Occasional Paper 2007 September September David Romano David

Groups in Groups

The conclusion to this study addresses possible strategies for containing radical The conclusion to this study addresses This article outlines the history and genesis of Kurdish Islamist groups in Iraq. Based Islamist groups genesis of Kurdish This article outlines the history and An Outline of Kurdish Islamist Islamist Kurdish of An Outline these movements. in constructing such strategies. Islamist movements, and the dilemmas inherent Particular attention is paid to the links between various groups, their transformation or splintering their transformation Particular attention is paid to the links between various groups, in spawning Muslim Brotherhood Iraqi the non-Kurdish of and the role into new organizations, on fi eldwork and personal interviews conducted in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, this study presents a conducted in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, this study presents eldwork and personal interviews on fi movements. published details about these cant amount of never-before signifi Abstract: Th e Jamestown Foundation Papers refl ect the views of their authors, not those of Thof Occasional those Foundation. e Jamestown not Foundation. authors, their Therefl Jamestown of Papers views with the ect associated or sponsored event or a conference of result the Th as with or associated Foundation e Jamestown scholars and analysts by created community.Th be policy may the papers to ese valuable be Th to that believes reports Foundation e Jamestown and essays are Papers Occasional ffi il r nelgne hnes epcal i rgr t Ersa n . and Eurasia to regard in especially channels, offi intelligence through or available always, not cial is but be, should that information of source only the often is sources, fiIt bias, agenda. political or primary without lter delivered and Jamestown’sis material indigenous Utilizing information. such to access restrict frequently that and States United the to important tactically or strategically are that societies those in trends and events about community policy broader the and policymakers educate and to inform This of e mission Foundation eJamestown Th Th e Jamestown Foundation’s Mission tel: (202)483-8888 •fax:(202)483-8337 1111 16thSt. NW, Suite 320 Washington, DC 20036 • www.jamestown.org • * Occasional Paper

