DOSYA: Kürdistan’da İdeoloji

Kurdish Salafism: Ideological and Organisational Roots in the Region of Deniz çifÇi

Introduction , and specifically , has, since its arrival in the Kurdish regions during the 7th and 8th centuries, been one of the leading factors in determining the ’ socio-cultural and political affiliations and theiremic and epic identification. The Kurds, however, have not followed or performed a homogeneous form of Islam. The changes and variations in Islamic thought and the formation of various re- ligious schools and movements have been reflected in the Kurds’ own complex practices of engagement. The Kurds follow diverse , madhhabs (the Sunni school of jurisprudence) and tariqas (in particular Naqshbandiyya and Qadiri- yya—two significant Sunni spiritual ways of ), though the overwhelming majority have adopted Orthodox (according to van Bruinessen, ap- proximately 80 percent of the Kurds in general)1 or heterodox (according to Romano, approximately 20 percent of the Kurds in ).2 There are also Shiite Kurds (around 5 cent of the Kurds, mostly in and to lesser extent in Iraq), 3 and adherents of the Yazidi (mostly in Iraq) and Ahl-i-Haq (People of the Truth, also known as Kakai and ) . Ahl-i-Haq followers mostly live Iran and Iraq. Some associate Ahl-i-Haq with Shi’ism, but these faiths both doctrinally and in terms of their and practices show certain differences.4

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The overwhelming majority of Sunni Kurds follow the Shafi’i madhhab. Some Kurds, such as those of the ethno-religious Kurdish Zahra religious movement, use Shafi-i jurisprudence to draw clear boundaries between Kurdish society and that of their Turkish and Arab neighbours, as the latter follow Hanafi jurispru- dence. Of the Sunni Kurds, a considerable number follow the Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya Sufi tariqas, even though some Salafi Kurds, such as Abdul Latif Salafi, consider these tariqas—and Sufism in general—to be a deviant path.5 Some of the Kurdish Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya leaders, such as the Naqshbandiyya adherent Sheik Ubeydullah, Sheik Said and Mustafa Barzani, and the Qadiriyya follower Sheik Mahmoud Barzanji, organised the Kurdish national movements in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Salafism is another school of thought that has found sympathy with some Kurds, but, compared with the other schools of thought and the Naqshbandiyya and Qa- diriyya tariqas, Salafism arrived late in the Kurdish regions. Salafism’s appearance among the can be dated back and/or linked to the formation of the [Kurdish] , founded around some bookstores in Diyarbakir and Batman in the Kurdish regions of Turkey in the late 1970s and early 1980s.6 However, Hez- bollah’s relationship with Salafism is quite pragmatic and controversial. Hezbol- lah’s rejection of secular lifestyles and regimes and its call for the formation of an Islamic state (during its initial years), or at least the establishment of a Sharia-based religious system in Turkey, 7 and its demands for social and religious puritanism, allow us to consider the group within a broader Salafi framework. Doctrinally, Hezbollah’s refusal to accept an extreme application of takfir (excommunication) and militant , its use of ta’wil (allegorical interpretation of religious texts), and its over emphasis on the concept of Sunnah8 are also decisive factors pro- viding a grounds for identifying the group within a moderate Salafi context in general. However, certain factors blur the boundaries between Hezbollah and the mainstream Salafi trend. These include Hezbollah’s relations with the Shiites and Sufis, its celebration of Mawlid (the observance of the birthday of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH)), its relations with the secular systems, its involvement in politics (with the formation of Huda-Par in 2012), and the reduced emphasis it puts on the creation of an Islamic state (at least not officially). Hezbollah in this regard is neither a completely a Salafi group nor a non-Salafi group.9 Hezbollah and its affiliated groups also avoid providing clear answers regarding whether they can be defined within Salafism’s boundaries or not. This means that it is possible to findnurcu Said-i Nursi’s and the takfiri jihadist Sayyid Qutb’s books on the same shelves in Hezbollah’s or its related group-affiliated houses, a fact which I person- ally witnessed during my fieldwork visits in 2014. In my personal communication with the Hûda-Par and some former Hezbollah members in 2013-2015 in Istanbul and Batman, for example, none of them mentioned the term Salaf or Salafism in

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response to my question how do you identify yourself and the manhaj of your cause? They simply said they were Muslim. Defining Hezbollah entirely within or outside Salafism’s boundaries is therefore problematic. On the other hand, although their precise number is not yet known, there are some Kurdish individuals who share the Salafi ideology have joined various Salafi groups in Turkey, such as the ISIS-related Halis Bayancuk’s group (known as the Abu Hanzala group). In fieldwork research carried out in Istanbul in 2015, I met five members of this group—two of them were of Kurdish origin. Some of them had been in throughout 2012-2014 and had joined Japhat al-Nusra’s (Nusra Front) ranks for a while. They told me that Abu Hanzala’s group and Salafi Jihadi groups in Syria had recruited many Kurds from Turkey, particularly from the cities of Bingöl, Adiyaman, Agri, Batman, Konya, Bursa, Izmir, and Istanbul.10 In some ISIS-related videos and publications, too, there were Kurdish jihadists who spoke with a Kurmanji accent and called on the Kurds to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and to fight against the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and secular Kurdish parties in Iraq.11 Aar- on Stein’s study has also confirmed that some Kurdish individuals have joined global Salafi groups, such as al-Qaida’s Syria affiliate Jabhat al-Sham (previously known as Japhat al-Nusra), the Salafi Ahrar al-Sham group, and ISIS.12 Though it is not at the collective level, it is safe to say that; Salafi jihadi ideology has found sympathy within some Kurdish individuals in Turkey. Salafism also appeared quite late among the Kurds in Syria and Iran, compared with the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. Salafism failed to receive much support in these regions; nonetheless, some did join al-Qaida and ISIS, especially in Iran. Following the US occupation of Iraq in particular, Iran turned a blind eye to the Salafi groups’ activities in order to encourage the Salafi Jihadi groups to fight against the US forces. Iran allowed Salafi Jihadis to cross Iraq and Afghanistan through its lands; for example, Iran permitted a high number of al-Qaida’s and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s militants to cross the Kurdistan region in 2001.13 Fur- thermore, Iran tolerated Salafi groups’ activities among the Sunni Kurds in order to counter-balance the activities of the secular and nationalist Kurdish political parties the Komala Party of (Komala) and the Democratic Par- ty of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI).14 Iran’s policies in this regard provided a grey zone for Salafi Jihad group activities through interactions with the Sunni Kurds, as Hemn Sayyedi, a former Kurdish politician and researcher, told me.15 Iran’s ethno-religious pressure has also driven some Kurdish individuals to join ISIS in recent years.16 For example, there were Kurdish Iranians who participated in the ISIS attacks on the Iranian parliament on June 7, 2017.17 Salafism is nonetheless quite weak and lacking a strong base and significant grassroots membership among the Kurds in Syria and Iran.

