Cuaderno De Documentacion

SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DE ECONOMIA Y APOYO A LA EMPRESA

MINISTERIO DIRECCION GENERAL ANALISIS MACROECONOMICO DE ECONOMÍA Y Y ECONOMÍA INTERNACIONAL COMPETITIVIDAD SUBDIRECCION GENERAL DE ECONOMIA INTERNACIONAL

CUADERNO DE DOCUMENTACION

Número 94

ANEXO X

Alvaro Espina Vocal Asesor 24 de Enero de 2012

ENTRE EL 15 DE OCTUBRE Y EL 15 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2011 BACKGROUND PAPERS:* 1. Constitutional document crisis nears resolution, sources say, Almasryalyoum…11 2. ElBaradei warns of new revolution in Egypt, Almasryalyoum by Arabic Edition…12 3. Yemen’s southern rebels emerge from the shadows, TheGuardian by Tom Finn…13 4. Turkey’s zero problems problem, Project Syndicate by Sinan Ulgen…16 5. Brotherhood candidate announces formation of joint committee with Salafis, Almasryalyoum by Arabic Edition…18 6. La Turquie menace d’arrêter les exportations d’électricité vers la Syrie, Le Monde.fr de AFP…19 7. Le président yémenite, Ali Abdallah Saleh, dit qu’il partira dans trois mois, Le Monde.fr de AFP…20 8. Truce agreed between rival militias in Libya, Reuters by Oliver Holmes…21 9. A disturbing new dimension of far-right terror, Spiegel OnLine …22 10. Xenophobic crimes have too often been minimized, Spiegel OnLine …33 11. Revolutionary youth union to take part in demo planned for Friday, Almasryalyoum by Mohsen Semeika…36 12. Isolating Assad, Financial Times …37 13. Jordan and China add to pressure on Syria, Financial Times by Daniel Dombey…38 14. Arab league finds its voice on Syria, Financial Times by David Gardner…40 15. Tunisie: les resultants définitifs ont été annoncés, Le Monde.fr by Reuters…42 16. Comment affaiblir davantage le régimen syrien, Le Monde.fr …43 17. Le régime syrien dans le collimateur de l’Europe, Le Moonde.fr by AFP…44 18. Islamists and NDP remnants duke it out on north coast, Almastyalyoum by Rana Khazbak…47 19. Why are political cartoons incendiary? The New York Times by Victor S Navasky…50 20. La ligue arabe suspend la Syrie, Le Monde.fr by Amr Nabil…53 21. Foreign minister: Egypt rejects outside intervention in Syria, Almasryalyoum by Arabic Edition…55 22. Q&A: Islamist presidential candidate on Egypt’s future, Almasryalyoum by Amina Ismail…57 23. El árabe, una lengua europea como las otras, Svenska Dagbladet…60 24. Warring factions divide Yemen’s capital, The Washington Post by Sudarsan Raghavan…62 2

25. Liberal parties disagree on supra-constitutional principles document, Almasryalyoum by Mahmoud Gaweesh…66 26. Ahead of vote, Egypt’s parties and skepticism are growing, The New York Times by Neil MacFarquhar…68 27. Iran ready to negotiate deal to allay nuclear-program concern, Russia says, Bloomberg by Henry Meyer…71 28. Diplomacy is the least damaging option with Iran, Financial Times by Anne Marie Slaughter…73 29. Syrian opposition group pelted with eggs in Cairo, Almasryalyoum by AP…75 30. El gigantesto proyecto solar del Sáhara abastecerá a España en 2015, El País.com…77 31. La aspiración nuclear iraní no se puede resolver por la fuerza, El País de Georgina Higueras…80 32. Nuevo ropaje para el islamismo, El País.com de Jean Daniel…83 33. La sangría de la represión suma ya más de 3.500 muertos en Siria, El País.com de Enric Gonzalez…85 34. Arab League mee ton Syria’s failure to honor peace plan, Almasryalyoum by AFP…87 35. The free market secret of the Arab revolutions, Financial Times by Hernando de Soto…89 36. Yemen: la abigüedad es un lastre, FP de Ana Echangüe…91 37. Islamists plan 18 November protests against supra-constitutional principles, Almasryalyoum by Arabic Edition…93 38. Supra-constitutional principles cause rift between political forces, Almasryalyoum by Arabic Edition…94 39. Supra-constitutional debate hats up again, Almasryalyoum by Noha El- Hennawy…96 40. Why Tunisia succeeds while Egypt fails, Almasryalyoum by Bahey el din Hassan…98 41. Libia, la sharia y nosotros, El País.com de Bernard Henri Levy…100 42. Qatar calls for Arab league to meet again on Syria, The New York Times by Reuters…103 43. La Guerra fría, El País de Lluis Bassets…103 44. El Asad responde con más represión a la tregua exigida por el mundo árabe, El País.com de Enric González…104 45. ¿Cuál será el próximo?, El País.com de Juan Goytisolo…106 46. ¿Fue Albert Camus asesinado por el KGB?, El País.com de Antonio José Ponte…107 47. Charlie atacada, El País.com Editorial…109 48. Interrogation is not a social science, Financial Times by Gillian Tett…111 3

49. El regimen sirio mantiene la represión y pide a los opositores que se entreguen, El País de Agencias…113 50. La Haya pide ayuda para deterner a Saif el Islam por crímenes contra la humanidad, El País.com de Isabel Ferrer…114 51. Supra-constitutional debate heats up again, Almasryalyoum de Noha El Hennawy…115 52. Military powers in draft constitutional documental spark ire of opposition figures, Almasryalyoum by Staff…117 53. Un academic formado en EEUU, Nuevo jefe del Gobierno de transición libio, El País de JMM…119 54. Constitutional principles document gives military special status, Almasryalyoum by Arabic Edition…121 55. US expert: leadership of military Inc is running Egypt, Almasryalyoum by Nadine Marroushi…122 56. We won’t allow military council to rule from behind the curtain, says ElBaradei, Almasryalyoum by Ibtisam Taalab…124 57. Crisis brewing over constitutional principles, Almasryalyoum by Noha El Hennawy…125 58. Wafd leader: some Islamist groups conditionally approve constitutional principles, Almasryalyoum by Staff…129 59. Civil state is a matter of national security, says army chief of staff, Almasryalyoum by Mahmoud Mosalem…130 60. Looming question: who’ll get to write the constitution?, Almasryalyoum by Rana Khazbak…131 61. Brotherhood rejects pre-election drafting of constitution, Almasryalyoum by Staff…134 62. Brotherhood leader: proposed constitutional amendments mostly reasonable, Almasryalyoum by Mena…135 63. Constitutional amendment committee: article II will not be touchetd, Almasryalyoum by Staff…136 64. Omán, entre el cambio y la tradición, El País de Angeles Espinosa…137 65. La oposición siria denuncia la muerte de nueve personas en otra ola de represión, El País de Agencias…140 66. Iran warns US to avoid clash over nuclear programme, The Guardian by Nick Hopkins…142 67. Israeli PM orders investigation into Iran leak, The Guardian by Ian Black…144 68. Syria protests across the country aim to test regime’s pledge to end crackdown, The Guardian by Martin Chulov…146 69. Tunisie: l’échec des modernists, Le Monde.fr by Isabelle Mandraud…148

70. Syria crackdown gets Italy firm’s aid with US Europe syp gear, Bloomberg by Ben Elgin…150 71. Arab league to reveal Syria peace plan Wednesday, Middleeastlive …155 72. Arab league roadmap helps Assad play for time, The Guardian by Simon Tisdall…167 73. Syria agrees to Arab League plan, Aljazeera.net by AFP…170 74. Sources: freezing Syria’s Arab league membership out of the question, Almasry Alyoum by Mena…172 75. Egyptian government defends SCAF policies, http://www.almasryalyoum by Mena…172 76. Erdogan escalates Germany criticism, Spiegel On Line by Anna Reimann…173 77. Plutôt mourir qu’être jugé par la CPI m’a dit Kadhafi, Le Monde.fr…176 78. Il y a en Libye de quoi armer toute l’Afrique, Le Monde.fr by de David Sperry…178 79. Turkey hardens stance against Syria, Financial Times by Daniel Dombey…181 80. A long list of Suckers, The New York Times by Thomas L Friedman…183 81. The two-state solution: where next?, Open Democracy…185 82. Un academico formado en EEUU, nuevo jefe del Gobierno de transición libio, El País de JMM…188 83. La ONU insta a Libia a mantener sus arsenales fuera del alcance de Al Qaeda, El País de Agencias…190 84. Rasmussen pone punto final en Trípoli a la misión de la OTAN, El País de Juan Miguel Muñoz…191 85. El islamismo avanza en la nueva Libia, El País de Juan Miguel Muñoz…193 86. El emir de Catar anuncia elecciones para su cámara consultiva, El País de Angeles Espinosa…196 87. Islam y democracia, El País.com de Antonio Elorza…197 88. Blog Internacional: Orilla Sur, ¿Cuándo felicitará Francia a Ennahda en Túnez?, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…200 89. Las claves de la victoria de Ennhda en Túnez, FP de Ana María Menéndez…203 90. By cutting UNESCO funding, Obama has lost credibility, Spiegel On Line…206 91. Libya struggles to create army out of militias, The Washington Post by Mary Beth…208 92. Dos abogados alemanes se querellan contra Turquía por crímenes de guerra, El Mundo de U Topper…211 93. El otoño árabe, El País de Ignacio Sotelo…212

94. Ankara tries to bolster fight against Taliban, Financial Times by Daniel Dombey…214 95. Rasmussen excluye cualquier intervención de la OTAN en Siria, ABC.es…215 96. Gunfire and fear fill Tripoli’s security vacuum, Financial Times by Borzoy Daragahi…217 97. Insumisos contra los militares egipcios, El Mundo de Francisco Carrión 98. La votación aumenta el aislamiento de Obama en la crisis palestino-israelí, El País de Antonio Caño…223 99. El régimen sirio va a implosionar, Informática hoy de Isabel Munera…225 100. Atambáyev arrasa en los comicios DE Kirguizistán ante denuncias de fraude, El País de Agencias…227 101. La Unesco aprueba la adhesión de Palestina como Estado miembro, El País de Ana Teruel…229 102. China advierte al régimen sirio que la violencia no puede continuar, El País de Agencias…231 103. La fiebre de cultivos perturba Africa, El País de Andrea Rizzi…233 104. Sequías, inundaciones y alimentos, El País.com de Paul Krugman…236 105. Libia acelera la formación de su Ejército ante la retirada de la OTAN, El País de Juan Miguel Muñoz…238 106. Libyan leader wants tos peed up elections, The Washington Post by Mary Beth…241 107. Room for debate: a running commentary on the news, The New York Times …243 108. Clinton credited with key role in success of NATO airstrikes, Libyan rebels, The Washington Post by Joby Warrick…247 109. Arab league submists plan to end Syria crisis, awaits response from Damascus, The Washington Post by Associated Press…251 110. Nato all but rules out Syria no-fly zone, The Guardian by Luke Harding…253 111. Clinton: Libya showed US leadership to be essential, The Washington Post …255 112. La muerte de Gadafi, El País.com de Bernard-Henri Lévy…258 113. El Asad lanza un aviso: una intervención en Siria quemaría la región, El País de Agencias…260 114. Crescent moon, waning west, The Economist …262 115. Islamist to the fore, The Economist…264 116. Yemenis demand Saleh’s trial amid deadly violence, Almasryalyoum by AFP…267 117. AP six Al Qaeda linked militant killed in southem, Almasryalyoum by AP …268 6

118. La Corte de la Haya localiza a Saif el Islam y le promote un juicio justo, Almasryalyoum.com de Isabel Ferrer…269 119. Un atentado suicida causa dos muertos en el Kurdistán turco, El País de Blanca López Arangüena…271 120. Teoría y práctica del tiranicidio, El País.com de José María Ridao…272 121. Los cadáveres más buscados también son incómodos, El País de Berna González Harbour…276 122. Ennahda promete construir la democracia en Túnez, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…278 123. En Tunisie, le parti islamiste officiellement vainqueur, Libération.fr…280 124. Al-Aridha, surprise parti de Hechmi Hamdi, Libération.fr de Elodie Aufray…282 125. La hora de Palestina, Project Syndicate de Michel Rocard…284 126. La Libye, la charia et l’embarras occidental, Le Monde.fr de Natalie NOugayrède…286 127. Turquía desafía a Siria al acoger a combatientes contrarios a El Asad, El País de Liam Stack…288 128. La ONU revoca el mandato que permitió la intervención en Libia, El País de Agencias…290 129. L’homme qui a lance la revolution tunisienne, La Sentinelle de Julien Pain…292 130. Modelo a seguir, ¿el FIS argelino o el AKP turco ?, El País.com de IC…296 131. Occidente ve el futuro de Libia con creciente preocupación, El País de Ricardo Martínez Rituerto…298 132. The responsability to protect comes of age, Project Syndicate by Gareth Evans…300 133. Des négociations s’ouvrent en Syrie sur fond de violences continues, Le Monde.fr de Khaled Al Hariri…303 134. Après Ben Ali et Kadhafi, un printemps islamiste ?, Le Monde.fr de Alexander Najjar…305 135. Au Yémen, la trêve n’empêche pas les tueries à Sanaa et Taëz, Le Monde.fr de Reuters…307 136. Au Yémen, Saleh signe une trêve avec son général rebelle, Le Monde.fr de AFP…308 137. Islamismo en Túnez, El País de CET…311 138. Libi-únez, El País de Miguel Angel Bastenier…311 139. Washington acelera sus planes para contener a Irán tras su salida de Irak, El País de Antonio Caño…313 140. Los islamistas buscan un pacto en Túnez, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…315 7

141. ¿El triunfo islamista en Túnez es una amenaza para el proceso democrático?, Eskup de Cristina Manzano…317 142. La UE concentrará la ayuda al desarrollo en la democracia y los derechos humanos, El País de Gloria Rodríguez-Pina…320 143. La nueva Libia nace marcada por el desgobierno y los excesos de los rebeldes, El País de Juan Miguel Muñoz…323 144. The Arab spring will create strong islamist parties’10, Spiegel On Line …325 145. Moderate Islamist party heads toward victory in Tunisia, The New York Times by David Kirkpatrick…327 146. An-Nahda declares victory in Tunisian elections, Middleestlive…330 147. Kadhafi a été enterré mardi à l’aube, le Monde.fr de Reuters…332 148. Amnesty dénonce un climat de peur régnant dans les hôpitaux syriens, Le Monde.fr …333 149. Burma: at freedom’s gate, Financial Times by Amy Kazmin…334 150. Islam politico 2.0, El País de Zouhir Louassini…339 151. The three spectres at the Arab feast, Financial Times by David Gardner…341 152. Tunisie: les islamistes prêts à s’allier avec la gauche, Le Monde.fr de AFP…343 153. Tunisie : Ennahda s’engage à respecter les droits des femmes et des minorités, Le Monde.fr de AFP…345 154. Quand Kadhafi demandait à Berlusconi d’arrêter les bombardements, Le Monde.fr de AFP…347 155. Los islamistas moderados se atribuyen la victoria en las elecciones de Túnez, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…349 156. Retour à Sidi Bouzid, berceau du printemps árabe, Le Figaro.fr para Thierry Oberlé…351 157. Los comicios de Túnez arrancan con una gran influencia de votantes, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…354 158. Gadafi, ETA y el niño Torres, El País.com de John Carlin…356 159. Tunisians vote in a Milestone of Arab Change, The New York Times by David Kirkpatrick…357 160. Palestinian bid for full UNESCO membership imperils American financing, The New York Times by Steven Erlanger…360 161. In his last days, Qaddfi wearied of fugitive’s life, The New York Times by Kareem Fahim …362 162. Libia arranca dividida la era tras Gadafi, El País de Juan Miguel Muñoz…365 163. Todos queríamos que lo mataran, El País de Juan Miguel Muñoz…367

164. Libya prepares for liberation ceremony, The Guardian de David Batty…369 165. Sin Gadafi, El País.com Editorial…371 166. EEUU celebra el triunfo de la estrategia compartida en Libia, El País de Reuters…372 167. De la guerra tradicional a la contrainsurgencia, El País de David Alandete…374 168. Los islamistas de Túnez inquietan al sector laico de la sociedad, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…376 169. Mi sueño es conjugar islam y modernidad, El País.com de Ignacio Cembrero…378 170. Gaddafi’s fall is a moment for relief, not for euphoria, Financial Times by Mark Malloch-Brown…381 171. A new chapter for Libya, but will the victors stay united?, The Guardian Julian Borger…383 172. Muammar Gaddafi’s violent death leaves Libya at a crossroads, The Guardian by Simon Tisdall…385 173. Muammar Gaddafi the king of kings dies in his hometown, The Guardian …389 174. New Libyan government recognizes Syrian opposition council, The Washington Post…392 175. El ejército turco invade el norte de Irak tras el brutal ataque de la guerrilla kurda, El País de Blanca López Arangüena…393 176. El PKK vuela los últimos puentes, El País de Juan carlos Sanz…395 177. Egypt’s souring transition, Open Democracy of Khalil al Anani…397 178. It can’t be all anger, The Psychology of Occupy Wall Street of Jeffrey O G Ogbar…399 179. Democracy in revolution: the Mediterranean moment, Open Democracy of Mehmet Dosemeci…403 180. El 15-M es emocional, le falta pensamiento, El País.com de Vicente Verdú…408 181. In crowded Cairo quarter, Islamists try to seize mantle of a revolution, The New York Times by Anthony Shadid…410 182. Jailed Egyptian blogger on hunger strike says he is ready to die, The Guardian by Jack Shenker…413 183. Reports of more deaths in Yemeni protest, Aljazeera.net by Reuters…415 184. So, what do yo think of your husband’s brutal crackdown, Mrs Assad? The Independent…417 185. La voz de los ciudadanos, Frankfurter Allgemeine AFP…419 186. La larga historia de una masacre olvidada, Le Monde de Jean Texier…421 9

187. 17 octobre 1961 dans le JT de L’Ortf, pas un mot sur les morts, Le Monde.fr…425 188. Assad, his raids on Lebanon, and Syria’s slow slip into civil war, The Independent of Robert Gisk…426 189. Arab leaders put pressure on Assad as repression in Syria continues, The Independent by Alastair Beach…428 190. Tiny Kingdom’s huge role in Libya draws concern, The Wall Street Journal by Sam Dagher…429 191. Una agenda energetica para Libia: Seguridad, reconstrucción y gobernanza (ARI), Real Instituto ElCano de Gonzalo Escribano…436 192. América toma el relevo de las protestas, El País…446 193. Wall Street ha matado el sueño americano, El País de David Alandete…450 194. ¿Una revuelta o un movimiento social?, El País.com de Norman Birnbaum…453 195. Inédita primavera feminista en el mundo musulmán, El País.com de María Dolores Masana…455 196. La question coloniale: une histoire politisée, Le Monde.fr de Pierre Nora…457 197. Les manifestations meurtrières se succèdent au Yémen, Le Monde.fr de AFP…460 198. Sol ilumina media mundo, El País de Joseba Elola…462 199. Occupy Wall Street protests continue worldwide, The Washington Post by Karla Adam…464 200. ¿Debe la comunidad internacional presionar más a Siria para su democratización?, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…465 *Índice elaborado por Francisca Simón Gil

Constitutional document crisis nears resolution, sources say Author: Arabic Edition On Tuesday, informed sources said that meetings held by Deputy Prime Minister Ali al- Selmy might result in a compromise over his controversial constitutional principles document, a text designed to enshrine fundamental rules and principles into Egypt’s future constitution. The revelation comes one day before the deadline that political forces gave the government to withdraw the document altogether. As part of the compromise, Article 1 – which pertains to the constituent committee tasked with writing the new constitution – along with articles 9 and 10 – which provide certain privileges for the armed forces – may be amended. The sources said Selmy was adamant about maintaining the armed forces’ special status and only allowing the National Security Committee – not parliament – to discuss military affairs. He was more lenient regarding the constituent committee and said he would allow a wider representation of parliament members, something which would please Islamist trends, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis. Selmy gave political forces 24 hours to discuss the latest changes before the document was presented to the military council and officially announced on Wednesday. “If the amendments are agreed upon, we’ll invite all political parties to sign the document,” said Wahid Abdel Meguid, president of the Democratic Alliance’s follow- up committee, adding that the signatories would “morally” bound to the document. “In that case, Friday’s million-man demonstration wouldn’t be necessary,” he said. For his part, Saad al-Husseiny, member of the executive office of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, said the document should only play an “advisory” role in forming the new constitution. “We would reject it if it deviated from that role,” he said. Tarek al-Zommor, spokesman of the Jama’a al-Islamiya Shura Council, agreed. On the other hand, Nader Bakar, member of the Salafi Nour Party’s supreme committee, said the party categorically rejects the document, be it advisory or obligatory, and insists that the military council hand over power by April. Translated from the Arabic Edition Publishing Date: Tue, 15/11/2011 - 18:31 Related material Brotherhood refuses supra-constitutional principles document Constitutional principles document gives military special status

Source URL (retrieved on 15/11/2011 - 21:03): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/515049 11

15/11/2011 - 21:57

ElBaradei warns of new revolution in Egypt Arabic Edition Author: Arabic Edition Prominent presidential hopeful Mohamed ElBaradei on Tuesday renewed warnings that a "revolution of the hungry" could occur in Egypt if the country remained unstable. ElBaradei’s words came during an interview with Tunisia’s Al-Shorouk Daily. Nine months after the 25 January revolution first began, Egypt’s old constitution is still ruling the country, noted ElBaradei, adding that the country suffers from a fabricated, unjustified polarization between civil and religious forces. He said that Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy’s constitutional principles’ document comes at a time that Egyptian society is consumed by fear that it will not be fully represented in the new constitution. “We didn’t adopt the right path during the transition period,” he said. There are two issues that the Egyptian people are wary of, namely the state’s civil nature and the role of religion in the political system, he added. ElBaradei expects that Selmy will amend the document to contain the emerging crisis. “I’m not surprised that the Tunisian Nahda Party won a majority in the constituent council, and I think Islamic parties in Egypt will get a good percentage of seats in parliament,” he said. “We have to define what type of Islam we’re talking about, the Islam of bin Laden, Sheikha Housnia… or Erdogan?” “We’ve mismanaged so many issues that we’ve become enemies of ourselves,” he added. Publishing Date: Tue, 15/11/2011 - 21:57 Related material Coptic church invites ElBaradei to Easter Parliamentary speaker: ElBaradei only a thinker if he doesn't join a party

Source URL (retrieved on 16/11/2011 - 10:52): Al-Masry Al-Youm 15/11/2011 - 21:57 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/515103

Yemen's southern rebels emerge from the shadows Hirak leader calls for beleaguered regime in Sana'a to accept south's self-determination demands Tom Finn in Aden guardian.co.uk, Friday 11 November 2011 18.42 GMT

A woman mourns her son, killed during shelling by forces loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the southern city of Taiz. Photograph: Khaled Abdullah/Reuters Leaders of a five-year secessionist movement in Yemen's restive south are threatening to overturn a 1990 unification deal and declare independence, amid growing frustration that their grievances are being overshadowed by the bloody power struggle raging in the country's northern capital Sana'a. "We give the regime this ultimatum: either you acknowledge our legitimate demands to self-determination or you will soon find Yemen split once again into two countries," said General Nasser al-Taweel, a prominent leader of the Hirak, or southern secessionist movement. Years of maltreatment and neglect at the hands of the Sana'a government had left many in Yemen's south querying the value of the 1990 merger between the then Marxist-led south and the tribal-dominated north. Now, with President Ali Abdullah Saleh's armed forces battling renegade soldiers and tribal militias in Sana'a, the separatists are seizing the opportunity of a weakened central government to try to see through their claim to independence. In the southern port city of Aden, a former British colony built in the dusty crevices of an extinct volcano, the Hirak, who for years bristled at the region's marginalisation under northern rule, have emerged from the shadows. Bus stops draped in the blue, red,

and white flags of the former socialist republic of South Yemen and kitted out with amplifiers have been transformed into makeshift protest stages and podiums for the delivery of defiant "anti-unity" speeches. In the suburbs, abandoned government buildings overlook alleys strewn with shattered paving slabs and heaps of smouldering rubbish, ominous reminders of the running street battles between separatist demonstrators and security forces that still haunt the city. Even the hoarding showing the president outside the airport has not survived the Hirak's blitzkrieg. "Get out Ali, you dog, free the south!" is scrawled in thick red paint across the ruler's eyes. Years of intimidation, floggings and midnight arrests by the regime's secret police had forced most of the Hirak's leadership abroad or underground. Now they move freely about the city, organising weekly rallies and holding round-table discussions in coffee shops and restaurants. "The regime is expending all its firepower on the north," said Mohammed Omar Ahmed Jubran, an elderly Hirak leader, addressing a group of youth activists in a ramshackle tea shop in downtown Aden. "We must seize this opportunity to regain our rights." Though the south is home to only a fifth of Yemen's 22 million people, it generates the majority of the impoverished Arab country's wealth. Up to 80% of oil production comes from the south, along with its fisheries and Aden's port and refinery. But southerners claim they have lost out since unity both in terms of access to local power and jobs – the governors of all seven southern provinces are from the north – and as a result of systematic land grabs by well-connected northerners. "How is that a northern sheikh can own a farm in the south that is bigger than Dubai, while an ordinary southern citizen cannot find 15 square metres to build a house on?" said Mohammed Al-Azaadi, a final year medical student at Aden university. "They have looted the foundations of our state. Now all we have left now is our blood." Others lament the loss of the liberal culture that once pervaded Aden, blaming this on an infiltration of conservative Islam from the north. Adeni women say they had better access to education and jobs before unity. Others voice bitterness over rigid dress codes imposed by Islamists who gained influence after the 1994 civil war. "In the 80s women and men here reached greater equality than many parts of Europe," said Raqiya Homeidan, 66, an outspoken defender of women's rights and the first woman in the Arabian Peninsula to become a practising lawyer. "Now we've gone back a century." The advent of Egyptian-inspired protests in February saw flurries of cooperation between protesters in the north and south. Both agreed to raise neither the Southern nor the Yemeni flag during demonstrations in order not to fracture opposition voices and undermine the immediate goal of regime change. But euphoria has given way to disenchantment. Many southerners are convinced that the Islamist-dominated opposition are more interested in its own political ambitions than addressing their popular grievances.

"They [the opposition] do not recognise our struggle as a political one. They speak about us as if we are an inconvenience not an independence movement," said Saleh Bin Farid Al-Awlaki, a prominent southern sheikh and wealthy businessman backing the secessionists. But the south now has religious radicals of its own to contend with. Thousands of refugees have fled Islamist militants who have captured cities in the neighbouring province of Abyan. Packed into the dingy classrooms of primary schools across Aden, they recall with terror the sight of the self-described "guardians of Islam" overrunning cities and plundering weapons factories after a swift retreat by army forces. But some accuse Saleh of deliberately fomenting conflict in Abyan in order to make the south seem unworthy of statehood. The southern movement still lacks unity, strong leadership and international support, said Prof Abdul Faqih, a professor of politics at Sana'a University. "But this problem is not about to go away. The southern issue is to Yemen what Palestine is to the Middle East: until it is addressed there can be no stability in the region." http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/11/yemen-southern-rebels-hirak-secession

ISLAM Turkey’s “Zero Problems” Problem Sinan Ulgen 2011-11-15

ISTANBUL – It was good while it lasted. Designed by Turkey’s newly elected government in 2002, the country’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy helped it to climb into the league of influential regional powers. The policy’s goal – to build strong economic, political, and social ties with the country’s immediate neighbors while decreasing its dependency on the United States – seemed to be within sight. But the Arab Spring exposed the policy’s vulnerabilities, and Turkey must now seek a new guiding principle for regional engagement. Until the onset of the Arab uprisings, “zero problems with neighbors” meant zero problems with the Middle East’s established autocratic regimes. But, when Arab political opposition began to gain traction this year, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government faced an unavoidable choice: whether to maintain its policy of engagement with authoritarian Arab leaders, or acknowledge that their countries’ citizens were not having “zero problems.” The revolt in Libya provided the first concrete challenge to Turkey’s policy. Though Turkey’s Western partners swiftly broke with Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi in support of the opposition, the “zero problems” principle dictated that the Turkish government maintain relations with the old regime. After initially adopting a neutral stance, Turkey soon recognized that its indecisiveness was damaging its image. Turkey was thus confronted with a fundamental conflict between its cherished policy of uncritical engagement with regional political rulers and the imperative to support the Libyan people’s democratic aspirations. Eventually, the government decided to support the latter over the former, thus effectively ending its “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Turkey became the last NATO member to give its backing to the Libyan rebels. In many ways, Syria was the poster child for the “zero problems with neighbors” policy. But the Syrian crisis became another nail in the coffin of Turkey’s regional policy. At the end of the 1990’s, Syria and Turkey were on the brink of war, owing to Syria’s

support of Kurdish terrorism. But the two governments mended their relationship, even contemplating the creation of a regional common market. So, when mass protests erupted in Syria in January, Turkey hoped to leverage the relationship of mutual trust that the two countries had presumably developed, actively nudging Syrian President Bashar al-Assad towards democratic reforms. Faced with Assad’s intransigence, however, Erdoğan’s government demonstrated that it had learned from its Libyan experience: this time, Turkey did not hesitate before harshly criticizing Assad. In a clear departure from established Turkish policy, Erdoğan even imposed unilateral sanctions on Syria – all the more remarkable for a country that has typically condemned sanctions. Indeed, as recently as last year, Turkey voted against new sanctions on Iran at the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, the Turkish government’s rhetoric also changed. Giving their full- fledged support to the Syrian opposition, Turkey’s leaders started to profess their country’s duty to protect the victimized people of the Middle East. The consequences of this fundamental shift in Turkey’s regional outlook are likely to be profound. After all, Turkey’s new outlook implies that it is intent, for the first time in its history as a republic, on promoting democratic principles in the region. A more vocal Turkish policy on issues related to fundamental freedoms and democratic reform in the region will necessarily alter Turkey’s relations with its less progressive neighbors. Indeed, if Turkey’s new agenda is to become credible, Erdoğan’s government cannot continue to turn a blind eye to the gross human-rights violations in neighboring Iran, where Erdoğan’s government was the first to congratulate President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad following Iran’s tainted elections in 2009. An equally important component of the new policy’s credibility will be Turkey’s ability to resolve its own democratic shortcomings, particularly with regard to freedom of expression, non-interference with the media, and minority rights. Progress in these areas will be critical to the success of Turkey’s foreign-policy agenda. Turkey’s geopolitical role as a country that is at once European and Middle Eastern is more complex than ever. For such a country, there is no such thing as “no problems.” In an environment that is being reshaped in unpredictable ways by the Arab awakening, Turkey will have to redefine what it means to be a good neighbor. Sinan Ulgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe and the chairman of the Istanbul based EDAM think tank. Turkey’s “Zero Problems” Problem2011-11-15 http://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/ulgen2/English

Brotherhood candidate announces formation of joint committee with Salafis Author: Arabic Edition A Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) candidate running for parliamentary elections on Tuesday announced the formation of a nationwide committee comprised of Salafis and Muslim Brotherhood members to discuss general matters pertaining to Egypt. The decision to form a joint committee comes in the wake bickering between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood about election issues. Yossry Hany, a candidate running in the first constituency in Mansoura, said Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Supreme Guide Kharyat al-Shater will be a member of the committee. During an FJP conference in Khaleeg village, Hany said everyone should work under an Islamic reference. “Everyone should respect this because our country is Islamic," Hany said. The Muslim Brotherhood, Hany said, wanted to form the committee in Daqahlia “to mull dialogue with other trends, including liberals and secularists, as they were all excluded under the rule of the former regime.” Observers fear a potential electoral alliance between FJP, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, and parties affiliated with Salafis during parliamentary elections, which would grant Islamists absolute power in parliament and in writing the new constitution. FJP had earlier said it would contest 40 percent of parliamentary seats. However, an alliance that includes the Salafi Nour and Asala parties as well as the FJP said it expects to win about 30 percent of the seats. Translated from the Arabic Edition Publishing Date: Tue, 15/11/2011 - 16:30 Related material Brotherhood pursues NDP remnants Brotherhood says websites functioning following hacker attacks

Source URL (retrieved on 15/11/2011 - 18:14): Brotherhood candidate announces formation of joint committee with Salafis15/11/2011 - 16:30 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/514924

La Turquie menace d'arrêter les exportations d'électricité vers la Syrie LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 15.11.11 | 16h13

La pression diplomatique s'intensifie sur le régime de Damas.AFP/GAMAL NOMAN Comment accentuer la pression sur le régime de Damas ? La solution pourrait passer par le domaine énergétique. La Turquie – ancien allié régional de Damas – envisage ainsi de réviser ses livraisons d'électricité à la Syrie voisine si le climat actuel persiste entre les deux pays. La Turquie a également décidé d'arrêter des explorations de pétrole menées conjointement avec la Syrie. Au total, six puits syriens sont concernés. Les récentes attaquesU des missions diplomatiques turques U en Syrie par des manifestants pro- gouvernementaux ont aggravé les tensionsU entre Ankara et le régime de Bachar Al-

Assad.U Au plan diplomatique, Damas semble de plus en plus isolé après huit mois de répression violente du mouvement de révolte. Les monarchies arabes du Golfe se sont opposées mardi 15 novembre à la tenue d'un sommet arabe, réclamé dimanche par la Syrie. Damas avait en effet réclamé une réunion d'urgence pour évoquer la crise qui secoue le pays depuis mars, au lendemain de la décision de la Ligue arabe de suspendre la Syrie de ses réunions. NOUVELLE RÉUNION MERCREDI À RABAT Les relations entre Damas et les six pays du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG), dont l'Arabie saoudite est le chef de file, se sont fortement détériorées, notamment après la mise à sac par des manifestants syriens soutenant le régime des ambassades d'Arabie saoudite et du Qatar à Damas. Le CCG avait condamné dimanche "ces agressions" contre les deux ambassades, les qualifiant de "violation des conventions internationales". Les diplomates arabes se retrouvent mercredi à Rabat pour discuter des mesures annoncées au Caire visant à sanctionner les autorités de Damas, alors que la répression de la contestation depuis huit mois en Syrie a fait 3 500 morts, selon l'ONU. http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/11/15/la-turquie-menace-d-arreter- les-exportations-d-electricite-vers-la-syrie_1604110_3218.html 19

Le président yéménite, Ali Abdallah Saleh, dit qu'il partira dans trois mois LEMONDE.FR Avec AFP | 15.11.11 | 12h46 • Mis à jour le 15.11.11 | 12h50 C'est la chronique d'un départ annoncé, puis reporté. Le président yéménite, Ali Abdallah Saleh, a affirmé lundi qu'il quitterait "bien sûr" le pouvoir après un accord entre les différentes parties sur un mécanisme de transfert du pouvoir et après des élections. "Celui qui veut s'accrocher au pouvoir est fou", affirme le président du Yémen, qui tient les rênes du pays depuis trente-trois ans, dans un entretien à la chaîne française France 24. "Quand un accord sera trouvé sur le plan du Golfe, qu'il sera signé et quand un calendrier sera défini pour sa mise en oeuvre et que des élections auront eu lieu, le président partira", a-t-il ajouté. M. Saleh a déjà promis à plusieurs reprises de quitter le pouvoir mais n'a jamais signé le plan des monarchies arabes du Golfe, qui prévoit son retrait du pouvoir, en échange d'une immunité pour lui-même et ses proches. Sur France 24, M. Saleh a affirmé "n'avoir jamais refusé de le signer" mais dit qu'il voulait le "lire" et "travailler sur un mécanisme" pour le mettre en œuvre. Lire aussi : Yémen : Saleh serait prêt à quitter le pouvoir Au Yémen, le président Saleh se rapproche de la sortie Yémen : Saleh répète qu'il est prêt à abandonner le pouvoir, mais pas à ses opposants M. Saleh a par ailleurs contesté lundi que son gouvernement ait réprimé les protestataires réclamant son départ, tout en indiquant que le "Printemps arabe" qui a conduit à la chute de plusieurs dirigeants était plutôt "le chaos arabe". La répression des manifestants qui réclament la démission du président Saleh et les affrontements entre troupes rivales ont fait des centaines de morts depuis janvier au Yémen. PRESSION DE L'ONU L'émissaire de l'ONU pour le Yémen, Jamal Benomar, a appelé lundi à un rapide transfert du pouvoir dans ce pays après des entretiens avec le général dissident Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar selon qui le changement est désormais "inévitable". "Le moment est venu d'accélérer le changement au Yémen et d'entamer un transfert du pouvoir", a affirmé M. Benomar aux journalistes. "La résolution du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU est un message clair de la communauté internationale que l'heure d'un accord politique est venue". Le Conseil de sécurité a demandé le 21 octobre au président Ali Abdallah Saleh de signer un plan de sortie de crise proposé par les monarchies du Golfe. Ce plan, que le président Saleh refuse de parapher, prévoit notamment qu'il remette le pouvoir à son vice-président en échange d'une immunité pour lui et sa famille. Le Conseil de sécurité a également appelé à la fin de la répression des manifestants qui réclament la démission du président Saleh et qui a fait des centaines de morts depuis janvier. http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/11/15/le-president-yemenite-ali- abdallah-saleh-dit-qu-il-partira-dans-trois-mois_1603802_3218.html 20

Truce agreed between rival militias in Libya

Mon, Nov 14 2011By Oliver Holmes TRIPOLI (Reuters) - Four days of fighting between militias from Libya's coastal city of Zawiyah and members of the Wershifanna tribe have ended after a truce was agreed, according to fighters on both sides. Fighting had erupted on Thursday after a row over a military base, a key component of defenses under Muammar Gaddafi, along the main highway from Tripoli to Tunisia. Libyan officials and diplomats say they are concerned at the way local disputes have flared in the heavily armed vacuum left by Gaddafi, and say some groups among those towns which rebelled early against the old order appear to be bandying accusations of pro-Gaddafi sympathies among neighboring groups in order to further their interests in long-standing local feuds. "The fighting has stopped and brigades from Tripoli have come to maintain the peace," a fighter from Zawiyah said on Monday. Groups of men were celebrating in the streets of Wershifanna, named after the tribe and a few miles south of the military base, on Monday and many were carrying the flag of the ruling National Transitional Council (NTC). On Saturday, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, chairman of the NTC, blamed "irresponsible" former rebels for violence which has fanned fears that thousands of fighters who helped topple Gaddafi may turn on each other. Abdul Jalil, who NTC members said personally took part in lengthy negotiations since Friday, has been trying to end the clashes between men from Zawiyah and the neighboring tribe. NTC spokesman Mahmoud Shammam said Abdul Jalil and other senior Libyan leaders had met representatives of both sides on Sunday in Tripoli to secure an agreement to end the fighting. Fighters attacked each other with rockets, mortars and machineguns over the weekend, but Reuters journalists in the village of Wershifanna on Monday said there were no signs of continued fighting. Although Gaddafi is dead, many of the rebel militias that fought to topple him say they will not hand in their weapons until a national army is formed. Members of the Wershifanna tribe have angrily denied accusations that they harbor loyalties to Gaddafi - several hundred demonstrated in Tripoli on Monday, angry at a local television station which had aired comments to that effect. (Additional reporting by Alastair Macdonald; Writing by Oliver Holmes) http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14/us-libya-clashes-truce-idUSTRE7AD1P320111114

11/14/2011 12:07 PM The Brown Army Faction A Disturbing New Dimension of Far- Right Terror Germany has been shocked by a series of revelations relating to a trio of neo-Nazis who appear to have carried out a crime wave lasting for over a decade. They are suspected of murdering nine immigrants and a policewoman as well as a series of bank robberies. The evidence points to a new kind of right-wing terrorism unlike anything Germany has seen. By SPIEGEL Staff. Frühlingsstrasse in the Weissenborn neighborhood of the eastern German city of Zwickau is a street lined with renovated old houses, manicured front gardens and sidewalks that look swept clean. It would be an idyllic residential neighborhood, if it weren't for the house at number 26. The windows are smashed, a section of the front wall has collapsed onto the lawn, and there is a gaping black hole on the right side of the second floor. An incendiary bomb exploded at this house a little over a week ago. But the real nature of the bomb that exploded there was not clear until last Friday. As it turned out, the reverberations from the explosion rocked not just the nearby houses on Frühlingsstrasse, but the whole of Germany. Beate Zschäpe, who was renting an apartment in the building, left the house shortly before flames burst from the windows at 3:05 p.m. on Nov. 4. She dropped off her cats with a neighbor, and then she did what has been doing time and again for almost 14 years: She disappeared. Three hours earlier, a fire had also been set in a parked camper in Eisenach, a city 180 kilometers (110 miles) away. The two men inside, Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt, had just robbed a bank. They had ended up in Eisenach after being on the run for 14 years. The two men shot themselves before a police patrol could reach the burning vehicle. Shocking Discoveries It didn't take investigators long to see the connection between the two incidents. Then they began digging through the wreckage in Frühlingsstrasse, looking for clues. The deeper they dug, the more astonished and shocked they were by what they uncovered. At first, it seemed that they had just hit upon a gang of bank robbers that had blown up their hideout. They dug deeper. Were the two men and one woman a neo-Nazi trio that had built pipe bombs in the eastern state of Thuringia in the late 1990s and had gone into hiding in the Zwickau area? The investigators dug even deeper. Was the trio a group of cold-blooded murderers who had gunned down police officer Michèle Kiesewetter in the southwestern city of Heilbronn four years ago? The 22

investigators found Kiesewetter's service weapon, a Heckler & Koch P 200, and that of her severely injured fellow police officer in the burned-out camper, while the presumed murder weapon was found in the rubble in Zwickau. But that wasn't the end of the story. Were they members of a right-wing extremist terrorist organization that had randomly shot and killed nine men throughout Germany since 2000, eight of them of Turkish origin and one from Greece? That was the point at which the investigation had arrived by the end of last week, when police found a weapon in the pile of rubble that had become synonymous with what was probably Germany's longest, most brutal and most mysterious series of murders. The weapon was a Ceska, model 83, 7.65 caliber Browning. The Pink Panther's Terror Tour Although the authorities had not yet completed their analysis of the pistol when SPIEGEL went to press, they are almost completely convinced that it's the same Ceska that was used to commit the so-called "doner killings," named after two of the victims, who sold doner kebabs, between 2000 and 2006. Next to the weapon lying in the fire- blackened rubble in Zwickau, police found four DVDs that had already been placed into envelopes. A 15-minute film by a group calling itself the "National Socialist Underground" (NSU) had been burned onto the disks. In the film, which SPIEGEL has viewed, the authors call themselves a "national network of comrades whose principle is to value action above words. As long as fundamental changes do not occur in politics, press and in freedom of opinion, the activities will continue." Using a macabre cartoon style, the authors take the Pink Panther cartoon character on a "tour of Germany," making stops at the sites of the nine doner murders. They film the sign on the door of flower shop owner Enver S., the first victim, and show his body and a photo that the neo-Nazis apparently took at the scene of the crime, with the heading "Original." The film, scored with the music from the Pink Panther cartoon series, is a chilling mix of infantile and fascist esthetics. In another bizarre image, the police appeals for public assistance are derided, under the heading: "Today: Doner Skewer Campaign." The cynical post-mortem is accompanied by a press review including newspaper articles about the killings and the photos of several Turks who were shot to death. In the video, the neo-Nazis also claim responsibility for a 2004 bombing in Cologne, in which 22 people were injured, almost all of them ethnic Turks. The video shows the presumed bomb before detonation, a suitcase on a bicycle filled with shiny nails, and a gas cylinder. The film ends with photos of the police murder in Heilbronn and the presumed police weapon. The agitprop videos, addressed to several media outlets and Islamic cultural centers, were apparently intended to ignite the next stage, a propaganda campaign, after 13 years of silent terror. The neo-Nazis apparently felt strong enough now to take on all of society. On the Wrong Track The Ceska and the DVDs are the key elements in a case that is unprecedented in the history of postwar Germany: a series of murders apparently committed by neo-Nazi killers, presumably stemming from a white-hot rage against foreigners, and yet

committed with such ice-cold precision that it took investigators an entire decade to finally track down the group. In fact, until recently the authorities were on the wrong track, believing that the doner killings were committed by the Turkish mafia and were related to a protection racket, or that the killers could be traced to nationalist splinter groups in Turkey or elsewhere, but certainly not to right-wing extremist groups. Indeed, the authorities were convinced that they had the latter under control, which is now proving to have been a miscalculation. This error of judgment is all the more glaring because there were apparently also co- conspirators. As the state government in Thuringia confirms, one of the men was using the name "Holger G." The real Holger G., who had apparently earlier told authorities that he was merely doing the trio a favor, was arrested on Sunday. He is suspected of providing the group's members with identification documents. Members of the state government in Thuringia already speculate that they are dealing with a larger "right- wing extremist network," which supported the trio "up until the last minute." How else could the fugitives have obtained so many weapons and passports? There are some indications that the trio from Thuringia was merely the hard core of a terrorist cell of the sort that has until now only been the stuff of audacious conspiracy theories. Were they a miniature underground army, a sort of Brown Army Faction like the far-left Red Army Faction which terrorized Germany in the 1970s, consisting of two men and one woman, equipped with 19 weapons and the ability that all terrorists share, namely to deactivate their conscience? Echoes of the RAF The fact that neo-Nazis are becoming militant and committing attacks isn't a new phenomenon. The best-known case is that of Munich Oktoberfest killer Gundolf Köhler, who set off a bomb at the Wiesn festival site in Munich on Sept. 26, 1980, killing himself and 12 other people. Köhler was a member of Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann, a paramilitary group of right-wing extremists who dreamed of civil war. The Hoffmann group had already been banned before the Oktoberfest bombing. Another example is that of Berlin right-wing extremist Kay Diesner, who shot a police officer in 1997 while he was being chased, and was then sentenced to life in prison. And in Munich, several followers of neo-Nazi leader Martin Wiese were sent to prison for several years after police uncovered their 2003 plot to bomb a cornerstone-laying ceremony at a synagogue in the city. But there is no precedent in German postwar history for an underground right-wing combat group that funds itself through bank robberies and plans and commits deadly attacks, defying the authorities' attempts to stop them using manhunts, informants and state-of-the-art surveillance technology. In fact, this sort of terrorism has until now only been associated with a group operating on the other side of the political spectrum, the Red Army Faction (RAF). All of this raises many new questions. For example, what other crimes did the group commit? Investigators believe that they can pin at least 14 bank robberies on the trio. But in addition to the doner murders, which can now apparently be attributed to them, were they involved in other terrorist attacks? Suddenly everything seems possible, and every angle is being investigated. For example, police now speculate that the group may have been behind an unsolved bombing in the southwestern city of Saarbrücken, at a

1999 exhibition focusing on war crimes committed by the German army, the Wehrmacht, in World War II. Beate Zschäpe, who had disappeared from the Zwickau flat shortly before it was firebombed, has since turned herself in to the police. Nevertheless, when SPIEGEL went to press she was still refusing to make any statements, and her role in the group remains unclear. When contacted by SPIEGEL, her attorney also declined to comment on the accusations. Rumors that Trio Were Informants The greater the mystery, the more outrageous the speculation. There have been persistent rumors that German intelligence agencies once helped the trio escape, or even used Böhnhardt, Mundlos and Zschäpe as informants, despite vehement and repeated denials by federal and state officials. In a 2001 memo, even police officers with the State Office of Criminal Investigation speculated that Zschäpe at least might have been working as an informant -- a charge that, once again, the intelligence agencies vigorously deny. The German Federal Prosecutor's Office has now taken charge of the investigation and, with the help of the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), is trying to make sense of the case. The mystery already begins with the three would-be terrorists' individual backgrounds. Even their closest relatives probably do not know what they have been doing for the last 14 years. The families of Böhnhardt and Mundlos had not heard anything from them until they received a call from Zschäpe on Nov. 5, at about 8 a.m. She was calling to tell them that the two men were dead. Drifting into Extremism Their death in the burning camper and the explosion at the Zwickau apartment soon afterwards marked the end of a journey that began in the mid-1990s and proceeded in one direction: the pursuit of even more hatred and more violence. At first, there was little to distinguish the three Thuringia residents from so many other young people in the states of the former East Germany who drifted into the right-wing extremist scene after German reunification. For many people, it was a milieu that seemed to offer a home of sorts. Some turned away from the far-right groups after a while, because they wanted prospects for the future rather than just slogans. But Mundlos, Böhnhardt and Zschäpe were different. Instead of seeking reconciliation with the system, they wanted to sever all ties with it. When they went underground, they burned all bridges behind them for good. It was the three of them against everyone else, that was their new belief. Zschäpe was born in 1975 and grew up in a drab, prefabricated apartment building in the eastern city of Jena. Böhnhardt, three years younger than Zschäpe, was a construction worker who was often out of work. Mundlos, born in 1973, was the son of a professor and had originally planned to obtain the Abitur, the German school-leaving certificate that is required to enter university. Mundlos enrolled at the Ilmenau College in Thuringia in 1995 to complete his high- school education and get the Abitur. Former fellow students describe him as "ambitious and hard-working" and say that he was particularly strong in physics and mathematics. But his habits seemed odd to them. He always wore "black, uniform-like clothing." They also say that there was a self-drawn portrait of Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess, 25

tucked away in the back corner of the desk in his room at a Christian student dormitory. Mundlos apparently went to see his far-right friends in Jena whenever he could. 'Weapons Nut' The neo-Nazis in Jena were a secretive group. Someone familiar with the milieu calls it "tight-knit," and describes Mundlos, Böhnhardt and Zschäpe as close friends opposed to the rest of the world: foreigners, people on the left, and "cops." They called themselves the Kameradschaft Jena (the term Kameradschaft, literally "comradeship," is used by German neo-Nazis for small militant groups), and their hard core consisted of no more than eight people. A neo-Nazi called André K. apparently acted as the group's leader, or "Führer," while Mundlos and Böhnhardt were his "deputies," forming the second rank. Zschäpe was one of the group's ordinary members. All of them were well known in the city. In the mid-1990s, Zschäpe, Mundlos and Böhnhardt made regular appearances at the Wednesday meetings of the right-wing extremist group Thüringer Heimatschutz (THS), as its former leader Tino B. recalls. According to B., Mundlos was "not exactly the dumbest of people," while Böhnhardt kept quiet during discussions. "His area of expertise," says B., "was weapons. He was a weapons nut." Zschäpe contributed her staunchly nationalist sentiments to the group. Former acquaintances say that the trio sometimes got together to play Monopoly, except that they had modified the board to conform to their worldview. The "Jail" square, for example, had been renamed "Concentration Camp." What they apparently didn't know was that the THS group was under constant surveillance from the very beginning. In 1994, the Thuringia branch of Germany's domestic intelligence agency the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, based in the state capital Erfurt, recruited young neo-Nazi Tino B. as an informant. From then on, he was informant No. 2045 (code-named "Otto"), and he provided the state intelligence agency with prime insider material on the militant organization. The officials in Thuringia felt that up to two dozen reports were so important that they forwarded the material to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution's national headquarters in Cologne. Fake Letter Bombs Intelligence agents recall that there were additional attempts to recruit informants in the second half of the 1990s. But, at least according to the files at both the state and federal intelligence agencies in Thuringia and Cologne, Böhnhardt, Mundlos and Zschäpe were not among the would-be recruits. The three apparently viewed themselves as something of an "elite" circle, says a THS insider. The men wore combat boots and bomber jackets and attacked "ticks," as leftists and people with an alternative lifestyle were known in neo-Nazi slang. They reportedly picked fights at events in the area such as local fairs and badgered foreigners. But apparently it wasn't enough for them. In mid-April 1996, Böhnhardt placed the torso of a mannequin on a highway bridge near Jena. The mannequin was dressed in a sweatshirt with a yellow Star of David and a sign that read: "Careful -- Bomb!" The state police formed a special task force to investigate what was deemed a possible hate crime.

A few months later, in November 1996, Böhnhardt's car was searched at a police roadblock. The authorities found a small arsenal in the vehicle, including a knife, throwing stars sharpened on both sides and gas cartridges. The incidents continued. When fake letter bombs with swastikas on them were sent to the Thüringische Landeszeitung newspaper, the city government and police headquarters in Jena between Dec. 30, 1996 and Jan. 2, 1997, the authorities immediately suspected the hard core of the Kameradschaft Jena. In fact, they had no other suspects. The public prosecutor's office investigated the group on charges of "disturbing the public order with threats to commit crimes," but there was no evidence. The neo-Nazis either denied everything or simply refused to testify. The case was dropped on June 18, 1997. Oversight or Warning? The incidents continued. On Sept. 28, 1997, pedestrians found a bomb in front of the city theater in Jena. It was hidden in a red suitcase adorned with a swastika painted on a white background. The device contained 10 grams of TNT but, as the prosecutors investigating the would-be attack soon discovered, although it was a working bomb, it was not capable of being detonated because the battery was missing. Was it an oversight? Or was it meant to be a warning? At any rate, this time the perpetrators had demonstrated that they could do more than just build fake letter bombs. In October 1997, a court in Thuringia sentenced Böhnhardt to two years and three months in a youth prison, because of the mannequin he had hung from the highway bridge and other crimes. But Böhnhardt was not required to serve the sentence right away, and he promptly took advantage of the time he was given. The next dummy bomb turned up only about two months later, on Dec. 26, 1997. Again, it was in a red-painted suitcase featuring a swastika in a white circle. This time it was found in front of a memorial to the anti-fascist resistance movement at a cemetery in Jena. Investigators set their sights on the Kameradschaft Jena once again. This time they did a thorough investigation and combed through all the files. A canister filled with gasoline and a wooden box with a swastika painted on it -- hadn't they seen this before? As it turned out, they had, at the Ernst Abbe Stadium in Jena, in an earlier incident in 1996. They also discovered that the canister and the box were from the construction yard of a company where Böhnhardt's father had worked and where the son had received occasional jobs. His fingerprints were also found on a metal tube that had turned up in connection with a bomb threat in Rudolstadt near Erfurt on Oct. 15, 1997. In addition, a friend had denounced Böhnhardt, claiming that he was also responsible for an explosion in a center for foreign asylum-seekers. Going Underground Böhnhardt was now under surveillance, but in retrospect it seems almost unbelievable how amateurishly the authorities acted. At the end of January 1998, police officers rang Böhnhardt's doorbell and presented a search warrant. But they found nothing, and Böhnhardt was allowed to calmly drive away. On Jan. 26, 1998, police searched Mundlos's Jena apartment on the basis of "exigent circumstances." Zschäpe, who was living in her mother's house, also received a visit. The police confiscated a crossbow, slingshots, a "morning star" weapon and the banned

war flag of the German Reich. They also found the Monopoly game with the "Concentration Camp" square on it, which resulted in Zschäpe being charged with hate speech. But the investigators discovered their biggest find in a garage near the Jena sewage treatment plant, after receiving a tip-off from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. When they opened the garage, they discovered right-wing extremist propaganda material, four pipe bombs and 1,392 grams of TNT. They learned that Zschäpe had rented the garage, and neighbors told them that they had also seen Mundlos and Böhnhardt entering and leaving the property. By this point, the police had enough evidence to proceed against the trio. But then the group found out that their bomb workshop had been discovered -- something that wasn't surprising, given the series of searches. The group found themselves facing a crucial decision: Should they flee or not? Böhnhardt had little to lose. But Mundlos only had only a year to go before graduating from the Ilmenau College. Zschäpe also seemed to hesitate, and went to see her attorney in Weissenfels, near Leipzig. But then they reached a decision, and all three went underground. An arrest warrant was issued on Jan. 28, but by then it was too late. Nowhere to Be Found It was an embarrassing gaffe for the Thuringian state police, but it was about to get worse. Only two weeks later, the Thuringia State Office of Criminal Investigation (LKA) put up wanted posters for the trio and announced a reward of 3,000 deutschmarks (€1,534). The LKA also dispatched special investigators, but the neo- Nazis were nowhere to be found. Tino B. alias "Otto," the informant working for the state intelligence agency, recalls today how the Kameradschaft Jena helped the trio. He reported that a certain Ralf L. had lent his car to Mundlos, Böhnhardt and Zschäpe, but that the neo-Nazis were promptly involved in an accident while trying to flee. According to the informant, André K. was in charge of obtaining fake passports, and donations were collected at solidarity concerts to pay a Russian for the forged documents. But apparently things never got that far. The neo-Nazis from Thuringia apparently remained in touch with their friends for six months after going underground. "Otto" once told his contacts about a telephone conversation with Mundlos and Böhnhardt, in which they had said that they wanted to abscond to South Africa. The two men were already invisible to everyone else. When Böhnhardt's grandfather died and was buried at a Jena cemetery on March 24, 1998, the police were on the lookout. But Böhnhardt didn't turn up. Giving the Police the Slip Nevertheless, the state interior ministry was confident that it could soon capture the trio. On June 19, 1998, the domestic affairs committee in the state parliament announced that an "extensive manhunt" was underway for Böhnhardt, Mundlos and Zschäpe, and that it expected an arrest "very soon." The Office for the Protection of the Constitution also got involved, first on the state level in Thuringia and later on the national level. But it was all to no avail. The files contain a surveillance photo taken in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt in early 2000, which shows three people. But the officers in question

were not certain it was the trio, and by the time they had confirmed the identity of the three suspects, they were gone. The investigators even pursued clues that Zschäpe, Böhnhardt and Mundlos may have left for Namibia or Lake Balaton in Hungary. But, once again, they found nothing. According to sources close to the investigators, Zschäpe, Böhnhardt and Mundlos also turned up near Chemnitz in the neighboring state of Saxony. The authorities were apparently on the verge of arresting them several times. But it never happened. It is possible that the investigators came within a hair's breadth of catching the trio at the time. Apparently the trio was indeed active in Chemnitz. They had obtained weapons and the two men had specialized in bank robberies. The public prosecutor's office now believes that Böhnhardt and Mundlos were responsible for at least 14 robberies since 1999: two in Thuringia, two in the northeastern state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and 10 in Saxony, of which seven were committed in Chemnitz. In a noticeably large number of these cases, two masked men rushed into a bank, always proceeding with extreme brutality, and they usually fled on bicycles, seemingly disappearing without a trace. They had planned to use the same approach in their last robbery, in Eisenach, when they rode bikes to their parked camper. But this time the police had changed their strategy. They had blocked all arterial roads and searched for the camper within the sealed-off ring. Apparently, Böhnhardt and Mundlos decided to wait it out inside the ring. But the police officers in Eisenach had already figured out that a camper was an ideal place for two men on bikes to go. The two bank robbers were trapped. But 12 years had already passed until then, years in which there could have been casualties during the robberies. In 2002, for example, a shot went off in the midst of a scuffle, and a young bank employee was hit in the stomach. Killing Spree There were in fact deaths in all those years, at least 10, as the investigators now believe, and all the victims were targeted. Even while in hiding, the trio led a double life. On the one hand, they committed ordinary bank robberies to keep themselves afloat while they were fugitives. On the other hand, Böhnhardt and Mundlos apparently committed politically motivated murders, for which they almost always used the same weapon: the Ceska pistol. The first was on Sept. 9, 2000. Enver S., 38, a florist from the western state of Hesse, was only helping out a friend. One of his customers owned a flower stand on a deserted arterial road in Nuremberg. When he decided to travel to Turkey on vacation, Enver agreed to watch his stand. Shortly after lunch, he was found covered in blood, after having been struck by several bullets from the Ceska and a second weapon. Less than a year later, on June 13, 2001, Abdurrahim Ö., an alteration tailor, died in his small shop in downtown Nuremberg, from several shots to his head. Again, it was the Ceska. Neighbors told police that, a few days before the murder, they had heard Ö. arguing loudly and intensely with two men in an Eastern European language. They were reportedly arguing about money. The next murder victims were two vegetable sellers, one in Hamburg and the other in Munich. The Munich victim's wife later told police that her husband had felt threatened weeks before the murder, and that he had also been afraid of other Turks, who had

visited him. At first glance, these are not signs that would point to the involvement of Mundlos or Böhnhardt, although the weapon, the Ceska that was used in each case, does. Most incriminating, however, is the DVD that police fished out of the wreckage, complete with photos the killers had apparently taken themselves. No Scruples The killing spree would also explain why Böhnhardt, Mundlos and Zschäpe remained in hiding even after June 22, 2003, the day when they might have been able to return to society. It was the day on which, under the statute of limitations, the time limit ran out for prosecuting the crimes they could have been charged with on the basis of their neo- Nazi past in Thuringia. They could have started with a clean slate. But obviously that would not have been possible if they had several murders under their belts. The next Turk, Yunus T., died in the northeastern city of Rostock on Feb. 25, 2004, just as he was opening a kebab stand. Then a kebab stand owner in Nuremberg was killed. Eyewitnesses later remembered two cyclists, whom they had seen enter the kebab stand for a few moments and then get back on their bikes and ride away again. It seemed to fit the pattern: Böhnhardt, Mundlos and two bikes. Then a Greek, the co-owner of a locksmith company who had gambled for money in Turkish and Greek cafés and apparently had debts, was killed in Munich. The next victim was a kiosk owner in the western city of Dortmund, also a man with financial troubles, followed by a German of Turkish origin who ran an Internet café in the central city of Kassel. By that point, the two neo-Nazi terrorists apparently had no scruples left. It appeared that, to them, killing was an everyday, banal and normal activity. In the video in which they claim responsibility for the murders, they ridicule every victim. 'You Don't Forget Those Images' Wednesday April 25, 2007 was a sunny day in Heilbronn in the southwestern state of Baden-Württemberg. There was hardly a cloud in the sky, and it was warm enough to wear a T-shirt. The booths for the traditional May festival were being set up on the Theresienwiese fairgrounds. When police officer Michèle Kiesewetter and her partner Martin A. drove onto the grounds in their police car, they parked at the northern end of the site. At 1:50 p.m., the two officers were taking their lunch break. Kiesewetter, 22, sat in the driver's seat and A., two years her senior, sat next to her, as they ate their lunch in the car, with the windows open. A 2:13 p.m., the emergency call center in Heilbronn received a call stating that a cyclist had found two dead police officers. The police arrived at the scene three minutes later, where they found Kiesewetter and Martin A. lying next to their squad car. Both had been shot in the head. The young policewoman was dead, and her partner A. barely survived. According to the reconstruction of the crime scene, the killers must have snuck up on them from behind. "They were downright executed," recalls Frank Huber, who led the task force investigating the crime at the time. "You don't forget those images. They burn themselves into your memory." The murderers stole Kiesewetter's Clejuso handcuffs, a container of pepper spray and a Victorinox Swiss Army knife. All of these items were later found in the ruins of the

building in Zwickau, as was the presumed murder weapon. The two stolen Heckler & Koch service weapons were found in the burned-out camper, next to the bodies of Böhnhardt and Mundlos. The Stuttgart public prosecutor's office believes that there is overwhelming evidence that Böhnhardt and Mundlos are connected with the murder of the young police officer. But what was the motive? A New Kind of Terrorism A possible connection between the victim and the presumed murderers is that they were all from Thuringia. Kiesewetter was from Oberweissbach in the Thuringian Forest, while Böhnhardt and Mundlos were from Jena. Kiesewetter had never worked in Thuringia. She was about 10 years younger than her presumed killers, and it seems highly unlikely that there was a personal connection. The killers, for their part, had no reason to shoot two police officers in broad daylight. It was too risky. They already had guns, so the dangerous and horrific attack on the officers would not have been necessary simply to steal their service weapons. Then what was the reason? Despite the DVDs found at the house in Zwickau, which show an image of the Pink Panther holding a gun to a police officer's head and pressing the trigger, the investigators are still left with many loose ends, partly because the group doesn't fit into any pattern. Until now, only two forms of political terrorism have existed, whether it was committed by people on the left or the right or by Islamists. One involved the "propaganda of the deed," as the 19th-century French anarchist Paul Brousse dubbed his concept, which was later perfected by Russian and Italian anarchists. According to Brousse, deeds were meant to speak for themselves and be self-explanatory for the masses. Words merely deprived deeds of their power. The second approach merely requires the deed as a template for the declarations, manifestos and claims of responsibility that follow. For each of its attacks, Germany's Red Army Faction wrote a long letter in which it explained why a particular high- ranking political or business figure supposedly deserved to die. Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden regularly explained himself in video messages and called for attacks on the West. Survival Guarantee For Böhnhardt, Mundlos and probably Zschäpe, their alleged actions, which lasted over a decade, followed neither approach. They certainly must have been pleased to read all the speculation over who could be responsible for the doner murders, the police killing in Heilbronn and the many bank robberies. But none of them ever left any indication that there could be a political motivation for their crimes, and right-wing extremists were also kept out of the loop. As a result, there could be no copycats, no public supporters, as in the case of the RAF, and no way of gauging the public reaction to the attacks. The trio had to be content with the knowledge of what they had done. From a crime-fighting perspective, it was a recipe that ensured survival for 13 years. Silence was a sort of survival guarantee, even if it came at the cost of no one understanding the racist motivations for their alleged deeds. Only in the last few months

did the neo-Nazis apparently feel strong enough to take the next step and reveal the reasons behind their deeds. Perhaps the trio had indeed gathered a group of supporters and was planning to launch a new deadly offensive. But what kept them going over the years? Was it pure hatred, aimed at foreigners and the government alike? Fascist fantasies of omnipotence? The items that investigators are gradually recovering from the debris in Zwickau provide at least a few clues. Why, for example, did Mundlos, Böhnhardt and Zschäpe want to keep Kiesewetter's pepper spray, weapon and handcuffs? For neo-Nazis with a 9mm Luger automatic pistol in their closet, four-year-old pepper spray couldn't have been very useful. Mundlos and Böhnhardt could also have put Kiesewetter's weapon in a plastic bag and dropped it into a lake, and no one would have been able to solve the murder. They could have done the same thing with the Ceska that was used for the doner killings. These items only acquire significance as trophies. The DVDs also fit into this pattern. It seems as if, in the end, Böhnhardt and Mundlos did want to leave behind a document detailing their exploits. Funeral Pyre The two men must have known that there was no way out. Their suicide was apparently planned in advance, as were the explosion in the apartment and the fire in the camper, which became a funeral pyre for the two suspected right-wing terrorists. The only person who could provide information about what happened is the last surviving member of the group, Beate Zschäpe. But she isn't talking. REPORTED BY MAIK BAUMGÄRTNER, JÜRGEN DAHLKAMP, SIMONE KAISER, CONNY NEUMANN, SVEN RÖBEL, HOLGER STARK, ANDREAS ULRICH AND STEFFEN WINTER Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

URL:  http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797569,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links:  Photo Gallery: Investigators Dig for Clues in Zwickau http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-75093.html  Photo Gallery: Neo-Nazis' Bizarre Video Manifesto http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-75101.html  'Shameful' Crime: German Officials Under Fire in Neo-Nazi Terror Case (11/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797572,00.html  Twist in 'Doner Killings' Case: Police Find Gun Used in Unsolved Murder Series (11/11/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797327,00.html  'The Bomb-Makers of Jena': Suspects in Bizarre Case Identified as Neo-Nazis (11/10/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797077,00.html

11/14/2011 02:35 PM The World from Berlin 'Xenophobic Crimes Have Too Often Been Minimized' Germans have been shocked to learn in recent days of the existence of a right-wing terror cell in their midst. Media commentators say authorities were long too preoccupied with the threat of Islamist and left-wing violence -- and were prone to playing down right-wing attacks. The failure of Germany's security authorities to solve a string of racist murders committed by a neo-Nazi group since 2000 has triggered acusations that they have underestimated the far-right threat and have been too preoccupied with combating Islamic and left-wing extremism. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said on Monday that the case is a "disgrace for Germany." And she seems not to be alone in that assessment. Several observers, lawmakers and government officials have demanded an urgent investigation into how a trio of neo-Nazis from eastern Germany, possibly aided by accomplices, could have remained undetected for so long. Media commentators in Germany say the case is a major embarrassment to the police, domestic intelligence services and state prosecutors. Racist attacks on immigrants and their property, commonplace especially in the former communist east of the country ever since unification triggered economic upheaval and social dislocation, have routinely been dismissed as isolated incidents committed by thugs. Now, however, evidence discovered by chance has uncovered a well-organized, well- armed network of killers, bombers and bank robbers -- and has made a mockery of efforts to minimize right-wing violence, say editorial writers. Center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "It is incomprehensible and deeply disturbing: for years, a racist terrorist gang was able to rampage through Germany and execute immigrants. They were able to plan attacks, build and throw bombs. The were able to do all that because police, intelligence authorities and state prosecutors largely excluded racist motives. The crimes weren't deemed to be acts of terrorism, authorities said they were isolated cases that weren't connected and had no political background." "This mistaken judgment reminds one of the 1980s and 1990s when asylum-seekers' hostels went up in flames. Many investigators would first declare the cause as an 'electric short circuit' or as a 'cigarette' or would say 'they're just killing each other.'" "Xenophobic crimes have too often and for too long been minimized -- they were described as 'incidents' and 'fights.' Maybe that has to be seen as the sad prelude when it comes to answering the question of how it was possible that Nazi terrorism remained undetected -- and wouldn't have been detected if two perpetrators hadn't killed themselves."