rst place. A A rst place. Arab populations, a Arab populations, David Romano David 3 Executive Summary Executive Based on fi interviews conducted in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, this eldwork and personal Based on fi This study pays particular attention to links between various Iraqi Kurdish Islamist various Iraqi Kurdish Islamist particular attention to links between This study pays A great number of Iraqi Kurdish Islamist groups, including militant Islamist movements, including militant Islamist of Iraqi Kurdish Islamist groups, great number A dilemmas inherent in constructing such strategies. dilemmas inherent in constructing study presents a signifi published details about these movements. of never-before cant amount study presents a signifi strategies for containing radical Islamist movements, and the The conclusion addresses possible of outside states and foreign Islamist organizations appears crucial to explaining what success organizations of outside states and foreign Islamist has enjoyed. political in Iraqi of the non-Kurdish Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood in spawning these movements in the fi of the non-Kurdish Iraqi Muslim is presented in order to better understand various groups’ historical “map-tree” of the movements other Islamist movements in Iraq. In some cases, the support roots and their relationships with movements, their history, their transformation or splintering into new organizations, and the role and the into new organizations, their transformation or splintering history, movements, their much broad popularity in as it has amongst some neighboring in Iraqi Kurdistan as it has much broad popularity reuniting. splintering and occasionally Kurdish Islamist groups keep multiplying, number of small have emerged in the last 20 years. Despite the fact that politicized Islam never seemed to enjoy as Islam never seemed to enjoy years. Despite the fact that politicized in the last 20 have emerged Th e Jamestown Foundation Arab Sunniones. This studyemploystheterm“Islamist”toreferthosewhosubscribe organizations thanShiiteones,anduntil2003,manymoreKurdishSunniIslamistgroups ThehistoryofandlinksbetweenSunniIslamistpoliticalgroupsinIraqstandsoutas approximately sixtypercentofIraq’s population,IraqproducedmanymoreSunniIslamist a remarkablypoorlyunderstoodfacetofthecountry. DespitethefactthatShiitesaccountfor Theincludedillustration (appendix1)of“SunniGroups”providesanoutline nature alsoomitsomegroups, manyofwhichhadnomorethanadozen active membersand phenomenon willbediscussed laterinthispaper. The listofgroupspresentedheremustby of thesegroupsappearto havebeenKurdishSunniIslamistgroups–likely reasonsforthis of themajorSunniIslamistpoliticalorganizations inIraq. A disproportionatelylarge majority becomes available. in Iraq,withfurtherdetailstobeadded(andpossible errorsrectifi study asapreliminary, generaldescriptionandanalysis ofthehistoryKurdishIslamistgroups questions aboutthesemovementsremainunresolved. Readersshouldthereforeapproachthis interviews intoasaccurateandinformativeanaccountpossible,indicatewhereseveral account oftheissue. An attempthasbeenmadetosynthesizeanextremelylarge amountof and thereforethispapercannotclaimtooffer afullycomprehensiveorabsolutelyauthoritative of theinformationgatheredfromthesesourceswasunfortunatelycontradictoryorincomplete, and “average”(especiallyinareaswhereIslamistorganizations wereveryactive).Some were conductedwithformerIslamists,Iraqigovernmentandsecurityoffi fieldwork andinterviewsconductedinIraqbetweenOctober2003May2004.Interviews scarce inavailablesecondarysources,mostoftheinformationpresentedhereisbasedon described. Sinceunclassified informationonespeciallySunniIraqiIslamistgroupsremains Kurdish Islamistorganizations (suchastheIraqiMuslimBrotherhood),thesegroupsarealso In caseswhereSunnibutnon-KurdishIslamistgroupsmanifestedaninterestingassociationto different KurdishIslamistgroupsthattriedtoplayamajorpoliticalroleinIraqsincethe1920s. Islamists anallthemorepressingconcern. This articleattemptstodescribeandmapoutthe of politicalIslaminIraqipoliticsmakesunderstandingthebackgroundandassociations would notbeconsidered“radical.” a groupholdingverypuritan,strictinterpretationofIslambutnotadvocatingviolentmeans institutionalized politicalsystemand/orattacksoncivilians)ratherthanideology of thisanalysis,thelabel“radical”or“extremist”referstotactics(violenceoutsidelegal, in politicalcontestationbybothinstitutionalandextra-legal,violentmeans.Forthepurposes foreign toatrueMuslimsociety”[1]. This studyfocusesspecifically onIslamistgroupsengaging to itsfullextent,meaningthatsecularformsofgovernmentsandinstitutionsareconsidered “,” defined asa“GroupofideologiesinIslamthatwanttousetheSharia,MuslimLaw, An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq Since thefallofSaddamHussein’s regimein2003,politicalinstabilityandtheresurgence Th e Hydra – Sunni Islamist Groups in Iraqi Politics An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq 4 ed), as additionalinformation cials, CoalitionForces , meaningthat Occasional Paper ganizing David Romano David s strategy – as with gymen from joining . A greater Islamicization A . 5 Th e Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood Muslim Iraqi e Th other Islamist movements, MB doctrine holds that most or all problems and social ills in society other Islamist movements, MB doctrine holds that most or all problems and Muslim culture are the result of Muslims having strayed from Islam, its proper observance, Brotherhood attempts a in general. In stage three (“implementation” or “direct action”) the trade unions and the military), and establishing programs to endear themselves to the people trade unions and the military), and establishing programs to endear – including charities, clinics, schools and other services for the poor the MB’ of society stands out as one of the major objectives of this stage of two (“formation” or “expansion”), they focus more on broader recruitment drives, or two (“formation” or “expansion”), they focus more on broader recruitment ltrating important parts of society (such as universities, the public service, their supporters, infi the group [8]. As with their seventy or so national branches in other countries, the Iraqi MB the group [8]. activists and educate people believed in a three-stage strategy: In stage one, they recruit core stage). In stage about their vision of Islam and society (the “establishment” or “indoctrination” powerful [7]. Crucially, the Iraqi MB never succeeded in attracting Shiites to its banner – when the Iraqi MB never succeeded in attracting powerful [7]. Crucially, Sayyid Mohsen approached the highest ranking Shiite authority around 1959, the organization Shiite cler al-Hakim, he refused to cooperate and even went so far as to bar quite negligible. Sheikh Abd al-Qadim Zallum led the group until his death in 2003. Abd al-Qadim Zallum led the group until quite negligible. Sheikh early days, the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood was neither particularly radical nor In its and favorable towards violence and the conduct of in the military sense of the term [5]. and favorable towards violence and in a few violent actions against the engaged Iraq, the ILP Immediately after its founding in [6]. Its membership in Iraq appears to have remained government and was quickly suppressed (ILP) in 1954 (see graph). The fi rst ILP was founded only one year earlier in Jerusalem, by was founded only one rst ILP The fi (ILP) in 1954 (see graph). eventually spread to several The organization al-Din al-Nabahani. Taqi Palestinian Sheikh Asia. It is considered quite radical, secretive Africa to Central Muslim countries, from North Liberation Party They founded the Iraqi branch of the Islamic and deference to the monarchy. peaceful approach small group of MB members did not agree with the organization’s A the country’s sectarian mosaic – with Arab, Kurdish and Turkmen members [3]. One of the Turkmen Arab, Kurdish and sectarian mosaic – with the country’s of Palestine, which sent rst actions in Iraq was to found the Society for the Salvation fi MB’s ght in the 1948 Palestine war [4]. three brigades of volunteers to fi Iraq), modeled after the original MB of Egypt (founded in 1928). Sheikh Mohammed al-Sawaf, Iraq), modeled after the original met Egyptian MB founder Hassan al-Bannah there, who an Iraqi student studying in Egypt, ected rst MB cell in Iraq refl The fi branch of the organization. convinced him to found an Iraqi isn’t concerned with what type of people her children become” [2]. The Iraqi MB emerged in Iraqi MB emerged The [2]. type of people her children become” concerned with what isn’t cite either 1946 or 1951 as the founding date in sources the mid 1940s or early 1950s (different Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as the forerunner of all, or at least most, Islamist political groups or at least most, Islamist political (MB) as the forerunner of all, Muslim Brotherhood [Sunni] Islamic groups [in Iraq] the different went so far as to state that: “All in Iraq. One even Brotherhood is like a mother who The Muslim the Muslim Brotherhood. are descended from the interviewed for this study described experts and former Islamists Several of the Iraqi about which very little is known. Nonetheless, the author would be grateful for any corrections for any corrections would be grateful the author known. Nonetheless, very little is about which may wish to provide. information that readers to the text or additional Th e Jamestown Foundation system in1960,theMBdecidedtotakeopportunityforlegalstatusandcreateanoffi AftertheRevolutionof1958,monarchy’s demisedidindeedleadtoaperiodof andliberals. When nationalist PresidentQasimdeclaredanopeningofthepolitical extreme instabilityandintensecompetitionbetweenIraqiIslamists,communists,nationalists, fell, theIraqiCommunistPartywouldtakeover. Iraqi MBsupportedthemonarchyformostpart,fearingthatifHashemite takeover ofthecountry(bylegalmeansifpossible,sometimesbyextra-legalmeans)[9]. this papernowturns[13]. WhilewecandescribetheIraqiIslamicPartyascontinuation of,ortheheirofIraqi described as‘illegitimateoffspring.’ Manyoftheseemerged inIraqiKurdistan,asubjecttowhich Muslim Brotherhood,theMBanditsearlyactivists alsospawnedalar practically none)[12]. school ofIslamiclawsoasnottoalienatepotential Shiitesupporters(ofwhichtherearestill Party stillstrivestocreateanIslamicstateinIraq, althoughithasavoidedadoptinganyspecifi the IraqiIslamicParty when MBexilesreturnedtothenewly-createdKurdistan Autonomous Zone(KAZ)toreestablish InneighboringIranMBcadresbeganinthe1980stobelatedlypursuestagetwooftheir Iraqi refugeeslocatedthere.IraqitselfwouldnotwitnessthereturnofBrotherhooduntil1991, strategies (formationandexpansion)moreseriouslybyheavilyrecruitingthenindoctrinating more repressionin1979furtherthinneditsranks. to Ba’athism,orwereexecuted[11]. The MBleadershipdecidedtoceaseallactivitiesinIraqafter members leftthemovement,wentintoexile(mostlyLondonorGulfcountries),“converted” The plotfailedandninety-sixmembersoftheSecretGroupwereexecuted.RemainingMB Group (seeappendix1)andattemptedacoupagainstthegoverningIraqiBa’athistleadership. Army, togetherwithnewMBrecruitsandsympathizers,formedtheMuslimBrotherhoodSecret throughout the1960s.In1971,remnantsofIslamicMilitaryOr took overthegovernment,enactinglastinalongseriesofcoupswhichplaguedIraqipolitics Several othergroupsinIraqipoliticsbeatthemtoit,however, andin1968Ba’athistplotters past stagetwo),theMBviewedamilitarycoupasholdingouttheirbestchancesfortakingpower Army). Lackingsignificant strengthinsocietyatlarge (probablyasaresultofmovingtooquickly In1961,lessthanoneyearaftertheIslamicParty’s formation,QasimclosedtheIraqi the intentionofenactingacoup(seeappendix1–IslamicMilitaryOr political systemandbannedtheparty. The MBthenorganized officers withintheIraqiarmy, with public andindividualrightsasMuslims,exceptinmattersofreligion”[10]. peacefully ininstitutionalpolitics,andstatedthatnon-Muslimsshould“enjoythesamepolitical, direct action. The manifestoof theIslamicPartysuggestedthatMBwaswillingtoparticipate some coreactivistsinthe1940sand50s)directlytothirdstage–politicalcontestation 1). Essentially, theIraqiMBwasmovingfromfirst stageofitsstrategy(havingrecruited political party–theIslamicPartyofIraq–ledbyDoctorMohsen An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq (see appendix1–stillledbyMohsen Abdul Hamid). The IraqiIslamic 6 Abdul Hamid(seeappendix ganization Within Iraqi ge numberofwhatcouldbe ganization Within theIraqi cial The c . Occasional Paper David Romano David Afghanistan. One 7 Th e Union of Muslim Scholars of Kurdistan Muslim Scholars of Union of e Th versus the Umma – Islamist Groups in Iraqi Kurdistan in Iraqi Groups – Islamist the Umma versus Nationalism Kurdish appears to have functioned as a meeting, speaking and writing venue for Kurdish Islamists in the appears to have functioned as a meeting, speaking and writing venue Aziz brothers, who went on to later found early days of the movement. Most noteworthy were the main Islamist movements. several of Iraqi Kurdistan’s [18]. Second, several of the UMSK’s members went on to found important Kurdish Islamist [18]. Second, several of the UMSK’s Brotherhood, the UMSK movements. Besides serving as the regional front for the Muslim contemporary Arab Iraqi counterpart (the Union of Muslim Scholars), did not explicitly take on Arab Iraqi counterpart (the Union of Muslim Scholars), did not explicitly take on contemporary First, several sources This group is included here for two main reasons. a political role for itself. Muslim Brotherhood for the interviewed described the UMSK as the Kurdistan front organization of Kurdistan (UMSK), like its Founded in 1954 in Halabja, the Union of Muslim Scholars Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), despite being described as the main vehicle for protest votes despite being described as the main vehicle for protest votes Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), against these two ruling nationalist parties. a huge following, however. This includes the two largest groups, the Islamic Movement of groups, the Islamic Movement This includes the two largest a huge following, however. Movement of Kurdistan, both of which ran in various Iraqi Kurdistan and the Islamic Unity behind the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan elections but placed well or several of these factors play a role in the formation of each of the Kurdish Islamist groups or several of these factors play a groups ever developed One must remember that none of the Kurdish Islamist discussed below. on towns such as Halabja and ethnic cleansing pursued by , both of which Kurdish on towns such as Halabja and ethnic powerless to stop; and 4) Links with a generalized, global nationalist and leftist parties proved after the retreat of the Soviet Union from Islamist movement, particularly emergence: 1) Saddam’s attempt to undercut Kurdish nationalists by supporting and using attempt to undercut Kurdish nationalists by supporting 1) Saddam’s emergence: particularly since it became uence in Iraqi Kurdistan, infl ’s nascent Islamists; 2) Neighboring in Kurdistan in the wake of the chemical attacks The widespread despair autonomous in 1991; 3) factors may provide some explanation for their different particularly since the 1980s. Four in Iraqi Kurdistan, eventually emerged number of Islamist groups Nonetheless, a large that emerged between the Iraqi state and Kurdish nationalists, the state also frequently turned to between the Iraqi state and Kurdish that emerged nationalist rebels branded as heretics and tools of the enemies cooperative to have Kurdish of the Islamic world [17]. nationalists are also extremely critical of Islamic politics, feeling that opponents of the Kurds used politics, feeling that opponents extremely critical of Islamic nationalists are also never [16]. Indeed, Islamist politics them and stymie their national ambitions Islam to oppress in Iraqi Kurdistan as Kurdish nationalism did. In the contest attracted nearly as much support Islam [14]. Sami Shourush, for instance, argues that “the Islamic fundamentalist movement fundamentalist movement that “the Islamic Shourush, for instance, argues Islam [14]. Sami Kurdish a political movement...” [15]. Many uential as Kurds is not very infl among Iraq’s the 1950s), Sunnis, Shiites, Yezidis, Ahl-al-Haq, Sarlus, Shakak and a plethora of Sufi orders, Shakak and a plethora of Sufi Ahl-al-Haq, Sarlus, Yezidis, Shiites, the 1950s), Sunnis, pluralism groups in the area. Such religious the creation of Islamist would seem to discourage political infertile ground for conservative and scholars to declare Iraqi Kurdistan led many Kurds its population of Christians, Jews (until of Iraqi Kurdistan, with The religious pluralism Th e Jamestown Foundation ally againsttheBa’athistsinBaghdad.IranapparentlysoughtparticipationofIraqiMuslim TheIslamicMovementofKurdistan(IMK)wasfoundedsometimearound1986-88, organization’s creation,financing andprotection,seekingtocreateanIslamistforceinIraq towards theendofIran-Iraqwar. The Iraniangovernmentplayedanimportantroleinthe TheIMKfirst establisheditselfintheforbidding easterncorneroftheKurdish Autonomous Zone: violent Islamistgroups(seeappendix1anddiscussion below). tactics. Manyofthesereturning Afghan veteranslaterbrokeoff from the IMKtofoundmore the Sovietsin Afghanistan, whichincreased pressurewithintheorganization toadoptjihadist of theIMK’s mostimportantmembers consistedofIslamistKurdsreturningfromthewaragainst – with Aziz favoring‘armedstruggle’ overtheMB’s morepeacefulmeansofthetime[23].Many the MBactuallyrevolvedaroundmeanstoattainanIslamicstateinIraqandIraqiKurdistan Hence someobservers’ contentionthatthedisagreementbetweenOsman Aziz, hisfollowersand books weretranslatedintoKurdishandinfluenced theIMKintoadoptingajihadistoutlook[22]. Kurdish-Arab differences inthemovement[21]. Additionally, EgyptianIslamistSayidQutb’s the EgyptianIslamicJihad was likelyunacceptable.Somesources,however, statethattheIMKhadEgyptianmembersfrom For manyKurdishIslamistssuchasOsman Aziz, emphasizingthegoalofPan-Arabism the IslamicParty’s attachment tobothIslamand Arab nationalism.‘Azami(unintentionally)describesthisaspectof of disaffection fromtheMuslimBrotherhood,becauseMB’s leadershipdisplayedastrong Osman Aziz hadfallenoutwiththeMB–individualswhoallpossessmultipleand nationalists atthesametime. These twooverlappingidentitiesmayhavecontainedtheseeds overlapping identities–andinthecaseofIraqiKurds,manywerebothIslamistsandKurdish for thenorthernIraqbranchofMuslimBrotherhood. Aziz, aformermemberoftheUnionMuslimScholarsKurdistan Brotherhood An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq of Halabja. The regionislargely self-contained, separatedfromtherestofKurdistan by hugs theborderwithIran southofSuleimaniyeh;itsdistrictcentreisthe sizeable town both SunniteIslamandvarious Sufi sectswasespeciallyhospitable. The Howramanregion The Howramanareathatforcenturieshasbeena centreofreligiousactivityandhometo nation andatsomepointinthefutureunityofIslamiccommunity[20]. should beachievedgradually, beginningwiththeunityofIraq,then Arab which wouldinturnbethenucleusofIslamicunityasadvocatedbyparty irrespective ofreligion,ethnicityorsect. This wastoserveasanucleusofPan-Arabunity, On thehomefront,IslamicPartyupheldnationalunityonbasisofIraqicitizenship in theIMK,butMBrefused[19]. The IMK’s creationthenfelltoOsman Abdul (and byextensiontheMuslimBrotherhood’s) ideology: organization, whichiftrueraisesquestionsregardingtheextentof Th e Islamic Movement of Kurdistan 8 and originallyresponsible . Unity Occasional Paper [30]. In Tawala, Tawala, David Romano David ganization. Many . Each time the PUK 9 who engaged in attacks in the KDP and who engaged in attacks in the KDP law in the areas it controlled [28]. Some of the Suleimaniyeh [24]. Suleimaniyeh [24]. towering mountains to the south and east, and the large Sirwan reservoir, also known as Sirwan reservoir, and the large south and east, mountains to the towering Halabja with road connects Only one paved north and west. Lake, to the Darbandikhan in 1997 (see appendix 1). Hamas based itself in the town of Khormal and promoted a literalist, in 1997 (see appendix 1). Hamas based itself in the town of Khormal attacks on book stores, clubs, interpretation of the Quran [29]. Hamas militants also staged Salafi not dress ‘modestly’ beauty salons, and tourist areas, and threw acid at women who did the IMK had refrained from imposing to form Hamas broke off , Barziani, and Krekar) Afghan veterans (Hassan Sofi movements opposed such and join the Kurdistan Regional Government, that important splinter These dissidents were also upset that from the group. cooperation with secularists and broke off secular PUK It was in 1997 and 1998, when the IMK decided to cooperate with the distinct movements within the IMK – these included Bapir’s Islamic Youth group and a kind Youth Islamic ’s distinct movements within the IMK – these included Afghanistan and joined the IMK in of summer camp run by Mullah Krekar (who returned from Kurdish youth. 