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In contrast, Salafism has extensive and deep ideological and organisational roots in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRG), as will be discussed in detail in the follow- ing section. Under various names and structures, Salafi groups have existed and become influential among some Kurds in the KRG since the late 1950s. Inspired by the (MB), some Kurdish sheiks—in particular those who received an education in Egypt and/or who interacted with the MB’s Iraq affili- ates—organised in and around the Halabja region. Certain local and regional po- litical developments—internally, the Kurdish national struggle against the Ba’ath regime, by the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP), by the Patriotic Union Party’s (PUK) attempts to prevent the conversion of religion into ideological activism, and by the formation of an Islamic state—and externally—by the Soviet-Afghan war, and by the emergence and dissemination of Salafi Jihadi ideology—provided a fertile environment for the formation of the Kurdish , the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK, also called the Islamic Movement in Iraq Kurdistan or IMIK) in 1987. The IMK initially admitted purist Salafis, Ikhwanis, Salafi Jihadis, and moderates into its ranks; however, it failed to keep all of them under its control after the late 1990s. Most Salafi Jihadi groups were Kurdish veterans of the Afghan war (Kurd-Afghan veterans) who had split from the IMK, and they initially formed Jund al-Islam (JAI, Soldiers of Islam) on September 1, 2001, and later Ansar al-Islam (AAI, Supporters of Islam) on December 10, 2001. The latter declared the formation of an Islamic emirate in the Kurdistan Mountains and imposed ultra-conservative Salafi Jihadi doctrines on the territories under its control. The AAI was driven out of Kurdistan following the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, but the group has continued to have influence over some Kurdish individuals. Militant Jihadi Salafism, there- fore, lacks collective support in Kurdistan; however, there are a growing number of non-militant Jihadi forms of Salafism in Kurdistan. Alongside some moderate Salafi parties, many Kurds are either part of or have sympathy for various small and well-organised Salafi groups, such as the Abdul Latif Salafi group. We can certainly say, then, that Salafism is on the rise in the KRG in multiple forms. Having established this historical and modern geo-political context, this article aims to explore the ideological and organisational roots of Salafism in the KRG. The article is structured into three parts. The first part provides a brief discussion of Salafism, the second examines the historical and organisational roots of Salafi movements in Kurdistan, in particular the IMK, and the final part describes the Salafi Jihadi groups themselves, in particular AAI.

Salafism: A Brief Framework Salafism is a reform movement of Sunni Islam that presents itself as embodying the moral and and practices of the first three Muslim generations

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(also known as as-Salaf as-Salih, the pious predecessors): the Sahabah (Prophet - hammed (PBUH) and his companions); the Tabi’un (their successors); and the Taba Tabi’un (the successors of the successors). These generations are called Salaf, and those who follow them Salafis.18 The ideas and practices of the Salaf embody how to approach, understand, interpret, and practice religion.19 Salafism is meant to involve moral and religious purification, which, Salafis claim, can only be achieved by replicating the values of the Salaf period, which is the purest and most pious period, known as the golden period. The Salafis thus attribute sacred meaning to their manhaj, or method, and regard it as the only rightful and authentic way, referring to the Hadith reported by al-Bukhari: “The best people are those of my generation, then those who come after them, then those who come after them. Then, there will come people after them whose testimony precedes their oaths and their oaths precede their testimony.”20 Salafism is one of the most socially and religiously conservative schools within Islamic thought, defining itself as the ‘saved ’ (firqa najiya).21

Salafism in Kurdistan Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) Salafism’s appearance in Iraq dates back to the 19th century, mostly among the Alusi family and some religious Ulama.22 The Salafi movement’s presence in mod- ern Iraq dates back to the late 1950s. Later, the Muslim Brotherhood’s increasing political and religious activism and call for jihad provided the momentum for the growth of Salafi ideas in the Muslim world, including Iraq. However, Iraq’s social and political structure, and later the Ba’ath party’s seizure of power (1968-2003), limited the MB’s influence in that country and restricted the spread of its social, religious, and political activism there.23 Because of the doctrinal conflict between Salafism and Shiism, there was no ground for Salafi activism among the Shiites. This meant that Salafism only managed to attract a small number of Sunni Arabs and Kurds. The Ba’ath party’s ideology (a mixture of Arab socialism and nationalism) and authoritarian rule, however, did impede the MB to reach masses .24 Even so, the Ba’ath party did tolerate the MB’s activism in the Kurdish region to some degree, as part of its aim to balance and restrict the Kurdish national movements—the KDP and the PUK—and also to limit the rise of ethno- through religion. The MB found a positive reception from some Sunni Arabs and Kurds in the 1950s, in the cities of , Arbil, , Basra, and Sulaimani.25 These followers initially gathered together under the name the Society for the Salvation of Palestine, led by Sheikh Mohammed al-Sawah.26 This group’s Kurdish members, along with some Kurd- ish sheiks who were influenced by Hassan al-Banna’s ideas, later established the

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Union of Muslim Scholars of Kurdistan (UMSK) in Halabja province in the Kurd- istan region in 1954. 27 The UMSK embraced the ideology and strategy of the MB. The Kurdish nationalist movement’s organisational and military dominance, its opposition to the politicisation of religion, and its conversion into an “Islamist activist ideology” and imposition of Sharia in the public space, 28 ultimately limited the UMSK’s influence. The Kurds’ war with the Iraqi regime and the majority of the Kurds’ prioritisation of their ethno-national identity over their religious struggle further impeded the UMSK’s expansion. The UMSK’s restricted activities thus meant that it was mainly active among some Kurdish sheiks and religious individuals in and around Halabja. Nonetheless, the UMSK managed to create an organisational and ideological foundation that would later give birth to the various religious groups in Kurdistan in the late 1980s.29 The first religious groups in Kurdistan were thus small and mostly located in Halabja and its environs, but, over time, their attempts to impose Sharia law and expand into larger Kurdish areas drew some Kurds to them, and some of the group members’ desire to take up arms led to the KDP and the PUK becoming concerned about the conversion of religion into ideological activism, especially in its militant form, in the Kurdish region, as this was a direct challenge to the Kurdish national struggle, and had the potential to weaken their own power.30 The KDP and the PUK were also of concern to Iraq and other countries in the region, mainly Iran, because of their attempts to use these religious groups to undermine Kurdish national activism and ethno-national consciousness. The KDP, but mostly the PUK, thus took an uncompromising stance against radical Salafi Kurdish Islamic groups and Salafi ideology, arguing that Salafi ideology was incompatible with democracy and change. According to prominent PUK politician Mullah Bakhiyar: “As long as Salafism reigns over religion, religion can never make itself compatible with change. If religion is saved from Salafism, without a doubt, religion can come forward with all changes and give comfort to the of the human”.31 Resisting pressure from Kurdish nationalist groups, and in order to publicise reli- gion, some Salafis, according to Abu al-Waleed al-Salafi,32 organised armed resis- tance between 1975-1980 and established the first armed Islamic group. They began operating under the name the Islamic Army in Kurdistan33 after they had initiated political activism and organised mass demonstrations against Saddam Hussein’s “village destruction campaign” project in the late 1980s.34 The Iraq army violently crushed the Kurdish Islamists, who, heavily defeated, went into hiding in the mountains, where they established the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK-Bizût- neweyî Îslamî Li Kurdistan)35 under the charismatic leadership of Mullah Uthman Abd al-Aziz.36 Declaring jihad against Saddam Hussain’s regime, but also against secular Kurdish forces,37 the IMK’s slogan was “Quran, rifle, the banner, and there is no but God and is His Messenger”.38 The IMK admitted mem-