"Would this have been imaginable in the era of the Red Army Faction? (editor's note: the left-wing terrorst group that waged a campaign of assassinations, bombings and kidnappings in the 1970s and 1980s). In those days, 'wanted' posters hung in every post office. And could Muslim bombmakers have lived in Germany undetected for so long? There's a strangely phlegmatic indifference: It may conceal a scandal involving the domestic intelligence authority -- a terrible lack of professionalism linked to an 'oh well' attitude that says: right-wing extremists aren't really terrorists, are they?" "For decades, left-wing extremists in Germany were seen as intelligent and dangerous, right-wing extremists as stupid and therefore harmless. Neo-Nazis were and are too often dismissed as idiots: and when they set fire to foreigners' homes or kick people to death, they were seen as individual perpetrators. But a terrorist crime remains a terrorist crime even if no brazenly pretentious claim of responsibility is sent to a news agency the next day." "Before banning the NPD one would have to ban the informants in its midst -- then one could ban the NPD. But first the state must stop regarding left-wing extremists and Islamists as more dangerous than right-wing extremists. As long as it does that, the state is being irresponsibly stupid." Conservative Die Welt writes: "If what has become known so far is true, then the scandal is that the investigating authorities (and the public) didn't detect the pattern of crimes or perhaps didn't want to detect them. Nine strikingly similar crimes were dismissed as local disputes. A resolute, comprehensive investigation is now needed." "One has to investigate whether this is an eastern German phenomenon or whether there has been a certain institutional leniency in dealing with the far-right scene. The reputation of the reunited nation, of its institutions and of its general public is at stake." Left-wing Berliner Zeitung writes: "The usual reflex reactions like calling for a ban on the NPD aren't very helpful. Everything known so far suggests that the perpetrators withdrew themselves from the unwritten rules of the far-right scene. The appear to have relied on just a handful of helpers. The trio purposefully maneuvered itself into a Bonny and Clyde community in which their own death was no longer seen as a threat. One can assume that conventional means of violence prevention wouldn't have affected them. The priority now must be to shed slight on what the police and domestic intelligence agency knew and when they knew it." Conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "The most important questions should address the work of the domestic intelligency agency, police and state prosecutors: were there hidden links with neo-Nazi clubs, cliques and "Kameradschaften" (editor's note: far-right groups) in Thuringia, Saxony and elsewhere that may have been regarded as more important than solving crimes? Whether the states -- and there was scarcely a state in which the trio didn't leave traces in more than 10 years -- had an effective system of exchanging information? And whether it wasn't a fatal error to regard right-wing extremist violence largely as a purely local, at most regional phenomenon, as a provinvial, idiotic counter-point to the all- overriding Islamist terror?" Tabloid Bild writes: 34

"The cowardly criminals and their neo-Nazi views were known to the authorities in a different context. Despite all the informants available, they weren't stopped. Were the domestic intelligence agents and police blind to the far-right risk? This question must be answered very quickly. The credibility of the police and the domestic intelligence authority are at stake." -- David Crossland

URL:  http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797631,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links:  The Brown Army Faction: A Disturbing New Dimension of Far-Right Terror (11/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797569,00.html  Photo Gallery: Investigators Dig for Clues in Zwickau http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-75093.html  'Shameful' Crime: German Officials Under Fire in Neo-Nazi Terror Case (11/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797572,00.html  Twist in 'Doner Killings' Case: Police Find Gun Used in Unsolved Murder Series (11/11/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797327,00.html  'The Bomb-Makers of Jena': Suspects in Bizarre Case Identified as Neo-Nazis (11/10/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797077,00.html

Revolutionary Youth Union to take part in demo planned for Friday Mohsen Semeika Mahmoud Gaweesh Author: Mohsen Semeika The Revolutionary Youth Union has announced its planned participation in Friday’s demonstration, which the union calls “The Friday of Handing Over Power,” but which the National Association for Change calls “The Friday of a Parliament without Former Regime Remnants.” The union called on all citizens to participate in order to pressure the military council to hand over power to a civilian authority, especially given its failures during the transition period, in particular its unfulfilled promise to hand over power within six months. Meanwhile, the Tagammu, the Communist, and the Reform and Development parties said they would not participate in the demonstration, saying the protest symbolizes Islamists’ intention to form a state within a state. “Not participating does not mean we disagree on the objective,” said Anwar Esmat al- Sadat, president of the Reform and Development Party, while his deputy, Rami Lakah, said staging many demonstrations reduces their impact. The Tagammu Party lashed out at the Islamists for objecting to the deputy prime minister’s constitutional principles document which reiterates the civil state and the transition of power. “Had they only objected to articles 9 and 10 that give the military exceptional powers, we would have stood by them,” the party said in a statement. Translated from the Arabic Edition Tahrir protesters Publishing Date: Mon, 14/11/2011 - 20:15 Related material Calls intensify for new million-man demonstration to topple govt Islamists call on Egyptians to boycott million-man protest

Source URL (retrieved on 15/11/2011 - 15:43): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/514715

ft.com comment Editorial November 14, 2011 11:30 pm Isolating Assad The Arab League suspended Libya within weeks of the regime turning its guns on Libyan civilians. After eight months of dithering, it is moving towards a similar decision on Syria. The tardiness is lamentable: 3,000 Syrians have been killed since March. Nonetheless, the League’s move is welcome as a damaging blow to what little remains of Bashar al-Assad’s domestic and regional legitimacy. The Syrian regime has long sought to bolster its support by portraying itself as a bulwark of Arab nationalism. If that claim still had any credibility, the League’s move has finally extinguished it. Regional leaders now have the diplomatic cover to ramp up the pressure on Mr Assad. King Abdullah of Jordan on Monday called for him to stand down. And strikingly, even Iran – Syria’s main ally – was muted in its criticism of the League’s move. More ON THIS STORY Global Insight Arab League finds its voice Criticism from Arab leaders rattles Syria Syria stunts maintain protest message Arab League threatens to suspend Syria Oil unlikely to fall below $100, says IEA ON THIS TOPIC Jordan and China add to pressure on Syria Defiance of city seen as key to Syria’s fate Syrian capital flight intensifies Syrian forces kill 20, say reports Regrettably, however, Russia has continued its unhelpful policy of blindly backing Mr Assad. This means that the UN is effectively barred from playing any role in stopping the bloodshed. The international community, therefore, will have to find other routes to keep up the pressure on Mr Assad’s autocratic regime. Diplomatically, the best way to do so is by boosting ties with the Syrian opposition. On Saturday, the Arab League announced plans to meet the Syrian National Council, to discuss a possible transition. The SNC is not the only grouping claiming to represent the Syrian opposition. But if it can show that it is sufficiently inclusive and well- supported, the Arab League should consider recognising it as the official voice of the opposition. The Assad regime’s biggest weakness, however, remains economic. In September, it was forced to impose a temporary ban on imports to conserve foreign exchange reserves; it has now also stopped paying foreign oil companies. The European Union and the US have already imposed tough sanctions on the regime and on Syria’s oil industry. However, Turkey, despite backing targeted sanctions, has yet to join in. Ankara’s stance is coloured in part by the economic cost to its south-eastern region after sanctions were imposed on Iraq in the 1990s. But a prolonged period of instability in Syria will do Turkey’s economy no favours either. It is time for Turkey to match its rhetoric with action. The same applies to the Arab League. In a meeting on Wednesday, Syria will attempt to overturn its suspension. Now is not the time for the League to back down. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/663baf02-0ecf-11e1-9dbb- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dmXlN32x 37

ft.com World Middle East & North Africa November 14, 2011 1:23 pm Jordan and China add to pressure on Syria By Daniel Dombey in Istanbul, James Blitz in London and Michael Peel in Abu Dhabi

International pressure on Bashar al-Assad ratcheted up on Monday, as Jordan’s King Abdullah became the first Arab leader to call on the Syrian leader to step down, and China joined calls for Damascus to end its violent crackdown. The moves followed the Arab League’s decision at the weekend to suspend Syria’s membership of the grouping, and attacks by pro-government demonstrators on diplomatic missions in Damascus belonging to Turkey, France and Saudi Arabia. More ON THIS STORY Global Insight Arab League finds its voice Editorial Isolating Assad Criticism from Arab leaders rattles Syria Syria stunts maintain protest message Arab League threatens to suspend Syria ON THIS TOPIC Defiance of city seen as key to Syria’s fate Syrian capital flight intensifies Syrian forces kill 20, say reports Editorial False promises “If I were in his shoes, I would step down,” King Abdullah told the BBC, although he added that a real resolution of the crisis afflicting the country required deeper political change than just a shift in personnel. “If it’s the same regime and the same members then we are going to be back to the same thing,” he said. Officials also stressed that Jordan’s action on Syria was as part of the Arab League initiative, rather than an attempt to strike out alone. King Abdullah was speaking at a time of accelerated diplomacy – just ahead of a series of meetings in Morocco, involving the Arab League, the Gulf Co-operation Council and Turkey. The Syrian National Council, a Turkey-based umbrella opposition group, has made clear it hopes the meetings will shift it closer to international diplomatic recognition as the voice of the Syrian people. In a surprising development that further underlines how international support for the Assad government is waning, China, said on Monday that it supported the Arab League’s move. 38

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Weimin said : “China supports the AL’s efforts to end the crisis in Syria and has called on concerned parties to implement the Arab League’s resolution at an early date and in a substantial and appropriate way.” By contrast, last month Beijing joined with Russia to veto an attempt to condemn Syria in the United Nations Security Council. He added: “Concerned parties should make concerted efforts and the international community should create favorable conditions for the implementation process.” Walid al-Moallem, Syrian foreign minister, on Monday accused Arab states of conspiring against Damascus, calling Saturday’s vote “shameful and malicious”. ”We wanted the role of the Arab League to be a supporting role but if the Arabs wanted to be conspirators, this is their business,'' he said at a press conference in Damascus. The minister reiterated an invitation for Arab League officials to visit Syria this week, accompanied by military and civilian observers to oversee implementation of an Arab League plan for ending the bloodshed. Russia said that it continued to support President Assad, with Sergei Lavrov, foreign minister, quoted by the ITAR-Tass news agency as saying Moscow opposed the Arab League’s decision to suspend Syria. European diplomats said Russia’s intransigence makes it difficult to envisage a fresh attempt to agree a UN resolution against Syria in the near future. However, European Union governments agreed on Monday to extend sanctions against Syria to 18 more individuals associated with a violent crackdown on dissent. The EU sanctions on Syria are the latest in a raft of measures it has implemented. In September, the EU imposed an embargo on crude oil imports from Syria and banned EU firms from new investment in its oil industry. To date, Turkey has not announced economic sanctions against Syria, despite suggestions by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country’s prime minister, that it would do so. However, in steps Turkish officials characterise as measures against Damascus, Turkey has also flown non-essential diplomatic personnel out of Syria, demanded the Syrian government protect remaining Turkish staff, and warned Turkish nationals against travelling to the country. Western governments insist that military action against the Syrian government remains unlikely. “This is a different situation from Libya,” said William Hague, Britain’s foreign minister. “There is no United Nations Security Council resolution and Syria is a much more complex situation.” D. Dombey et al. Jordan and China add to pressure on Syria November 14, 2011 1:23 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0U /04a64040-0ebb-11e1-b83c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dmXlN32x U

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GLOBAL INSIGHT November 14, 2011 7:21 pm Arab League finds its voice on Syria By David Gardner in London The Arab Spring, well into autumn with three dictators defenestrated, continues to spring surprises. The latest comes courtesy of the Arab League. In finding the collective will over the weekend to freeze the membership of Syria and its regime, this normally supine body is in danger of becoming consequential. The Cairo-based body had this month reached an agreement with the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad: for it to stop killing protesters; withdraw troops from cities such as Hama and Homs; release thousands of prisoners taken since the civic uprising began eight months ago; and begin a structured dialogue with its opponents. More ON THIS STORY Editorial Isolating Assad Criticism from Arab leaders rattles Syria Syria stunts maintain protest message Arab League threatens to suspend Syria Oil unlikely to fall below $100, says IEA ON THIS TOPIC UAE democracy activists plan hunger strike Opinion The free market secret of the Arab revolutions Bahrain manâ€™s death raises tensions Comment The Arab spring challenges that must be met There was not the remotest chance that a regime which has chosen to wage war on its people would implement this accord. Instead, the killings and detentions have intensified. So too, despite the brutal repression, have the protests â€“ alongside scattered but multiplying instances of the opposition starting to shoot back. Put another way, the regime’s response to what started as a clamour for reform but soon mutated into a call for revolution has left its opponents no alternative but to fight on. Does the Arab League’s hesitant entry into this fray make any difference to its vicious dynamics? Possibly. The decision to suspend Syria must still be confirmed by a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in the Moroccan capital, Rabat, on Wednesday. Yet the withdrawal of Arab envoys has already begun —hastened by government-incited mobs attacking the delegations of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, France and Turkey. The Arab League’s voice is different too, in that it no longer addresses itself to the Assad government but to three other interlocutors. It calls directly on the army to cease the repression. It has started a debate on how fully to recognise the Syrian opposition. And it seeks to involve the United Nations Security Council. This is ominous for a regime that has almost completely isolated itself internationally. It will make it much more difficult for Russia and China to continue obstructing any action against Syria by the Security Council. Moscow and Beijing have objected that the council’s resolution on Libya in March, authorising external intervention to prevent the regime of Muammer Gaddafi from massacring civilians, was stretched by Nato into

a warrant for regime change. Yet the Arab League called for that intervention. In the case of Syria, moreover, all the western powers are manifestly unwilling to intervene. The Arab decision on Syria, not taken lightly against a regime that has never shrunk from destabilising its neighbours, suggests above all that most Arab rulers no longer expect Mr Assad to survive. King Abdullah of Jordan on Monday called on him to step down. Even China implored Damascus to implement the Arab peace plan before it is too late. US and European sanctions on Syria, which will now almost certainly be reinforced by Arab and Turkish measures, are biting. The regime has severe cash flow problems that its one remaining ally, Iran, cannot or will not relieve. Revenue from oil and tourism has evaporated. Business allies are coming to see the regime as toxic, as the economy sinks and they themselves are penalised for links with the Assad clan. While no one doubts that the struggle for power in Syria will be prolonged and bloody, the present scale of repression is forcing the regime to mobilise unreliable parts of an army whose ranks are dominated by the Sunni majority. The Assads still have only two unconditionally loyal units made up of their own Alawite community, a heterodox tributary of Shia Islam. For Sunni Arab leaders normally reluctant to meddle overtly in the affairs of their neighbours, this all adds up to a golden opportunity to push back against Shia Iran and sever its alliance with Syria. Doing so could weaken organisations sponsored by both, such as Hizbollah, the powerful Lebanese Shia Islamist movement, and Hamas, the predominantly Sunni Palestinian group that has already refused to rally public support for the Assads. The regime, incensed by the support of Turkey, Qatar and others for an uprising it seems unable to extinguish, may well mobilise its proxies to push back too. But after this latest intervention of the Arab League in the Arab Spring, it can hardly continue to portray itself credibly as the “beating heart of Arabism”.

David Gardner Arab League finds its voice on Syria14, 2011 7:21 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aef1218e-0ee1-11e1-b83c- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dmXlN32x

Tunisie : les résultats définitifs ont été annoncés LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 14.11.11 | 12h57

Le chef du parti islamiste Ennahda, Rached Ghannouchi, au siège de son parti à Tunis, le 27 octobre 2011.REUTERS/ZOHRA BENSEMRA

La commission électorale tunisienne (ISIEU )U a annoncé officiellement lundi 14 novembre les résultats du scrutin du 23 octobre, qui constituait les premières élections libres du pays. Les islamistes d'Ennahda ont remporté 89 des 217 sièges de l'Assemblée constituante, suivis par le parti de gauche nationaliste du Congrès pour la République (CPR, 29 élus) et le mouvement Al-Aridah Chaabia ("Pétition populaire", 26 sièges). Le taux de participation a atteint 54,1 %, avec environ 4 millions d'électeurs qui se sont rendus aux urnes sur un sur un corps électoral estimé à 7, 569 millions de personnes. L'Assemblée constituante se réunira pour la premièree fois le 22 novembre à Tunis. La victoire d'Ennahda était connue depuis le 27 octobre. Le secrétaire général du parti islamiste, Hamadi Jebali, avait annoncé le lendemain "un nouveau gouvernement dans les dix jours". Le cofondateur d'Ennahda, Rached Ghannouchi, avait affirmé au Monde que ses priorités concernaient "les questions économiques et sociales". "Nous n'avons qu'un an devant nous avant d'être de nouveau devant les urnes, et alors les Tunisiens nous demanderont des comptes", avait-il expliqué. "Nous voulons nous concentrer sur les questions qui ont un impact immédiat sur les citoyens comme la sécurité, le développement, assurer la stabilité, réformer la justice, et poursuivre les affaires de corruption en y mettant fin sous toutes ses formes." AL-ARIDAH CHAABIA TROISIÈME FORCE POLITIQUE Le mouvement Al-Aridah Chaabia, dirigée par Hechmi Haamdi, un homme d'affaires tunisien basé à Londres, avait initialement été annoncé en quatrième position après l'invalidation de ses listes dans plusieurs circonscriptions. Mais il a récupéré sept sièges après réexamen des candidatures par le tribunal administratif de Tunis, devenant ainsi la troisième force politique du pays. Ettakatol (gauche) a fait les frais de cette décision, rétrogradant de la troisième à la quatrième place avec 20 élus. Le Parti démocrate progressiste (PDP, centre gauche) suit avec 16 parlementaires, puis le Pôle démocratique moderniste (PDM) avec 5 élus. Viennent ensuite l'Initiative (parti dirigé par un ancien ministre de Ben Ali) avec 5 élus, Afek Tounes (libéraux) avec 4 élus, le PCOT (communistes) avec 3 élus, Achab (nationalistes arabes) avec 2 élus et MDS (gauche), 2 élus. Les 16 sièges restants sont remportés chacun par des partis et listes indépendants. http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2011/11/14/tunisie-les-resultats-definitifs-ont-ete- annonces_1603365_1466522.html

Editorial du "Monde" Comment affaiblir davantage le régime syrien | 14.11.11 | 11h59 • Mis à jour le 14.11.11 | 12h51 Un régime aveuglé tente de se maintenir coûte que coûte au pouvoir à Damas. Un régime enferré dans un déni de la réalité de la contestation qui le défie, et à laquelle il ne sait répondre que par le déchaînement d'une violence d'Etat sans guère de limites. Un régime incapable aussi de lire la carte d'un monde arabe en profonde mutation. Il vient d'en faire la preuve devant une instance traditionnellement frileuse, la Ligue arabe, dont la proposition de sortie de crise a été à ce point tournée en ridicule par Damas qu'elle a décidé, samedi 12 novembre, en représailles, à une forte majorité, de suspendre le pays de ses instances. Le régime syrien a immédiatement réagi d'une manière quasi pavlovienne par la mise à sac, sur son sol, de représentations diplomatiques. C'est sans doute parce que le président syrien Bachar Al-Assad pensait avoir fait le plus dur en 2008 lorsqu'il était parvenu, notamment avec l'aide de la France, à se sortir de l'isolement consécutif à l'assassinat, pour lequel il est suspecté, de l'ancien premier ministre libanais, Rafic Hariri, en 2005, qu'il réagit aujourd'hui en autiste. De son rétablissement, il a tiré des certitudes qui l'empêchent de prendre la mesure et la nature des "printemps arabes". Sa chance est passée. Sur le terrain, les opposants, qui comptent leurs morts, leurs blessés et leurs torturés par milliers, n'écartent plus l'option armée, ni le principe d'une intervention internationale pour les protéger du régime. Ce dernier pourra se réjouir du déplacement de la crise sur un terrain où il pense être en situation de force. La solution militaire traduit pourtant sa faiblesse et le condamne à terme, puisqu'il n'est manifestement plus en mesure de tenir durablement le pays sans déployer ses chars, comme on a encore pu le constater à Homs il y a quelques jours, et que cette véritable guerre d'usure est de nature à creuser des divisions au sein même de l'armée. La décision de la Ligue arabe, qu'il faut saluer, va permettre à ceux qui refusent l'écrasement d'une aspiration à la liberté de revenir à la charge à l'ONU pour tenter d'obtenir le vote d'une résolution que bloquent jusqu'à présent les Russes et les Chinois. Elle pourrait également amorcer de nouvelles sanctions contre le régime syrien. En la matière, toute forme de pression internationale sera la bienvenue, mais, hormis une forme d'intervention directe, il est sans doute illusoire d'imaginer qu'elle puisse changer les termes d'un conflit qui se déroule d'abord à huis clos. Mais désarmer le régime, c'est aussi lui retirer ses slogans. Il faut dissiper le spectre de la guerre de religion dont pâtiraient au final deux des minorités du pays, les alaouites et les chrétiens, que le pouvoir agite en enfermant la contestation dans une dimension islamiste. Il faut rappeler que les ressorts de la révolte sont plus sociaux que confessionnels. Affaiblir le régime, c'est aussi tout mettre en œuvre pour qu'une alternative crédible émerge d'une opposition toujours morcelée et divisée. http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/11/14/comment-affaiblir-davantage-le-regime- syrien_1603338_3218.html

Le régime syrien dans le collimateur de l'Europe LEMONDE.FR avec AFP et Reuters | 14.11.11 | 10h30 • Mis à jour le 14.11.11 | 13h01

Le président Al-Assad n'a toujours pas réagi officiellement depuis la mise à l'écart de son pays, tant par la communauté internationale que par la Ligue arabe.AFP/KHALED DESOUKI

L'Union européenne a décidé, lundi 14 novembre, d'étendreU ses sanctions contre le régime syrien U à dix-huit personnes, essentiellement des militaires, et de geler des prêts européens dans le pays. Une interdiction qui passerait par un arrêt des financements de la Banque européenne d'investissement. Ces annonces sont un nouveau signal envoyé au régime de Bachar Al-Assad, accusé de poursuivre la répression dans le pays. Un "accord préliminaire" a ainsi été conclu entre représentants des pays de l'UE et doit être formellement validé par les ministres européens des affaires étrangères réunis à Bruxelles. Outre ces sanctions, la France, par la voix de son ministre des affaires étrangères, Alain Juppé, appelle à trouver un moyen de "protéger davantage" les populations civiles en Syrie face à "l'entêtement sanguinaire du régime de Damas" contre les contestataires. "LA SYRIE N'EST PAS LA LIBYE" Bachar Al-Assad n'a toujours pas réagi officiellement depuis la mise à l'écart de son pays, tant par la communauté internationale que par la Ligue arabe qui a exclu Damas de l'organisation en suspendant sa participation aux réunions, samedi. Le chef de la diplomatie syrienne, Walid Al-Moualem, a tout de même déclaré, lundi, que la suspension de son pays de la Ligue était "extrêmement dangereuse". Alors qu'il s'exprimait lors d'une conférence de presse retransmise à la télévision, il a également estimé qu'en apportant leur soutien à cette décision les Etats-Unis se rendaient

coupables d'incitation aux troubles. L'Irak n'a pas voté pour cette sanction. Le ministre des affaires étrangères irakien, Hoshyar Zebari, a justifié l'abstention de son pays lors du vote en soulignant que ce qui se passait chez son voisin avait un impact direct sur l'Irak. "Notre attitude n'était pas facile. La Syrie est un pays frère, important dans la région, et avec lequel nous entretenons des relations spéciales car il a accueilli des centaines de milliers de nos ressortissants quand notre pays traversait une période difficile", a-t-il déclaré. Il faisait allusion à la guerre confessionnelle de 2006 et 2007, qui avait poussé beaucoup d'Irakiens vers l'exil. Au lendemain de la suspension du régime par la Ligue arabe, Damas a réclamé la tenue d'un sommet d'urgence des chefs d'Etat des pays membres de la Ligue pour discuter des événements qui secouent le pays depuis mars.

Manifestation en faveur du régime à Tartous, dimanche 13 novembre. La veille, la Ligue arabe suspendait la participation de la Syrie à ses réunions. Photographie diffusée par l'agence officielle syrienne SANA.AFP/-SANA M. Al-Moualem a précisé que la Syrie se dirige vers la fin de la crise. Une crise qui "ne s'amplifie pas", selon lui. Le chef de la diplomatie a également présenté les excuses de son pays après les attaques menées samedi soir par des manifestants pro-régime contre plusieurs représentations diplomatiques dans le pays. "Nous sommes responsables, conformément au traité de Vienne, de la sécurité des ambassades et je présente mes excuses pour ce qui s'est passé", a-t-il déclaré, comme pour éviter de nourir encore un peu plus l'hostilité de la communauté internationale à l'égard du pays. Plusieurs centaines de partisans du président Bachar Al-Assad ont attaqué les ambassades saoudienne, qatarie et turque à Damas, ainsi que des missions diplomatiques turques et françaises à Lattaquié, dans le Nord-Ouest, et à Alep, au Nord, à la suite des déclarations de la Ligue arabe. D'autre part, le ministre a balayé d'un revers de la main l'éventualité d'une intervention étrangère en Syrie, notamment parce que la Syrie compte deux alliés de poids : la Chine et la Russie. "La Syrie n'est pas la Libye. Le scénario libyen ne se répétera pas ; ce qui se passe en Syrie est différent de ce qui s'était passé en Libye, et le peuple ne doit pas s'inquiéter." L'ONCLE DU PRÉSIDENT ORGANISE L'OPPOSITION

Le ministre des affaires étrangères russe, Sergueï Lavrov, condamne, lui aussi, la décision de la Ligue arabe de suspendre la Syrie, jugeant cette mesure "incorrecte". Il confirme ainsi le soutien de la puissance russe tant revendiqué par le pouvoir syrien. Selon M. Lavrov, "il y a quelqu'un qui fait tout pour que les Syriens ne parviennent pas à un accord entre eux". Pékin, autre allié de Damas, a, pour sa part, exhorté la Syrie à mettre en œuvre le plan de sortie de crise proposé par la Ligue arabe, tout en se gardant de soutenir d'éventuelles sanctions contre le régime. Dans le même temps, l'oncle de Bachar Al-Assad, Rifaat Al-Assad, en exil à Paris, organise l'opposition syrienne. Il vient de créer un mouvement politique, le Conseil national démocratique, et propose que "lui ou un autre membre de la famille Al-Assad" prenne le relais du président syrien. Le régime est accusé de ne pas avoir appliqué le plan de paix négocié avec la Ligue arabe, début novembre, qui prévoit en premier lieu un arrêt des violences. Depuis la mi- mars, plus de 3 500 personnes sont mortes dans la répression en Syrie. http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/11/14/la-syrie-dans-le-collimateur-de- l-europe_1603215_3218.html

Islamists and NDP remnants duke it out on north coast Author: Rana Khazbak

Photographed by Mahmoud Taha: Campaigning for Party of Freedom and Justice's candidates The winter deluge arrived early in Alexandria, but this year it is different. It is not the rains coming from the Mediterranean, but the showers of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi parliamentary candidates’ posters that coat every wall of the coastal city’s streets and alleys. It is almost impossible to walk down the street without seeing posters of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Nour Party, the political arms of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis respectively. The FJP is even reaching people in their homes, as cars bearing megaphones roam the streets throughout the day, describing the party’s election symbol, which is used to help illiterate voters recognize the party. Aside from the banners of several ex-members of the dissolved National Democratic Party (NDP) running in the elections, the materials of other parties seeking seats are barely perceptible amid the Islamists’ overwhelming street exhibition. “Now I have to choose between the Muslim Brotherhood and feloul [remnants of the old regime],” said a passerby to her friend as they walked along the seafront, staring at the huge blue banner of Tarek Talaat Mustafa, a former parliament member representing the NDP, and brother of multi-millionaire businessman Hesham, who is now serving 15 years in prison for plotting to murder a celebrity.

Alexandria has long been known as a hub for Islamists in Egypt. However, the situation in the Mediterranean city is only an exaggerated example of the struggle of the newly formed parties and young candidates in the face of decades-old Islamist forces. The strong presence of Islamists has forced other political forces, and especially the new parties and young independent candidates, to adopt a defensive tone in campaigns against Islamists. “How could he who pollutes our streets with his posters clean our country? How would he who calls me an infidel protect your and my religion?” said Wael Ahmed Hanoura, a parliamentary candidate who is running as a single-winner candidate with the Egypt Freedom Party, part of the Revolution Continues Coalition. The coalition is comprised of the 25 January Revolution Youth Coalition and six other parties from the three main forces of Egypt’s political spectrum: liberals, Islamists and socialists. More than half of the coalition’s candidates across the country are young people running in elections for the first time. Hanoura, who is also running for the first time, criticized the FJP for sticking posters on the walls and exploiting religion to attract voters. To differentiate themselves from the FJP and the Nour Party, candidates of the coalition only hang banners and send cars through the streets carrying candidates’ posters. “We want to give a good example of how a clean elections campaign should be,” Hanoura told to Al-Masry Al-Youm. Safwan Mohamed, a 27-year-old independent candidate in Alexandria’s Montaza district who is supported by the January 25 Youth Coalition, is also adopting a rather defensive campaigning strategy against his rival Abdel Moneim al-Shahat, a prominent Alexandria Salafi. Mohamed relies mainly on political awareness in his campaigning. “I tell people they should not be fooled by those who blackmail them into voting for a certain candidate by giving them charity money and food. I tell them it is an insult to them, as these candidates exploit their poverty to buy votes,” Mohamed said to Al- Masry Al-Youm. The Brotherhood and Salafis used the Eid prayers last week to enchant voters by distributing various gifts, including sheep branded with the party’s logo, and inviting citizens to attend sermons. “When people ask me what I am going to give them, I tell them it’s not my role to provide them with products or money. Rather it is drafting laws and monitoring the government to enforce these laws,” said Mohamed. The energetic young candidate complained that a lack of financial resources, relative to those of the Islamists and ex-members of NDP, represents a major obstacle to success in the elections. “Unfortunately, if I am to lose this race, it will be because of a lack of campaign promotion,” said Mohamed. “Although I used to lead tens of thousands of young people in protests during the 18- day uprising — people who know me very well — I am afraid I can’t actually reach out to all of them to let them know I’m running.” 48

In order to compensate for the deficiency, Mohamed mainly targets youth in his campaign, and relies on supporters who adopt a more youthful approach to promotion, such as drawing graffiti of him in the streets and talking to people in theaters, parks and on public transportation. Mohamed Saad Khairallah, another candidate representing the leftist Socialist Popular Alliance Party on the Revolution Continues Coalition party lists, shares Mohamed’s sentiments. “This is an unfair competition between us and the fundamentalist Islamist forces of the dark, funded from the Gulf countries,” said Khairallah. Khairallah added that his party list has filed three law suits against the FJP for using religious slogans such as “Islam is the solution,” exceeding the cap on campaign spending (set by the High Elections Commission at LE500,000), and tearing down the coalition’s campaign posters. Meanwhile, dozens of young activists from the April 6 Youth Movement and other sympathetic activists marched through the streets of Alexandria carrying sticks and tore down posters of candidates who are former members of the NDP. They also used black markers to distort their pictures and write “feloul” on them. “If the legal means didn’t succeed in isolating feloul from politics, then we will do a popular isolation,” said Mahmoud Swaidan, who is participating in the movement. “It's not only my battle. It's a battle of a whole generation that revolted against the past and present to shape its future,” said Mohamed. Campaigning for Party of Freedom and Justice's candidates Publishing Date: Sun, 13/11/2011 - 22:08 Related material Internet provides forum for counter-revolutionary feloul Posters back Egypt's military ruler for president

Source URL (retrieved on 15/11/2011 - 15:22): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/514392

November 12, 2011 Why Are Political Cartoons Incendiary? By VICTOR S. NAVASKY AS the founding editor and publisher in the late 1950’s of Monocle, a “leisurely quarterly of political satire” (that meant we came out twice a year) whose motto was “In the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king,” whenever the offices of a satirical magazine are firebombed, I’m interested.

Bibliotheque Nationale de France, Paris, France.

Honoré Daumier, the great French caricaturist, was thrown into prison for his depiction of King Louis-Philippe as Gargantua So earlier this month, when a Molotov cocktail landed in the offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo — luckily no one was injured — I wanted to know more. It seems the bomb arrived the day after the publication chose the Prophet Muhammad as its guest editor in chief for that week’s issue, and in a reference to Islamic law, or Shariah, temporarily changed its name to “Charia Hebdo.” The issue also featured a cartoon image of the prophet on its cover and a caption that said “100 lashes if you don’t die laughing.”

An equal opportunity offender, the periodical, historically known for pillorying Catholic clericalism and Judaism, was heavily criticized by Muslims in 2007 after reprinting cartoons of Muhammad published by a Danish newspaper that caused outrage in much of the Islamic world. The magazine’s editor, who goes by the name Charb, issued a statement saying “The prophet of Islam didn’t have to be asked twice” to be editor “and we thank him for it.” And the following issue featured a cartoon of Charlie Hebdo passionately kissing a Muslim man under the heading “Love is stronger than hate.” All of which once again spurred the debate on the relationship between free speech and the respectful treatment of Islam. Pierre Haski, a co-founder of a French news Web site, noted in The Guardian that “for many French Muslims, religion has become a cultural identity, a refuge in a troubled society where they don’t feel accepted.” In this context, he sees the attack as “a disturbing reminder of the underground tensions in society.” That prompted Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, a writer in the right-wing monthly The American Spectator, to condemn Mr. Haski for not condemning the firebombing. He added, (as if it didn’t go without saying), “There is no moral equivalence between those exercising their right to free speech and Islamists who wish to impose the standards of traditional Shariah on society and are prepared to harm physically others and their property to achieve that end.” There is, however, another issue that is equally, if not more, interesting to those of us who still live in the land of the blind. The debate on free speech versus taking into account the religious sensibilities of oppressed minorities (and majorities) is an important one. But nobody is talking about why it is that people become so agitated by cartoons and caricatures — a medium that so many dismiss as silly, trivial and irrelevant. Recent example: in August, masked gunmen beat Ali Farzat, a Syrian cartoonist, renowned throughout the Arab world, breaking two fingers on his drawing hand and his right arm after he published a cartoon showing President Bashar al-Assad hitching a ride out of town with Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi just before he was toppled from power. Less recent example: On July 22, 1987, outside the London office of Al Qabas, the Kuwaiti newspaper for which he drew political caricatures, the Palestinian Naji al-Ali another leading cartoonist of the Arab world, was assassinated. Arguably, Muslims, with their (ambiguous) prohibition against representations of Muhammad, are a special case, but it’s not only Muslims who get upset about caricatures. And the focus on caricature and cartoonists is nothing new. In the 19th century, Honoré Daumier, the great French caricaturist, was thrown into prison for his depiction of King Louis-Philippe as Gargantua. And in 1835, when the king re-established censorship, which had been temporarily suspended, it was not for print but rather for caricature (“censorship of the crayon”) on the ground that whereas “a pamphlet is no more than a violation of opinion, a caricature amounts to an act of violence.” And let’s not forget that Julius Streicher, editor of the Nazi newspaper Der Stürmer, notorious for its vicious, anti-Semitic cover caricatures, was the only war criminal executed by the Nuremberg tribunal who was not a high-ranking Nazi official.

Neuroscientists and Freudians all have their explanations as to why and under what circumstances people — be they Muslim workers, French tyrants or members of an international court — find this “silly,” “trivial” and “irrelevant” medium so threatening. I have long had a theory that one reason people become so agitated by cartoons is that there is no way of answering back. A caricature is by definition an exaggeration, a distortion, unfair. If you don’t like an editorial you can write a letter to the editor, but there is no such thing as a cartoon to the editor. But here’s another thought. For years anthropologists, art historians and others have patronized so-called primitive peoples as naïve heathens, as guilty of fetishism, animism and totemism because they believed that pictures had magical powers, that in some sense they were alive. These days neuroscientists tell us that if we want to understand our emotional reaction to what we see, we have to understand the brain, its right (emotional) and left (rational) spheres and how the visual stimulus passes on the information to the region called the amygdala, the brain’s so-called fear center. Maybe so. But I can’t help thinking that the British social historian E. P. Thompson was on to something when he wrote, in another connection, about “the enormous condescension of posterity.” In other words, if brains could whisper, mine would be whispering that perhaps these primitive peoples were right after all; maybe they knew not merely that pictures were magical but also why we should fear them. Victor S. Navasky is a professor at the Columbia Journalism School, and chairman of the Columbia Journalism Review, who is at work on a book about political cartoons. VICTOR S. NAVASKY Why Are Political Cartoons Incendiary? November 12, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/opinion/sunday/why-are-political-cartoons- incendiary.html?src=recg

La Ligue arabe suspend la Syrie LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 13.11.11 | 07h35 • Mis à jour le 13.11.11 | 10h42

AP/Amr Nabil Dix-huit des 22 membres de la Ligue ont voté en faveur de la "suspension de l'adhésion de la Syrie à toutes ses réunions" à compter du 16 novembre. La Ligue arabe a répondu samedi 12 novembre aux demandes des opposants au régime de Bachar al-Assad en suspendant la Syrie et en la menaçant de sanctions. Une décision qui sonne comme un camouflet sévère pour Damas, qui avait refusé d'appliquer comme promis le plan arabe de sortie de crise. En réaction, des manifestants pro-régime ont mis à sac samedi l'ambassade d'Arabie saoudite à Damas, et d'autres sont montés sur le toit de l'ambassade du Qatar, en signe de protestation contre la décision de la Ligue arabe. L'Arabie saoudite a violemment condamné dimanche 13 novembre cet acte. "Le gouvernement de l'Arabie saoudite rend les autorités syriennes responsables de la protection de tous les intérêts saoudiens en Syrie", a affirmé un responsable du ministère des Affaires étrangères cité par l'agence officielle SPA. "Les forces syriennes n'ont pas pris les mensures nécessaires pour empêcher les manifestants" de prendre l'ambassade d'assaut, déplorait le communiqué. L'Arabie saoudite avait rappelé le 8 août son ambassadeur à Damas pour dénoncer la répression en Syrie. Dix-huit des 22 membres de la Ligue ont voté samedi en faveur de la "suspension de l'adhésion de la Syrie à toutes ses réunions" à compter du 16 novembre. Avant la Syrie, la Libye, également touchée par la vague des révoltes du "Printemps arabe", avait été suspendue le 22 février des travaux de la Ligue. "SANCTIONS POLITIQUES ET ÉCONOMIQUES" La Ligue a en outre invité tous les courants de l'opposition à "se mettre d'accord sur un projet commun", a ajouté le responsable qatari devant la presse, précisant que la Ligue arabe souhaitait les rencontrer sous trois jours au Caire à ce sujet. La Ligue prône également des "sanctions politiques et économiques" contre le pouvoir syrien, sans donner plus de précisions sur ces mesures. Si Damas persiste à faire fi des avertissements arabes, la Ligue pourrait en outre faire appel aux Nations unies, a prévenu l'institution. Les mesures votées samedi, auxquelles trois pays – la Syrie, le Liban et le Yémen – se sont opposés, invitent également les Etats membres à retirer leurs ambassadeurs à Damas. DÉCISION "ILLÉGALE" 53

AFP/KHALED DESOUKI La suspension de la Syrie est "illégale et contraire au traité" de l'organisation panarabe, a aussitôt répliqué l'ambassadeur syrien auprès de la Ligue arabe, Youssef Ahmad. C'est une décision qui "met fin à l'action arabe commune et prouve que l'administration (de la Ligue) suit un programme édicté par les Américains et les Occidentaux", a affirmé M. Ahmad, qui a assuré que Damas "mettait en oeuvre tous les points" du plan arabe de sortie de crise et allait continuer de le faire. Damas avait dit accepter le 2 novembre un plan arabe prévoyant la fin des violences, la libération des détenus, le retrait de l'armée des villes et la libre circulation des médias, avant l'ouverture d'un dialogue national.

REUTERS/HANDOUT Dans un communiqué, le Conseil national syrien, qui regroupe la majorité de l'opposition syrienne, s'est félicité de ces décisions, les qualifiant de "pas dans la bonne direction", alors que les militants pro-démocratie avaient appelé vendredi les Syriens à défiler pour réclamer "le gel de l'adhésion de la Syrie à la Ligue arabe". UNE "ÉTAPE IMPORTANTE" Les Occidentaux, Union européenne et Etats-Unis en tête, ont réagi en saluant l'isolement "croissant" de la Syrie. Le président américain Barack Obama a "applaudi" une "étape importante". Le ministre français des Affaires étrangères Alain Juppé a appelé la communauté internationale "à entendre le message qui lui est adressé par les Etats arabes et à agir (...) dans toutes les instances internationales appropriées", faisant allusion au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. La répression de la révolte populaire, qui a fait selon l'ONU plus de 3 500 morts depuis la mi-mars, n'a pas faibli, faisant notamment plus de 120 morts en dix jours dans la seule région de Homs, un des foyers de la contestation dans le centre du pays. Le régime, qui ne reconnaît pas l'ampleur de la contestation, affirme lutter contre des "gangs terroristes" qu'il accuse de chercher à semer le chaos en Syrie.

En Syrie, des manifestants pro-régime ont mis à sac samedi l'ambassade d'Arabie saoudite à Damas, et d'autres sont montés sur le toit de l'ambassade du Qatar, en signe de protestation contre la décision de la Ligue arabe.AFP/LOUAI BESHARA

http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/articU le/2011/11/13/la-ligue-arabe-suspend-la- syrie_1603063_3218.html U

Foreign minister: Egypt rejects outside intervention in Syria Arabic Edition Author: Arabic Edition Egypt rejects foreign intervention in Syria under any pretext, Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr said Sunday. Preserving the unity of Syria is an absolute priority that should be observed under all conditions, Amr said in a press statement. Egypt's position, which calls for an end to all violence, the protection of Syrian civilians, and resorting to dialogue to end the crisis, remains unchanged, he said, noting that these very demands make up the Arab League initiative that was accepted by the Syrian government.

An emergency meeting of Arab foreign ministers on Saturday voted to suspend Syria's membership from all Arab League activities and called on Arab countries to recall their ambassadors from Damascus. Amr called on the Syrian leadership to implement the peace initiative in order to end Syria's suspension from the league. At a joint press conference with Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Araby, Qatari Prime and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim said the imposition of a no-fly zone over Syria and foreign intervention in the country were not discussed during the meeting. Under the Arab League resolution, if violence and killing continues in Syria, the Arab League chief should contact international human rights organizations, including the UN, and consult with the Syrian opposition to decide on procedures to end the violence. Syrian Ambassador to the Arab League Youssef Ahmed, meanwhile, described the resolution as illegal, a violation of the organization’s charter, and a sign that the Arab League submits to American and western agendas. Mohamed Kamel Amr Publishing Date: Sun, 13/11/2011 - 12:54 Related material Syrian ambassador insults Araby and Arab ministers Arab League votes to suspend Syria in 4 days

Source URL (retrieved on 13/11/2011 - 18:47): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/514190

Sun, 13/11/2011 - 11:23

Q&A: Islamist presidential candidate on Egypt's future

Author: Amina Ismail Last month, Mohamed Selim al-Awa, a moderate 69-year-old Islamist intellectual, announced the temporary suspension of his presidential campaign to protest the slow transition timetable set by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Awa, who is widely viewed as one of the more progressive Islamists in Egypt right now, warns that this slowness threatens to derail Egypt’s revolution. And he says he is ready to take to the streets again if power is not handed over to civilians soon. But Awa is also not especially critical of the military. He doesn’t believe, for instance, that the SCAF is engaging in an all-out power grab comparable to the 1952 Free Officers coup. For now, Awa says, it is important to focus on the upcoming parliamentary elections. Al-Masry Al-Youm recently sat down with Awa to discuss his views regarding Egypt as an Islamic state and the transitional period. What follows is an edited and abridged version of the interview. Al-Masry Al-Youm: What is your presidential campaign about? Mohamed Selim al-Awa: The individual, who has been ignored for at least 30 years! My main objective is to let every citizen discover his or her own value, power, points of weakness. We plan to do this by educating people and improving their living conditions, which are terrible. If we don’t do that then there won’t be any success in any program. Our second main concern is establishing the rule of law, which means equality in its application and justice for everyone, which can't be attained without the independence of the judiciary. Of course we have an economic and social program as well, but our main concern is the human being. Al-Masry: Will you implement Sharia [Islamic law]? Awa: Sharia is already implemented in Egypt. It does not need more implementation. Except the verse and prophetic sayings related to crimes and punishments; this needs clarification by the people and to be reflected in law. By the way, it is not the president 57

who implements law. It is the parliament and the judiciary. If the parliament passes a law which is in accordance with Sharia, the judiciary cannot reject it. This is not the president’s business. Al-Masry: There is a growing fear, not just in Egypt, that conservative Islamic thinking will take over politics and Arab countries will not operate democratically. What are your thoughts? Awa: What is wrong with strong Islamic feelings, positions and decisions? Why are we not similarly afraid of the strong American or Israeli positions? They are all run by very strong rulers who are supported by their parliaments and nobody objects. And if anyone objects, I would tell him that it is none of his business. Let elections take place, let people choose. Al-Masry: Do you think religion could be the basis of a constitution in Egypt? Awa: The question is wrong in itself. Religion cannot be the basis for a constitution. The constitution is an agreement between the political powers and the people of a country to run the country according to specific rules. These specific rules can be taken from anywhere, provided that people accept them. If people want constitutional rules taken from Sharia or France, then that is their business. These questions are referring to Islam as something different, fearful and something that people should be curious and cautious about. I disagree on this attitude toward Islam. Islam is a way of life, as is Christianity and Judaism. Why isn’t anybody objecting to the democratic Christian parties in Europe? Yet everyone objects to the Islamic political parties. We are an Islamic world and we have to have Islamist parties. What’s the problem with that? Al-Masry: Many Christians criticize you and say you claim to sympathize with them just because you are running for president. And they say, “How can we trust someone who said that we have weapons in our churches?” What do think of that? Awa: I didn’t say they have weapons in their churches. I was speaking in an interview with Al Jazeera about a specific incident. The public prosecution office investigated this case and the two who are accused are still under arrest. I was asked about this specific case and I answered. My words were rephrased. I was asked about weapons in churches. I said churches must be inspected, just as mosques are inspected. And I was asked, “If there are weapons in the churches against whom would they be used? I said certainly not against Israel, they would be used against Muslims.” Secondly, I cannot seriously claim that I am not seeking Christian votes. I am looking for the vote of every sincere Egyptian. But I am not making my political decisions for votes. Otherwise, I would have done hundreds of other politically popular things to satisfy people. Al-Masry: Why isn’t there in place yet a unified law on houses of worship? Awa: This law had been studied for five years and I have no idea why the previous parliament and government did not enact it. The problem in this law is on how to address already existing illegal places of worship. We have to treat every case on its own merits. We shouldn’t make a law making every illegal house of worship legal. This is against Christians as it is against Muslims, as it contradicts the law of the land.

Al-Masry: What do you think of the SCAF’s performance during the transitional period? Awa: They are doing the best they can, but the problem is their governing capabilities! They are not politicians. They don’t have expertise in dealing with non-military civilians. And they are quite unaware of the real political and social problems of Egypt. Al-Masry: Do you think the SCAF has contributed to disrupting the political and social scene and creating sectarian violence in Egypt? Awa: The SCAF does not contribute to that, but their rule of the country should come to an end as soon as possible, through parliamentary and presidential elections. Al-Masry: Why is the SCAF being stubborn about keeping single winner districts in the parliamentary elections, while most political parties and politicians don’t want them? Awa: The reason behind that is the constitutional court, not the SCAF. The constitutional court said that if the elections don’t have a mixture between individual candidate and party list-based seats, the parliament will be considered unconstitutional. The SCAF is following legal advice from the constitutional court, which is based on the old, now dissolved constitution. But we are fed up with this dialogue. We want the elections tomorrow, anyway. Let’s move from ruling by the military to ruling by the elected people. Al-Masry: Do you think that the military will be politically involved after the transfer of power? Awa: I don’t know but it shouldn’t be. I will fight against any involvement of the military in political life. Al-Masry: What are your fears for Egypt? Awa: Chaos, which we saw recently at Maspero. It was certainly intended and planned. I said there was a third party involved and I knew who they were, but I kept silent. Their identities are now published in the newspapers. Political powers and businessmen were involved in planning that a long time ago. Al-Masry: What is your hope for Egypt? Awa: To see Egypt a real democratic and free country that makes use of its vast resources. Mohamed Selim al-Awa Publishing Date: Sun, 13/11/2011 - 11:23 Related material Presidential hopeful Awa rejects extension of transition period Experts label Awa as Brotherhood's secret presidential nominee

Source URL (retrieved on 13/11/2011 - 18:43): Amina Ismail Q&A: Islamist presidential candidate on Egypt's future Sun, 13/11/2011 - 11:23 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/514173

SOCIEDAD MULTICULTURALISMO El árabe, una lengua europea como las otras 11 noviembre 2011 SVENSKA DAGBLADET ESTOCOLMO

Una periodista sueca de origen palestino recorrió Europa para determinar qué lugar ocupa el idioma árabe en el continente. El resultado fue bastante sorprendente. Lina Kalmteg A pesar de sus diez años de experiencia en la prensa, la periodista sueca de origen palestino Nadia Jebril nunca había tenido la ocasión de hablar árabe en el contexto de su profesión. Pero se le ocurrió la idea del programa “Rena rama arabiskan" [El árabe en todos sus estados], con la finalidad de determinar el lugar que ocupa el idioma árabe en Europa: en Suecia, Dinamarca, Gran Bretaña, Francia, Italia, Malta, España, Bosnia y por último, en el Líbano. "Queríamos realizar algo cuyo tema fuera el idioma árabe", explica. "Pero la gente tan sólo hablaba del islam y de Oriente Próximo, como si hubiera que limitarse a los asuntos clásicos". Y entonces pensó: "Entre nosotros hay muchos musulmanes y la mayoría hablan árabe. Pero aquí es donde vivimos. Y no se habla el mismo árabe que en Oriente Próximo, aquí se hacen mezclas". "Mi generación constituye un grupo aparte. Hemos crecido en un entorno radicalmente distinto al que conocieron nuestros padres. Por toda Europa las personas han recorrido miles de caminos que se entrecruzan. Se trata de un fenómeno nuevo al que nadie ha prestado atención". "¿Habla árabe?" A raíz de esta frustración surge la idea del programa "Rena rama arabiskan", que plantea la siguiente pregunta: ¿hasta qué punto puede una persona hacerse entender en Europa hablando árabe? 60

Nadia Jebril ya había constatado que con el árabe podía hacerse entender en Berlín. En el primer episodio, recorre Suecia con un cartel en el que se leía "¿Habla árabe?". A medida que avanza la serie, más allá de las fronteras suecas, conoce a personas en la calle, entrevista a lingüistas, a escritores, humoristas y artistas y el programa pronto adopta el aspecto de una inquieta lección sobre la Europa actual, un retrato que supera con creces el simple ámbito del idioma árabe. Nadia Jebril afirma que Suecia le sorprendió positivamente, pues allí encontró a personas interesadas por el idioma árabe y por muchas cosas más. El mayor desafío lo encontró en Dinamarca, un país en el que la cuestión del multilingüismo es objeto de un agitado debate y donde a los niños de lengua árabe se les dice que no está bien hablar este idioma. "Mezclan el debate sobre el idioma con el resto, con el único fin de abordar la cuestión de la inmigración", explica. Un programa sin objetivo político En Francia, conoce a personas que hablan árabe pero que se niegan a indicarle el camino para llegar a una tienda de discos. La insultan y gritan que deje de grabar. Y aunque intenta acercarse a las personas con su pancarta, se va sin conseguir su objetivo. Su conclusión es que esta reacción se debe sin duda a la forma con la que se ha descrito a las personas de habla árabe en los medios de comunicación franceses. En cualquier caso, consigue una cita con Khaled, el rey de la música rai. Recuerda que los dos reaccionaron con risas nerviosas. A él le incomodaba la idea de hablar árabe y mezclaba en sus respuestas una multitud de palabras francesas aunque ella no comprendía la mitad de lo que decía. Ella misma se sentía nerviosa al hablar su propio árabe: un dialecto palestino combinado con términos suecos como "brunsås" [salsa marrón]. Nadia Jebril insiste en el hecho de que el programa no tiene ningún objetivo político. Aunque se rodara antes del verano, en el punto álgido de la primavera árabe en el norte de África. Sin duda, unos acontecimientos con numerosas repercusiones. "Hoy ya no se considera a los árabes como víctimas o como opresores, sino como personas iguales al resto, con ganas de vivir bien y dispuestos a luchar para conseguirlo. Se observa una curiosidad renovada. Y nosotros, que nos parecemos a los que han luchado por sus ideales, podemos estar orgullosos e ir con la cabeza alta". http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/1159761-el-arabe-una-lengua-europea- como-las-otras

Warring factions divide Yemen’s capital By Sudarsan Raghavan, Friday, November 11, 3:14 AM Sanaa, Yemen — There’s not a soul walking on this stretch of Amman Street, one of the many front lines in this besieged capital. Shops are shuttered with large padlocks. Like totems, abandoned apartment buildings, scarred by mortar rounds and artillery shells, bear witness to the gloom. Every few moments, heavy gunfire shatters the silence. Mohammed Shansadine, a government soldier huddled with his comrades next to an olive green armored personnel carrier, knows his enemies well. They are defected members of his military. Some are from his village, men he knew as boys. “It is brother against brother, Muslim against Muslim,” said Shansadine, 24, lean and muscular with a wispy beard. “We have never been this divided.” A constellation of competing warriors, checkpoints, tanks, berms and trenches has deeply riven this ancient Middle Eastern capital, physically, psychologically and socially, unlike at any other moment in its modern history. In some areas of Sanaa, a sprawling metropolis that thrived before the dawn of Islam, rival militaries or tribal militias control entire neighborhoods. Elsewhere, power changes hands street by street. No single faction controls enough territory to impose its will on its foes. But all have the firepower to stop any political deal unfavorable to their interests, seesawing the capital between chaos and calm.

The precarious military stalemate helps explain why Yemen, with its abundance of weapons, tribes and poverty, has yet to plunge into outright civil war. But that possibility still exists as more violent confrontations seem inevitable. Cease-fire deals 62

are signed, then broken. In bursts, death grips the capital: Unarmed protesters get shot and clashes erupt, deepening the ruptures. On Thursday, gunmen again opened fire on anti-government demonstrators here, leaving a 13-year-old boy dead and at least a dozen people wounded. Ten months into Yemen’s populist revolt, Sanaa’s complex partition is the most visible sign of a parallel struggle for power, tribal authority and political survival unfolding among its ruling elites, even as the lives of ordinary Yemenis deteriorate with each day. “The situation is dark,” said Ali Abdu al-Tinni, 78, a frail retired government worker in the enclave of Hassabah who sleeps on his floor because of the shells and bullets that pound his street almost nightly. “We are living a life of fear.” Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s abrupt return from Saudi Arabia on Sept. 23 after a nearly four-month absence has hardened the stances of all the warring sides. Saleh, who was treated in Riyadh for injuries sustained in a June assassination attempt, appears more confident, refusing to cede power except on his own terms. Across the capital, his loyalists have become as emboldened. His opponents are ratcheting up their tactics, their mistrust of Saleh deeper than at any previous moment in his 33-year rule. “There may not be civil war. But tensions will escalate,” said Ali Saeed Ali-Ramisi, 41, an accountant, from his hospital bed after he survived a sniper’s bullet during a recent protest. “Ali Abdullah Saleh is not going to give up power on his own. And we’re not going to let go either.” From allies to enemies Seven years ago, Shansadine left his village in southern Ibb province and joined the Central Security Forces, commanded by the president’s nephew. Other villagers were under Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, then the president’s key ally. After pro-government snipers killed more than 50 unarmed protesters on March 18, Mohsen defected and joined the uprising. And Shansadine was soon battling men he considered his brothers. “They have been brainwashed,” he said of the villagers in the 1st Armored Division, Mohsen’s force. Today, the revolt has entered a more perilous period. Protesters are increasingly marching into government areas of the capital, protected by Mohsen’s soldiers. Government troops have used that as a pretext to open fire into the crowds. Shansadine, like most Saleh loyalists, claims that the 1st Armored Division is behind the attacks on protesters, hoping that they will generate international pressure for regime change. “It is all planned from inside Change Square,” he contended, referring to the encampment near Sanaa University where the activists have staged a massive sit-in since March. Kentucky Square, an intersection where a restaurant resembling a KFC once stood, was two blocks from where Shansadine was standing. It’s now one of the city’s primary front lines. Government forces killed dozens of protesters there in September, triggering fierce clashes with Mohsen’s forces. As Shansadine spoke, a mortar round landed nearby. “If they continue to attack us, we’re going to move forward,” he warned. On the other side of Kentucky Square, a mirror image unfolded. Along Haeel Street, sandbags were piled up in front of disfigured buildings that have been pounded by 63

artillery fire. Soldiers and civilians ran swiftly across intersections to evade sniper bullets. Mohsen’s commanders, near sand-colored armored personnel carriers, said they were fighting to protect the activists. But a visit to a nearby government garrison shows they have pummeled it with mortar rounds and rockets. “We’re silent, but inside us is a volcano,” said Ahmed Mu’nis, 32, a 1st Armored Division soldier with a grizzled beard, who is also from Ibb province. “If we are forced, we will not stand and do nothing. We’ll fight back.” Moments later, a high-caliber bullet struck a corner of a building a few feet away, sending a large puff of dust into the air. A tribal stronghold A few miles to the north, in the capital’s battered Hassabah enclave, graffiti on a wall read: “Go away, you slaughterer, Ali Abdullah Saleh.” Men in traditional Yemeni dress, Kalashnikov rifles slung over their shoulders, patrolled deserted streets littered with trash. They are the tribesmen of the Ahmar clan, Yemen’s preeminent tribal family headed by Sheik Sadiq al-Ahmar. Ahmar is also the leader of the Hashid, Yemen’s most powerful tribal confederation, to which the majority of the warring elites, including Saleh, belong. Once Saleh’s close allies, Ahmar and his nine brothers are now the president’s bitter enemies. On the streets circling the neighborhood are units of the Republican Guard, headed by Saleh’s son Ahmed. They have engaged in fierce clashes with the Ahmar tribesmen, lobbing mortars and rockets at each other, killing scores. The Ahmars’ palatial ancestral home is now a charred hulk. Saleh has blamed the attempt to kill him on the Ahmars and Mohsen, who is not related to the family. They have denied the allegation. But they are preparing themselves: Long trenches have been dug around Hassabah to fight off any incursion. At a Republican Guard checkpoint, Gen. Mohammed al-Qadi said the units were defending themselves, pointing at buildings defaced by bullets and mortars. “The Ahmars are our biggest enemy,” he said. “We are ready to break into their place and fight them in there, but our orders are to hold still for now.” At a fortified intersection, tribal fighters defiantly vowed to protect their territory at any cost. “Saleh wants revenge,” Saleh al-Saleba, 30, a tribal fighter, said as his comrades nodded. “He has come back to wage war.” Saleh’s return has deepened tribal allegiances. Soldiers who belong to the Ahmar tribe have defected to join the tribal militia. Injured tribesmen are eager to fight against the government. “If they enter Hassabah, everyone here will rise up,” said Abdulghani al-Dhawi, 26, on patrol a day after being treated for four bullet wounds. “We love our sheik.” Sultan Turfan, another fighter, asked: “Hasn’t Saleh learned anything from Gaddafi?” Clans divided Just as Yemen’s military is divided, so are its myriad clans. The Ahmars and Saleh have cultivated tribal loyalties through an extensive system of patronage. Now,

Hashid tribesmen are fighting one another as well as tribesmen in the Bakeel, the second most powerful tribal confederation, in proxy conflicts, adding a new layer of upheaval. In Soufan, a neighborhood nestled on the northern edge of Hassabah, 30 Meter Road is the demarcation line of one such standoff. On one side is the sprawling compound of Himyar al-Ahmar, the deputy speaker of parliament and one of the Ahmar brothers. On the other side is the mansion of Sagheer Hamoud Ahmed Ben Aziz, a pro-government tribal leader with the Bakeel. For the past several weeks, their tribesmen have been firing mortar rounds and rockets across the road at each other. At the same time, Ben Aziz is fighting Mohsen’s forces, while Ahmar is fighting nearby Republican Guard units. “They even killed my cook the other day,” said Himyar al-Ahmar, 55, as he walked over shattered glass, his back hunched to avoid a sniper bullet. Seated in a side room of his mansion — his normal meeting room was covered with debris from an artillery shell that crashed through the wall — Ben Aziz spoke of how his grandfather and the Ahmars’ grandfather also fought each other to resolve disputes. But this tribal conflict, he said, “was the worst in generations.” He vowed to defend Saleh. “Whenever they attack, we will respond double,” said Ben Aziz, looking across 30 Meter Road. “The president’s return has brought hope for me and all Yemenis.” Trapped in the crossfire Zaafran Ali al-Mohana, 42, and her family fled their home near Kentucky Square recently after their house was hit by a rocket and sniper fire. “I grew up in that house,” she said, visibly upset. “The social life is paralyzed,” added the mother of three who was staying with relatives. “It’s difficult now even for one neighbor to check on another.” In today’s dissected Sanaa, there are dozens of no-go zones, where a wrong turn can place you in the sights of a sniper. Roads are barricaded with rocks, bricks, even furniture. By nightfall, the city thins out, with some areas turning ghostly. The vast web of checkpoints has caused long delays; ribbons of traffic unwind for miles. In many neighborhoods, businesses are closed, choking an economy that’s already on the edge of death. Most schools and universities are closed, indefinitely. In Hassabah, the house of Tinni, the retired government worker, is pocked with bullets. With no electricity, he is forced to buy food each day. If there are clashes, he goes hungry. Prices of candles, like most consumer goods, have risen, so he often lives in darkness. “We blame all the sides,” he said out of earshot of the tribal fighters. “They are all after power.” Sudarsan Raghavan Warring factions divide Yemen’s capital November 11, 3:14 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/warring-factions-divide-yemens- capital/2011/10/20/gIQA5WC69M_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

11/11/2011 - 11:47

Liberal parties disagree on supra- constitutional principles document Mahmoud Gaweesh Adel el-Daragli Author: Mahmoud Gaweesh Liberal political parties' reactions to the interim government's proposed supra- constitutional principles have varied between defending and rejecting the document. The parties that reject the document will hold a meeting on Sunday to announce whether or not they will participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Others argue that the principles will work to guarantee a civil state, condemning Islamist parties' rejection of them as opportunistic. And others still have delayed taking final stances on the document until controversial articles 9 and 10 are amended. As currently written, Article 9 stipulates that only the armed forces have the right to discuss issues related to the military and its budget, and Article 10, which forms a National Defense Council to be headed by the president, does not give the council the responsibility of overseeing the military's budget. The Democratic Alliance, an electoral bloc led by the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, has vowed to take to the streets if the supra-constitutional principles are passed, demanding that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) drop the proposal and sack Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy, who has been campaigning for its passage. The Brotherhood and other Islamists view the document as potentially limiting the upcoming parliament's ability to form the constituent assembly that will draft the nation's new constitution. The controversial articles protecting the military from oversight have raised reservations among non-Islamists as well. The supra-constitutional principles document should act as a guide, not a mandatory decree, said WasatU Party U Spokesperson Tarek al-Malt, encouraging all Egyptians to abide by the principles as a “codeU of honor.” U He added that his party rejects articles 9 and 10 as they are currently written.

The DemocraticU Front Party U will reject the constitutional document if articles 9 and 10 are not amended, said party Chairman Al-Saeed Kamel. The Tagammu Party will not participate in the million-strong demonstrations Islamist parties have planned for 18 November to denounce the supra-constitutional principles, announced party leader Hussein Abdel Razeq. He accused the Freedom and Justice Party and Salafi parties of being opportunistic in opposing the document. Islamist parties have participated in all major discussions concerning the supra- constitutional principles from the beginning, including the National Reconciliation

Conference held by former Deputy Prime Minister Yehia al-Gamal, as well dialogues convened by both presidential hopeful Mohamed ElBaradei and the Democratic Alliance to write their own supra-constitutional documents. Islamists' opportunism is obvious, Abdel Razeq said, considering that they only now reject the document despite being involved in its drafting process since the beginning. The Wafd Party will not take part in the 18 November demonstrations, said Wafd Party deputy head Baha Abu Shaqa, arguing that political parties desperately need to unite ahead of the parliamentary elections. Abu Shaqa also noted that Islamist parties had previously agreed on the principles when they were discussed within the Democratic Alliance. The Wafd Party has since left the coalition. The Egyptian Social Democratic Party agrees with the proposed principles except for what party Chairman Mohamed Abul Ghar called “strange articles” relating to the powers of the armed forces. Abul Ghar said he supports drafting a document that reassures all segments of society, including the economic and tourism sectors. "We are waiting for the amendments. If they amend the document, we will approve it," he said. The Adl Party rejects setting any rules for the next parliament, as they would be unconstitutional and lead Egypt into a dark tunnel, said Abdel Moneim Emam, a leading figure in the party. He noted that his party has already rejected articles 9 and 10. "If these two articles are amended or canceled, the party will approve the document, provided that it only functions as a guide." Translated from the Arabic Edition Ali al-Selmy Archived Photo?: 0 Publishing Date: Fri, 11/11/2011 - 11:47 Related material Islamists plan 18 November protests against supra-constitutional principles Supra-constitutional principles cause rift between political forces Mahmoud Gaweesh Liberal parties disagree on supra-constitutional principles document11/11/2011 - 11:47 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/513596

Middle East November 9, 2011 Ahead of Vote, Egypt’s Parties and Skepticism Are Growing By NEIL MacFARQUHAR CAIRO — At the rally kicking off his campaign for Parliament, Basem Kamel, a core member of the youthful council that helped spur the end of the Mubarak government, wrestled with his stump speech calling for civilian rule. “We don’t want to return to the Islam of the Middle Ages,” said Mr. Kamel, his shaved head and white suit setting him apart in Sharabiyya, an impoverished northern Cairo neighborhood in his campaign district. “I don’t want the Islam that preaches I am right and everyone else is an infidel.” The official campaign for Egypt’s first parliamentary elections since President Hosni Mubarak was toppled in February has started slowly, coinciding with a weeklong break marking the year’s main Muslim holiday.

Moises Saman for The New York Times. Last-minute preparations for an event in Cairo held by the Egyptian Social Democratic Party. But the campaign’s contours have been known for months, namely how a group of upstart, mostly liberal parties will challenge the well-organized juggernaut of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as remnants of the old government’s political machine. The question shadowing the election is whether a robust enough Parliament will emerge to fulfill an elusive goal of the revolution: challenging the military’s 60-year grip on power. Given that the young organizers who first summoned protesters to Tahrir Square pulled off a miraculous feat — chasing a president of nearly 30 years from office in 18 days — they were expected to play a leading role in what came next.

Reality proved different. Initially, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces appeared interested in consulting with the youth coalition. But the youths broke off the meetings after a violent April crackdown on demonstrators. “We decided it was better to try to establish ourselves on the street than to talk to the military council,” said Shady el-Ghazaly Harb, a 32-year-old surgeon who is now building his own liberal party, The Awareness Party, and is sitting out these elections. “The military wanted us for decoration,” he said. “They used us as a source of information, an indicator of the mood on the street, of how the youth will react — but it was not an interactive experience.” Although they still meet, the 17 or so core members of the Revolution Youth Coalition splintered among factions much like the entire Egyptian political spectrum. Some, including the young members of the Muslim Brotherhood, started parties of their own. Some were absorbed into older groups as mummified political parties struggled to their feet. Some thrived as media stars. “They were all beggars before the revolution,” said Mohamed Salah, an acerbic columnist for the pan-Arab Al-Hayat newspaper, summarizing a common perception. “Now half of them are TV talk-show hosts while the other half appear on their shows as paid guests, while the rest of the population cannot find money to buy food.” About six of the original members hope to translate their role into a parliamentary seat in the three-stage elections that run through Jan. 10. But they face pronounced skepticism. “We don’t care about them, they are just like Mubarak, all they want is money,” groused one heavily veiled woman dismissively just before Mr. Kamel rose to speak. Her main concern was the pervading sense of instability: “We just want things to go back the way they were.” Mr. Kamel is running for the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, among the strongest liberal groups with its mix of Muslims and Coptic Christians, which argues seriously that Egypt might emulate Sweden. The rally played on nostalgia for better days by not starting with the current martial national anthem, but a more romantic version from the 1920s with lines like “I am an Egyptian built by those who built the everlasting pyramids.” Mr. Kamel noted in an interview that he could not run as a revolutionary. (The 42- year-old architect was pushing the youth envelope, but because Mr. Mubarak was 82, people half his age were deemed youthful.) “They know that we were somehow pioneers in this, but now is not the time to say that,” he explained. “I have to speak about the new constitution, about education, health care and the environment.” Still, his speech referred to those halcyon days. “In the square we were one hand in the revolution and no one asked if the other prayed or was a believer or not,” Mr. Kamel said. “The current regime wants to divide us so we are weak and can be easily ruled.” He kept repeating the need for a “civilian” state, or “madani” in Arabic, because the religious portray the word “almani” or “secular” as something Western and immoral.

After the rally, potential voters found that Mr. Kamel came off as more earnest than electric, wishing that he had offered specific prescriptions for solving this nation’s complicated social and economic problems. Egypt’s basic election math goes something like this: Among up to 50 million voters, 20 to 30 percent are believed to be supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamist factions and are sure to vote. Less than 20 percent, the elite and the Coptic Christian minority, are likely to be committed to civilian rule and are also eager to vote. Hence the challenge is to win over the roughly 50 percent of undecided voters — not least in getting them to vote. Attempts to form unified slates derailed, with, by rough count, 14 liberal organizations and 8 Islamist parties fielding candidates. Standing out among more than 6,000 candidates for 498 seats is difficult. “The only difference between the liberals is that one has curly black hair and the other is bald,” Mr. Salah deadpanned. Despite the splintering of the Islamist parties into factions, analysts estimate that the Muslim Brotherhood still commands a hefty 70 percent or so of the Islamist vote. Given its widespread penetration and organization into individual neighborhoods through clinics and social services, it will likely do well, particularly if turnout is low. In Tunis last month, the main Islamic faction took more than 40 percent while the strongest liberal group followed with 30 percent. The effort to convince voters that the stakes are high has been hobbled by the fact that the powers of this next Parliament remain increasingly vague as the military council has said it plans to preserve ultimate authority for at least another year. Almost the entire political spectrum was outraged anew last week by proposals floated by the caretaker government meant to guide the process of writing a new constitution. It had been expected that the new Parliament would choose the next cabinet and a 100- member council to write a new constitution, paving the way for presidential elections in a year. But the ruling military council seems determined to dilute that. First, nothing obliges it to pick the next ministers from the winners. Second, the proposed constitutional guidelines suggest that the generals will pick 80 members of the council, leaving just 20 from the new Parliament, and put the military outside civilian oversight. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular cried foul, accusing the military of trying to stymie the organization’s anticipated strong role in shaping the next constitution. In their attacks on the military council, both the Brotherhood and liberal candidates like Mr. Kamel try gingerly to draw a line between the ruling generals and the armed forces themselves, which remain broadly popular as Egypt’s last stable pillar. “The regime has still not changed, the revolution is still not complete,” Mr. Kamel said in his speech. “Every Egyptian has a role now, it might be a small or large one but nevertheless it’s a role and each Egyptian must take it.” Dina Saleh Amer and Heba Afify contributed reporting. NEIL MacFARQUHAR Ahead of Vote, Egypt’s Parties and Skepticism Are Growing November 9, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/world/middleeast/ahead-of- egypts-elections-parties-and-skepticism-grow.html?src=recg 70

Iran Ready to Negotiate Deal to Allay Nuclear-Program Concern, Russia Says By Henry Meyer - Nov 10, 2011 Iran is ready for a negotiated deal to allay concerns about its nuclear program, Russia said a day after a senior Iranian official held talks in Moscow. Russia won’t support new measures against Iran even after the United Nations atomic watchdog concluded in a report that the country continued work on developing a nuclear weapon until at least last year, Alexander Lukashevich, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, said by telephone in the Russian capital today. “Iran has confirmed that it wants to resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA,” Lukashevich said, referring to the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency. “This is incompatible with efforts to impose new sanctions, which will only drive any prospects of negotiations into a dead end.” The U.S. and European allies say they will press for further economic punitive measures against Iran. Russia supported four rounds of UN Security Council sanctions from 2006 to 2010. Britain will press China and Russia, both veto-wielding members of the security council, to increase pressure on Iran, U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague said yesterday. Moscow Talks The deputy head of Iran’s National Security Council, Ali Baqeri, yesterday met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow to discuss the Iranian nuclear program, according to the Foreign Ministry. Iran and Russia are working out the details of the agreement, Baqeri told reporters today in Moscow. Iran is ready to “clear up all questions” the IAEA has, he said. Russia wants to resolve the dispute by lifting sanctions against Iran in stages, in return for Iranian cooperation on inspections. The offer is “still on the negotiating table,” Lavrov said this week. China believes sanctions against Iran won’t fundamentally resolve problems related to the country’s nuclear program, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said at a briefing in Beijing today. Iran and the international community should negotiate a solution within the framework of six-party talks, Hong said. UN Demands The world’s fourth-largest oil producer has rejected UN demands to suspend uranium enrichment, which can be used both for generating electricity and making nuclear warheads. Negotiations broke down in January after talks in Istanbul between Iran and the five permanent members of the security council -- China, France, Russia, the U.K. and U.S. -- as well as Germany.