1992), which provided Islamic instruction and military training to Kurdish veterans of the Afghan war joined the IMK upon returning to Iraqi Kurdistan in the early Afghan war joined the IMK upon returning to Iraqi Kurdistan in the early Kurdish veterans of the IMK members founded various Afghan veterans and other charismatic rst some of the At fi 1990s. either a refl tensions within the IMK or simple opportunism. ection of divisions and either a refl the hypothesis of a seriously divided or movements, which would support from the IMK to found more radical Islamist splinter groups did break off Several appeared ready and able to destroy the IMK, Iran intervened and brokered an agreement [27]. appeared ready and able to destroy about statements and conciliatory rhetoric jihadist bellicose between alternated The IMK likewise the political system -- peaceful approach and willingness to function within the organization’s the IMK intermittently participated in the PUK-administered part of the Kurdistan Regional the IMK intermittently participated frequently clashed with each other Government, the two groups also allowed the IMK to thrive. Under strong Iranian pressure, the PUK in 1996 withdrew from the allowed the IMK to thrive. Under villages along the Iranian border such as Biyara, Halabja-Howraman area (including Although ceded it to the IMK. Sadiq) and effectively and Said Khormal, Gool, Panjwin, Sargat PUK regions of control (bombings, assassinations, attacks on unveiled women and Christians) PUK regions of control (bombings, The increasing power vacuum and received shelter there [26]. ed to IMK held territory often fl along with continuing Iranian support, and PUK fought each other to a standstill, as the KDP confl ict, the KDP and PUK tried to use Kurdish Islamists against each other. During the late During against each other. and PUK tried to use Kurdish Islamists ict, the KDP confl Hamas and Jund al-Islam Tawhid, 1990s, Islamists from armed fi ghters. armed fi the next four years of armed civil and PUK. During KDP Regional Government (KRG), the broke out between the two main parties of the Kurdistan ghting In the summer of 1994, fi Kurdish organizations, and ran in the 1992 Kurdish elections. It only garnered around 5% of It only garnered around 5% ran in the 1992 Kurdish elections. and Kurdish organizations, its power in the the group focused on consolidating after which however, the popular vote, elded around 500 mountainous Halabja [25]. It fi it enjoyed the most popularity region where Following the withdrawal of Saddam’s forces from the region in late 1991, the IMK acted as from the region in late 1991, the forces of Saddam’s Following the withdrawal nationalist and Islamist communist, secular, Front amalgamation of various part of the Kurdistan Th e Jamestown Foundation Despite(orperhapsbecauseof)thelossofseveralitsmorecommittedandextremist puritanical Wahabi interpretationofIslam. included many Arab veteransof Afghanistan (includingHawlerihimself)[31].Ittooespouseda TheIMK’s largest militaryunit(350-400fighters), theSecondSoranForce(seeappendix they werebased)asanindependentforce. The SecondSoranForcewasledby Aso Hawleriand 1), brokeoff fromtheorganization in1998aswellandtook controlofBiyara(thevillagewhere leadership ofthegroup. 1998 theIMKassassinatedHamasleaderHassanSofi, afterwhichOmarBarzianitookoverthe Manyofthe sourcesintervieweddescribed Ali BapirandhisIslamicGroupasbeing justas radical asthemost Wahabi andviolent ofhispeers,butmorepractical,patientand cautious[34]. in theJanuary2005Iraqielections,givingittwo seatsintheInterimNational and preachedanaustereSalafi-Wahabi interpretationofIslam. The IMKreceived0.7%ofthevote mosques [33]. The mosqueswerebuiltwithmoneyfromSaudi Arabia andotherGulfcountries, TheIMKwasdisarmedin2003byorder oftheKurdistanRegionalGovernment. With According toonePUKsource,alltheIMKever really didintheareasitcontrolledwasbuild the arrivalofU.S.forcesinarea,IMKwas nolongerinapositiontoopposesuchanedict. given thattheconstituentelementsoffederation hadalldeparted. the formernameofIslamicMovementKurdistan(seeappendix1)totheiror militants alsoleftinJuly2001(seeappendix1).BySeptemberofthe followers thatcametobeknownastheReformistGroup(seeappendix1).BarzianiandhisHamas Hamas and brokeoff toformtheIslamicGroup(seeappendix1)inJuneof2001,basedformer Theuniondidnotlastlong,however. Apparently asaresultofbothpersonaldifferences apart in2001.Long-timeIMKmember Ali Bapirtookmostoftheformer Al-Nahda and divergent viewsregardingstrategyandmethods,theIslamicFederationofKurdistanfell with OmarBarziani’s Hamasandbroughtitintothefederation(seeappendix1). Unity MovementofKurdistan–seegraph). The IslamicFederationofKurdistanalsoreconciled al-Nahda andtheIMK,formedIslamicFederationofKurdistan organizing peoplearoundIslamicprinciples.In1999,thetwo Aziz brothers(AliandSadiq)united Brotherhood Union ofMuslimScholarsKurdistan. Al-Nahda seemstohavestayedclosertheMuslim AnotherIslamistgroupledbyyetanother Aziz brotheralsoexistedinIraqiKurdistansince his brotherandIMKfounderOsman Aziz, hadbeenactiveintheMuslimBrotherhood-linked 1993 –al-Nahda(theIslamicRenaissanceMovement),ledbySadiq over asheadoftheparty. assistance. ItsleaderOsman Abdul Aziz diedin1999,afterwhichhisbrother Ali Abdul Aziz took part oftheKurdistanRegionalGovernment,andafter1998UnitedStatesalsoprovided (after theKDP andPUK)[32]. The IMKreceivedfinancial supportfromthePUKwhileitwas militants, untilthelate1990sIMKwasthirdmostpopularpoliticalpartyinIraqiKurdistan An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq stronghold ofKhormal.MullahKrekarbrokeawayaroundthesametimewithabunch and itsstrategicapproach,remainingfairlylowkeyfocusingoneducating Th e Islamic Group 10 Abdul Aziz. Sadiq Aziz, like (also knownastheIslamic Aziz brothersreturned Assembly. ganization, members Occasional Paper Tawheed Tawheed Ali Bapir’s release Ali Bapir’s David Romano David Abu Wa’il, Wa’il, Abu 11 Tawheed Tawheed fi region along ghters and took control of additional villages in the Howraman fi an expert and instructor in sabotage; and Abu Darda’a, an instructor in terrorism an expert and instructor in sabotage; and al-Islam a and assassination...Upon the signing, the three transferred to Jund that 60 of the $300,000 grant supplied by bin Laden. In total, the report claimed Afghanistan [40]. ghters in Jund al-Islam received training in approximately 400 fi According to a report in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, three Afghan-trained Arabs Afghan-trained three Al-Sharq al-Awsat, According to a report in Abdul Rahman, who serves as bin Ladin’s Abu witnessed the agreement: representative for the supervision of unity and media in Kurdistan; northern Iraq. As it became increasingly evident that a U.S. attack on Afghanistan loomed, many As it became increasingly evident that a U.S. attack on northern Iraq. Afghanistan to Iraq. Jund al-Islam clashed with IMK Arab mujahadeen also began moving from and Islamic Group Shafi as its base (the Second became the leader of Jund al-Islam, using the village of Biyara Shafi Islamist groups The joining of these three Soran Force controlled Biyara since around 1998). ed Jihad in unifi of Osama binLaden, who wanted a stronger, purportedly occurred at the urging The merger occurred a few days before September 11, 2001. Kurdish Afghan veteran Abdullah Abdullah Afghan veteran 2001. Kurdish occurred a few days before September 11, The merger the Second Soran Force agreed to join them few months later, A Bakr Hawleri (see appendix 1). movement Jund al-Islam (see appendix 1): and they renamed the combined Abu by united with Hamas to form the Islamic Unity Front, led Tawheed In July 2001, after the Hariri assassination and other actions received sanctuary there. Several after the Hariri assassination and with and Afghanistan to initiate relations to members also reportedly traveled train in al-Qaeda camps [39]. Tawheed also engaged in a campaign of assassinations, targeting of non-Muslims and foreigners, of non-Muslims also engaged in a campaign of assassinations, targeting Tawheed ed into IMK territory around Halabja [38]. Militants who fl bombings, and acid attacks on women prominent assassinated Tawheed opposition to the KDP, erce radical Islamist movement in fi , in February 2001. Like Hamas, politician Franso Hariri, governor of Christian KDP A Abdul Ghani Bazazi. originated in the city of Erbil and was led by Mullah Tawheed Islamic Group territory in order to travel deeper into Iraqi Kurdistan, which they did on many into Iraqi Kurdistan, which they in order to travel deeper Islamic Group territory cult to it diffi making at times, however, armed militias also clashed The two group’s occasions. evaluate the true nature of their relations. allowed to meet inside the small offi ce granted to the IMK [37]. After its founding in June 2001 After its founding the IMK [37]. ce granted to inside the small offi allowed to meet other villages town of Khormal and a few Group controlled the market (see graph), the Islamic to pass through al-Islam militants had al-Islam controlled territory. Ansar adjacent to assisted Ansar al-Islam [36]. The Islamic Group is a legal, albeit closely watched, party in the albeit closely watched, party The Islamic Group is a legal, al-Islam [36]. Ansar assisted legal but it is tolerated and region, the party is not Iraqi Kurdistan. In the KDP PUK-run part of Ali Bapir was arrested by U.S. Forces on July 10, 2003. Many prominent Kurdish personalities Kurdish personalities Many prominent July 10, 2003. U.S. Forces on was arrested by Ali Bapir Group statement demanding the PUK, signed an Islamic and groups, including and Ali Bapir cooperated closely with the record, insisted that speaking off cers, [35]. U.S. offi The Islamic Group describes itself as a non-violent Salafi when strongly protested movement, and Salafi itself as a non-violent Group describes The Islamic Th e Jamestown Foundation A fewmonths(December2001)afterJundal-Islam’s creation,afourthgroupofradical two organizations cooperatedwitheachother. the Iranianborder. After thistheyagreedonacease-fire with Ali Bapir’s IslamicGroupandthe raising efforts ofthegroupweredirectedat Arab donors(mostprobablyinthe Arabian Gulf (despite thegroup’s majorityKurdishmembership),whichwould seemtoindicatethatfund Additionally, Ansar al-Islampropagandavideosthatwereobtained inIraqwereall KRG (theKurdistanDemocraticPartyofIranand Komala)tomaketoomuchtroubleforIran. effective meansofwarningIraqiKurdsnottoallowIranianKurdishdissidents basedinthe secular partiesrulingtheKRG.Supportfor Ansar al-IslamcouldprovideIranwithaparticularly provided supporttothisradicalSunnigroupasa meansofexercisingleverageontheKurdish Mullah Krekarhimself)enteredandleftthearea viaIran[45]. the Iranianborder),veteransfrom Afghanistan joinedthemviaIran,andtheircadres(including Inadditionto Ansar al-IslamcellsoperatingasfarawayItaly, GermanyandBritain, the group’s militarysuppliescameinfrom Iran(themountainousregiontheycontrolledtouches a significant degreeofIraniansupportwasnecessary for Ansar al-Islamtofunction,giventhat violence anddestabilizationoftherulingsecularKurdishnationalistparties. Ansaral-IslamstagedanumberofattacksintheKRGzonebetweenDecember2001 and [44]. The grouphopedtofomentanIslamicrevolutioninIraqiKurdistanthroughacampaignof March 2003,includingassassinations,attacksonPUKmilitarypositionsandsuicidebombings generally ontoanothercountry. (regardless of their actual nationality), and took a yearly vacation by first traveling to Iran and then AnsarincludedPalestinians,Iranians,Jordanians, Afghans and Arabs fromvarious were paidtheirsalaryinthecurrencyofhomecountry. MostofthemheldIranianpassports countries, accordingtoaPUKagentwholivedintheareatheycontrolled[43]. them broughtinfromIran. other facilitiesforthepopulation. They boughttheirfoodandsuppliesfromthevillagers,orhad money frombusinessesinthevillagestheycontrolled,andfailedtobuildanyschools,clinicsor the villagersingeneraldetested Ansar al-Islamanditsstrictrules[42]. Ansar took protection joined Ansar al-Islam. They hadheatedarguments withtheirfamiliesforjoiningthegroup,and Villagers described the Ansar militantsasextremelytough,motivatedandexperienced to flee theirpositions. According tovillagersinBiyara,onlythreemenfromthevillageactually fighters whowouldeventiethemselvestogetherduringbattle,sothatnoonebetempted spiritual leaderandadoptedthenewnameof Ansar al-Islam. Abdullah al-Zam(OsamabinLaden’s mentor)[41].Jundal-IslamtookonMullahKrekar asits Najm al-DinFaraj Ahmad) livedinPakistanthe1980sandstudiedIslamicjurisprudenceunder the IMK/IslamicFederationofKurdistan Islamists joinedtheorganization --MullahKrekar’s ReformistGroup,yetanothersplinterfrom