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bers following various Islamic and from numerous religious groups into its ranks, among them Ikhwanis and moderate Salafis, though Salafi Jihadis became dominant later.39 The most well-known Ikhwani faction within the IMK was al-Nahda (the Islamic Renaissance Movement), under the leadership of Sadiq Abd al-Aziz,40 which had been active in Kurdistan since 1993. The Salafi Jihadis were mostly Kurdish veterans of the Afghan war, and they put pressure on the IMK to commence armed struggle and form a Taliban-style Islamic emirate in Kurdistan. 41 The Soviet-Afghan war drove many Muslims to join their ranks from Muslim countries and from across Europe, including Kurds, and these were quickly indoctrinated in Salafi Jihadi ideology.42 The nature of the war—fighting against the godless communists and saving Muslim lands—provided a strong religious motivation to convert and an environment in which to do so. The Soviets’ defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan led many Arab-Afghans to return to their country of origin and run their struggle from there, with the intent to remove tawaghit (a derogatory term referring to infidelity) or secular Muslim rulers and establish an Islamic state, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s attempts to foment the idea of Salafi jihad in Jordan, Syria, Palestine, and Iraq.43 The defeat of the Soviet army—even though it was due in large part to the US and West’s military and financial support—caused many Salafi Jihadis to believe that they could remove secular Muslim authorities and establish an Islamic state, as the Taliban had in Afghanistan between 1996-2001. Most of the Arab-Afghan jihadis, therefore, either founded local Salafi Jihadi groups on their return home or became part of the global Salafi Jihadi movement al-Qaida. Kurd-Afghan veterans also returned to Kurdistan with the same motivation. They joined the IMK and put pressure on the group to launch an armed struggle and form a Taliban-style Islamic emirate.44 These veterans believed that they could defeat the secular Kurdish forces and the Iraqi regime, placing firm reliance on the strength of their ideological motivation, the Kurds’ religious identity, and Kurdistan’s geographic conditions. The Kurd-Afghan Salafi Jihadis were also not happy with the IMK’s Ikhwani ideology and enactment of a non-armed strate- gy.45 In particular, Kurdish national parties failure to prevent Saddam Hussein’s Halabja genocide in 1988 and the Iraqi army’s violent advance into Kurdish ter- ritories provided an opportunity for the Salafi Jihadis to justify armed struggle, and allowed them to put pressure on the IMK to adopt a more aggressive line.46

IMK-PUK Conflict The Kurdish Islamists’ message did attract some Kurds in the 1990s, with the result that the IMK could present themselves as an alternative power in Kurdish politics. The establishment of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq in 1992 and the Iraqi army’s

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withdrawal from the Kurdistan region furthermore provided a golden opportunity for the IMK to reorganise in Kurdistan. This was not a welcome development to either the KDP or the PUK, both afraid that regional countries, especially Iran, might exploit Kurdish Islamists to undermine the Kurdish national struggle. Iran was certainly happy to see a power balance between the KDP and the PUK and the Kurdish Islamists and a reduction in the strength of Kurdish nationalism, but, since its primary concern was the elimination of Saddam Hussein’s regime, it did not want an internal Kurdish conflict to damage the Kurds’ fight against it. But the PUK was in greater fear of Islamists’ potential influence and the consequent weakening of its own power, since the Islamists were mostly active in PUK-con- trolled territories. The PUK therefore commenced an armed conflict in between 1990, lasting until 1992, and drove the IMK out of many areas, with hundreds dead on both sides.47 A high number of IMK members went to Iran in the 1990s. With a growing awareness of the damage being caused to both sides, and of Kurdish national groups’ desire to pursue Kurdish Islamic activism on legal platforms—including the main body within the IMK, the Ikhwanis and mod- erate religious individuals—the PUK now decided to cooperate with the IMK and support its participation in elections.48 The IMK did so in the election held in 1992 in the Kurdistan region. The IMK’s past military expansionism had been unpopular, however, among Kurds who had believed it had damaged their fight for independence, and the IMK’s new turn to political activism did not lead to success in the election: it won only 5,05 percent of the total votes (49,108 votes out of roughly 1 million votes), which was not enough to pass the 7% election threshold for gaining a seat at parliament.49 This electoral failure, especially considering its political activism and experience, was a surprise for the IMK, causing the group to withdraw and return to Halab- ja and the places where it had strong support. Electoral defeat for the Kurdish Islamists, on the other hand, provided a golden opportunity for Salafi Jihadis to now justify their arguments for seizing territorial control and re-engaging in armed struggle. This meant the establishment of an alternative authority in those areas where they were powerful, because, despite the IMK’s defeat in most of Kurdistan, the group had succeeded in achieving around 50% percent of the votes in and around Halabja.50 The IMK aimed to concentrate its power in those areas and provide social services there, including local administration, education, and health. The IMK’s main aim in this regard was to create a separate social, cultural, political, economic, and military structures. To the PUK, this meant a parallel au- thority and administration, and it strongly reacted to the IMK’s new autonomy. 51 The PUK soon initiated military operations to end this authority, which resulted in severe clashes between both parties. The PUK’s military capacity was superior to that of the IMK, and it succeeded in stopping, or at least considerably weakening,

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the IMK’s activities in and around Halabja. Nonetheless, the IMK took advantage of the KDP-PUK clashes and managed to secure military and territorial control in some mountainous areas. The conflict between the PUK and the IMK was extremely costly to both sides, and further weakened the Kurds’ struggle against the Iraqi regime. To stop the conflict, the IMK and the PUK, encouraged by Iran, which mediated in the ne- gotiations, reached an agreement, known as the Pact, in 1997.52 Based on this agreement, the IMK joined the Kurdistan Regional Government and took responsibility for the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs. The IMK in return renounced its policy of promoting religion and imposing Sharia law, and allowed the PUK to establish its authority in Halabja, Tawella, and the Panjwin districts lying near the Iranian border.53 The IMK undoubtedly did not abandon its ultimate goal of creating an Islamic emirate, but it well knew that neither the political conditions in Kurdistan nor the recent regional developments were convenient for doing so. Though the agree- ment did end the conflict between the PUK and the IMK, then, it nevertheless greatly increased tensions between them, fostering many discussions among the various factions within the IMK. Salafi Jihadi groups within the IMK were espe- cially dissatisfied at having reached an agreement with secular Kurdish parties, and vehemently opposed its terms, in particular abandoning the aim of imposing Sharia law and forming an Islamic state. This was an essential aspect of their struggle, based on Salafism’s view that is and that secular groups are heretical. 54 In particular, the Kurdish Afghan veterans continued to disseminate their Salafi Jihadi ideas, and ultimately forced the IMK to adopt strict jihadi methods55 of pursuing defiant armed resistance against the Kurdish and Iraqi forces, claiming that they could easily overthrow Saddam Hussain, defeat the secular Kurdish forces, and establish an Islamic emirate in Kurdistan.56

