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KURDE, 106, Rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél INSTITUT KUDE RPARD IS E Bulletin de liaison et d’information n°358 janvier 2015 La publication de ce Bulletin bénéficie de subventions du Ministère français des Affaires étrangères (DGCID) et du Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (FASILD) ————— Ce bulletin paraît en français et anglais Prix au numéro : France: 6 € — Etranger : 7,5 € Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France : 60 € — Etranger : 75 € Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 13 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél. : 01- 48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01- 48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: [email protected] Bulletin de liaison et d’information de l’Institut kurde de Paris N° 358 janvier 2015 • KOBANÎ : VICTOIRE DE LA RÉSISTANCE KURDE • SINDJAR : LA LIBÉRATION COMPLÈTE DE LA VILLE EST PROCHE • MOSSOUL : LES PESHMERGAS GAGNENT DU TERRAIN • KIRKOUK : AFFRONTEMENTS ET TENSIONS • LONDRES : UNE CONFÉRENCE ANTI-DAESH SANS LES KURDES • CULTURE : DISPARITION DU BARDE HASSAN SISAWE KOBANÎ : VICTOIRE DE LA RÉSISTANCE KURDE près plus de quatre mois cain ne revenait pas, à la mi-jan - se présenteront, nous les frappe - de combats acharnés, la vier, sur la déclaration qu’avait fait rons. » (USA Today). résistance kurde a fini par en octobre dernier John Kerry, A libérer la ville de Kobanî et alors au Caire, au sujet du peu Mais indépendamment de l’attitude infliger ainsi une défaite d’importance que présentait la de la Maison blanche concernant la hautement symbolique aux djiha - ville kurde dans la stratégie globa - défense conjointe des YPG et des distes de l’État islamique. Aux pre - le des États-Unis concernant le ter - Peshmergas, l’opinion américaine, miers jours de janvier, l’Observatoire rain syrien. Le secrétaire de presse elle, s’est montrée plus sensible au syrien pour les droits de l’homme du Pentagone, le vice-amiral John symbole que représente la résistance estimait que 80% de la ville de Kirby, répétait ainsi dans une kurde, seule à affronter avec succès, Kobanî avait été repris par les déclaration aux media, le 13 jan - au sol, l’État islamique ; ce symbole a Kurdes, appuyés par les nombreuses vier, que son gouvernement pu aussi être ressentie par Daesh, au frappes aériennes de la Coalition : en n’avait pas changé ses considéra - vu des nombreux assauts quasi-sui - effet, d’après les statistiques des tions sur l’importance mineure cidaires lancés contre la ville. Le 16 militaires américains, 80% de leurs qu’il accordait à Kobanî, mais que janvier, l’EI lançait ainsi une ultime frappes en Syrie avaient eu lieu les combattants du Daesh se ruant lourde attaque pour briser les lignes autour de Kobanî depuis le début par vagues à l’assaut de cette ville des YPG en quatre points de la ville, de l’hiver (plus de 270 sur 333). s’étaient eux-mêmes offerts en attaque que Rahmi Abdel Rahman Malgré cela, le gouvernement améri - cibles à la Coalition : « Tant qu’ils (OSDH) a jugée la plus importante • 2 • Bulletin de liaison et d’information n° 358 • janvier 2015 depuis un mois (AFP). Mais quatre – les miliciens Daesh ont lancé 19 accord entre l’armée et les YPG pré - jours plus tard, en plus de repousser attaques suicides, ont perdu 3710 voyait pourtant d’être «démilitarisé ». les Daesh, les Kurdes ont réussi à hommes, et les corps de 316 d’entre Selon l’OSDH, les YPG ont arrêté 10 s’emparer d’une colline stratégique eux sont restés aux mains des YPG. soldats et miliciens, alors que des au-dessus de la ville, celle de – les YPG ont endommagé 87 véhi - combats se prolongeaient dans la ville Mishtenur. leur donnant une capaci - cules, dont 5 Hummers et 2 panzers, (Reuters), faisant 18 victimes, 8 com - té de feu sur les positions ennemies ont détruit 16 chars blindés et 8 battants YPG et Asayish, 9 soldats et encore en place dans Kobanî, tuant mitrailleuses Douchka; miliciens du régime. L’armée a aussi une quarantaine de miliciens Daesh – 408 combattants des YPG et YPJ et bombardé trois zones kurdes à et mettant la main sur d’importants un Peshmerga ont perdu la vie dans Hassaké. stocks d’armes et de munitions. Le la « bataille de Kobanî ». 