An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq Ansar al-Islam (see appendix1).MullahKrekar(whoserealnameis 12 The ShiiteregimeinIranlikely Ansar members Occasional Paper Ansar Three ferent David Romano David When they returned to Iraq, , returned their weapons to them, , returned their weapons to them, 13 Islamic Kurdistan in multi-party politics. We believe in the right of parties to alternate in power. We We believe in the right of parties to alternate in power. We in multi-party politics. Instead of these reject dictatorships, repression, monopoly of authority and torture. We have a reformist message in every aspect, starting with politics. We believe We have a reformist message in every aspect, starting with politics. We Halabja, Kifri, Soran, Suli, Rania, Kalar, Debundihan, Kirkuk) and six television stations (Dohuk, Debundihan, Kirkuk) and six television stations Halabja, Kifri, Soran, Suli, Rania, Kalar, state that: Suli, Rania, Halabja, Erbil, Kirkuk and Garmyan) [54]. Party leaders Relief, are from the KIU, and the Islamic relief organizations provide the KIU with funds [53]. Relief, are from the KIU, and the Islamic relief organizations in Kurdistan (Erbil, Dohuk, In the Spring of 2004, the KIU already owned ten local radio stations – most of the The party receives support from the Gulf countries the Kurdish political system. Islamic World as active in Iraqi Kurdistan, such cials of aid organizations local workers and offi working from within The KIU insists that it pursues a moderate platform of peacefully insisting that the KIU serves as a Kurdish front of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood. KIU leaders insisting that the KIU serves as a Arab modern incarnation in the also admit to having excellent relations with the Brotherhood’s parts of Iraq, the Islamic Party of Iraq [52]. Brotherhood, they do admit to having been “inspired” by the Brotherhood and functioning as a Brotherhood, they do admit to having sources interviewed contradicted this claim, however, in the 1950s [51]. Other secret organization principles and the need to construct an Islamic state) [50]. In 1994, they entered Phase principles and the need to construct the establishment of the Kurdistan Islamic Union cially declared of their program and offi of or tied to the Iraqi Muslim Although KIU leaders claim that the KIU was never part (KIU). (‘establishment and indoctrination’) amongst Iraqi refugees there. (‘establishment and indoctrination’) with which they began assisting charitable organizations nanced they brought with them Gulf-fi spread an ideological message based on a return to Islamic the poor (at the same time that they Kurds in the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood returned to Iraqi Kurdistan. Many of them had spent Kurds in the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood strategic program of the MB’s Two Iran, pursuing Phase several years during the 1980s in Zone, high ranking Autonomous the creation of the Kurdish After the 1991 uprising and militants for a few days and then brought them back to the border militants for a few days and then [49]. and allowed them to reenter Iraq attack on their territory, however [48]. Villagers in Biyara, Sargat and Gul (all former Ansar- Gul (all former and Sargat in Biyara, Villagers however [48]. attack on their territory, operate from safe Ansar al-Islam to now allows on the border) stated that Iran controlled villages such as Mariwan. In other cases, Iranian authorities held houses in adjacent Iranian towns A many of the militants. killing and capturing territory along the Iranian border, al-Islam from its Iran just before and during the U.S.-PUK ed into members apparently fl Ansar number of larger Ansar PUK series of operations dislodged U.S. Special Forces and In March 2003, a joint ideologies but the same goals” [47]. The goals in question revolved around weakening Kurdish revolved around weakening Kurdish The goals in question same goals” [47]. ideologies but the KRG. nationalists in the Saddam’s government provided fi nancial assistance to the group, and that one of Ansar al-Islam’s al-Islam’s Ansar that one of to the group, and assistance nancial provided fi government Saddam’s such cooperation Apparently from Iraqi intelligence [46]. took his orders Wael) leaders (Abu [Iraqi intelligence] had dif “Ansar al-Islam and the Mukhabaraat occurred because countries). Finally, at least one Ansar al-Islam militant being held by the PUK indicated that PUK indicated being held by the militant Ansar al-Islam one at least Finally, countries). Th e Jamestown Foundation TheKIUingeneralstressesitsmoderatenature,andthefactthatithasnomilitiaorarmed forces. OnDecember6,2005(shortlybeforetheIraqielections),KIUoffi experienced furthersplits whichtypicallyledtotheemergence ofthemostradical,extremistand or foundanewgroup.Such newgroups,especiallytheIslamicMovement ofKurdistan,then the groupwereactivein the MBoroneofitsfrontorganizations beforebreakingawaytojoin In othercases,suchaswiththeIslamicMovement ofKurdistanandal-Nahda,keyleaders of theMB,anorganizational frontoftheMB,andregionalbranch MB,respectively. of MuslimScholarsKurdistan,andtheKurdistan IslamicUnionemer Mappingoutthehistoryandlinkages ofSunniIslamistgroupsinIraqleadstoastriking Brotherhood inonewayoranother. Organizations suchastheIslamic PartyofIraq observation: virtuallyallIslamistorganizations inthecountrytracetheirrootsback totheMuslim the radarscreenby2005. has subsumedtheremnantsofal-Islamintoit,giventhat Ansar al-Islamlargely disappearedfrom Sunnah membership betweenthegroups.Ifrelationshipprimarily (by actingasguidesinIraqiKurdistan,forinstance)andthattheremayevenexistoverlapping Several ofthesourcesinterviewedthoughtthat Ansar al-Islammilitantsassist Ansar al-Sunnah Jihad anduntilrecentlyledby Abu Musabal-Zarqawi), Ansar al-Sunnah,and Jaysh . Three ofthemostsignificant oftheseextremistgroupsareal-QaedainIraq(fomerly Tawhid and new organization. An undeterminednumberofforeignjihadistshavealsoincreasedtheirranks. SincethefallofSaddam’s regimein April of2003,anumberextremistandmainly Extremely secretive,thesegroupsfrequentlychangednamesorannouncedtheformationofa Sunni Arab groupsemerged inIraqandplacedthemselvesattheforefrontofinsurgency there. the groupfourprovincialseatsandoneseatinIraqiNational 7.1% ofthevoteinDohukGovernorate,3.6%Erbil,and10.8%Suleimaniya[57]. campaign ofharassmentandintimidationbytherulingKurdishparties.Nonetheless,KIUtook elections. Particularlyaftertheirwithdrawalfromthelist,KIUoffi all themajorKurdishpoliticalpartiesintooneelectorallistforDecember2005legislative of theparty[56]. The KIUhad recentlywithdrawnfromtheKurdistan Alliance, whichcombined mob, asKDP policelookedon.FourKIUmemberswere killed, includingahighrankingofficial in Dohuk(oneofthethreegovernoratesthatmakeupKRGregion)wereattackedbyalocal An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq members [55]. it isnotdictatorialbutgivestoomuchpreference(money, jobs,etc.)toparty but nottothesameextent. There isstillsocialinjustice,meaningpreference.No, of theBa’athpartythatweareagainstrepressionandtorture. we believeindemocracy, tolerationandalternationofdifferent parties.Itisbecause and Kurdish Ansar al-Islamwasclose,therealsoexistsapossibilitythat Ansar al-Sunnah Contemporary ArabSunniContemporary Islamist Groups Conclusion –Th e Brotherhood’s Children 14 Assembly. cials complainedofageneral This stillexistsnow ged astheofficial party Arab Sunni Ansar al- , the Union This gave ces Occasional Paper