The Vienna-based IAEA concluded Iran has pursued a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on its ballistic missiles in the strongest doubts it has expressed about Iranian insistence it is only seeking peaceful atomic power. The findings bolster the arguments of U.S. and European officials who say negotiations with Iran have failed to halt a covert nuclear-weapons program. Iran won’t withdraw “an iota” from its atomic program, said President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, dismissing the IAEA report released Nov. 8 as “baseless” in a speech broadcast on Iranian state television yesterday. ‘Not Genuine’ Documents provided by the UN agency are “not genuine” and come from the U.S., Baqeri said. Russia has said the IAEA accusations date back 10 years and contain “nothing new.” A Russian scientist, Vyacheslav Danilenko, denied helping Iran to develop a nuclear bomb following a Washington Post report about his suspected role, the Kommersant newspaper reported today, citing an interview with the expert. The IAEA report said a foreign scientist, whom it didn’t name, had worked in Iran from 1996 to 2002 and assisted in conducting experiments to raise the yield of atomic warheads. Lukashevich said today the report’s release was aimed at preventing the resumption of dialogue with Iran. Newspapers in Israel have reported Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has raised the prospect of Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons that would threaten Israel. Military experts say that Israel would need U.S. participation to be effective. Lavrov said Nov. 7 that an Israeli military strike against Iran would be a “serious mistake fraught with unpredictable consequences.” Such an attack against Iran would call into question Israel’s existence, the Iranian deputy security chief said today. To contact the reporter on this story: Henry Meyer in Moscow at [email protected] To contact the editor responsible for this story: Balazs Penz at [email protected] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-11-10/iran-ready-to-negotiate-deal-to- allay-nuclear-program-concern-russia-says.html

ft.com comment The A-List

Anne-Marie Slaughter November 9, 2011 America • Foreign Policy • Middle East

Diplomacy is the least damaging option with Iran When it comes to Iran, the best is consistently the enemy of the good. The International Atomic Energy Agency report issued on Tuesday on Iran’s nuclear programme uses strong language relative to earlier reports, but essentially affirms what western governments already know or believe. Parsing the bureaucratese, the IAEA details information that it believes to be “credible”, indicating “that Iran has carried out activities to the development of a nuclear explosive device”; that before 2004 “these activities took place under a structured program”; and “that some activities may still be ongoing.” In short, for all the sanctions and diplomacy, Iran continues to make steady progress toward producing a nuclear weapon. We might be able to make a deal that would at least bring some Iranian stocks of low-enriched uranium into the custody of a third country – starting a process of multilateral cooperation to meet Iran’s legitimate needs for nuclear fuel, while constraining its illicit activities. This would still leave Iran enough LEU to produce a bomb, and could legitimise its enrichment efforts, allowing them to continue contrary to UN demands. That would be bad. But continuing with a policy of sanctions and pressure that is not working is worse. The IAEA report documents repeated Iranian violations of UN obligations and IAEA requests. It catalogues Iranian military efforts to obtain nuclear-related and dual-use equipment, to ramp up production of nuclear fuel by “undeclared pathways,” to acquire nuclear weapons development information from a “clandestine nuclear supply network,” and to design an actual weapon, including testing of components. Harvard Professor Graham Allison, a leading expert on nuclear proliferation, has a more direct approach. He has a chart showing a nuclear football field, with the endzone being the possession of enough highly-enriched uranium to create a bomb. It shows that Iran has enough low-enriched uranium (5 per cent) to create four bombs, but that the time needed to upgrade this keeps Iran 30 yards from the endzone. In addition, though, Iran is building a large stockpile of medium-enriched uranium (20 per cent), which takes much less effort to convert to bomb-grade material. That puts it on the 10-yard line – a very short distance from its goal. The Stuxnet worm does appear to have set Iran back by perhaps two years, but that is being overcome. New generations of cyber-viruses may be harder to insert and easier to defend against. Military action will remain an option, but would run counter to the Obama administration’s entire strategy of integrating rising powers into a strong international order. It is also not certain to work, and would have deeply counterproductive political effects inside Iran and probably across the Muslim world.

That leaves diplomacy. In late 2009 the US, France and Russia proposed a deal whereby Iran would give up its own stocks of LEU in return for international provision of sufficient nuclear fuel to run a medical research reactor in Tehran. Mahmoud Ahmadi- Nejad originally seemed receptive, but Iran then backed out quickly. In the spring of 2011, Brazil and Turkey reached a weaker version of the same deal, in which Iran would transfer 1,200kg of LEU to Turkey in return for the same quantity of nuclear fuel for the Tehran reactor. That move widely was seen as an Iranian ploy to blunt another round of UN sanctions. The US pointed out, rightly, that Tehran was not committing to stop enrichment, and secured agreement on more and stronger sanctions. Meanwhile, it made its displeasure clear in Ankara and Brasilia; the deal fell through; and Tehran continued its programme. What was lost was any opportunity to establish a precedent of keeping Iranian fuel outside Iran, and working within a cooperative rather than a coercive frame that would allow Iran to save face. Today, if Barack Obama were to put that deal on the table, he would be hammered by his Republican opponents, in Congress and on the presidential campaign trail, for giving away the store, negotiating from weakness, affirming US decline, and so on. But if we are really as worried about an Iranian bomb as we claim, results should trump political perceptions. The IAEA report has the dual advantage of expressing global concern over Iranian behavior and of focusing attention on Iran’s violation of its international obligations. Western governments should now turn back to Turkey and Brazil. Turkish-Iranian frictions are on the rise, particularly over Syria and Arab uprisings across the region. But Turkey has a direct stake in avoiding an outcome in which Iran upstages it as the region’s only nuclear power besides Israel; and Iran has a stake in working with Turkey at least some of the time in the complex triangular politics emerging among Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s new president, has a stake in doing something that Lula was unable to accomplish; Brazil also has a strong incentive as a nation that flirted with developing nuclear weapons but then renounced its programme. Let them initiate a new round of negotiations under UN auspices – with full backing from the US, France, Russia and other powers concerned. At the least, it deprives the Iranian government of its familiar US whipping boy. At most, we might succeed in halting play on the 10-yard line and then changing the game. President Obama is riding high in national security matters these days, largely as a result of following his own instincts. He can afford a return to his initial policy of pragmatic engagement, particularly on an issue that does not pit the Iranian government against his own people. He may fail, but he has proved himself to be a leader willing to risk failure to get results. Given the price of continuing our current policy, it’s time to change course. The writer is a professor at Princeton University and former director of policy planning at the US State department http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/11/09/diplomacy-is-the-least-damaging-option-with- iran/#axzz1dJrGREcp

Wed, 09/11/2011 - 15:51

Syrian opposition group pelted with eggs in Cairo Author: AP BEIRUT — Angry Syrian protesters pelted a group of opposition leaders with eggs outside Arab League headquarters in Cairo on Wednesday, preventing them from entering the building for talks with the organization's chief about the violence in Syria. The scuffle highlights the deep divisions within the Syrian opposition, which is struggling to overcome infighting and inexperience eight months into the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad's autocratic regime. The fault lines within the movement continue to hamper its efforts to topple Assad and have prevented the opposition from gaining the traction it needs to present a credible alternative to the regime. Instead, it remains deeply divided over fundamental issues, such as whether to engage in dialogue with the regime and call for foreign military intervention. The protesters in Cairo — apparently concerned the group of opposition leaders would agree to a dialogue with the Syrian government — threw eggs at a four-man delegation of the Syrian National Coordination Committee, headed by Hassan Abdul-Azim, as they tried to enter the Arab League's headquarters in downtown Cairo. Members of the delegation, who were pushed and shoved by about 100 protesters, were forced to turn back. "No to dialogue with the regime," shouted one protester who gave only his first name, Amjad. Arab league officials said the delegation left to get a change of clothes and would return in a few hours time, but an official said later that a member of the delegation was meeting with Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Araby. The Syria-based National Coordination Committee (NCC) is a rival to the broad- based Syrian National Council (SNC) group that was announced in Turkey in October and rejects all forms of contact with the regime under the current crackdown. Some Syrians see the NCC, which includes veteran activists and former political prisoners, as more lenient and willing to engage in a dialogue with the Syrian leadership. The NCC's stance has prompted some anti-government protesters in Syria to carry banners reading: "The National Coordination Committee does not represent me." Members of the NCC reject the accusations, and the group's chief is adamant there will be no dialogue during the crackdown, but there have been reports of infighting and differing opinions within the group itself. Hussein al-Odat, a Damascus-based member of the NCC, said talks with members of Assad's regime were out of the question until Syria implements the first part of an Arab League plan agreed to last week by putting an end to the violence and the security crackdown.

"After that, we will enter negotiations over changing the regime from its current form to a democratic, pluralistic one and negotiate on the terms of a transitional period," he told The Associated Press. He said the delegation was in Egypt in response to an invitation by Araby, who wanted to hear the group's views. Syria agreed to a peace plan brokered by the Arab League last week, but officials say Damascus has since failed to abide by its commitments under the plan, including to pull tanks and other armor out of cities and stop the bloodshed that the U.N. estimates has left at least 3,500 people dead. The deal includes a pledge to work on starting a dialogue with the Syrian opposition. But the violence has continued unabated — more than 100 people have been killed in the flashpoint region of Homs in central Syria in the past week — prompting Qatar's prime minister to call for an emergency meeting Saturday to discuss Damascus' failure to abide by its commitments. It was not clear what action the league would take if the bloodshed continues, although it could isolate Syria by suspending or freezing its membership. That would be a major symbolic blow to a nation that prides itself on being a powerhouse of Arab nationalism. Archived Photo?: Syrians protest before Arab league in Cairo Publishing Date: Wed, 09/11/2011 - 15:51 Related material UN human rights office: Death toll in Syria rises to at least 3500 Arab League meet on Syria's failure to honor peace plan

Source URL (retrieved on 09/11/2011 - 20:03): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/513070

El gigantesco proyecto solar del Sáhara abastecerá a España en 2015 El consorcio alemán escoge Marruecos para erigir la primera central el año que viene - El apagón nuclear decidido por Berlín tras Fukushima acelera el plan

El sueño de una red de energías limpias- IGNACIO CEMBRERO - Madrid - 09/11/2011 Desertec, Industrial Initiative (DII), el más ambicioso proyecto energético desde que se erigieron las primeras centrales nucleares, tiene fecha y lugar para su arranque e incluso un destino para sus primeras exportaciones. El faraónico plan de sembrar de paneles solares el Sáhara arrancará el año próximo en Marruecos y, entre 2015 y 2016, suministrará a España parte de la electricidad producida, si se cumplen los plazos previstos.

Alemania, cuyas empresas capitanean la iniciativa, ha adelantado su inicio en tres años porque ha decidido prescindir de la energía nuclear en 2022 y porque cree que la llamada primavera árabe facilita la puesta en marcha de ideas innovadoras en un marco político más estable. "Al acelerar nuestro abandono de la energía nuclear [como consecuencia del accidente de Fukushima] necesitamos seguir abasteciéndonos en electricidad a precios asequibles y por eso estamos interesados en importar energías renovables en el futuro", explicó, la semana pasada en El Cairo, Jochen Homann, secretario de Estado alemán de Economía y Tecnología. "Desertec nos brinda esa oportunidad". "Nos gusta la primavera árabe porque ha propiciado un montón de ideas y suscitado apoyos para el proyecto", declaraba desde Múnich Paul van Son, director ejecutivo de Desertec, a la agencia Reuters. "Creo que grandes proyectos de infraestructuras pueden contribuir a la estabilidad", añadió. Encabezado por empresas alemanas como E.ON, Siemens o el Deutsche Bank, Desertec es un ambicioso plan para construir decenas de centrales solares y algunas eólicas, de Marruecos a Egipto, para que, de aquí a 2050, proporcionen al menos el 15% del consumo eléctrico de Europa. Entre los participantes figuran también compañías españolas, como Red Eléctrica y Abengoa Solar, francesas como Saint-Gobain, italianas como Enel y Terna, etcétera. La inversión prevista en los próximos 38 años es de 400.000 millones de euros. Las centrales consisten en miles de grandes espejos de metal que dirigen los rayos del sol hacia tuberías con aceite que traspasan el calor a agua. Al calentarse mueve turbinas de vapor que, a su vez, generan electricidad 24 horas al día porque el calor se almacena en grandes depósitos de sales fundidas. Esta electricidad será transportada a Europa mediante cables de alta tensión especiales (HVDC) con apenas pérdidas. En seis horas el Sáhara recibe tanta energía solar como la que consume el mundo en un año. Marruecos, el área de Ouarzazatte, es el lugar elegido para poner la primera piedra. En 2012 se empezará a erigir una central que ocupará 12 kilómetros cuadrados, producirá 150 megavatios y costará 600 millones de euros. Después se construirán otras centrales hasta alcanzar los 500 megavatios. A partir de 2015, su electricidad será en parte vendida en el mercado marroquí, en parte en el español. España, cuyo primer proveedor de hidrocarburos es Argelia, tendrá entonces un segundo suministrador energético de peso en el Magreb. ¿Por qué se empieza por Marruecos? Desde Desertec se alegan tres razones. Se trata de un país estable, que ha hecho su propia apuesta por las energías renovables y que ya está unido a Europa por dos cables submarinos hoy en día infrautilizados. Hace ya un par de años, Marruecos lanzó por su cuenta su propio plan solar, eólico e hidráulico que prevé invertir (6.220 millones de euros) para levantar centrales que, de aquí a 2020, produzcan 2.000 megavatios equivalentes al 42% de su consumo eléctrico. La elección de Marruecos no ha gustado en Argelia, el país que más desierto tiene y con el que Desertec mantuvo en África del Norte sus primeros contactos. La opción marroquí "ilustra la gestión caótica de este asunto por las autoridades argelinas", se lamentaba la web Tout Sur l'Algérie achacando a Argel la responsabilidad del fracaso.

Recordaba, de paso, las declaraciones contradictorias del presidente argelino, Abdelaziz Buteflika, favorable a acoger el proyecto, y de su ministro de Energía, Youcef Yousfi, al principio muy reacio. "Marruecos no nos ha quitado este proyecto", sostuvo en la radio pública de Argel Nureddine Bouterfa, presidente de la compañía eléctrica argelina Sonelgaz. Lo que sucede es que "Marruecos tiene necesidad de energía y nosotros no estamos en las mismas condiciones que ese país", añadió. Argelia está, junto con Túnez, entre los siguientes objetivos de Desertec. Con Túnez las conversaciones están muy avanzadas. El consorcio empresarial de Múnich confía también en que, de aquí a 2020, al menos otros cuatro países árabes (Libia, Egipto, Siria y Arabia Saudí) y Turquía se apunten al proyecto, que entonces desbordaría los límites del Sáhara. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/gigantesco/proyecto/solar/Sahara/abastecera/E spana/2015/elpepisoc/20111109elpepisoc_3/Tes

Internacional KIYOTAKA AKASAKA, Subsecretario General de la ONU para Comunicación e Información Pública “La aspiración nuclear iraní no se puede resolver por la fuerza” Georgina Higueras Barcelona 9 NOV 2011 - 10:23 CET

Kiyotaka Akasaka, durante un acto público en Suiza en junio pasado. / UN PHOTO

Japonés y diplomático de carrera, Kiyotaka Akasaka, de 63 años, lleva desde 2007 trabajando con Ban Ki-moon, pero cree que el criticado secretario general de la ONU va a renovar a todo su equipo directivo de cara a su segundo mandato, que comienza en enero. Akasaka, que se encuentra en Barcelona para participar en el Diálogo Oriente- Occidente que organiza Casa Asia, considera que el “mayor reto que hoy en día enfrenta la ONU es el apoyo a la primavera árabe”. Pregunta. Vivimos tiempos revueltos. ¿Qué está haciendo Naciones Unidas para paliar las crisis? Respuesta. Sobre todo 2011 es significativo por haber alumbrado la primavera árabe; una revolución genuina realizada por los árabes mismos sin interferencias internacionales que ya ha triunfado en Túnez, Egipto y Libia, y que fermenta en Siria, Yemen y Bahréin. El mayor reto de la ONU es ayudar a que la revolución sea para mejorar la vida de sus gentes y establecer la democracia. P. En Libia, la ONU se involucró… R. La resolución 1.973 del pasado 17 de marzo es histórica. La ONU puso en práctica con ella el concepto de protección de civiles que se acordó en 2005 y que permite el uso de fuerza militar para impedir el sufrimiento de los civiles. La resolución supuso el apoyo de la ONU a los libios para liberarse de la tiranía.

P. ¿Y por qué no intervienen en Siria, donde mueren a diario decenas de personas? R. Ban Ki-moon ha sido muy firme y ha exigido por teléfono a Bachar el Asad que deje de matar a manifestantes pacíficos, pero desgraciadamente los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad no están de acuerdo en responder con contundencia al desafío sirio. Esperemos que el ultimátum de la Liga Árabe surta efecto. P. ¿Echa en falta la cacareada reforma del Consejo de Seguridad? R. Es muy difícil actuar si los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad no se ponen de acuerdo. La reforma tendría que haberse abordado hace mucho tiempo. Todos coinciden en que es necesaria y los distintos trabajos están muy avanzados, pero en estos momentos no hay voluntad de robustecer el Consejo de Seguridad. P. ¿Vamos para atrás? R. Si comparamos con la guerra fría se ha progresado mucho hacia el multilateralismo. Ya no hay una gran demanda de acciones unilaterales. En este sentido, podemos hablar de mejora. P. ¿Qué opina de que Israel se prepare para atacar de forma unilateral las instalaciones nucleares de Irán? R. Esperamos que los iraníes no desarrollen armas nucleares y cumplan las resoluciones de Naciones Unidas. P. ¿Responde con una reprimenda a Irán cuando es Israel el que habla de atacar? R. La aspiración nuclear iraní no se puede resolver por la fuerza. Una acción militar solo agravará el problema, no lo resolverá. Por eso pedimos a Irán que cumpla con las resoluciones de la ONU. P. ¿Ha molestado a la ONU que Palestina pidiera a la Unesco su admisión como Estado? R. Consideramos que Palestina debería haber seguido el proceso de reconocimiento iniciado ante el Consejo de Seguridad, que supone que primero debe pronunciarse este y que, en caso de que uno de sus cinco miembros vete el reconocimiento —como ya ha anunciado EE UU que hará—, se recurrirá a la Asamblea General, donde Palestina solo podría ser admitida como Estado observador (igual que el Vaticano, sin derecho a voto). P. Pero eso puede tardar. R. No. Creo que esta misma semana el Consejo de Seguridad se pronunciará al respecto. P. Entonces ¿no han gustado las prisas de Palestina? R. La ONU debe aceptar lo que decidan sus miembros, pero antes de tomar una decisión deben tenerse en cuenta las consecuencias. La Unesco ha perdido los 60 millones de dólares anuales de la contribución de Estados Unidos [que la ha retirado en protesta] y esta seria reducción de su presupuesto tendrá sin duda un impacto. También está claro que para los palestinos las consecuencias políticas y psicológicas serán muy distintas. P. Tal vez para la ONU el impacto sea negativo pero Palestina está dispuesta a seguir buscando el reconocimiento de otras agencias como la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS).

R. En 1988 ya hubo un gran debate en la OMS sobre el ingreso de Palestina, que finalmente optó por no presentarse. Ahora la asamblea de la OMS es en mayo y hay tiempo para organizar la estrategia. Yo espero que para entonces hayan comenzado las negociaciones entre Palestina e Israel para la creación de dos Estados capaces de vivir en paz. La ONU está impulsando esas negociaciones aunque reconoce que el clima no es el más propicio después de la decisión de la Unesco y la respuesta del Gobierno israelí de construir nuevos asentamientos. P. ¿Le preocupa la situación de Corea del Norte? R. Mucho. Estamos intentando que Corea del Norte acepte volver a las conversaciones a seis bandas para el desmantelamiento nuclear. Pero también nos preocupa la malnutrición de la población. La agencia humanitaria de Naciones Unidas, OCHA, acaba de visitar el país y ha visto una seria malnutrición de los niños sobre todo en el campo. P. Como responsable de Comunicación y Información Pública de la ONU ¿considera que Internet es determinante en la primavera árabe? R. Lo que moviliza a las gentes son el pensamiento y las ideas. Internet y las redes sociales son meras herramientas, que no pueden sustituir a las ideas. Los medios de comunicación deben seguir jugando su importante papel de transmisores de lo que pasa pero con informaciones exactas y bien elaboradas por profesionales expertos, periodistas y editores, que analicen los hechos. KIYOTAKA AKASAKA “La aspiración nuclear iraní no se puede resolver por la fuerza” 9 NOV 2011 - 10:23http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/09/actualidad/1320830630_460127.html

TRIBUNA: JEAN DANIEL Nuevo ropaje para el islamismo La modernidad consiste en separar la fe del poder, y el Estado de la religión Ennahda quiere decir "renacimiento" y puede muy bien prescindir de toda connotación religiosa JEAN DANIEL 09/11/2011 Todos aquellos que han querido creer que la revolución tunecina se liberaría de imperativos religiosos se han equivocado. Pero todos aquellos que han necesitado creer que los islamistas tunecinos no podían "modernizarse" también se han equivocado. Queda por saber si la modernización se asemeja enteramente a la democracia. El caso es que en Túnez nos encontramos ante una contrarrevolución. No se trata de una revancha de los predecesores, por lo tanto no es una restauración. Es el frenazo dado legalmente por el propio pueblo a la revolución que una parte de su juventud se había inventado y que resplandecía como una primavera en el mundo árabe. Se pensaba que en el universo árabe-musulmán la revuelta tunecina había introducido la primacía de la libertad sobre la identidad, y la de los principios universales sobre la tradición étnico-religiosa. No hay nada de ello. Sin duda la mayoría acepta una reformulación modernista del islam que implica el respeto al estatus de la mujer y a algunos otros atributos democráticos. Pero la fidelidad al islam, por el contrario, se ha reforzado, subrayado y celebrado. El lirismo de los teóricos franco-tunecinos superó con demasiada rapidez al sentimiento profundo de las gentes. Los tunecinos nos recuerdan que incluso una revuelta victoriosa contra el tirano puede muy bien acomodarse a la fe religiosa y hasta apoyarse en ella. También hay que contar con todos aquellos a quienes había inquietado el carácter intempestivo de la emergencia revolucionaria. En Egipto, los Hermanos Musulmanes se han felicitado de que sus hermanos tunecinos hayan contribuido al avance de su propia causa. Los libios han confirmado, sucesivamente, el carácter teocrático de su futuro Gobierno y el hecho de querer presentarse como musulmanes "moderados", sin que se pueda todavía saber a qué se refiere esa moderación, sobre todo después del asesinato de Gadafi. Finalmente, en Argelia y en Marruecos, donde estábamos cansados de ver celebrar en todo momento el "modelo" tunecino, la mala conciencia ha desaparecido y los hombres del poder se han sentido confortados. En resumen, el temor a una democracia de tipo occidental, que permitiera una independencia total con respecto a la religión, se ha disipado. La mística de la fidelidad a las tradiciones ha prevalecido sobre el romanticismo del triunfo de la libertad. Queda por saber en qué consiste realmente esa modernización tunecina del islamismo que Rachid Ganuchi nos anuncia y que ha comenzado a poner en práctica con la formación de un Gobierno de unión nacional. Si es sincero, podría decirse que Rachid Ganuchi ha vuelto a nacer. Discípulo en otro tiempo de Nasser, Ganuchi nunca disimu-ló entonces su simpatía activa por la doctrina de Hassan al Banna, el fundador egipcio de los Hermanos Musulmanes. Cuando fundó su movimiento islámico en 1981, es decir, el año en que 83

Anuar el Sadat fue asesinado, sabía bien que los islamistas no eran unos demócratas, aunque hoy se le atribuye haber desautorizado la violencia en un momento en el que los integristas de todos los países árabes se solidarizaban con los diferentes movimientos terroristas. Pero es un hecho cierto que Rachid Ganuchi no deja de elogiar al régimen turco y su manera de conciliar la pertenencia al islam con la defensa de todas las libertades. Pretende crear, dice, el modelo más democrático del mundo árabe. Hay sin embargo muchos fallos en ese nuevo personaje que quiere esculpir el líder del islamismo tunecino. Dos días antes del comienzo de la consulta electoral, Ganuchi se tornó amenazante al fijar él mismo el número de electores por debajo del cual no dudaría en lanzar sus tropas a la calle. La respuesta del primer ministro, Benji Caid Essebsi, resultó ejemplar. No se dirá nunca hasta qué punto este hombre habrá servido a su país en unas circunstancias delicadas, cuando no dramáticas. El segundo patinazo de Rachid Ganuchi tuvo lugar la semana pasada, cuando lamentó el modo en que los tunecinos mezclaban el francés y el árabe, poniendo así en riesgo la santa lengua del profeta. Hay que recordar aquí que, contrariamente al fundador del moderno Túnez, Habib Burguiba, la segunda lengua preferida de Rachid Ganuchi no es el francés sino el inglés. Forma parte de esa generación de islamistas refugiada en Londres, ciudad a la que se ha llegado a llamar Londustán. Esa defensa de la lengua árabe, que es más que nada un ataque contra la utilización del francés, ha tenido lugar en numerosos centros islamistas, especialmente en Marruecos. Lo que no impide en modo alguno a millares de jóvenes magrebíes que desean viajar a Francia practicar el francés. No soy en absoluto partidario de proyectar una duda sistemática sobre la sinceridad de los responsables de Ennahda, ni sobre su voluntad de modernizar el islam. Pero es preciso que, de una vez por todas, las cosas sean claras. La modernidad, si es que hay que emplear esta palabra para evitar el vidrioso término de "laicidad", consiste en separar la fe del poder, y el Estado de la religión. Es sencillo, es claro y las implicaciones son evidentes. Si tal es el proyecto de Rachid Ganuchi, ¿por qué seguir entonces apoyándose en el islamismo y no en el islam? Después de todo, Ennahda quiere decir "renacimiento", y puede muy bien prescindir -si así se decide- de toda connotación religiosa. Para Rachid Ganuchi y los suyos no se trata solo de tranquilizar a los opositores, a los turistas y a los inversores ante la inmensidad de los problemas económicos y financieros que ya se le plantean a ese pequeño país. Se trata también, y ello es esencial, de frenar el celo y la subversión de los extremistas religiosos, que progresarán como lo hacen cuando estiman que sus ideas están en el poder y que ellos han determinado la victoria. Entonces se descubrirá que los verdaderos islamistas son los que se oponen a la modernización democrática del islam. JEAN DANIEL Nuevo ropaje para el islamismo09/11/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Nuevo/ropaje/islamismo/elpepuopi/20111109el pepiopi_4/Tes

La sangría de la represión suma ya más de 3.500 muertos en Siria Las tropas de Bachar el Asad continúan el asedio contra la ciudad de Homs ENRIC GONZÁLEZ - Jerusalén - 09/11/2011

Manifestantes contra El Asad en un funeral por víctimas de la represión, el 2 de noviembre en Hula, cerca de Homs. / REUTERS Homs se ha convertido en el bastión de la lucha contra el presidente Bachar el Asad. Las fuerzas del régimen sirio siguen atacando la ciudad, en la que un número indeterminado de militares desertores encabezan la defensa. Una portavoz de la ONU dijo ayer que la situación en Homs era "particularmente horrorosa" y anunció que desde el inicio de la revuelta, en marzo, la violencia se había cobrado ya más de 3.500 muertos en todo el país. El Ejército y las bandas armadas de El Asad han lanzado varios asaltos sobre Homs. En abril, los militares dispararon con ametralladoras sobre una manifestación y en las semanas siguientes emplearon tanques y artillería para someter el barrio de Baba Amr. En junio, el Gobierno proclamó que Homs había sido "pacificada". Pero la ciudad, situada en el centro del país, a medio camino entre los dos principales núcleos urbanos sirios, Damasco y Alepo, se mantiene en rebelión. El caos provocado por los combates callejeros ha permitido la entrada en Homs de numerosos grupos de desertores, que se hacen fuertes en un barrio y se retiran hacia otra zona en cuanto las fuerzas gubernamentales estrechan el cerco.

La ONU estima que desde la semana pasada, cuando Siria y la Liga Árabe dijeron haber alcanzado un acuerdo de pacificación que luego resultó fallido, al menos 60 personas han muerto en combates o por disparos de las fuerzas de El Asad sobre la población civil. Casi todas las víctimas recientes se han registrado en Homs y sus alrededores. Según la oposición, las víctimas mortales en los últimos días son más de 100 y ayer se contabilizaron al menos tres, una de ellas una joven de 16 años. El Gobierno sirio prohíbe la entrada en el país de prensa extranjera independiente, lo que impide verificar esas informaciones. Periodistas árabes que han logrado llegar clandestinamente a Homs en nombre de Al Yazira y la BBC coinciden en describir una situación caótica, con abundancia de hombres armados y continuos tiroteos. El Consejo Nacional sirio, un organismo que intenta aglutinar a la oposición en el interior y en el exilio, asegura que la ciudad sufre "una catástrofe", bajo fuego de artillería continuo desde hace días, con los hospitales colapsados, escasez de alimentos y, en algunos barrios, sin suministro de agua corriente y electricidad, y pide la protección internacional para detener la matanza. "Necesitamos observadores extranjeros, gente que pueda prestar testimonio sobre lo que está ocurriendo", dijo un portavoz del Consejo opositor. "Las tropas sirias utilizan tanques y armamento pesado para atacar barrios residenciales", confirmó ayer Ravina Shamdasani, portavoz del Alto Comisionado de la ONU para los Derechos Humanos. Un soldado sirio declaró en días pasados a la BBC que él y sus compañeros tenían orden de "disparar contra todo lo que se mueva, contra cualquiera que camine por la calle". La Liga Árabe se reunirá el sábado próximo para debatir sobre el incumplimiento, por parte de Bachar el Asad, de los acuerdos alcanzados con delegados del organismo. El presidente sirio se comprometió, según la Liga Árabe, a acuartelar sus tropas, liberar a los presos políticos y permitir las manifestaciones pacíficas. Nada de eso ha ocurrido. El presidente sirio sabe que las presiones de la Liga Árabe son perfectamente resistibles y que el apoyo diplomático y militar de China y Rusia le permite resistir las sanciones económicas estadounidenses y europeas y le hace inmune a posibles intervenciones internacionales patrocinadas por la ONU. Irán, que ha enviado a Siria asesores militares, y su milicia libanesa, Hezbolá, constituyen los dos respaldos regionales del régimen. ENRIC GONZÁLEZ La sangría de la represión suma ya más de 3.500 muertos en Siria 9/11/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/sangria/represion/suma/3500/muertos/Siri a/elpepiint/20111109elpepiint_7/Tes

07/11/2011 - 15:48

Arab League meet on Syria's failure to honor peace plan Author: AFP The Arab League on Sunday called an emergency meeting on Syria's failure to implement its peace plan, as forces reportedly killed at least 19 demonstrators after prayers on one of Islam's holiest days. The announcement that Arab foreign ministers would hold the gathering came on the fourth straight day of deadly violence since Syria agreed to the League's peace blueprint aimed at ending eight months of bloodshed. The Arab League said a meeting was called for next Saturday because of "the continuation of violence and because the Syrian government did not implement its commitments in the Arab plan to resolve the Syrian crisis." Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani, chair of an Arab panel on the crisis, has said "if Syria does not respect its commitments, the ministerial committee will meet again and take the necessary decisions." A human rights group said that security forces killed at least 19 civilians as anti-regime demonstrations were staged across Syria on Sunday, the first day of the Eid al-Adha feast marking the end of the Hajj pilgrimage. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said the continued killings made it clear that President Bashar al-Assad's regime had no intention of ending its bloody bid to crush dissent. Sixteen of the civilians were killed in Homs, the flashpoint central city where protests against Assad's rule were held in most districts despite a weeks-long military crackdown. Most of the deaths occurred in the Baba Amro neighbourhood of Homs, where clashes have raged for days, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said in a statement received in Nicosia. Security forces also shot dead two civilians in the city of Hama, which lies further to the north, and another in Idlib province, near the border with Turkey. And in Talbi, a town near Homs, "four protesters were wounded, one seriously, when the security forces fired on a demonstration," said the Britain-based Observatory. "Dozens of people were injured by security forces who shot at a major demonstration in Kafruma, an area of the province of Idlib, in the northwest of Syria," it added. Security forces also fired tear gas and shots in the air to disperse a demonstration in Damascus's western Kafar Susseh neighborhood, the watchdog said. Five protesters were wounded and more than 70 people arrested during the Kafar Susseh crackdown, the Observatory said. 87

In other incidents, armed forces stormed and surrounded the villages of Zamalka and Irbin, in the province of Damascus, said the Local Coordination Committees (LCC), an activist network spurring protests in Syria. The latest reported crackdown on protests came as state radio said Assad attended Nour mosque in the northern town of Raqqa for morning prayers to mark Eid al-Adha. But following the prayers, nationwide marches were held in support of Homs and against the regime, said both the Observatory and the LCC. The latest deaths bring to at least 60 the number of people killed since Assad's government signed on to the Arab League peace plan on 2 November. The Arab roadmap calls for an end to violence, the release of those detained, the withdrawal of the army from urban areas and free movement for observers and the media, as well as talks between the regime and opposition. As a first step, Syria on Saturday said it had released more than 550 people who were arrested during anti-regime protests, to mark the Eid al-Adha feast. But the Syrian Observatory said detainees in prisons across Syria had on Sunday begun hunger strikes in protest at the authorities "who are not keeping their promises of freedom." The French foreign minister said it was now clear there was "nothing more to expect" from Assad's regime in terms of honoring its commitments under the Arab peace plan. "Bashar al-Assad accepts the Arab League peace plan and the next day he massacres dozens more people in the streets," Juppe told Europe 1 radio on Sunday. Arab League chief Nabil al-Araby had warned the failure of the deal would be "disastrous" for Syria and the region and demanded an immediate end to the bloodshed. The United Nations estimates that more than 3000 people have been killed in a brutal crackdown since anti-regime protests erupted in mid-March. Syrians protest before Arab league in Cairo Archived Photo?: ةيفيشرا Publishing Date: Mon, 07/11/2011 - 15:48 Related material Arab League tells media to get permits before covering Syrian uprising / Security forces kill at least six in Syria on Muslim holiday / Syrians protest before Arab league in Cairo

Source URL (retrieved on 08/11/2011 - 10:55): AFP Arab League meet on Syria's failure to honor peace plan07/11/2011 - 15:48 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/512643

ft.com Comment Opinion November 8, 2011 8:44 pm The free market secret of the Arab revolutions By Hernando de Soto A few weeks ago I met Salem, the younger brother of the brave Tunisian fruit vendor whose self-immolation triggered the Arab uprising. When I asked him what his brother in heaven would say if we asked what he hoped his sacrifice would bring to the Arab World, Salem did not hesitate: “That the poor also have the right to buy and sell.” It is worth remembering these words as experts busily debate the challenges for the future of the Arab revolution as countries balance the quest for democracy, fidelity to Islam, with secularism and tribal power. More ON THIS STORY In depth Middle East protests Tunisia victors seek to calm women’s fears Nahda pledge on investment in Tunisia Global Insight Victory in Tunisia hands Nahda responsibility Editorial Jasmine revolution ON THIS TOPIC Global Insight Arab League finds its voice UAE democracy activists plan hunger strike Bahrain man’s death raises tensions Comment The Arab spring challenges that must be met In the wake of the overthrow of three autocrats, not enough credit has been given to the mighty consensus that triggered the uprising – the desire of a vast, underclass of people to work in a legal market economy. In the culturally diverse Middle East and north Africa, the one common thread is its informal economy. This is the key to future growth and indeed stability. This huge shift began after all when the 26-year-old Tarek Mohamed Bouazizi, immolated himself in front of the governor’s offices in the town of SidiBouzid last December, after his merchandise was confiscated. One day after he set himself alight, thousands of people in his town and neighbouring villages took to the streets. Before a few weeks passed, many of the 180 million Arabs who work in and around the informal markets in the Middle East and north Africa were identifying with his disempowerment and sending their shouts to heaven. Millions marched under banners for reform. According to research by colleagues of mine, at least 35 businessmen followed his desperate example and set themselves on fire (13 more in Tunisia, 17 in Algeria, four in Egypt, three in Morocco and so on). People identified with his dire situation: like 50 per cent of all working Arabs, he was an entrepreneur, albeit on the margins of the law, who died trying to gain the right to hold property and do business without being hassled by corrupt authorities. If the region’s new leaders want to make a difference, they have to appreciate the underclass of such aspirant capitalists, a supranational movement that spans Arab cleavages, different languages, political environments and cultures. That will be the driving force in the months ahead. If Marx taught us anything, it is that the powerless can crystallise into a revolutionary class when they become conscious that they share a common suffering –and especially when a martyr embodies that suffering. There is no doubt that millions of Arabs see Bouazizi as their icon. “We are all Mohamed Bouazizi,” Mehdi Belli, a university IT graduate working as a merchant in L’Ariana market in Tunis, told me. 89

To understand this you have to appreciate the details: Bouazizi flicked his lighter on at 11.30am, one hour after a policewoman, backed by two municipal officers, had expropriated his two crates of pears ($15), a crate of bananas ($9), three crates of apples ($22) and an electronic weight scale ($179, second hand). While a total of $225 might not appear to justify suicide, the fact is that, as a businessman, Bouazizi had been summarily wiped out. Without those goods, Bouazizi would not be able to feed his family for more than the next month. Since his merchandise had been bought on credit and he couldn’t sell it to pay his creditors back, he was now bankrupt. Because his working tools were confiscated, he had lost his capital. Because the customary arrangement to pay authorities three dinars daily for the property right to park his vendor’s cart on two square yards of public space had been terminated, he lost his informal access to the market. Without property and trade, his reputation as a reliable administrator of goods was now undermined in the only market he knew. He was not on a salary. He was a budding entrepreneur. According to his mother and his sister, his goal was to accumulate capital to grow his business. But this was impossible as we discovered when we investigated the records and the laws he had to comply with. To get credit to buy the truck he so needed, he needed to demonstrate he had some kind of legally recognised collateral. The only legal collateral he had access to was the family house in SidiBouzid. However, he had never been able to record a deed in the property registry, an indispensable requirement for using the house as a guarantee. Compliance requires 499 days of red tape at a cost of $2,976. To create a legal enterprise he would have had to establish a small sole proprietorship. This would require taking 55 administrative steps during 142 days and spending some $3,233 (12 times Bouazizi’s monthly net income, not including maintenance and exit costs). Even if he had found the money and the time to create a sole proprietorship firm the law did not enable him to pool resources by bringing in new partners, limit liability to protect his family’s assets, and eventually, issue shares and stocks to capture new investment. The forces of the market have come to the Arab world – even if governments didn’t invite them in. Political leaders must realise that, since Bouazizi went up in flames and his peers rose in protest, poor Arabs are no longer outside but inside, in the market, right next to them. The Arab consensus ahead is undoubtedly about more than just emancipating the entrepreneurial poor. But Middle Eastern and African leaders cannot afford to forget what the industrial revolution was about: if their agenda does not include tackling the nitty-gritty institutional deficiencies that make most Arabs poor, they will eventually open the doors to the anti-democrats and enemies of modernity who fight democracy and modernity in their name. The writer is author of ‘The Mystery of Capital’ and ‘The Other Path’ The free market secret of the Arab revolutions November 8, 2011 8:44 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/653fab0e-0a00-U 11e1-85ca-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dmXlN32x U

YEMEN: LA AMBIGÜEDAD ES UN LASTRE 07 de noviembre de 2011 Ana Echagüe [4] La actuación internacional en Yemen y el plan provisional propuesto por el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo han provocado desconfianza en los manifestantes, que tienen la percepción de que el presidente Saleh pueda salirse con la suya.

MARWAN NAAMANI AFP/Getty Images. Mujeres yemeníes se manifiestan en Sanaa a favor de la democracia y exigen la caída de Saleh.

Puede que el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas acabe de hacer pública una resolución de condena de la situación en Yemen, pero las operaciones antiterroristas como el reciente asesinato selectivo del agente de Al Qaeda Anwar al Awlaki están anulando cualquier intento de aislar a un régimen cada vez más deslegitimado. Occidente tiene que elegir: o se enfrenta al régimen con toda la fuerza de sus convicciones o el presidente Saleh pensará que tiene cierto margen de maniobra. Es incongruente cooperar con un brazo del Gobierno mientras se exige al dirigente que dimita. Las declaraciones como las de John Brennan, adjunto al presidente para la Seguridad Interior y el Antiterrorismo, sirven para ilustrar el problema: “La cooperación antiterrorista con Yemen está en la mejor situación que he visto en toda mi estancia en el cargo... Los yemeníes han hecho una buena labor en la búsqueda y detención y en los ataques contra la gente de Al Qaeda... Aunque el país se encuentra en plena agitación interna... la información circula en ambos sentidos... compartimos la información que tenemos”. También es ilustrativo el hecho de que, en varias ocasiones, Saleh haya mencionado la alianza antiterrorista Estados Unidos-Yemen. La preocupación por la presencia de los terroristas en la Península Arábiga y el miedo al peligro que supondría un vacío de poder han contribuido a esa ambivalencia. 91

Washington ha financiado y entrenado a miembros de la guardia republicana y las fuerzas de seguridad interior, bajo el mando de hijos y sobrinos de Saleh. A mediados de 2010, Yemen era el mayor receptor de una cuenta creada por el Departamento de Defensa estadounidense para suministrar material o entrenar a fuerzas militares extranjeras en actividades antiterroristas. El Estado yemení, que recibió 252,6 millones de dólares (unos 18,3 millones de euros), estaba incluso por delante de Pakistán (203,4 millones). Aparte de las señales contradictorias que implica ese tipo de cooperación, las líneas que separan la actuación antiterrorista de una intervención en nombre del Gobierno pueden ser muy borrosas. Los representantes de la Administración de EE UU aseguran que han dejado claro al Ejecutivo yemení que el uso de fuerzas o equipos proporcionados por Estados Unidos para reprimir a los opositores internos es inaceptable, pero no está claro cómo pueden hacer respetar esas condiciones. Es probable que el miedo a un vacío de poder acabe beneficiando a alguna de las facciones de la élite tradicional que se disputan el poder después de apropiarse de un movimiento que comenzó como una revuelta popular. Desde luego, el plan provisional propuesto por el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo, respaldado por Estados Unidos y Europa, tiene más posibilidades de derivar en una recolocación de quienes ya están al mando que en una transformación del orden político. Otro asunto polémico es el hecho de que ese plan provisional ofrezca inmunidad judicial al presidente y su familia a cambio de su dimisión, una propuesta rechazada por la mayoría de los participantes en el movimiento de protesta. Existe la percepción generalizada de que la comunidad internacional está permitiendo que el presidente Saleh se salga con la suya. Si las potencias occidentales hubieran actuado con rapidez y coordinación desde el principio, quizá habría sido posible presionarle para que dimitiera. Pero, cuando comenzaron las protestas en enero, los estadounidenses y los europeos titubearon. Y cuando empezaron a hacer declaraciones, fueron unas informaciones nada apremiantes en comparación con las exigencias a propósito de Egipto, Libia y Siria. La UE ha dado la impresión de que se conforma con esperar a ver cómo se desarrollan los acontecimientos. Eso no es aceptable. Es necesario que haya una condena concertada y sostenida por parte de la comunidad internacional. Debe suspenderse toda la ayuda en materia de seguridad y hay que congelar los activos del presidente Saleh y los responsables de seguridad en el extranjero. Debería valorarse la posibilidad de dictar sanciones. Hay que llevar a cabo una investigación internacional de los recientes abusos y desplegar la presencia de observadores de derechos humanos de la ONU. Aunque Bruselas no desempeña un papel de mediador fundamental en Yemen, no cabe duda de que podría alzar la voz y tener una presencia más activa. A medida que la preocupación de la seguridad haga que los donantes retiren fondos y personal, la Unión debe estar dispuesta a ocupar su puesto y empezar a identificar las necesidades de ayuda a medio y largo plazo. Ana Echagüe Yemen: La ambigüedad es un Lastre 07 de noviembre de 2011 http://www.fp-es.org/print/3767

07/11/2011 - 18:06

Islamists plan 18 November protests against supra-constitutional principles

Author: Arabic Edition Islamists are planning for massive demonstrations on Friday, 18 November to protest the document of supra-constitutional principles Deputy Prime Minister Ali al- Selmy is advocating for. Selmy met with political leaders on Wednesday to discuss the 22-clause document, which will put in place certain guidelines on the character of the state to be followed whenever the new constitution is written. The document is a product of months-long discussions. After the March constitutional referendum determined that the new constitution will be drafted by a constituent assembly selected by the newly elected parliament, secular forces began to fear that a Islamist-led parliament might pick drafters that would want an Islamic state. Salafi preacher and presidential hopeful Hazem Abu Ismail has urged Egyptians to take part in the protests. In a statement published Monday on his Facebook page, Abu Ismail called for circulating leaflets and using all means of communication to spur Egyptians to attend the demonstrations. Mamdouh Ismail, vice chairman of the Salafi-led Nour Party, said he has changed his mind and decided not to sue Selmy. The proposed document instead requires another revolution to oust the deputy prime minister and others who would benefit from its passage, he said. Speaking to Al-Masry Al-Youm, Abu Ismail pointed to a "US project behind the document" and blamed certain people who are seeking government influence against the people's will. Ismail compared the manner in which Selmy has presented the document to "the style Israel adopts in treating the Palestinians.” He stressed that preparations are already underway for the 18 November protests. Salafi Front Spokesman Khaled Saeed revealed that the front has coordinated with Salafi groups and the Muslim Brotherhood ahead of the anticipated demonstrations. The Salafi Front is not looking to remove Selmy from his post, Saeed said, adding that “faces change but the policies of the old regime survive.” The goal behind the protest is to force the government not to enact the document and press the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to hand over power by April 2012, he said. The legal adviser to the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, Ahmed Abu Baraka, ruled out the possibility of legal action against Selmy over the proposed document.

The document is a government attempt to manipulate the constituent assembly that will be formed to write the new constitution, he said, adding that Selmy's effort undermines the rule of law and violates the people's will. The Muslim Brotherhood rejects the document completely, regardless of amendments, Abu Baraka told Al-Masry Al-Youm. Yousry Hammad, the spokesperson for the Nour Party, stressed that the more Selmy steps up his efforts to pass the document, the more his party will escalate its efforts to prevent it. He claimed that 99 percent of Egyptians reject the document, aside from the Tagammu and Wafd parties, remnants of the former Mubarak regime and anti-Islamist groups. Translated from the Arabic Edition «ريرحتلا ةينويلم» يف نيرﻩاظتملا مؤي «ليربج» Publishing Date: Mon, 07/11/2011 - 18:06

Source URL (retrieved on 07/11/2011 - 20:27): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/512737

06/11/2011 - 14:20

Supra-constitutional principles cause rift between political forces Author: Arabic Edition The Democratic Alliance’s elections committee, led by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, has invited various political forces that have reservations regarding the recently proposed supra-constitutional principles bill to meet on Thursday in order to take a common position on it. Committee Chairman Wahid Abdel Meguid said it asked Deputy Prime Minister Ali al- Selmy, who prepared the bill, to delete the phrase in Article 9 that says “the army is the protector of legitimacy” on the grounds that the people are the guardians of legitimacy, as they are the source of power. The committee also asked Selmy to delete Articles 2 and 3, which deal with the committee that will be formed to prepare the constitution. The committee says it wants no single party to solely prepare the constitution, be it the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the government or parliament. Also, it said, the constituent assembly should fairly represent all segments of society, regardless of the number of its members from inside and outside parliament.

The committee claimed that all parties and political forces object to these proposals, which they deem as taking the will of the people into custody. It also said the proposals issued by the cabinet should not be labeled as a constitutional document, and should be signed by all political party leaders at a national conference as “guiding principles,” so as not to deprive the people of their inherent right to accept or reject any draft constitution. The committee said it is thereby defending the right of the people, not that of parliament or the future constituent assembly, as it is the people who must have the final word in the referendum on Egypt's constitution, without the custodianship of any party or authority in the country. Finally, it reminded the cabinet that its idea of taking to the streets on 18 November if the proposed bill is passed still stands. On the other hand, the National Assembly for Change (NAC) has accused Islamist forces of using the bill and the standards of the constituent committee to impose their will on the people. In a statement on Saturday, the NAC said those forces are trying to control parliament and form the constituent committee by themselves in order to achieve their own agenda, warning of jeopardizing the elements of the civil state and the goals of the peaceful revolution. The statement also considered dialogue on the document a positive step in principle, as it could lead to a national consensus, despite its reservations regarding Article 9 on the status of the army, and what it called the “ambiguous” means of forming the constituent committee or putting in place guarantees that it would not be controlled by a particular trend. “The document should heal the current political division that has resulted from a certain extremist religious discourse that tries to thwart any bid for national consensus over a new constitution that reassures all parties about the future of Egypt,” the statement said. It has also accused certain political forces, which it did not identify, of unnecessarily calling for million-strong demonstrations without consulting other national and revolutionary forces, so as to promote their own partisan agendas, thereby reducing the impact of demonstrations as a method to achieve people’s demands. “The Muslim Brotherhood was for writing the constitution first,” said NAC coordinator Abdel Gelil Mostafa. “But they changed their position when they found that the Interim Constitution would ensure them a better control of parliament.” بعشلا تاباختنا «ناوخإلا» ضوخ نلعي «عيدب» Translated from the Arabic Edition Publishing Date: Sun, 06/11/2011 - 14:20 Related material Brotherhood refuses supra-constitutional principles document Constitutional principles document gives military special status Supra-constitutional debate heats up again بعشلا تاباختنا «ناوخإلا» ضوخ نلعي «عيدب»

Source URL (retrieved on 08/11/2011 - 11:03): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/512361 95

03/11/2011 - 10:37

Supra-constitutional debate heats up again Author: Noha El-Hennawy With less than a month left to elect Egypt’s first post-Hosni Mubarak parliament, the controversy over the promulgation of a binding charter with basic constitutional principles is once again reigniting political divides. On one hand, Islamists voice vehement opposition to a charter that they believe is an attempt to weaken their influence, while secularists endorse the move but fear it could lead to further empowerment of Egypt’s generals. On Wednesday, the Muslim Brotherhood-led Democratic Alliance convened and voted to take to the streets if the charter is passed. Along with 10 other mostly Islamist parties, the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party demanded that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces drop the proposal and sack Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy, who has been campaigning for the charter. Islamists reiterated their argument that such a charter would infringe on the authority of the 100-member constituent assembly that the parliament is supposed to elect and entrust with drafting the new constitution. To support their argument, they refer to the results of the March referendum, when nearly 80 percent votes favored this scenario. “We affirm that there is no way the people’s free will can be circumvented,” read the statement issued by the alliance after Wednesday’s meeting. The signatories also threatened to call for a million-man march on 18 November if the military holds onto the charter and ignores the demand echoed by several presidential candidates to hold the presidential poll and hand power over to civilians by 12 April. “[The draft charter] is categorically rejected,” said Mohamed Selim al-Awa, a potential moderate Islamist candidate for president, who was present at the meeting. “The document is an attempt to impose guardianship on the parliament’s two chambers which are set to elect the constituent assembly.” Another two presidential hopefuls, including Ayman Nour and Abdullah al-Ashal were also present. Wednesday’s meeting came in reaction to talks held yesterday by Selmy with leaders of several political groups and public figures to discuss the 22-clause document with a set of principles that will determine the identity of the state and lay out fundamental principles and liberties. Selmy had reportedly said that this document will be included in a binding constitutional declaration by the SCAF. The call to issue a set of binding constitutional principles was first made by secular political forces shortly after the results of the March referendum showed that the process of drafting the new constitution might fall into the hands of the new parliament. Fearing an Islamist parliamentary majority, many secularists called for the promulgation of a document with a set of “supra-constitutional” principles that the constitution’s

architects should have to abide by. Such a charter should impose clear restrictions to prevent Islamists from turning Egypt into a “religious” state. To preempt such moves, tens of thousands of Islamists rallied in Tahrir Square on 29 July in an unprecedented show of force, raising slogans in support of an Islamic state. The scene of Tahrir Square packed with bearded men mostly in white robes and women wearing black niqabs sent shock waves through large segments of society. To reassure these people, Selmy announced in August that the military might issue a new constitutional declaration with a set of basic principles that ensure the establishment of a civil democratic state. Selmy’s document discussed yesterday states that Egypt is a democratic civil state, Islam is its official religion and Islamic Sharia is the primary source of legislation. It goes on to give the right to non-Muslims to follow their own creeds in personal status and religious matters. Islamists have been constantly opposed to the use of the term “civil” insisting that it can pave the way for the establishment of a secular political system. They have also voiced vehement resistance to the reference to “non-Muslim” creeds insisting that the word bears a recognition of other non-monotheistic religious groups that Islam does not recognize. In the meantime, the document includes another controversial clause that bothers many non-Islamist forces. This clause gives the SCAF the exclusive right to oversee the affairs of the military and to discuss the budget of the armed forces. Several party leaders, who attended the talks, voiced reservation over this clause and had reportedly demanded that it be amended so that the parliament could have the right to oversee the budget of the armed forces. Potential presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei dismissed the draft charter as “a distorted” document for the powers it gives to the military. “The armed forces are not above the state and will never be. There is a difference between a democratic civil state that guarantees fundamental human rights and military custodianship,” ElBaradei wrote on his Twitter account. He did not oppose the principle of putting forward a charter with constitutional guidelines but insisted it should be authored by “an impartial commission.” The empowerment of the military was manifested in another document that Selmy discussed with political parties at yesterday’s meeting. That document sets regulations for the composition and work of the constituent assembly that will draft the constitution. The military-sponsored proposal states that only 20 out of the assembly’s 100 members could belong to parties represented in the new parliament, meaning the remaining 80 should be elected from outside the parliament. The same document gives the military the right to refer the new constitution to Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court if it violates values of freedom or any of the military-issued constitutional declarations. If the constituent assembly fails to draft the new constitution within six months, the military has the right to form a new assembly, the proposal says. For some liberals, allowing the military to retain power would be less harmful that leaving Islamists unchecked. To Mohamed Hamed, a leader of the Free Egyptians Party, a military dictatorship is more acceptable that a “Taliban-style” rule.

“Would you compare the regression to dark ages to a normal form of human despotism?” he asked rhetorically. “We can rebel against human despotism and take to the streets. [Plus], but I don’t think the military would dare do injustice to the people after what it saw in Tahrir Square,” he said. To resolve this standoff between Islamists opposing the charter and most liberals who endorse it, the military should put the matter to a public referendum, suggested Hamed. ةيفيشرا Archived Photo?: Salafists protest para-constitutional principles Publishing Date: Thu, 03/11/2011 - 10:37 Related material Military powers in draft constitutional document spark ire of opposition figures Constitutional principles document gives military special status Publishing lists Abdullah al-Ashal/ Ali al-Selmy/ Ayman Nour/ constituent assembly/ constitution/ Democratic Alliance/ Muslim Brotherhood/ parliament/ supra- constitutional principles/ News/ News features

Source URL (retrieved on 09/11/2011 - 20:14): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/511527

Wed, 02/11/2011 - 00:27

Why Tunisia succeeds while Egypt fails Author: Bahey el-din Hassan I traveled to Tunisia over a week ago to attend the country‘s first free elections. As I left Cairo, I had given in to a sense that Egypt had lost its way, a feeling that has become widely shared in this country. I returned to find Egyptians even further engulfed in pessimism about the future. The Maspero massacre on 9 October, which took the lives of over two dozen Copts, made things worse: It left many with an overwhelming feeling that the country is moving in a terrible direction, perhaps even to the brink of internal strife. But this does not seem to alarm the generals ruling the country, one of whom said recently in a private meeting that he feared Egypt would “go the way of Somalia.” If that’s the case, why do things like the chastity of Egyptian women (who were arrested in March and forced by military police to undergo “virginity tests” for the first time in Egyptian history) top the military’s agenda? Meanwhile, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has given a green light for the prosecution of human rights advocates on charges of high treason and harming national security. This, frankly, is shocking. Contrast this to the public mood in Tunisia. While the people I met there disagreed about many things, all of them were optimistic about the future. From the ministers of interior and security reform, to the heads of the Supreme Authority for Elections of the Constituent Assembly and the National Independent Committee for Media and Communication Reform, to politicians, rights activists and trade unionists who led the

uprising in the mining belt in Redeyef, all of them told me their country was moving in the right direction. Post-revolution Tunisia is not perfect and it will certainly face major challenges in the future. But it is on the right path. What accounts for this difference in public opinion? Tunisian rights advocate Ridha Raddaoui explained Tunisia’s progress in simple terms: “We were lucky that our army was politically weak.” Another rights activist, Ayachi Hammami, concurred, even before the discussion had turned to Egypt. I believe differences in three factors have distinguished Tunisia from Egypt in the post-revolution period: its army, its Islamists and its political elite. The Tunisian army played a decisive role in the revolution (by refusing to open fire on demonstrators and by stopping police officers who tried to continue the crackdown), but it did not assume control of the country. After the departure of Ben Ali, power was immediately transferred to a civilian government. The army chose to watch from a distance - close enough to allow for intervention, but only if the state was in danger of collapse. Ultimately, the army bet on the wisdom of the Tunisian people and the political competence they acquired over time and through experience. Tunisia’s Islamists are newer to politics and less opportunistic and reactionary than their Egyptian counterparts. They adopt political not religious platforms and refrain from making provocative demands, like the application of Islamic law or even special recognition for it in the constitution. Tunisian Islamists have not made it their mission to police Tunisians’ morals or their private lives. This has made the conflict over identity in Tunisia less polarizing than in Egypt. Thus, Tunisians find it relatively easier to reach a consensus over the future shape of the country, even with Ennahda’s recent victory. Finally, the political acumen of the Tunisian elite, in comparison to their Egyptian peers, is also of great importance. Although both countries witnessed leaderless revolutions, the Tunisian elite caught on early to the importance of not leaving a political vacuum that could be filled by counter-revolutionary forces. Instead, they created the High Council for Achieving the Goals of the Revolution, a clever structure that brought together a wide range of political and civil society actors: Islamist and secular party representatives, trade unionists, human rights advocates, and several distinguished public figures. To avoid disagreements that could damage this historical initiative, no political parties were allowed to assume ruling positions in the council. The political elites did not waste their energies on settling scores. Instead, they focused on building institutions, writing a constitution, and adopting legislation that, upon implementation, would address grievances of the past. Tunisia’s Council did not wait for recognition from anyone, unlike the proposed presidential council in Egypt that was rejected by the ruling Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and conservative political forces from the start. Rather, it fought to earn political legitimacy through responsible social practice. As a result, it won legal recognition as well and became the official platform for drafting legislation in the transitional period. It established independent civil commissions to manage the elections and reform the media. In Egypt, by contrast, political elites have wasted their time either seeking retribution against their enemies or cozying up to SCAF in hopes of sharing power. They are very good at issuing statements and staging demonstrations, but their words and actions have not created any new facts on the ground. Egypt’s power structure has remained 99

unchanged and the army, which rose to helm of politics six decades ago, is still in charge. Since 1952, Egypt has only been ruled by leaders from a military background. As a result, the generals that took power after the ouster of Hosni Mubarak are more adept than other political players. As the SCAF works to secure its long-term interests, it has managed to preserve the old regime, to divide its revolutionary opponents and drain their energies, and to revive the tired old formula of “It’s either us or the Islamists.” Meanwhile, the US administration has not reconsidered its stance toward Egypt or the Arab region as whole. It continues to prioritize “stability,” even in a time of mass revolt, thus choosing to stand on the wrong side of progress. Thus far the Tunisians have fostered a political and social consensus in the post- revolution period and have managed a transition where every small success seems to lead to a greater one. By contrast, the transition in Egypt has been marked by one failure after another, and may portend even greater disasters to come. Bahey el-din Hassan is director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. Publishing Date: Wed, 02/11/2011 - 00:27

Source URL (retrieved on 08/11/2011 - 10:49): Bahey el-din Hassan Why Tunisia succeeds while Egypt fails02/11/2011 - 00:27 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/511148

REPORTAJE: OPINIÓN Libia, la 'sharía' y nosotros Por su experiencia con los rebeldes libios, el autor defiende que la minoría que concibe la sharía en el sentido fanático no triunfará sobre el ideal democrático en la nueva Libia BERNARD-HENRI LÉVY 06/11/2011 Qué pensar sobre el asunto de la sharía? ¿Podría resultar que hayamos apoyado a los insurgentes de Bengasi solo para encontrarnos con un Estado que prohíbe el divorcio y reinstaura la poligamia? Precisiones. Explicaciones. 1. Todo parte de una frase. Una única frase. Desde luego, no la pronunció cualquiera, sino Mustafá Abdeljalil, presidente del Consejo Nacional de Transición y padre de la victoria. Pero, presidente o no, Abdeljalil es miembro de un Consejo cuyas decisiones son colegiadas. Y este Consejo es, como su nombre indica, un órgano de transición que no tiene por vocación promulgar las leyes de la futura Libia. Abdeljalil ha expresado una opinión. Tal vez, un deseo. Puede que ni siquiera se trate de un deseo, sino de una garantía concedida a la minoría de combatientes islamistas que pagó el tributo más alto durante la liberación. Y aunque hubiera expresado el fondo de su pensamiento, ¿qué peso tendría eso, dado que se ha comprometido, como todo el CNT, a no aspirar a ningún puesto en la Libia posterior a la transición?

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Para saber cómo será esa Libia, habrá que esperar a la Asamblea Constituyente, que tendrá lugar dentro de ocho meses. Luego, a las elecciones generales. Y, finalmente, a ver qué tipo de Gobierno sale de ellas. Pretender que una simple frase pronunciada en el calor de un mitin -por un hombre importante, sí, pero a punto de salir de escena- baste para que el país se tambalee es prueba de mala voluntad. 2. Hay sharías y sharías. Y antes de entonar la gran letanía de la regresión y la glaciación, hay que saber de qué se habla. Para empezar, sharía no es una palabrota. Como yihad (que significa "esfuerzo espiritual" y los islamistas terminaron traduciendo como "guerra santa"), como fetua (que quiere decir "pronunciamiento religioso" y, debido al caso Rushdie, el mundo se acostumbró a entender como "condena a muerte"), la palabra sharía es objeto de una despiadada guerra semántica, pero, por suerte, para la mayoría de los musulmanes sigue significando algo eminentemente respetable. Este término aparece cinco veces en el Corán y las traducciones francesas lo vierten a esa lengua como "vía". No es el nombre de un "código" ni, aún menos, de un corsé exhaustivo de reglas, sino de un conjunto de "valores" sometidos a la interpretación de los doctores. Es un término genérico, es decir, que les corresponde a los legisladores proponer una aplicación más o menos evolutiva, más o menos estricta. Dicho esto, la práctica totalidad de los países musulmanes se remiten a la sharía. La mayoría, incluida la Libia de Gadafi a partir de 1993, ha hecho de ella una de las fuentes de la ley. Y, cuando no es así, como ocurre en Marruecos, es porque el islam es la religión del Estado. El problema es pues saber qué implica ese vocablo: ¿la lapidación de la mujer adúltera, como en Irán?, ¿la amputación de los ladrones, como en Arabia Saudita?, ¿o bien un compendio de preceptos morales que, por ejemplo en Egipto, se esfuerzan en combinar con el Código Napoleónico? 3. Evidentemente, a partir de ahí queda planteada la cuestión de la vía que escogerá Libia. Evidentemente, se prepara una nueva batalla, esta vez ideológica, en la que se tratará de arbitrar entre la minoría que concibe la sharía en el sentido de los fanáticos y aquellos que quieren verla concertarse con el ideal democrático. Evidentemente, tenemos un papel que desempeñar en esta segunda batalla, pues les corresponde a los amigos de la nueva Libia, a los aliados que la han ayudado a liberarse de una de las dictaduras más sangrientas de la época, ayudarla también a no caer bajo el yugo de otra tiranía. Pero, por caridad, basta de mala fe. No volvamos a hacerles a los libios la jugada, en versión civil, del famoso "estancamiento" que, al cabo de ocho días de bombardeos, hacía que a algunos el tiempo les pareciese eterno. Y no le pidamos a esta Libia rota por 43 años de despotismo, no le pidamos a este país sin Estado, sin tradición jurídica, sin verdadera sociedad civil, que se convierta en tres meses en una patria de los derechos humanos. Treinta años después de Solidarnost, la democracia polaca aún busca su verdadera identidad. Rusia no ha llegado más allá de Putin. Francia necesitó un Terror, una Restauración, dos Imperios y varios baños de sangre para materializar el ideal republicano de 1789 y, después, la idea de laicismo. 101

¿Y hay quien quiere que Libia pase de la oscuridad a la luz? La batalla será ardua. Se producirán bandazos, regresiones, momentos de confusión. Pero conozco bastante a los hombres y mujeres que, en Bengasi o Misrata, propiciaron esta revolución para saber que no se dejarán confiscar los derechos conquistados en tan dura lucha. La Libia pos-Gadafi se ha convertido en un importante escenario del gran cisma que recorre el mundo musulmán, del enfrentamiento histórico (y, en adelante, democrático) entre las dos concepciones del islam: el islam de las Luces y el de las tinieblas, el de los moderados y el de los extremistas, el de la mano tendida a Europa y el de la guerra de civilizaciones; y apuesto a que, en ese escenario, la victoria corresponderá a los amigos de la libertad. - Bernard-Henri Lévy Libia, la 'sharía' y nosotros06/11/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Libia/sharia/elpepusocdgm/20111106elpdmgpa n_1/Tes

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November 6, 2011 Qatar Calls for Arab League to Meet Again on Syria By REUTERS CAIRO (Reuters) - Qatar's prime minister called for Arab states to meet next Saturday to discuss the Syrian government's failure to take steps to solve its crisis, Egypt's official news agency MENA reported. "Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, the Qatari Prime Minister, called for an emergency Arab League council meeting at foreign minister level next Saturday to look at the latest developments in Syria," MENA said. The meeting would discuss "the continuing violence and the government's failure to stick to its obligations under the Arab Action Plan to solve the crisis in Syria," it said. (Reporting by Omar Fahmy and Mahmoud Abdel Gawad; Writing by Tom Pfeiffer; Editing by Janet Lawrence)

http://www.nytimes.comU /reuters/2011/11/06/world/middleeast/international-us-syria- arabs.html?_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=print U

Del alfiler al elefante

La guerra con Irán Por: Lluís Bassets | 06 de noviembre de 2011 Suenan otra vez los tambores de la guerra con Irán. Suenan, es verdad, donde siempre han sonado. En Israel, la única potencia nuclear de Oriente Próximo, que considera el proyecto de desarrollo nuclear iraní como “una amenaza existencial”. Quien le da al tambor esta vez es directamente el primer ministro Benjamin Netanyahu, que ha dejado filtrar la existencia de un debate en el interior de su Gabinete sobre la eventualidad de un ataque inmediato contra las instalaciones donde avanza el proyecto nuclear iraní. Es difícil dibujar los perfiles de esta noticia, porque todo suele ser borroso en el territorio de las armas nucleares y de las amenazas que las acompañan. Cuesta hacerlo con el proyecto iraní, que en principio es de carácter civil, aunque llegado a cierto umbral solo sería cuestión de plazos muy breves para que se convirtiera en una realidad militar de potencial agresivo. También cuesta hacerlo con la gesticulación israelí, que es recurrente. No sabemos si la filtración prepara el ambiente para un bombardeo aéreo que puede producirse en cualquier momento; o si es una jugada táctica amenazante en la partida que sostiene Netanyahu con Obama, su íntimo aliado sobre el tablero de Oriente Próximo. La idea de una guerra con Irán, en la que Israel intentaría involucrar a Estados Unidos, se halla en las antípodas de la estrategia de Barack Obama, que incluía la acción diplomática y el diálogo con el régimen de Teherán, al igual que contaba con la buena 103

marcha de las negociaciones de paz entre palestinos e israelíes. No tendría lógica que Estados Unidos abriera un nuevo flanco bélico, después de intentar cerrar los anteriores de Irak y Afganistán, cuando el pésimo estado de su economía le exige prestar la mayor y casi exclusiva atención a la creación de empleo. Irán no suscita ansiedad únicamente en Israel. Netanyahu juega con la silenciosa simpatía de Arabia Saudí y de los países del Golfo, donde los gobernantes suelen ser sunitas y buena parte de los gobernados chiitas, de forma que los primeros temen las revueltas de los segundos, alentadas por las pretensiones de liderazgo sobre el entero islam por parte de los ayatolás. No sabemos si Netanyahu le dará al botón de la guerra, pero lo que ha hecho hasta ahora —incluyendo el intercambio de prisioneros con Hamás en proporción de 1 a 1.000, su feroz oposición al reconocimiento de Palestina y el anuncio de construcción de 2.000 nuevas viviendas en territorio ajeno— se dirige a recuperar una iniciativa política que había perdido desde que empezó la revuelta árabe. La escalada de la tensión con Irán rebaja las expectativas de cambio en Siria y polariza de nuevo a la opinión árabe, a la vez que suaviza el aislamiento en que se halla Israel. Es una paradójica amenaza desestabilizadora de la que quiere extraer estabilidad. http://blogs.elpais.com/lluis_bassets/2011/11/la-guerra-con-ir%C3%A1n.html#more

El Asad responde con más represión a la tregua exigida por el mundo árabe La oposición al régimen de Damasco denuncia la muerte de 19 manifestantes ENRIC GONZÁLEZ - Jerusalén - 05/11/2011 La crisis siria ya no puede resolverse con diálogo o iniciativas diplomáticas. El último intento de conciliación, protagonizado por la Liga Árabe, quedó sepultado ayer bajo una nueva oleada de violencia. El presidente Bachar el Asad ha perdido ya a todos sus aliados árabes, pero sigue confiando en que la fidelidad de su Ejército y la brutalidad de la represión acaben sofocando una revuelta que no ha hecho sino crecer en los últimos siete meses. Los presuntos acuerdos alcanzados el martes entre el régimen sirio y la Liga Árabe no despertaron demasiadas esperanzas, dadas la intransigencia demostrada hasta ahora por El Asad y la tradicional irrelevancia de la institución regional. La jornada de ayer, viernes, día de rezos y de manifestaciones, constituía la prueba definitiva. El resultado confirmó las previsiones más pesimistas. Las fuerzas de seguridad del régimen, que según los términos del acuerdo debían empezar a retirarse de las calles, redoblaron la violencia contra las marchas de opositores, especialmente en Homs. Portavoces de la oposición dijeron que a mediodía había ya nueve víctimas mortales. El Gobierno aseguró que reinaba la tranquilidad. [Por la noche, activistas opositores elevaron la cifra de muertos a 19 personas, informa Reuters]. Homs, con una población de 800.000 personas, se ha convertido en el agujero negro por el que desaparece cualquier posibilidad de transición pacífica en Siria. Según fuentes médicas de la ciudad citadas por la agencia Reuters, en los dos últimos días han muerto unas 100 personas. La prohibición de acceso a la prensa internacional, salvo 104

excepciones elegidas por el régimen, impide verificar cuál es la situación real en Homs y en el resto del país. De los testimonios telefónicos y correos electrónicos aportados por vecinos y activistas se deduce una rápida tendencia al caos. El Ejército y la policía siguen disparando contra todo lo que se mueve y practicando detenciones masivas, pequeños grupos de militares desertores tratan de organizar una fuerza rebelde y proliferan las bandas armadas a favor y en contra del régimen. El Ministerio del Interior ha ofrecido a "quienes portan armas, las venden, las distribuyen, las compran o financian su compra, y no hayan cometido ningún asesinato" que se entreguen en la comisaría más próxima, a cambio de una futura amnistía. La oferta ha sido ignorada igual que otras anteriores, dudosamente creíbles porque el régimen no ha cumplido hasta ahora ninguna de sus promesas. La ONU estima que más de 3.000 personas, entre ellas cientos de militares, han muerto en Siria desde mediados de marzo, cuando comenzó la revuelta. Las coordinadoras locales que impulsan la revuelta contra El Asad convocaron ayer "manifestaciones masivas" para, dijeron, poner a prueba los compromisos supuestamente alcanzados por la Liga Árabe, uno de los cuales consistía en que el régimen toleraría en adelante las protestas pacíficas. El resultado de la convocatoria fue desigual, como en anteriores ocasiones: mucha gente salió a la calle en Homs, Daraa, Banias, Deir-el-Zour y en general en los suburbios de la capital, Damasco; en el centro de Damasco y en Alepo, la mayor ciudad del país, no hubo en cambio manifestaciones. La prueba funcionó, en cualquier caso: allí donde la gente empezó a concentrarse se oyeron de inmediato tiroteos, según portavoces de la oposición. Los acuerdos entre el Gobierno sirio y la Liga Árabe, anunciados el miércoles en El Cairo, establecían que Bachar el Asad debía retirar de los centros urbanos los tanques y vehículos blindados, permitir las manifestaciones pacíficas y liberar a los presos políticos. El Asad también se comprometió, supuestamente, a permitir la entrada de periodistas y monitores de la Liga Árabe en territorio sirio. De forma significativa, el acuerdo no indicaba cuándo debía ocurrir todo eso. Las iniciativas de la Liga Árabe suelen caracterizarse por la ambigüedad, necesaria para mantener unidos a 22 países muy dispares, y por la escasez de resultados. En el caso de Siria su mediación tenía una dificultad añadida: Bachar el Asad considera que Arabia Saudí y Egipto, las dos potencias de la organización y las dos grandes referencias del islam suní, están detrás de las protestas en su país e intentan derribar el régimen baasista, apoyado en las minorías religiosas alauí (una escisión del chiísmo) y cristiana. Costaba creer que El Asad fuera a pactar algo con una organización, la Liga Árabe, que muy mayoritariamente desea su caída. Aún costaba más creer que fuera a retirar sus tanques de las calles, ya que eso habría propiciado manifestaciones masivas y habría dejado al régimen indefenso frente a la presión popular. El baño de sangre puede durar mucho, porque Bachar el Asad dispone aún de la fidelidad de casi todo el Ejército (los mandos militares son alauíes como él) y de un respaldo mayoritario entre las clases empresariales de Damasco y Alepo. También cuenta con el miedo de las minorías religiosas y de sectores moderados a que una caída del régimen comporte el establecimiento de un Estado islámico.