Salafi Jihadi Splinters from the IMK Kurdish Hamas, The Second Soran Unit and Tawheed Groups Ideological contradictions and disagreements regarding strategies and methods and relations with the secular Kurdish parties began to lead to disputes between the IMK and Salafi Jihadi groups in the early 1990s. Certain external local and regional developments—such as clashes between the IMK and Kurdish national parties, the creation of no-fly zones, and the Kurdish national struggle—delayed an early split within the group. But internal ties were severed after the IMK joined the electoral system and ended armed conflict, soon afterwards abandoning the commitment to forming an Islamic emirate as part of the Tehran agreement. The IMK was now divided between Salafi Jihadis and the main body of the IMK (Ikhwanis).

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The first Salafi Jihadi splinter group to leave the IMK was Hamas in 1997, led by Mullah Abu Asad Hewleri.57 Adopting a militant jihadi interpretation of Salaf- ism in its ideology, Hamas actively supported and engaged in extremely violent activities in Kurdistan.58 The group declared militant jihad, including against secular institutions, international humanitarian and relief organisations, Kurd- ish and non-Muslim politicians, and civilians who did not obey and practice Sharia law—particularly women who did not behave properly, or who did not cover their bodies.59 The second Salafi Jihadi group that broke from the IMK was the Second Soran Unit in 1998, under the leadership of Abu Abdullah al-Shafi. Al-Shafi was a well-known figure within the Kurdish Salafi Jihadi network, and he led the main Salafi Jihadi group until his arrest in May 2010. The majority of the Second Unit’s fighters were Kurdish and Arab veterans of Afghanistan,60 and it was well organised and armed compared to other Salafi groups—it is estimated that the group had around 350-400 fighters.61 The Second Soran Unit also adopt- ed an extreme interpretation of Salafism, in particular “a puritanical Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.”62 The third Salafi Jihadi group to split from the IMK was Tawheed in 2000, led by Abu Muhammad al-Kurdi. Tawheed’s base was in Balek in the Qandil mountains, close to the Iranian border. The Tawheed group united with the Path of Ibrahim group, which was led by Omar Baziani. Follow- ing their union, Baziani was appointed to Tawheed’s leadership.63 Similar to the Second Soran Unit, Tawheed also adopted a Wahhabi interpretation of Salafism and mostly attacked the KDP, especially through assassinations.64 As part of its policy of publicising religion and imposing Sharia, Tawheed followed the path of Hamas and initiated attacks on the various KRG-affiliated and independent secu- lar intuitions and civilians, particularly women who were not clothed according to Islamic rules. They threw acid on the faces of unveiled women, and attacked beauty salons, clubs, and tourist areas.65 This Salafi Jihadi group’s purpose was to spread fear among Kurdish individuals who preferred and practiced a secular lifestyle.66 They succeeded in their aim to some extent, because, as some of my female participants—such as a female academic at Sulaimani University—told me, secular Kurdish women covered their faces and avoided going to beauty salons for a while when they heard of Salafi jihadis’ acid attacks.67 Most members of Hamas, the Second Soran Unit, and Tawheed were Kurds, but they also included a considerable number of Arabs, mainly from Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. A Kurdish teacher who used to live under these group-controlled villages in 2001 told me in our interview in Sulaimani in Kurd- istan confirmed this. He said he could easily recognize them through their accents and physical appearance. However, he said there were also Arab militants within them who spoke different forms of .68

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Komal Islam and the Islah Movement The IMK was weakened by the breakaway formation of Hamas, the Second Soran Unit, and the Tawheed groups. Within the IMK itself, disputes became far more apparent,69 and resulted in further fragmentation following the death of its char- ismatic leader Uthman Abd al-Aziz in 1999 and the succession of his brother, Abd al-Aziz. Soon after assuming the leadership, Ali Abd al-Aziz united with his brother, Sadiq Abd al-Aziz led al-Nahda, and Kurdish Hamas in 1999, to form the Islamic Unity Movement of Kurdistan (IUMK), also called the Islamic Federation of Kurdistan.70 But al-Aziz was unable to hold the federation together, mainly because of doctrinal ideological disputes and strains over leadership and methods, and it fragmented in 2001.71 Taking many of the al-Nahda members with him, , the former military commander of the IMK, then established Komal Islam (Kurdistan Islamic Group) in 2001. Initially holding a Salafi ideology, Ali Bapir’s Komal Islam ultimately abandoned armed resistance and a militant jihadi form of Salafism in 2001; the group now takes part in elections and local government and has good relations with the secular system.72 It even avoids calling itself Salafi. The Komal Islam’s political advisor, Muhammad Hakim Jabhar, told me that the members prefer to be called Muslim rather than Salafi, though they respect and follow the Salafi path. He claimed that some religious groups have manipulated and corrupted Salafism.73 The collapse of the Islamic Federation of Kurdistan also resulted in the formation of the Salafi Jihadi Islah Movement (Reform Association) in 2001, led by Mullah Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad, known as Mullah Fateh Krekar, a highly experienced and well trained Kurd-Afghan veteran who returned to Kurdistan in 1992.74 Mul- lah Krekar learned Islamic jurisprudence from al-Qaeda’s mentor Abdullah Az- zam.75 According to Jason Burke, Krekar founded a guesthouse in Peshawar where he greeted and hosted many of the Kurdish jihadists during the Afghan-Soviet war.76 His ideology combines Salafi Jihadi doctrines with Sayyid Qutb’s ideological activism.77 The Islah Movement was also one of the most extremist groups, and the overwhelming majority of its members were Kurdish.78 The Islah Movement had Kurdish national views, which is unusual when compared to other Salafi Jihadi groups, which typically distanced themselves from the Kurdish national struggle. Even quite recently Krekar has “wholeheartedly” supported Kurdish independence.79 Mullah Krekar’s group was relatively well armed and well or- ganised in some Kurdish areas; even so, he was unable to withstand the PUK’s military power and, as the following section discuss, his movement ultimately merged with the JAI. After the split between Ali Bapir and Mullah Krekar, Ali Abd al-Aziz returned the group to its original name, and the IMK’s leadership passed to his brother, Irfan Abd al-Aziz, in 2007. All of the Salafi Jihadi groups discussed above have had an influence in dissem- inating Salafi ideas among the Kurds, but, as the following section explains, it

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was when the JAI, and later AAI, Salafi Jihadi groups first established territorial control and set up a de-facto Islamic emirate that the seeds of militant Salafi jihadism in the KRG were sown.