25 janvier, le drapeau du TEVDEM Hassaké est partagée entre quartiers (Mouvement pour une société Après l’annonce du retrait de Daesh kurdes et mixtes, et quartiers pure - démocratique), plate-forme poli - de Kobanî, John Kerry a déclaré, ment arabes. Les Kurdes YPG contrô - tique du PYD, long de 75m, flottait dans une volte-face assez spectacu - lent les premiers alors que l’armée et sur la colline, alors que les YPG laire, que les Kurdes venaient de les forces syriennes sont maîtres des annonçaient contrôler à nouveau la remporter une bataille « straté - seconds, selon un accord entre les totalité de la ville et quelques vil - gique » contre l’État islamique. deux parties, depuis 2012. Les raisons lages à l’est et au sud. de ces affrontements divergent selon Du côté de l’État islamique, une agen - les sources, certaines disant que le Mais les miliciens Daesh tenaient ce de presse, Amak news agency, général en chef syrien basé à Hassaké, encore les abords immédiats de la localisée dans les territoires syriens Mohammed Khaddour, essaie depuis ville et tout le « canton » de Kobanî occupés par l’EI, a diffusé l’interview un mois de supprimer tous les check- et 350 villages, restaient encore à de deux hommes présentés comme points des Kurdes YPG et de repous - reconquérir, alors que la moitié de des combattants du Daesh, s’expri - ser ces derniers hors de la ville, Kobanî est détruite, ce qui a fait par - mant sur leur retrait de Kobanî : selon comme cela aurait déjà été fait pour ler de « victoire à la Pyrrhus » par eux, la principale raison de ce retrait a les check-points des Forces arabes de certains éditorialistes, d’autant que été les bombardements aériens inces - défense nationale (les milices parami - 200 000 réfugiés restent du côté turc, sants de la Coalition : litaires mises en place par le gouver - à Suruç, et que la Turquie vient de « Récemment, nous nous sommes nement en 2012). bâtir un autre camp, d’une capacité retirés de ‘Ayn al Islam [« Source de d’accueil de 35 000 personnes, le l’Islam », le nom donné par l’EI à Dans ce cas, cela pourrait indiquer plus grand camp de réfugiés sur son Kobanî] peu à peu, à cause des une tentative de l’armée régulière de sol. frappes aériennes et de la mort d’un reprendre le contrôle de toute la ville, certain nombre de nos frères. » en l’expurgeant de ses milices, kurdes Le 21 janvier, un des Peshmergas et arabes, qui s’affrontent sur le ter - envoyés par le Gouvernement du L’un des combattants a aussi présenté rain de Hassaké et de ses environs Kurdistan d’Irak à Kobanî a perdu la la destruction de la ville comme un pour leur mainmise, amorçant ainsi vie dans un combat contre l’EI : message « adressé à Obama ». Le un début de « nettoyage ethnique » Zerevan Akrem Abdulmajeed, qui second a ainsi décrit les frappes : entre Kurdes et arabes, chacun devant faisait partie des équipes médicales, « J’en jure par Dieu, leurs avions ne se réfugier soit dans Hassaké nord, à a été tué par un snipper, comme l’a quittaient pas les airs, de jour comme majorité kurde ou dans Hassaké sud à annoncé officiellement Jabbar de nuit ; ils bombardaient tout le jour majorité arabe. Yawar, le secrétaire général du et toute la nuit. Ils visaient tout. Ils ministère des Peshmergas. attaquaient même les véhicules ; ils n’ont pas laissé un bâtiment debout. » Depuis plus d’un an, le co-président Le bilan total des pertes humaines et du PYD, Salih Muslim, prédit que la des opérations a été établi et dévoilé En parallèle, d’autres combats, plus situation très « sensible » à Hassaké au lors d’une conférence de presse inattendus mais aussi plus spora - peut mener à des affrontements donnée par le commandement mili - diques, ont éclaté, à la mi janvier entre kurdo-arabes, comme à Serê Kaniyê, taire des YPG, via son porte parole, les YPG et les forces du gouverne - sauf que cette fois, au lieu d’affronter Shoresh Hassan : ment syrien, dans le « canton » de l’ASL et les djihadistes, les YPG – les « forces de défenses » kurdes Djezireh, à Hassaké, ville partagée en feraient face aux forces gouvernemen - ont réussi 220 actions militaires, 98 zones de contrôle entre YPG et forces tales. La différence avec les anciens autres ont eu des résultats « incer - gouvernementales, quand des soldats combats de Serê Kaniyê, est aussi que tains », et il y a eu 37 attaques sui - syriens et des miliciens du Baath ont les deux protagonistes sont menacés cides de la part des YPG. pris le contrôle de bâtiments qu’un et attaqués par l’État islamique. n° 358 • janvier 2015 Bulletin de liaison et d’information • 3• SINDJAR : LA LIBÉRATION COMPLÈTE DE LA VILLE EST PROCHE algré une avancée ralentie dans et hors de la ville de Sindjar, a, à son tour, mis le pied sur les par les snipers et les pièges alors que les Peshmargas, assiégeant monts Sindjar, et rendu visite aux à l’explosif, les les anciens assaillants, jouent le rôle officiels yézidis sur place, ainsi qu’à M Peshmergas ont annoncé de snipers à leur tour. Ces bombar - la tombe de Sheikh Sharafaddin, un le 7 janvier, avoir atteint le dements posent d’ailleurs la ques - des « lieux saints » vénérés par les centre-ville de Sindjar Une source tion de l'état de la ville une fois net - yézidis.
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