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ENRIC GONZÁLEZ El Asad responde con más represión a la tregua exigida por el mundo árabe Jerusalén - 05/11/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Asad/responde/represion/tregua/exigida/mundo/arabe/elpepi int/20111105elpepiint_1/Tes JUAN GOYTISOLO ¿Cuál será el próximo? JUAN GOYTISOLO 05/11/2011 Es como en el juego de los bolos. ¿Cuál caerá el próximo? Derribados el del fugitivo Ben Ali, el del humillado Mubarak y el de quien, tras tildar de ratas a los rebeldes de su propio pueblo y de incitar a matarlos como a perros rabiosos, se escondió como aquellas en un conducto de desagüe y pereció como estos en un previsible, pero indigno linchamiento, las miradas del mundo entero se vuelven hacia el déspota sirio, cuyas "amadas víctimas" crecen de día en día y desmienten con su sangre las falaces promesas de aperturismo y transición a un régimen pluralista. Pese al ritmo sobrecogedor de muertos y asesinados, el bolo sigue en pie sin que ningún actor del complicado juego que allí se ventila acierte a dar definitivamente con él. En sus recientes declaraciones a la prensa británica, el acorralado dictador decía por una vez una media verdad: si la actual guerra civil o, por mejor decir, guerra contra los civiles suscita una creciente y a todas luces deseable intervención exterior, un seísmo de gran magnitud sacudiría la totalidad de la región. Por su situación geográfica -epicentro de todos los conflictos-, la caída de la interminable dictadura de su clan familiar (¡más de 40 años!) tendría efectos imprevisibles y descolocaría por razones distintas, tanto a Israel como a Irán, afectaría a Arabia Saudí, Líbano y a las enfrentadas facciones palestinas. Mientras Ahmadineyad perdería a su único aliado en la zona, el statu quo con Israel y la frontera segura del Golán cederían paso a una tensión avivada por los sentimientos propalestinos de los rebeldes a El Asad, cuyo efecto se contagiaría a la dividida sociedad libanesa y a la inestable monarquía jordana. Por una vez, los intereses de Tel Aviv y Teherán convergen. En cuanto al reino saudí, su creciente temor a la primavera árabe y el enquistamiento de su gerontocracia, se traducen ya en la compra masiva de armas y en una política interior de palo y zanahoria, con fetuas que apuntaban su presunta sacralidad y ayuda alimenticia a una población asfixiada por el rígido armazón wahabí. Pero el continuado martirio de Hama, Homs, Deraa y otras muchas ciudades sirias no debe permanecer impune. A diferencia de la masacre de la primera en 1982, los vídeos de los móviles, Facebook, Twitter y demás redes sociales permiten seguir día a día el empleo brutal de tanques, helicópteros y artillería contra los manifestantes; fosas comunes con cadáveres ajusticiados; la lluvia de balas que rocía a quienes desfilan pidiendo la caída del régimen; los asesinatos selectivos de disidentes y el acoso a los blogueros y medios informativos foráneos. La paz que pretende preservar Bachar el Asad y sus esbirros es la de los cementerios. El recurso a la amenaza islamista esgrimida por el dictador no debe ser una excusa para que los organismos internacionales permanezcan con los brazos cruzados ante un régimen criminal. El cuarto bolo debe ser derribado y, cuanto antes lo sea, mejor. JUAN GOYTISOLO ¿Cuál será el próximo? 05/11/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/sera/proximo/elpepiint/20111105elpepiint_2/Tes 106

TRIBUNA: ANTONIO JOSÉ PONTE ¿Fue Albert Camus asesinado por el KGB? Los diarios del checo Jan Zabrana recogen que el accidente automovilístico en el que murió en 1960 el premio Nobel francés fue orquestado desde Moscú por su condena a la invasión de Hungría Camus murió en el acto, el cráneo fracturado y el cuello roto. La carretera era recta en aquel tramo La edición en español de los diarios de Zabrana recoge solo una décima parte del original checo ANTONIO JOSÉ PONTE 05/11/2011 El pasado agosto el Corriere della Sera habló del asesinato de Albert Camus a manos de la KGB. El diario italiano citaba al eslavista Giovanni Catelli, este citaba una entrada de los diarios del checo Jan Zabrana, y Zabrana, su encuentro con alguien próximo a la inteligencia soviética. Según esa versión, lo que fuera considerado en 1960 un accidente mortal de tráfico había sido, en el fondo, un asesinato político. Camus pagaba de ese modo su condena de la invasión soviética a Hungría y el apoyo ofrecido a Boris Pasternak para el Nobel. "Escuché algo sumamente extraño de boca de un hombre que sabía muchas cosas y contaba con fuentes bien informadas", anotó Zabrana en su diario. Aquel hombre confesó que el accidente automovilístico había sido orquestado desde Moscú. Ofreció detalles de la operación (un artefacto segó el neumático que giraba a alta velocidad) y del procedimiento: la orden venía del propio ministro de Exteriores, Shepílov (no, como teórico del cambio introducido por Jrushchov, Shepílov había sido quien fraguó la alianza con Nasser en 1955 y en 1956 fue ministro de AA. EE., sustituyendo a Molotov, y fue el responsable de la política exterior soviética durante la crisis del canal de suez y la revolución de Hungría de 1956, pero en febrero de 1957 había sido reemplazado por Gromico y cesado del comité central en junio de 1957 por oponerse a Jrushov con el “grupo antipartido”) a quien Camus había acusado de las muertes ocurridas en Hungría. (Acerca de la URSS, Camus escribió en otra ocasión: "Que ese régimen concentracionario sea adorado como el instrumento de la liberación y como escuela de la felicidad futura..., eso es lo que combatiré hasta el fin"). Zabrana no dejó pistas acerca de la identidad del confidente. Su viuda (él murió en 1984) se inclina por dos candidatos: un checoestadounidense profesor de literatura rusa en la Universidad de Cornell y un profesor checo en la Universidad canadiense de Waterloo. De ellos, solamente vive el segundo, que evitó comentar la noticia. Ganador del Nobel de Literatura en 1957, Albert Camus compró con dinero del premio un antiguo criadero de gusanos de seda en Lourmarin, en la Provenza. Hizo obras en el edificio, recorrió los anticuarios locales hasta conseguir amueblarlo del todo, mandó traer un piano de París. Convirtió el granero en despacho, y prometió al anterior propietario que cuidaría de los olivos del jardín. A los 45 años de edad comentó a unos amigos: "Por fin he encontrado el cementerio donde seré enterrado". En esa casa, acompañado de su esposa y de sus hijos gemelos, celebró la Nochevieja de 1959. Camino de París llegaron los Gallimard (de la familia de su editor) que le eran más cercanos: Michel, su mujer Janine, Anne, un perro. Y a la hora de marcharse él hizo subir al tren a su esposa e hijos, y decidió hacer el viaje con los Gallimard.

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Michel condujo su Facel-Vega, Janine cedió el puesto de copiloto a Camus. Viajaron sin prisas: visitaron a unos amigos, comieron en Orange. Cenaron en una hospedería cerca de Mâcon, donde brindaron por el nuevo año y por los 18 años recién cumplidos de Anne. Al día siguiente, después de una comida ligera en Sens, retomaron el viaje. En las proximidades de Villeblevin, un pueblito del departamento de Yonne, el Facel-Vega se salió de la carretera de un bandazo, chocó contra un plátano, rebotó contra otro árbol y se hizo pedazos. Michel Gallimard falleció a los cinco días. Su mujer y su hija salieron indemnes. Del perro no se tuvo más noticia. Camus murió en el acto, el cráneo fracturado y el cuello roto. En uno de sus bolsillos fue encontrado el billete de vuelta a París que no utilizaría. En el maletero del coche, el manuscrito inconcluso de la novela El primer hombre, publicada décadas más tarde por su hija. La carretera era recta en aquel tramo. Los peritos hablaron de bloqueo de una rueda y de rotura de un eje. El médico personal de Camus llegó a reconocer que el estado de sus pulmones no le habría permitido hacerse viejo. A la luz del viaje tan casual que hiciera con los Gallimard y del zigzagueante retorno a París podría desestimarse la hipótesis del asesinato político. Aunque más casual y zigzagueante podían mostrarse los servicios secretos soviéticos. Consultado acerca del asesinato, el biógrafo Olivier Todd se resistió a aceptar tal hipótesis. Sus investigaciones en los archivos secretos soviéticos no arrojaron indicio alguno que pudiese alentarla. Y, si bien un informe enviado por el Partido Comunista Argelino al Partido Comunista Francés y de allí a Moscú consignaba: "Hay que proceder a algunas depuraciones de agentes provocadores troskistas como Camus", ese informe estaba fechado en 1937. Todd reconoció, sin embargo, que los fondos examinados por él mostraban cómo Moscú utilizaba a los checos para los trabajos sucios. (Quizás el interlocutor de Jan Zabrana sabía de qué hablaba). Aunque Praga era, además de campamento de reclutaciones, gran mentidero de la guerra fría. Y por la ciudad pululaban sospechas (bastante descabelladas algunas) que apuntaban a Moscú igual que, tres siglos antes, en torno a la derrota de la Montaña Blanca, cundieron fantásticos rumores en contra del catolicismo. Jan Zabrana era lector de libros prohibidos, radioyente clandestino de emisoras occidentales. Reconstruía detectivescamente cuanto ocurría en el mundo. El 31 de diciembre de 1973 anotó: "Anteayer se publicó en París el nuevo libro de Solzhenitzin, el Archipiélago Gulag. ¿Una novela? ¿Un reportaje? Hasta ahora no sé nada más. El acrónimo Gulag lo conozco del epílogo de El doctor Zhivago". Narrador y poeta, la prohibición de publicar sus textos le dejó como única salida la traducción literaria. Tradujo de los dos principales idiomas contendientes de la guerra fría: a Pasternak y Mandelstam, a Ginsberg y Plath. Su único delito consistía en descender de políticos socialdemócratas. Sus padres fueron encarcelados al llegar los comunistas al poder, y la casa familiar terminó expropiada. Él tuvo cerrado el acceso a los estudios superiores (ni siquiera en seminarios teológicos consiguió estudiar) y, recluido en el país bajo restricciones de libros y de ideas, cada dato lejano que obtenía tuvo que resultarle precioso. En sus diarios calibra las equivocaciones políticas de Pound y Sartre y Ginsberg y Eluard y Evtushenko: practica una entomología no reducida a los ejemplos locales. 108

Así, anota nombres de escritores cubanos encarcelados por el régimen castrista o lamenta que no llegue de una vez la desaparición de Franco. Esas notas versan también sobre el oficio de traductor, la perversión política de la lengua, el envejecimiento y la muerte. Son páginas excelentes, que lo colocan entre los grandes escritores de diarios del pasado siglo. ("A partir de los 45 me paso la vida escribiéndole a alguna gente para contarles cuánto los quiero. Y no es porque los quiera, es para que no me maten", apuntó. A la misma edad en que Camus dijo encontrar su cementerio, él tuvo también cálculos de muerte). La edición en español de estos diarios -Toda una vida, Melusina, 2010- constituye solamente una décima parte del original checo. Coincide en selección con las ediciones italiana y francesa, y ninguna de ellas incluye la referencia al asesinato de Camus. Tan extraña decisión editorial, la de dejar fuera de los extractos traducidos una noticia así, permite suponer cuánto de apasionante habrá quedado inalcanzable para quien no lea checo. El final de Albert Camus como ajuste de cuentas remite a unas páginas más imposibles todavía. No por escritas en checo, sino por inescritas: las que habría compuesto Leonardo Sciascia, precisamente colaborador del Corriere della Sera, con todo este asunto. Sciascia, que dedicó un volumen al secuestro y asesinato de Aldo Moro, que investigó los pormenores del suicidio de Raymond Roussel y la desaparición del físico Ettore Majorana, ¡qué bien se habría ocupado de los detalles automovilísticos de la muerte de Camus, de los rumores del espionaje soviético en Praga, de las suposiciones de la viuda de Zabrana y del silencio guardado por ese profesor que aún queda vivo! ANTONIO JOSÉ PONTE¿Fue Albert Camus asesinado por el KGB? 05/11/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Fue/Albert/Camus/asesinado/KGB/elpepuopi/2 0111105elpepiopi_11/Tes EDITORIAL 05/11/2011

'Charlie', atacado El semanario satírico francés Charlie Hebdo sufrió el miércoles un ataque con cócteles molotov que dejó inutilizada la sede de su redacción en París. El ataque parece estar relacionado con el hecho de que la revista dedicase su número de la semana a la victoria de los islamistas en Túnez y a la declaración del presidente del Consejo Nacional de Transición libio anunciando que el país se regiría por la sharía. La totalidad de las fuerzas políticas francesas han condenado el atentado, que evoca episodios anteriores como el del periódico danés Jyllands-Posten. Quienes atacaron la redacción de Charlie Hebdo no representan a nadie sino a ellos mismos. Tampoco defienden el islam sino que reivindican su cerril fanatismo tomando como excusa una revista satírica. Antes de las revueltas árabes, los violentos jugaban con el equívoco infundado de que representaban los sentimientos y las aspiraciones de los ciudadanos de países en los que la religión mayoritaria es el islam. Hoy, ni siquiera pueden apelar a esa coartada interesada. En Túnez y en Libia, los dos países a los que Charlie Hebdo dedicó el número por el que ha sido atacado, los ciudadanos, islamistas o no, se han enfrentado a sus tiranos, no a una publicación satírica. Ni en Francia ni en estos países, en los que, como en Túnez, también se han producido ataques contra medios de comunicación, podrá una minoría erigirse en intérprete violento de la mayoría. Ataques como el perpetrado contra Charlie Hebdo pretenden retrotraer la percepción pública europea al momento anterior a las revueltas árabes, en las que por fin emergió la imagen de 109

ciudadanos decididos a disfrutar de sus derechos donde antes solo parecía haber seguidores confesos o inconfesos de los fanáticos que invocaban un credo religioso. Ese era el escenario idóneo para quienes deseaban imponer su proyecto político autoritario mediante la violencia; un escenario hacia el que no debería existir el retorno. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Charlie/atacado/elpepuopi/20111105elpepiopi_2/Tes

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ft.com Life&Arts FT Magazine November 4, 2011 8:52 pm Interrogation is not a social science By Gillian Tett Academics have been used for years by western intelligence: think of all the psychiatrists in the cold war

In 10 days, one of the more colourful tribal gatherings of the academic world will take place: several thousand “social anthropologists” will descend on Montreal, for the annual gathering of the American Anthropological Association. To the outside world, the proceedings might look rather esoteric, if not downright hippy. In the 109 years since the AAA was founded, social anthropologists have tended to study far-flung cultures, or topics such as the cultural meaning of food. But when the anthropology “tribe” assembles this year, it will have a new topic to discuss: its links with “power” – or, at least, the US military. Last month, the AAA posted an article from Nature on its website that claimed that the US military has been employing the services of anthropologists in Afghanistan to improve its data-gathering techniques. In particular, during the past five years, it has apparently run so-called “human terrain analysis” programmes, to make its Afghan operations more culturally sensitive. More ON THIS STORY Gillian Tett The great cover-up Gillian Tett Is there a shadowy plot behind gold? Gillian Tett The real bull market Gillian Tett Leaving a digital legacy Gillian Tett Why $14,000bn no longer scares us No surprise there, then. Western intelligence groups have been using academics for years: just think of all the psychiatrists employed in the cold war. If nothing else, the past decade of western (mis)adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown just how badly the western governments need to improve their understanding of “other” cultures. But what has made this latest revelation so controversial is that Julia Bowers, the anthropologist named by Nature, was not just writing tomes about Afghan marriage rituals, she was aiding interrogations too. Or as Nature reported her telling a conference: 111

“Typically human-terrain analysis is more of a human data-gathering and mapping approach…” but cultural expertise was “key in the support I was providing to the interrogator to develop a relationship with the detainee”. While, crucially, it is unclear how widespread this practice might be, the revelation has reawakened the debate about just how far social scientists should allow themselves to aid the elite. The contradictions are manifest. During recent decades, academic anthropologists – like sociologists – have tended to cultivate a fairly anti-authoritarian air. This is partly because they have often studied poor communities, but also because the very process of analysing how social systems work tends to leave one pretty cynical about the state and its dominant ideologies. Or, as the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss often observed, anthropologists tend to be “outsiders”, precisely because they are observers. In practice, the discipline has often been entangled with power. Indeed, the whole idea of studying “other cultures” first emerged during the British Empire, when 19th-century colonial administrators, missionaries and educators decided that they needed to understand the “natives”. Sometimes this was for overt military ends. More often, though, there was a more subtle power game: Victorian anthropologists took it for granted that “native” cultures were inferior and “primitive”, which justified “civilising” missions. In the early 20th century, some academics reacted against this legacy, and, after the second world war, the discipline came to deplore this colonial heritage. But in the 1960s, rumours surfaced that some anthropologists were being recruited by the CIA in Vietnam. In 1970, Eric Wolf, then chair of the AAA ethics committee, declared that social scientists were being recruited to assist the military in dealing with counterinsurgency in Thailand. “These programs comprise efforts at the manipulation of people on a giant scale and intertwine straightforward anthropological research with overt and covert counter-insurgency activities in such a way as to threaten the future of anthropological research,” he warned. And, according to a new book, Weaponizing Anthropology, by David Price, in recent decades the CIA has been funding social science programmes, and using the analysis for unlikely ends, such as designing policy at the Abu Ghraib detention centre. This probably only affects a tiny minority of anthropologists. But it has sparked horror. Indeed, the AAA now operates a so-called “rapid response” team to offer ethical advice. This supports anthropologists who want to help, say, aid programmes – but not interrogations. “Advising people on how to extract information from people who don’t want information extracted, that is the antithesis of what the anthropological encounter is supposed to look like,” Hugh Gusterson, a network leader, has observed. But the pressures will not die away soon; not when budgets are being cut, jobs are scarce and governments (and corporations) are desperate to get better information about culture. To put it another way, precisely because anthropologists are good at analysing cultures and power structures, their research is of interest to people in… er… power. It is a bitter irony; even – or especially – in Afghanistan. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/7134e5c4-05b3-11e1-a429-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1cx0Ox5Vc

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Internacional El régimen sirio mantiene la represión y pide a los opositores que se entreguen Activistas denuncian la muerte hoy de al menos otros siete manifestantes Decenas de opositores han fallecido desde que el Gobierno aceptó el plan árabe EL PAÍS / AGENCIAS Amman / Madrid 4 NOV 2011 - 16:32 CET5

Un manifestante reta a las fuerzas de seguridad en Khalidia. / REUTERS Son ya decenas los muertos a manos de las fuerzas de seguridad sirias desde que el Gobierno del presidente, Bachar el Asad, aceptara la propuesta de la Liga Árabe para terminar con la crisis abierta entre el régimen y los miles manifestantes que protestan en su contra. Según el recuento de los activistas pro derechos humanos, única fuente de información debido al cerrojo mantenido por el régimen, otras siete personas han perdido la vida hoy a disparos ante la represión en varias ciudades sirias. El Asad ha dado además una semana a los alzados para que se entreguen a cambio de una amnistía. "El ministerio del Interior llama a los ciudadanos que portaron armas, las vendieron o entregaron (...) y no cometieron crímenes que se entreguen en la comisaría de policía más cercana". Según la información difundida por la televisión estatal siria, aquellos que se entreguen en el plazo de siete días, empezando el sábado, serán puestos en libertad de inmediato dentro de un plan de amnistía general. El plan árabe aceptado por El Asad prevé el cese de las hostilidades, la liberación de manifestantes y el diálogo con opositores Nuevas muertes en Homs "Mucha gente cayó al suelo con heridas de balas", ha relatado por teléfono a la agencia Reuters Mohamed, residente de Kanaker, localidad situada a 30 kilómetros de la capital, Damasco. Este sirio ha manifestado su temor a que muchos de los alcanzados por los

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disparos hayan perdido la vida. Los activistas calculan que al menos un manifestante ha muerto en esa ciudad. Los activistas cifran en dos los fallecidos por los disparos de las fuerzas de seguridad sirias en Homs, uno de los bastiones de la oposición más castigado por la represión. Ayer, en esa misma ciudad y tan solo un día después de que Damasco aceptase el plan de la Liga Árabe, al menos nueve personas cayeron ante el ataque de acorazados del Ejército sirio, según informó el Observatorio Sirio de los Derechos Humanos. Las mismas fuentes han informado de que dos manifestantes han muerto en la localidad de Al Gauta. Asimismo, el observatorio señaló que un civil y un militar supuestamente desertor de las Fuerzas Armadas sirias han perdido la vida a manos de los servicios de inteligencia militar cuando trataban de cruzar la frontera con Jordania para refugiarse en el país vecino. Los disparos de los efectivos sirios han causado heridas además a varios opositores de Deraa. Las fuerzas de El Asad se han personado también hoy, día de la oración, en al menos las localidades de Hama, Latakia, Maarat al Numaan. El plan árabe aceptado por El Asad prevé el cese de las hostilidades, la liberación de manifestantes y el diálogo con grupos opositores. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/04/actualidad/1320412599_63462 0.html

LA TRANSICIÓN EN LIBIA La Haya pide ayuda para detener a Saif el Islam por crímenes contra la humanidad Luis Moreno Ocampo, fiscal jefe de la Corte Penal Internacional, anuncia ante la ONU que investigará presuntos crímenes cometidos por la OTAN, las fuerzas del Consejo Nacional de Transición libio y los leales al dictador Isabel Ferrer La Haya 3 NOV 2011 - 00:30 CET La Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) teme perder la pista de Saif el Islam, hijo del fallecido dictador libio Gadafi acusado de crímenes contra la humanidad. Para evitarlo y así poder arrestarle, ha solicitado ayuda a la comunidad internacional. Luis Moreno Ocampo, fiscal jefe de la Corte, formuló esta petición el jueves durante la lectura del informe oficial sobre su labor ante el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas. Según el jurista, el hijo prófugo de dictador libio trata de escapar de su tierra con apoyo de mercenarios. De ahí que la CPI precise la colaboración de los países donde pudiera refugiarse. La pasada semana, la propia Corte aseguró a Saif el Islam, de 39 años, que tendría un juicio justo si se entregaba. Después de varios desmentidos sobre su paradero y supuesta detención, el contacto se produjo a través de intermediarios. Desde entonces, sin embargo, no ha habido más llamadas. Moreno Ocampo también ha anunciado ante la ONU que su equipo investigará “de forma imparcial e independiente”, las denuncias de presuntos crímenes de guerra cometidos por todas las partes. Ello incluye a los hombres leales a Gadafi, las fuerzas del Consejo Nacional de Transición, e incluso la OTAN. En el caso de la Alianza Atlántica, el fiscal analizará los detalles de la campaña de bombardeos lanzada durante los últimos meses para facilitar la caída del dictador. Además de Saif el Islam, la CPI busca al ex jefe del espionaje interno, Abdulá al Sanusi. Acusado asimismo de crímenes contra la humanidad, podría estar ya fuera de Libia. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/03/actualidad/1320276614_195704.html

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Thu, 03/11/2011 - 10:37

Supra-constitutional debate heats up again Noha El-Hennawy Author: Noha El-Hennawy With less than a month left to elect Egypt’s first post-Hosni Mubarak parliament, the controversy over the promulgation of a binding charter with basic constitutional principles is once again reigniting political divides. On one hand, Islamists voice vehement opposition to a charter that they believe is an attempt to weaken their influence, while secularists endorse the move but fear it could lead to further empowerment of Egypt’s generals. On Wednesday, the Muslim Brotherhood-led Democratic Alliance convened and voted to take to the streets if the charter is passed. Along with 10 other mostly Islamist parties, the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party demanded that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces drop the proposal and sack Deputy Prime Minister Ali al- Selmy, who has been campaigning for the charter. Islamists reiterated their argument that such a charter would infringe on the authority of the 100-member constituent assembly that the parliament is supposed to elect and entrust with drafting the new constitution. To support their argument, they refer to the results of the March referendum, when nearly 80 percent votes favored this scenario. “We affirm that there is no way the people’s free will can be circumvented,” read the statement issued by the alliance after Wednesday’s meeting. The signatories also threatened to call for a million-man march on 18 November if the military holds onto the charter and ignores the demand echoed by several presidential candidates to hold the presidential poll and hand power over to civilians by 12 April. “[The draft charter] is categorically rejected,” said Mohamed Selim al-Awa, a potential moderate Islamist candidate for president, who was present at the meeting. “The document is an attempt to impose guardianship on the parliament’s two chambers which are set to elect the constituent assembly.” Another two presidential hopefuls, including Ayman Nour and Abdullah al-Ashal were also present. Wednesday’s meeting came in reaction to talks held yesterday by Selmy with leaders of several political groups and public figures to discuss the 22-clause document with a set of principles that will determine the identity of the state and lay out fundamental principles and liberties. Selmy had reportedly said that this document will be included in a binding constitutional declaration by the SCAF. The call to issue a set of binding constitutional principles was first made by secular political forces shortly after the results of the March referendum showed that the process of drafting the new constitution might fall into the hands of the new parliament. Fearing an Islamist parliamentary majority, many secularists called for the promulgation of a document with a set of “supra-constitutional” principles that the 115

constitution’s architects should have to abide by. Such a charter should impose clear restrictions to prevent Islamists from turning Egypt into a “religious” state. To preempt such moves, tens of thousands of Islamists rallied in Tahrir Square on 29 July in an unprecedented show of force, raising slogans in support of an Islamic state. The scene of Tahrir Square packed with bearded men mostly in white robes and women wearing black niqabs sent shock waves through large segments of society. To reassure these people, Selmy announced in August that the military might issue a new constitutional declaration with a set of basic principles that ensure the establishment of a civil democratic state.

Selmy’s document discussed yesterday states that Egypt is a democratic civilU U state, Islam is its official religion and Islamic Sharia is the primary source of legislation. It goes on to give the right to non-Muslims to follow their own creeds in personal status and religious matters. Islamists have been constantly opposed to the use of the term “civil” insisting that it can pave the way for the establishment of a secular political system. They have also voiced vehement resistance to the reference to “non-Muslim” creeds insisting that the word bears a recognition of other non-monotheistic religious groups that Islam does not recognize. In the meantime, the document includes another controversial clause that bothers many non-Islamist forces. This clause gives the SCAF the exclusive right to oversee the affairs of the military and to discuss the budget of the armed forces. Several party leaders, who attended the talks, voiced reservation over this clause and had reportedly demanded that it be amended so that the parliament could have the right to oversee the budget of the armed forces. Potential presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei dismissed the draft charter as “a distorted” document for the powers it gives to the military. “The armed forces are not above the state and will never be. There is a difference between a democratic civil state that guarantees fundamental human rights and military custodianship,” ElBaradei wrote on his Twitter account. He did not oppose the principle of putting forward a charter with constitutional guidelines but insisted it should be authored by “an impartial commission.” The empowerment of the military was manifested in another document that Selmy discussed with political parties at yesterday’s meeting. That document sets regulations for the composition and work of the constituent assembly that will draft the constitution. The military-sponsored proposal states that only 20 out of the assembly’s 100 members could belong to parties represented in the new parliament, meaning the remaining 80 should be elected from outside the parliament. The same document gives the military the right to refer the new constitution to Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court if it violates values of freedom or any of the military-issued constitutional declarations. If the constituent assembly fails to draft the new constitution within six months, the military has the right to form a new assembly, the proposal says. For some liberals, allowing the military to retain power would be less harmful that leaving Islamists unchecked. To Mohamed Hamed, a leader of the Free Egyptians Party, a military dictatorship is more acceptable that a “Taliban-style” rule.

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“Would you compare the regression to dark ages to a normal form of human despotism?” he asked rhetorically. “We can rebel against human despotism and take to the streets. [Plus], but I don’t think the military would dare do injustice to the people after what it saw in Tahrir Square,” he said. To resolve this standoff between Islamists opposing the charter and most liberals who endorse it, the military should put the matter to a public referendum, suggested Hamed. Salafists protest para-constitutional principles ةيفيشرا Publishing Date: Thu, 03/11/2011 - 10:37 Related material Military powers in draft constitutional document spark ire of opposition figures / Constitutional principles document gives military special status Show in newsticker: Salafists protest para-constitutional principles / Abdullah al-Ashal/ Ali al-Selmy/ Ayman Nour/ constituent assembly/ constitution/ Democratic Alliance/ Muslim Brotherhood/ parliament/ supra-constitutional principles/ News/ News features

Source URL (retrieved on 08/11/2011 - 11:05): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/511527

Wed, 02/11/2011 - 13:00

Military powers in draft constitutional document spark ire of opposition figures Author: Staff Presidential hopeful Mohamed ElBaradei and the April 6 Youth Movement on Wednesday both voiced separate rejections of the government's draft constitutional principles document and the far-reaching powers it grants the military. During his meeting with several political powers on Tuesday, Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy proposed a draft constitutional principles document as well as criteria for electing members to the assembly that will draft the new constitution.The document proposes that a 100-member constituent assembly be comprised of 80 non- parliamentary members and 20 members from political parties represented in parliament, with a maximum of five members from each party.

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The draft also calls for the establishment of a national defense council headed by the president that would examine national security measures and be responsible for approving all military-related legislation. The document also exclusively grants the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) the right to examine military affairs, including the armed forces budget. Military budget allocations would be listed as the first item in the national budget without detailed figures on proposed expenditures, the document suggests. In a Twitter message, ElBaradei called for withdrawing the proposed draft. He stressed that a democratic civilian state differs from military custodianship and called for an impartial panel to present constitutional principles that can be respected by all political players. The former IAEA directed also said the priority should be for unity not more chaos and conflict. In June, ElBaradei offered a draft constitutional principles document that did not grant the military any political role or special advantages. In May, SCAF member Mamdouh Shahin called for including constitutional articles that would grant the military additional powers, including the authority to intervene to protect the people, as well as preventing the parliament from discussing the military budget and diminishing presidential powers over internal army affairs "Principles that lead the armed forces to control the state and escape accountability are totally rejected," Injy Hamdy, a spokesperson for the April 6 Youth Movement, said in a statement released Wednesday. Hamdy criticized the document, calling the broad powers it grants to the SCAF a farce. The movement also said the nation should be allowed to monitor the military's budget. Ali al-Selmy Publishing Date: Wed, 02/11/2011 - 13:00 Related material Brotherhood refuses supra-constitutional principles document Constitutional principles document gives military special status Show in newsticker: Ali al-Selmy Ali al-Selmy April 6 Youth Movement constituent assembly constitution Injy Hamdy Supreme Council of the Armed Forces News Top stories

Source URL (retrieved on 08/11/2011 - 11:17): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/511230

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Internacional Un académico formado en EE UU, nuevo jefe del Gobierno de transición libio Abdelrahim Elkib pide al mundo respeto a los intereses de la nueva Libia El flamante jefe del Ejecutivo promete respeto a los derechos humanos La ONU insta al Consejo de Transición a que controle los arsenales de armas J. M. M. / AGENCIAS Trípoli 1 NOV 2011 - 09:53 CET164

Abdelrahim Elkib, tras la votación. / MARCO LONGARI (AFP) El nuevo jefe del Gobierno libio de transición, Abdelrahim Elkib, ha subrayado en su primera comparecencia en el cargo el compromiso de las nuevas autoridades por construir un estado democrático y respetuoso con los derechos humanos. "Estamos implicados en la construcción de una nación respetuosa con los derechos del hombre y que no aceptará violaciones de los mismos", ha recalcado Elkib. En rueda de prensa ofrecida en Trípoli, Elkib ha afirmado que Libia ha conseguido llegar a esta situación nueva "por la voluntad del pueblo libio", en clara alusión a la rebelión contra el régimen del coronel Muamar el Gadafi. Elkib ha manifestado que las nuevas autoridades desean mantener "una relación privilegiada con los países vecinos" y desligada por completo de cualquier vinculación con el antiguo régimen. "El mundo debe respetar a Libia y sus intereses, como Libia desea hacer con el mundo en aras del entendimiento mutuo", ha afirmado el nuevo jefe del Ejecutivo. Elkib, según dice su currículo, es ingeniero eléctrico de formación. Obtuvo su licenciatura en la Universidad de Trípoli en 1973. Tres años después cursaría sus estudios de especialización en los campus estadounidenses de Carolina del Norte y Carolina del Sur. Desde 1985 es profesor universitario de una facultad de Alabama. También forma parte del cartel de expertos del Instituto del Petróleo de Abu Dhabi. Elkib fue elegido ayer nuevo jefe del Gobierno libio de transición tras la votación llevada a cabo por el Consejo Nacional Transitorio (CNT). Elkib, que tendrá ahora 15 119

días para formar su gabinete de gobierno, obtuvo el apoyo de 26 de los 51 miembros del CNT, el órgano que se ha encargado de representar los intereses políticos de los rebeldes libios desde que se alzaron contra Gadafi. Elkib sustituye en el cargo al hasta ahora primer ministro de transición, Mahmud Yibril, con pocas simpatías entre los sectores islamistas y asociado al régimen de Gadafi como responsable del Consejo de Desarrollo entre 2007 y 2011. Yibril, como el flamante jefe del Ejecutivo, residió durante mucho tiempo en el exterior por lo que recibió críticas desde el bando de los alzados por no conocer el país a cuyos mandos se había puesto. Elkib sustituye en el cargo al hasta ahora primer ministro de transición, Mahmud Yibril, con pocas simpatías entre los sectores islamistas La hoja de ruta del CNT mantiene la primera convocatoria electoral para dentro de ocho meses. Entonces, el Ejecutivo de transición tiene previsto que las urnas elijan una Asamblea constituyente que prepare el camino para los primeros comicios presidenciales un año después. No obstante, la sociedad civil desconfía de que en tan solo ocho meses, el Gobierno de transición sea capaz de sentar los cimientos para llevar a los libios a las urnas por vez primera http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/01/actualidad/1320137625_98408 7.html

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Tue, 01/11/2011 - 18:16

Constitutional principles document gives military special status Author: Arabic Edition Political forces are divided over the constitutional principles document that Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy proposed at a meeting with party representatives and public figures on Tuesday. “The document is obligatory and those who oppose it must bear responsibility,” Selmy said, pointing to the Islamist forces that refused to attend the meeting. The document states that the people are the source of power, and that their will should not be superseded by supra-constitutional principles that cannot be changed. To write the constitution, the document forms a committee to be comprised of 100 members, of whom 80 are from outside parliament, and 20 are from parties inside parliament, with a maximum of five members for each party. It also forms a National Defense Council, headed by the president, which is tasked with preserving the security and safety of the country. It grants the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces the sole right to review all matters related to the army and discuss its budget, which would be the first item on the state budget. The council also has the sole right to approve legislation pertaining to the armed forces. Attendees of the meeting announced their approval of the draft document in principle, but requested that Article 9, which relates to the armed forces, be amended so as to allow parliament’s national security committee to supervise it and discuss its budget as well. “The intelligentsia approves the draft in principle but expresses reservation on Article 9,” said Mohamed Salmawy, head of the Egyptian Book Authority. Hafez Abu Seada, head of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, walked out of the meeting. “Most attendees were remnants of the dissolved National Democratic Party,” he said. “And the document makes parliament good for nothing.” Meanwhile, the Islamist coalition said it would hold a press conference on Wednesday to announce their response to the meeting. “Any agreement reached during that meeting is worthless,” said Ahmed Abu Baraka, legal adviser to the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. Translated from the Arabic Edition Publishing Date: Tue, 01/11/2011 - 18:16 Related material Constitutional amendment committee: Article II will not be touched Brotherhood leader: Proposed Constitutional amendments mostly reasonable US expert: Leadership of 'Military Inc.' is running Egypt

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26/10/2011 - 11:00

US expert: Leadership of 'Military Inc.' is running Egypt Author: Nadine Marroushi The Egyptian military’s economic interests have long been considered too taboo to discuss in the mainstream media, so little is known about the sections of the economy that fall under the military’s control. But now that a military council is formally ruling the country, the time is ripe to examine the issue more closely. Robert Springborg has written extensively on the Egyptian military and the politics and political economy of the Middle East. He is the author of two books on Egypt: "Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order" (1989) and "Family Power and Politics in Egypt" (1982). His most recent work is a chapter on gas and Egyptian development in "The Handbook of Oil Politics," due for publication in 2012. From 2000 to 2002, he was director of the American Research Center in Egypt, and has held numerous other positions in the US, UK and Australia leading programs on the Middle East. Al-Masry Al-Youm recently spoke on the phone with Springborg, who is currently in the US, about the importance of the military’s business interests in its decision-making process, what is meant by the military economy and the military’s relationship with Egypt’s privatization program. Al-Masry Al-Youm: In early February, before Hosni Mubarak stepped down, you warned that the military would look to hold on to power. This is what we seem to be witnessing now with a longer-than-planned transitional phase. Robert Springborg: I don’t believe I said the military would seek to hold onto power in the form of a classical coup d’etat. What I meant to say in any case was that the military would seek to ensure that it was not subordinated to any other power. The delay in constituting a new system of government results probably not from a change in the military’s strategic objective of “ruling but not governing,” but from the tactical difficulties of forming a civilian government that forswears any meaningful control over the military. Al-Masry: How much do you think the military’s vast business interests in the country influence their desire to stay in power? Springborg: The business interests of the military are hugely important to their decision-making, and the leadership of "military incorporated," which is same as the leadership of the military itself, is now running the country. A key problem is that the military economy lacks transparency. It is opaque, so we don’t know its exact size or components. Another issue is that the military’s business interests distract them from their national security roles, of which the key but not only one is to defend the country. The Egyptian military lags behind others in the region in part because it is so preoccupied with generating revenues. Its abilities to carry out 122

search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, anti-piracy, and to operate with other, friendly forces are weak. They have modern equipment, but much of it is not operable because they aren’t training personnel adequately to use nor to maintain it. One reason why they are not is that they employ conscripts in military-controlled businesses. Al-Masry: How do you define the military economy? Springborg: The military economy includes the numerous factories and production facilities that fall under the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Military Production. These also include companies affiliated with the Arab Organization for Industrialization and National Services Production Organization. In theory, these are state-owned entities but their accounts are not subject to financial oversight by the Central Auditing Organization. Al-Masry: A trend in the economy during the transitional phase is the re- nationalization of companies privatized under the Mubarak regime. How much is this in the military economy’s interests? Springborg: The military opposed privatization that intensified in 2004 under the government of former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, and that was overseen by former Investment Minister Mahmoud Mohie Eddin. It was upset at the increased pace of privatization. That said, the military was happy with privatization as long as it ended up [gaining from it]. It didn’t want the government to sell state-owned enterprises to Gamal Mubarak’s cronies. So under the Nazif government, some of the privatization in state- owned enterprises went to the military to mollify its leadership. Its interests in strategic areas, such as port facilities, ship repair and building, increased. The Alexandria Shipyard, for example, is owned by the military, and under Nazif they acquired a competitor company. There was also an unwritten rule under Mubarak that mid-ranking officers and generals would get senior positions within privatized companies. Aviation companies and construction companies do have senior generals working in them. Al-Masry: How important are their business holdings given that strategic industries, such as cement, are not within their control? Springborg: Well, they are unhappy about that state of affairs. The military is not strongly represented in energy-intensive industries. The compensation to that is that they do control a lot of land. The total asset value of their land holdings is not clear, but we know that much of the land allocated to the construction and tourism sectors was or remains under military control. Starting from the 1980s, under Mubarak, the military got the land and crony capitalists got the energy intensive production industries. The military’s biggest interest is in the construction industry. This is because the military has its own, internal construction capacities; because of its influence over the allocation of land; and because construction depends heavily on relations with government, either because it is paying for it or because it must authorize it. Military officers have the governmental connections that facilitate contracts and approvals. Al-Masry: From the perspective of protecting the military economy, is the military threatened by the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections? Springborg: Yes. What it wants is a weak parliament and a presidency that will not challenge its authority. As it now looks the parliament will be weak because it will be divided among various political forces and because it will not be based on any definitive

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constitutional authority. So it will not be strong enough to oversee the military, such as by examining its finances. So, any civilian control of the military by default will fall to the president. That is why the apparent thinking now of the military is for the president to be someone from the military. The delay of the presidential election is due in part probably to the attempt to prepare the ground for a candidate either from the military or absolutely subordinate to it. In the meantime the military will look to expand its role in the economy, either through acquiring more companies or by assisting officer-owned companies gain more business. Publishing Date: Wed, 26/10/2011 - 11:00 Related material We won’t allow military council to rule from behind the curtain, says ElBaradei April 6 Youth Movement: Military's policies will lead to new stage of revolution Show in newsticker: Egyptian army tanks deployed in February 2011

Source URL (retrieved on 09/11/2011 - 19:56): Nadine Marroushi US expert: Leadership of 'Military Inc.' is running Egypt26/10/2011 - 11:00 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/508736

, 20/10/2011 - 20:36

We won’t allow military council to rule from behind the curtain, says ElBaradei Author: Ibtisam Taalab Presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei on Thursday renewed his criticism of the way the ruling military council is managing the transition period. “We won’t allow the milita0ry council to rule from behind the curtain,” he said, adding that Egypt would not fall if the council leaves. “The people are the state, and it was the people who made the revolution,” he said. ElBaradei also said that the former regime is still present, but only the faces were changed. “The trial of the former president takes five years, while our sons are arrested and immediately referred to military courts,” he pointed out. “The council deals with problems from a security perspective,” he said. “This makes it worse than the Mubarak regime.” He called for a constitution representing all segments of Egyptian society to be written before the presidential elections are held. “The new constitution must guarantee the rights of the majority and protect those of the minority,” he said, calling for the need to abolish the Shura Council and the split representation of farmers and workers in parliament. “It will take us a year and a half to be on the right political track,” he noted. 124

ElBaradei speaks on Maspero violence Thu, 20/10/2011 - 20:36 Related material ElBaradei: Atmosphere of hatred resulted in Church bombing Parliamentary speaker: ElBaradei only a thinker if he doesn't join a party

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Wed, 24/08/2011 - 18:08

Crisis brewing over constitutional principles Author: Noha El-Hennawy A cabinet-backed charter calling for legal provisions guaranteeing a democratic and secular Egyptian government has sparked fierce debate - and careful consideration - in the halls of power and religious institutions and among political parties and civil society in recent weeks. Islamists reject binding conditions on the writing of Egypt’s new constitution, while secular groups and civil society see it as a chance to safeguard their interests in the event that Islamists dominate upcoming elections. Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy made headlines last week after announcing the cabinet had sponsored a document laying out the basic principles of the new constitution, which is supposed to be drafted following parliamentary elections. Selmy also said that the military will issue a constitutional declaration based on the same principles. Meanwhile, the prime minister has met with Islamist groups to discuss the composition of the assembly that will write a new constitution. According to the copy of the cabinet-sponsored principles received by Al-Masry Al- Youm, the document stipulates that Egypt is “a civil democratic state” based on citizenship rights, pluralism, freedom, justice and citizenship rights. The political system is democratic republican; it respects the peaceful transition of power between elected governments and the separation between the three branches of government, reads the 21-clause document. The charter maintains the article of the previous constitution recognizing Islam as the state religion, Arabic as its official language and the principles of Islamic Law as the primary source of legislation. However, it adds a new clause stipulating that non- Muslims should be able to follow their own creeds in their personal status matters and religious affairs, an amendment that many liberal and Coptic forces have been calling for. In recent weeks, Selmy has been holding meetings with political parties from the far right to the far left, as well civil society organizations to probe their views on the charter.

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“We strongly support the charter,” said Emad Gad, leader of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party who represented his party in a meeting with Selmy last Wednesday. His party demanded that the charter be made legally binding on the constituent assembly that the new parliament will elect to draft the constitution. The liberal Free Egyptian, Awareness, and Democratic Front parties were also present at the meeting. Making the charter binding lies at the heart of the secular-Islamist divide that has been deepening since the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Most secular forces have voiced fears that Islamists, who seem best organized and most capable of mobilizing voters, might garner a sweeping majority in the new parliament and hence monopolize the drafting of the constitution. Such control, secularists believe, might enable them to impose a religious state that restricts individual liberties and discriminates against religious minorities and women. To preempt such a scenario, secular parties have been pushing for a binding document of universal principles and a clear affirmation that Egypt’s new order will be fully democratic. While secular groups celebrate the cabinet’s charter for stating that Egypt is a “civil state,” meaning to them neither military nor religious, Islamists insist the expression should be removed. “In our perspective, ‘civil’ means secular,” Adel Afify, founder of the Salafi Asala Party told Al-Masry Al-Youm. “Liberals or non-Muslims cannot impose their views on the rest of the people.” Last week, the Islamist-led Democratic Alliance for Egypt, spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood and including a group of Salafi parties, published its own charter that defined Egypt only as a democratic state. The term civil was not mentioned. The liberal Wafd Party acquiesed to the charter in principal, despite internal divisions on whether there should be any collaboration with Islamists. Some Islamists also welcomed a similar charter that Al-Azhar had issued. Islamists insist that none of these charters should be binding but only serve as guidelines. They argue that imposing any clauses on the constituent assembly is a violation of democracy. On Monday, Afify’s party along with the Wasat, Adl and Hadara parties met with Prime Minister Essam Sharaf, his deputy and legal experts to discuss the matter. The Salafi Nour Party has categorically refused to meet with the prime minister to discuss the document. The attendees also discussed a proposal drafted by an independent group of legal experts and political party leaders of eligibility conditions for the constituent assembly that will draft the constitution. The proposal advocates prohibiting any member of the new parliament from running for the assembly and stipulates that 80 of 100 assembly members should come from labor unions, professional associations, farmers’ groups, human rights organizations, university professors’ unions, Christian and Muslim religious institutions, judicial bodies, officially recognized parties, the armed forces, geographical areas with “special cultures” (namely Sinai, Nubia and the farthest southern spots) and youth and interest groups. The remaining 20 seats should be filled by public figures, constitutional law experts, intellectuals and artists, according to the copy received by Al-Masry Al-Youm.

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“This document needs more work and more discussions,” Ahmed Shokry, leader of the Adl party told Al-Masry Al-Youm. He objected to the ban on parliamentarians serving the assembly, arguing that half the constituent assembly can come from the parliament and the other half from outside. He also opposed a clause giving the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces the right to veto the composition of the assembly if it violates the membership conditions laid out in the document. According to Mohamed Nour Farahat, a law professor at Zagazig University and one of the architects of the eligibility conditions, this article was added to diffuse fears that Islamists would have free reign in forming the assembly. In recent months, there has been a debate over whether the military should play any political role in the future. Driven by the desire to deter elected officials from dismantling a fledgling democracy, some non-Islamist jurists and political forces have demanded that the military be in charge of safeguarding the civil nature of the state. The constitutional charter up for discussion does not assign the military any political role beyond protecting national sovereignty and security. Politicians who spoke to Al- Masry Al-Youm and met with the government affirmed that there was no mention of the possibility of adding any clause that would entrust the military with defending democracy. However, last week, the army chief of staff told a group of intellectuals that the “civil nature of the state is a matter of national security.” This statement had raised speculations that the military might push for stretching its political mandate in the new constitution. “I believe it [an article requiring the military to protect democracy] is necessary but it seems that there is no national consensus on the matter,” said Tahany al-Gebaly, vice president of the Supreme Constitutional Court and a contributor to the constituent assembly eligibility conditions. Islamists oppose the inclusion of any article for fear that the army might interfere against them as was the case in Algeria in the 1990s. Yet many non-Islamist groups have also opposed making the military the guardian of democracy, arguing that such a clause could open the door for military coups. Last week, Selmy also met with representatives of 100 NGOs to discuss the constitutional document. “Some of us demanded that the charter make reference to international human rights conventions,” Nasser Amin, director of the Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and legal Prosecution told Al-Masry Al-Youm. In several clauses, the charter recognizes a plethora of individual rights and liberties. “Human dignity is a fundamental right for each person. All Egyptians are free and equal in terms of their rights, liberties and general duties before the law. Discrimination on basis of gender, race, language, religion, wealth or social status is prohibited,” reads the text.

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The charter also recognizes freedom of expression, access to information and freedom of movement and travel and prohibits the detention or arrest of any citizen with no prior judicial warrant. But for some rights activists these protections are incomplete. “There is no clause that stresses social justice in the charter,” said Khaled Ali, director of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights. Ali, who also attended the talks, added that some groups also asked for an article requiring the government to set a maximum wage. “But, overall, the charter is not bad,” added Ali, referring to clauses affirming the right to education, housing, nutrition, healthcare and a minimum wage. Ninety percent of the attendees said the document should be made legally binding, Ali said. Experts have voiced conflicting views on the most appropriate legal mechanism of making the document binding. Farahat said it should be put to a public referendum, while Gebaly of the constitutional court argues that a military-issued constitutional declaration is enough. The idea of a referendum was discussed ruing “All we care about is making it binding, whether by having the SCAF issue a constitutional declaration or holding a referendum,” said Gad of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party. Archived Photo?: Ali al-Selmy Publishing Date: Wed, 24/08/2011 - 18:08 Related material Islamists: Supra-constitutional principles would provoke Egyptians Civil state is a matter of national security, says army chief of staff Comments History will judge those in charges of the current affair in Egypt, it is their responsibility to steer Egypt to the right direction. They shouldn't relay on the Egyptian people at large in the way the new constitution is written, as we all know that most of the Egyptians are politically illiterate, and are easily influenced by religion as it is the only subject they know (not understand), so for the sake of Egypt and the Egyptian people do not hand the country to these power seeking knowledge and experience lacking backward people who want to drag Egypt back to the dark ages.

Source URL (retrieved on 09/11/2011 - 21:31): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/489381

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22/08/2011 - 14:22

Wafd leader: Some Islamist groups conditionally approve constitutional principles uthor: Staff A number of Islamist groups have given conditional approval to a document containing guidelines for Egypt’s future constitution, provided that it does not include supra- constitutional principles, the chairman of the liberal Wafd Party, Al-Sayed al-Badawy, has announced. Those groups include the Jama'a al-Islamiya and Salafi movements, he said. “I held a meeting at the party’s headqurters with representatives from Salafi movements and the Jama'a al-Islamiya in order to agree on unity and renounce disagreement, especially in constitution-related issues,” Badawy told Al-Masry Al-Youm on Monday. On 12 August, Ali Selmy, deputy prime minister for political affairs, presented a draft document of supra-constitutional principles concerning citizenship and the country’s identity as a civil state, drawing heavily on principles laid down in constitutions internationally and in human rights declarations. The document has been subject of fierce debate since then, pitting liberals and secularists, who back the document, against some Islamist groups who oppose it. Some Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest political group, earlier rejected supra-constitutional principles being agreed at this stage, defending instead the results of the referendum on constitutional amendments in March, according to which the next parliament was tasked with electing a panel that writes the constitution. According to observers, secularists and liberals fear Islamist groups will dominate the next parliament, which is scheduled to be elected in November, and which would enable them to select a constitutional panel with Islamist leanings. Badawy noted that if a new constitutional declaration is made prior to elections, it will be approved by the Democratic Coalition, which comprises 28 political parties including the Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm) and other Islamist parties. He added that the proposed constitutional principles will be binding for all potential signatories. Adel Afify, chairman of the Salafi Asala Party, said Badawy was attempting to reconcile disputing groups. He revealed that he called during the meeting with Badawy for the suspension of conflict between secularists and Islamists in order to give the armed forces a chance to secure Egypt’s borders with Israel, which witnessed violence last Thursday. Commenting on fears of a possible Islamist takeover in the upcoming parliament elections, Selmy told satellite news channel Al-Arabiya on Sunday that his country had never been a theocracy. He added that though the religious dimension is fundamental to Egyptian society, it will remain a civil state, as it has always been.

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Publishing Date: Mon, 22/08/2011 - 14:22 Related material Brotherhood refuses supra-constitutional principles document Democratic Coalition parties agree on supra-constitutional principles Deputy PM proclaims civil state, pluralism in draft constitutional document

Source URL (retrieved on 09/11/2011 - 20:17): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/488719 Wafd Party From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Accommodation of the British presence Easily the greatest factor contributing to popular disillusionment with the Wafd was the party's failure to boycott the Farouk government after it acceded to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The policies followed by the party during the Anglo-Egyptian crisis of the mid-1930s alienated many Egyptian nationalists - heretofore the single most reliable support bloc for the Wafd - and severed the party between its small but powerful accommodationist minority and its large but voiceless resistant majority. The failure of the Wafd to more aggressively oppose the continuation of the British presence "left Egyptian politics devoid of a popularly legitimized leader or party." New Wafd party was (ديدجلا دفولا بزح In 1983 a New Wafd Party (Arabic: Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid founded, following a liberal, nationalist line similar to the original Wafd party.[19] In the November and December 2005 legislative elections the party won 6 out of 454 seats in the People's Assembly

Wed, 17/08/2011 - 18:52

Civil state is a matter of national security, says army chief of staff Author: Mahmoud Mosalem Army Chief of Staff Sami Annan affirmed his support for the principle of Egypt as a civil state on Tuesday, saying that the principle must be enshrined in the new constitution as a matter of national security. “We must insist on this clause,” he said during a meeting with Egyptian intellectuals, adding that he is willing to discuss the issue with all political factions. Annan said that the military council is keen on handing over power to an elected civil authority. “The military council acts as a representative of the people and not as an alternative to the former regime,” he said. “We have moved forward and there is no retreat." He added: "We want to obliterate the term 'sectarian strife' from the Arabic language."

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Assistant Defense Minister for Legal Affairs Mamdouh Shahin said the law on parliamentary elections would be announced at the end of this month. “Candidacies would be equally based on proportional and individual lists,” he explained, adding that the council had discussed the new law with the Supreme Constitutional Court and other legal bodies. Translated from the Arabic Edition نانع يماس Publishing Date: Wed, 17/08/2011 - 18:52 Publishing Date: Wed, 17/08/2011 - 18:52 Related material Islamist presidential hopeful rejects role for military in protecting civil state Political groups call for civil state over iftar in Tahrir

Source URL (retrieved on 09/11/2011 - 21:39): Mahmoud Mosalem Civil state is a matter of national security, says army chief of staff17/08/2011 - 18:52 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/487334

Mon, 13/06/2011 - 21:26

Looming question: Who'll get to write the constitution? Rana Khazbak Omar Zein Author: Rana Khazbak While the debate over whether the Constitution should be written before or after the parliamentary elections continues to capture national attention, the question of who gets to write the Constitution remains little discussed. In the March referendum, over 70 percent of Egyptians accepted amendments to the 1971 Constitution to require that the new Constitution be drafted by a 100- member constituent assembly elected by parliament. But non-Islamist political forces, including liberals, social democrats and leftists have called for postponing the elections until after a constitution is drafted; they fear that a potentially Muslim Brotherhood dominated-parliament could hijack the process. The group, which has existed for 83 years, is believed to be the best prepared political force for coming elections. “Parliamentary elections next September will mean that a certain party will gain a majority of the seats, and so it will not be representative of the whole ideological and political forces in the country to draft a constitution,” said Mahmoud Hetta, an organizer in the ‘Constitution First’ campaign launched by the National Association for Change. 131

Presidential hopeful Mohamed ElBaradei and the National Accord Conference, which brings together a host of political players to discuss proceedings during the interim period, supports the constitution coming first. Eight civil society organizations echoed the same concerns in a letter sent to the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, urging it to follow the example of the Tunisian revolution in drafting the new constitution. The Tunisian population will elect a constituent assembly in October to draft a new constitution followed by parliamentary and presidential elections. The idea of setting up a constituent assembly has various precedents in history, notably India’s 1950 Constitution, which was prepared over several years. The 217 members of the constituent assembly were elected indirectly by members of individual provincial legislative assemblies. Similarly, France’s first charter, drafted in 1789, was put together by a similarly elected body. The French elected the National Assembly, whose members represented the clergy, the nobility, and commoners, to draft a constitution. Ahmad Mekky, vice-president of the Court of Cassation, suggests that in order to solve the impasse, political forces should accept the roadmap put forth by the SCAF but take advantage of the fact that the constitutional declaration, put forth by the military rulers in late March to act as an interim constitution, fails to specify who should be included in the constituent assembly. The groups should work on creating guarantees that it won’t be dominated by a single political force. “Let the elections happen first but the different political and social forces have to agree on a set of regulations for choosing the constituent assembly to make sure it represents the different political and social forces,” said Mekky. However, Mekky is in favor of postponing parliamentary elections to give time for groups to be able to have a say in influencing the constitution. “The elections should happen not earlier than November after labor and student unions are formed and elected because they will make sure a big part of the society is represented,” said Meky. While SCAF remained largely mum on the issue, the two camps debating whether to write the constitution before or after parliamentary elections have overlooked the more important question of how to draft a representative document that ensures genuine participation of the country’s disparate groups. “I am watching a failing democracy where the two camps agreed that citizens’ role stops at the ballot box, wrongfully thinking that when the political forces meet and agree, that means the whole population is represented, which is not the case,” said Alaa Abdel Fattah, a leftist blogger and activist. Abdel Fattah added that drafting the new constitution has to guarantee popular participation to produce principles that people largely agree on. “A constitution that doesn’t represent the hopes of the people will lead to a nothing more than a useless legal piece of paper rather than being true social contract that everybody abides by,” said Abdel Fattah.

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Abdel Fattah, along with other grassroots organizations, is working on an initiative called “Let's Write Our Constitution," which aims at enabling a broader segment of the Egyptian people to participate in drafting the new document. The initiative takes South Africa’s so-called Freedom Charter as a model. In 1955, three thousand delegates gathered in a South African town to attend the Congress of People for completing the Freedom Charter. The event produced a vision of freedom for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. The meeting was preceded by months of preparation as 50 thousand volunteers interviewed the population. They asked one simple question: What is South Africa that you dream of? The answers were compiled and sent to elected committees in each district which were then sent to other committees at the provincial level. The committees put the answers in the form of a list of demands and gave them to constitutional experts who drafted the actual charter. “Through Let’s Write Our Constitution initiative, we aim at writing a popular constitution from the bottom up without including any of the political parties’ elite,” said Ahmed Ragheb, director of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center. Ragheb explained that his group would organize open meetings in all of Egypt’s governorates in order to discuss issues of concern to ordinary Egyptians. “These meetings should produce a citizen bill of rights and a vision for the Constitution,” added Ragheb. Another initiative was announced by ElBaradei last week, where he said that he would work with political forces as well as human right activists in order to draft a human rights document that would be presented to the public for debate. The convention would be based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It would write a preamble for the Constitution and would never be modified or changed once it was approved by the people. The preamble would embody the spirit of the constitution’s clauses. ElBaradei and others are deliberating how to allow the Egyptian people a greater say in how the Constitution is drafted. Political divides and SCAF’s vision for the transition will determine whether such efforts succeed. Archived Photo?: Vote count of constitutional amendments poll Publishing Date: Mon, 13/06/2011 - 21:26 Related material Brotherhood rejects pre-election drafting of constitution Amending the Constitution to change the Egyptian state

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Sun, 08/05/2011 - 18:52

Brotherhood rejects pre-election drafting of constitution Author: Staff The Muslim Brotherhood on Sunday rejected calls made by Egyptian liberal and leftist movements for drafting a new Egyptian constitution prior to parliamentary elections slated for September. Secular groups and parties meeting at a conference in Cairo on Saturday called for drafting a constitution that would require the Egyptian army to ensure Egypt remained a civil state. The groups also demanded amending Article II of the interim constitutional declaration and add a paragraph granting non-Muslim Egyptians the right to be ruled in accordance with their own religious texts. In a statement, the secular groups said that "the completion of state institutions, the development of a permanent constitution and the transfer of power to the people in a democratic and legitimate manner, is the best way to achieve stability, encourage investment and begin development and advancement.” The statement went on to say that the “constitutional declaration concludes that the procedures to achieve this are time-limited.” It said that the groups “are still hearing voices calling for prolonging the transitional period, postponing the parliamentary, Shura Council and presidential elections, and drafting the constitution.” The Muslim Brotherhood responded with its own statement: “These [people] are only interested in their personal benefit with no consideration for the country’s best interests… and the interests and objectives of the revolution.” In April, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which currently rules Egypt, announced a constitutional declaration for running the country during the transitional period. The document states that an elected parliament would form a constitutional committee of 100 members to write a permanent constitution. The Brotherhood said that it wants the constitutional committee to be elected by representatives of the people and not formed through appointments by decision makers. The group also emphasized that the committee should heed the demands of all segments of society when drafting the new constitution. Observers say the biggest controversy surrounding the writing of a new constitution concerns the choice between a presidential or parliamentary system. Islamist forces back the parliamentary system, while secular forces support the presidential system. Observers also believe the military's role in the political process will be a focus of controversy when it comes time for writing the new constitution. Publishing Date: Sun, 08/05/2011 - 18:52

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Related material ElBaradei requests constitutional article protecting secular state Secular forces prepare to confront Islamists in elections

Source URL (retrieved on 09/11/2011 - 20:47): Brotherhood rejects pre-election drafting of constitution 08/05/2011 - 18:52 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/428718

27/02/2011 - 11:14

Brotherhood leader: Proposed Constitutional amendments mostly reasonable Author: MENA The constitutional amendments proposed on Saturday overall meet many of the current popular demands, and are mostly reasonable, said Essam al-Erian, a leading Muslim Brotherhood member. Still, he said, there are certain points with which the Brotherhood is not satisfied. For example, article 5, banning the formation of parties on the basis of religion, remains despite, he says, contradicting article 2, which states that Islam is the official religion of the state. Al-Erian added that the Brotherhood's official position on the proposals will be announced later. An army-appointed eight-member commission recommended opening Egypt's presidential elections to competition and imposing a two-term limit on future presidents. A candidate would be allowed to run by fulfilling one of three requirements: Collecting 30,000 signatures from 15 of Egypt's 29 provinces, receiving the approval of at least 30 members of the elected parliament, or representing a party with at least one member in parliament. Full judicial supervision of the electoral process was also recommended, which would address criticism that the government routinely rigged past elections. The panel proposed limiting the implementation of Emergency Law to a maximum of six months and stipulating that it depends upon the approval of an elected parliament. Extending it should require a public referendum, it said. The commission's chief, Tareq al-Bishri, said that the proposals are for a temporary Constitution, and that after the current interim period a new Constitution should be drafted. Essam el-Erian Publishing Date: Sun, 27/02/2011 - 11:14 Related material Commission announces proposed changes to Egyptian Constitution Constitutional amendment committee: Article II will not be touched

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Source URL (retrieved on 09/11/2011 - 19:46): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/332661

20/02/2011 - 17:13

Constitutional amendment committee: Article II will not be touched Author: Staff Egypt's constitutional amendment committee said on Sunday that it would not be amending Article II of the Constitution, which states that Islam is the state religion, or Article V, which explicitly prohibits “establishment of political parties on any religious ideology or foundation." In a statement, the committee also said the first part of the Constitution, which contains general provisions, will not be changed. In the statement, the committee stressed that constitutional amendments would safeguard future elections, in particular upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, so as to reflect the true will of the Egyptian people. The committee went on to say that the amendments will go hand in hand with democratic changes the country plans to make. The committee explained that the articles to be amended concern decision-making policies of the state, which concern powers of the president, the Parliament and the Shura Council. In the statement, Committee Chairman Tariq al-Bishri said that the committee was working in a completely independent manner and in accordance with Egypt’s general interests. Al-Bishri went on to say that the committee is currently preparing its final draft of the amended articles and that it would be announcing the amendments during the next few days. He said the amendments would include a political rights, People's Assembly and Shura Council laws concerning the electoral process. Publishing Date: Sun, 20/02/2011 - 17:13 Related material No plans for constitutional changes, says Mubarak junior Constitution committee agrees to amend 6 articles of national charter ةيروتسدلا ةمكحملا مامأ «نييباقنلل» ةيجاجتحا ةفقو

Source URL (retrieved on 09/11/2011 - 19:42): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/324621

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Internacional Omán, entre el cambio y la tradición El sultán Qabús otorga poderes legislativos a la recién elegida Cámara baja omaní pero reafirma sus poderes absolutos Omán se enfrenta al reto de la sucesión a Qabús La diplomacia silenciosa de Omán Los regímenes del mundo árabe tratan de evitar el efecto contagio Omán, la monarquía petrolera más estable del Golfo Ángeles Espinosa Mascate 2 NOV 2011 - 13:39 CET

El sultán Qabús se dirige al Consejo de Omán. / MOHAMMED MAHJOUB (AFP) El sultán Qabús ha convocado al Consejo de Omán en el palacio Fuerte de Shomukh, a una veintena de kilómetros de Nizwa, la antigua capital del sultanato. La cita trata de conjugar cambio y tradición. El monarca va a pronunciar el primer discurso público tras las protestas del pasado marzo y acaba de otorgar poderes legislativos al recién elegido Majlis al Shura (la Cámara baja, que junto con el Consejo de Estado forma el Consejo de Omán). Pero el protocolo de la ceremonia reafirma sus poderes absolutos. Qabús, a punto de cumplir 71 años y 41 en el poder, llega al salón del trono por una puerta distinta al resto, escoltado por su guardia personal. Miembros de la corte, ministros, representantes de ambas cámaras, diplomáticos e invitados se ponen de pie tras haberle esperado durante una hora. La disposición de las butacas impide que ninguno le tenga de frente. Un “salam aleikum” (la paz sea con vosotros) es todo el saludo que intercambia con los asistentes. El sultán admite la necesidad de prestar “mayor atención y facilitar más oportunidades a la juventud”

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Ante los próceres del país, el sultán admite la necesidad de prestar “mayor atención y facilitar más oportunidades a la juventud” y promete cero tolerancia con la corrupción. También hace una breve alusión a los “rápidos cambios a nivel regional e internacional”. “No podemos sustraernos a lo que sucede a nuestro alrededor”, señala en aparente referencia a las revueltas árabes. Sin embargo, la -primavera- omaní se limitó a pedir puestos de trabajo, mejores salarios y lucha contra la corrupción, sin cuestionar al soberano. “Tenemos un problema de desempleo, especialmente entre los jóvenes, que constituyen la mayor parte de la población omaní”, señala el ministro de Información, Hamed bin Mohamed al Rashdi, en un encuentro con un pequeño grupo de periodistas invitados al sultanato para asistir al discurso de Qabús el pasado lunes. No obstante, considera que “la mayoría de las demandas de los manifestantes han sido respondidas con los reales decretos de su majestad”. La impresión generalizada es que han triunfado los candidatos con mayores lazos tribales y, por tanto, más conservadores El sultán Qabús cambió a los ministros acusados de corrupción, elevó el salario mínimo de 150 riales (unos 300 euros) a 200 riales y prometió 50.000 puestos de trabajo, en un país de 3,2 millones de habitantes (un tercio de ellos extranjeros). Anunció además reformas políticas, cuya máxima expresión ha sido la concesión de poderes legislativos y de control del gasto público al Majlis al Shura, el Consejo Consultivo cuyos 84 miembros acaban de tomar posesión. Por primera vez los candidatos han sido autorizados a utilizar carteles y mensajes telefónicos para hacer campaña. Pero sin partidos ni programas políticos, resulta difícil saber qué representa cada uno o que significa su elección. La impresión generalizada es que han triunfado los candidatos con mayores lazos tribales y, por tanto, más conservadores. Entre los elegidos también están tres de los activistas que alentaron las protestas de marzo, aunque hasta ahora han evitado a la prensa. Algunos observadores aseguran que aquellas muestras de descontento fueron aprovechadas por los islamistas. El ministro Al Rashdi rechaza las categorías. “Todos somos omaníes, tenían algunas peticiones y la mayoría se han respondido”, concluye. Sin embargo, en el discurso del sultán no falto una advertencia contra el extremismo. Aún reconociendo los esfuerzos, Khalid al Haribi opina que “todavía no se cuenta con los jóvenes y las jóvenes omaníes”. Al Haribi es el director ejecutivo de Tawasul, lo más parecido a un -think tank- que hay en este país. “Sin una evaluación y puesta en práctica de los cambios, va a pasar tiempo antes de que veamos un traspaso de conocimiento y de poder entre generaciones en el sultanato”, resume. La brecha generacional es clave. Quienes han vivido la transformación del país desde el golpe de Estado con el que Qabús derrocó a su padre en 1970, respaldan su forma cautelosa de gobernar y la gradualidad en las reformas que les han llevado del Medievo hasta el siglo XXI sin grandes traumas y convertido Omán en un oasis de estabilidad en una región convulsa. El desarrollo no se limita a la capital. El viaje hasta el palacio de Shomukh, a 170 kilómetros al suroeste de Mascate, permite comprobar que la electricidad, el agua potable o los servicios sanitarios se han extendido hasta el último rincón del país. Sin embargo, para la mayoría de los omaníes (el 70% de los cuales tiene menos de 30 años), las referencias son otras. 138

Sólo hay que acercarse a alguno de los cafés de la playa de Qorum, o asomarse a los chats de SablatOman, para comprobar que las nuevas hornadas de omaníes no sienten la misma reverencia que sus padres hacia el sultán. Aunque su figura aún es tabú, empieza a debatirse el modelo de monarquía. Y lo más importante, los jóvenes están perdiendo el miedo a hacer preguntas. “Las reformas tenían que haberse hecho mucho antes. ¿Por qué no se hicieron?”, pregunta Asma, de 26 años y que busca trabajo desde que se graduó en relaciones internacionales en 2009. A Asma, le preocupa la inflación, pero “también la falta de libertades políticas y sociales, o el derecho a expresarse libremente”. En su opinión, “los cambios han sido un primer paso, pero hacen falta campañas de concienciación pública y una completa revisión del sistema educativo para que no lave el cerebro a la gente”. “Es lo mejor que ha podido pasarle a Omán”, señala Saleh Zakwani, en referencia a las protestas. Zakwani, editor del Muscat Daily, el más osado de los cautelosos periódicos omaníes, enseguida precisa que “el sultán ya estaba trabajando en las reformas con anterioridad”. Sea como fuere, fuentes diplomáticas occidentales expresan su temor de que se hayan creado “excesivas expectativas de reforma” porque el monarca “sólo ha dado unos tímidos pasos”. Por ahora, parece haber contentado a la mayoría que, a la vista de lo que ha sucedido en Túnez, Egipto, Libia o el vecino Yemen, también sopesa qué puede perder y ganar. “Estamos convencidos de que no volverá a ser necesario recurrir al levantamiento popular para exigir un mejor gobernanza”, asegura Al Haribi. “A partir de ahora los omaníes somos también corresponsables en la toma de decisiones que van a determinar nuestro futuro”, advierte http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/02/actualidad/1320237593_15216 7.html

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Internacional La oposición siria denuncia la muerte de nueve personas en otra ola de represión El régimen reanuda las operaciones un día después de haber aceptado el plan de la Liga árabe para el cese de la violencia Siria acepta el cese de las acciones violentas y la liberación de detenidos Agencias El Cairo 3 NOV 2011 - 14:33 CET

Protesta contra el régimen durante un funeral de víctimas de la represión, ayer en Hula, cerca de Homs. / HANDOUT (REUTERS) El Gobierno sirio volvió a utilizar hoy sus fuerzas armadas para reprimir el movimiento opositor. Tan solo un día después de haber aceptado el plan de la Liga Árabe que llamaba a las autoridades sirias a retirar las fuerzas militares de la ciudad, vehículos acorazados del Ejército abrieron fuego contra los opositores en la ciudad de Homs. Al menos nueve personas murieron, según denuncia el Observatorio Sirio de Derechos Humanos. El grupo opositor señaló que hubo intensos tiroteos en varios distritos de Homs esta mañana y que el Ejército mandó refuerzos al barrio de Bab Amro. Por su parte, los Comités de Coordinación Local, otra organización opositora, confirmaron la muerte de seis personas en Homs, sin ofrecer más detalles. En la provincia septentrional de Idleb, el Ejército detuvo a siete manifestantes que salieron a las calles de la localidad de Kafr Umh para protestar en contra del plan de la Liga Árabe y las promesas de las autoridades de Damasco de resolver la crisis que vive el país, según el Observatorio. 140

Estas informaciones no han podido ser verificadas de forma independiente debido a las restricciones que impone el régimen sirio a los periodistas para trabajar. Las víctimas se producen después de que las autoridades de Damasco se comprometieran ayer ante los países árabes en El Cairo a cesar la violencia y liberar a los detenidos durante las protestas contra el régimen. La hoja de ruta trazada por una comisión ministerial de la Liga Arabe recibió la aprobación del Gobierno sirio, que también aceptó abrir sus fronteras al escrutinio de observadores árabes y de la prensa internacional. Además, el plan estipula el repliegue de ciudades y barrios del país de "toda presencia armada". La Liga Arabe advirtió a Siria de que volvería a reunirse para adoptar medidas si no aplicaba inmediatamente la iniciativa. Los grupos opositores recibieron con escepticismo el anuncio y dudaron del cumplimiento de las promesas de las autoridadessirias. Desde mediados de marzo pasado, Siria es escenario de revueltas populares contra el régimen de Al Asad, que han causado la muerte de unas 3.000 personas, entre ellas unos 187 menores, según las últimas cifras de la ONU. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/03/actualidad/1320326219_80599 0.html

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Iran warns US to avoid clash over nuclear programme Iranian foreign minister says America has 'lost its wisdom and prudence' as tensions mount over Tehran's enrichment efforts Nick Hopkins, Julian Borger and Ian Black guardian.co.uk, Thursday 3 November 2011 18.52 GMT

The Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, said his country was 'prepared for the worst'. Photograph: Esam Omran Al-Fetori/Reuters Iran has warned the US not to set the two countries on a collision course over Tehran's nuclear enrichment programme, as diplomatic tensions reflected growing concern that the Middle East might be on the verge of new conflict. The Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, spoke amid reports that the Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has been trying to rally support within his country for an attack. The Guardian revealed that the UK was advancing contingency plans for joining American forces in a possible air and sea campaign against military bases in Iran. The revelations led to Nato insisting on Thursday that it would play no part in any military action, and provoked the rebuke from Salehi, who insisted that any attack by either Israel or the US would provoke immediate retaliation. He also accused Washington of recklessness. "The US has unfortunately lost its wisdom and prudence in dealing with international issues," he told reporters during a visit to Libya. "Of course we are prepared for the worst, but we hope that they think twice before they put themselves on a collision course with Iran."