Jund al-Islam (JAI) We have seen that despite sharing similar ideological underpinnings and having almost the same ultimate goals, Salafi jihadist groups in IMK operated inde- pendently of each other for a while. Various internal and external factors and developments, however, made their merging unavoidable in the later 2000s. The September 11 attacks, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the increasing international pressure put on Saddam Hussain’s regime, and the US signalling of a military operation in Iraq, were some of the regional political developments that led Salafi Jihadi groups to consolidate and establish a strong front. Domestic developments, too, imposed pressure on Kurdish Salafi Jihadi groups to merge. The end of the internal Kurdish conflict between the KDP and the PUK following the Washington agreement in 1998, along with both groups’ military supremacy, led to them receiving international support, increasing their desire to eradicate Salafi Jihadis from Kurdistan.80 This drove Salafi Jihadi groups—Hamas, Tawheed, the Second Soran Unit, and the Islah movement—to cooperate further and unite against both internal and external threats and developments. Furthermore, al-Qaida also urged Kurdish Salafi Jihadi groups to combine their powers and create a Salafi Jihadi front against US forces and their Kurdish and Shiite allies in Iraq. After the US invasion and the destruction of its military and training bases in Afghanistan, al-Qaida began looking for a place of shelter where it could transfer its transnational Salafi Jihadis. The US declaration that it would occupy Iraq, the power vacuum in Iraq, and Kurdistan’s geographical conditions, all made Kurdistan a very convenient place. A document found in Kabul in 2001 revealed that al-Qaida urged the Kurdish Islamist groups to unite and establish “ Islamic Brigades.”81 Kurdish Salafi Jihadis also spoke of the Kurds’ Muslim identity and highlighted the necessity for cooperation between Islamic movements both at the local and global levels.82 Some of these groups’ fighters had already either been part of or associated with al-Qaida during the So- viet-Afghan war.83 The Kurdish Salafi Jihadi groups, therefore, were also willing to cooperate with al-Qaida; this was also important considering JAI’s financial needs. Motivated by these factors, Mullah Abu Bakr Hewleri and Abu Qatada from the Tawheed movement initially visited the al-Qaeda leadership.84 Members of Hamas85 as well as Mullah Kreker, the leader of the Islah Movement—who, as mentioned before, was an Afghan veteran with close affiliations to al-Qaida’s leadership during his time in Afghanistan—also visited al-Qaida leadership in

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Afghanistan. These Kurdish Salafi Jihadi groups visited al-Qaida and vowed “to expel those Jews and Christians from Kurdistan and join the way of Jihad, [and] rule every piece of land . . . With the Islamic Shari’a rule.”86 Soon after the meeting with the al-Qaida leadership, the first union of Kurdish Salafi Jihadis was established between Tawheed and Hamas under the name Jabhat al-Tawheed al-Islamiya in July 2001, led by Omar Baziani.87 A few months later, the Second Soran Unit joined the union, and they established JAI on Sep- tember 1, 2001—the groups took Biyara as their stronghold. 88 The initial aim of JAI was to appoint the Jordanian Abu Abdullah al-Shami (he was affiliated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group) as their leader, but this was ultimately rejected because he was foreign to the region and could not speak the local language. Instead, a Kurd-Afghan veteran, Abu Abdullah al-Shafi (also known as mullah Wuria Hewleri), was announced as amir.89 The formation of JAI, according to JAI sources and al-Sharq al-Awsat’s report, was witnessed and brokered by three Afghan-trained al-Qaida members: Abu Abdul Rahman, who was al-Qaida’s representative for the regulation of unity between Kurdish Salafis; Abu Wa’il, who was an expert and instructor in sabotage; and Abu Darda’a, who was known as an instructor in and assassination.90 JAI, according to the Kurdish sources, received approximately $300,000 to $600,000 from al-Qaida.91 A former JAI militant named Fatah, who was imprisoned by the PUK, also confirmed this. In his interview with theChristian Science Monitor, Fatah stated that in a conversation (which took place in his presence) between Kurdish Islamist group representatives and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Kurdish Islamists said that “they had already received money once from Abu Qatada.”92 JAI was the first union between Kurdish Salafi Jihadists, and the group was deter- mined to eliminate any political, military, and religious obstacles preventing the formation of an Islamic emirate in Kurdistan. The group declared jihad against the secular Kurdish political parties, secular institutions, different religious groups, and Naqshbandi Sufis—all of these groups and institutions, to JAI, deviated from the “true path of Islam.”93 More explicitly, as noted in a Human Rights Watch Report, JAI declared that it was seeking to “defend the areas under the influ- ence of the Muslims from interference and control by the secularists,” and that among its aims was “the propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice (al-amr bil ma’ruf wal nahiy ‘an al-munkar), as well as ensuring the application of Sharia and undertaking “the religious duty of jihad against the secularist apostates.”94 Kurdish forces, mostly the PUK, were already concerned about the Salafi Jihadis in Kurdistan, and the formation of JAI in this regard intensified their fears and provoked the PUK to take military action against the group’s bases. The PUK’s forces defeated JAI in many areas and pushed them back to the Iranian border.95 JAI’s defeat and withdrawal from some regions made the formation of

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new and more powerful unions necessary. The group consequently consolidated its power with Mullah Krekar’s militant Salafi Jihadi movement, Islah, which was also in conflict with the PUK-controlled regions in Kurdistan.

Ansar al-Islam (AAI) JAI and the Islah movement combined their power and declared the formation of AAI on December 10, 2001.96 AAI announced the formation of an Islamic emirate in Kurdistan, also known as the “emirate of the mountains.”97 Mullah Krekar was appointed as the group’s amir and Abu Abdullah al-Shafi (the formeramir of JAI) as second in command. The latter is in charge of the Sharia and administrative and organisational matters, while Mullah As’ad Muhammad Hassan (Asu Hawliri) is the deputy for military issues.98 AAI embraced an extreme puritanical Orthodox Sunni Islamic ideology, with a firm reliance on a Wahhabi interpretation of Salaf- ism, especially in its manhaj.99 Moreover, it was also “influenced by the thoughts of Sayyid Qutb in ideology and the program of the Egyptian [Islamic] Jihad group in activism.”100 Abdullah Azzam, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada, Abu Musab al Suri, and Abu Bashir were other leading Salafi Jihadi figures who inspired AAI’s ideological stance.101 According to the Kurdish and AAI-affiliated sources, the number of the group’s fighters reached around 5600 in 2001-2003.102 Most of AAI’s militants were Kurdish, but there were also Turkmens and Arab Afghans from Iraq, Morocco, Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Yemeni, and Sudan in its ranks. 103 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi affiliated Jihadis also cooperated with and joined AAI until 2003. 104 Al-Zarqawi, who set up a military and training camp in Herat in Afghanistan between 1999-2001, evacuated his members soon after the US invasion of Afghanistan and took sanctuary in AAI until 2001-2003.105 AAI soon extended its area of influence and formed Sharia and military training camps,106 in total some 27 training centres.107 It established its stronghold in the Biyara area and seized control of the many villages and surrounding areas, ruling almost 200 km with a populace of approximately 400.000.108 Establishing a Tali- ban-style Islamic emirate in the territories under their control, AAI set a “Hisba apparatus and issued new identities to their members.”109 Continuing JAI’s militant practice and strategy, AAI declared war against secular institutions and imposed Sharia law; all men were obliged to pray at the mosque during time; wom- en were barred from education and work and had to cover their whole face (with the traditional abaya); products with women’s pictures were banned; beards were obligatory for men; there was segregation of sexes; and there were severe Islamic punishments for drinking alcohol and committing adultery, including amputation and flogging.110 Based on Salafi Jihadi ideology, as is also the case with militant , AAI defined all other religious interpretations and groups, in particular

