 PART II Feminism in a State Feminist System……………………………133 CHAPTER 5 FEMINIST CRITIQUE: THE NORWEGIAN CASE……………………134 5.0 “[…] intense discussions about modernity”………………………………134 5.1 The significance of the Norwegian case…………………………………..136 5.2 The period of self-reflection – a historical perspective…………………...138 5.3 Methodological considerations……………………………………………142 5.4 Criticism of the thinking of modernity……………………………………147 5.4.1 The conservatism of modern thought………………………………………………….147 5.4.2 The patriarchal project of modernity…………………………………………………..156 i) Modern history – a history of patriarchy………………………………………………….156 ii) The modern canon of patriarchal thinkers………………………………………………..161 5.4.3 The abstractions of modernity…………………………………………………………167 5.4.4 Critique of the modern autonomous subject…………………………………………..175 5.4.5 Epistemology and methodology……………………………………………………….184 5.4.6 Feminist strategies……………………………………………………………………..198 5.4.7 The problems of universalism…………………………………………………………204 5.4.8 Individualism and the good community…………………………………………….....214 5.4.9 Equality and power…………………………………………………………………....227 5.4.10 The public and the private……………………………………………………………232 5.4.11 Capitalism and patriarchy……………………………………………………………239 5.4.12 Rationality, femininity and sentiments………………………………………………244 5.4.13 The aesthetical