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In a separate interview with a Turkish newspaper, Salehi claimed Tehran was ready for war with Israel. "We have been hearing threats from Israel for eight years. Our nation is a united nation … such threats are not new to us," he said. "We are very sure of ourselves. We can defend our country." The pressure on Iran has been building since allegations surfaced of a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington. The White House insists Tehran was behind the plot, but the Iranian regime has denied that. The episode added to US concerns about Iran's nuclear enrichment programme and the increasing belligerence of its regime. Intelligence suggests that some of the Iranian centrifuges that can produce weapons-grade uranium are being hidden inside a fortified military base in Qom, about 100 miles south-west of Tehran. The International Atomic Energy Authority will next week deliver its latest bulletin on Iran's nuclear programme and is expected to provide fresh evidence of covert plans to engineer warheads. The Israeli defence minister, Ehud Barak, said to be one of those pushing for an early attack on Iran, was in London on Thursday for talks with David Cameron's national security adviser, Sir Peter Ricketts, the foreign secretary, William Hague, and the new defence secretary, Philip Hammond. Hague said the meeting had given them a chance to discuss "shared concerns such as … the threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme". Downing Street said "all options are on the table" for dealing with Iran unless it truly abandons any plans to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Though Britain says its policy on the issue has not changed, the Guardian disclosed that British military planners were now having to turn contingency plans into practical steps, such as considering when to deploy Royal Navy submarines equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles to the region, in case Barack Obama bows to pressure to launch missile strikes against Iranian bases. Although Iran has insisted it is only developing nuclear energy, Whitehall officials believe the regime will have hidden all it needs to build weapons inside fortified compounds within 12 months – adding a sense of urgency to diplomatic efforts. The Nato secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, called for political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the growing crisis. He insisted that Nato would not be drawn into any military action. "Let me stress that Nato has no intention whatsoever to intervene in Iran, and Nato is not engaged as an alliance in the Iran question," he said. Villy Søvndal, the new Danish foreign minister, said he could not see any circumstances in which his country would join a military effort against Iran, as it had done in Libya and Afghanistan. "The difference between Libya and Iran is that I could never imagine a UN resolution behind a military attack on Iran. There would be no regional backup. That would be one of the most impossible military missions. "Of course, you can bomb some buildings and equipment and maybe you could delay for a period of one or two years. But I can no see any situation in which Denmark would participate. It would produce so much instability … you could also end in a situation where you strengthen the present Iranian regime."

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In Israel, the row over whether to launch strikes against Iran continued, with Netanyahu reportedly ordering an investigation into alleged leaks of plans to attack nuclear facilities. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Jarida, the main suspects are the former heads of the Mossad and the Shin Bet, respectively Israel's foreign and domestic intelligence agencies. Netanyahu is said to believe that the two chiefs, Meir Dagan and Yuval Diskin, wanted to disrupt plans being drawn up by him and Barak to hit Iranian nuclear sites. Both Dagan and Diskin oppose military action against Iran unless all other options – primarily international diplomatic pressure and perhaps sabotage – have been exhausted. In January the recently retired Dagan, a hawk when he was running the Mossad, called an attack on Iran "the stupidest idea" he had ever heard. The Kuwaiti newspaper has a track record of running stories based on apparently high-level leaks from Israeli officials. Even well-informed Israeli observers admit to being confused about what is going on behind the scenes. "It seems that only Netanyahu and Barak know, and maybe even they haven't decided," said Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, both respected writers for the newspaper Haaretz. "While many people say Netanyahu and Barak are conducting sophisticated psychological warfare and don't intend to launch a military operation, top officials … are still afraid." The debate in Israel intensified further on Wednesday when Israel test-fired a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to Iran. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/03/iran-warns-us-clash- nuclear?CMP=EMCNEWEML1355

Israeli PM orders investigation into Iran leak Kuwaiti paper says Binyamin Netanyahu believes the heads of the Mossad and Shin Bet may have leaked plans for attack Israel has successfully test-fired a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and striking Iran.

IanU Black,U Middle East editor guardian.co.uk, Thursday 3 November 2011 13.57 GMT Israel's prime minister has ordered an investigation into alleged leaks of plans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities, it has been reported. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Jarida, the main suspects are the former heads of the Mossad and the Shin Bet, respectively Israel's foreign and domestic intelligence agencies.

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Netanyahu is said to believe that the two, Meir Dagan and Yuval Diskin, wanted to torpedo plans being drawn up by him and Ehud Barak, the defence minister, to hit Iranian nuclear sites. Tzipi Livni, leader of the opposition Kadima party, is also said to have been persuaded to attack Netanyahu for "adventurism" and "gambling with Israel's national interest". The paper suggested that the purpose of the leaks was to prevent an attack, which had moved from the stage of discussion to implementation. "Those who oppose the plan within the security establishment decided to leak it to the media and thwart the plan," it said. Both Dagan and Diskin oppose military action against Iran unless all other options – primarily international diplomatic pressure and perhaps sabotage — have been exhausted. In January the recently retired Dagan, a hawk when he was running the Mossad, called an attack on Iran "the stupidest idea I've ever heard". The Kuwait paper has a track record of running stories based on apparently high-level leaks from Israeli officials. Even well-informed Israeli observers admit to being confused about what is going on behind the scenes. "It seems that only Netanyahu and Barak know, and maybe even they haven't decided," commented Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, both respected Haaretz writers. "While many people say Netanyahu and Barak are conducting sophisticated psychological warfare and don't intend to launch a military operation, top officials … are still afraid." The idea that something significant is going on in this highly sensitive area was rekindled last week in comments by columnist Nahum Barnea, who wrote in Yedioth Ahronoth that the officials running Israel's military and intelligence services were opposed to a war with Iran. "Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak are the Siamese twins of the Iranian issue," he wrote. "A rare phenomenon is taking place here in terms of Israeli politics: a prime minister and defence minister who act as one body, with one goal, with mutual backing and repeated heaping of praise on each other… They're characterised as urging action. "Netanyahu portrayed the equation at the beginning of his term as: [Iranian president Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad is Hitler; if he is not stopped in time, there will be a Holocaust. There are some who describe Netanyahu's fervour on this subject as an obsession: all his life he's dreamed of being Churchill. Iran gives him the chance." The debate in Israel was further fanned on Wednesday when Israel successfully test- fired a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and striking Iran.

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Syria protests across the country aim to test regime's pledge to end crackdown Opposition groups call for rallies to see if government backing for the Arab League's blueprint to bring end to violence is genuine Martin Chulov guardian.co.uk, Thursday 3 November 2011 19.16 GMT

Syria's protests have been met with a brutal state response. This funeral is for 11 villagers killed near Homs on Wednesday. Photograph: REUTERS Syrian opposition groups have called on protesters to take to the streets in large numbers on Friday to test the sincerity of the regime's promise to end its sustained crackdown on dissent. Activists inside Syria and in exile say the state's backing of an Arab League plan to stop seven months of violence will be tested over the weekend with demonstrators attending rallies across the country. The European Union also called on Damascus to honour the terms of the Arab League deal, which president Bashar al-Assad's government said it would implement in full. Arab League officials on Thursday briefed Syrian opposition figures on the plan, which is being hailed as a blueprint to end an increasingly violent revolt that has led to at least 3,000 civilian deaths since March. But as the briefing was being held, it became clear that no timetable had been laid down for implementing the key selling points of the plan, such as removing tanks from civilian areas, freeing prisoners and allowing monitors and foreign reporters into the country. "This gives Damascus room to move," said a Beirut-based activist. "Without a timeline, it's not a plan, it's a wish-list."

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The Arab League said Damascus had also conceded to a meeting with opposition figures, something it had steadfastly refused to do until now. In an interview over the weekend, Assad repeated his refusal to hold a dialogue with the Syrian National Council (SNC), a coalition of opposition figures who are trying to organise a governing council in exile. Up to 20 people were killed nationwide on Thursday in killings that marked an inauspicious start to the peace plan. At least six of the deaths were in the flashpoint city of Homs, where an armed insurgency against government security forces continues to rage. "On Tuesday night and on Wednesday the fighting here was intense," said a resident of Homs, Mohamed Dahbi. "They came for us before dawn – the usual thing of tanks and artillery." In a meeting in Cairo Arab League chief, Nabil al-Arabi, was told by Samir al-Nashar, a member of the SNC, said an absence of trust would make a summit with the Syrian regime unlikely. "We told the secretary general of our fears that the regime will not keep its promises," he told the Egyptian state media agency, Mena. "We discussed entering negotiations with the authorities to move from a totalitarian to a democratic system, and demanded that President Assad leaves power." Lady Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief, praised the Arab League initiative, calling on Damascus to "fully and rapidly" carry out the plan. She stopped short of the stance of Britain and the US, which also welcomed news of the deal but insisted that Assad had to leave office. Both countries pointed to a list of promised reforms made by Assad over the past seven months that have not been honoured. Ashton said Damascus now needed to give opposition groups room to organise. In a statement, she said that the plan could only work "if the Syrian authorities provide the space and security for opposition groups to work with all sectors of the Syrian population for a peaceful political transition". Syria's leaders have repeatedly claimed that they have not been given time to deliver on reforms announced earlier in the year, such as removing a constitutional article that empowers the Baath party as the country's supreme authority, and allowing multi-party elections. Assad has said reform protests can start in earnest once calm is restored to the country's towns and cities. However, anti-regime demonstrators have maintained a strong presence across the country and have increasingly courted regional support. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/03/syria-protests-test-regime- pledge?CMP=EMCNEWEML1355

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Tunisie : l'échec des modernistes | 02.11.11 | 13h45 • Mis à jour le 08.11.11 | 14h25 Isabelle Mandraud (Service International) Depuis 2006, et la victoire, dans un contexte particulier, du Hamas à Gaza, les islamistes n'avaient pas remporté d'élections. En Tunisie, ils arrivent largement en tête des premières élections libres organisées le 23 octobre pour désigner une Assemblée constituante. Certes, Ennahda, avec 41,7 % des sièges, n'a pas la majorité absolue, mais il domine la "nouvelle Tunisie", comme ses dirigeants se plaisent à le souligner, et dirigera le futur gouvernement provisoire. Après trente ans de règne autoritaire d'Habib Bourguiba, père de l'indépendance tunisienne et laïque revendiqué, puis vingt-trois ans de dictature de Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, le parti islamiste est apparu comme l'alternative "naturelle". Les classes populaires n'ont pas été les seules à glisser leur bulletin dans l'urne ; dans la communauté tunisienne à Paris comme dans la banlieue chic de Tunis, des hommes et des femmes, diplômés, ont voté pour les listes d'Ennahda. Et pourtant... Les islamistes n'ont pas été à l'origine du soulèvement populaire qui a mis fin, le 14 janvier, à l'ancien régime et provoqué la fuite de Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali en Arabie saoudite. Comme beaucoup, ils ont regardé en spectateurs les émeutes des jeunes éclater au centre du pays, le 17 décembre 2010, à Sidi Bouzid, puis à Kasserine, ou Thala. Comme d'autres, comme la bourgeoisie, ils ont attendu la mi-janvier pour rejoindre, incrédules, les cortèges. Ils sont venus, petit à petit, se mêler aux manifestants sur la place de la Kasbah, à Tunis. En arrière-plan. Ce ne sont pas les islamistes, non plus, malgré 30 000 d'entre eux emprisonnés, qui ont pendant des années, porté sur la scène internationale la voix de l'opposition. En 1988, le chef de file du Mouvement de la tendance islamiste (le MTI, ancêtre d'Ennahda), Rachid Ghannouchi, gracié par l'ancien président Ben Ali après sa première condamnation aux travaux forcés à perpétuité, avait même exprimé sa "confiance" dans le dirigeant tunisien, avant de se trouver contraint à l'exil. A Bruxelles, Paris ou Washington, ce sont les modernistes, laïques et de gauche, qui ont surtout combattu à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur le régime de Tunis, dénoncé la censure et les tortures. A Paris : Kamel Jendoubi, opposant privé de passeport pendant dix ans, Souhayr Belhassen, présidente de la Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme ; à Tunis : l'ancien député Khamaïs Chammari ou l'avocate Radhia Nasraoui, qui a eu une fille dans la clandestinité avec son mari, Hamma Hammami, porte-parole du Parti ouvrier communiste tunisien (POCT)... Des hommes politiques engagés comme Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, chef de file du Parti démocrate progressiste (PDP), qui mena à deux reprises une grève de la faim, en 2005 et en 2007, ou Mustapha Ben Jaafar, président depuis 1994 du Forum démocratique pour le travail et les libertés (FDTL, "Ettakatol" en arabe), candidats écartés de l'élection présidentielle, ont eux aussi tenté de défier le pouvoir de Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali.

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Après la chute de l'ancien régime de Carthage, ce sont les modernistes, toujours, qui ont été aux avant-postes de la première phase de la transition démocratique. Eux qui ont imposé le calendrier, les listes paritaires - uniques dans le monde arabe et au-delà -, le mode de scrutin proportionnel au plus fort reste, les règles de financement, réformé les lois électorales, de la presse et des partis. Ennahda a, certes, participé aux travaux, mais en acteur de second plan. Tout a changé avec la campagne. Incapables de s'entendre, trop sûrs d'eux, les modernistes ont rejeté l'idée d'une liste commune pour l'élection à l'Assemblée constituante qui aurait mis la dynamique de leur côté. Au lieu de cela, les ambitions personnelles des uns et des autres ont avivé les rivalités et brouillé les messages. Au fil des semaines, ces formations se sont laissées enfermer dans un débat identitaire avec lequel elles n'ont jamais su se mettre à bonne distance, tantôt ménageant la chèvre et le chou, tantôt s'indignant au point de faire d'Ennahda le principal sujet de discussion. Et tandis que le parti islamiste ravivait dans tout le pays ses anciens réseaux de militants, affaiblis mais disciplinés, les modernistes ont ignoré des régions entières et leurs habitants confrontés aux pires difficultés économiques et sociales. Leurs meetings, entre soi, avec le concours d'intellectuels et d'artistes tunisiens de renom, auraient tout aussi bien pu se dérouler à la Mutualité de Paris qu'à la Coupole de Tunis. Ce n'est que dans les derniers jours que les forces progressistes ont tenté d'inverser la tendance, en multipliant, mais trop tard, les opérations de porte-à-porte. La panique aidant, certains ont même envoyé des SMS aux membres de la commission électorale pour leur demander, le plus sérieusement du monde, de repousser d'une semaine le scrutin... La sanction est aujourd'hui cruelle. Le PDP de Nejib Chebbi s'est effondré. Ettakatol de Mustapha Ben Jafaar n'arrive qu'en quatrième position, derrière le Congrès pour la république (CPR, nationalistes de gauche) et le richissime homme d'affaires de Londres, Hachemi Hamdi, dont une partie des listes populistes a été invalidée. Le Pôle démocratique et moderniste (PDM) n'emporte que 5 sièges. Et c'est désormais la question de l'alliance avec Ennahda pour gouverner qui fait débat en leur sein : à l'exception du PDP qui a exclu cette hypothèse, ailleurs les discussions vont bon train. Non, les partis modernistes n'étaient pas bien placés pour gagner cette première élection. [email protected] Article paru dans l'édition du 03.11.11 Tunisie : l'échec des modernistes Mis à jour le 08.11.11 | 14h25 http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/11/02/tunisie-l-echec-des- modernistes_1597402_3232.html

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Syria Crackdown Gets Italy Firm’s Aid With U.S.-Europe Spy Gear By Ben Elgin and Vernon Silver - Nov 3, 2011 As Syria’s crackdown on protests has claimed more than 3,000 lives since March, Italian technicians in telecom offices from Damascus to Aleppo have been busy equipping President Bashar al-Assad’s regime with the power to intercept, scan and catalog virtually every e-mail that flows through the country. Employees of Area SpA, a surveillance company based outside Milan, are installing the system under the direction of Syrian intelligence agents, who’ve pushed the Italians to finish, saying they urgently need to track people, a person familiar with the project says. The Area employees have flown into Damascus in shifts this year as the violence has escalated, says the person, who has worked on the system for Area. Area is using equipment from American and European companies, according to blueprints and other documents obtained by Bloomberg News and the person familiar with the job. The project includes Sunnyvale, California-based NetApp Inc. (NTAP) storage hardware and software for archiving e-mails; probes to scan Syria’s communications network from Paris-based Qosmos SA; and gear from Germany’s Utimaco Safeware AG (USA) that connects tapped telecom lines to Area’s monitoring- center computers. The suppliers didn’t directly furnish Syria with the gear, which Area exported from Italy, the person says. The Italians bunk in a three-bedroom rental apartment in a residential Damascus neighborhood near a sports stadium when they work on the system, which is in a test phase, according to the person, who requested anonymity because Area employees sign non-disclosure agreements with the company. Mapping Connections When the system is complete, Syrian security agents will be able to follow targets on flat-screen workstations that display communications and Web use in near-real time alongside graphics that map citizens’ networks of electronic contacts, according to the documents and two people familiar with the plans. Such a system is custom-made for repression, says Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which promotes tighter sanctions against Syria. “Any company selling monitoring surveillance technology to the Assad regime is complicit in human rights crimes,” he says. Privately held Area, which got its start in 1996 furnishing phone taps to Italian law enforcement, has code-named the system “Asfador.” The title is a nod to a Mr. Asfador who cold-called the company in 2008 asking it to bid on the deal, according to one person knowledgeable about the project. The person didn’t know Mr. Asfador’s full

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name, and efforts to identify him were unsuccessful. The price tag is more than 13 million euros ($17.9 million), two people familiar with the deal say. Change Outpaces Deals Area Chief Executive Officer Andrea Formenti says he can’t discuss specific clients or contracts, and that the company follows all laws and export regulations. He says governments often use what is known as “lawful interception” gear to catch criminals. Without referring specifically to Syria, Formenti says political change can outpace business deals. “You may consider that any lawful interception system has a very long sales process, and things happen very quickly,” he says, citing the velocity of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s fall, only a year after pitching his Bedouin tent in a Rome park on a visit to Italy. “Qaddafi was a big friend of our prime minister until not long ago.” When Bloomberg News contacted Qosmos, CEO Thibaut Bechetoille said he would pull out of the project. “It was not right to keep supporting this regime,” he says. The company’s board decided about four weeks ago to exit and is still figuring out how to unwind its involvement, he says. The company’s deep- packet inspection probes can peer into e-mail and reconstruct everything that happens on an Internet user’s screen, says Qosmos’s head of marketing, Erik Larsson. Monitoring Centers “The mechanics of pulling out of this, technically and contractually, are complicated,” Larsson says. The daisy chain of Western companies from the U.S. to Europe shows the route high- tech surveillance equipment takes on its way to repressive regimes that can use it against their own political enemies. As uprisings in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia toppled Arab leaders this year, Assad, 46, has held on, deploying security forces against demonstrators protesting his rule, and defying a call by U.S. President Barack Obama to step down. Bordering Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, Syria has been run by Assad and his late father, Hafez, for a combined 41 years. Captor Computers Area is installing the system, which includes the company’s “Captor” monitoring-center computers, through a contract with state-owned Syrian Telecommunication Establishment, or STE, the two people familiar with the project say. Also known as Syrian Telecom, the company is the nation’s main fixed-line operator. Without the Area gear, Syria’s current electronic surveillance captures only a portion of the nation’s communications, and lacks the new system’s ability to monitor all Internet traffic, say the two people who know of Syria’s capabilities through their work for Area. Businesses that sell surveillance equipment to Syria should be held accountable for aiding repression, says Osama Edward Mousa, a Syrian blogger who was arrested in 2008 for criticizing the regime and fled to Sweden in 2010.

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“Every single company who is selling monitoring technology to the Syrian government is a partner to stopping democracy in Syria,” he says. “They are a partner to the killing of people in Syria. They are helping the Syrian government stay in control.” Syria Sanctions The European Union has imposed a series of sanctions against Syria since May, including a ban on arms sales and a freeze on assets of people in the regime. The measures don’t prohibit European companies from selling Syria the sort of equipment in Area’s project. The U.S. has banned most American exports to Syria other than food or medicine since 2004. That means the U.S. government may need to determine if the shipment of NetApp’s hardware to Syria violated sanctions, says Hal Eren, a former lawyer for the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control who is in private practice in Washington. “Products of U.S. origin, whether they’re exported or re- exported, are generally prohibited to Syria,” Eren says. NetApp, which has a market value of about $15 billion and more than 10,000 employees, makes its products in countries around the globe, according to its most recent annual report. NetApp ‘Not Aware’ “NetApp takes these matters very seriously and is committed to global trade compliance,” Jodi Baumann, NetApp’s Sunnyvale-based senior director for corporate communications, said in a statement. “We are not aware of any NetApp products being sold or having been sold into Syria.” The NetApp deal was structured in a way that avoided dealing directly with Area, one of the people familiar with the project says. NetApp’s Italian subsidiary sold the equipment through an authorized vendor in Italy which then re-sold it to Area, the person says. Utimaco General Manager Malte Pollmann says his company relies on Area to ensure its equipment is used and exported legally. “Area is a trusted long-term partner,” he says. Utimaco, based in Oberursel near Frankfurt, wasn’t aware of any Syria project involving its gear and rarely knows where partners install its equipment, Pollmann says. “I wouldn’t need to know, because it’s not the duty of any of our end partners to tell us,” Pollmann says. “We don’t sell direct.” No Information Sophos Ltd., the Abingdon, England-based provider of security and data-protection software that controls Utimaco, referred questions to Utimaco, said Fiona Halkerston, who handles Sophos media relations at London agency Johnson King Ltd. STE General Director Baker Baker didn’t respond to a request for comment faxed to his office. At Syria’s embassy in Rome, a press officer said she had no information about the system and declined to comment on human rights implications of such monitoring. 152

Syria’s purchase of the system illustrates how authoritarian governments are using Western-produced surveillance technology to track dissidents. In Iran, a Bloomberg News investigation showed, European companies provided or marketed gear to track citizens’ locations and communications that law enforcement or state security agencies would have access to. Tools for Interrogators In Bahrain, interrogators of human rights activists used text-message transcripts generated by European surveillance equipment, the investigation found. Other Middle Eastern nations that cracked down on uprisings this year purchased the same gear, including Egypt, Yemen and Syria, according to the report. In Syria, Area’s system for intercepting e-mail and Web sessions will be more intrusive than simpler equipment for blocking websites. The U.S. is looking into reports that Syria is using technology made by Blue Coat Systems Inc. (BCSI), another company based in Sunnyvale, to censor the Internet and record browsing histories, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said at an Oct. 24 news briefing. Blue Coat is investigating allegations its filtering gear was sold or transferred to Syria, spokesman Steve Schick says. The company doesn’t sell to Syria and prohibits its partners from selling to Syria or other embargoed countries, he says. The State Department’s Nuland underscored the ban on virtually all U.S. exports to Syria, responding to a question about Blue Coat during the news conference. State Department Concerned “We are concerned about reports of the use of technology by repressive regimes in general, but Syria in particular, to target activists and dissidents,” she said. Over the past three years, Area has been working to furnish Syria with precisely those tools. Area, which is based in a modern office building next to Milan’s Malpensa Airport, got the 2008 phone call asking it to compete for the project as it was struggling to collect debts at home, the person familiar with the call says. Along with two Italian competitors, the company had been pressing the Italian government that year to pay overdue bills for interception work, Area CEO Formenti says. Area won the Syria deal in 2009, two people familiar with the project say. This February, a ship carrying the computers and other equipment arrived in the Syrian port of Latakia, one of the people says. Death Toll With the gear in Syria, deployment of Asfador unfolded in parallel with Assad’s escalating crackdown. The turmoil began in mid-March. Two weeks into the violence, on March 30, Italian employees of NetApp and Area exchanged e-mails in which the computer supplier gave advice to the surveillance company on how to configure equipment that had just been delivered, copies of the correspondence show. That same day, Assad addressed Syria’s parliament, blaming the protests on a “conspiracy.” “If the battle was imposed on us today, we welcome it,” he said. 153

By then, more than 90 people had been killed in clashes, according to Amnesty International. An Area schematic for “NetApp Storage Cluster B,” dated May 26, shows how the U.S. company’s stacks of disks were being wired in computer cabinets. The schematic bears the Asfador code name as well as a cover sheet titled “STE PDN Monitoring Center Project.” Also on May 26, Syrian security forces killed at least three protesters in the Daraa governorate, bringing the death toll to more than 1,100 people. Surveillance Room If Area’s installation is completed as planned, Assad’s government will gain the power to dip into virtually any corner of the Internet in Syria. Schematics for the system show it includes probes in the traffic of mobile phone companies and Internet service providers, capturing both domestic and international traffic. NetApp storage will allow agents to archive communications for future searches or mapping of peoples’ contacts, according to the documents and the person familiar with the system. The equipment has already been set up in an air-conditioned room at a telecom exchange building in the Mouhajireen neighborhood of Damascus, where about 30 metal racks hold the computers that handle the surveillance and storage, the person familiar with the installation says. The data center has a linkup to a surveillance room one floor above, where the intercepted communications will stream to some 40 terminals, the person says. Two people familiar with terms of the deal say that as a final stage of the installation, the contract stipulates Area employees will train the Syrian security agents who will man those workstations -- teaching them how to track citizens. To contact the reporters on this story: Ben Elgin in San Francisco at [email protected]; Vernon Silver in Rome at [email protected]; To contact the editors responsible for this story: Melissa Pozsgay at [email protected]; Gary Putka at [email protected] Ben Elgin and Vernon Silver Syria Crackdown Gets Italy Firm’s Aid With U.S.-Europe Spy Gear Nov 3, 2011 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-03/syria-crackdown- gets-italy-firm-s-aid-with-u-s-europe-spy-gear.html

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Arab League to reveal Syria peace plan – Wednesday 3 November 2011 • Syria agrees to Arab League plan to end violence • Activists condemn 'executions' as bloodshed continues • Israel warns activists over ships sailing to Gaza • Nobel winner condemns UN inaction over Yemen and Syria

Colonel Riad Assad, leader of the Syria Free Army, said the defected brigade is continuing to attack government targets. Photograph: Hasan Yetmez/Reuters

6.24pm: Time for an evening summary. Syria • Syria has accepted an Arab League roadmap aimed at ending the bloody crackdown that has plagued the country for the past seven months. The proposal calls for the regime to withdraw armoured vehicles from the streets, stop violence against protesters, release all political prisoners and begin a dialogue with the opposition within two weeks. Syria also agreed to allow journalists, rights groups and Arab League representatives to monitor the situation in the country. • The news has been greeted with a heavy dose of scepticism, with many urging Damascus to follow through in concrete terms. "I hope that this agreement will be implemented without delay," said UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, noting Bashar al-Assad had not kept promises in the past. "We are happy to have reached the agreement and we'll be happier if it is carried 155

out," said Qatar's Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim. A potential stumbling block remained in the location of talks with the opposition. Arab diplomats involved in the process said they had suggested Cairo while Syrian insisted that all dialogue take place in the capital Damascus, AP reported. • Meanwhile, the bloodshed continues. Activists in Syria say the security forces have killed at least 11 people in Homs in an apparent execution. The Local Coordination Committees described the killings as the Hawleh massacre, after the district in Homs where the killings took place. Graphic video evidence has emerged suggesting the victims of the violence were bound and gagged before being executed. Amnesty International's Neil Sammonds said the incident "appears to be a revenge attack or manipulated to look like a revenge attack" carried out by plain-clothed security forces. (See 1.40pm.) Activists in Syria also said gunmen had attacked a bus carrying workers from the village of Jib Abbas as they were returning from their jobs, killing nine passengers. Israel and Palestinian territories • Pro-Palestinian activists have launched another attempt to break the blockade in Gaza. An international group set sail from Turkey aboard two boats- one Canadian and one Irish- carrying 27 people, said the organisers of "Freedom Wave to Gaza". An Israeli official told Reuters the ships would not be able to reach their destination, adding Israel "will take whatever measures will be necessary" to stop that happening. • Unesco has pleaded with the US to reinstate the funding withdrawn after the agency voted to admit Palestine. Irina Bokova issued a statement warning the US that its withdrawal of funds put at risk programmes that are "in America's core interests".(See 5.07pm.) Yemen • At least nine people have been killed in heavy clashes between government troops and dissident army units in the southern Yemeni city of Taiz. A Yemeni medical official told AP they died in clashes between pro-opposition militia and civilians. There are also reports of heavy shelling in the city. • There are more signs that President Ali Abdullah Saleh is inching towards accepting a UN transition plan that would see him hand over power to his deputy. The state news agency SABA quoted the EU envoy to Yemen, Michele Cervone d'Urso, as saying last night that Saleh had accepted the formula. (See 11.20am.) Egypt • The jailed Egyptian blogger Alaa Abd El Fattah has written a secret letter from his prison cell, accusing the country's military rulers of murder. "I never expected to repeat the experience of five years ago," he writes. "After a revolution that deposed the tyrant, I go back to his jails?" The 29-year-old is being held in what he describes a cockroach-infested 6x12 foot cell with eight other men, according to the Guardian's Jack Shenker. Iraq • October was the bloodiest month this year for civilians in Iraq, according to government figures. The Health Ministry has said that 161 civilians were killed in the month just passed, a sharp increase from September's 110. (See 11.15am.) The news comes nearly a fortnight after Barack Obama said US troops would leave Iraq by the end of the year. Libya • Groups of Libyan fighters involved in a personal feud exchanged fire at Tripoli hospital, leaving one dead and five wounded over two days of battles. AP described it as one of the most serious cases of personal score-settling by revolutionary forces since the fall of the Gaddafi regime.

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5.47pm: My colleague Simon Tisdall has written a piece reacting to Syria's acceptance of the Arab League roadmap. The stage is now set, he writes, for a "pretend peace".

The mooted deal raises uncomfortable questions for the US, Britain and Syria's neighbours such as Turkey. Having demanded Assad step down and imposed swingeing sanctions to achieve that end, they face the awkward prospect – if the plan goes ahead – of the regime surviving indefinitely as international pressure eases and hopes of genuine democratic reform are effectively dashed. 5.07pm: The aftermath of Unesco's vote to admit Palestine rumbles on. The director-general of the Paris-based agency has issued a statement today warning the US that its withdrawal of funds puts at risk programmes that are "in America's core interests". Irina Bokova referred specifically to projects "such as those fostering a free media in nascent Mideast democracies." 5.00pm: The Arab League says Syria has accepted its proposal to ease the country's 7- month-old political crisis, AP is reporting. It adds:

The proposal calls on Syria to withdraw all tanks and armoured vehicles from the streets, stop violence against protesters, release all political prisoners and begin a dialogue with the opposition within two weeks. Syria also agreed to allow journalists, rights groups and Arab League representatives to monitor the situation in Syria. It remains unclear if the agreement will make a difference on the ground. Syria has continued its bloody crackdown on anti-government protesters despite international condemnation and previous promises of reform. 4.11pm: The funeral for men killed in an apparent execution near Homs, turned into a focus for protests, according to video from activists. Thousands of people turned out for the ceremony, the unverified footage shows. The caption to this clip said the men were murdered by president Assad's gangs. Graphic footage of nine bound and gagged men emerged this morning (see 9.54am) 3.56pm: Pro-Palestinian activists have launched another attempt to break the blockade in Gaza. Democracy Now reports the Tahrir left from an undisclosed port in the eastern Mediterranean Sea earlier today bound for the Gaza Strip. The "Freedom Waves to Gaza" flotilla marks the latest attempt by international activists to break the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. Egyptian journalist, Lina Attalah, who is on board tweeted:

we just reached international waters aboard of the canada boat to #gaza #freedomwaves @almasryalyoum_e #tahrir 3.38pm: UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon has again demanded an immediate end to the crackdown in Syria, and urged president Assad to agree to the Arab League plan. AFP quoted him telling a news conference in Tripoli: "Killing civilians must stop immediately in Syria. He [Bashar al-Assad] must implement the agreement as soon as possible." Syrian activists are not holding their breath about the League's proposals, judging by responses on Twitter.

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Edward Dark:

18 dead in #Syria today after the regime "agrees" to Arab League paper ... what would happen if it didn't????? Shakeeb Al-Jabri: So I guess we will not see #Syria's rep respond to the Arab League plan. Shame, I really need a laugh. Maysalon: Not feeling optimistic about this - "@guardiannews: Arab League to reveal Syria peace plan - live updates gu.com/p/334vt/tf" 3.20pm: The Arab League is holding an emergency meeting in Cairo to discuss its Syria plan, while it continues towait for an official response from Damascus, al-Jazeera reports. Earlier a Lebanese official suggested a possible reason for the delay. "The Syrian authorities want the opposition to drop weapons, the Arab states to end their funding for the weapons and the opposition, and an end to the media campaign against Syria," the official told Reuters. 2.57pm: The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, has a similar account to Amnesty's of the apparent executions near Homs, CNN reports. It says: At least 18 people were killed in the Syrian province of Homs Wednesday, the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said. Five people were killed by gunfire in different neighbourhoods in the city of Homs by security forces and their supporters, the organisation said. In the al Shammas neighborhood, a civilian died of wounds he sustained, and the body of a woman was found near a bus station, the group reported. Eleven others were killed in the town of Kfarhala/Al Hula after they were attacked in the factory where they worked by armed men coming from villages that support the Syrian regime, the organisation said. 2.41pm: While we still wait for the details of the Arab League plan on Syria, the opposition Syrian National Council have called on the organisation to suspend Syria's membership. Deutsche Presse-Agentur quotes a Council statement as saying: "The Arab League should freeze Syria's membership and ensure the protection of civilians." Omar Idlibi, a spokesman for the opposition Local Coordination Committees, underlined reluctance from many in the opposition to enter dialogue with the regime. "How can we sit down with a government that is still killing our people on the ground?" Idlibi told DPA. Talks with the opposition is thought to be a key plank of the League's plan. But as Foreign Policy magazine points out only the Damascus-based National Coordination Committee accepts the idea of dialogue with the regime. 1.40pm: Bound and gagged victims of an apparent execution, whose bodies were filmed today near Homs, (see 9.54am) were killed by plain-clothed security forces in an revenge attack, local sources told Amnesty International's Neil Sammonds.

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"It appears to be a revenge attack or manipulated to look like a revenge attack," he said after speaking to several sources in the area. The incident comes after reports that nine people of either Christian or Alawite were killed after an attack on a bus, he said. Some hours after that ... shabiha - regime militia who go around in civilian clothes - went into this tissue factory and killed up to 11 people. It is apparently their bodies which are shown in a very gruesome video. It looks as though some have been beaten up, one has had his hand cut off. Some said they had been killed by knives, others that they had been shot. All of the people we spoke to today, said it has become very ugly [in Homs] and it has become harder and harder to really know what's happening. It [Homs] is the third largest city [in Syria]. It has got a strong ethnic mosaic going through it, although most people are Sunni. But it has become the heart, effectively, of the resistance. Thousands of people who have defected from the army have congregated, it appears, in the Homs province. We are getting different figures for how many have left the army, but most say perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 [defected soldiers] have kept their arms and are using them primarily to defend civilians areas. There is a danger that Syria is drifting into civil war, Sammonds said. It is one of the main cards of the regime, that this is what they may encourage to make it looks as if they are the best arbiter. Still the overwhelming majority of the protesters are peaceful ... Events such as these killings do generate all sorts of fears for the way that this could go. Sammonds also discussed the importance of videos in documenting the violence in Syria. The videos have been extremely important, given that the majority of news media, and independent human rights organisations, have not been allowed into the country. Many people from the protesting side have got better and better at documenting abuses, by stating the date and location of where videos are being filmed. It is way of bringing home to the outside world the gravity of abuses. These kinds of killings of civilians, probably with the role of security forces, is something which the international community has to be taking some strong measures on. It should be referred by the security council to the international criminal court, it is really as serious as that. We can't verify it and we have not spoke to the people who took the video. So we are going on what a number of generally trusted contacts have been telling us in and around Homs. There is rawness to the video, as people are howling and talking about 'this is the guns of Bashar which have done that, where's the Arab League?' It looks like a genuine video. But the context to the killing remains a mystery, and until organisations such as ourselves and independent media are allowed to go in and see what's happening, it is going to be difficult to workout what's happening in places like Homs. 1.00pm: More details have emerged about that horrific video footage showing the bound and gagged victims of an apparent execution in Homs province in central Syria (see 9.54am). The campaign group Avaaz said 11 dead men were found in a factory with gunshot wounds to the head. It publishes the names of eight of them, and adds there was evidence they had been tortured. The factory manager, Molham al Khodr, was among the dead, it said. A witness who discovered the bodies said: At around 8 this morning we discovered the massacre. The corpses had their hands tied, were gagged and the bodies were facing the wall. All of them were shot in the back of the head. We think the perpetrators used silencers on the weapons because there had been no sound of gunfire

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12.26pm: Time for a lunchtime summary. Syria • The Arab League is preparing to unveil its plan to end the violent crackdown by the Syrian regime on protesters. Details of the proposals are still sketchy but Syria's state news agency said they would be announced in Cairo today. The plan is expected to involve giving the Assad regime a deadline to remove tanks from the streets and begin talks with the opposition. • Despite the fanfare, there is confusion over whether Damascus has given the plan the thumbs-up. AP reported that, while state-run media said last night that the regime had agreed to the plan, a senior Arab League official said they had not yet received any response from Syria. (See 10.31am.) • Meanwhile, the bloodshed continues. Activists in Syria say the security forces have killed 13 people in Homs. The Local Coordination Committees described the killings as the Hawleh massacre, after the district in Homs where the killings took place. Graphic video evidence has emerged suggesting the victims of the violence were bound and gagged before being executed. Yemen • At least nine people have been killed in heavy clashes between government troops and dissident army units in the southern Yemeni city of Taiz. A Yemeni medical official told AP they died in clashes between pro-opposition militia and civilians. There are also reports of heavy shelling in the city. • There are more signs that President Ali Abdullah Saleh is inching towards accepting a UN transition plan that would see him hand over power to his deputy. The state news agency SABA quoted the EU envoy to Yemen, Michele Cervone d'Urso, as saying last night that Saleh had accepted the formula. (See 11.20am.) Libya • Groups of Libyan fighters involved in a personal feud exchanged fire at Tripoli hospital, leaving one dead and five wounded over two days of battles. AP described it as one of the most serious cases of personal score-settling by revolutionary forces since the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Egypt • The jailed Egyptian blogger Alaa Abd El Fattah has written a secret letter from his prison cell, accusing the country's military rulers of murder. "I never expected to repeat the experience of five years ago," he writes. "After a revolution that deposed the tyrant, I go back to his jails?" The 29-year-old is being held in what he describes a cockroach-infested 6x12 foot cell with eight other men, according to the Guardian's Jack Shenker. Iraq • October was the bloodiest month this year for civilians in Iraq, according to government figures. The Health Ministry has said that 161 civilians were killed in the month just passed, a sharp increase from September's 110. (See 11.15am.) The news comes nearly a fortnight after Barack Obama said US troops would leave Iraq by the end of the year. Iran • President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to have won the latest battle in his political war with Iran's supreme leader. A petition to summon him to appear before parliament for 160

questioning over issues including corruption failed after some legislators withdrew their support for it. (See 11.58am.) 11.58am: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, appears to have won the latest battle in political war with Iran's supreme leader. AP reports on the failure of petition to summon him to parliament for questioning over a long list of accusations, including corruption. The power struggle is an internal conflict in Iran in the run-up to parliamentary elections in March 2012 and the 2013 presidential election. Had the petition succeeded, Ahmadinejad would have been the first Iranian president to be hauled before parliament a serious blow to his standing in the conflict involving the president, lawmakers and Iran's powerful clerics. By Sunday, 73 lawmakers had signed the petition, meeting the constitutional requirement that a quarter of lawmakers in the 290-seat assembly support the bid to call in a president. But at least three legislators withdrew their signatures Wednesday, effectively killing the motion, at least temporarily, said Mohammad Hossein Farhangi, a prominent lawmaker. 11.52am: The writer Robert Dreyfuss puts the Arab League plan for Syria in context. Writing on Comment is Free, he says:

Because the league is dominated by Saudi Arabia, however, and because the delegation to Damascus was led by Qatar, which led the Arab military action against Libya, it seems likely that the Arab League is tilting strongly against Assad. That's not because the king of Saudi Arabia and his friends in the Gulf Co-operation Council care about dead protesters. More important to them is that there's a chance to deal a knockout blow to an ally of Iran, a key strategic goal in the cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

11.37am: The jailed Egyptian revolutionary Alaa Abd El Fattah has written a secret letter from his prison cell, accusing the country's military rulers of murder and lamenting what he views as the army's hijacking of the revolution, writes Jack Shenker. The piece, produced covertly from inside Bab El-Khalq prison where Abd El Fattah is being held, was handed to his heavily pregnant wife, Manal, during a visit on Monday. It is being published in Arabic by the Egyptian newspaper Al Shorouk and in English by the Guardian, and is likely to intensify the growing divisions between Egypt's increasingly repressive army junta and pro-change activists on the street. Abd El Fattah, one of Egypt's most prominent anti-regime voices and a former political prisoner under the Mubarak dictatorship, was taken into military custody on Sunday evening following public criticisms of the army's conduct on the night of 9 October, when at least 27 people were killed during a Coptic Christian protest march in downtown Cairo. Abd El Fattah's letter begins: I never expected to repeat the experience of five years ago: after a revolution that deposed the tyrant, I go back to his jails? 161

The memories come back to me, all the details of imprisonment; the skills of sleeping on the floor, nine men in a six-by-12-foot (two-by-four-metre) cell, the songs of prison, the conversations. But I absolutely can't remember how I used to keep my glasses safe while I slept. They have been stepped on three times already today. I suddenly realise they're the same glasses that were with me in my last imprisonment; the one for supporting the Egyptian judiciary in 2006. And that I am locked up, again pending trial, again on a set of loose and flimsy charges – the one difference is that instead of the state security prosecutor we have the military prosecutor – a change in keeping with the military moment we're living now. You can read the rest here. 11.20am: At least nine people have been killed in heavy clashes between government troops and dissident army units in the southern Yemeni city of Taiz. A Yemeni medical official told AP they died in clashes between pro-opposition militia and civilians. Abdel-Raziq al-Gabri, a field hospital doctor, says security forces randomly shelled several neighbourhoods in Taiz, where pro-opposition fighters had taken over a government building in the city centre. The New York Times's Laura Kasinof says the fighting in the city centre began- according to the government- "after opposition tribesmen tried to take over education building". Reuters reports a local unnamed source saying that a bank has been attacked and looting broken out. Meanwhile, there are more signs that President Ali Abdullah Saleh is inching towards accepting a UN transition plan that would see him hand over power to his deputy. The state news agency SABA quoted the EU envoy to Yemen, Michele Cervone d'Urso, as saying last night that Saleh had accepted the formula. D'Urso, who reportedly asked the opposition to return home before the Muslim Eid al-Adha holiday next week so that a deal could be finalised, was quoted as saying: "We are convinced that we are on the verge of reaching an agreement soon and above all else the matter calls for political commitment. We hope that Eid al-Adha will be an occasion to announce to Yemen and the world that Yemen has passed towards a new stage." 11.15am: Almost a fortnight after Barack Obama's announcement that US forces would complete a total withdrawal from Iraq by the end of year, here's a stark reminder of the bloodshed that remains. Reuters reports this morning that October saw the greatest number of civilians killed in the country this year. The Health Ministry has said that 161 civilians were killed in the month just passed, a sharp increase from September's 110. According to Reuters, the statistics also reveal that: The number of police officers killed rose to 55 from 42 in September, while 42 soldiers died in violence compared to 33 the previous month, according to statistics from the interior and defence ministries. Bombings and other attacks wounded 195 civilians, 142 police and 101 soldiers, the ministries said. Eighty-five insurgents were killed during the month. Obama announced on 21 October that there would be no more American boots on the ground after 31 December, nearly nine years after the invasion that ousted Saddam Hussein. Analysts are now openly wondering what the effect of the draw-down will be on the security situation. John F Burns of the New York Times, wrote on Monday: With American troops gone, and with them the role they have played as the ultimate guarantor of the new constitutional rules adopted under American occupation, all bets, at least potentially, will be off.

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Could there be a return to the incipient civil war of 2005 to 2007? A military coup in Baghdad, and the rise of a new Iraqi strongman (if not, all would hope, in the brutal tradition of Saddam)? Yes, to both questions — though the argument that has prevailed in American deliberations is that both outcomes are unlikely, and in any case ultimately unavoidable, if American troops are not to be held hostage interminably to the insolubles of Iraqi politics. October saw a number of major attacks in which civilians were caught up, including a double bombing last week that killed 32 people and wounded 71 in a Shia district of Baghdad. 10.54am: Syria watcher Randa Slim charts the divisions in the Syrian opposition in Foreign Policy Magazine. She says the key issues of difference are: dialogue with the regime, foreign intervention, and the use of violence. Slim says there are "no formal communication channels yet between" the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army. But on this blog yesterday council member Ausama Monajed suggested the council was in discussions with FSA. He hinted at some of the differences explored by Slim. The Council wants to persuade the FSA to focus on the protection of civilians and to maintain the peaceful nature of the uprising. But the opposition is struggling to maintain this stance, Slim said: Despite the majority's best efforts to maintain the peaceful character of the protest movement, developments on the ground might over time push toward the militarization of the opposition. There is accumulating evidence that there is ongoing weaponisation of segments of the Syrian population. Activists inside Syria explain this development as citizens acquiring weapons for self-defence purposes. As one activist from Homs told me, "we will not allow another Hama (massacre) to take place." It is difficult to gauge the tactics of defected soldiers, Slim adds: Military defectors play an unclear role in the Syrian opposition. Recently, they have claimed responsibility for an attack on a Syrian army convoy killing a military officer and eight soldiers in central Syria. In Homs, they are defending the neighbourhoods coming under attack from the Syrian military. In other cities, they establish a ring around the protesters helping to defend them against soldiers and pro-regime militias. Their role is difficult to assess because it seems to differ from one region to the next. It is also hard to gauge the type and level of coordination between the protesters and the defectors on one hand, and between the different hubs where the military defectors are located on the other. It is also still unclear what weapons the defectors have at their disposal and whether they are able to secure military assistance from neighbouring countries. 10.31am: Details about the Arab League's Syria plan continue to dribble out, ahead of a meeting in Cairo. But there is confusion about whether Damascus has agreed to the plan as the regime's news agency claims. An AP report filed in Cairo, and carried by the Washington Post, says: Arab League diplomats say the organization is about to unveil a plan to ease violence in Syria that calls for the withdrawal of tanks and armored vehicles from the streets and free elections. The Arab League is expected to announce the plan Wednesday at a meeting in Cairo. Syria's state-run media said late Tuesday that Damascus has agreed to an Arab League plan, but a senior Arab League official said they had not yet received any response from Syria. Arab diplomats involved in the process told The Associated Press the proposal also calls for release of all political prisoners and a new constitution as well as free presidential and

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parliamentary elections. They spoke on condition of anonymity because the proposal is not yet public. AFP reports concerns that Syria is simply playing for time. "Syria's answer could be 'yes, but,' a manoeuvre to buy time," it quotes one diplomat as saying. It also points out that the Assad regime has insisted on changes to the original Arab League plan. 9.54am: Graphic video evidence has emerged suggesting that the latest victims of the violence near the Syrian city of Homs were bound and gagged before being executed. The video [Warning: extremely disturbing content] shows the bodies of nine men with their hands bound and mouths taped. The footage cannot be independently verified. Activists claim the men were killed in Hawleh near Homs. The state news agency Sana claims four members of the security forces were killed by "armed terrorist groups" in Homs. 9.32am: Alaa al-Aswany, author of the hit Egyptian novel the Yacoubian Building, has turned to satire to highlight the continuing brutality of the Egypt's military government. He imagines a discussion between two officials, in a translated version reproduced on the Arabist blog. Official 1: If the people are satisfied, why did they rise up and rebel against our legitimacy? Do you actually believe that to this day I don't understand what happened during the events of last January? Official 2: Well, your Excellency, I hope you can accept one observation from your student. The reason behind the events of last January was that the security apparatus got it wrong. It allowed the people to gather together, having confidence in its ability to break them up by force. The important thing now is that from the outset we don't let them gather together. We now are focused on violent preemptive actions in order to prevent demonstrations from even starting. Official 1: Yeah, we should have hit them stronger. We were mistaken. We thought the Egyptians were all just simple people. I never imagined they could have done something like that. Official 2: The people are simple, sir. The problem lies in the children on Facebook, they like stirring up problems among the people. Official 1: These are agents, traitors, only looking to sabotage the country 9.23am: The offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo have been burned out in a petrol-bomb attack after a special Arab spring edition entitled "Sharia Hebdo" featured a cartoon of the prophet Muhammad on the cover as "guest editor", writes Angelique Chrisafis. At around 1am the offices were gutted after a petrol bomb was thrown into a window and set light to the computer system, blowing out windows and burning most of the office contents. The fire happened before the "sharia" edition was to hit news stands on Wednesday morning in what the paper had mockingly called a "celebration" of the victory of the moderate Islamist party An-Nahda in the Tunisian elections and the Libyan transitional executive's statement that Islamic sharia law would be the country's main source of law. On the front page a cartoon prophet Muhammad says: "100 lashes if you don't die of laughter!" 9.11am: Activists in Syria say the security forces have killed 13 people in the latest crackdown in Homs. The Local Coordination Committees, the group which publicises the protests, is

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describing the killings as the Hawleh massacre, after the district in Homs where the killings took place. It has circulated footage of the dead body of Samer Abdou, who it says was one of those killed. [Warning: graphic content]. 8.43am: Welcome to Middle East Live. The main focus today looks set to be Syria after the Assad regime said it had agreed to an Arab League peace plan despite its continuing to crackdown against protesters. Syria • Syria says it has agreed to an Arab League plan to end the violent crackdown against protesters. Details of the proposals are still sketchy but Syria's state news agency said they would be announced in Cairo today. The plan is expected to involve giving the Assad regime a deadline to remove tanks from the streets and begin talks with the opposition. • The leader of the defected army brigade said his troops continue to conduct ambushes against the President Bashar al-Assad army, despite an appeal by the opposition Syrian National Council to adopt more defensive tactics. Colonel Riad Assad, leader of Free Syrian Army, told the LA Times: "We are striking Assad's regime and his army in many spots." Yesterday a member of the opposition council told the Guardian said it was trying to persuade the Free Army to halt attacks and concentrate on defending civilians. In his interview the defected colonel did acknowledge the importance of protecting civilians and the need for safe haven. "We don't have the ability to buy weapons, but we need to protect civilians inside Syria," he said.

• Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose country is providing sanctuary to the Free Syrian Army, said he believed the Syrian uprising would succeed. The Turkish daily Zaman said he told a party meeting: We had a friendship that began nine years ago but Syria failed to appreciate this. They [Syrian rulers] did not pay heed to our warnings. … But we cannot remain silent in the face of this process. We will continue to display the necessary stance. I believe that the Syrian people will be successful in their glorious resistance. Yemen

• The Yemeni Nobel peace prize laureate Tawakkol Karman has condemned the UN's inability to condemn the crackdown against protests in both Yemen and Syria. Writing in the Guardian she says: The world has not shown the least interest in what the Saleh regime does with Yemen and its revolutionaries. Despite this huge number of martyrs, despite the transformation of the country into a huge prison where citizens struggle to get even a drink of water for their

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children, and despite the use of heavy weapons against civilians, Saleh's regime did not even receive a token verbal condemnation from the United Nations or other world governments – despite our calls to impose sanctions ... In the same vein, I call upon them to show similar concern for the suffering of the revolutionaries in Syria, where the machinery of President Bashar al-Assad's regime produces a daily harvest of dead and wounded. This is a moment of truth for the values of freedom about which our region has heard so much from the international community, without having access to them... I ardently call upon the free people of the world to examine what is happening in my country and Syria especially, and to honour their responsibilities to confront rulers who do not hesitate to carry out the most heinous crimes against people who have the temerity to demand their natural rights to freedom and dignity. Libya • Groups of Libyan fighters involved in a personal feud exchanged fire at Tripoli hospital, leaving one dead and five wounded over two days of battles. AP described it as one of the most serious cases of personal score-settling by revolutionary forces since the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Israel and the Palestinian territories • Internet services in the West Bank and Gaza have come under "sustained attack" by unknown hackers in multiple locations, according to officials, a day after Palestinians won recognition at Unesco. "There has been a sustained attack since the morning from many sources in many countries," said Palestinian Authority spokesman Ghassan Khatib. "It is deliberate and continuous." • Israel is to rush settlement growth in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in response to the successful Unesco bid. It also imposed a temporary halt on the transfer of tax revenues which it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority pending a final decision on whether to impose a long-term freeze. Qatar • The Gulf state of Qatar is to hold its first national election for a royal advisory body – another sign that the upheavals of the Arab spring are prompting defensive reactions across the region. The announcement, by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, signals an important, if largely symbolic, advance for a tiny country whose great wealth has allowed it to punch above its weight internationally, but without so far adopting the democratic standards it advocates for others. Arab League to reveal Syria peace plan – Wednesday 3 November 2011http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/2011/nov/02/arab-league-to- reveal-syria-plan-live-updates?CMP=EMCGT_031111&

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Arab League 'roadmap' helps Assad play for time The plan could become a convenient cover, allowing the regime to crush the uprising while engaging in ill-defined 'dialogue'

Simon Tisdall guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 2 November 2011 15.58 GMT

A picture released by a Syrian official news agency shows people demonstrating support for the president, Bashar al-Assad, in the city of Rakka. Photograph: Sana/AFP/Getty Images President Bashar al-Assad's reported acceptance of an Arab League "roadmap", unveiled on Wednesday, is good news for those who yearn for an end to the killing in Syria. About 4,000 people have died since the uprising began seven months ago. Tens of thousands more have been injured, jailed or forced to flee the country. But the mooted deal raises uncomfortable questions for the US, Britain and Syria's neighbours such as Turkey. Having demanded Assad step down and imposed swingeing sanctions to achieve that end, they face the awkward prospect – if the plan goes ahead – of the regime surviving indefinitely as international pressure eases and hopes of genuine democratic reform are effectively dashed. Evidently worried they could be outflanked diplomatically, opposition activists quickly dismissed Assad's move as a blatant attempt to buy time. US officials said they still believed Assad should resign. "We have had a lot of promises of reform," the state department spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland, said. "Let's wait and see: a) whether we really have a deal here, and b) whether that deal is implemented." Turkey reacted in much the same way. The Arab League proposals call for the withdrawal of army tanks and other security forces from the streets of Syria's cities and the release of political prisoners, overseen 167

by Arab monitors. Once a "national dialogue" is under way, the roadmap postulates the creation of a new constitution, to be followed by presidential and parliamentary elections. Given the regime's repressive record, scepticism that such an inevitably drawn-out process would be allowed to reach fruition seems fully justified. Seen this way, the League's plan could quickly become a convenient cover, behind which the uprising would be definitively crushed even as the ill-defined "national dialogue" between the regime and its chosen interlocutors meandered on inconclusively. All the same, three key factors, all working in Assad's favour, now make this unsatisfactory outcome more rather than less likely. The first is Assad's unexpected tenacity in clinging to office. His unyielding performance should not have come as a surprise – but it has, nevertheless. Assad survived the furore over the 2005 assassination of the Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, which was widely blamed on his regime. He survived the forced withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. He survived Israel's bombing of a suspected nuclear reactor and numerous other humiliations, not least over the occupied Golan Heights. Assad learned the trick of political longevity at the knee of his late father, Hafez, who died in his bed. Stubbornness is a family trait. Secondly, Assad has launched a not unskillful political counter-offensive in recent days, giving interviews in which he courted Russian opinion and warned western and regional leaders of a Middle-East-wide sectarian and Islamist "earthquake" if the Syrian uprising succeeded. He has also mobilised regime supporters in big street demonstrations in Damascus, the southern city of Sweida and in Latakia on the coast. His positive response to the Arab League plan, even if disingenuous, is part of this political fightback – and may disarm his fiercer critics among the Gulf states. The third, crucial factor favouring Assad's survival is what appears to be a growing international realisation that with the Syrian opposition split, divided over tactics and failing to make serious headway, the consequences of continuing, possibly escalating, violent instability in Syria are simply not worth the probable strategic cost. Claims that Syrian kidnap squads are operating against exiled dissidents in Lebanon, possibly with the connivance of Syria's local proxies, and reports of Syrian army incursions and border mine-laying provide just two examples of how ongoing Syrian strife could terminally unsettle an already fragile neighbouring state. Similar considerations apply to Iraq, where American troops are due to complete their withdrawal next month. Obama may not like the idea of Assad retaining power, but Washington would be even more worried if Syrian unrest spilled over into Iraq, with Syria's Sunni majority hypothetically conspiring with their Iraqi counterparts against both countries' established governments. Israel, whose relationship with the Palestinians is once again spiralling towards outright confrontation, has an ever more pressing interest in seeing calm on its Syrian flank. Turkey, too, has a clear security and commercial interest in a Syrian settlement, not least because of the Kurdish issue that affects both countries. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime minister, has overplayed his hand in typical fashion in recent months. But he has little to show for his anti-Assad stance except a collection of unhappy Syrian refugees squatting on Turkish soil and the ruination of his ambitious "friends with neighbours" foreign policy. The Arab League plan provides cover for him, too. 168

The US and Britain had long entertained hopes that Assad could be lured into the western camp, that he was at heart a reformer, that his key alliance with Iran could be broken. His reaction to the Arab spring has shattered those illusions. But the opposite idea, bordering on a fond hope, that he could be ousted from within without too great a cost to western and regional interests, is now also proving false. Assad gained another significant boost this week. Nato stated once again for the record that there would be no western intervention in Syria, under any circumstances. The opposition cannot shift him, either. And so it seems, despite all the bloodshed and the diplomatic brouhaha of recent months, Assad is not going anywhere. Instead, the stage is set for a pretend peace. Simon Tisdall Arab League 'roadmap' helps Assad play for time The plan could become a convenient cover, allowing the regime to crush the uprising while engaging in ill- defined 'dialogue' http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/02/arab-league- roadmap-assad-time/print

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Syria agrees to Arab League plan Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo announce Syria's acceptance of proposals aimed at easing violence. Last Modified: 02 Nov 2011 17:12 Source: Al Jazeera and agencies

Anti-regime protesters had urged the Arab League to do something about Syria [AFP]

The Syrian government has accepted several measures suggested by the Arab League aimed at halting the violence in Syria, including the removal of tanks and armoured vehicles from the streets. The breakthrough was announced at an emergency meeting in Cairo on Wednesday, where the body gathered to discuss plans to ease the violence and end the unrest in Syria. "The Arab League welcomes the Syrian government's agreement to the Arab plan," a statement by the League said, adding that it "emphasised the need for the immediate, full and exact implementation of the articles in the plan".