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Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya tariqas, as deviant paths, and declared war on them, and even destroyed their tombs in 2002.111 For instance, AAI seized Kakai villages (the Ahl-e Haqq ), demolished their shrines, and left them with three options: convert to Islam, pay a jizya (tax), or leave their homes.112 The group’s political and administrative practices in this regard were similar to the Taliban’s emirate in Afghanistan, as the latter’s first act after seizing power was to destroy statues. AAI entered into fierce conflict with the Kurdish peshmerga forces. The group organised attacks on PUK security forces and assassinated politicians; for example, they killed 42 PUK peshmergas in one assault and killed a KDP-affiliated leading Christian politician and Hewler governor Franso Hariri on February 18, 2001.113 The group also attempted to assassinate the PUK prime minister of the time, , in April 2002. Five of his bodyguards and two of the assassins were killed. The PUK and the KDP had long experience of war with these groups. However, AAI’s declaration of total war, its strategy, well-organised structure, and well- equipped military capacity, all worried Kurdish forces—in particular the PUK. Despite its military superiority and the tens of thousands of peshmerga forces, the PUK was failing to remove AAI from many regions. In order to garner inter- national attention and support, Kurdish security forces and intelligence services published many reports regarding AAI, with strong emphasis on its links with al-Qaida and exposure of its production of chemical materials.114 Kurdish media also published extensive bulletins on the group’s activities and atrocities in the areas under its control and its violence in rural areas, including in the cities of Sulaimani and Hewler/Arbil. Yet AAI only first began to receive international attention when the Secretary of State Colin Powell highlighted the links between Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida, and Saddam Hussein in his address to the United Nation’s security council in 2003. Powell asserted that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was al-Qaida’s Iraq affiliate and had established a military camp that provided training on poisons and explosives in the AAI-controlled areas of Kurdistan. Powell furthermore stated that Saddam Hussain had a high-level agent (it was later revealed that he meant Abu W’ael) in AAI. Powell thus claimed that al-Qaida and AAI were producing ricin gas, with the full knowledge of Saddam Hussain.115 Powell’s speech provided the impetus for launching a military oper- ation against AAI; soon after the occupation of Iraq, the PUK and United States Special Forces initiated a massive military attack on AAI’s bases, and the group was driven out of the Kurdistan mountains in late March and April,116 and AAI lost a significant number of its militants and a few of its leading figures in this campaign. Some of the remnants of the Jihadis crossed into Iran,117 but the majority went into hiding in Sunni Arab areas, particularly in Mosul, in Iraq. Soon after the heavy defeat, the AAI Sharia council disbarred Mullah Krekar from the amir position, with the claim that he had violated AAI’s program through his

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press statements and because that he lived in , meaning that his refugee status, his physical distance from AAI controlled areas, and certain other diffi- culties prevented him from successfully leading the group.118 To sever its prior connection with Mullah Krekar,119 and to signify that it was making “an effort to appeal to Sunni Islamic sensibilities,”120 AAI renamed itself Ansar al-Sunnah (AAS-Helpers of Sunnah) on September 20, 2003 and appointed Abu Abdullah al-Shafi’i as its new amir.121 The group began to organise in Sunni Arab areas and, with the rising Sunni insurgency, started to recruit from different national- ities. This included bringing many Arabs and muhajirun (the emigrant) into its ranks.122 As it began extending into Sunni Arab areas and taking part in the Sunni insurgency, AAS gave priority to the defeat of the US and its allies (the Shiites and Kurds) in Iraq and focused on the formation of an Islamic emirate in Iraq.123 AAS, operated under the name AAS, actively participated in the Sunni insur- gency,124 and also cooperated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jamaat al-Tawheed wal-Jihad group. 125 AAS did not join Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group, but around 300 of its members in Mosul gave bay’ah (pledge of alliance) to al-Zarqawi.126 AAS also refused to join al-Qaida’s Mujahedeen Shura Council (MSC), to further dis- tance itself from al-Qaida.127 It consequently refused to join the al-Qaida affiliated, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, founded in 2007).128 AAS’s relations with al-Qaida and affiliated groups in this regard remained at the tactical level; they were not strategic allies.129 AAS avoided taking part in a sectarian conflict in Iraq, even though Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s declaration of total war on the Shiites, along with the Iraqi security and coalition forces’ fierce attacks upon them130 inevitably dragged them into a sectarian conflict to a certain extent, especially between 2005-2007. AAS, cooperating with al-Qaida, further committed itself to violence against the US and against Iraq’s security forces; nonetheless, though “it would undertake other sectarian attacks” it “generally refrained from mass-casualty attacks explicitly targeting the country’s Shi’a.”131 Al-Zarqawi’s strategy of dragging Sunnis and Shiites into a sectarian war and committing heinous attacks and Shiite forces’ counter-response—in particular, their attacks on Sunnis—soon made al-Zarqawi the leading figure on the Iraqi battleground. Most Sunni Arabs and foreign fighters preferred to join al-Zarqawi rather than AAS.132 The group consequently suffered from a lack of recruits, and further went into crisis in 2006, when tensions arose over the imprisonment of their leading figure, Abu Wa’el Sa’adun al-Qaid, and following the news of his cooperation with the US authorities. AAS considered Abu Wa’el’s cooperation with the US to be an agreement with the Sahwa (awakening movement), and disavowed him.133 This led Abu Wa’el, along with some other leading figures, to establish Jamaat Ansar al-Sunnah: the Shari’a Committee.134 In turn, and to distinguish itself from Abu Wa’el’s group, AAS returned to its previous name, AAI, in 2007, under

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the leadership of Abu Abdullah al-Shafi.135 The group fought against the Sahwa movement and Iraqi security and coalition forces between 2007-2010. Many of the group’s high-ranking officers were either killed or arrested during this period, including its general military leader Abu Mustafa al-Kurdi in 2007 and its amir al-Shafi, arrested in Baghdad in May 2010. Al-Shafi’s arrest was a painful blow to the AAI, but it continued to operate, particularly in Mosul and Kirkuk, under the leadership of Abu Hashim Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman al-Ibrahim, who was appointed on December 15, 2011.136 Ultimately, he too was arrested, at the beginning of 2014.137 The multiple deaths or arrests of leading figures consider- ably weakened AAI’s operational capacity, but many of its members’ defections to the Islamic State in 2014 also were significant blows to the group.138 AAI is still active, but has fallen into relative obscurity compared to the rise of Islamic State.