ganizations curriculum; once they . Such tactics garten,’ introducing garten,’ David Romano David The Kurdistan Ansar al-Islam, the ve per cent of Ansar ve per cent of Wahhabi forces within Iraq, Wahhabi towards rst necessary steps Attempts to implement vigilant , stating that even the Islamic , stating that even 15 radical program, naturally. These four policies do not constitute a complete anti-Islamist power in Iraq, almost certainly will be active in trying to strengthen power in Iraq, almost certainly will be active in trying to strengthen and to protect its own interests in Iraq” [61]. fourth item is of particular importance, given observations such as that of Graham Fuller: “Gulf fourth item is of particular importance, given observations such as seem interested in helping states, as suggested by the news report on al-Kubaysi above, also to fear from a recrudescence of Shiite Arabia, which has much Saudi assert Sunni Islamic power. government threatened by Islamist radicalism. Finally, fi nancial transparency aims to prevent fi government threatened by Islamist radicalism. Finally, such as the kind of outside assistance that provided seed money to groups This various Islamist parties. uence on and by establishment of radical madrasses, or undue infl pedagogy that extols tolerance, pluralism and moderation. The third policy of putting Islamist The third policy of pedagogy that extols tolerance, pluralism and moderation. security policies for any groups and certain imams under surveillance constitutes prudent in a better position to monitor those homes being used for this purpose and who is attending the in a better position to monitor those at preventing curriculum, simultaneously aims supervising schools’ The second policy, meetings. and promoting instead a extremist interpretations of Islam from being taught to young people after prayers refl to discourage the indoctrination and recruitment that radical ects an attempt after prayers refl the political discussions that frequently follow prayers. Islamist groups often engage in during move meetings to private homes, the authorities end up being If as a result of the closures they 3) Keeps close surveillance on Islamist parties and imams; and 4) 3) Keeps close surveillance on Islamist coming into the region from abroad [60]. Closing mosques transparency rules for any money been implemented in Iraqi Kurdistan. democratic principles, have already mosques after prayers; 2) Supervises schools’ Regional Government now 1) Closes radicalization in Iraq, without completely gutting Some strategies to inhibit Islamist democratic rules of the game? Banning avowedly peaceful and moderate Islamist or democratic rules of the game? Banning societies that value freedom and democracy does not appear to be an option for extremist violence they seek to prevent. might just as easily lead to the very al-Islam members had been part of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, the Islamic Group, or al-Islam members had been part the radicals involves devising strategies to stop The way to stop the Kurdistan Islamic Union. if they play by the however, the ‘kindergartens,’ [59]. How can we stop the ‘kindergartens’” people to the Islamist perspective and allowing them to make the fi people to the Islamist perspective Minister Sinjari adds that “Ninety-fi becoming committed jihadists [58]. grow in power, the history and linkages between Islamist groups outlined above presents us between Islamist groups outlined the history and linkages grow in power, Karim Sinjari and PUK Interior Minister both KDP According to questions. with some troubling moderate Islamist groups act like a ‘kinder Chief of Security Dana Majid, the and resort to violence as soon as they felt strong enough to do so. as soon as they felt strong and resort to violence to change their ‘moderate tune’ the Kurdistan Islamic Union plan Party of Iraq and Islamist groups such as the Islamic contention that non-violent Even if one rejects the image for practical reasons. Other commentators went still further reasons. Other commentators image for practical nature’ both display their ‘true extremist the Kurdistan Islamic Union would Party of Iraq and and Ansar al-Sunnah. According to many local Iraqi observers I spoke to, organizations such such to, organizations observers I spoke to many local Iraqi According Ansar al-Sunnah. and strong of Kurdistan also possessed a Group and the Islamic Movement Islamic Ali Bapir’s as moderate but presented a somewhat more jihadist extremism and violence, tendency towards violent Islamist groups in Iraq – such as Hamas, Tawhid, the Second Soran Force, Ansar al-Islam, Ansar Force, the Second Soran Tawhid, Hamas, Iraq – such as groups in violent Islamist Th e Jamestown Foundation emerged beforethe2003Iraq war. Islam inIraq,giventhatatleastIraqiKurdistan,themajorityofgroupsexaminedhere much weightisoftenattachedtotherolethat Western occupyingforceshadinfomentingradical forces areabletoprovidesomemeasureofsecurity. This studywouldseemtoindicatethattoo groups suchasal-QaedainIraqand Ansar al-Sunnah,aslongthisdoesnotoccurbeforeIraqi less favorabletothem. The departure offoreigntroopswouldlikewiselessentheappealradical rights organizations wouldalsomaketheoverallclimateinwhichextremistmovementsthrive Reconstruction, provisionofsecurity, internationaldevelopmentassistanceandsupportforhuman 16. Foradiscussionofthe issue,seeHelkotHakim,“Kurds,IslamandState Nationalism,”in 15. (London: SaqiBooks),115-139. Absul-Jabar, ed., “The ReligiousCompositionoftheKurdishSociety: Sufi Orders,SectsandReligions,”inFaleh 14. Foradiscussionofthedifferent religioustendenciesinIraqiKurdistan,see SamiShourush, 13. The IraqiIslamicPartydoes 12. ‘Azami,174. 11. Author’s interviewwith NiaziSaid Ali, March11, 2004,Qalachwalan, Iraq. Israeli conflict asthecentralissueconcerning entireIslamiccommunity.” asserted thatthePalestinianproblemcouldonly be solvedbyforce. 10. ‘Azami,168. Article 6ofthemanifestoaddressedminorities.‘Azamiadds“Thepartyprogram Papyrus, 1999,Hebrew). (accessed June24,2005);alsoNachman Tal, 247, November16-22,1995, 9. Formoreonthethreestagestrategy, see“PoliticsinGod’s Name,” Arabs. 8. ‘Azami,167.‘AzamiprovidesalistofleaderstheMBin1960s,allwhomwereSunni 7. 6. Author’s interview withNiaziSaid Ali, March11, 2004,Qalachwalan,Iraq. globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizb-ut-tahrir.htm (accessedJuly18,2005). 5. “Hizbut-Tahrir al-Islami(IslamicPartyofLiberation),”GlobalSecurity.org, http://www. 4. Books, 2002),164. ed., Ayatollahs, Sufis andIdeologues:State,religionsocialmovementsinIraq(London:Saqi 3. Basimal-‘Azami,“TheMuslimBrotherhood:GenesisandDevelopment,”inFaleh March 11, 2004,Qalachwalan,Iraq. Patriotic UnionofKurdistan(PUK)intelligenceofficial incharge ofmonitoringIslamistgroups, 2. Author’s interview withNiaziSaid Ali, DirectoroftheInstitutefor Training Specialistsand 1. Islamism,”EncyclopediaoftheOrient,http://lexicorient.com/e.o/islamism.htm. Ibid Ibid Ibid An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq . ., 165. ., 136. Ayatollahs, Sufi sandIdeologues:State, religion andsocialmovementsinIraq http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/archives/parties/muslimb/polgod.ht not describeitselfaspartoftheMuslimBrotherhood, however.however A DecadeofFundamentalism Notes 16 The MBviewedthe Arab- Al-Ahram Weekly (Tel Aviv: JCSSand Absul-Jabar, , No. m . Occasional Paper 45-58. David Romano David April 12, 2004; author’s April 12, 2004; author’s ged as the most likely year http://www.uga.edu/islam/iraq. ganizations (Suleimaniya), ganizations (Suleimaniya), http://www.komall.org/b/ 17 drew more support and took the number three position in ghters is provided by Rubin, while the year 1998 comes from me. I ghters is provided by Rubin, while