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The League said the Syrian government had approved an Arab plan for dialogue with the opposition and steps to end seven months of bloodshed, according to its statement released during the ministerial meeting in Cairo. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani told a news conferrence after the meeting: "We are happy to have reached this agreement and we will be even happier when it is implemented immediately." He said the Arab League would continue contacts between the Syrian government and the opposition "in preparation for a national dialogue within two weeks." "[The reports] indicate that the Syrians have indeed agreed to some of those stumbling blocks," Al Jazeera's Jane Arraf reported from the Egyptian capital. "It means that they have apparently agreed to withdraw tanks and armoured vehicles from cities and towns, they have agreed to a meeting with the opposition, importantly not in Damascus as they had been insisting but here in Cairo with the Arab League. "They have agreed to let journlaists back into the country and they have agreed to a ceasefire as well as releasing political prisoners," Arraf added. Continued violence

Meanwhile on Wednesday, pro-democracy activists say Syrian security forces killed at least 13 factory workers in a village northwest of Homs. The victims were stopped at a roadblock on Wednesday where they were shot by forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad, the activists said. "They were workers at a small building blocks factory. The exact time of their death is not known, but it appears it was this morning," Ahmad Fouad, a Homs-based activist, told the Reuters news agency by phone. An activist submitted a Youtube video, purportedly shot in the village of Kfar Laha, that showed several bodies, gagged and with their hands tied behind their backs. Kfar Laha, in the Houla region, is considered a centre for protests against Assad's government. The region is also home to an armed movement opposing the president. Wednesday's killings of those opposed to the Assad government follow online claims that nine members of the president's own Alawite sect had been dragged from a bus and then shot by assailants in the western province of Homs. The claims were made by an activist out of Homs and on a social-networking site supportive of the Assad government. Omar Idlibi, a prominent activist in exile in Beirut, told the Reuters news agency that circumstances of Tuesday's bus incident remained unclear. However he did say that the shooting occurred near a main army roadblock in Homs. It is suspected that Wednesday's attack on the villagers was a revenge attack following the incident on Tuesday. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/11/2011112163044247764.html

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WED 2 NOV 2011 LAST UPDATED: 16:57 Sources: Freezing Syria's Arab League membership 'out of the question' MENA Wed, 02/11/2011 - 14:20 Suspending or freezing Syria's membership during the Arab League's urgent meeting on Wednesday is out of the question, Arab diplomatic sources have said. It is unclear where such a move would lead, particularly because the situation in Syria is different from that in Libya, one source added. The same sources said the meeting would focus on examining Syria's response to the Arab Roadmap for ending violence there, which was proposed by the Arab ministerial committee in Doha Sunday, according to MENA. The proposed plan calls for ending violence, withdrawing tanks from the streets, releasing detainees, and holding a national conference for dialogue between the regime and the opposition under the auspices of the Arab League, the sources said. The Arab League meeting, which will be held at the cabinet level, will also discuss the results of the committee's communications with Syrian leaders and the results of its visit to Damascus. Translated from the Arabic Edition http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/511248 The Egyptian government on Wednesday defended the Supreme Council of the Armed Egyptian government defends SCAF policies MENA Wed, 02/11/2011 - 18:00 Forces, which faces sharp criticism for mismanaging the transitional period and making unilateral decisions. The armed forces are trying to transfer power to an elected civilian administration, said Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf, in an opening speech in the Dii's 2nd Desert Energy Conference, delivered on his behalf by Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade Mahmoud Issa. The armed forces are protecting the current transition period, Sharaf added. “Egypt is undergoing political developments that aim to achieve more democracy, transparency, and an improved standard of living.” The government is working to make structural reforms to provide more work opportunities, particularly for low income people. Rights groups and activists have accused SCAF of mismanaging the transition period and making unilateral decisions without consulting political forces. The government angered the opposition when Deputy Prime Minister for Political Affairs Ali al- Selmy issued the draft document giving the army special status in the country’s new constitution. The transition government under Essam Sharaf has no power, and SCAF rules from behind it, analysts say. The government may not issue laws without approval of SCAF, which is accused of continuing the same policies as former President Hosni Mubarak. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/511352 172

11/02/2011 01:14 PM Turkish Prime Minister in Berlin Erdogan Escalates Germany Criticism

By AnnaU Reimann U A ceremony on Wednesday to mark 50 years since the first Turkish 'guest workers' arrived in Germany should be a friendly photo opportunity for the leaders of the two countries. But many tensions still exist, and Turkish leader Erdogan has taken aim at Germany once again in a controversial interview. When Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdogan meet today at the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, the pictures of two important world leaders should be nice, friendly ones; the German chancellor and the Turkish prime minister shaking hands as they cement the friendship between their two countries. The ceremony is being held to mark the 50th anniversary of the first 'guest workers' arriving in Germany from Turkey, and ahead of the prime minister's visit, Merkel praised the migrants, saying they had become part of the country. The reception for Erdogan laid on by German President Christian Wulff on Tuesday evening was also a harmonious affair. But the kind words and grand gestures between the two countries cannot cover the fact that serious tensions exist between them -- tensions underlined by inflammatory comments made by Erdogan in an interview with German daily Bild on Wednesday. Turkey is one of the world's up and coming nations, and its economy is booming. At the same time, Erdogan is pursuing a new, aggressive foreign policy which is viewed with the utmost concern not only by Turkey's immediate neighbours, but also in Berlin. After the ceremony in the Foreign Ministry, therefore, the leaders are likely to talk turkey, so to speak. Erdogan and Merkel will meet for a frank exchange of opinions in which sensitive foreign policy issues will be on the agenda -- including the situation in North Africa and the Middle East, the conflict with the Kurds and bilateral relations. Call for Dual Citizenship But the tone emanating from Ankara has intensified significantly in recent weeks against Germany. Ahead of his visit, Erdogan fanned the flames even more in his interview with Bild. "German politicians do not give engough recognition to the integration of the three million Turks in Germany," he told the paper. There are already 72,000 Turkish employers in Germany employing 350,000 people, he said. "The guest workers of yesterday are slowing becoming employers, academics, artists," the prime minister added. Relatively few of the three million Turks are German citizens, though. While many are fully integrated, others speak German poorly and tend to stay within large Turkish- speaking communities. Erdogan called for them to be allowed to hold dual citizenship, something Germany does not generally allow -- a position underlined by the country's Interior Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich. "I think that those who say, yes, we want to stay in Germany -- with all the consequences, with all the need for integration, should apply for German citizenship," he told broadcaster ZDF. "And then they are not Turks any

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more -- I think one must make the decision at some point in one's life, and I think that's right." But in his Bild interview, Erdogan criticised Germany's opposition to dual citizenship and laws which oblige any Turks moving to Germany to speak good German before arrival, saying this infringed their human rights. "If a young Turkish man loves a woman in Turkey and wants to marry her, this is seen as a mistake, as Germany demands that she first learn German. But what is the language of love?" he said. "It cannot be that the love of young people is only allowed to exist in German by decree," he added. 'Obvious Existing Problems' The issue of integration has long been a source of discord between Germany and Turkey. Just in the past year, Chancellor Merkel had promised to tackle the "obvious existing problems" as the 50th anniversary of the arrival of Turkish guest workers in Germany approached. Erdogan, however, had taken to the stage in front of Turkish audiences in Germany to warn of "assimilation," and demanded Turkish schools in Germany -- something which caused much irritation among German politicians. There is also the question of Turkey's bid to join the European Union. Erdogan complained that Turkey feels let down by Germany as it pursues the slow-moving bid, which faces broad scepticism. Merkel has argued for Turkey to be granted "privileged partnership" rather than full membership. Erdogan, however, claims that German politicians "should do much more for Turkey's EU accession, because it would massively encourage the integration" of Turks in Germany. "Because we Turks feel so many positive things about Germany, we feel let down here," he added. Some in Germany fear that, rather than accept a privileged partnership, there is a risk of Turkey turning away from Europe altogether. In fact, the economically- thriving country has lost interest in the crisis-stricken EU in recent months. With economic growth of around ten percent and a tripling of per capita income since 2002, Ankara is hardly dependent on securing closer economic relations. German industry figures have long warned of losing Turkish business; Turkey is an extremely important export market for Germany. Even Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has said: "We must open the door to Europe wide for Turkey, rather than constantly build new obstacles until one day Turkey turns away from us." Erdogan's call for regulations to be eased for Turks coming to Germany could also prove uncomfortable for Merkel. The chancellor had announced some time ago that there conditions for Turkish business people in particular would be improved, but nothing has yet happened. Turkey Flexes its Muscles Yet another problem between the two countries is the PKK conflict, with Turkish politicians repeatedly attacking the German government and accusing Berlin of indirectly protecting the Kurdish terrorists. "Twice as many PKK members live in Germany as in the Qandil mountains in northern Iraq," claimed Cemil Cecik -- speaker of the Turkish parliament and a party colleague of Erdogan -- according to the

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Süddeutsche Zeitung. The prime minister himself has criticized German foundations and accused them of funding the PKK. One thing is certain: As a regional power, Turkey is starting to flex its muscles. Erdogan was hailed during a visit to the region following the Arab revolts in Tunisia and Egypt and became the symbolic head of the freedom movement. The moderate Islamists who were victorious in the recent Tunisian elections model their Islamic political framework on that of his governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). Erdogan recently made his country's opinion of its own power unmistakeably clear: "Our interests range from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean," he said. Particularly difficult for the Germans is the Israeli question. In the Middle East conflict, Turkey is invariably on the side of the Palestinians, and has called on the UN to recognize a Palestinian state. Germany, however, voted against Palestinian membership of UNESCO. The relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem has fallen to a low point since the incident on the Gaza aid ship "Mavi Marmara" in May 2010, when nine Turkish activists were killed as the Israeli navy stormed the flotilla. This summer, the Turks threw the Israeli ambassador in Ankara out. Erdogan has promised to provide an escort of warships the next time an aid convoy sets off for the Gaza Strip. During a visit to South Africa a few weeks ago, the Turkish prime minister described Israel as a "threat" to the Middle East. Israel also plays a role in Turkey's dispute with Cyprus. The situation there is complex: Turkey has occupied the northern part of the island since 1974 and does not represent the Republic of Cyprus -- that is, the larger Greek southern part. The Republic of Cyprus, an EU member state, has claimed the huge gas and oil reserves in the waters around the island and has accordingly signed an agreement with Israel on the demarcation in the Mediterranean Sea. But Ankara was angered because Turkish northern part of Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey, was not taken into consideration. Erdogan announced that the Turkish navy would show its presence there "very often" and would send warships out on patrol. Ankara has also announced a freeze on relations with the EU when Cyprus assumes the rotating presidency next year. -- with wires URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,795423,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links:  Fifty Years of Turkish Immigration: 'Guest Workers' Relive Their Journey to Germany (10/31/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,795054,00.html  Victory for Ennahda: Why Tunisians Voted for the Islamists (10/26/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,794133,00.html  Crossing into Iraq: Turkey Launches Revenge Attacks on Kurdish Militants (10/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,792794,00.html  A Calculated Offensive: Why Is Erdogan Attacking Germany's Foundations? (10/06/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,790296,00.html  Erdogan's 'Dangerous Macho Posturing': EU Politicians Slam Turkey's Anti-Israel Course (09/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,786204,00.html  Cyprus Dispute: German Conservatives Welcome Turkey's EU Threats (07/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,775490,00.html

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Reportage "‘Plutôt mourir qu'être jugé par la CPI’", m'a dit Kadhafi" | 02.11.11 | 14h07 • Mis à jour le 02.11.11 | 16h05 Jusqu'à la fin, il a été au côté de Mouammar Kadhafi. Mansour Dhaou était l'une des cinq personnes présentes dans la Toyota blindée de l'ancien Guide libyen lorsqu'elle a été stoppée par un tir de missile de l'OTAN, jeudi 20 octobre au matin. Quelques heures plus tard, Mouammar Kadhafi, capturé par des révolutionnaires de Misrata, mourrait dans des circonstances non élucidées. Mansour Dhaou, lui, a perdu connaissance sur le champ de bataille et ne sait de rien de précis sur la mort de son "maître". En revanche, il a été le témoin privilégié des dernières semaines du dictateur libyen, assiégé dans Syrte. Le Monde s'est entretenu avec lui, sous la surveillance d'un geôlier, dans son lieu de détention à Misrata. Mansour Dhaou, 56 ans, barbe poivre et sel et tenue grise, semble en bonne santé et dit être bien traité. Il n'aime pas qu'on le présente comme "le chef de la sécurité de Kadhafi". "C'était l'officier Ezzedine Al-Hencheri qui gérait sa sécurité personnelle, moi j'étais un accompagnateur, minimise-t-il. Mon titre officiel, depuis 1999, est chef de la Garde populaire. Je ne me suis occupé de la sécurité personnelle de Kadhafi qu'entre 1992 et 1997. Je n'étais pas au courant de tout." Ezzedine Al-Hencheri a été retrouvé mort à Syrte, conséquence d'une exécution sommaire, semble-t-il. Selon le récit livré par M. Dhaou, le convoi avec lequel Mouammar Kadhafi a fui aurait dû démarrer à 3 heures ou 4 heures du matin, mais la désorganisation a retardé le départ. "Il a fallu entasser les blessés dans les coffres, tout était chaotique. L'idée était de se rendre à Jaraaf (à une trentaine de kilomètres à l'ouest de Syrte). C'est là que Kadhafi est né et que ses parents sont enterrés. C'est comme s'il avait voulu mourir chez lui." Le cortège, composé d'une quarantaine de véhicules, transportait environ 200 personnes, les tout derniers défenseurs de Syrte : "C'étaient des civils, les soldats avaient été décimés par les frappes de l'OTAN ou avaient déserté." Mouammar Kadhafi est resté à Syrte pendant tout le mois précédant sa mort. Selon M. Dhaou, le Guide a fui Tripoli le 18 août, deux jours avant l'attaque de la capitale et son soulèvement simultané. "C'était l'idée de ses gardes de corps et de son fils Saïf Al- Islam, qui pensaient que Tripoli n'était pas tenable." A juste titre, la ville est tombée en deux jours, notamment grâce à la trahison du commandant de la katiba Mohammed, la brigade chargée de sa défense : "Sur 3 800 hommes, seuls 160 ont combattu. Kadhafi était amer, il voyait le cercle de ses fidèles se réduire." Début septembre, le Guide libyen croit la reconquête encore possible. "Après quarante- deux ans au pouvoir, il ne pouvait pas penser autrement. Je pense qu'il croyait en sa propre propagande. Et ses fils, surtout Saïf, le poussaient dans ce sens." Mansour Dhaou assure qu'Abdallah Al-Senoussi, le chef des renseignements, et lui- même ont tenté à plusieurs reprises de convaincre Mouammar Kadhafi de démissionner. "Dans la première quinzaine de mars, il a failli le faire. Mais Saïf l'a convaincu de

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rester. Il voulait hériter du pouvoir après lui. Puis le mandat d'arrêt de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) a tout compliqué. La seule fois où j'ai entendu Kadhafi en parler, il a dit : "Plutôt mourir en Libye qu'être jugé par Ocampo (Luis Moreno Ocampo, le procureur de la CPI)"." Saïf Al-Islam Kadhafi a quitté Tripoli le 22 août - après une dernière apparition surprise à l'hôtel Rixos - pour Bani Walid, à 130 km au sud-est de la capitale. "Il est resté tout le long là-bas", assure M. Dhaou, selon lequel il était en contact avec son père par secrétaires interposés et par téléphones satellitaires. Quant à Khamis, chargé de la 32e brigade, M. Dhaou pense qu'il est mort le 27 août près de Tarhouna. "Saïf était la tête politique, c'est lui qui décidait de la ligne. Khamis et Moatassem ne s'occupaient que de l'aspect sécuritaire des choses." Saïf Al-Islam, dont la trace a été perdue depuis la chute de Bani Walid, autour du 15 octobre, serait en contact indirect avec la CPI en vue d'une reddition. Les nouvelles autorités libyennes préféreraient qu'il soit jugé en Libye, où la peine capitale est en vigueur. Le témoignage de Mansour Dhaou risque de peser en défaveur du "dauphin" de Mouammar Kadhafi. Cela ne lui assure pas pour autant l'immunité pour son rôle dans la répression passée, sur lequel il reste très évasif. Outre Mansour Dhaou, Ahmed Ibrahim, responsable des comités révolutionnaires, et Ahmed Ramadan, secrétaire particulier de l'ancien Guide, seraient détenus à Misrata, sans qu'il soit possible de confirmer où et par qui. Tout début septembre, Mouammar Kadhafi envoie MM. Dhaou et Al-Senoussi en mission secrète à Sebha, un autre de ses bastions dans le Sud libyen, pour organiser la résistance. De retour à Syrte, Abdallah Al-Senoussi, lui aussi recherché par la CPI, s'est éclipsé pour aller enterrer son fils. Il n'est jamais revenu et se trouverait aujourd'hui au Mali. Mansour Dhaou, lui, est resté à Syrte, ce qui relativise sa timide prise de distance avec l'ancien régime. Aux premiers jours de son séjour à Syrte, le colonel craignait bien plus les frappes de l'OTAN qu'un assaut des rebelles. "Il n'est jamais sorti en ville, ne recevait presque personne. Au début, il était à l'hôtel. Puis il s'est déplacé tous les quatre ou cinq jours, passant d'une maison à l'autre. Une vingtaine de personnes l'accompagnaient." A la toute fin, il déménageait sans cesse dans le quartier No 2, sous le feu continu des rebelles. M. Dhaou explique ne pas avoir eu de véritable conversation avec Mouammar Kadhafi pendant le dernier mois. "Il lisait le Coran et d'autres livres, écrivait beaucoup, dormait souvent. C'était un homme âgé, de presque 70 ans. La situation était très difficile, il n'y avait ni eau, ni électricité, ni téléphone. Nous étions coupés du monde. Ça le déprimait, il n'avait pas l'habitude, il était inquiet." Mouammar Kadhafi ne s'occupait pas de stratégie militaire - "il n'a pas tiré un coup de feu", assure M. Dhaou -, laissant cela à son fils Moatassem. L'ancien leader libyen en voulait tout particulièrement "à ceux qu'il considérait comme des amis et qui l'avaient trahi : le président français Sarkozy, Berlusconi, Erdogan et Tony Blair, plusieurs dirigeants africains", énumère l'homme qui tenait lieu d'aide de camp à Kadhafi. Christophe Ayad http://www.lemonde.fr/libye/article/2011/11/02/plutot-mourir-qu-etre-juge-par-la-cpi-m-a-dit- kadhafi_1597343_1496980.html#ens_id=1481986

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"Il y a en Libye de quoi armer toute l’Afrique" | 01.11.11 | 11h36 • Mis à jour le 01.11.11 | 11h58

Photo prise le 26 octobre, dans un dépôt d'armes à quelque 100 km au sud de Syrte.AP/David Sperry C'est un hangar blanc, de 35 m sur 7, sans fenêtre. La porte en métal, fermée par une chaîne, est recouverte de deux mots: "Danger, partez !" Les habitants de Sokna, la plus petite des trois localités qui forment l'oasis de Joufra, au centre de la Libye, en sont persuadés: ce hangar, situé dans un complexe relevant du ministère de la défense, contient du gaz moutarde. "Il y a deux énormes frigos là-dedans remplis de barils", raconte Mohammed Ali, chef du comité militaire des révolutionnaires locaux. Il assure qu'une équipe de trois experts américains est venue, début octobre, inspecter les locaux. "Ils ont enfilé des tenues en plastique. Quand ils sont ressortis, ils nous ont dit de ne plus entrer là-dedans, que c'était très dangereux. Puis ils ont soudé la porte." Visiblement, la menace n'a pas empêché des curieux de faire sauter le scellé et de s'attaquer aux gonds. Sans succès. Selon les habitants, quatre soldats français des forces spéciales, arrivés avec des combattants de Benghazi le 21 septembre, ont visité le local. "Ils ont emmené à Benghazi un camion rempli d'appareils spéciaux." Les habitants désignent aussi une usine locale, où travaillaient des Serbes, comme un centre de production d'armes chimiques: selon un ex-officier, il s'agirait d'une fabrique de dynamite. Le hangar de Sokna, voire l'usine suspecte, sont-ils les deux nouveaux sites de stockage d'armes chimiques, dont l'existence a été révélée dimanche 30 octobre par l'ex-chef de l'exécutif du Conseil national de transition (CNT) libyen, Mahmoud Jibril ? Youssef Safi Eddine, le plus haut gradé chargé des armes chimiques dans l'armée libyenne, a confirmé à l'Agence France-Presse la découverte récente de gaz moutarde "non neutralisé" sur deux sites, dont l'un avec du gaz "prêt à un usage militaire". Les lieux, tenus secrets, seraient sous bonne garde et intacts. Selon l'Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC), dépendant des Nations unies, la Libye possédait officiellement 11 tonnes de gaz moutarde. Le régime en avait révélé l'existence, tout comme celle de matériau radioactif, lorsqu'il avait renoncé à son programme d'armes de destruction massive en 2003. Le gaz avait été 178

neutralisé mais sa destruction n'était pas achevée. Durant la guerre civile, l'OTAN a surveillé la menace chimique, à laquelle Mouammar Kadhafi n'a pas eu – ou pas pu avoir – recours. Le stock "officiel" se trouve à Ghawagha, à l'autre extrémité de l'oasis de Joufra. C'est probablement le plus grand dépôt d'armes de toute la Libye : une centaine de bunkers creusés à même la montagne, au nord de Waddan, de sorte que les camions peuvent y manœuvrer. Le site, connu de tous, n'est gardé par personne. Il suffit de pousser la grille d'entrée. Les bunkers se répartissent à droite et à gauche de la piste. Plus de deux sur trois ont été détruits par des bombardements des avions de l'Alliance, d'une précision diabolique. "Chaque fois que l'OTAN touchait un bunker, on voyait depuis le village des explosions qui duraient parfois toute la nuit, se souvient Senoussi Al-Tayeb, chef militaire des rebelles de Waddan. C'était comme un feu d'artifice effrayant." Le site est jonché de restes de munitions calcinées, retombées un peu partout. "Heureusement, l'OTAN n'a jamais visé les bunkers contenant les armes chimiques. Joufra est une cuvette, nous y serions tous passés." Cet officier à la retraite assure que les bunkers contenant le gaz moutarde, un peu à l'écart et au nombre de deux à quatre selon les sources, sont bien gardés. Impossible de vérifier. Mais tout Waddan rapporte la mésaventure de deux rebellesqui avaient garé leur pick-up près des entrepôts dont ils s'approchaient à pied, quand deux bombes les ont visés avant qu'un missile détruise leur véhicule. "C'est l'OTAN qui assure une surveillance des entrepôts avec ses drones", explique M. Al-Tayeb. Washington a débloqué 40 millions de dollars (29 millions d'euros) pour sécuriser les entrepôts d'armes libyens. Les premiers experts sont arrivés en fin de semaine dernière.

A Syrte, le 19 octobre. REUTERS/THAIER AL-SUDANI Les visites se succèdent mais les sites restent sans protection sérieuse. Or toute l'oasis de Joufra n'est qu'un immense arsenal. Mouammar Kadhafi et son fidèle ministre de la défense, Abou Bakr Younès Jaber, tué à ses côtés le 20 octobre à Syrte, en avaient fait le centre nerveux de l'appareil militaire libyen. L'oasis, constituée de trois localités modestes – Houn, le chef-lieu, au centre, Waddan, à l'est, et Sokna, à l'ouest – est idéalement située au centre de l'immensité libyenne. Ahmed Al-Arabi, professeur d'ingénierie à l'université de Joufra, est un révolutionnaire de la première heure. Il a agi pendant des mois dans la clandestinité. "Tout passait par ici. C'était une immense caserne. Si on avait commencé par prendre Joufra, Kadhafi n'aurait jamais tenu sept mois." Mais la disproportion des forces était telle qu'il n'a rien pu faire avant septembre.

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Avec son beau-frère, le colonel Nasser Abdelhafiz, qui occupait un poste de responsabilité au ministère de la défense, ils ont tenté de faire passer secrètement des informations à l'OTAN, via les rebelles de Misrata. "On voyait tout. Comment les convois de munitions partaient la nuit, recouverts de légumes et de fourrage ; comment des fermes ont été utilisées pour entreposer des armes ; comment le ministre de la défense s'est caché dans la compagnie d'électricité… A la fin, il s'était installé à l'hôpital." Parfois, ces informations ont été utiles, souvent, elles sont arrivées trop tard. "L'OTAN a bombardé beaucoup de choses inutiles, comme nos installations radars, souligne le colonel Abdelhafiz, spécialiste de la défense antiaérienne. Et ils ont négligé des cibles plus importantes." Ce n'est que le 19 septembre, deux jours après la fuite de Younès, que Joufra s'est entièrement libérée, avec l'aide de l'OTAN. Ensuite, cela a été la ruée. Les rebelles ont débarqué de partout, alléchés par les fabuleuses quantités d'armes encore présentes. "Il y a en Libye de quoi armer toute l'Afrique, confirme M. Abdelhafiz. Dans les années 1970 et 1980, Kadhafi a acheté en quantités astronomiques. L'oasis compte pas moins de 200 entrepôts. Mais c'est du matériel obsolète." Obsolète mais suffisant pour fabriquer pendant des décennies des engins artisanaux (IED), qui ont démontré leur redoutable pouvoir de tuer en Irak et en Afghanistan. "J'ai peur que tout cela tombe entre de mauvaises mains", confirme-t-il. Il pense aux missiles sol-air portatifs de type Strella, et surtout aux Igla, plus récents, d'une portée de 5 à 6 km et thermoguidés. Largement de quoi abattre des avions civils en tout cas. Les combattants de Misrata ont été les plus prompts pour piller les principaux stocks d'armes, suivis par ceux de Zentan, Gherian, Zaouïa. "Que pouvais-je faire ? Ils disaient qu'ils avaient besoin d'armes pour le siège de Syrte", plaide M. Al-Tayeb, censé contrôler les entrepôts de Ghawagha. Après la mort de l'ex-Guide libyen, tous les rebelles sont partis. Le colonel Abdelhafiz a été chargé par le ministre de la défense du Conseil national de transition (CNT) de sécuriser les stocks de Joufra. Mais il vient d'apprendre qu'un autre gradé avait été mandaté par le chef d'état-major pour la même tâche. Sans coordination ni troupes, il ne peut que compter sur les 200 combattants de la katiba (brigade) Al- Jazira, dépêchés depuis Benghazi pour l'aider. Mais leur commandant, Hani Zeidan, ne veut pas se déployer sur des dépôts pillés par les rebelles de Misrata, qu'il ne semble pas apprécier: "Dieu sait ce qu'ils ont fait de ces armes. Je ne veux pas être tenu pour responsable de leur disparition." En attendant, il a fait envoyer à Benghazi plusieurs dizaines de véhicules de transport blindés, officiellement "pour protéger les champs pétroliers". "Les rebelles ne sont pas venus protéger les dépôts, mais les piller, déplore le colonel Abdelhafiz, impuissant. Ils préparent l'avenir, au cas où ça tourne mal. L'important, se rassure-t-il, c'est qu'on sache qui a pris quoi et l'a emmené où." C'est bien le problème. Christophe Ayad Article paru dans l'édition du 02.11.11 http://www.lemonde.fr/libye/article/2011/11/01/il-y-a-en-libye-de-quoi-armer-toute-l- afrique_1596736_1496980.html

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ft.com World Middle East & North Africa November 1, 2011 5:11 pm Turkey hardens stance against Syria By Daniel Dombey in Istanbul Turkey has signalled possible support for a buffer zone to protect Syrian civilians if Damascus continues its crackdown on democracy protests, as tensions rise between the two former strategic partners. Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, told the Financial Times that Ankara was preparing targeted sanctions against Damascus and left the door open for more drastic steps at a later date, such as a buffer zone or a no fly-zone on Syrian territory. More ON THIS STORY Ankara tries to bolster fight against Taliban Turkey ends low interest rate policy Turkish quake death toll rises sharply Powerful earthquake rocks eastern Turkey Video Turkey earthquake kills at least 200 “The Syrian regime is attacking the Syrian people, which is unacceptable,” Mr Davutoglu said in an interview. “When we see such an event next door to us of course we will never be silent.” When asked about Turkey’s stance on a buffer zone or a no-fly zone, he said: “We hope that there will be no need for these type of measures but of course humanitarian issues are important…There are certain universal values all of us need to respect and protecting citizens is the responsibility of every state.” His comments are an indication of the growing pressure Turkey is putting on Syria, on the rhetorical level at least, to halt the crackdown. By contrast, in August Turkish officials rejected reports they were planning to impose a buffer zone, while Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Nato’s secretary general, dismissed the idea of a no-fly zone this week. Turkey’s position is important because the country cultivated closer ties with Damascus until this year and is now taking an active role in reaching out to the Syrian opposition. Speaking at the Turkish parliament on Tuesday, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, praised the Syrian protests as “glorious” and expressed his belief that they would succeed. Ankara’s tougher approach has been greatly welcomed by the US, which has been leading calls for Bashar al-Assad, Syrian president, to leave power. On Tuesday Syrian state television announced that a final agreement had been reached between the Syrian government and an Arab League committee working to find a solution that could end the unrest, although it did not provide any details. The US said it welcomed any international efforts to end the violence in Syria, but reiterated its call for Mr Assad to step down. Although in the interview Mr Davutoglu denied claims that Turkey allowed armed Syrian rebels to operate from its territory, last week he became one of the first international officials to meet leaders of the Istanbul-based opposition Syrian national council.

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Mr Erdogan is also likely to visit Syrian refugee camps in Turkey in the near future, and could announce further sanctions against Damascus when he does. The trip had previously been scheduled for last month, but was postponed because of the death of Mr Erdogan’s mother. Although Mr Davutoglu said Turkish sanctions against Syria would be targeted rather than broad, any unilateral steps would mark a change of tack for Turkey, which has long depicted sanctions against its neighbours as both ineffective and damaging to its own economy. “We have always been against sanctions, economic sanctions which will harm people,” Mr Davutoglu said. “But certain measures [that] have an impact on a regime fighting against its own people are different.” Mr Davutoglu also rejected a claim by Mr Assad that western intervention in Syria could turn the country into another Afghanistan. “[To compare] Syria to Afghanistan would mean implicitly to accept that it is a failed state, which is not true,” he said. “There is a state continuing in Syria; the important thing is how the leaders of this state are acting.” He added that the correct analogy was with eastern Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s and warned Mr Assad: “Those leaders who do not understand this correctly will lose power.” Daniel Dombey Turkey hardens stance against Syria November 1, 2011 5:11 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f1438150-049e-11e1-ac2a-U

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November 1, 2011 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN A Long List of Suckers By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Agra, India Last week, I toured the great Mogul compound of Fatehpur Sikri, near the Taj Mahal. My Indian guide mentioned in passing that in the late 1500s, when Afghanistan was part of India and the Mogul Empire, the Iranian Persians invaded Afghanistan in an effort to “seize the towns of Herat and Kandahar” and a great battle ensued. I had to laugh to myself: “Well, add them to that long list of suckers — countries certain that controlling Afghanistan’s destiny was vital to their national security.” There were already plenty on that list before, and there have been even more since. As America now debates how to extract itself from Iraq and Afghanistan, it is worth re- reading a little Central Asian history and recalling for how many centuries great powers — from India to Persia, from Britain to Russia, and now from America to Iran, Turkey and Pakistan — have wrestled for supremacy in this region, in different versions of what came to be called “The Great Game.” One can only weep at the thought of how much blood and treasure have been expended in this pursuit and how utterly ungreat this game has been in retrospect. No one ever wins for long, and all they win is a bill. It is with this bias that I think about the debate following President Obama’s decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq, on schedule, at the end of this year — a decision that has been greeted with much huffing and puffing from hawkish Republicans about how Obama will be remembered for losing Iraq to Iran. Iraq will now fall under Iran’s “influence,” they proclaim, and none of us will ever be able to sleep well again. Please put me down in the camp that thinks Obama did the right thing and that Iran’s mullahs will not be the winners. Why? Well, for starters, centuries of history teach us that Arabs and Persians do not play well together. Yes, Iraq has a Shiite Muslim majority and so does Iran. But Iraqi Arab Shiites willingly fought for eight years against Persian Iranian Shiites in the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, I am certain that in recent years America’s lingering troop presence in Iraq actually gave Iran greater influence in Baghdad. The U.S., however well intentioned, became a lightening rod that absorbed a lot of Iraqis’ frustrations with their government’s underperformance, and the U.S. “occupation” drew all attention away from Iran’s shenanigans inside Iraq. Iraqis are a proud people. Once our troops are gone, Iraqi Arabs will surely focus entirely on their own government’s

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performance and on any Iranian or other attempts to try to be the puppeteer of Iraqi politics. Any Iraqi leader seen as Tehran’s lackey will have problems. Indeed, once we’re gone, I actually think the dominant flow of influence will be from Iraq toward Iran — if (and it is still a big if) — Iraq’s democracy holds. If it does, Iranians will have to look across the border every day at Iraqis, with their dozens of free newspapers and freedom to form any party and vote for any leader, and wonder why these “inferior” Iraqi Arab Shiites enjoy such freedoms and “superior” Iranian Persian Shiites do not. “Iran’s interests were served by the Arab status quo ante — ideologically bankrupt regimes brutalizing disenfranchised populations,” argues Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment. “The more representative governments there are in the Middle East, the more it highlights the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a salmon swimming upstream against the current of history.” Some say Iran was the geopolitical winner of the U.S. intervention in Iraq. I’d hold off on that judgment, too. “The Iranian regime is at its lowest moment of influence in the region — 14 percent popularity in the latest Zogby poll,” remarked Abbas Milani, who teaches Iranian politics at Stanford. What you see today if you look underneath the Islamic revolutionary facade in Iran, added Milani, “is a flourishing of painting, films and music, driven by technology. It is a society seeking its own bottom-up blend of Islam and modernity. The regime has no role in this.” Just as I don’t buy the notion that we need to keep playing The Great Game in Iraq, I also don’t buy it for Afghanistan. “If the U.S. steps back, it will see that it has a lot more options,” argues C. Raja Mohan, a senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research, in New Delhi. “You let the contending regional forces play out against each other and then you can then tilt the balance.” He is referring to the India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, China and Northern Alliance tribes in Afghanistan. “At this point, you have the opposite problem. You are sitting in the middle and are everyone’s hate-object, and everyone sees some great conspiracy in whatever you do. Once you pull out, and create the capacity to alter the balance, you will have a lot more options and influence to affect outcomes — rather than being pushed around and attacked by everyone.” America today needs much more cost-efficient ways to influence geopolitics in Asia than keeping troops there indefinitely. We need to better leverage the natural competitions in this region to our ends. There is more than one way to play The Great Game, and we need to learn it. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN A Long List of Suckers November 1, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/opinion/friedman-a-long-list-of- suckers.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

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The two-state solution: where next? Tony Klug, 06th November 2011 As a series of abstentions, including those of Britain, France, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, leave Palestine with eight confirmed votes in favour of UN recognition – just short of the nine needed to sway the 15-nation UN Security Council – the author argues that there is no win-lose or lose-win scenario in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. About the author Dr. Tony Klug is a special adviser on the Middle East to the Oxford Research Group and a long-time writer on Israeli-Palestinian issues. Among the key questions here, as I see it, are: is a two-state framework still feasible and, if not, is the so-called 'one-state solution' the default alternative? Is that what’s next? Proponents of a unitary state would certainly claim that it is. However, in my view, there is a fundamental flaw at the heart of their proposal, for it is predicated on the notion that what, at root, is a historical clash of two national movements can, hey presto, be turned into a struggle for civil rights. All the evidence, past and present, and all the reasoning, point, I believe, to the inescapable conclusion that it is not possible to resolve this conflict without satisfying the common, minimum, irreducible aspirations of both peoples for self-determination in at least part of the land that each has regarded as its own. This, as I see it, is axiomatic. In other words, a unitary state is not just unfeasible but implausible. Language in this area is often used carelessly and we need to distinguish between a unitary state and a binational confederated state that would retain the two national identities and essential zones of sovereignty. To my mind, this formulation would be a possible – I would say a desirable – future outgrowth of a two-state model, possibly incorporating other neighbouring states, notably Jordan. A unitary state But, for a moment, let’s suspend reality and assume that I am wrong and that a unitary state is plausible and feasible and comes about. What would be its implications? Take the Palestinian right of return – a central plank of the one-state argument. Under an independent Palestinian state, a law to enact this right would almost certainly be among the first to be promulgated, albeit limited to the West Bank and Gaza. It is close to inconceivable, however, that a combined Israeli-Palestinian government in a unitary state would ever reach a consensus on such a massive disruption to the fragile population balance. Further, the one-state solution would put an end to the Palestinian dream of independence and self-determination, obliging them instead to share common statehood 185

with another people – a people with whom they have been bitter foes for the best part of a century – in a joint non-Arab and non-Muslim state, simultaneously relinquishing the struggle for the end of occupation. It just doesn’t bear scrutiny. Moreover, any attempt to eradicate the sovereign Israeli state and its predominantly Jewish character is liable to revive the Jewish fear of genocide, or minimally of discrimination and persecution, and meet with fierce resistance. In the light of their history, it is hard to imagine Israeli Jews of almost any stripe voluntarily sacrificing their hard-won independence to become a minority again in someone else’s land. Two-state feasibility So, if the one-unitary-state idea fails the plausibility test, how does the two-state idea fare with the feasibility test? I would say less-and-less well, day-by-day. The principal obstacle is that the state that already has its independence has for years been chiselling away at the territory of the putative other, bit-by-bit eroding the practicability of the only solution that has ever made sense. When I first advocated two states [9] in the early 1970s in a Young Fabian pamphlet, ‘A Tale of Two Peoples’, there were fewer than 5,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Today there are in excess of 500,000, spread throughout the territory. To paraphrase, this project must be one of the longest state-suicide notes in history. If any of you has any influence, please use it to advise the Israeli government to flip its current policy and be the first to support the Palestinian bid at the United Nations while securing amendments to safeguard its own legitimate interests. That would be a really astute move, something that Israeli governments were once rather good at. Failing this, and assuming the regrettable absence of serious international pressure, the real alternative to two states may come into play - not the fantasy of one harmonious egalitarian utopia - but, when the crunch comes, a unilateral Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank and a unilateral withdrawal from other parts. The annexed areas would, we may suppose, embrace all or most of the territory on which Israeli settlements have been built – although there may be some consolidation - together with the surrounding infrastructure and modern road system. The areas from which Israel pulls out – probably all or most of the heavily populated Palestinian cities – might then be fenced off and left to their own fate, with or without a Palestinian Authority to govern and speak for them. Such an action, far from resolving the conflict, would deepen and entrench it and give rise to sustained international condemnation. Israel and its hapless citizens would be made to suffer the consequences of increasing isolation at every level. Jews around the world would not be immune to the effects either. For their part, the Palestinians would have suffered a heavy – maybe a mortal - blow in their quest for an independent state and may now find their other policy options to be extremely limited, apart from possibly enforced absorption back into the Jordanian state. It would turn what could still – just - be a win-win two-state situation into a possibly irretrievable lose-lose situation. There is no win-lose or lose-win scenario in this conflict. In sum, Israel now faces a stark choice: freeze all further settlement growth in preparation for swift and focused negotiations based on the pre-June 1967 boundaries with equitable land swaps, or prepare for permanent conflict and indefinite pariah status – not quite what its founders had in mind! I suspect their advice, at this point in time, would be to follow the biblical injunction to ‘seek peace and pursue it’. 186

These were Tony Klug's opening remarks as a panellist at a meeting of the LSE Israel Society held on October 25, 2011

Source URL: http://www.opendemocracy.net/tony-klug/two-state-solution-where-next Created 11/06/2011 - 17:24 Links: [1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/international-politics [2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/democracy-and-government [3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/conflict [4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/civil-society [5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/palestine [6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/israel [7] http://www.opendemocracy.net/freeform-tags/palestine-at-un [8] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/tony-klug [9] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/two-states-for-two-peoples-solution-or- illusion [10] http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ [11] http://www.opendemocracy.net/about/syndication

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días para formar su gabinete de gobierno, obtuvo el apoyo de 26 de los 51 miembros del CNT, el órgano que se ha encargado de representar los intereses políticos de los rebeldes libios desde que se alzaron contra Gadafi. Elkib sustituye en el cargo al hasta ahora primer ministro de transición, Mahmud Yibril, con pocas simpatías entre los sectores islamistas y asociado al régimen de Gadafi como responsable del Consejo de Desarrollo entre 2007 y 2011. Yibril, como el flamante jefe del Ejecutivo, residió durante mucho tiempo en el exterior por lo que recibió críticas desde el bando de los alzados por no conocer el país a cuyos mandos se había puesto. Elkib sustituye en el cargo al hasta ahora primer ministro de transición, Mahmud Yibril, con pocas simpatías entre los sectores islamistas La hoja de ruta del CNT mantiene la primera convocatoria electoral para dentro de ocho meses. Entonces, el Ejecutivo de transición tiene previsto que las urnas elijan una Asamblea constituyente que prepare el camino para los primeros comicios presidenciales un año después. No obstante, la sociedad civil desconfía de que en tan solo ocho meses, el Gobierno de transición sea capaz de sentar los cimientos para llevar a los libios a las urnas por vez primera. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/01/actualidad/1320137625_98408 7.html

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Internacional La ONU insta a Libia a mantener sus arsenales fuera del alcance de Al Qaeda La organización expresa su preocupación por la proliferación de lanzamisiles tierra-aire AGENCIAS Nueva York 1 NOV 2011 - 12:49 CET3

Armamento abandonado en el desierto al sur de Sirte. / YOUSSEF BOUDLAL (REUTERS) El Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas ha instado al Gobierno de transición libio, en una resolución aprobada la pasada noche, a que siga el rastro del arsenal de armas en paradero desconocido para evitar que llegue a manos de la red Al Qaeda u otras organizaciones. El texto, aprobado por los 15 miembros del órgano de la ONU a instancias de Rusia, expresa su "preocupación por la proliferación desde Libia a la región de todas las armas, de todos los tipos, en especial las llamadas MANPADS", y urge a Trípoli a que trate de frenarla. Se conoce como MANPADS a los sistemas antiáreos (lanzamisiles tierra-aire) portátiles cuyo tamaño reducido posibilita que puedan ser cargados por un solo individuo y accionados sobre el hombro. Este tipo de armas son muy populares entre las organizaciones armadas que se nutren del comercio ilegal de armas y son capaces de derribar aeroplanos o helicópteros. "Subrayamos el riesgo de desestabilización que supone la proliferación de armas ligeras y de pequeño calibre en el Sahel", dice la resolución aprobada. El texto llama igualmente a mejorar la cooperación entre todos los países de la región para evitar que 190

esas armas faciliten "las actividades terroristas, incluidas las de (la organización) Al Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico" (AQMI). AQMI ha hecho de la zona del Sahel su principal foco de actividad, especialmente en Mauritania, Argelia, Chad y Mali, por lo que la comunidad internacional espera que las nuevas autoridadeslibias refuercen sus fronteras para evitar que más armas caigan en sus manos. 10.000 armas sin rastro El rotativo Der Spiegel informó recientemente que el almirante de la OTAN Giampaolo Di Paola había informado en una conversación con parlamentarios alemanes que unos 10.000 de estos lanzamisiles, antes en manos de las fuerzas gadafistas, habían desaparecido. La resolución de la ONU solicita de igual modo al Gobierno libio a que coopere con la Organización para la Prohibición de las Armas Químicas y destruya las que los combatientes rebeldes hallaron recientemente. La decisión de Naciones Unidas llega unas horas después de que el secretario general de la OTAN, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, firmase desde Trípoli el punto final a siete meses de operaciones. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/01/actualidad/1320146343_54007 2.html

Internacional Rasmussen pone punto final en Trípoli a la misión de la OTAN La Alianza concluye su campaña en una guerra que dejó 40.000 muertos Los cadáveres más buscados también son incómodos, por BERNA GONZÁLEZ HARBOUR La muerte de Gadafi, por BERNARD-HENRI LÉVY Teoría y práctica del tiranicidio "Yo capturé a Gadafi" Juan Miguel Muñoz Trípoli 31 OCT 2011 - 20:53 CET16

El exjefe de seguridad de Gadafi, Mansur Daw. / PHILIPPE DESMAZES (AFP)

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Más prolongada de lo previsto, en tiempos de profunda crisis económica, y no exenta de disputas internas entre los socios de la coalición, la campaña militar de la OTAN en Libia, una de las “más exitosas en los 62 años de historia” de la alianza, en palabras de Anders Fogh Rasmussen, concluyó la pasada medianoche. El secretario general de la organización viajó ayer a Trípoli —exactamente siete meses después de que la OTAN asumiera el liderazgo de las operaciones aprobadas por el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas a mediados de marzo— para estampar la rúbrica final a una aventura militar que culminó el 20 de octubre cuando Muamar el Gadafi cayó en manos rebeldes. Fue capturado en Sirte, su ciudad natal, tras el último bombardeo de una coalición en cuyas misiones aéreas y navales han participado 18 países, alguno de ellos árabe, especialmente Catar. Aunque el “nunca olvidaremos esta ayuda” es una de las frases que se escuchan con más frecuencia de labios de libios de toda condición, hubo sus más y sus menos. Tras aplaudir a rabiar la intervención militar extranjera, que salvó el 19 de marzo a Bengasi de una masacre segura —Gadafi había advertido en una célebre arenga a sus fieles que aniquilaría “callejón a callejón” a los sublevados, a los que tachó de “ratas”—, los libios lamentaban que la OTAN no fuera más contundente en marzo y abril, cuando los cadáveres de insurgentes llenaban las morgues de los hospitales. “OTAN, no os comprendemos”, rezaban algunas pancartas en la primavera de Bengasi, durante los más aciagos días de la contienda. La alianza, no obstante, alegó que se limitaba a cumplir el mandato de la ONU, que ordenó adoptar “todas las medidas necesarias para la protección de los civiles”. Sin embargo, Rusia y China, que se abstuvieron en la votación del Consejo de Seguridad, airearon reiteradamente su malestar por lo que juzgaron una violación de las resoluciones aprobadas en Nueva York. A juicio de Moscú y Pekín, los dirigentes de los países occidentales, que hasta hacía muy poco habían agasajado a Gadafi, cambiaron el objetivo de la campaña para lograr el derribo del régimen. Así sucedió. “Es fantástico estar en la Libia libre… Actuamos para protegeros. Juntos tuvimos éxito y Libia es finalmente libre, desde Bengasi hasta Brega; desde Misrata hasta las montañas de occidente y Trípoli”, declaró ayer un satisfecho Rasmussen. “Habéis iniciado un nuevo capítulo de la historia de Libia. Nuestros comandantes fueron muy cuidadosos para asegurarse de que no os dañaban a vosotros y a vuestras familias”, dijo dirigiéndose a los seis millones de ciudadanos del único país árabe en el que el alzamiento se transformó en una guerra abierta que ha concluido con la muerte de unos 40.000 combatientes y civiles abatidos en matanzas indiscriminadas. Aunque algunos ataques de los cazabombarderos franceses y británicos —los aviones no tripulados de Estados Unidos entraron en acción en contadas ocasiones— mataron a algunos civiles inocentes, las operaciones se ejecutaron con enorme precisión. Junto a las carreteras libias que bordean el Mediterráneo son visibles los grandes destrozos causados por los bombardeos aliados en las bases militares que dirigían Mutasim y Jamís, hijos del tirano. Unas ruinas que no pueden ser causadas por los cohetes que ambos bandos emplearon a destajo. El embargo de armas al régimen y la imposición de la zona de exclusión aérea despojaron a las tropas de Gadafi de gran parte de su capacidad en los campos de batalla, en una guerra que arroja cifras mareantes: 9.600 misiones de ataque de los pilotos aliados arrasaron casi 6.000 bases militares, puestos de mando, centros de comunicaciones, defensas antiaéreas, más de 1.000 tanques y vehículos, y algunos 192

complejos residenciales en los que perecieron varios familiares del coronel que se aupó al poder tras un golpe de Estado el 1 de septiembre de 1969. La OTAN repliega. Y Gadafi reposa en un lugar secreto del desierto. Juan Miguel Muñoz Rasmussen pone punto final en Trípoli a la misión de la OTAN La Alianza concluye su campaña en una guerra que dejó 40.000 muertos31 OCT 2011 - 20:53 CET16 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/31/actualidad/1320090238_66841 4.html

Internacional El islamismo avanza en la nueva Libia Los más extremistas ganan peso en el Gobierno interino del país mientras la aplicación de la ley islámica despierta el recelo de los países occidentales Los recelos territoriales empañan la declaración del fin de la guerra libia La ONU insta a Libia a mantener sus arsenales fuera del alcance de Al Qaeda Un académico formado en EE UU, nuevo jefe del Gobierno de transición libio Juan Miguel Muñoz Trípoli 1 NOV 2011 - 19:25 CET

Un libio muestra su nuevo pasaporte, con la nueva bandera del país. / JOSEPH EID (AFP) Los viernes, día de oración musulmán, incluso los controles militares de los sublevados libios quedaban desiertos durante el apogeo de la rebelión contra Muamar el Gadafi. La asistencia a las mezquitas es ahora masiva, tras muchos años en los que la presencia en los templos era motivo de sospecha para los omnipresentes agentes libios. Depuesto el régimen, el fervor religioso, siempre latente, se ha desatado en una sociedad extremadamente conservadora. Y el campo político no podía quedar al margen. Mustafá Abdelyalil, presidente del Consejo Nacional Transitorio (CNT), declaró la liberación del país el 23 de octubre en Bengasi. Y, en su alocución ante decenas de miles de personas, aseguró que ninguna normativa podrá contravenir la sharía, el cuerpo de derecho islámico que se convertirá en la fuente principal de la legislación. Entre los aliados que 193

ayudaron decisivamente a derrocar a Gadafi no han sido bien recibidas las palabras de Abdelyalil, quien aludió a la eliminación de los intereses bancarios y a la regulación del matrimonio y el divorcio, que podría dar carta blanca a la poligamia. En las calles libias, la referencia a la sharía ni siquiera es materia de discusión, entre otras razones porque supondría en algunos asuntos poco más que un mero cambio sobre el papel. Prohibida la poligamia durante la dictadura gadafista, los casos de hombres casados con más de una mujer son poco frecuentes, pero nunca han desaparecido, especialmente en el ámbito de las tribus beduinas.

El primer ministro del CNT libio, Mahmud Yibril, / SABRI ELMHEDWI (EFE) Balkis Blau, médica de 25 años, es soltera y partidaria de la adopción de la sharía, opinión muy extendida también entre las mujeres, sobre todo en el oriente libio, cuyas ciudades son menos cosmopolitas que la capital. “Por supuesto que estoy de acuerdo. Lo que hacía Gadafi era teatro. Siempre ha habido hombres casados con más de una esposa”, afirma Blau. Lo que no significa que la mayoría de las mujeres vea con buenos ojos la poligamia. Al contrario, la rechazan. O solo la admiten en determinados casos. “Yo no aceptaría”, añade la doctora, “que mi marido se casara con otra mujer. No me gusta nada. Salvo que la esposa no pueda procrear o esté gravemente enferma, no lo apruebo”. La interpretación de la sharía no es monolítica. En el Egipto de Mubarak también es la principal fuente de la legislación, según un precepto constitucional, y ello no impidió a los clérigos de Al Azhar, la más prestigiosa institución musulmana suní, prohibir en su día el velo en la universidad del mismo nombre. En Túnez, muy dependiente del turismo, los dirigentes de Ennahda, el partido triunfador en los recientes comicios con

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un arrollador 42% de los votos, se han apresurado a garantizar que las mujeres podrán seguir luciendo bikinis en las playas y que el alcohol —prohibido en Libia por la dictadura de Gadafi— podrá seguir consumiéndose en los restaurantes y bares. En temas como la poligamia, la ‘sharía’ solo sería un cambio sobre el papel Preocupa en las capitales occidentales este resurgir del islamismo político en Libia. Pero no provoca la misma alarma cuando el fundamentalismo más radical se instala en Estados como Arabia Saudí, impulsor del integrismo más radical. Cabe preguntarse por qué este renacimiento en el Magreb. Y no hay que escarbar demasiado para hallar la respuesta. Al margen de que los islamistas han sufrido, como ningún otro colectivo, décadas de cárcel y tormento en Libia, Túnez y Egipto a manos de los esbirros leales a los déspotas defenestrados, las organizaciones islamistas han seguido un patrón que también se ha implantado en Líbano y Palestina. Sus organizaciones caritativas no conocen el descanso: construyen hospitales y escuelas, y atienden a los más necesitados en países dominados durante medio siglo por élites políticas proclives al saqueo de los recursos públicos. Ahora, las voces de los líderes políticos islamistas se escuchan con creciente frecuencia en Libia. El académico Alí Salabi, desde Bengasi, y el comandante militar de Trípoli, Abdelhakim Belhaj, no han escondido sus recelos frente a la clase política liberal. Salabi tildó en septiembre de “extremistas laicos” a los nuevos dirigentes, y de Mahmud Yibril —primer ministro recién reemplazado por el profesor tripolitano Abdul al Rahim al Kib— dijo que estaba conduciendo al país a “una nueva era de tiranía y dictadura”. “Puede ser”, añadió, “peor que Gadafi”. La caridad de los más radicales ha atendido a los más necesitados

Molestaba a Salabi y a Belhaj, excombatiente en Afganistán contra las tropas soviéticas en la década de los ochenta del siglo pasado, que buena parte de los miembros del Gabinete fueran docentes formados en Estados Unidos y residentes durante décadas en este país y otras naciones occidentales. No acaban de digerir que quienes han sufrido el exilio, pero no la brutal represión padecida por los libios en su tierra, sean quienes llevan la voz cantante. Porque, además, “alguno de ellos ni siquiera se expresa o lee correctamente la lengua árabe”, según precisa un diplomático occidental acreditado en Trípoli. Los islamistas, en todo caso, han ganado influencia paulatinamente en el Gobierno interino. El ministro de Economía saliente es un titulado en Seattle (EE UU) y dirigente de los Hermanos Musulmanes, Abdalá Samía. Abdul Wahid, presidente en Reino Unido de Hezbi Tahrir, una organización que aboga por la unidad de la comunidad musulmana, apunta en artículos publicados en los diarios The Times y Tripoli Post otros motivos por los que en occidente se teme la adopción de la sharía: “No es, como tan a menudo se describe, un cuerpo legal estático. Existen normas indiscutidas, pero la mayoría de las leyes están sometidas a un permanente debate... En materia de relaciones internacionales, prohíbe tajantemente la dependencia colonial de otros Estados. Permite firmar tratados comerciales con otros países, pero rechaza el sometimiento a instituciones hegemónicas controladas por unos pocos países poderosos en beneficio de sus intereses. En asuntos políticos, significa elegir a los gobernantes, que deben rendir cuentas y consultar al pueblo sobre cuestiones importantes”.

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http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/01/actualidad/1320170181_47160 4.html

Internacional El emir de Catar anuncia elecciones para su cámara consultiva El jeque Hamad cumple la promesa de permitir la elección de parte del organismo consultivo del Estado absolutista Ángeles Espinosa Mascate (Omán) 1 NOV 2011 - 09:48 CET11

JANEK SKARZYNSKI (AFP) El emir de Catar, el jeque Hamad bin Jalifa al Thani, ha anunciado este martes que las elecciones para el Consejo Asesor se celebrarán en la segunda mitad de 2013, según ha informado la agencia de noticias oficial catarí, QNA, citada por Reuters. Catar, uno de los países con mayor renta per cápita del mundo gracias a la explotación de petróleo y gas, es una monarquía absolutista regida por la familia Al Thani. La cabeza del Estado es el emir. El anuncio catarí no aclara cuáles van a ser los poderes del Consejo, si serán meramente consultivos o también legislativos. En este último caso, se tratará de un paso revolucionario. En cualquier caso es un paso importante en el contexto regional. El emir había ya anunciado este propósito a hacer la concesión de la ley básica y ahora cumple. "Desde el estrado de este Consejo, declaro que hemos decidido que las elecciones para el Consejo Asesor se celebren en la segunda mitad de 2013", ha dicho el emir en un discurso. "Sabemos que todos estos pasos son necesarios para crear el moderno Estado de Catar y un ciudadano qatarí capaz de afrontar los desafíos actuales y levantar el país. Confiamos en que seréis capaces de asumir la responsabilidad", ha señalado. 196

Como resultado de estas elecciones, el Consejo Asesor de Catar será una cámara de 45 miembros en la que 30 serán electos por primera vez y 15 designados. Esta composición está prevista en una carta otorgada (un texto constitucional aprobado unilateralmente por el Gobierno). Hasta el momento, Qatar solo había celebrado unas elecciones municipales. Para el politólogo Khalid al Haribi, director ejecutivo de Tawasul, un think tank de Omán, “esto es un signo de que todos [en la región] están buscando un modelo con posibilidades de éxito porque no quieren correr riesgos. El emir de Catar había declarado en anteriores ocasiones que estaba observando con interés el desarrollo de la experiencia omaní con el Consejo Consultivo, para ver en qué medida podía ser aplicable a Catar. Es significativo que se haya dado este paso sin que hubiese presión popular para pedir el cambio”. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/11/01/actualidad/1320137304_54566 4.html

TRIBUNA: ANTONIO ELORZA Islam y democracia El nuevo régimen de Túnez puede ofrecer un ejemplo de mayores consecuencias que el de Turquía Es cuestionable llamar "islamista" a un Gobierno que no implante la 'sharía' ANTONIO ELORZA 01/11/2011 El humorista del diario tunecino nos presenta a dos personajes que conversan. Uno de ellos expresa su miedo ante la llegada al poder de los islamistas, y cuenta al otro que se ha abastecido, por si acaso, de agua y de leche. "Te equivocas", le contesta su interlocutor. "Harías mejor en almacenar vino y cerveza". Una de las imágenes habituales del islamismo le identifica con la prohibición de las bebidas alcohólicas, y de hecho, siendo Túnez país musulmán, el Gobierno ponía las cosas difíciles a los bebedores de las clases populares, reservando la venta a tenduchos semiescondidos de propiedad estatal y solo en las principales localidades. Para los consumidores de alto nivel adquisitivo y turistas. El segundo indicador de intransigencia correspondería a la islamización del vestido femenino. De momento, las únicas señales emitidas por Rachid Ghannushi, líder de Ennahda, el Partido del Renacimiento, vencedor en las elecciones, conciernen a lo segundo y en nada anuncian la aplicación de la vulgata islamista. El modelo sería el AKP turco de Erdogan. Solo puede preocupar su crítica al hecho de que en Túnez coexistan el francés y el árabe, que a su juicio debiera ser la lengua propia del país. Por lo demás, una vez suprimidas las restricciones del régimen de Ben Ali sobre el hiyab, Ghannushi ha anunciado un futuro de coexistencia, al regresar tras un largo exilio: "Las mujeres y los hombres son libres de elegir su estilo de vida; soy contrario tanto a imponer el velo, como a prohibirlo en nombre de la modernidad". Su preocupación se vuelve hacia los problemas concretos que afectan a la mujer tunecina: el salario inferior al de los hombres, la ausencia de guarderías y algo de lo cual los espectadores españoles pueden percibir la importancia en el filme egipcio El Cairo 678: el acoso sexual. Como en el curso de la campaña electoral, la moderación ha presidido todas y cada una de las 197

declaraciones del veterano político, aun cuando tendría razones para quejarse por un sistema electoral que castigó a Ennahda como partido ganador, impidiendo su clara mayoría absoluta en la Asamblea Constituyente. Bajo la bandera del islam, la democracia parece haber llegado a Túnez, no sin seguir un recorrido sinuoso, ya que el factor religioso no contó en la insurrección contra Ben Ali y los grupos progresistas han tenido pésimos resultados. Incluso entró en escena un factor inesperado, con el millonario residente en Londres que obtuvo casi el 10% de los votos haciendo campaña solo desde su televisión. Pero el sustrato islámico estaba lo suficientemente arraigado en la sociedad tunecina como para imponerse, más aún si su portavoz político desarrollaba una campaña abierta a la tolerancia y al pluralismo de cara al futuro. En el caso de que tales previsiones optimistas se confirmen,se abre una nueva era en las relaciones entre la religión musulmana y la democracia, que ya había tenido antecedentes teóricos en autores tunecinos como Mohamed Charfi. Recordemos su libro Islam y libertad. Frente a la restauración del orden tradicional bajo el cumplimiento estricto de la sharía que parece inevitable en Libia, el nuevo régimen tunecino puede ofrecer un ejemplo de mayores consecuencias que el de Turquía, ya que en este caso existía el antecedente de Kemal Ataturk, con todo su legado de defensa del laicismo y, además, por encima de las creencias comunes, no se trata de un país árabe como Túnez. Lo que si conviene es tener en cuenta que si el islamismo turco, de posiciones radicales a mediados de los años noventa, parece haberse ajustado al patrón de la democracia, el tunecino puede seguir el mismo camino, guiado aquí por el conocimiento del grado de evolución de la sociedad que tendrá Ennahda a su cargo. Como consecuencia, resulta cuestionable llamar "islamista" a un Gobierno que renuncie a implantar la sharía, adopte una Constitución democrática y promueva el pluralismo político. Es útil llamar a las cosas por su nombre. El islamismo tiene una seña de identidad clara que es la adopción de la sharía, del conjunto de normas basadas en el Corán y en las sentencias del profeta, con el objeto de mantener o forjar un orden social regido en su totalidad por el principio de "ordenar el bien y prohibir el mal" cuyo contenido marcan los textos sagrados. Fue el programa tradicional de los Hermanos Musulmanes de Egipto, de los cuales procede Ennahda, y lo es hoy de los principales movimientos islamistas en el mundo. No lo es, según sus palabras, de Ennahda. Partido islámico o simplemente musulmán sería una calificación más ajustada. Es la ocasión también para distinguir entre islam e islamismo, en el sentido de la tradición doctrinal, tantas veces olvidada, del islam progresivo. Desde que en 1925 Ali Abderraziq, teólogo de la Universidad de Al-Azhar, afirmara la posibilidad (y la necesidad) para los musulmanes de elaborar una doctrina moderna del Estado, al poner en cuestión el califato como institución divina, una corriente minoritaria de pensamiento, pero de argumentación sólida, ha sentado los fundamentos de una convergencia entre islam y democracia. En su base está la idea de que la enseñanza del profeta no determina forma alguna de Gobierno en particular. La construcción teológica contenida en la primera parte del Corán, las aleyas de La Meca, es de naturaleza fundamentalmente religiosa, contempla la yihad como esfuerzo hacia Dios y no contiene un mensaje político vinculante; incluso en la fase medinense del profeta armado, en el llamado "versículo de los emires", la autoridad es vista desde el ángulo de la obediencia debida a quien la ejerce legítimamente. Insistiendo en el mismo punto, el profesor marroquí Mohamed al-Jabri, en La razón política en el islam, recordaba que la

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doctrina islámica no era asociable con ninguna forma política concreta y que, en todo caso, aquí en directo enfrentamiento con los islamistas, la referencia a la consulta (shura) del profeta con sus compañeros sería un antecedente de las formas democráticas de organización del poder. Aun desde juicios históricos discutibles, más allá va aún Fátima Mernissi, al asociar la democracia y el concepto islámico de razón con las mujeres creyentes, asumiendo el papel de vanguardia de esa lucha para poner fin a un orden social fundado sobre "la ocultación de lo femenino". Como ocurriera con la formación del cristianismo democrático en el siglo XIX, al buscar refugio en los Evangelios frente a la Iglesia oficial, el islam democrático se remonta a "la inspiración de los orígenes", perdida luego con las elaboraciones de los "piadosos antepasados", referencia esencial del islamismo, con el propósito de combatir la idea de que la doctrina islámica es una ortodoxia irreformable. Citemos Islam y modernidad, del también tunecino Abdelmajid Charfi. El dato de la crítica de Ghannushi al salafismo y al radical Sayyid Qutb, fundador del yihadismo moderno, mostraría su alineamiento con dicho enfoque. En fin, la lectura democrática del islam no solo responde en los últimos tiempos a una evolución en el terreno de las ideas, sino también a la constatación del carácter opresivo del islamismo realmente existente. Es así como el pensamiento musulmán progresista surgió con fuerza en Irán al percibir destacados participantes en la "revolución de los ayatolás" el precio de la ausencia de democracia. Frente al islam de la identidad, Abdelkarim Soroush propugnará un islam de la razón, cuya acción crítica debe permitir la distinción entre los aspectos nucleares y los accesorios de la religión. Lo esencial es sembrar "la cultura de la democracia", explicó el ayatolá Montazeri, sucesor designado de Jomeini que este apartó a última hora. La fallida revolución verde resulta de estos antecedentes. Esperemos que la experiencia de la vida en democracia y una prolongada oposición a la dictadura desde el exilio hayan movido las posiciones políticas de Ennahda en la misma dirección. ANTONIO ELORZA Islam y democracia01/11/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Islam/democracia/elpepuopi/20111101elpepiopi _4/Tes

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Internacional Blogs Internacional Orilla Sur / Rive Sud / South Shore Un repaso de la trepidante actualidad de la orilla sur del Mediterráneo y sus repercusiones en el sur de la Vieja Europa. Passer en revue l’ardente actualité de la rive sud de la Méditerranée et son impact sur le sud du Vieux Continent. A review of the hot news on the southern shore of the Mediterranean and its impact in the south of Old Europe.

¿Cuándo felicitará Francia a Ennahda en Túnez? Por: Ignacio Cembrero | 31 de octubre de 2011 Francia ha sido mezquina con ese Túnez que da a luz una democracia. Su ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Alain Juppé, se alegró, desde luego, del “buen desarrollo de las primeras elecciones libres en Túnez”, pero no fue más allá. Ni una palabra para felicitar a los vencedores empezando por los islamistas de Ennahda. Ni una palabra tampoco para subrayar la voluntad de París de trabajar con el nuevo gobierno salido de las urnas.

Más bien al contrario, los mensajes emitidos por París están salpicados de amonestaciones. Son « conminatorios » escribe la web informativa tunecina « Leaders ». « Francia vigilará el respeto de los derechos humanos y los principios democráticos » en Libia y en Túnez, advirtió, el miércoles, el presidente Nicolas Sarkozy durante el último Consejo de Ministros, como si la situación en ambos países fuese comparable. Más tarde Juppé volvió a la carga evocando las « líneas rojas que no

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hay que franquear ». « Vamos a ser muy vigilantes y tenemos medios para mostrar esa vigilancia », amenazó. Por último, Bernard Valero, portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, rehusó el viernes comentar los resultados oficiales de las elecciones que ese mismo día hacía público el ISIE, el organismo independiente tunecino que las organizó, so pretexto de que aún no eran definitivos. Ridha Torkhani, uno de los responsables del ISIE, señala que solo se conocerán los resultados definitivos hacia el 10 de noviembre, pero no serán muy diferentes de los anunciados el viernes. Es legítimo preocuparse por las intenciones, a medio y largo plazo, de Ennahda. Pero primero hay que ser generoso y alegrarse del arranque de esta experiencia democrática en África del norte, manifestar el deseo de respaldarla, de trabajar codo con codo con los nuevos representantes del pueblo tunecino. Francia era mucho menos vigilante en tiempos de la dictadura del presidente Zine al Abidine Ben Ali cuyo sistema político y económico era considerado un modelo por un buen número de sus dirigentes gubernamentales. ¿Es necesario recordar que la ministra de Asuntos Exteriores, Michèle Alliot-Marie, puso el 11 de enero a disposición del dictador, tres días antes de su derrocamiento, “la experiencia de las fuerzas de seguridad [francesas] reconocida en el mundo entero”? Podría permitir, precisó, “resolver situaciones de seguridad de esta índole”. El problema de Túnez era, según ella, de seguridad y París estaba dispuesto a contribuir a solucionarlo. La reacción de las autoridades francesas tras el escrutinio en Túnez está en las antípodas de la que mantuvieron, por ejemplo, tras el referéndum constitucional del 1 de julio en Marruecos que los jóvenes contestatarios del Movimiento 20 de Febrero, la oposición de izquierdas, un sindicato y los islamistas de Justicia y Espiritualidad boicotearon. « Se ve de antemano que el pueblo marroquí ha tomado una decisión histórica », declaró Juppé. « Saludamos la fuerte participación del pueblo marroquí en este referéndum », añadió. La participación fue en Marruecos, según el Ministerio del Interior, del 72,65%, pero ese dato no toma en cuenta a los millones de marroquíes adultos no inscritos, a veces voluntariamente, en las listas de electores. Si se toma en consideración la participación real fue de aproximadamente un 40%, según sostienen, por ejemplo, el intelectual laico Fouad Abdelmoumni o el movimiento islamista Justicia y Espiritualidad. La reacción de la ex potencia colonial en Túnez contrasta también con la de sus socios europeos. Todos, empezando por Roma o Berlín, se apresuraron en alegrarse de la celebración de elecciones libres. Madrid « felicitó a los partidos políticos » tunecinos representados en la Asamblea Constituyente y les ofreció su asesoramiento para redactar une Constitución democrática. Londres se declaró deseoso de « trabajar estrechamente con el nuevo gobierno ». Pero en Europa fue, sin lugar a dudas, Catherine Ashton, la Alta Representante para los Asuntos Exteriores de la Unión, la que llegó más lejos. Felicitó « al partido Ennahda que ha cosechado el mayor número de votos ». Los estadounidenses, por su parte, se han adelantado a todo el mundo a la hora de ensalzar y dar ánimos al nuevo Túnez. A las felicitaciones del presidente Barack Obama se ha añadido la intervención del embajador de EE UU en Túnez, Gordon Gray. Dejó claro que si el próximo primer ministro tunecino, probablemente Hamadi Jebali, es islamista, no le supone un problema. 201

“La administración de EE UU trabajará con el próximo gobierno tunecino cualquiera que sea su composición porque ese gobierno refleja la elección del pueblo”, declaró de entrada el embajador en Túnez casi en el mismo momento que en París el portavoz del Ministerio de Exteriores seguía resistiéndose a comentar el resultado de las elecciones tunecinas. « La administración de EE UU no tiene ninguna reserva con relación al éxito de Ennahda en las elecciones a la Constituyente porque se trate de un partido islámico”, añadió Gray. “El movimiento Ennahda ha subrayado en varias ocasiones su compromiso con la puesta en pie de un régimen civil”, recordó. En consecuencia Washington se dispone a lanzar tres iniciativas, modestas pero simbólicas, de apoyo a la reactivación económica de Túnez. Francia fue la última potencia occidental en desvincularse de Ben Ali y ahora es de nuevo la última en celebrar con los tunecinos el nacimiento de una democracia. http://blogs.elpais.com/orilla-sur/2011/10/cuando-felicitara-francia-a-ennahda-en- tunez.html#more

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Ana María Menéndez LAS CLAVES DE LA VICTORIA DE ENNAHDA EN TÚNEZ 31 de octubre de 2011 Ana María Menéndez El partido islamista tunecino Ennahda ha articulado en poco tiempo un mensaje conciliador y moderado que ha sabido llegar a diferentes sectores de la población. ¿Poca sharia y mucho turismo para el desarrollo?

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La victoria del movimiento Ennahda (El Renacimiento) en las elecciones para una asamblea constituyente celebradas el 23 de octubre en Túnez ha sido amplia e indiscutible. Con un porcentaje de voto del 41,47%, traducido en 90 escaños de una asamblea de 217, el partido islamista se sitúa como la primera fuerza política a una distancia de casi 28 puntos porcentuales y 60 escaños del segundo partido más votado (Congreso por la República). La victoria es aún más impresionante si se tiene en cuenta

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que Ennahda ha sido la formación más votada en todas las circunscripciones menos una, y entre los tunecinos residentes en el extranjero. Ha ganado incluso en las dos circunscripciones de la capital, donde se presumía que los partidos laicos tenían su feudo. Además, el proceso electoral ha sido limpio y transparente, como han reconocido todos los numerosos observadores electorales internacionales, incluida la misión de la Unión Europea. La victoria del islam político en Túnez no ha causado sorpresa, ya que todas las encuestas publicadas durante el periodo postrevolucionario y hasta el comienzo de la campaña electoral señalaban al movimiento como la fuerza política más conocida por los tunecinos. Sin embargo, la amplitud de la victoria sí ha sido inesperada, puesto que las encuestas no le habían otorgado nunca más del 25% y se suponía que la oposición de los sectores laicos del Túnez cosmopolita iba a presentar una resistencia mayor. No ha sido así, entre otros factores por la fragmentación de los partidos no religiosos, con la consiguiente dispersión de votos. Y, al mismo tiempo, Ennahda ha encontrado eco y apoyo significativos en segmentos diversos de la sociedad tunecina. La primera gran baza de esta formación ha sido la rapidez y eficacia de su reconstrucción. En el Túnez de Ben Alí, la tolerancia hacia el islam político era menos que cero. No existía, como sí sucede en otros países de mayoría musulmana, presencia islamista en las redes sociales o en candidaturas independientes más o menos controladas. En este país árabe, los islamistas estaban muertos, en prisión o en el exilio. Sin embargo, desde enero y en apenas 9 meses han sido capaces de desplegarse y hacer llegar su mensaje por todo el territorio. Es un partido escasamente personalista: el retorno tras 22 años de exilio en Londres de su líder histórico, Rachid Ghannouchi, sirvió para dotarlo de una cabeza visible, pero el verdadero poder de Ennahda está en la presencia de su militancia en la sociedad, lo que le permite movilizar considerables recursos humanos y económicos. Desde su legalización, Ennahda ha mantenido, además, un discurso abierto, conciliador y de mano tendida. Ha hecho hincapié en mensajes tranquilizadores: economía de mercado, continuidad de la política exterior, respeto de los derechos de las mujeres…. En fin, poca sharia y mucho turismo para el desarrollo. Es un tópico considerar que la base de simpatizantes y votantes de Ennahda se encuentra en las zonas rurales, más atrasadas y conservadoras, del interior del país y entre las clases populares de las cités –los polvorientos y densamente poblados barrios desfavorecidos– de las cosmopolitas urbes costeras. Sin embargo, y a falta de un análisis más riguroso que se podrá llevar a cabo cuando se disponga de más detalles, los números y la victoria de Ennahda en Túnez capital, sugieren que existe un sector urbano de clases medias educadas y profesionales que votan a este partido. Son aquellos que quieren seguridad, fin de la corrupción, justicia social y un fondo de valores suministrados por el islam, que consideran una parte esencial de su identidad. Es interesante constatar que la pretendida línea divisoria entre laicismo y religión tiene bastante menos peso en la sociedad tunecina de lo que se creía. De hecho, el laicismo parece haber devenido un valor minoritario de la élite urbana de una cierta edad. Por contra, una parte importante de la sociedad contempla la relación entre estado y religión de una forma más tradicional, como elementos complementarios. Los tunecinos no han comprado el miedo al pretendido doble lenguaje de los islamistas. Sean o no 204

practicantes, muchos ciudadanos sienten que la religión es un pilar básico de la sociedad. Y no hay que olvidar, por otra parte, y como baza a favor del islam político, que tanto la dictablanda de Bourguiba como la dictadura de Ben Alí se definían como laicas.