Concluding Remarks Salafism has begun to receive attention from some Kurds in the last three decades, and has even begun to fall in line with some of their values and ideals, as it has in many Muslim countries and among Muslims in Western countries. Salafism has deep ideological and organisational roots in the Kurdish region and has indoctrinated some Kurdish individuals. The appeal of Salafism in the Kurdis- tan region is one of the factors contributing to the survival of militant jihadism. AAI in this regard represents the militant Salafi Jihadi trend within the primary stream of Salafi thought, placing a firm reliance on Wahhabism, or the Wahhabi interpretation of Salafism. This form of Salafism has allowed AAI to construct a strong theological justification and basis for pursuing a militant jihadi method. AAI has only survived for a short period of time and is restricted to a particular area, but it has sown the seeds of militant Salafi Jihadi ideas in some Kurdish individuals. Even so, it has still failed to secure collective and/or mass support. The majority of recent Salafi groups follow a purist form of Salafism. However, Salafism is not a homogeneous movement in Kurdistan, and there are various small and large non-violent Salafi movements in the region. Most of the non-violent forms of Salafism have been transferred into Kurdistan through Saudi Arabian-affiliated charities and organisations, or by some charismatic figures, such as Abdul Latif Salafi, who were influenced by any of the purist Salafi movements outside of Kurd- istan.139 The Kurdish national parties—the KDP and the PUK—have also turned a blind eye to the spread of these ideologies or promoted purist and loyal Salafis in order to eliminate, or at least to limit, the influence of militant Salafi Jihadism, and this succeeded to some extent. This has also made it easy for these groups to organise.140 Salafi groups can reach a considerable number of individuals through mosques, their own TV and radio stations, publications, and social media. They

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have created sub-spaces and networks. Kurdish security forces may have placed surveillance on some of these activities, mainly in the big cities, but most small Salafi groups in rural areas are beyond the security forces’ reach. Particularly in small towns and villages, they organise through mosques and spread their Salafi ideology. Salafi ideas are in the rise in Kurdistan in distinct forms, though most of them avoid performing a takfiri militant jihadi form of Salafism.

Notes 1 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems’, in The Kurds A Contemporary Overview, ed. by Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Sterl Stefan (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 26–52 (p. 28). 2 David Romano, Kürt Dirilişi: Olanak, Mobilizasyon ve Kimlik, trans. by Mustafa Topal and Erdogan Gedik (Vate Yayınları, 2010), p. 20. 3 M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, Third (Rowman & Little- field Publishers, 2018), p. 278. 4 Ziba -Hosseini, ‘Inner Truth and Outer History: The Two Worlds of the Ahl-I Haqq of Kurdistan’, International Journal of Studies, 26.2 (1994), 267–85 (p. 267) . 5 Mamosta Abdul Latif - Salafi w Sofiakani Kurdistan. 2015 [accessed 23 September 2019]. 6 Mehmet Kurt, Din, Şiddet ve Aidiyet: Türkiye’de Hizbullah (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), pp. 48–50. 7 ‘Hizbullah Cemaati`nin Manifestosu Yayınlandı!’, Doğruhaber Gazetesi, 2012 [accessed 1 October 2019]. 8 ‘Hizbullah Cemaati`nin Manifestosu Yayınlandı!’ 9 For a detailed disucsison on types of Salafism see; Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’,Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29.3 (2006), 207–39; Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 24–30. 10 Interview with five members of Abu Hanzala group, in Istanbul Turkey, Feb- ruary 2015. 11 Aymenn Al-Tamimi, ‘The Islamic State and the Kurds: The Documentary Ev- idence’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10.8 (2017) [accessed 2 October 2019].

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12 See Aaron Stein, ‘Islamic State Networks in Turkey: Recruitment for the Caliph- ate’, Atlantic Council, 2016, 13 [accessed 24 September 2019]. 13 Bill Roggio, ‘Zarqawi Aide Returns to Afghanistan to Wage Jihad for al Qaeda’, The Long War Journal, 2011 [accessed 13 September 2015]. 14 Scheherezade Faramarzi, ‘Iran’s Salafi Jihadis,’Atlantic Council, 2018 [accessed 24 September 2019]. 15 Interview (Phone) with Hemn Seyedi, London, October 2, 2019. 16 Interview (Phone) with Hemn Seyedi, London, October 2, 2019. 17 Aria Bendix, ‘Iranian Kurds Likely Responsible for ISIS Attacks in Tehran’, The Atlantic, 2017 [accessed 2 October 2019]. 18 Abu Khadeejah Abdul-Wahid, ‘What Is Salafism? What Does It Call To?’,Abu Khadeejah. 2014, p. 2 [accessed 2 October 2019]. 19 Müfrih b Süleyman El-Kavsi, Selefilik Tanımı, Tarihi, Alanları, İlkeleri ve Özellikleri (Guraba Yayınları, 2010). 20 Al-Bukhari,Muhammad Ibn Ismail (2009). Sahih Al-Bukhari, Trans. by Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Last Edition, 2009, I–IX, p. Volume 8, Book 76, Number 436. 21 Saalih Al-Fawzan, The Methodology of The Salaf Us Saalih and The Ummah’s Need For It (The book is available at, http://www.mpubs.org/features/publi- cations/479-ebook-the-methodology-of-the-salaf-us-saalih-and-the-ummahs- need-for-it-by-shaykh-saalih-al-fawzaan: Muwahhideen Paublications Ebook Series, 2013). 22 Itzchak Weismann, The Naqshbandiyya: and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi Tradition (London New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 95. 23 Pierre-Jean Luizard, ‘Islam as a Point of Reference for Political and Social Groups in Iraq,’ International Review of the Red Cross, 89.868 (2007), 843–55 (p. 849) [accessed 15 May 2019]. 24 Matthew Derrick, ‘Islam as a Source of Unity and Division in Euroasia’, in Eurasian Corridors of Interconnection: From the South China to the Caspian Sea, ed. by Susan M. Walcott and Corey Johnson (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 130–56 (p. 147). 25 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 109.