. gure of 350-400 fi

Ayatollahs, Sufi s and Ideologues: State, religion and social movements in Iraq, movements and social religion Ideologues: State, s and Sufi Ayatollahs, m

(accessed July 20, 2005). The fi . The fi gure of 350-400 fi by Rubin, while the year 1998 comes from me. I ghters is provided gure of 350-400 fi The fi . .

IbidIbidIbid

Ibid. Ibid.

Ibid. Author’s interview with Jamal Hussein, Omeid Qaradaghi, Bahman Tahir, Ali Mustafa, and Kara Tahir, interview with Jamal Hussein, Omeid Qaradaghi, Bahman Author’s

36. Author’s interview with a U.S. Army Major, December 20, 2004, Erbil. Army Major, interview with a U.S. Author’s 36. statements.ht

35. For the text of the statement, see the Islamic Group’s website at 35. For the text of the statement, see the Islamic Group’s Security, Suleimaniya), April 12, 2004, Suleimaniya. Suleimaniya), Security,

interview with Niazi Said Ali, March 11, 2004; author’s interview with Dana Majid (PUK Chief of 2004; author’s March 11, Ali, interview with Niazi Said Suleimaniya branch of Islamic Renaissance Movement) and Fuad Majid Misri, Suleimaniya branch of Islamic Renaissance Movement) and Fuad

Fathi, February 1, 2004, Suleimaniya; author’s interview with Hawji Mullah Amin (former leader of interview with Hawji Mullah Fathi, February 1, 2004, Suleimaniya; author’s 34.

Fathi, February 1, 2004, Suleimaniya. 33. Author’s interview with Jamal Hussein, Omeid Qaradaghi, Bahman Tahir, Ali Mustafa, and Kara Tahir, Omeid Qaradaghi, Bahman interview with Jamal Hussein, Author’s 33.

the Kurdish political scene. 32. Since then, the Kurdistan Islamic Union

this occurred. split from the IMK – sources I interviewed were all unsure, and 1998 emer split from the IMK – sources I interviewed

have unfortunately had diffi determining the exact date that the Second Soran Force completely culty have unfortunately had diffi 31.

30. “Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Mouse that Roared?” The 30. “Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: December 2001.

29. Michael Rubin, “The Islamist Threat from Iraqi Kurdistan,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Threat from 29. Michael Rubin, “The Islamist Briefi ng, February 7, 2003, 3. Briefi

28. “Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Mouse that Roared?” International Crisis Group, Iraq The 28. “Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: (Suleimaniya), February 22, 2004.

27. Author’s interview with Fareid Assasad, President of the Institute for Strategic Studies interview with Fareid Author’s 27. 26. Author’s interview with KRG Interior Minister (KDP) Karim Sinjari, March 13, 2004. interview with KRG Interior Minister (KDP) Karim Sinjari, Author’s 26.

25. (Suleimaniya), February 22, 2004.

24. Author’s interview with Fareid Assasad, President of the Institute for Strategic Studies interview with Fareid Author’s 24. html#sects

23. Alan Godlas, “Muslims, Islam and Iraq,” University of Georgia, Alan Godlas, “Muslims, Islam and Iraq,” University of Georgia, 23. 22.

February 1, 2004. Fathi, former Islamists now working at the Bureau of Democratic Or now working at the Bureau Fathi, former Islamists 21. Author’s interview with Jamal Hussein, Omeid Qaradaghi, Bahman Tahir, Ali Mustafa, and Kara Ali Mustafa, Tahir, Bahman with Jamal Hussein, Omeid Qaradaghi, interview Author’s 21. espousing no preference for one ethnic group as well as Pan-Arabist ambitions. for one ethnic group as espousing no preference 20. ‘Azami, 170. ‘Azami does not seem to recognize the contradiction inherent in simultaneously the contradiction inherent in ‘Azami does not seem to recognize 20. ‘Azami, 170.

19. Author’s interview with Niazi Said Ali, March 11, 2004. 11, Ali, March with Niazi Said interview Author’s 19. March 11, 2004. March 11,

Renaissance Movement) and Fuad Majid Misri, April 12, 2004; author’s interview with Niazi Said Ali, Niazi Said interview with April 12, 2004; author’s and Fuad Majid Misri, Renaissance Movement) 18. Author’s interview with Hawji Mullah Amin (former leader of Suleimaniya branch of Islamic leader of Suleimaniya branch Amin (former with Hawji Mullah interview Author’s 18.