De hecho, no deja de ser revelador que los partidos no religiosos que han mantenido una posición de no Los ciudadanos han confrontación con Ennahda, Congreso votado mayoritariamente por la para la República y Ettakatol, hayan ruptura. Han votado más a quienes encontrado mucho más apoyo (30 y 21 hicieron oposición real a Ben Alí y escaños, respectivamente) que las fueron sus víctimas formaciones que han llamado al “frentismo” contra los islamistas, el Partido Democrático Progresista y el Polo Democrático (17 y 5 escaños, cada uno). Todos estos partidos son históricos de la oposición a Ben Alí, en mayor o menor grado, y todos comparten una ideología de centro-izquierda, con matices. Pero los tunecinos progresistas, a similitud de oferta, han elegido a los conciliadores, y esperan de ellos una cooperación y un “diálogo crítico” con los islamistas, no una pelea continua. Los ciudadanos han votado mayoritariamente por la ruptura. Han votado más a quienes hicieron oposición real a Ben Alí y fueron sus víctimas. Entre “que vienen los barbudos” y “que vuelve Ben Alí” han preferido lo primero. Nada ilustra mejor esta aseveración que el sorprendente caso de La Petición Popular, un partido oscuro y populista, fundado por un tunecino millonario que reside y opera una cadena de televisión para Túnez desde Londres y que, con una campaña casi exclusivamente desde su televisión, consiguió situarse como tercera fuerza política con casi 30 escaños en las elecciones. En el momento en que se conoció este resultado, comenzaron a saltar las alarmas porque el líder es simpatizante de Ben Alí. Se desataron los rumores y las confabulaciones sobre la larga mano del huido dictador y, al final, la Comisión Electoral Independiente anuló –aplicando el código electoral– seis de las listas, con la consiguiente rebaja de sus diputados electos a 19. Cualquier sospecha de involución encuentra rechazo y contundencia. Como sucediera con la revolución de los jazmines, la victoria de Ennahda sitúa a Túnez en otro momento histórico, quizá también pionero. Tras la catastrófica experiencia de Argelia y el caso palestino, es la nueva oportunidad del islam político de gobernar un país árabe en paz, libertad y progreso. Un enorme desafío. Artículos relacionados  Túnez: de la revolucuón a la transición. Ana María Méndez  El largo camino que aguarda a Túnez. Barah Mikail  Lecciones desde Túnez. Oladiran Bello  El mito de un Túnez moderado. Rasha Moumneh  Aromas a jazmín y libertad en el Magreb. Antonio Navarro  Luchas en la red: la primera dama de Túnez. Ana María Menéndez “Las claves de la victoria de ennahda en Túnez” 31 de octubre de 2011 http://www.fp-es.org/las-claves-de-la-victoria-de-ennahda-en-tunez

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11/01/2011 01:29 PM The World from Berlin By Cutting UNESCO Funding, 'Obama Has Lost Credibility' The Palestinians succeeded in their bid to become full members of UNESCO and the Americans followed through on their threat to cut off funding. German commentators, however, are unsure whether either party will benefit from the dispute. The reaction from the US seemed almost inevitable. Once the Palestinians succeeded in Paris on Monday in their attempt to become a full member of UNESCO, the United Nations' cultural organization, the response from Washington came quickly. The US cut off its funding to UNESCO. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said the US government was obliged under law to freeze its next UNESCO payment of $60 million (€43 million) which was due later this month. She said: "To admit Palestine as a member is regrettable and premature." Previously, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon had expressed fears that the controversial inclusion of Palestine into UNESCO -- the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation -- could have damaging effects. He said: "We will need to work on practical solutions to preserve UNESCO's financial resources." And the decision does indeed present a great danger to the financing of UNESCO: The biennial budget for 2010-2011 amounts to $653 million (€461 million), with the US responsible for about 22 percent of that. The three largest contributors also include Japan and Germany. A 'Cascade' Effect UNESCO has, however, survived without American funding in the past. The United States pulled out of the organization under Ronald Reagan, rejoining two decades later under George W. Bush. Following their success, Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Malki told the meeting in Paris: "This vote will erase a tiny part of the injustice done to the Palestinian people." And UNESCO could be just the start -- the Palestinians' top envoy at the UN in Geneva said on Tuesday that he believes their membership will "open the door" to joining 16 other UN agencies within weeks. "Now we are studying when we are going to move for full membership on the other UN agencies," Ibrahim Khraishi said. US officials, meanwhile, warned of a "cascade" effect at other UN bodies that might follow from the UNESCO decision. Commentators in Germany remain unsure of the benefits either to the US for withholding the funding, or the Palestinians for forcing through the vote. The Financial Times Deutschland writes: "The US, Germany and some of their allies have tried to prevent the Palestinians from joining the UN cultural organization UNESCO. They failed. They should let it be. The 206

US announcement that it would quit paying membership fees is inappropriate to the customs of an international organization. Additionally, the uproar over the issues is counterproductive to the aims of those opposed to the admission." "Furthermore, America's behavior only serves to bring more attention and momentum to the questionable course of the Palestinians. Both the US and Israel criticized Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas for forcing a cultural organization to make a decision in a political conflict. But it's through this massive resistance that Abbas gains the attention and political capital that he wants. Abbas has provoked, and hit the bull's eye." The left-leaning Berliner Zeitung writes: "Last year, the US contributed around 16 percent of the Palestinian Authority's budget. Israel received about $3 billion in military aid and diplomatic backing. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Abbas are ignoring America nonetheless." "One continues to build settlements, while the other would rather pursue a unilateral strategy than negotiate. Netanyahu fears no consequences because the US Congress is behind him, while Abbas knows that Fatah is the only alternative to the radical Islamist Hamas. Obama has maneuvered the peace process into a dead end street. In the absence of alternatives, his threats are ineffective: Following through with them would harm the US more than Israel or the Palestinians. If Obama cuts off financial aid to Abbas and UNESCO, he would lose important allies as well as his credibility in the Arab world. If the payments continue, nobody will be able to take his threats seriously in future." The center-left Berlin-based Tagesspiegel writes: "The inclusion of Palestine as a full member of UNESCO ... has many unwanted side effects. UNESCO will no longer be able to finance important projects like the promotion of girls' education in Afghanistan, because the US is now forced by law to cease contributions -- 22 percent of the UNESCO budget. Europe's clout in the Palestinian question is now officially documented; the EU's inability to exert influence on the Middle East can no longer be hidden." "The practical consequences will lead some friends of the Palestinians to again doubt how politically viable their leadership is when it counts. Therefore, there is little reason to congratulate the new member of UNESCO. The price is too high." The center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "That UNESCO has now included Palestine as the 195th member in its ranks could raise the pressure on Israel to look to hold talks with Palestinian President Abbas not only in theory, but also in practice -- with confidence-building steps like the clearing of settlements and concrete proposals." "The membership of 'Palestine' in UNESCO is for the Palestinians a success d'estime that may bring their acceptance into the United Nations a small step closer. Both Israel and the US should consider whether this membership really weighs so heavily that they must terminate their participation in the organization. Washington has already done this once, isolating itself in the process." -- David Knight

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URL:  http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,795196,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links:  A Plea for the Palestinian Cause: Abbas Appeals to the World's Conscience (09/24/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788154,00.html  Poker With UN Votes: Europe Divided on Palestinian Question (09/22/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787889,00.html  SPIEGEL Interview with Palestinian Prime Minister: 'An Independent Palestine Will Be Inevitable' (09/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787165,00.html  The World from Berlin: 'Lip Service Is No Longer Sufficient for the Palestinians' (09/16/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,786684,00.html  Arab League Head Nabil Elaraby: 'What's Wrong with the Palestinians Appealing to the UN?' (09/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,784815,00.html  Diplomatic Maneuvering: Palestinians Plan Application for UN Membership (08/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,778128,00.html

Libya struggles to create army out of militias By Mary Beth Sheridan, Published: November 1 TRIPOLI, LIBYA — Libya has emerged from its civil war with more than 300 militias and no political consensus on forming a national army, raising concerns that irregular, gun- toting groups could become entrenched and pose a long-term challenge to the government, officials here said. On Monday, Libyan leaders began to establish a new interim government with the authority to create the armed forces, choosing the technocratic Abdurrahim el-Keib as prime minister. But the militiamen who won the eight-month war have made it clear that they will not submit meekly to the new civilian authorities. “Creating a new army is not going to be by an official statement or resolution. It has to come after a negotiation,” said Anis Sharif, a spokesman for Abdulhakim Belhadj, an Islamist seen as the dominant militia leader in Tripoli. Reining in the militias is crucial to restoring order after the fighting between NATO-backed revolutionaries and loyalists of longtime dictator Moammar Gaddafi, diplomats say. NATO

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officially ended its operations in Libya on Monday night, giving the country full responsibility for its own security. Although many of the fighters have been in a celebratory mood since the war ended, several confrontations between rival militias have threatened to escalate into bloodshed — including one at Tripoli’s airport Monday. “The danger is that you have young men returning from battle, bored and with a newfound sense of regional identity and personal pride,” said a Western official in Tripoli, who was not authorized to comment on the record. Militia and military leaders recognize the need to demobilize or integrate fighters into the security services, the official said. “But the key will be agreeing and implementing a plan to do this.” ‘A political vacuum’ Efforts to relaunch the army have been hobbled by the central government’s weakness and rivalries among revolutionaries. Sharif said that one of the main goals of the Transitional National Council was to avoid a political vacuum. “On this point, they failed — and failed completely,” he said, recalling that many of the council’s members remained in the eastern city of Benghazi, the bastion of the revolution, after Gaddafi’s forces were driven from Tripoli in August. “They left the capital with a political vacuum,” he said, and militias from other areas have moved in and set up camp. Islamist fighters have squabbled with revolutionaries who once belonged to the national army over who should lead Libya’s new armed forces, so the top post is vacant, officials said. The military’s No. 2 officer — Deputy Chief of Staff Suleiman Mahmoud al-Obeidi — was stunned last month when a militia from the western Zintan region seized control of his Tripoli base while he was out of town, his aides said. In response, Obeidi summoned about 700 heavily armed revolutionaries and threatened to wrest back control of the base, an old army supply headquarters in western Tripoli, said his son and legal adviser, Haytham al-Obeidi. “It could have been a real confrontation. We were very, very angry,” the younger Obeidi said. The crisis was defused only when President Mustafa Abdel Jalil intervened, he said. Haytham al-Obeidi said there were tensions between fighters from eastern Libya, where army officers such as his father defected en masse, and those from the west, many of them irregulars who took on Gaddafi’s military, risking torture and death. Another confrontation occurred Monday evening at Tripoli’s military airport, where revolutionaries from eastern Libya pulled their guns on the crew of a military aircraft to try to get it to fly them to Benghazi, said Tripoli militia members who guard the facility. The group from the east was arrested, they said. Human rights concerns The lack of a unified Libyan military and police force has alarmed human rights activists, who say militias are meting out justice on an ad hoc basis to the country’s roughly 7,000 political prisoners, sometimes resorting to torture. At least 100 militias are operating in the city of Misurata, which suffered a bloody siege during the war, and more than 150 are in Tripoli, Western officials said. There are dozens more in Benghazi.

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The cities have established councils to oversee the armed groups, but the degree of organization is limited. Sadiq Turki, a revolutionary who is director of a military hospital in Tripoli, told a reporter that all of his militia members had ID cards and had to register their weapons. “It’s forbidden to fire in the streets,” said Turki, wearing a black T-shirt and camouflage pants. “Even my bullets, we do an inventory. Someone comes every few days and counts.” But moments after he spoke, someone with a semiautomatic rifle let loose with a rat-tat-tat- tat-tat-tat-tat in the hospital garden, apparently firing in the air for fun. “Who’s shooting? Who’s shooting?” Turki demanded. Militias possess not only rifles, but also antiaircraft guns, rocket launchers and other heavy weapons. “In the future, we’ll give them up to the military — when we have a military,” said Ashraf Jibril, 32, a jeans-clad revolutionary guarding the military airport. But the military can exert control only if the armed militias abandon their weapons, diplomats say. Sharif said militia leaders are trying to form an umbrella group to negotiate with the government on the new military. A chief demand, he said, is that longtime Gaddafi allies who changed sides during the revolution not get top jobs. “We don’t want, after all this sacrifice .Ԝ.Ԝ. to see the same old faces in charge again,” he said. Diplomats say they expect Belhadj, who played a key role in the revolution, to seek senior Defense Ministry posts for his allies. That has caused some unease among Western officials, since Belhadj belonged to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which was listed by the State Department as a terrorist organization. Belhadj has said he did not support al- Qaeda, as some members of the group did. Under Gaddafi, Libya had an elite military force of about 25,000, plus a roughly equal number of low-paid, poorly equipped conscripts and officers. A vast group of young men with little military experience joined the revolution — doctors, students, used-car salesmen and others. Many seem to want to stay, in part because the economy has slowed to a crawl. A Defense Ministry spokesman, Col. Ahmed Bani, said that all qualified revolutionaries would be welcome in the new armed forces of the oil-rich country. “We have enough money, we have enough jobs for them,” he said. Several militia members said they would be willing to return to civilian life if ordered to do so. But some seem to be settling in for the long haul. Jibril, who was a dentist before the revolution, showed a reporter a former hotel near the military airport that is being converted into a headquarters for his men. It had an office with a conference table that seats 25. “We’ll make a cafe here, for coffee and tea,” he said, showing off a bar. So was he planning to stay for a while? “I think so,” he said. “Because of the security of the country. We can’t count on the old police. Most of them were with Gaddafi.” Mary Beth Sheridan Libya struggles to create army out of militias November 1 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/libya-struggles-to-create-army-out-of- militias/2011/10/28/gIQAwWsjaM_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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TRIBUNALES | En el Tribunal Federal de Karlsruhe Dos abogados alemanes se querellan contra Turquía por 'crímenes de guerra' Ilya U. Topper | Estambul Actualizado martes 01/11/2011 04:30 horas Ejecuciones sumarias mediante disparos a quemarropa, bombardeos contra pastores de ovejas, mutilaciones de cadáveres, incluso el uso probable de armas químicas o gases tóxicos... El dossier se lee como un filme de terror. Recopilado por la organización alemana Maf-Dad, dedicada a la defensa de los derechos de los kurdos, recoge detalles de la 'guerra sucia' del Ejército turco entre los años 2003 y 2011. Desde este lunes está en los tribunales: dos abogados alemanes acaban de deponer una querella contra Turquía por "crímenes de guerra" en el Tribunal Federal de Karlsruhe. En el 'banquillo': el primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, tres ministros de Defensa y seis jefes de Estado Mayor. Falta por saber si la querella será admitida a trámite, algo que se sabrá dentro de algunas semanas. Los indicios son sólidos, creen los abogados, Britta Eder y Heinz- Jürgen Schneider, ambos de Hamburgo. El informe de 108 páginas va acompañado de medio centenar de fotografías y una decena de vídeos... en parte un material que activistas kurdos en Hakkari ya difundieron a la prensa hace un año y que muestra cadáveres extrañamente calcinados, ennegrecidos e hinchados. Indicios, según los abogados, de que murieron por efectos de armas químicas. Otra fotografía muestra una joven guerrillera del PKK, muerta tras recibir un disparo en el ojo. A quemarropa, según juzga un forense alemán, no un tiro recibido en el combate. Es decir que la joven, Leyla Peldek, fue ejecutada tras haber sido hecha prisionera. Una compañera suya, Leyla Hannan, murió en el tiroteo y un vídeo, disponible en el informe, muestra cómo los soldados posan con sus armas ante el cadáver destrozado y le quitan los calcetines. No se ve más, pero los testimonios de activistas sugieren que no es algo aislado: "El Ejército turco mutila a los cadáveres de los guerrilleros después de abatirlos", aseguró ya en agosto de 2010 Ismael Akbulut, activista de la organización de derechos humanos Insan Haklari Dernegi (IHD) en Hakkari. "Les cortan las manos, los pies o la cabeza. En el caso de las mujeres 'juegan' con las partes sexuales", todo ello para humillar a las familias que recogerán los restos mortales, añadió. Tanto el uso de armas químicas, por el que el informe aduce numerosos testimonios e indicios, como la muerte de decenas de ovejas y otros animales en las zonas bombardeadas, como las ejecuciones de prisioneros y el abuso de cadáveres son crímenes de guerra, afirman los abogados alemanes. Y como tal pueden ser juzgados en Alemania, dado que en los pocos casos en los que la Judicatura turca tramita querellas contra policías o soldados de bajo rango acusados de abusos graves en el contexto kurdo, siempre salen absueltos.

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Los abogados añaden que los seis jefes de Estado Mayor militares ―incluido el actual, Necdet Özel―, en ningún caso disfrutan de inmunidad, pero creen que la ley alemana tampoco concede protección a los políticos en activo, como el actual ministro de Defensa, Ismet Yilmaz o el propio Erdogan, si se trata de crímenes de guerra o contra la humanidad. Y en todo caso, añaden, una querella puede admitirse a trámite e investigarse incluso si los acusados disfrutan de inmunidad. Otra cosa es que el Tribunal Federal alemán quiera hacerlo. Y que la policía detenga al primer ministro turco durante su próxima visita oficial a Alemania es más que inverosímil. También, que espose a un jefe del Estado Mayor cuando se acerque para concluir un contrato de venta de armamento alemán a Turquía... Ilya U. Topper Dos abogados alemanes se querellan contra Turquía por 'crímenes de guerra'01/11/2011 04:30 horas http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/31/internacional/1320088665.html

Internacional El otoño árabe Incluso en Túnez, el país norteafricano más laico, un islamismo salafista duro ha enseñado la oreja Ignacio Sotelo 31 OCT 2011 - 21:26 CET Pese a que se hayan recogido algunos frutos desde la caída de las dictaduras —las elecciones del 23 de octubre a una Asamblea constituyente en Túnez y las del 28 de noviembre a la Asamblea del Pueblo (cámara baja) en Egipto —y aunque se haya desencadenado una guerra civil en Libia, que probablemente haya terminado con la muerte del dictador, y otra amenace en Siria, si es que no hace tiempo que ha empezado, la primavera árabe muestra tonos otoñales que presagian un duro invierno. Frente al optimismo inicial de los jóvenes que se lanzaron a la calle pidiendo libertad, justicia y empleo, hoy pocos dudan de que el proceso será mucho más difícil de lo que ya nos temíamos. Incluso en Túnez, el país norteafricano más laico, ha enseñado la oreja un islamismo en sus rasgos salafistas más duros. Unos cientos de manifestantes intentaron incendiar una emisora de televisión que se había atrevido a proyectar la película franco-iraní, Persépolis, que consideran blasfema por presentar a Dios en la figura de un viejo con barba, seguida, para más inri, de un debate sobre el integrismo religioso. Con todo, importa recalcar que el partido islamista, Ennahda, condenó la violencia salafista. También en Túnez el islamismo desempeñará un papel importante, pero será uno moderado que acepte la separación de Estado y religión. No tiene el menor sentido seguir apelando al peligro islamista, como hizo el régimen derrocado, para dificultar que se establezca una democracia medianamente satisfactoria, peligro que exageran sobre todo los que se beneficiaron con la dictadura, pero también algunos medios de comunicación europeos. Muchísimo más grave es lo ocurrido en Egipto. Después del terrible atentado del primero de enero con un coche bomba a la salida de una iglesia de Alejandría que costó

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29 muertos, el domingo 9 de octubre, la represión salvaje de la policía militar ocasionó 26 muertos y cientos de heridos entre los cristianos coptos que se manifestaban pacíficamente por la quema de una iglesia en Asuán. Distintas fuentes, entre ellas el portavoz de la Iglesia católica en Egipto, confirman que los matones que empleaba la policía durante la dictadura de Mubarak fueron los que introdujeron la violencia en la manifestación para justificar la represión policial. Dos matanzas, una ocurrida antes de la caída del dictador y la otra después, que muestran el mismo perfil. Queda así patente un hecho que, por lo demás, no deja de ser obvio: el poder sigue estando en el Ejército, como ha ocurrido desde el derrocamiento del rey Faruk en junio de 1952 y sobre todo desde que Gabel Nasser se hizo con el poder en 1954. Aunque el Ejército esté dividido entre una fracción nasserista, cuyo tamaño no se trasluce al exterior, y una mayoría pro-occidental, (una ruptura interna que aún podría traernos alguna sorpresa), está, sin embargo, totalmente unido en la búsqueda de una solución “democrática” que garantice la conservación de sus muchos privilegios. Nada mejor que un choque entre religiones para distraer la atención de los verdaderos problemas. Pese a atizar la violencia entre las religiones, el Ejército se esfuerza en parecer neutral, a la vez que imprescindible para mantener el orden, de modo pueda conservar indefinidamente la posición de fiel de la balanza. Mohamed el Baradei, premio Nobel de la paz en 2005, sin duda el candidato laico que menos gusta al Ejército, hace unos días ha pedido que se confeccione una hoja de ruta que marque claramente las etapas que se han de recorrer para arribar a la democracia, sin recibir, claro está, respuesta alguna. Aparte del debate más coyuntural en torno a las manipulaciones que se están llevando a cabo en la selección de los candidatos —el Ejército quiere una Asamblea muy fragmentada, constituida en buena parte por candidatos “independientes”, que la mayoría proviene del régimen de Mubarak— la cuestión central que hoy se dirime es el papel que desempeñará el islamismo político. Los Hermanos Musulmanes están divididos entre una minoría que se aferra al proyecto original de un Estado islámico y la mayoría que ha evolucionado hacia un liberalismo conservador que, pese a más de medio siglo de persecuciones, el Ejército podría favorecer como la forma de lograr una cierta estabilidad democrática, conservando poder y prebendas. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/31/actualidad/1320092778_64315 8.html

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ft.com World Asia-Pacific Afghanistan October 31, 2011 11:43 pm Ankara tries to bolster fight against Taliban By Daniel Dombey in Istanbul and Matthew Green in Islamabad Turkey is bringing together leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan in an attempt to reduce tensions that Ahmet Davutoglu, Ankara’s foreign minister, says could complicate efforts to end the war against the Taliban. Mr Davutoglu told the Financial Times that the meeting between Presidents Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan and Abdullah Gul of Turkey, came “at a critical time” because of clashes between Kabul and Islamabad. More ON THIS STORY Kabul suicide bomber kills US soldiers West must keep Pakistan ties, says Nato chief Karzai strengthens ties with India Frustrated Karzai lashes out at Pakistan Haqqani leader captured in Afghanistan Although the gathering in Istanbul on Tuesday reflected Ankara’s ambitions on the world stage, many participants acknowledged that the obstacles to a breakthrough are forbidding Senior Afghan officials have publicly accused the Pakistan army’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency of playing a role in the September 20 assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former Afghan president who led efforts to reach out to insurgents, and Kabul broke off dialogue with Pakistan in its wake. “If there is tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there cannot be a healthy transition,” Mr Davutoglu, said, referring to the drawdown of US surge forces in Afghanistan and the transfer of the fight against the Taliban to Afghan forces He added that as part of the attempt to establish mutual trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the meeting would gather together the two countries’ chiefs of staff, intelligence heads and interior ministers – a list that includes General Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistani’s army chief – and he called for the countries to hold more joint manoeuvres. Tuesday’s meeting came as part of a big international push to make progress towards a political settlement of the Afghan war by the end of the year. That effort also includes a gathering on Wednesday, also in Istanbul, that will feature Hillary Clinton, US secretary of state, and a host of representatives from other states and bodies. “If we want to establish peace in Afghanistan, there are inescapable countries which should be definitely in the process,” Mr Davutoglu said, noting that Mrs Clinton would be sitting at the same table as her counterpart from Iran, as would the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan.

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“The purpose of this will be mainly to create regional ownership,” he said. “Stability in Afghanistan means regional stability: instability in Afghanistan means regional instability.” Diplomats have depicted this week’s gatherings in Istanbul as a stepping stone to a meeting next month in Bonn, which had been intended to cap the year by getting a political process under way to end the Afghan war. But such hopes have been revised downward with the stubbornly high level of violence in Afghanistan – including a weekend attack in Kabul that killed 17 people, including 13 foreigners, and the deaths in Kandahar on Monday of three Afghans working for the UN refugee agency. One former Afghan presidential adviser said even before the Rabbani killing, Mr Karzai had become increasingly frustrated with Pakistani intransigence, suspending his previous attempts to persuade Islamabad to help convince the Taliban to give up the fight. Mr Karzai’s government has announced it will convene a meeting of tribal elders and politicians, or jirga, in Kabul starting on November 16 to chart a new policy towards talks with the Taliban, after which dialogue with Pakistan may resume, an Afghan diplomat said. “Negotiations with Pakistan and the Taliban have stopped,” the diplomat said. “EverythingԜ.Ԝ.Ԝ.Ԝwill be (decided) in the jirga.” Daniel Dombey y Matthew Green “Ankara tries to bolster fight against Taliban October

31, 2011 11:43 pm” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/dc714e94-03e8-11e1-864e-U

00144feabdc0.html#axzz1cSWNk79U U

Internacional Rasmussen excluye cualquier intervención de la OTAN en Siria El secretario general de la organización ha advertido además que lo sucedido en Libia es «un mensaje para el mundo entero para que no ignore la voluntad de los pueblos» El secretario general de la OTAN, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, excluyó este lunes cualquier intervención militar de la Alianza en Siria, contra cuyo régimen, no obstante, sí hizo una condena por proseguir con su «política represiva». En una conferencia de prensa en Trípoli, la capital de Libia, adonde llegó en una visita no anunciada previamente, Rasmussen manifestó que «una intervención de la OTAN en Siria queda totalmente excluida; no tenemos ninguna pretensión en tal sentido». Sin embargo, Rasmussen envió a las autoridades de Damasco algo parecido a una velada amenaza cuando señaló que todoU lo que ha sucedido en Libia U desde el comienzo de la revuelta contra el régimen de Muamar al Gadafi, el pasado 17 de febrero, hasta su captura y muerte a manos de milicianos rebeldes, el pasado 20 de octubre, debe ser considerado como «un mensaje para el mundo entero para que no ignore la voluntad de los pueblos».

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En este sentido, recalcó que todos los regímenes y gobiernos del mundo deben tener en cuenta las aspiraciones de los pueblos y trabajar por la instauración de la democracia. http://www.abc.es/20111031/internacional/abci-rasmusen-excluye-cualquier-intervencion- 201110311622.html

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ft.com World Middle East & North Africa October 31, 2011 11:42 pm Gunfire and fear fill Tripoli’s security vacuum By Borzou Daragahi in Tripoli

"House of bin Mansour" - Across Tripoli gunmen have turned up at private houses demanding ownership in a sign of post-revolutionary disorder Everyone who was there has a different version of what happened early on Monday morning. The only thing certain is that various groups of one-time rebel fighters, including some who claimed to be guarding the hospital, got into a gunfight inside and just outside the Libyan capital’s largest medical facility, terrifying patients and sending physicians and nurses cowering for cover. “All these security people, all these revolutionary fighters, they act like they [are] securing the city and securing the hospital,” said Nabil Bay, a doctor at Tripoli’s Central Hospital. “We don’t feel safe. I’m fed up seeing them every day.” More ON THIS STORY Libya names interim premier Roula Khalaf Tunisia shows Libya the way In depth Libya in transition Libyan rebels’ anger over 200 missing bodies Libyan critics of NTC concerned for democracy Increasingly, residents of the capital say they have had enough of swarms of gun-toting self-styled revolutionary fighters roaming the city streets and claiming to be protecting residents against lurking foes. To make matters worse, many are from outside the capital, from cities such as Misurata and Zintan. They played a role in freeing the city from Col Muammer Gaddafi’s rule in August and now appear to be attempting to secure political gains by declining to head home. “There seems to be a growing resentment in Tripoli against the friendly occupation,” said a western diplomat in Tripoli, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “But the fighters are afraid if they go, remnants of the regime will come back.” Instead of engaging in the give-and-take of politics, the rebel fighters drive around the city at high speed, sometimes smashing recklessly into other vehicles that don’t move fast enough. One 20-year-old architecture student’s saloon was struck three times by 217

different fighters over the course of a week. When she got out of her car to complain in one incident, the rebel in a pick-up truck urged her menacingly to go back to her car. On Sunday, two French citizens and an American journalist were detained for hours after a group of fighters accused them of filming the late Col Gaddafi’s compound without their permission. The fighters continue to fire their weapons into the air, leading to dozens of injuries and occasional deaths because of celebratory gunfire. “It should be stopped. It was supposed to be stopped,“ said Dr Abdul Raouf Mohammad, a surgeon at the capital’s Mitiga Hospital, where victims of the celebratory gunfire included a teenage girl killed by a shot through the chest on the day Col Gaddafi was killed. International observers have grown alarmed at the continued presence of the weapons and the various makeshift groups of gunmen, sometimes jostling for position against each other like street gangs, as well as the potentially combustible political dynamics. They’ve urged the provisional National Transitional Council to co-ordinate security among armed groups more effectively, to set up a clear chain of command, to register all weapons and to ensure a genuine monopoly of power under state control. “There’s a big power struggle between the NTC and the revolutionary fighters,” said the western diplomat. “Now that Gaddafi has been taken out as a unifying force, they’re afraid that the guys who fought the revolution will lose out to those who didn’t fight.” Even some in the National Transitional Council say they are struggling to find a way to get the many guns off the street by giving the young men wielding them something more productive to do with their lives and filling the security vacuum that justifies holding onto weapons seized from Col Gaddafi’s armouries over the course of the eight- month civil war. “You need to rehabilitate the fighters,” said one NTC official. “Otherwise, they will turn against you.” The gunmen’s presence at hospitals has alarmed medical professionals. Doctors at Central Hospital said on three different occasions fighters put a gun to the head of a physician, demanding access to the operating room or to know the whereabouts of a patient. A group of doctors sent a letter to the transitional authorities several weeks ago threatening to go on strike if they did not put a stop to the rebels’ transgressions. “Even during the worst days of the war we came to work,” said Dr Bay. “But I now feel threatened.” In the early Monday morning incident, fighters from Zintan got into an argument with other fighters over a patient suspected of being a Gaddafi loyalist. One young man pulled out a gun, firing off a round in the corridor that left a bullet hole in a wall. Patients and doctors screamed, and the men took their fight outdoors in front of the hospital entrance, where each group got on their mobile phones and summoned allies with truck-mounted heavy guns. Gunfire ensued outside, leaving pockmarks in the hospital facade and nearby buildings. One fighter was shot in the leg, said Abdul- Salaam Abdul-Agha, one of the gunmen guarding the hospital.

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“All these people with guns,” he said, admitting he was exasperated and confounded by the entire situation, “what do you think they’re going to do with them? Build bridges?” On Sunday, between 100 and 200 Tripoli residents staged a protest in Martyrs’ Square, calling on fighters to stop roaming the streets in pick-up trucks mounted with large- calibre guns. “No to heavy weapons,” they chanted, according to a participant. “The women and children especially are not used to seeing people with such guns,” said Abdullah Azar, a 28-year-old optician who supported the revolution but is now publicly speaking out against some of the fighters’ excesses. “It makes them feel insecure.” At a parade by the equivalent of the Libyan boy scouts on Monday in the neighbourhood of Bin Ashour, fighters in a half dozen pick-ups mounted with antiaircraft guns and Russian-made Grad rocket launchers parked alongside. “As soon as they make a national army, I will hand them over,” said Bassem Sharif, a 29-year-old former taxi driver who was holding an RPG-9 rocket-propelled grenade launcher. “But now, I don’t know to whom I hand over the weapons.” Borzou Daragahi Gunfire and fear fill Tripoli’s security vacuum October 31, 2011 11:42 pm

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EGIPTO | Doctor Jekyll y Mister Hyde en el ejército egipcio Insumisos contra los militares egipcios  La última víctima del Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas ha sido el bloguero Alaa Abdel Fatah  Más de 5.000 personas se manifiestan en en El Cairo para pedir su liberación  12.000 civiles han sido juzgados por tribunales militares. 'Derrotamos al dictador pero no a la dictadura' Francisco Carrión | El Cairo Actualizado lunes 31/10/2011 20:41 horas Pocos imaginaron en enero que el ejército que debía salvaguardar la revolución pudiera transfigurarse en el asesino de los sueños que nacieron de la primera libertad.

Maikel Nabil, en la Plaza Tahrir.| F. Carrión Nueve meses después, la junta militar escenifica el extraño caso del doctor Jekyll y el señor Hyde: Tutela el cambio democrático del país más poblado del mundo árabe mientras persigue a activistas que "tuitearon" el camino o blogueros que alzaron la voz contra su autoridad. La última víctima del Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas, que administra Egipto desde la caída de Hosni Mubarak, es Alaa Abdel Fatah. El joven, de 29 años, es un conocido activista que ya padeció 45 días de cárcel en 2006 por exigir en la calle la independencia judicial. Más de 5.000 personas se han manifestado este lunes en El Cairo para pedir la liberación de Abdel Fatah. Los manifestantes pidieron, según informó a Efe el activista del Movimiento 6 de Abril, Ramy al Sewisy, el fin de los juicios militares a civiles y la liberación de todos los activistas que están siendo interrogados por la Fiscalía castrense.

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Este domingo un tribunal castrense impuso a Abdel Fatah 15 días de detención cautelar mientras se desarrolla la investigación. Los uniformados le acusan de "incitar a la violencia y el sabotaje" tras denunciar el papel del ejército en los dramáticos sucesos del pasado 9 de octubre, cuando 26 personas fallecieron en una manifestación de la minoría copta. "Cometieron una masacre horrible y ahora en vez de poner en marcha una investigación, envían a juicio a los activistas por decir la pura verdad", denunció Alaa antes de comparecer en la corte. Su último twitter -un escueto "Entro"- fueron también los últimos caracteres de su libertad. Dos meses de huelga de hambre La batalla más dramática contra la junta militar se libra en la prisión de Al Marg, al norte de El Cairo. Allí, Maikel Nabil, un bloguero copto de 26 años, resiste después de dos meses de huelga de hambre. Se niega a aceptar la condena de tres años de cárcel por "insultar al ejército y difundir noticias falsas". Un artículo publicado en su bitácora bajo el título de "El ejército y el pueblo nunca fueron una mano" desató definitivamente la ira de la junta militar. "Es más honorable morir o suicidarse que permitir que un puñado de criminales nazis crean que han tenido éxito en coartar mi libertad. Yo soy más grande que esa farsa", escribe desde la cárcel. "Maikel rechaza comparecer ante una corte militar porque jamás insultó a las Fuerzas Armadas", señala a ELMUNDO.es su hermano Mark, portavoz de una familia preocupada por la salud del joven. "Está muy deteriorado", agrega mientras insiste en que la familia ha tratado de convencerle sin éxito para que abandone la huelga de hambre. "Mis padres han llegado a disculparse por sus palabras pero el ejército es inflexible y tememos lo peor". La muerte de Maikel -considerado el primer preso de conciencia de la transición- sería un nuevo golpe para una junta militar presidida por Husein Tantaui, un mariscal que fue ministro de Defensa a las órdenes de Hosni Mubarak durante dos décadas. 12.000 civiles, ante la justicia militar Sin embargo, el periplo judicial de Alaa o Maikel no son historias aisladas. La mano de los uniformados ha entregado a más de 12.000 civiles a la justicia militar. Y el legado de la dictadura pervive: Las viejas tácticas de tortura aún se practican. El pasado jueves Essam Atta, un joven de 24 años, fue torturado hasta la muerte en la cárcel de Tora, a las afueras de la capital egipcia. Un día antes la sentencia por el asesinato de Jaled Said, el inspirador de la revolución, en junio de 2010 fue una victoria de la impunidad. Los dos policías que lo lincharon fueron condenados a tan solo siete años de cárcel. Entretanto, los artífices de la dictadura disfrutan de un idilio de retrasos y aplazamientos. Este domingo el proceso contra el 'rais' fue pospuesto hasta el 28 de diciembre. Su juicio se desarrolla en una corte ordinaria, lejos de los tribunales militares. Los pobres, los civiles más vulnerables La travesía carcelaria de Maikel ha alentado la creación de asociaciones de derechos humanos como la plataforma 'No a los juicios militares a civiles'. Una red de

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voluntarios mantiene un teléfono de emergencia que ofrece asesoramiento legal a quienes se enfrentan a un tribunal castrense. En declaraciones a este diario, Nadim Emad, dirigente del grupo, desglosa las cifras de los civiles juzgados: "Unas 1.000 personas han sido absueltas. Otras 3.000 han sido condenadas pero están en libertad con suspensión de la pena. El resto, unos 8.000 civiles, cumple castigo en la cárcel". "La mayoría de los condenados pertenece a una clase muy popular. Es gente pobre y humilde que carece de medios para contratar un abogado", precisa. Según Amnistía Internacional, procesos judiciales como el del bloguero en huelga de hambre está plagado de errores y retrasos innecesarios. Y ahora advierte- "la vida de Maikel pende de un hilo". "La decisión del tribunal de apelaciones de revocar el fallo le obliga a regresar al punto de partida jugando cruelmente con su vida", apunta la organización, que reclama su liberación inmediata e incondicional. "La junta militar comete demasiados errores y muchas de las políticas que practican son similares a las que solía adoptar Mubarak", apunta Gamal Eid, director de la Red Árabe para la Información sobre Derechos Humanos. "Si el Consejo no abandona el poder en un plazo razonable, estallará otra revolución", alerta el activista. Desde su celda, Maikel asegura que "la revolución derrotó al dictador pero no a la dictadura". En la enésima vuelta de tuerca al proceso, el joven fue sometido la pasada semana a pruebas en un hospital de salud mental de la capital. Incansable, el bloguero que en 2009 defendió su derecho a la objeción de conciencia al servicio militar obligatorio afirma: "No imploro libertad a un grupo de asesinos y ladrones de la patria". Francisco Carrión Insumisos contra los militares egipcios31/10/2011 20:41 horas http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/31/internacional/1320059094.html

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Internacional La votación aumenta el aislamiento de Obama en la crisis palestino-israelí La admisión de Palestina deja a EE UU en una situación de retirada del organismo ¿Para qué sirve Tony Blair en Oriente Próximo? Palestina 194: "Sí a un Estado, sí a la libertad" Obama fija las fronteras de 1967 como base para el acuerdo entre palestinos e israelíes Antonio Caño Washington 31 OCT 2011 - 20:28 CET

El presidente de Estados Unidos, Barack Obama. / BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI / POOL (EFE) La admisión de Palestina como miembro de la Unesco aumenta la presión sobre Estados Unidos para encontrar una solución negociada del conflicto palestino-israelí antes de tener que imponer su veto para impedir que Palestina se convierta también en miembro de la ONU. El riesgo de un fracaso de Barack Obama, cada día más aislado en este asunto, parece inevitable. Obama se reunió ayer con el ex primer ministro británico Tony Blair, representante del Cuarteto que negocia el problema palestino, en el enésimo intento de elaborar un plan para reanudar las conversaciones bilaterales. Pero Blair no goza ya de autoridad para impulsar una propuesta, al Cuarteto (EE UU, Rusia, Unión Europea y ONU) no le

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queda oxígeno para seguir actuando y ni el propio Obama demuestra la voluntad suficiente como para sacar algo adelante. La situación, desde el punto de vista de la negociación, es desalentadora, y el voto de ayer en la Unesco es el recordatorio de que este conflicto se encamina hacia más confrontación y mayores dificultades. Todavía está bajo estudio de un comité del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU la solicitud presentada por Palestina el pasado 23 de septiembre para ser admitida como miembro de pleno derecho de esa organización. La votación final está congelada a la espera de una mejor alternativa, pero probablemente tendrá lugar este noviembre, con lo que la polémica generada sobre el voto de la Unesco puede ser un modesto aperitivo de la tormenta que se puede generar por la decisión del Consejo de Seguridad. Una ley aprobada en los años noventa obliga a la Administración norteamericana a suspender su contribución económica a cualquier organismo de la ONU que admita a Palestina. EE UU aporta el 20% del presupuesto de la Unesco, lo que representa actualmente unos 70 millones de dólares. Aunque Obama intente retrasar la suspensión de las contribuciones con determinadas maniobras, es casi imposible que el Congreso, en su conformación actual, le facilite cualquier opción que no sea el pleno cumplimiento de la ley. EE UU quedará, por tanto, en una situación de retirada de hecho de ese organismo, del que ya estuvo ausente desde que Ronald Reagan lo decidió por las sospechas de que estaba demasiado escorado hacia los enemigos de EE UU. George Bush se reincorporó después de los atentados del 11 de septiembre, pero en la actualidad la mayoría dominante en el Partido Republicano es contraria a la participación en el sistema de Naciones Unidas. Con todo, ese no es el aspecto más grave de la votación sobre la admisión de Palestina. Lo más grave es que se produce en un momento en que la Casa Blanca carece de una estrategia viable para evitar la profundización del conflicto. Obama está hoy bajo sospecha de las autoridades palestinas, por negarse a respaldar su iniciativa de reconocimiento internacional, y también bajo sospecha del Gobierno de Israel, por haber defendido la creación de un Estado palestino en las fronteras de 1967. Su capacidad de maniobra es mínima. A eso se suma la presión doméstica de un Congreso que, en el caso de que se llegue a votar en el Consejo de Seguridad, va a demandar medidas de represalia contra la ONU y contra los palestinos, incluida la suspensión de las aportaciones que se hacen a la organización internacional y de las ayudas que se entregan a la Autoridad Palestina. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/31/actualidad/1320088702_25831 8.html

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Informática hoy

Descuentos, cupones y códigos promocionales para compras online El régimen sirio va a implosionar. Isabel Munera 31 octubre 2011 (Publicado por Solaris en 04:27) Cauto pero esperanzado con las transiciones que se acaban de iniciar en Túnez, Egipto y Libia. Así se muestra el diplomático de carrera y portavoz popular de Exteriores en el Congreso, Gustavo de Arístegui, en su último libro: Encrucijadas árabes. Lo que España y el mundo se juegan (Singular Ediciones). Un título elegido a propósito para diferenciarse de aquellos analistas que, a su juicio, han pecado de «un exceso de optimismo» al hablar de primaveras árabes. «He preferido hablar de encrucijadas porque algunos de estos procesos pueden acabar en democracias reales, pero serán procesos muy largos y que atravesarán numerosas vicisitudes. Creo que muchos políticos y analistas confundieron deseos con la realidad», explica. Sin duda, lo que está ocurriendo en Libia es una buena prueba de que la democracia todavía es un sueño lejano para los países que acaban de despertar de la tiranía. «Un Estado de Derecho que se precie de serlo tiene que dar al peor de sus delincuentes un juicio justo. El espectáculo que hemos visto en Libia con la muerte de Gadafi, el exhibicionismo de la crueldad del que han hecho gala, la vejación y la humillación gratuita no presagia nada bueno. Yo espero que las fuerzas democráticas que existen en Libia acaben teniendo la fuerza de convencer a la mayoría de los libios que ése no es el camino», argumenta. Para Arístegui, el peligro ahora es que «se cambien dictaduras durísimas del siglo XXI por dictaduras medievales sanguinarias y bárbaras», y advierte de que espectáculos tan «repugnantes y sórdidos» como «la tortura» que ha sufrido «un monstruo como Gadafi, emitida en directo y difundida en internet, lo único que ha hecho es exacerbar aún más la represión en países donde todavía no han caído los tiranos contestados», como en Siria. «Conociendo al régimen de Asad, antes de que eso ocurra va a ahogar todavía más las protestas en sangre y fuego, porque lo ocurrido en Libia le va a hacer pensar que el error de Ben Ali, Mubarak y Gadafi fue no llegar a sus extremos para salvar a sus regímenes», explica. Sin embargo, Arístegui considera que el tiempo corre en contra de Bashar Asad y que, antes o después, su régimen terminará haciendo «implosión». Pero mientras esto ocurre, este experto en el mundo árabe defiende que la comunidad internacional debe ser mucho más dura con un régimen que está «masacrando» a su pueblo. «El consejo de seguridad de Naciones Unidas debe condenar sin paliativos al régimen sirio y se deben adoptar sanciones que manden un mensaje inequívoco a Asad», añade. El terremoto regional, que comenzó con la revuelta tunecina, está lejos de calmarse y sus réplicas no han hecho más que comenzar. Para Arístegui, las primeras declaraciones del presidente del Consejo Nacional de Transición sobre el imperio de la sharia - ley islámica- resultan «preocupantes», porque su aplicación en términos estrictos «no es compatible con la democracia»; y el triunfo del partido islamista En Nahda en Túnez 225

debe ser acogido con «cautela» porque, de momento, es pronto para cantar victoria. «Todo el mundo tiene derecho a la evolución política e incluso quienes tienen un pasado muy oscuro como Rachid Ghanuchi [líder de En Nahda], pero habrá que esperar a ver si las decisiones que toma el nuevo Gobierno se encaminan hacia la democracia». Aunque, realmente, la «clave de lo que pueda suceder en el mundo árabe la tiene Egipto», donde los islamistas se perfilan también como los vencedores. «Ahí el arraigo del islamismo es mayor que en Túnez, pero tengo esperanza, porque la intolerancia se concentra en una minoría». Isabel Munera El régimen sirio va a implosionar31 octubre 2011, disponible en: http://informaticacero.blogspot.com/2011/10/el-regimen-sirio-va-implosionar.html

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Internacional Atambáyev arrasa en los comicios de Kirguizistán ante denuncias de fraude La OSCE avala con "cautela" el proceso electoral en la exrepública soviética La oposición asegura que ha habido irregularidades masivas El ex primer ministro se hace con más del 60% de los votos AGENCIAS Biskek 31 OCT 2011 - 11:47 CET 1

Almazbek Atambáyev deposita su voto. / EFE El ex primer ministro de Kirguizistán Almazbek Atambáyev ha ganado las elecciones presidenciales celebradas este domingo en el país centroasiático con una amplia mayoría absoluta, por lo que no habrá segunda vuelta, según ha declarado el jefe de la Comisión Electoral Central (CEC) kirguís, Tuigunalí Abdraímov. La Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), encargada a través de sus observadores de velar por el cumplimiento del proceso electoral, ha expresado un optimismo "con cautela" ante el futuro de la democracia en el país, pese a admitir algunos "defectos" con las listas de electores. Según datos oficiales, con el 95% de los votos escrutados, Atambáyev obtiene el 62,95%, muy por delante de su principales rivales, Adaján Madumárov (14,92 %) y de Kamchibek Tashíyev (14,42 %). Los otros 13 candidatos no consiguieron siquiera alcanzar el 1%, en unas elecciones cuya transparencia ha sido cuestionada con dureza por la oposición. "No reconocemos la victoria de Almazbek Atambáyev en la primera vuelta. Según nuestros datos, debe celebrarse una segunda ronda", subrayó Nurgazí Anarkulov, jefe de prensa de la campaña de Tashíyev.

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Rechazo del resto de partidos Los opositores han denunciado irregularidades masivas durante la jornada de votación. "Demandamos la destitución de los miembros de la CEC por la deficiente organización de las elecciones", declaró ayer el candidato presidencial opositor Kubatbek Baibólov, quien responsabilizó directamente a Atambáyev de las irregularidades. La OCDE, a través de una nota de su Oficina para las Instituciones Democráticas y los Derechos Humanos. ha celebrado que los comicios se hayan celebrado de forma pacífica, pero ha lamentado los "defectos" en el recuento de las papeletas tras la votación que ha calificado de "irregularidades significativas". La organización, en el mismo comunicado, denuncia que muchos votantes no aparecieron en las listas electorales, que se detectó voto múltiple en algunos centro y que algunos observadores no pudieron acceder al recuento. La presencia de bases militares de EE UU y Rusia convierten a Kirguizistán en un país estratégico en el Asia Central. Las instalaciones estadounidenses en Manas son y han sido vitales para la campaña de Afganistán. El permiso, no obstante, finaliza en 2014, año en el que, según lo anunciado por el presidente Barack Obama, no quedará ningún soldado estadounidense en Afganistán. Por este motivo, entre otros, Atambáyev ha expresado su simpatía a la unión aduanera propuesta por Rusia. La revuelta de abril de 2010 enfrentó a los líderes de la revolución de los tulipanes de 2005, que habían derrocado al primer presidente de la independencia, Askar Akayev, y expulsó del poder a Kurmanbek Bakíyev. La inestabilidad llevó entonces a enfrentamientos entre kirguises y uzbekos en la región meridional y a la muerte de más de 200 personas. Según la Constitución aprobada en referéndum el 27 de junio de 2010, Kirguizistán es una república parlamentaria y el jefe del Estado se elige por un período de seis años y no puede ser reelegido. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/31/actualidad/1320052345_87582 4.html

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Internacional La Unesco aprueba la adhesión de Palestina como Estado miembro EE UU amenaza con dejar de financiar a la agencia de promoción de la cultura Cuenta atrás para Palestina, por ENRIC GONZÁLEZ Ana Teruel París 31 OCT 2011 - 16:03 CET108

El presidente palestino, Mahmud Abbas, en Doha. / K. JAAFAR (AFP) La Conferencia General de la Unesco, reunida en París hasta el 10 de noviembre, ha votado este mediodía la adhesión de Palestina, hasta ahora con estatuto de misión observadora, como Estado miembro de pleno derecho. El ingreso, que ha contado con 107 votos a favor, incluido el de España, 14 en contra y 52 abstenciones, supone un paso más en el pulso palestino por integrar la ONU con las mismas condiciones. Estados Unidos amenaza con dejar de financiar a la agencia, lo cual equivale para la Unesco perder el 22% de su presupuesto. Para el Gobierno israelí, la decisión aleja la posibilidad de lograr un acuerdo paz. Pese a la imposibilidad de encontrar un consenso europeo, algo que ha lamentado la ministra de Ciencia e Innovación, Cristina Garmendia, en su intervención ante la Conferencia General, España cumplió con su promesa de votar a favor de la adhesión, al igual que Francia, que había manifestado sus reticencias por un proceso considerado prematuro. Rusia, China e India, también se han pronunciado a favor. Italia y el Reino Unido se han abstenido mientras que Alemania se ha sumado a Estados Unidos, Israel y Canadá en contra de la adhesión.

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España y Francia han votado a favor del nuevo estatus ; Italia y Reino Unido se han abstenido. Alemania se ha pronunciado en contra Al contrario de la ONU, donde la adhesión requiere el aval del Consejo de Seguridad en el que existe el derecho de veto, para entrar como Estado de pleno derecho en la Unesco un Estado necesitaba los dos tercios de la Conferencia General, el equivalente de la Asamblea General de la ONU, compuesta por 193 Estados miembros. Para el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores palestino, Riyad al-Malki, que ha sido el encargado de defender la petición de adhesión en la Unesco, el ingreso marca un “momento histórico que le devuelve a Palestino ciertos derechos”. “La única vía hacia un Estado palestino debe pasar por negociaciones directas. No existen atajos y estimamos que los esfuerzos de los que hemos sido testigos hoy son contraproducentes”, ha explicado por su parte el embajador estadounidense ante la Unesco, David Killion. “Se trata de una maniobra palestina unilateral que no traerá ningún cambio en el terreno pero que hipotecará un poco más las posibilidades de lograr un acuerdo de paz”, ha reaccionado el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores israelí en un comunicado. “Esta decisión (…) pone nuevos obstáculos en la vía de la reanudación de las negociaciones”, añade. El embajador israelí ante la Unesco, Nimrod Barkan, ha advertido también que los países que votaron a favor perderán influencia sobre el Estado hebreo. El pasado 5 de octubre, el Consejo ya votó a favor de que prospera la propuesta de adhesión, con una abrumadora mayoría de 40 de los 58 estados miembros. Tan solo cuatro –Estados Unidos, Alemania, Letonia y Rumania- votaron en contra, mientras que 14 de ellos –entre ellos España y Francia- se abstuvieron. Sin embargo, España indicó entonces que votaría a favor de la propuesta en la votación de hoy. La adhesión Palestina le facilita el proceso al nuevo Estado miembro para pedir el reconocimiento como Patrimonio Mundial de la Humanidad algunos de los territorios palestinos ocupados por Israel, como Belén, Hebrón y Jericó. Pero sobre todo, marca una nueva victoria en su recorrido por su reconocimiento como Estado de pleno derecho en la ONU. El pasado 23 de septiembre, el presidente de la Autoridad Palestina, Mahmud Abbas, pidió oficialmente la adhesión plena en la organización internacional con sede en Nueva York. El Consejo de Seguridad, en el que Estados Unidos ya anunció que opondría su veto, tiene previsto examinar la solicitud el próximo 11 de noviembre. La Unesco por su parte deberá renunciar al 22% de su presupuesto, unos 70 millones de dólares, dado que Washington ha anunciado que pondría fin a su contribución en caso de reconocimiento del Estado palestino. Dos leyes de principios de los 90 prohíben en efecto a Estados Unidos financiar agencias de la ONU que reconozcan plenamente a Palestina, mientras que no exista un acuerdo de paz con Israel. El Estado hebreo también ha anunciado hoy que cesaría su aportación a la Unesco, lo cual, sumado a la Estados Unidos, supondría para la agencia una pérdida de cerca del cuarto de su presupuesto. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/31/actualidad/1320057074_45290 3.html

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Internacional China advierte al régimen sirio que "la violencia no puede continuar" El enviado de Pekín para Oriente Próximo afirma que el régimen de Bachar el Asad tiene que "respetar y responder a las aspiraciones legítimas del pueblo sirio" Rusia y China impiden a la ONU actuar contra el régimen sirio Agencias El Cairo 30 OCT 2011 - 14:43 CET

El enviado especial de China para Oriente Próximo, Wu Sike, con el canciller sirio Walid al-Moallem en una imagen cedida por la agencia oficial siria. / - (AFP) El enviado chino para Oriente Próximo, Wu Sike, ha afirmado este domingo en El Cairo que, en una reciente visita a Damasco, advirtió al régimen sirio del peligro de que siga la represión. Wu ha dicho que señaló a los altos funcionarios sirios "el peligro de la situación" y añadió que la violencia "no puede continuar". El régimen de Bachar el Asad tiene que "respetar y responder a las aspiraciones y reivindicaciones legítimas del pueblo sirio", agregó. La visita de Wu a Damasco, que duró tres días y concluyó este sábado, se produjo después de una visita a Siria de un comité ministerial de la Liga Árabe que propuso una iniciativa para poner fin a la crisis, e iniciar un diálogo entre el Gobierno y la oposición sirios. Según detalla el sitio web en español del diario oficialista chino People's Daily, Wu transmitió la preocupación de Pekín "por los sangrientos enfrentamientos" y "pidió poner en práctica la reforma a través del diálogo y de otros medios pacíficos". El 231

diplomático, no obstante, reiteró la "continua cooperación entre las dos naciones en todos los foros internacionales" y la férrea oposición del gigante asiático "en contra de todos los intentos [de Occidente] por interferir en los asuntos internos sirios". China, junto con Rusia, impidió a principios de octubre que la ONU actuara en contra de Siria. Wu aseguró que en las reuniones que mantuvo con el vicepresidente sirio, Farouk al Shara, y el ministro de Exteriores, Walid al Moallem, solamente compartió "algunas ideas y sugerencias" para iniciar un proceso de reformas. La declaración del representante de Pekín coincide con la publicación de una entrevista que el presidente sirio concedió al diario británico The Sunday Telegraph, en la que advierte a Occidente de que un hipotético ataque contra su régimen "quemaría toda la región" y crearía "otro Afganistán". Desde el inicio de las protestas en Siria, en marzo pasado, han muerto más de 3.000 personas. China advierte al régimen sirio que "la violencia no puede continuar"30 OCT 2011 - 14:43 CEThttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/30/actualidad/1319981583_7 43441.html

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Internacional La fiebre de cultivos perturba África La carrera internacional para explotar tierras fértiles en el continente amenaza el equilibrio en el reparto del agua y espolea protestas de comunidades campesinas El precio de los alimentos supera ya el nivel de la burbuja de 2008 Sequías, inundaciones y alimentos, por PAUL KRUGMAN Andrea Rizzi Madrid 30 OCT 2011 - 19:50 CET9 Un hombre en una aldea cercana a Kinshasa. / HABIBOU BANGRE (AFP) La pugna para el acceso al petróleo, al gas y a los minerales es una fuerza subterránea que ha contribuido significativamente a plasmar el mundo moderno. En el siglo XXI, se hace cada vez más evidente que, para comprender las relaciones internacionales, a esos factores habrá que añadir otro: el acceso a tierras fértiles. La carrera por el control de superficies cultivables está en pleno desarrollo. La poderosa subida de los precios de los alimentos ocurrida en 2007-2008 impulsó el fenómeno. Muchos gobiernos de países dependientes de las importaciones de alimentos se convencieron de la necesidad de reducir su vulnerabilidad comprando o alquilando tierra en otros países. En 2011, tras un par de años de relativa calma, los precios han estado constantemente por encima del pico de 2008, según el índice elaborado por la Organización para los Alimentos y la Agricultura de la ONU (FAO, por sus siglas en inglés). La fiebre de los cultivos sigue ardiendo y, según vaticinan los expertos, no hay visos de que vaya a remitir a corto y medio plazo. África es el principal escenario de la carrera. La falta de transparencia de muchos acuerdos y la ausencia de fiables registros públicos en varios países impide perfilar estadísticas exhaustivas a escala global acerca del fenómeno. Pero los datos disponibles indican que este es de amplísimas proporciones, con contratos que cubren extensiones de miles de kilómetros cuadrados. Tan solo en Etiopia, Mozambique, Sudán y Liberia, unos 43.000 kilómetros cuadrados fueron vendidos o arrendados a inversores extranjeros entre 2004 y 2009, según datos oficiales recopilados por el Banco Mundial. Se trata de una superficie equivalente al territorio de Suiza. Si se tiene en cuenta que son muchos los países que —en África, pero también en otros continentes— viven experiencias similares, la magnitud del asunto es evidente. El incremento de la población mundial, la dieta más rica de millones de personas en países emergentes y la creciente cantidad de cultivos destinados a biocombustibles explican la subida del precio de los alimentos y, en gran parte, la consiguiente búsqueda de tierras. Más allá de su dimensión económico-social, este empuje tiene implicaciones geopolíticas. Una de ellas es el control del agua. “Estas grandes inversiones se sitúan en zonas con un acceso estratégico al agua”, comenta en conversación telefónica Michael Taylor, analista del International Land Coalition, una ONG que sigue de cerca el fenómeno. “Por ejemplo, varios países de las cuencas del Nilo y del Níger son grandes receptores de este flujo de inversiones. Muchos de los contratos firmados en estos países no regulan claramente la cuestión del uso del agua. La utilización del caudal del Nilo ya es

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motivo de tensión entre Egipto y otras naciones de la cuenca. Cuando todos estos proyectos estén en pleno funcionamiento, son de esperar crecientes extracciones de agua. Hay un alto potencial para que se generen conflictos". Unos 200 millones de personas vivían en la cuenca del Nilo en 2005, y la ONU estima que serán 330 millones en 2030. Crece en varios países la frustración de campesinos y pastores expropiados

Malí, uno de los países por los que pasa el río Níger, vendió o alquiló unos 2.400 kilómetros cuadrados de tierra a extranjeros tan solo en 2010, según datos recopilados por el Oakland Institute. Más de 100 millones de personas viven en la cuenca del Níger. Países que sufren escasez de agua —como Arabia Saudí, Catar o los Emiratos Árabes Unidos— figuran entre los mayores protagonistas de la carrera por la tierra. “Pero también hay otras clases de inversores: países como China o India, que tienen agua para cultivar pero temen que en el futuro su sector agrícola sea incapaz de abastecer a sus grandes poblaciones; y empresas de países occidentales, que quieren tierra para cultivar biocombustibles, o simplemente vender más en el mercado internacional”, observa Taylor. No faltan tampoco inversores que simplemente buscan refugio de las turbulencias del mercado financiero. La pugna por el agua está detrás de muchas de las compras de tierra

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La pugna del agua no es la única evidente consecuencia geoestratégica en este fenómeno. También tiene un potencial desestabilizador en la política de Estados en los que la tierra es una cuestión vital, el medio de subsistencia directa de grandes porcentajes de la población. Disturbios y tensiones Madagascar es un caso premonitor de lo que puede ocurrir. En 2009, el rechazo a un proyecto para conceder a la empresa surcoreana Daewoo la explotación de una superficie de 13.000 kilómetros cuadrados —aproximadamente la mitad de Bélgica— fue el catalizador de un profundo malestar social que estalló con unos tremendos disturbios que dejaron decenas de muertos. El Gobierno que asumió el poder tras los desórdenes tumbó inmediatamente el proyecto. La frustración de campesinos o pastores expropiados o despojados del derecho de acceso a las tierras ha creado ya tensiones en varios otros países. Los defensores de esta clase de proyectos alegan que las inversiones permiten crear nuevas infraestructuras, puestos de trabajo y una mejora de la productividad agrícola. Los detractores alertan de que, en la mayor parte de los casos, suponen el desalojo de comunidades enteras, que la creación de puestos de trabajo es muy inferior al número de personas que han perdido su medio de vida, que la exportación de la producción de esos terrenos daña países con mercado alimentarios muy precarios. Varias ONG han denunciado en los últimos años numerosos atropellos a los derechos de las comunidades locales. Para reducir esos riesgos, el Comité sobre la Seguridad Alimentaria está impulsando un código voluntario de conducta internacional. El comité celebró una sesión en Roma del 17 al 22 de octubre, pero no logró terminar las negociaciones. Olivier de Schutter, relator especial de la ONU sobre el derecho a la Alimentación, alertó de que “está en marcha una carrera entre los inversores [que quieren obtener más terrenos] y la comunidad internacional, que quiere regular este proceso para evitar que tenga consecuencias pavorosas”. “La atmósfera en la negociación es constructiva”, señala en conversación telefónica Duncan Pruett, consultor de Oxfam que asistió a la sesión del CSA. “El problema es que incluso si se llegara a un acuerdo en los próximos meses, ese código voluntario no tocaría en todo caso los factores que impulsan el fenómeno”. Esos siguen ahí. “Nuestros análisis sugieren que nos espera una fase de volatilidad del mercado de alimentos”, explica George Rapsomanikis, economista de la FAO. “Además, varios casos de restricciones a las exportaciones —como las de India y Vietnam sobre el arroz en 2008, y la de Rusia sobre cereales en 2010/2011— parecen haber reforzado el deseo de autosuficiencia. Hemos pasado de una era en la que se impulsaba un mercado abierto, a otra en la que cada uno quiere protegerse”. Históricamente, actitudes semejantes han terminado a menudo causando graves tormentas en las relaciones internacionales. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/30/actualidad/1319999483_73886 8.html

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TRIBUNA: PAUL KRUGMAN Sequías, inundaciones y alimentos PAUL KRUGMAN 13/02/2011 Estamos en mitad de una crisis alimentaria mundial (la segunda en tres años). Los precios mundiales de los alimentos batieron un récord en enero, impulsados por los enormes aumentos de los precios del trigo, el maíz, el azúcar y los aceites. Estos precios desorbitados solo han tenido un efecto limitado en la inflación estadounidense, que sigue siendo baja desde un punto de vista histórico, pero están teniendo un impacto brutal para los pobres del mundo, que gastan gran parte o incluso la mayoría de sus ingresos en alimentos básicos. Las consecuencias de esta crisis alimentaria van mucho más allá de la economía. Después de todo, la gran pregunta acerca de los levantamientos contra los regímenes corruptos y opresivos en Oriente Próximo no es tanto por qué se están produciendo como por qué se están produciendo ahora. Y hay pocas dudas de que el hecho de que el precio de la comida esté por las nubes ha sido un desencadenante importante de la cólera popular. ¿Y qué hay detrás del repunte de los precios? La derecha estadounidense (y la china) culpa a las políticas del dinero fácil de la Reserva Federal, y hay al menos un experto que afirma que hay "sangre en las manos de Bernanke". Mientras tanto, el presidente francés Nicolas Sarkozy culpa a los especuladores y les acusa de "extorsión y pillaje". Pero las pruebas cuentan una historia diferente, mucho más siniestra. Aunque hay varios factores que han contribuido a la drástica subida de los precios de los alimentos, el que realmente sobresale es la medida en que los acontecimientos meteorológicos adversos han alterado la producción agrícola. Y estos acontecimientos meteorológicos adversos son exactamente la clase de cosas que uno esperaría ver a medida que el aumento de las concentraciones de los gases de efecto invernadero cambie el clima (lo que significa que la actual subida del precio de la comida podría ser solo el principio). Ahora bien, hasta cierto punto, el vertiginoso ascenso de los precios de los alimentos forma parte de un encarecimiento general de los productos básicos: los precios de muchas materias primas, que abarcan todo el espectro desde el aluminio hasta el zinc, han estado subiendo rápidamente desde principios de 2009, principalmente debido al acelerado crecimiento industrial en los mercados emergentes. Pero la relación entre el crecimiento industrial y la demanda está mucho más clara en el caso del cobre, por ejemplo, que en el de los alimentos. Excepto en los países muy pobres, el aumento de la renta no tiene un gran efecto en la cantidad que come la gente. Es cierto que el crecimiento en algunos países emergentes como China conduce a un aumento del consumo de carne y, por tanto, a un incremento de la demanda de pienso para los animales. También es cierto que las materias primas agrícolas, especialmente el algodón, compiten por la tierra y otros recursos con los cultivos destinados a la alimentación (como también lo hace la producción subvencionada de etanol, que consume muchísimo maíz). De modo que tanto el crecimiento económico como las malas políticas energéticas han contribuido en cierta medida al repentino encarecimiento de la comida.

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Aun así, los precios de los alimentos iban a la zaga de los precios de otros productos básicos hasta el verano pasado. Entonces llegó el azote del tiempo. Fíjense en el caso del trigo, cuyo precio casi se ha duplicado desde el verano. La causa inmediata del repunte del precio del trigo es evidente: la producción mundial ha caído en picado. La mayor parte del declive de dicha producción, según los datos del Departamento de Agricultura de EE UU, es el reflejo de una drástica bajada en la antigua Unión Soviética. Y sabemos a qué se debe eso: una ola de calor y una sequía sin precedentes, que elevaron las temperaturas de Moscú por encima de los 38 grados por primera vez en la historia. La ola de calor rusa solo ha sido uno de los muchos acontecimientos meteorológicos extremos recientes, desde la sequía de Brasil hasta las inundaciones de proporciones bíblicas de Australia, que han mermado la producción mundial de alimentos. La pregunta, por tanto, pasa a ser qué hay detrás de estas condiciones meteorológicas extremas. Hasta cierto punto, estamos viendo las consecuencias de un fenómeno natural, La Niña, un acontecimiento periódico en el que el agua del Pacífico ecuatorial se enfría más de lo normal. Y los fenómenos de La Niña se han relacionado históricamente con crisis alimentarias mundiales, entre ellas, las crisis de 2007 y 2008. Pero la historia no termina ahí. No se dejen engañar por la nieve: en conjunto, 2010 está vinculado con 2005 por ser el año más cálido del que se tienen registros, aun cuando nos encontrábamos en un periodo de actividad solar mínima y La Niña fue un factor de enfriamiento durante la segunda mitad del año. Los récords de temperatura no solo se batieron en Rusia, sino en al menos 19 países, que representan una quinta parte de la superficie terrestre del planeta. Y tanto las sequías como las inundaciones son consecuencias naturales de un mundo que se calienta: las sequías porque hace más calor, las inundaciones porque los océanos más calientes liberan más vapor de agua. Como siempre, no es posible atribuir ningún acontecimiento meteorológico concreto a los gases de efecto invernadero. Pero el patrón que estamos viendo, con máximos extremos y en general un tiempo extremo que se vuelve mucho más habitual, es justo lo que uno esperaría del cambio climático. Por supuesto, los sospechosos habituales se pondrán como locos ante las insinuaciones de que el calentamiento global pueda tener algo que ver con la crisis alimentaria; quienes insisten en que Ben Bernanke tiene las manos manchadas de sangre suelen ser más o menos los mismos que insisten en que el consenso científico sobre el clima es el reflejo de una descomunal conspiración de la izquierda. Pero las pruebas indican, de hecho, que lo que estamos viviendo ahora es un adelanto de la alteración, económica y política, a la que nos enfrentaremos en un mundo recalentado. Y dada nuestra incapacidad para actuar frente a los gases de efecto invernadero, se avecinan muchas más cosas, y mucho peores. - http://www.elpais.com/articulo/primer/plano/Sequias/inundaciones/alimentos/elpepueco neg/20110213elpneglse_3/Tes

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Internacional Libia acelera la formación de su Ejército ante la retirada de la OTAN La Alianza Atlántica pone hoy fin a sus operaciones en el país norteafricano Los cadáveres más buscados también son incómodos, por BERNA GONZÁLEZ HARBOUR La muerte de Gadafi, por BERNARD-HENRI LÉVY Teoría y práctica del tiranicidio "Yo capturé a Gadafi" Juan Miguel Muñoz Trípoli 30 OCT 2011 - 20:11 CET 61 Varios libios toman fotografías de la destrucción de la casa del fallecido líder libio Muamar al Gadafi. / SABRI ELMHEDWI (EFE) Caía la tarde del 19 de marzo cuando la OTAN, amparada por la resolución 1973 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, que había establecido un par de días antes la zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia, salvaba a Bengasi de una matanza. Los tanques de Muamar el Gadafi avanzaban a un par de kilómetros de la cuna de la rebelión cuando fueron abrasados por los cazabombarderos franceses. El aluvión de agradecimientos a la Alianza Atlántica y al presidente Nicolas Sarkozy fue acompañado por la irrupción de banderas tricolores francesas —también británicas y de Catar— en la plaza de los juzgados de Bengasi. Aunque deseaba el Consejo Nacional Transitorio (CNT), el organismo que ha dirigido el alzamiento, que la aviación de los países occidentales continuara su labor hasta final de año, los aliados, aquejados por la crisis económica, no han cedido a la pretensión de las nuevas autoridades libias. El último minuto de hoy lunes, muerto el dictador y arrasado su poderío militar, la OTAN concluye sus operaciones militares, mientras el CNT acelera la formación de un nuevo ejército que afronta una labor repleta de desafíos. Más de 22.000 misiones aéreas, el permanente patrullaje de las costas mediterráneas, el envío de asesores castrenses franceses, británicos e italianos, el suministro de armamento francés y la llegada de uniformados de Catar —por muy reacios que fueran los flamantes líderes políticos libios a la presencia de tropas extranjeras en su país— impidieron que la revuelta fuera aplastada. Están convencidos los líderes políticos y militares, aunque todavía no den el paso de trasladar el Gobierno desde Bengasi a Trípoli, de que el peligro se ha desvanecido y que los gadafistas no suponen ya riesgo alguno. “Debemos tener cautela. Preferiríamos que la OTAN permaneciera hasta fin de año, pero no creemos posible un contraataque de los fieles al antiguo régimen. Cada día somos más fuertes”, comenta Mohamed Alí bin Kura, portavoz militar de Zauiya. La prioridad es la formación de un Gobierno interino y de un ejército que reemplace a las anárquicas milicias que hicieron la guerra sin un mando unificado.