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26 David Romano, An Outline of Kurdish Islamist Groups in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, September 2007), p. 5. 27 Romano, An Outline of Kurdish Islamist Groups in Iraq, p. 7. 28 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, ‘A Complete History of Jamaat Ansar Al-Islam (Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi’s Translation of a Full History of Ansar al-Islam Written by Abu al-Waleed al-Salafi on Twitter in Arabic Recently (Late No- vember).’, 2015 [accessed 16 May 2019]. 29 Romano, An Outline of Kurdish Islamist Groups in Iraq, p. 7. 30 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 31 Rudaw, ‘Prominent Kurdish Politician Argues to Save Islam from Salafism’, 2019 [accessed 29 May 2019]. 32 On a Twitter account written in Arabic in November 2015, Abu al-Waleed al-Salafi provided quite detailed explanations about the history of the Kurdish Islamists. (For an English translation see: ‘A Complete History of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam’ by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, Dec 15, 2015. Available on; http://www. aymennjawad.org/2015/12/a-complete-history-of-jamaat-ansar-al-islam). Though it is just a Twitter account and raises questions regarding its reliability, the majority of his explanations are compatible with/supported by the exist- ing literature, in particular Ansar al-Islam’s official publications such as the book entitled “Ensar el-Islam Cemaati (Jamaat Ansar al-Islam).2015. Kuresel Yayinlari, Istanbul).” 33 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 34 ICG, Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Mouse That Roared? (Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group-ICG, 7 February 2003), pp. 1–12 (p. 2) [accessed 15 May 2019]. 35 Some leading figures among the IMK were Mullah Uthman Abd al-Aziz, Ali Abd al-Aziz and Sadiq Abd al-Aziz brothers, Mullah Krekar, al-Barzanji, and Ali Babir. 36 Aram Rafaat, ‘Kurdish Islam and the Question of Kurdish Integration into the Iraqi State’, The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, 37.1 (2012), 3–37 (p. 29). 37 ICG, p. 2. 38 H. Mahmoud, ‘The Political Islamic Movements in Iraqi Kurdistan. Al-Thaqafa Al-Jadida [The New Culture]’, Damascus: The Publications, 295, 2000 cited in Harish 2013, 99. 39 Ansar al-Islam Media Board, Ensar El-Islam Cemaati [Ansar Al-Islam Community], trans. by Muhsin Demirci (Istanbul: Küresel Kitap, 2015), pp. 27–28. 40 ICG, p. 4.

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41 Stanford University, ‘Islamic Movement of Kurdistan : Mapping Militant Or- ganizations’, 2019 [accessed 22 September 2019]. 42 John A. Turner, Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and International Order (New York: Springer, 2014), p. 146. 43 ‘Zarqawi Interview: Part One; Zarqawi Interview Part Two; Zarqawi Inter- view Part Three’, 2006 [accessed 10 Sep- tember 2015]. 44 Stanford University. 45 Ansar al-Islam Media Board. 46 ICG, p. 2. 47 Jeffrey S. Dixon and Meredith Reid Sarkees, A Guide to Intra-State Wars: An Ex- amination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014 (Los angeles-Lon- don-New Delhi-singapore-Washington DC: SAGE CQ Press, 2016), p. 407. 48 Ansar al-Islam Media Board, pp. 25–26. 49 Gareth R. V. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 201 50 Stanford University. 51 Human Rights Watch, Ansar Al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan (London, 5 February 2003) [accessed 16 September 2015]. 52 Ansar al-Islam Media Board, pp. 73–76. 53 Michael Rubin, ‘The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan’, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, December 2001 [accessed 16 September 2015]. 54 Ansar al-Islam Media Board; Also see; ICG, p. 3. 55 Romano, An Outline of Kurdish Islamist Groups in Iraq, p. 8. 56 Dan Darling, ‘The Rise of Ansar Al-Islam,’ Weekly Standard, 28 July 2005 [accessed 16 September 2015]. 57 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 58 Michael Rubin, ‘The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan’, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 3.12 (2001) [accessed 14 May 2019]. 59 Human Rights Watch. 60 Dan Darling, ‘Ansar Al Islam Dossier,’ ed. by Rohan Gunaratna, Centre For Po- licing Terrorism, 2004, p. 9 [accessed 16 September 2015].

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61 Romano, An Outline of Kurdish Islamist Groups in Iraq, p. 10. 62 Romano, An Outline of Kurdish Islamist Groups in Iraq, p. 10. 63 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 64 Rubin, ‘The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan’. 65 ICG, p. 4. 66 Quil Lawrence, Invisible Nation: How the Kurds’ Quest for Statehood Is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East (New York-London-Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2009), p. 114. 67 Interview with an academic, Sulaimani, Kurdistan Region in Iraq, September 22, 2016. 68 Interview with a Kurdish teacher, Sulaimani, Kurdistan Region in Iraq, Sep- tember 20, 2016. 69 Strategic Comments, ‘Al-Qaeda in Northern Iraq?’, Strategic Comments, 8.7 (2002), 1–2 . 70 Stanford University. 71 Stanford University. 72 ICG, p. 3. 73 Interview (Phone) with Muhammad Hakim Jabhar (Komal Islam’s Political Advisior), 8 July 2019. 74 Saed Kakei, ‘The Islamic Movement of Kurdistan: From Conflict to Coop- eration,’ Ekurd Daily, 2013 [accessed 22 September 2019]. 75 Darling, ‘Ansar al Islam Dossier’, p. 14. 76 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, 2Rev Ed edition (London; New York: Penguin, 2007), pp. 329–30. 77 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 78 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 79 Rûdaw, ‘Time Has Come to Break from Iraq, Says Radical Kurdish Cleric Mul- la Krekar’, Rudaw.Net, 2016 [accessed 3 October 2019]. 80 Ansar al-Islam Media Board, pp. 23–24. 81 Human Rights Watch. 82 Mahmoud cited in Harish 2013, 99. 83 Darling, ‘Ansar al Islam Dossier’, p. 14. 84 Michael Rubin, ‘The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan,’ middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 3.12 (2001) [accessed 14 May 2019]. 85 Burke, pp. 332–34.

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86 cited in Jonathan Schanzer, Ansar Al-Islam:Iraq’s al-Qaeda Connection (Wash- ington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 15 January 2003) [accessed 14 May 2019]. 87 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 88 Ansar al-Islam Media Board, pp. 55–58. 89 Ansar al-Islam Media Board, p. 58. 90 cited in Rubin, ‘The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan’. 91 Catherine Taylor, ‘Taliban-style Group Grows in Iraq’, Christian Science Monitor, 15 March 2002 [accessed 14 May 2019]. 92 (Peterson, 2002) 93 Human Rights Watch. 94 Human Rights Watch. 95 Human Rights Watch. 96 Ansar al-Islam Media Board, pp. 81–83. 97 “The Banner of al-Sahab expresses the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, and the banner was black, and era of the Umayyads and the banner was white, and the era of the Abbasids and the banner was black.” Aymen 98 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 99 Human Rights Watch. 100 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 101 Ansar al-Islam Media Board, p. 63. 102 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 103 Interview with a Kurdish teacher, Sulaimani, Kurdistan Region in Iraq, September 20, 2016. 104 Burke, p. 379. 105 Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), p. 197. 106 Ansar al-Islam Media Board, p. 63. 107 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 108 : Ansar al-Islam Media Board, p. 62. 109 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. 110 Human Rights Watch. 111 Human Rights Watch. 112 Human Rights Watch. 113 Lydia Khalil, ‘The Transformation of Ansar Al-Islam’, The Jamestown Foundation, 2005

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