17. Absul-Jabar, Absul-Jabar, Th e Jamestown Foundation 45. ZacharyJohnson,“Al-Qaeda’s NewFront,” International), 2004,ChapterSix(“NorthernIraq”). 44. Formoreonthis,seeJonathanSchanzer, December 19,2003. 43. Author’s interview withShaho Ali Aziz, ChiefofPUKinBiyara,formerspyagainst Ansar, Biyara. 42. Author’s interview with Taleb KaderRahmanandthreeotherBiyaravillagers,December19,2003, 41. GlenRangwala,“Iraq’s MajorPoliticalGroupings,”Iraq Watch, October1,2002, 2004, ChapterSix(“NorthernIraq”). Qaeda link,seeJonathanSchanzer, 40. link (theotherssaidtheydidnotknowforcertain). December 2001.Mostofthesourcesinterviewedforthisstudycorroborated 39. MichaelRubin,“TheIslamist Threat fromIraqiKurdistan,”MiddleEastIntelligenceBulletin, itself (Author’s personalinterview, October3,2005,Erbil). burned downbyHamasmilitants,whichforcedhimtorelocatefromhisvillagenearErbilthecity Jund al-Islam 38. A ChristianbarberinErbiltoldtheauthorthatnumberofattacksby Tawheed, Hamasandlater Group anditsarmedmilitia. Jihadist rhetoric,theKurdistanGovernmentcouldnotingoodconsciencegrantalicensetoIslamic 37. KDP InteriorMinisterKarimSinjaritoldtheauthorthat afterreviewingtheirpartyplatformandits 55. Kurdistan IslamicUnion, March7,2004,Suleimaniya. 54. Author’s interviewwithHamedSaid andothermembersoftheSuleimaniyaleadership ofthe 53. Author’s interviewwithHawjiMullah Amin andFuad MajidMisri, April 12,2004. 52. Kurdistan IslamicUnion,March7,2004,Suleimaniya. 51. Author’s interviewwithHamedSaidandothermembersofthe Suleimaniyaleadershipofthe 50. Author’s interviewwithNiaziSaid Ali, March11, 2004. accurate. information remainsdifficult tocorroborateandwas sharedwithmeinformally, Ibelieveittobe among thosetheIraniansreleasedbackintoIraq, relatedthesamebasicstorytome. 49. A numberofsources ondifferent occasions,including aformer Ansar militantwhowas Biyara. 48. Author’s interview with Taleb KaderRahmanandthreeotherBiyaravillagers,December19,2003, 47. difficult toascertainthereliabilityofthisinterview. under nocompulsiontoanswerinterviewers’ questionsandhadagreedtodosovoluntarily, itis Shamani, April 27,2004,Suleimaniya. Although PUKauthoritiesinsistedthat Mr. Shamaniwas 46. PhilippeGapet(Frenchindependentjournalist)andtheauthor org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/cron.htm iraqwatch.org/perspectives/rangwala-100102.ht Ibid Ibid Ibid Ibid An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq . . . . This isalsoagoodsourceformoredetailonJundal-Islam.Forthepurportedal- This isalsoagoodsourceformoredetailonJundal-Islam.Forthepurportedal- far exceededwhatwasreportedinthenews.Headdedthathisownhousehadbeen Al-Qaeda’s Armies 18 Al-Qaeda’s Armies m Frontline (accessedJuly20,2005). (New York: SpecialistPressInternational), l . (PBS),January25,2005, (New York: SpecialistPress ’s interviewwith Abdullah Rahman Tawheed-al-Qaeda http://www.pbs. Although the http://www. Occasional Paper g. David Romano David , December 9, 2005, , December 19 Radio Free Europe Radio Free About the Author About

Th e author would likeTh to thank the CanadianDepartment ofNational Defence R.B. Myers David David Romano is assistant professor of international studies at Rhodes College. His

Ibid.

Post-Doctoral Post-Doctoral Fellowship program and the McGill University based Interuniversity Consortium for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies (ICAMES) for research support which made this paper possible. “Conducting research ict in zones,” PS: the Political Science Middle confl East’s & Politics, 39:3. movements, and nationalism. His most recent publications include Th e Kurdish Nationalist Movement Movement Nationalist Kurdish e Th include publications recent most His nationalism. and movements, e(Cambridge Future University ofPress, 2006), Ethnopolitics, Kirkuk,” “Th 6:2,June 2007, and research research focuses on Middle East politics, the Kurdish issue, rebellions against state social authority,

August, 2003. 61. “Islamist Politics in Iraq after ,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 108, U.S. Institute of Peace Special in Iraq after Saddam Hussein,” 61. “Islamist Politics 60. Majid, April 12, 2004, Suleimaniya. April Majid, 2004. with Karim Sinjari, March 13, interview Author’s 59. 58. Author’s interview with Karim Sinjari, March 13, 2004, Erbil; author’s interview with Dana 2004, Erbil; author’s with Karim Sinjari, March 13, interview Author’s 58. uk/iraq051215results.html http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/9DFDF2B2-3D52-4B9B-A56A-38D835CBBB33.html. 20 January 2006, http://middleeastreference.or election results, as released on 57. December 2005 56. “Iraq: Kurdistan Islamic Union Responds to Attacks,” Attacks,” to Union Responds Kurdistan Islamic 56. “Iraq: Th e Jamestown Foundation An Outline ofKurdish Islamist Groups inIraq

IRAQI MUSL IM BROTHE RH OOD 1946 (195 1) Islamic Sunni Groups Liberation Ar my Blue Line : Org. front or transform ation of group D avid R om ano 1954 Green Line : Merger and for m ation of new group Rhodes College Isla m ic Military Red Line : S p l i n t e r g r o up rom [email protected] Org . w/in Iraqi Black Line : Som e kind of link with group A r m y Green Filling : Group that existed in 2005 19 61 Union o f Muslim Black Bold Border : Known link with al-Qaeda Muslim Bro therhoo d Schol ars of Dotted Box Border : Mainly Sunni Arab group Secret Group Kurdistan 1954 19 71 I s l a m i c P ar t y o f I r a q Kurdista n Isl am ic 1960 U nion (Y et girt u) M o h s e n A bdul I s l a m i c M o v e m e n t o f 19 94 (1 980 ) H a m id S a l ah a d i n B aha a l - D i n Islamic P arty K u r d i s t an ( I M K ) o f I r a q 1987 -88 Second Sor an 19 91 Osm an Ab dul Aziz Force M o h s e n A bdul Ali Ab du l Aziz 1998 H a m id Aso Ha wleri Al-Nah da/Isl amic Renaissance Moveme nt H a m as 20 1993 1997 S a d i q A bd u l A ziz H a s s a n S of i Om ar Barziani

I s l a m i c F e d e r at io n o f Kurdistan (aka I slamic H a m as U n i ty M o v e m en t o f Tawheed Ta whid & members I s l a m i c G r o u p Kurdistan ) J u l y 200 1 May 2 000 Jihad 1999 Abdu l Gh an i 2003 Zar qaw i ( K o m a l ) Islamic Jun e 20 01 U n i ty F r o n t Bazazi Ali Bap ir Ju ly 2001 I M K Ab u B akr Al-Q aed a in Reformist Gr oup S e p t 2 0 01 Hawle ri I r a q J a y s h Mu lla K rek ar Aziz 2004 M u h am m a d 2001 Zarqa w i 2003 Jun d Al-Islam Ans ar al- S e p t 2 0 01 A n s ar a l - S u n n a h Islam A bdu lah Sh af i F O R E I G N 2003 A bu Ab du llah A l- Dec.2001 J I H A D IS T S H a s s a n b i n M ah m u d K r e ka r