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Ayuda para buscar los misiles desaparecidos J. M. MUÑOZ Esfumados, detenidos, muertos en combate o asesinados los prebostes del gadafismo, el Consejo Nacional Transitorio (CNT) debe acometer dos tareas que requieren la ayuda de la tecnología de los países occidentales. Es imposible que pueda llevar a cabo con sus escasos recursos estas misiones: el control de los miles de kilómetros de las fronteras del sur del país con Níger, Mali y Argelia, y la búsqueda de misiles tierra-aire desaparecidos de varios arsenales. En pleno desmadre bélico, muchos depósitos de armas carecieron de custodia e inmensas cantidades de explosivos y misiles tierra-aire -—cuya apropiación por grupos terroristas supondría un enorme riesgo para la estabilidad regional y los vuelos comerciales— fueron robadas de los arsenales. Se ignora quién los saqueó. Musa el Kuni, representante de la etnia tuareg en el CNT, admitía a este diario el 17 de octubre en Madrid que un equipo de especialistas de Estados Unidos se hallaba en Libia para rastrear el paradero de esos proyectiles. Creen los militares que se rebelaron contra Muamar el Gadafi que están en algún lugar del enorme desierto libio. Tampoco son capaces, y así lo admiten los jefes militares, de garantizar la seguridad en los límites territoriales de Libia con Malí y Argelia, y tampoco con Níger, donde Gadafi contaba, y sigue contando Saif el Islam, con el apoyo de gran parte de la población y sus líderes tribales, que dicen harán lo que sea necesario para salvar al hijo del autócrata en fuga que negocia su entrega al Tribunal Penal Internacional. Esta región es un paraíso del contrabando, y la escasez de milicianos para vigilarla, patente. "Las fronteras con Túnez y Egipto son ya seguras y no hay problemas. En el sur es diferente. No tenemos la misma sensación. La gran mayoría de los rebeldes eran personas que vivían en las ciudades del Mediterráneo y en las montañas occidentales del país, y aunque se han desplazado al sur varios grupos de ellos, no conocen bien el terreno en que se mueven", reconoce Mohamed Alí bin Kura, portavoz militar de Zauiya. La resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, votada por unanimidad el pasado jueves, expresa su preocupación por estos dos retos en los que está embarcado el Gobierno libio, que implora la asistencia de los países aliados en la guerra. El coronel Bashir el Neiri, uno de los oficiales que combatió en Misrata, explica el procedimiento de formación del Ejército: “El consejo militar de cada ciudad está eligiendo a sus representantes, que acudirán a Bengasi la próxima semana para establecer la nueva jerarquía militar y elegir a sus jefes”. Hay que esperar unos días porque la peregrinación a La Meca está en su apogeo y la fiesta que pone fin a este precepto islámico (Eid el Adha, la fiesta del sacrificio) comenzará a partir del lunes de la próxima semana. En algunas ciudades ya se conocen los nombres de los delegados que viajarán a Bengasi. El coronel Sadik Fehel el Bum representará a Zauiya, localidad a 50 kilómetros al oeste de Trípoli escenario de matanzas que dejaron sin aliento la insurrección. Sin duda, los militares de profesión —despreciados durante décadas por el régimen de Gadafi, que creó y dotó de armamento moderno a las brigadas que dirigirían sus hijos Mutasim y Jamis— jugarán un papel decisivo. Se trata ahora de que los shabab (muchachos), esa multitud de médicos, funcionarios, abogados, campesinos, maestros, desempleados, mecánicos o ingenieros que, a veces, acudían al frente con un simple cuchillo en sus manos, entreguen las armas. Ya se está consiguiendo.

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Los ciudadanos convertidos en milicianos durante ocho meses de contienda han respondido obedientes a los llamamientos oficiales y a los carteles adheridos a las paredes tripolitanas que, como una señal de tráfico, prohíben llevar armas en lugares públicos. El panorama en las ciudades libias está dando un vuelco espectacular. Cuando menos en Bengasi y Trípoli. Hace solo una semana, el trasiego de camionetas cargadas con baterías antiaéreas y ametralladoras atestaba las calles y avenidas de la capital. Han desaparecido. Casi de un plumazo. Cierto es que muchos de quienes conducían esos vehículos procedían de Misrata (200 kilómetros al este de Trípoli) y Zintán (en las montañas de Nafusa, junto a la frontera tunecina), cuyos guerrilleros fueron determinantes en la caída de Trípoli. Pero tampoco se observa a los miles de hombres armados que deambulaban de un lado a otro celebrando la muerte del sátrapa o la liberación oficial del país. La inmensa mayoría de quienes empuñan un kalashnikov llevan colgando visible una acreditación expedida por el CNT. Trípoli ya es lo que era antes del 17 de febrero: una ciudad con un tráfico caótico y con colas a las puertas de los bancos para retirar el dinero con el que celebrarán la fiesta de Eid el Adha. Misrata es caso aparte. El desarme de los shabab llevará más tiempo en esta ciudad, cuyos mandos prometen que nunca permitirán el retorno a localidades vecinas (Tauerga y Sirte) a la población que respaldó abiertamente al tirano y perpetraron horribles tropelías en Misrata. Juan Miguel Muñoz Libia acelera la formación de su Ejército ante la retirada de la OTAN30 OCT 2011 - 20:11 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/30/actualidad/1320001193_43558 5.html

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Libyan leader wants to speed up elections By Mary Beth Sheridan, Monday, October 31, 12:54 AM TRIPOLI, Libya — Libya’s outgoing prime minister called Sunday for speeding up the timetable for holding elections, warning that a political vacuum could develop in a country emerging from an eight-month civil war. Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril noted that under current plans, Libyans would have to wait until June to choose a panel to oversee the writing of a new constitution, which would set the stage for presidential and legislative elections. “We don’t want an eight-month gap,” he said at a news conference. The delay would be “dangerous,” he said. Jibril’s comments suggested that there are differences within the National Transitional Council, which provided political leadership during the struggle to overthrow dictator Moammar Gaddafi but has moved slowly to establish order in the postwar phase. Hundreds of revolutionary militias are imposing order nationwide, and human-rights groups say they could become entrenched unless the interim government asserts control soon. The transitional council is engaged in lengthy discussions about who will serve in an interim government to lead the country for the next eight months. Jibril, who is considered to have limited popularity, has said he won’t form part of the new government. He suggested more than doubling the size of the transitional council, to 120 members, adding women, young people and military leaders from around the country — groups whose absence has sparked criticism. The expanded council could draw up a constitution and prepare the nation for elections, he said. Jibril also told reporters that chemical weapons had been found at two locations, and that international experts had been summoned to examine the sites. He declined to provide details. The U.S. State Department had said during the war that it thought Libyan stockpiles of mustard agent and uranium were secure. But Jibril’s announcement indicated that new arms caches had been discovered. Mary Beth Sheridan Libyan leader wants to speed up elections October 31, 12:54 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/libyan-leader-wants-to-speed-up- elections/2011/10/30/gIQAdmGFXM_print.html

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Room for Debate: A Running Commentary on the News Religion at the Ballot Box Updated October 30, 2011 06:40 PM Religion at the Ballot Box

Introduction

Joe Mortis Discussions of faith are a staple of American politics, on both the right and the left. One minister who supports Rick Perry said that, as a Mormon, Mitt Romney is not a Christian — but still would be preferable to “a professing Christian like Barack Obama who embraces un-biblical values.” For his part, President Obama has often emphasized his religion, saying last year that “my public service is part of that effort to express my Christian faith.” If politicians say their religion guides them, and influential ministers have a litmus test for candidates’ “biblical values,” it’s fair to ask: Which politicians espouse policies that align with Christianity? How so? Politicians say their religion guides them, so it’s fair to ask: What exactly would a Christian platform look like?

Debaters First, Rule Out Obama

Colleen Carroll Campbell The 2012 Faith Issue: Poverty

Jim Wallis A Foreign Policy Checklist

Richard Land It's About Virtue, as Well as Issues

Richard Cizik Correlation, but Not Causation 242

Andrew Kohut 'Christian' as a Political Code

M. A. Muqtedar Khan Compassion for Immigrants

Leith Anderson  The Religious Right, the Religious Left

Josef Sorett Why Prefer Christians?

Jean Bethke Elshtain Separating Personal From Political

Adam Brown First, Rule Out Obama October 30, 2011

ColleenU Carroll Campbell U is a columnist for The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, a former

speechwriter for President George W. Bush, the author of “TheU New Faithful: Why Young

Adults Are Embracing Christian Orthodoxy”U and the host of “Faith & Culture,” a TV and radio show on EWTN. When choosing a presidential candidate from among the flawed field of 2012 contenders, voters intent on bringing their Christian faith to bear on their ballot-box decisions should remember Lord Palmerston’s observation: in politics, one has no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Chief among a Christian’s interests must be the defense of innocent human life in its most vulnerable forms. Closely related is respect for religious liberty and those basic institutions – including man-woman marriage – that precede government. Which candidate is both willing to uphold Christian principles and capable of defeating the president who is not? By this measure, a vote for President Obama is a non-starter. Obama has been a firm ally of the abortion-rights lobby, permitted taxpayer funding for research that destroys human embryos, expressed sympathy for efforts to legalize assisted suicide, stopped defending the Defense of Marriage Act and shown surprising disregard for the conscience rights of his religious critics. As for his Republican challengers, most publicly champion the above principles. So the question becomes: Which candidate is both willing to uphold these principles and capable of defeating the president who is not? That last criterion would seem to rule out such candidates as Representative Michele Bachmann and Herman Cain, whose political charisma or ideological purity is overshadowed by lack of experience and electability. The most likely nominee remains Gov. Mitt Romney, a candidate 243

with a spotty record but solid policy proposals on these issues who would owe a large debt to pro-life, pro-family Christian voters if elected — a debt they should not let him forget.

Topics: PoliticsU ,U ReligionU U http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/30/the-role-of-religion-in-the-2012- election/the-christian-case-for-voting-against-obama 'Christian' as a Political Code October 30, 2011

M.U A. Muqtedar Khan U is an associate professor of political science and international relations at the University of Delaware. I have no problem if the American president chooses to align himself or herself with Christian principles as long as I get to choose which principles — such as love thy neighbor, serve the poor, turn the other cheek. But unfortunately, religion discards principles and becomes an identity when it enters the political arena. Therefore when a candidate wears his religion on his lapel, like the mandatory U.S. flag, he is not committing to principles, but is making a partisan pledge. For politicians, declaring a religion is a way to signal to a target audience: “I am one of you, and our politics (not religion) is the same. I am a Christian and I will ban the Shariah.” Unfortunately, religion discards principles and becomes an identity when it enters the political arena. I fear that in the secular West, when candidates are eager to reveal their religious affiliation, it is because they wish to hide their politics from public scrutiny. Mitt Romney, for example, emphasizes his “Christianity” in the hope that it will distract from his liberal tendencies. President George W. Bush claimed that Jesus was the political philosopher who inspired him, but his policies were Cheneyvellian. In religion and politics, the political context is more revealing than the religious text itself. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/30/the-role-of-religion-in-the-2012- election/christian-as-a-political-code Correlation, but Not Causation October 30, 2011

AndrewU Kohut U is the president of the PewU Research Center.U He is the co-author of four books and a frequent commentator on polls for National Public Radio. Religion is a significant factor in the way Americans think about politics. It has a bearing on political affiliation, political values, policy attitudes and candidate choice. No fewer than 70 percent of Americans say it is important to them that a president have strong religious beliefs. In 2007, the Pew Research Center found that “being a Christian” ranked second on the list of traits that Americans find most appealing in a presidential candidate, out of a list of 23. Only military service ranked higher. “Not believing in God” was clearly the most negative trait tested. Religious voters tend to be conservative voters -- but often, they aren't conservative because they are religious. According to the exit polls in 2008, 75 percent of American voters were Christian, 11 percent were members of other faith groups, and 11 percent are unaffiliated. Christian voters see the Republican Party as more friendly to religion than the Democrats. Typically, the most religious Christians back Republicans candidates at much higher rates than the less observant. In 2008, Christians who attended services weekly backed McCain over Obama, 57 percent to 42 percent. Those attending less often favored Obama, 53 percent to 46 percent.

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However, it is important to recognize that strong correlation between religiosity and political preferences is often not a direct one, but rather reflects the linkage between religion and other factors, like ideology and ethnicity. However, in some elections when moral issues are in play, such as 2004, religion can have a more direct impact. This is the case currently, with fewer white evangelicals backing Mitt Romney than members of other faiths, given their reservations about Mormonism. African Americans are one important exception to the link between religiosity and support for the G.O.P. As a group, they tend to be very religious, but vote overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/30/the-role-of-religion-in-the-2012- election/in-religion-and-politics-correlation-but-not-causation The Religious Right, the Religious Left October 30, 2011

Josef Sorett is an Uassistant professor U of religion and African-American studies at Columbia

University. He is onU Twitter.U In recent history, the right has dominated public use of religious language, and mostly applied it to social issues, so that only hot-button topics like abortion or same-sex marriage tend to be viewed as clearly decided by religious beliefs. On such issues, Christianity and “conservative” positions often end up conflated. But neither the “pro-life” position nor opposition to gay marriage is the only viewpoint that follows from a Christian perspective. On issues like gay marriage, a Christian perspective could lead voters to conservative or liberal stances. Christians who believe that the state should be bound to a literal reading of certain biblical passages might vote for a candidate who seems to agree. Yet there are also Christians who, for example, find in the scripture good news of a God who affirms all humanity, regardless of sexual orientation. These Christians might be more inclined to vote for a candidate who has supported legislation that seeks to protect the rights of gay and lesbian citizens. Such diverging positions are apparent on even most polarizing issues, and this holds for religious communities across lines of race and ethnicity. And there are a range of Christian perspectives on issues, including education, military and economic policies. With the Occupy Wall Street movement looming large, more people are raising concerns about the growing divide between the rich and poor. Christians active in these protests might be taking cues from the biblical tenet that one’s faith is measured by how we treat “the least of these.” In this view, there is a religious responsibility to hold government accountable — on everything from federal budgets to corporate bailouts. Ultimately, there is no simple or singular formula for applying Christianity such that a clear candidate emerges. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/30/the-role-of-religion-in-the-2012- election/the-christian-right-the-christian-left Why Prefer Christians? October 30, 2011 Jean Bethke Elshtain, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago, is the author of "Sovereignty:U God, State and SelfU" and an editor of

"OneU Electorate Under God?: A Dialogue on Religion and American Politics."U

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There’s a crucial question that tends to be forgotten: should Christians look for a candidate who identifies as a Christian? Such august fathers of the church as St. Augustine reminded Christians that they should always mark a careful distinction between the earthly city and the heavenly city and, further, that they should not anticipate being governed by a Christian. How important is the candidate’s professed religion? Martin Luther argued that Christians could very well be governed by “a Turk” (his term for Muslim) so long as they could practice their faith freely. There is no 'checklist' for who Christians should vote for. That said, as voters we look for candidates who embrace principles we cherish. On one level those are principles shared by all Americans (hopefully), namely, the presuppositions imbedded in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. We have no religious test for office, and we have no religious establishment. We have a secular state. That does not mean now, and never has, that we have a thoroughly secularized society. That has never been the case. Religion and politics have always intermingled in American society and politics. That is just fine. But it does complicate who one votes for and why. As Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out over half a century ago, Christians can share certain basic principles and differ quite strenuously on the public policies that best align with those principles. For example: in every reputable social science survey, Christians indicate that caring for the poor is of the highest priority. But that does not automatically translate into support for one policy or another. The principle and the policy are not welded together. There will be some Christians who favor huge government programs to deal with poverty, and others who insist that such programs only perpetuate poverty and second-class citizenship. It follows that there is no “check list” for who Christians should vote for. It has always been thus and will continue to be. There is no bright line save, it seems to me, if one can imagine a candidate — and it is hard to imagine this in contemporary America — who advocates ethnic cleansing or some similar horror. Then Christians should present a united force. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/30/the-role-of-religion-in-the-2012- election/why-prefer-christian-candidates Separating Personal From Political October 30, 2011 Adam Brown is an assistant professor of political science at Brigham Young University. The Savior Jesus Christ repeatedly taught that we should be generous toward all, treating others as charitably as we ourselves would like to be treated. The individual standard of Christian conduct is clear: Any Christian worthy of the name will aid the poor willingly, without coercion (2 Corinthians 9:7). That certainly speaks to individual standards of conduct. Jesus was wise enough not to classify Caesar’s economic policy as Christian or not. We should do the same. As for whether one candidate’s economic policy is more “Christian” than another’s, I would defer to Jesus Christ. When the Savior was asked to take a stance on a controversial taxation policy, he responded by pointing out Caesar’s face on the coins: “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar's, and unto God the things which be God's" (Luke 20:24-25). The Savior was wise enough not to classify Caesar’s economic policy as Christian or not. We would be wise to follow his example today. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/30/the-role-of-religion-in-the-2012- election/separating-personal-from-political

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Clinton credited with key role in success of NATO airstrikes, Libyan rebels By Joby Warrick, Monday, October 31, 12:04 AM TRIPOLI, Libya — At 5:45 p.m. on March 19, three hours before the official start of the air campaign over Libya, four French Rafale jet fighters streaked across the Mediterranean coastline to attack a column of tanks heading toward the rebel city of Benghazi. The jets quickly obliterated their targets — and in doing so nearly upended the international alliance coming to Benghazi’s rescue. France’s head start on the air war infuriated Italy’s prime minister, who accused Paris of upstaging NATO. Silvio Berlusconi warned darkly of cutting access to Italian air bases vital to the alliance’s warplanes. “It nearly broke up the coalition,” said a European diplomat who had a front-row seat to the events and who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters between allies. Yet the rift was quickly patched, thanks to a frenzied but largely unseen lobbying effort that kept the coalition from unraveling in its opening hours. “That,” the diplomat said, “was Hillary.” Seven months later, with longtime U.S. nemesis Moammar Gaddafi dead and Libya’s onetime rebels now in charge, the coalition air campaign has emerged as a foreign policy success for the Obama administration and its most famous Cabinet member, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Some Republicans derided the effort as “leading from behind,” while many others questioned why President Obama was entangling the nation in another overseas military campaign that had little strategic urgency and scant public support. But with NATO operations likely to end this week, U.S. officials and key allies are offering a detailed new defense of the approach and Clinton’s pivotal role — both within a divided Cabinet and a fragile, assembled-on-the-fly international alliance. What emerges from these accounts is a picture of Clinton using her mixture of political pragmatism and tenacity to referee spats among NATO partners, secure crucial backing from Arab countries and tutor rebels on the fine points of message management. Clinton, in an interview, acknowledged “periods of anguish and buyer’s remorse” during the seven months of the campaign. But, she said, “we set into motion a policy that was on the right side of history, on the right side of our values, on the right side of our strategic interests in the region.” From skeptic to advocate During the initial weeks of unrest in Libya, Clinton was among the White House officials clinging to fading hopes that Gaddafi might fall without any help from the West.

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From the first armed resistance on Feb. 18 until March 9, the disorganized opposition movement appeared to be on a roll, taking control of Libyan cities from Benghazi to Brega and Misurata on the Mediterranean coast. But in a single, bloody week, Gaddafi loyalists turned rebel gains into a rout, crushing resistance in towns across Libya before marshaling forces for a final drive against Benghazi, the last opposition stronghold. With Gaddafi threatening to slaughter Benghazi’s population “like rats,” the rebel leaders pleaded for Western intervention, including a no-fly zone. The appeal garnered support in Europe, particularly among French and British officials who began working on the text of a U.N. Security Council resolution that would authorize the use of military force against the Libyan autocrat. But the idea of a no-fly zone drew skepticism from within the Obama White House. Some officials, most notably then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, opposed military intervention. And Clinton, during two trips to Europe in early March, made clear that Washington was not eager to lead a politically risky military campaign against yet another Muslim country. She was loath to see Gaddafi trouncing aspiring democrats in his country and menacing fledgling governments in neighboring Egypt and Tunisia. But Clinton told aides, who later described the administration’s inner workings on the condition of anonymity, that the hard reality was that a no-fly zone, by itself, might make things worse. “We were opposed to doing something symbolic — that was the worst of both worlds,” said one of the aides. “We would have crossed the threshold [of intervention] without accomplishing anything.” Clinton had drawn up a list of conditions that included a formal request by Arab states for intervention. On March 12, the 22-nation Arab League did exactly that, voting to ask for U.N. approval of a military no-fly zone over Libya. The next day, March 13, Clinton traveled to Paris for a meeting with foreign ministers from the Group of Eight countries. In the marbled conference rooms of Paris’s Westin Hotel, she sat down for the first time with Mahmoud Jibril, the interim leader of Libya’s fledgling Transitional National Council. She also met privately with Persian Gulf diplomats to gauge Arab willingness to send warplanes to enforce a possible no-fly zone. And she huddled with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, whose country’s veto potentially could block any intervention effort at the United Nations. “When she went to Paris, there were no instructions from the White House on whether to support strong action in Libya,” said a senior State Department official, who explained that no consensus had been reached within the national security cabinet at the time. Yet, within three days, the official said, Clinton began to see a way forward. “This was an opportunity for the United States to respond to an Arab request for help,” the official said. “It would increase U.S. standing in the Arab world, and it would send an important signal for the Arab Spring movement.” By March 15, when Clinton spoke with Obama by phone to brief him on the meetings, she had become a “strong advocate” for U.S. intervention, one administration official said. The president, who had been weighing arguments from a sharply divided Cabinet for several days, sided with his secretary of state. Clinton was halfway across the Atlantic on March 17 when a resolution went before the U.N. Security Council authorizing a Libyan intervention with “all necessary means” — 248

U.N. code for military force. From the plane, Clinton worked the phones while the administration’s ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, met with counterparts to line up votes and to ensure that both Russia and China would withhold their vetoes. The resolution passed, 10 to 0, with five countries abstaining. Keeping alliance together The French air attack that so angered the Italians two days later grew from French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s desire to launch an early, symbolic strike before the official start of the campaign. The White House did not object — Sarkozy had been a key advocate of military intervention, and French leadership on Libya had boosted the president’s popularity at home. But the other allies were wary. France had floated the idea of a command structure distinct from NATO that would include some Arab countries while excluding Germany and other opponents of intervention. Italy and Turkey, meanwhile, insisted on NATO control and threatened to boycott any other arrangement. The early French attack deepened suspicions by the two countries that Sarkozy harbored “hidden agendas,” as Turkish President Abdullah Gul later said. French officials countered that NATO was too divided and ill-prepared to move quickly enough to help the rebels. With the alliance threatening to unravel, Clinton focused on damage control. She spent hours on the phone and in person with Berlusconi and Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, who eventually played crucial roles in providing air bases as staging grounds for attacks. The details of the military command were ultimately decided in a four-way conference call with Clinton, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, British Foreign Secretary William Hague and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Yet even as that conflict cooled, another one was erupting. Several Arab states, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, had agreed to supply warplanes and pilots to the coalition in a symbolic show of support by Muslim countries for military action against Libya. But three days into the bombing campaign, the Arabs appeared to be backing away, concerned by the possibility of a backlash in their own countries and angered by U.S. criticism of the Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain to put down an uprising there. By March 24, Qatar’s four promised jets still had not yet made an appearance over Libya, and the United Arab Emirates and Jordan had announced that they would provide only humanitarian assistance. In a bid to woo the Arabs back into the alliance, Clinton spoke at length by phone with Sheik Hamad Bin Jasim al-Thani, the Qatari foreign minister, while also making repeated calls to the UAE’s Sheik Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan and to Jordan’s King Abdullah II. “This is important to the United States, it’s important to the president, and it’s important to me personally,” Clinton told Arab leaders, according to one of the State Department officials.

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On March 25, Qatari-flagged Mirage 2000 jets flew their first sorties over Libya. All three countries eventually would supply military aircraft and experienced pilots to the Libyan campaign. Getting past stalemate The NATO-led air campaign quickly pushed Gaddafi’s forces from Benghazi. But by May, the alliance’s planes were patrolling front lines that barely moved. In Washington and in Europe, the word “stalemate” began to creep into opinion columns as lawmakers, skeptical of U.S. policy in Libya, began threatening to block funds for military operations there. Meanwhile, a cash crunch also loomed for the rebels, who were unable to sell oil and were legally blocked from tapping into Gaddafi’s overseas bank accounts. By early July, they had run out of money for weapons, food and other critical supplies. Clinton, ignoring the advice of the State Department’s lawyers, convinced Obama to grant full diplomatic recognition to the rebels, a move that allowed the Libyans access to billions of dollars from Gaddafi’s frozen accounts. At a meeting in Istanbul on July 15, she pressed 30 other Western and Arab governments to make the same declaration. “She brought everyone over at once,” said a Western diplomat who attended the Istanbul meeting. Tripoli fell five weeks later, after a relatively small U.S. expenditure of $1 billion and with no regular U.S. troops on the ground. In the air campaign, U.S. jets flew less than a third of the missions but supplied critical support in air refueling, surveillance and logistics for sorties flown by more than a dozen other nations. Still, no hero’s welcome The political benefits to Clinton and Obama remain far from clear. To many Libyans and others in the Muslim world, the lasting impression from the campaign is that of a reluctant America, slow to intervene and happy to let others take the lead. While Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron were given heroes’ welcomes during victory laps through Libya last month, Clinton was confronted during her recent Tripoli visit with questions about why the United States had not done more. “Many people feel that the United States has taken a back seat,” one student told her. U.S. critics of the administration’s policy say its Libya policy, while ultimately successful, is emblematic of a slow and haphazard response to the Arab Spring uprisings. “Earlier intervention might have prevented the conflict from ever reaching that dangerous precipice,” said Michael Singh, who served as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council under President George W. Bush.“There is a difference between building an international consensus and following one.” Clinton acknowledged that history’s verdict on the Libyan intervention was far from assured and said that NATO’s formula for aiding a popular uprising against a dictatorship may not be easily applied elsewhere. “We need to assess where we are, what we accomplished together, what the costs were,” Clinton said. Meanwhile, she said, “we do have to be more agile and flexible in

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dealing with a lot of the challenges we face, and we should be unembarrassed about that.” Staff writer Karen DeYoung in Washington contributed to this report. Joby Warrick Clinton credited with key role in success of NATO airstrikes, Libyan rebels October 31, 12:04 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/hillarys-war-how-conviction-replaced-skepticism-in-libya- intervention/2011/10/28/gIQAhGS7WM_story.html

Arab League submits plan to end Syria crisis, awaits response from Damascus By Associated Press, Updated: Monday, October 31, 11:03 AM

(SANA, File/Associated Press) - FILE - In this Monday, June 20, 2011 file photo released by the Syrian official news agency SANA, Syria’s President, Bashar Assad waves to the audience after he delivers a speech in Damascus, Syria. Syrian President Bashar Assad warned against Western intervention in his country’s 7- month-old uprising, saying such action would trigger an “earthquake” that “would burn the whole region.” BEIRUT — An Arab League committee has submitted a plan to end the bloodshed in Syria and a response from Damascus was expected Monday, Qatar’s foreign minister said. There were no details on what the plan entailed, but the announcement comes amid intensified efforts by the 22-nation body toward resolving the deadly seven-month confrontation between the regime of President Bashar Assad and protesters demanding his overthrow.

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The Arab League panel held a “clear and frank” meeting with a Syrian delegation in Qatar on Sunday, said Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim. An Arab diplomat in the league headquarters in Egypt meanwhile said the Arab League will hold an extraordinary session to discuss the unrest-torn nation on Wednesday. The ministers will receive a report on the mission to Syria and a “plan of action,” said the official, who asked that his name not be used because of the sensitivity of the issue. The uprising against Assad began in mid-March during a wave of anti-government protests in the Arab world that toppled autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The U.N. says that Assad’s crackdown has left more than 3,000 people dead. While the specifics of the proposal were unknown, the opposition’s stance on dialogue with the regime is mixed. Some influential figures in the opposition have refused to talk to the Assad regime while the military crackdown continues; others see dialogue as a way out of the crisis. In an interview published Sunday, Assad warned the Middle East will burn if the West intervenes in his country’s 7-month-old uprising, threatening to turn the region into “tens of Afghanistans.” Assad’s comments to Britain’s Sunday Telegraph were his harshest so far regarding the potential for foreign intervention. But they belie a growing concern over the possibility of some sort of Western military action after months of NATO airstrikes helped rebellious Libyans oust Moammar Gadhafi. “Syria is the hub now in this region. It is the fault line, and if you play with the ground, you will cause an earthquake,” Assad said. “Do you want to see another Afghanistan, or tens of Afghanistans?” Still the U.S. and its allies have shown little appetite for intervening in another Arab nation in turmoil, and Syrian opposition leaders have not called for an armed uprising like the one in Libya and have for the most part opposed foreign intervention. Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. © The Washington Post Company http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/arab-league-submits-plan-to- end-syria-crisis-awaits-response-from- damascus/2011/10/31/gIQAJc3NYM_story.html

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Nato all but rules out Syria no-fly zone Syrian president warns that intervention could lead to 'another Afghanistan' as Nato officials say Libya-like action lacks support Luke Harding and agencies guardian.co.uk, Sunday 30 October 2011 19.15 GMT

Bashar al-Assad said any western intervention in Syria would cause an 'earthquake'. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images Nato has all but ruled out the possibility of establishing a no-fly zone in Syria after the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, warned that any western intervention would cause an "earthquake" that would "burn the whole region". Despite the success of its Libya mission, which formally ends on Monday, Nato officials made it clear there was little prospect of the alliance establishing a similar no- fly zone to protect civilians and stem the mounting death toll in the eight-month Syrian uprising. Some Syrian anti-government groups have called on the west to defend them as bloody fighting between security forces and armed protesters escalates and the country drifts towards civil war. Tanks were reported to have shelled a historic district in the central city and opposition stronghold of Homs today. At least 20 soldiers were killed and 53 wounded on Saturday in clashes with opposition forces in the city. Rebel gunmen also ambushed a bus in the north-west province of Idlib, killing 10 security officers, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported. One attacker also died. But Nato officials say the Libya "template" is unlikely to work in Syria, adding that currently a Syrian "mission" lacks both international consensus and wider regional support. The UN security council would need to approve any Syrian operation – a step that would be unlikely given Russian and Chinese opposition. "We would need a clear mandate from the international community, as well as support from the Arab League and Syria's neighbours," a Nato official said, adding that so far "no-one had asked" for Nato's help. Nato's reluctance to get embroiled in Syria internal conflict came as Assad warned that outside intervention in his country's affairs could lead to "another Afghanistan". In an

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interview with the Sunday Telegraph, he conceded that western states "are going to ratchet up the pressure". But he added: "Syria is different in every respect from Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. The history is different. The politics is different. Syria is the hub in this region. It is the fault line, and if you play with the ground you will cause an earthquake … Do you want so see another Afghanistan?" Assad showed little sympathy for opposition protesters, more than 3,000 of whom have been killed, since the uprising began in mid-March, the UN says. Some 1,200 troops have also died, Assad's government says. He admitted that "many mistakes" had been made by his forces, but said his regime was now battling "terrorists". The Syrian president maintained that those demonstrating against his rule were Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood members opposed to secular rule or "pan- Arabism", as he put it, under which the rights of Syria's Christian and Alawite minorities were guaranteed. He insisted he still enjoyed "popular legitimacy". "I live a normal life. I drive my own car, we have neighbours. I take my kids to school," he said. With no end to the violence in sight, a Syrian delegation met in Doha on Sunday with an Arab League ministerial committee. On 16 October the league gave Damascus a 15-day deadline to put in place a ceasefire, which ends on Sunday. Since then 343 people have been killed, including 40 on Friday, one of the worst days of bloodshed since the uprising began. Protests have intensified amid fast-moving events in the Arab world: the brutal death of Muammar Gaddafi, and Tunisia's successful democratic elections last week. In a show of support for Assad's regime, thousands of Syrians carrying the national flag rallied in Sweida, a city 70 miles south of Damascus, on Sunday. There have been two other large pro-Assad rallies in the capital and the coastal city of Latakia. The situation in Syria remains at the top of the international agenda. The UN secretary general, Ban Ki-Moon, said the latest civilian killings were alarming and called for Assad to carry out "far-reaching reforms, not repression and violence"." He also appealed for military operations to stop, and for the release of political prisoners ands well as those detained during recent protests. China's Middle East envoy also expressed concern. He said the fighting could not continue. Wu Sike told reporters that Assad's government must take "palpable steps" to end the bloodshed.said: "The Syrian government has to speed up implementing its promises of reform," said Wu. "There must be respect and response to the aspirations … of the Syrian people." The US has accused China and Russia of failing to throw their weight behind western efforts to isolate Assad's government diplomatically and toughen economic sanctions. Assad has friendly relations with Moscow, a crucial backer and supplier of military hardware. During an interview with Russia's state-run Channel One channel, he praised the Kremlin for its veto of the European-backed UN security council resolution imposing sanctions on Damascus. "We are relying on Russia as a country with which we have strong historic ties," Assad said. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/30/nato-syria-no-fly- zone?CMP=EMCGT_311011& 254

Clinton: Libya showed U.S. leadership to be ‘essential’ Monday, October 31, 2:14 AM Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton sat down with The Washington Post to reflect on the campaign that helped lead to the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi. Here are some highlights: On Gaddafi’s defeat as a vindication of Obama administration policy: “I do think that we set into motion a policy that was on the right side of history, on the right side of our values, on the right side of our strategic interests in the region. And it turned out to have brought about the result that we thought it would in a relatively short period of time. .Ԝ.Ԝ. We live in an incredibly complex world where America’s leadership is essential, where a lot of the things we want to see done in our own national interest in furtherance of our own values are important enough that, if necessary, we would do it unilaterally, but preferably, we want to do it with a coalition of nations that understand the interests and values at stake.” On the initial reluctance to embrace the no-fly zone: “It was so unclear in the beginning as to how this would play out. It took some time for me to be convinced that we could put together a credible coalition that would be able to support the opposition and to support strong action in the UN and then the kind of military support that they needed in order to have a chance at succeeding. .Ԝ.Ԝ. There was a lot of questioning within our government about whether we should do anything; if so, what should we do; what kind of role the United States should play. And it was important to do — to lay the groundwork, which meant we had to find out who these people were, look them in the eye, try to figure out how serious they were, how capable they were. We had to test the willingness of the Arab League and Arab countries to go beyond rhetoric to action and support. We had to be sure that the U.N. would pass the kind of resolution that would enable the international community, starting with sanctions and freezing of assets and then moving to the no-fly zone, embargo, civilian protection mission. And all of that took intensive amounts of diplomacy.” On ensuring Arab support for the mission: “The turning point in the international assessment was when the Arab League asked for action. And as I said, we had to do a lot to make it clear they totally understood what they were asking for when they asked for a no-fly zone, so that there couldn’t be any recriminations later. So we did a lot of that work, we laid the groundwork. So then when they came in with their Arab League meeting and said yes, we want you to do that, it was really important that they participate. And it turned out that they did. And although

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Egypt and Tunisia did not participate in any kind of military way, their support on the borders was absolutely essential.” On concerns about a possible stalemate: “I really did think if we had the patience to persist, we would see success with the mission. For a couple of weeks there, we were having regular calls of just the top national security officials with our military commanders who were part of the NATO mission in some supportive role, and our understanding of the situation was getting better by the day. The NATO mission, along with our Arab allies, was getting smoother. .Ԝ.Ԝ. When we started, we had no ability to have ground-based assessment teams that could give us the intelligence and the surveillance and the reconnaissance that you usually have. The president had said no boots on the ground. At the beginning, really, there were very few non-Libyan opposition people that were on the ground that could be in any way part of a command-and-control operation. So we have this difficult task in getting going, figuring out where we were.” On political opposition in the United States: “We had this problem that many in the Congress were either very supportive and thought we should be doing more than we were doing, and the other end of spectrum totally unsupportive and wanted us out and never there, and ‘end it now.’ .Ԝ.Ԝ. I felt like we were not making our case effectively enough, and I thought we had a really good case to make. .Ԝ.Ԝ The argument that I made, both in public to the press and behind closed doors to the Congress, I said when we were attacked on 9/11, NATO invoked Article 5 for collective defense. And we have had our allies, our NATO allies, plus a broad coalition of a total of about 48 nations, in Afghanistan with us now for a decade. They come to us and they say this is in our vital national security interests, this is really close to where we live. .Ԝ.Ԝ. All of a sudden, we’re going to say, ‘We can’t be bothered, I’m really sorry about that?’ I don’t think that you can have an alliance and be the leader of that alliance for as long as we have and assume that everybody will do what you think is important to do, if you don’t listen and respect what they think is important to do.” On the applicability of the “Libya model”: “This particular example will be studied for a long time because it was a real model of what we meant. Now, it took advantage of kind of established institutions like NATO; it sought legitimacy from established institutions like the U.N., the Arab League, et cetera. But it took the United States to kind of put all of the pieces together and then to keep everybody going. Because you’re right; we went through periods of anguish and buyer’s remorse and doubts, and there was all of that. .Ԝ.Ԝ. I think we need to let the lessons settle in, we need to assess where we are and what we accomplished together, what the costs were. But I think part of what we’re finding is that we do have to be more agile and flexible in dealing with a lot of the challenges we face, and we should be unembarrassed about that. We don’t have a one-size-fits-all that we can impose on every situation.” On the challenges facing the new Libya:

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“First and foremost, they have to unify the country. That will be a huge challenge. They have to figure out how to reconcile various political and religious beliefs. They have to unify all of the tribes. They have to deal with the rivalry that has existed forever between the west and the east, between Benghazi and Tripoli. And they’re going to have to be very clear as to what their agenda is and how it will help meet the needs of all the different groups. .Ԝ.Ԝ. They have a very complicated political task ahead of them, and they don’t have a lot of experience in what we consider politics. So we’ve offered all kinds of technical assistance and support going forward, as have many others. But that’s their overwhelming task, and that can be connected to their second overwhelming task, which is to create a government. .Ԝ.Ԝ. These were really thoughtful people. There’s a professional class in Libya that, despite all of the problems, survived. I think there will be some expats who might come back. So we’re going to help them any way we can.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/clinton-libya-showed-us- leadership-to-be-essential/2011/10/30/gIQAO28QXM_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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REPORTAJE: OPINIÓN La muerte de Gadafi El autor muestra su repulsa por las condiciones y la puesta en escena del asesinato del dictador libio, que espera sea un final, el último sobresalto de la edad bárbara Las condiciones de la muerte de Gadafi podrían corromper la esencia moral de una revolución hasta hoy casi ejemplar Los responsables del CNT parecen divididos entre la alegría de la liberación y el horror de este último acto BERNARD-HENRI LÉVY 30/10/2011 Las imágenes de su cadáver. Su rostro, aún vivo pero ensangrentado; parecen ensañados con él. Su cabeza desnuda, extraña y repentinamente desnuda. Me doy cuenta de que siempre lo habíamos visto coquetamente enturbantado; hay algo conmovedor en este detalle, algo que induce a apiadarse de ese criminal. De nada sirve que me repita a mí mismo que ese hombre era un monstruo. De nada sirve que repase las otras imágenes, las que me acosan desde hace ocho meses y son infinitamente más perturbadoras: los fusilamientos en masa de los años negros de la dictadura; las caras de los torturados; los ahorcados del 7 de abril y, luego, de todos los 7 de abril, o casi, que hacían las delicias de ese Calígula moderno; los osarios; las huellas de osarios; los muros manchados de sangre que descubrí en todas las etapas de mis viajes; los sepultados vivos a los que la revolución liberó de sus cárceles y, por fin, ya no tienen miedo. De nada sirve que me diga una y otra vez que ese muerto tuvo mil oportunidades para negociar, para detenerlo todo, para escapar, y que si no lo hizo, si prefirió sacrificar a su pueblo hasta el final, fue porque había decidido, con conocimiento de causa, ir al encuentro de este trágico destino. De nada me sirve recordar que nosotros, los europeos, no somos los más indicados para dar a nadie lecciones de humanidad revolucionaria, pues tenemos sobre nuestras conciencias las masacres de septiembre de 1792, así como a las mujeres rapadas tras la Liberación, a Mussolini colgado boca abajo y ultrajado, a los Ceausescu abatidos como animales y tantos otros ejemplos de "grupos en fusión revolucionaria" que, según Sartre, en el calor de la acción, se transforman en "jaurías linchadoras". Ni por esas. Debo de ser todo un bendito. O un enemigo irreconciliable de ese mal absoluto que es, en cualquier circunstancia, la pena de muerte. Pues en este espectáculo hay algo que me pone enfermo. En esas escenas de linchamiento hay una brutalidad que me indigna y que nada puede excusar. Peor: la imagen de esa agonía filmada, luego mostrada con complacencia y retransmitida por todas las televisiones del mundo, incluso transformada en fondo de pantalla, ha alcanzado, con ayuda de la técnica, una especie de cima en el arte de la profanación. Y ni siquiera me refiero a la imagen que vino después, al cuerpo exhibido, medio desnudo, en esa cámara refrigerada de Misrata por la que desfilan unos combatientes alborozados que se filman unos a otros haciendo la V de la victoria junto al cadáver en 258

vías de descomposición. Esos mismos teléfonos móviles que, durante ocho meses, fueron testigos de las peores atrocidades cometidas por el régimen se convierten ahora en herramientas sacrílegas que atentan contra esa ley inmemorial que, desde la Ilíada hasta la fundación del islam, exige respeto para los restos del vencido. Les digo esto mismo a mis amigos libios de París. Se lo digo a los miembros del Consejo Nacional de Transición (CNT) a los que consigo localizar por teléfono. Cuando me llama desde Misrata el comandante del regimiento del que dependían los elementos descontrolados que capturaron a Gadafi, le confieso, también a él, que comparto su alivio; que el de la caída del tirano ha sido un gran día para Libia; pero que las condiciones de su muerte, su puesta en escena y el espectáculo que vino después podrían, si no tienen cuidado, corromper la esencia moral de una revolución hasta hoy casi ejemplar. Todos lo entienden, creo yo. Todos los responsables del CNT con los que consigo hablar parecen divididos, como yo, entre la alegría de la liberación y el malestar, por no decir el horror, de este último acto. Y ese es, por otra parte, el sentido de sus cambios de opinión respecto al destino de los restos mortales del dictador -¿autopsia o no?, ¿comisión de investigación o no?- y a la decisión que toman, con bastante premura, y contra la presión de la opinión pública, de restituírselos a la familia y esclarecer completamente las condiciones de este incumplimiento de las leyes de la guerra. La verdad es que este asunto es esencial. Para el futuro de los pueblos de la región es más importante que la reafirmación de una sharía que, oficialmente, está en vigor en la mayor parte de los países arábigo-musulmanes y cuyo sentido sigue dependiendo de la interpretación, más o menos flexible, que se haga de ella. Cualquiera que haya reflexionado sobre la historia general de las revoluciones no puede ignorar que este es el tipo de episodio simbólico del que dependen, más allá de su imagen, la verdad profunda y el destino de una insurrección democrática. Pues una de dos... O bien este crimen cometido en grupo es, como la decapitación del último rey de Francia, según Camus, el acto fundador de la era que comienza, su reflejo anticipado, lo cual sería terrible... O bien no es un comienzo, sino un final, el último sobresalto de la edad bárbara, el fin de la noche libia, el último estertor de un gadafismo que, antes de expirar, ha necesitado volverse contra su autor e inocularle su propio veneno: pasado ese momento de exorcismo, la batalla por la libertad retomará su curso -aleatorio, sembrado de trampas, pero, en resumidas cuentas, más bien afortunado y fiel a las promesas de la primavera de Bengasi. Esta segunda hipótesis me parece hoy la más verosímil. Debemos ayudar con todas nuestras fuerzas para que, efectivamente, sea la que tome cuerpo. Es más que un acto de fe: la Libia libre no tiene elección. - Bernard-Henri Lévy La muerte de Gadafi30/10/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/muerte/Gadafi/elpepusocdgm/20111030elpdmg pan_1/Tes

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Internacional El Asad lanza un aviso: una intervención en Siria “quemaría la región” En una exclusiva con un medio inglés, el caudillo afirma que su país es “una falla geológica” y disuade a Occidente de buscarse “otro Afganistán” Al menos 20 soldados muertos en choques contra desertores en Siria Agencias Londres 30 OCT 2011 - 12:38 CET4

Manifestación de partidarios de Bachar El Asad / WAEL HAMZEH (EFE) En una entrevista que publica hoy el dominical británico 'The Sunday Telegraph', la primera concedida a un periodista occidental desde que comenzaran las protestas populares hace siete meses, el presidente de Siria, Bachar El Asad, ha dicho que una posible intervención militar en su país ocasionaría 'un terremoto' que 'quemaría toda la región'. El caudillo del régimen dinástico sirio, que se enfrenta desde marzo a un levantamiento popular con ansias de democracia, ha advertido en la entrevista de que un hipotético ataque contra su régimen por parte de los países occidentales podría provocar 'otro Afganistán'. El presidente El Asad ha lanzado el aviso después de que cientos de personas marcharan ayer hacia la embajada siria en Londres para mostrar su solidaridad con los ciudadanos sirios que sufren la represión a manos del régimen de El Asad. El Assad: "Siria es una falla geológica, y si juegas con ella podrías causar un terremoto. ¿Acaso quieren ver otro Afganistán, o decenas de afganistanes?". 260

Desde mediados de marzo pasado, Siria es escenario de revueltas populares contra el régimen de El Asad, que se han cobrado la vida de unas 3.000 personas, entre ellas unos 187 menores, según las últimas cifras de la ONU. Al menos veinte soldados sirios murieron ayer y otros 53 resultaron heridos durante choques contra supuestos militares desertores en la localidad central de Homs, según informaciones del Observatorio Sirio de Derechos Humanos. En esta misma ciudad, foco rebelde, murieron 40 manifestantes antigubernamentales por la reacción violenta de las fuerzas de seguridad sirias. En la entrevista con el rotativo británico, el mandatario sirio ha hecho hincapié en presentar a su país como una llave de estabilidad imprescindible en el frágil Oriente Próximo. "Siria es ahora el centro de la región. Es una falla geológica, y si juegas con ella podrías causar un terremoto. ¿Acaso quieren ver otro Afganistán, o decenas de afganistanes?", ha dicho El Assad. En los últimos meses han caído en las revueltas de la Primavera Árabe tres presidentes de gobiernos dictatoriales, Ben Alí en Túnez, Mubarak en Egipto y Gadafi en Libia, todos ellos comparables hasta cierto punto con el manejo totalitario de Siria por parte de El Asad. Sin embargo, el jefe del Gobierno de Damasco, capital siria, cree que su país es diferente 'en todos los aspectos. La historia (de Siria) es diferente. La política es diferente', manifestó. El conflicto sirio no remite: el viernes murieron 40 manifestantes en protestas; ayer, 20 soldados durante el asedio de Homs, foco rebelde. El dirigente sirio también reconoció que al comienzo de las revueltas populares en su país, sus fuerzas cometieron 'muchos errores', pero observó que actualmente el único objetivo son 'los terroristas'. Insistió además en que su respuesta a la 'primavera árabe' no fue la de un 'Gobierno tozudo' sino que 'seis días después' del comienzo de las protestas empezó 'la reforma'. En la protesta de ayer en la embajada siria en Londres, los manifestantes cantaron mensajes como: 'Vete Asad' y 'Siria Libre' durante una marcha que duró dos horas, a la que acudieron unos 1.000 activistas, según cifras de los propios organizadores. El Asad lanza un aviso: una intervención en Siria “quemaría la región”.En una exclusiva con un medio inglés, el caudillo afirma que su país es “una falla geológica” y disuade a Occidente de buscarse “otro Afganistán” 30 OCT 2011 - 12:38 CET4 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/30/actualidad/1319967959_95 9688.html

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The Arab world Crescent moon, waning West The decline of Western power in the Arab world is no bad thing Oct 29th 2011 | from the print edition

AFTER a slow summer, the Arab spring has turned into a turbulent autumn. The past few days have seen the gruesome end of Muammar Qaddafi, the more edifying spectacle of an orderly and open election in Tunisia (see article) and the death of Saudi Arabia’s ancient crown prince Sultan amid demands for the kingdom to modernise faster. Egypt, by far the most populous Arab country, is poised to hold its first proper election next month. Revolts and civil strife continue across the region, from Syria to Yemen and Bahrain. For the West, whose ties to Arab dictators once gave it great clout in the Middle East, events in the region have spun way out of control. That fact was underlined this week by the Iraqis’ insistence that all American forces must quit the country by the end of the year. Yet the West should not regret this turn of events. The power that it has lost in the short term should, in the long run, be replaced by influence born of good relations with decent governments. On balance, the Arab world is in far better shape than it was less than a year ago. For sure, the economies of all the countries affected by the democratic upheavals have slumped. That is true even of Tunisia, which has the best education and skills in the region. But dictatorship and state control suffocated the Arab economies—even those

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awash with oil. Once Arab countries’ borders open up and their governments become accountable to their citizens, they are likely to grow faster. And that will not happen until they have put in place a system of government that gives a far wider degree of participation than before. It is beginning to happen. Tunisia has led the way. Egypt promises to follow, though the generals in charge of its transition have been horribly inept of late, raising fears that the country may slip backwards to disorder or military control. But a parliament is due for election next month. It is to choose an assembly that may take a year or so to write a constitution providing for the election of a new Egyptian president. Libya, too, should have elections within a year. Everywhere risks lapsing into bouts of chaos and strife. But this trio of north African states looks set to give a democratic fillip to other Arab countries, including those such as Syria that seem destined for a time to be soaked in blood while they strive for liberation. The rise of political Islam is not necessarily cause for alarm among democrats in the West and the Arab world. In Tunisia an Islamist party, Nahda (“Renaissance”), that was brutally banned for decades has won a stunning victory at the polls. Egypt’s Muslim Brothers are likely to do well too. In Libya the Islamists may also be gaining ground. This rattles secular-minded Arab liberals and many well-wishing Westerners. But a more open and tolerant brand of political Islam better suited to the modern world seems to be emerging, especially now that its proponents must compete for the favours of voters who admire the Islamists’ hostility to corruption, but dislike the sectarian and conservative attitudes that many of them expressed when they were underground. No one can be certain that if Islamists gain power they will give it up at the ballot box, but secular rulers sometimes fail that test. And, on the whole, the threat of religious extremism with which strongmen used to justify repression has not materialised. Barring a few ungoverned pockets in Yemen and on the fringes of the Sahara, al-Qaeda has failed to benefit from the democratic wind. It’s a local show these days The strength of these revolutions is that they have been almost entirely home-grown. Those in Egypt and Tunisia had no outside help. Syria’s brave protesters are on their own and may, in time, triumph. Libya’s new rulers could not have succeeded without NATO’s bombers, but the absence of Western ground troops and of proconsuls telling the locals what to do has been in salutary contrast to what happened in Iraq eight years ago, where democracy was crudely imposed on an unprepared people (see Lexington). After the deaths of some 150,000-plus locals and around 5,000 Americans and other foreigners, Iraq has a freely elected government. But it has not developed the habits of tolerance between communities and the independent institutions that underlie all truly successful democracies. A decade of American hard power has been less effective than a few months of peaceful protest in setting countries on the road towards representative government. Partly because of the Iraqi adventure, America—at least its foreign policy—remains heartily disliked by Arabs across the region. That is only slightly less true under Barack Obama than it was under George Bush. America’s unpopularity stems partly from its backing of Israel and the continuing humiliation of the Palestinians, partly from its willingness to use force to get its way and partly from its history of supporting useful Arab dictators. Prince Sultan’s death may make this last point particularly salient. If the 263

reactionary Prince Nayef becomes the crown prince and de facto regent, America may struggle to maintain an alliance with him alongside friendships with the Arab world’s nascent democracies. Yet in the decline of Western power lie the seeds of hope for healthier relations in the future. Although the Arab world’s revolutionaries in general, and the Islamists in particular, are unlikely to hail the West as a model, they seem to be moving towards open political and economic systems. Nobody in Egypt, Tunisia or Libya is arguing for a Saudi Arabian, Iranian or even Chinese model. Arab students, businessmen and tourists in their thousands still choose to go to the West for their studies, their deals and their fun. The prospects for Western influence in the Arab world are good. But in the future it will be won through education, investment and, when requested, advice on building up institutions. Such levers do not work as quickly as those that were forged from deals with unpopular and unstable dictators. But, in the end, they are likely to prove more reliable. http://www.economist.com/node/21534782

Tunisia’s general election Islamists to the fore An Islamist party, Nahda, has won a handsome victory at the polls. But it seems determined to govern, at any rate at first, together with a host of secular parties Oct 29th 2011 | TUNIS | from the print edition

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LIKE many Mediterranean peoples, Tunisians are said to be prone to excesses of joy and despair. So it was scarcely surprising that the stronger-than-expected performance of Islamists in the country’s first-ever open and fair election, and the first free exercise of political rights thanks to the Arab spring, prompted an emotional response. Fans of Nahda (Renaissance), the long banned and persecuted Islamist party that has secured at least 41% of seats in the constitutional assembly, cheered and tooted as results were announced. But many liberal Tunisians mourned the end of an era. This most secular of Arab states, they sighed, had forsaken its cherished traditions of boozy beach-going tolerance. Yet the results of polling on October 23rd, following an impressive turnout by an estimated 60% of eligible voters, were not as dramatic as they may have seemed. In a real victory for democracy, Tunisia appears to be set not for a period of Islamist domination but for a healthy bout of barter and compromise between newly legitimised political forces. Rather than serving as a warning of the dangers of popular empowerment when political Islam dominates discourse across the Arab world, Tunisia’s elections make a compelling argument for letting the people choose.

What the polls do caution, however, is that seeming technicalities and political immaturity can make a huge difference to electoral outcomes. There is no doubt that Nahda, led by the 70-year-old Rachid Ghannouchi, deserved to outpoll its rivals, which included half a dozen small, nearly indistinguishable secular parties, as well as scores of independent groups. The Islamist party ran an exemplary campaign, exploiting sympathies for its history of resistance to the hated previous regime as well as for its identification with working-class authenticity in contrast to Tunisia’s traditional Francophone elite. Yet because of a system of strict proportional representation, exacerbated by what in some districts were as many as 100 choices on ballots, a third or so of all votes cast actually counted for nothing, having been wasted on small local lists that failed to garner enough numbers to return a seat. Playing by the rules, Nahda appears to have secured 88 seats in the 217-seat assembly, clearly entitling it to lead a new government, while gaining at least a quarter of actual votes. Failure to unite cost its secular opponents what should have been a clear majority. “All they had to do was pluck the fruit of their opponents’ mistakes,” commented Ridha Kéfi, the widely read editor of Kapitalis, a Tunisian news website.

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The voting produced other, smaller upsets. To general shock, the populist Petition Party, or Aridha, hitherto unknown and led by Hachemi Hamdi, a London-based owner of a low-budget satellite television station, emerged with 13% of seats, the third-largest showing. Mr Hamdi appears to have cashed in on a mix of his folksy notoriety as a native of Sidi Bouzid, the provincial town where riots by jobless youths last December first sparked Tunisia’s revolution, promises of immediate handouts to the poor, and a willingness to recruit among members of the disgraced former ruling party. Two small secular parties, meanwhile, confounded opinion polls. The Congress for the Republic (CPR), run by Moncef Marzouki, a prominent human-rights man, emerged as the second largest with 14% of seats, surging ahead of predictions. Tapped to do better, the Progressive Democratic Party, co-led by Nejib Chebbi, a lawyer and veteran politician, instead slumped to barely 7%. Commentators attributed the scores of these two secular outfits to Mr Chebbi’s strident attacks on Nahda and Mr Marzouki’s declaration that he would be happy to work with it. A third progressive party, the Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties, better known as Ettakatol, run by Mustafa Ben Jaafar, a doctor and former health minister, also did well to get 10%. A dozen smaller parties and local coalitions hold the remaining 16% of seats; 44% will be held by women. Under Tunisia’s so-far-smooth plan for its transition to full democracy, the new assembly is charged with drafting a constitution and appointing a government, including a prime minister and president. Nahda’s leaders have hastened to insist they are open to forming a coalition with any party—and have implied that they would not overturn Tunisia’s liberal laws on alcohol and women’s clothing. Its secretary-general, Hammadi Jebali, says he expects to be proposed for the premiership. Nahda people deny they seek the presidency, and say they will instead propose either Mr Marzouki, Mr Ben Jaafar or the current popular interim prime minister, the 84-year-old Beji Caid Sebsi. Despite some misgivings at the Islamist surge, most Tunisians appear relieved and satisfied by the results, convinced that they broadly reflect the popular will. Even among dedicated secularists, a common post-election refrain is that the next few months will prove a welcome test, with Nahda obliged to take responsibility and thus blame for policies rather than criticise from the sidelines. Given a sagging economy and a well of social grievances, the immediate test will be hard. Once a new constitution is in place, and elections are held next year for a proper parliament, Nahda may start to look a bit less shiny. http://www.economist.com/node/21534808

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Sat, 29/10/2011 - 10:56

Yemenis demand Saleh's trial amid deadly violence Author: AFP Yemenis marched by the thousands on Friday demanding President Ali Abdullah Saleh be tried, as a woman was killed by a sniper and five other people were wounded, four critically, witnesses said. Meanwhile, an officer in charge of anti-terrorism unit in the main southern city of Aden was killed in a car blast that was blamed on Al-Qaeda. "O men who love peace in the world, Saleh must face justice," chanted a crowd of 10,000 people that amassed after Friday prayers in Sittin Street, near Change Square, which has become the epicentre of anti-regime demonstrations. The opposition has been calling since January for the ouster of Saleh, whom they accuse of nepotism and corruption, but the strongman has refused to step down despite pressure from Gulf nations and the UN Security Council. "No immunity, no protection, Saleh and his agents must be judged," demonstrators yelled, galvanised by an imam who called on regime loyalists to "join their brothers in Change Square." "We all need this revolution to stop the injustice of Yemen," he said. The echo of explosions coming from the direction of of Al-Hassaba, a neighbourhood in northern Sanaa, rang out in the central square, an AFP correspondent said. Gunfire exchanges, which began over night between rival tribal forces in Al-Hassaba, continued intermittently on Friday, residents said. Meanwhile, pro-Saleh demonstrators gathered near the presidential palace and chanted their support for the embattled leader and for Yemeni-Saudi ties, paying tribute to the neighbouring kingdom's late crown prince, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz. A sniper killed a woman as she walked with her husband along Hael Street, which separates areas controlled by forces loyal to the government from those held by dissident troops supporting the opposition, witnesses said. The body of Kifaya al-Amudi, 28, was taken to a field hospital in Change Square, a medical official told AFP. There were also anti-regime protests in Ibb and Hudeida, residents said. In Taez, Yemen's second city, five people were wounded, four of them critically, when security forces opened fire against a funeral procession in a fiefdom of the opposition, witnesses said. And in Aden, a suspected Al-Qaeda attack killed an officer who led an anti-terrorism unit, a police officer told AFP.

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"A device placed under the car of colonel Ali al-Hajji, head of Aden's anti-terrorism unit, exploded, killing the officer and wounding two of his children," the source said. The devise exploded as the officer drove through the Al-Arish neighbourhood, near the airport, according to the police officer, who blamed Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which formed in January 2009 when Yemeni and Saudi branches of the extremist network merged, has exploited the popular uprising against Saleh to reinforce its presence in Yemen's south and east. Publishing Date: Sat, 29/10/2011 - 10:56 Related material Yemen forces fire on Sanaa protest march, 10 hurt Arab parliament demands an end to murder of Yemeni people Show in newsticker: Yemeni soldiers in Sanaa / al-qaeda/ Ali Abdullah Saleh/ change square/ protests/ Sanaa/snipers/ Yemen/ World news/ World

Source URL (retrieved on 08/11/2011 - 11:31): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/509818

Mon, 07/11/2011 - 17:49

AP Six Al-Qaeda-linked militants killed in southern Yemen Mon, 07/11/2011 - 17:49 Author: AP SANAA, Yemen — A Yemeni official said Monday that security forces have killed six militants and injured many others in fighting in the city of Zinjibar, the capital of the southern province of Abyan. The official said that heavy fighting between government forces and Al-Qaeda-linked militants continued until the early hours of Monday. He said several members of the security forces were injured, but he did not say how many. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to reporters. Security has collapsed across the Arab world's poorest country during the nine-month popular uprising seeking to oust President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This has allowed militants to seize entire towns in the country's rebellious south. Related material Yemenis demand Saleh's trial amid deadly violence Yemeni women burn their veils to protest crackdown

Source URL (retrieved on 08/11/2011 - 11:38): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/512730

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Internacional LA TRANSICIÓN EN LIBIA La Corte de La Haya localiza a Saif el Islam y le promete un juicio justo "Es inocente mientras no se demuestre lo contrario", dice el fiscal Moreno Ocampo.- El hijo de Gadafi mantiene ante los mediadores su inocencia Isabel Ferrer La Haya 29 OCT 2011 - 09:14 CET

El fiscal Moreno Ocampo juto a las fotos de Gadafi y su hijo Saif. / JERRY LAMPEN (REUTERS) La busca y captura de Saif el Islam, hijo predilecto de Muamar el Gadafi y hasta hace poco destinado a sucederle en Libia, está al rojo vivo. Acusado de crímenes contra la humanidad por haber participado -indirectamente- en la persecución y asesinato de civiles durante la revuelta contra la dictadura de su padre, la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) ha logrado hablar con él. Aunque el contacto se produjo a través de "intermediarios", el mensaje transmitido no dejaba lugar a dudas. El fiscal jefe, Luis Moreno Ocampo, quiere que Saif el Islam se entregue y le asegura "un proceso justo". "Tiene derecho a ser escuchado, como cualquier otro sospechoso. Es inocente mientras no se demuestre lo contrario, y corresponde a los jueces decidir", ha dicho Moreno Ocampo. La respuesta de Saif, a quien la comunidad internacional consideró en su día un moderado dispuesto a convertir su país "en el Dubái del norte de África", no fue desvelada en un principio por la Corte. Esta madrugada se conocía que Saif el Islam ha defendido su inocencia ante los mediadores del Tribunal Penal Internacional (TPI) con quienes mantiene "contactos informales". Ocampo desvelaba que Saif ha manifestado a los mediadores su interés por saber qué ocurriría en el caso de que fuera declarado inocente tras la celebración de un juicio. "Él dice que es inocente y que probará su inocencia, por lo que está interesado en las consecuencias que de ello se deriven", ha explicado Ocampo a la agencia de noticias desde Pekín, donde asiste a una conferencia jurídica. Además, ha aclarado que estos "contactos informales" no están orientados a llegar a un acuerdo con el hijo de Gadafi, sino a conseguir que se entregue al TPI para que pueda ser juzgado. No es de extrañar. A sus 39 años, el fugitivo no solo huye por el desierto con el estigma de presunto criminal internacional a cuestas. Si las informaciones del Consejo Nacional 269

de Transición libio (CNT), el actual Gobierno interino, son acertadas, los protectores de la familia del dictador caído son tuareg: los nómadas del desierto del Sáhara. Un pueblo distribuido por tres países fronterizos con Libia -esto es, Argelia, Malí y Níger-, que habrían prometido llevarle adonde quiera. Aunque, en estos momentos de la escapada, mejor sería decir que le llevarán donde se encuentre a salvo. Porque el hijo de Gadafi, arquitecto de formación, tiene miedo. Miedo a terminar linchado y asesinado a tiros por una turba, como su padre, cuya ejecución vio el mundo por Internet. O a morir en circunstancias dudosas, como Mutasim, uno de sus hermanos, capturado también vivo el pasado 20 de octubre por los rebeldes. "A través de canales informales, hemos sabido que un grupo de mercenarios estaría dispuesto a trasladar al hijo de Gadafi a un país africano que no sea miembro de la Corte Penal". Este es otro de los pasajes relevantes del comunicado mediante el cual la fiscalía subrayaba el esfuerzo que hace por traerlo a su sede, en La Haya. Porque el miedo que guía a Saif puede llevarle por dos caminos opuestos. En el primero, acabaría en una celda de la cárcel de la ONU en Holanda. La misma, por cierto, que alberga a los reos de las guerras de los Balcanes, al expresidente liberiano, Charles Taylor, y a Thomas Lubanga, el líder congoleño acusado de reclutar niños soldado. Por la otra ruta, podría intentar llegar, por ejemplo, a Zimbabue. Su presidente, Robert Mugabe, fue un firme aliado de Muamar el Gadafi. Y tal vez no lo entregara a los fiscales de La Haya. Como a otros líderes africanos, y a la misma Unión Africana, a Mugabe le parece que la Corte hace demasiado hincapié en los presuntos criminales de su continente. Una opinión compartida por Kenia o por Chad, dos miembros de la CPI que se niegan a detener a Omar el Bashir, presidente sudanés, acusado de genocidio en Darfur. A Moreno Ocampo no se le escapa la cambiante situación del hijo de Gadafi. Hasta ahora ha sido visto, supuestamente, al sur de Libia, en la frontera con Níger e incluso en Malí. Por eso el fiscal dijo ayer que buscaba la forma de "interceptar cualquier vuelo que cruzara el espacio aéreo de un país miembro de la Corte, y pudiera llevar a bordo a Saif el Islam". La Corte Penal Internacional carece de policía, y sus órdenes de arresto son ejecutadas por Interpol. El pasado mes de agosto, cuando los rebeldes libios aseguraron que habían capturado a Saif el Islam y otros dos hermanos Gadafi, Moreno Ocampo confirmó la información desde La Haya. Saif apareció al día siguiente en el centro de Trípoli para dar una rueda de prensa. Isabel Ferrer La Corte de La Haya localiza a Saif el Islam y le promete un juicio justo29 OCT 2011 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/28/actualidad/1319809145_29691 7.html

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Internacional Un atentado suicida causa dos muertos en el Kurdistán turco Una mujer se inmola cerca de una sede del oficialista Partido Justicia y Desarrollo El ataque ocurre en el 88 aniversario de la fundación del Estado turco El PKK vuela los últimos puentes Turquía persigue en Irak al PKK tras la matanza de 26 soldados en la frontera El Kurdistán turco vuelve a un camino sembrado de muertos Blanca López Arangüena Estambul 29 OCT 2011 - 15:07 CET

Policías turcos inspeccionan la zona donde se produjo un atentado en Estambul el pasado 26 de mayo. / EFE Tres personas han muerto y una veintena más han resultado heridas en un atentado suicida perpetrado por una mujer este sábado en la localidad de Bingöl, en el sureste de Turquía de mayoría kurda. La explosión se produjo hacia las 13.00 horas. Entre los muertos está la responsable del atentado. El atentado habría sido perpetrado cerca de una sede del Partido Justicia y Desarrollo (AKP), el partido islamista moderado en el Gobierno turco. En las primeras imágenes emitidas por la televisión turca, el ataque ocurrió en una de las principales avenidas de la ciudad. La explosión alcanzó a un restaurante y una juguetería cercanos. El gobernador de Bingöl, Mustafa Hakan Güvencer, ha explicado a la televisión estatal que una veintena de personas han sido ingresadas debido a las heridas causadas por el ataque y que por lo menos tres están graves. En la zona opera el grupo terrorista Partido de los Trabajadores del Kurdistán (PKK), que se alzó en armas contra el Estado turco en 1984 para reivindicar la independencia 271

de la región de mayoría kurda del sureste del país. Desde entonces han fallecido más de 40.000 personas. Bingöl es un pueblo situado en el Kurdistán turco y cuenta con una población de unos 86.000 habitantes. También se sitúa a unos cientos de kilómetros al oeste de Van, donde se produjo el terremoto que ha causado más de 500 víctimas. El ataque ha ocurrido el día que Turquía celebra el 88 aniversario de la fundación del Estado turco, en 1923. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/29/actualidad/1319893396_79617 3.html

REPORTAJE: Vida&artes Teoría y práctica del tiranicidio Matar al dictador caído, como Gadafi, sitúa al ganador de la guerra en la posición de un libertador - El espectáculo macabro tiene algo de totémico JOSÉ MARÍA RIDAO 28/10/2011 Las primeras noticias procedentes de Sirte la mañana del 20 de octubre daban cuenta de la detención de Gadafi. Pocas horas después las informaciones no hablaban ya de la detención, sino de la muerte del dictador libio. Según la nueva versión de los hechos, habría sido alcanzado durante un bombardeo de la Alianza Atlántica contra el convoy en el que trataba de huir. Un vídeo de escasa calidad, grabado desde un teléfono móvil, parecía corroborarlo: en él se observaba la imagen de un cadáver con el rostro contra el suelo y rodeado de hombres armados que se esforzaban por darle la vuelta, como si su intención fuera identificarlo. Solo con la ayuda de un paño alrededor de la mandíbula lo consiguen, y entonces sí, por un breve instante aparecen unos rasgos familiares que podrían ser los de Gadafi. Las dudas acerca de si se trataba de su cadáver no quedarían despejadas, sin embargo, por el análisis minucioso de este primer vídeo, sino por la inmediata aparición de otro, también de escasa calidad y también grabado desde un teléfono móvil. En él es Gadafi, indiscutiblemente Gadafi, quien avanza dando traspiés entre milicianos armados. La inercia de la versión anterior se proyecta sobre la siguiente: la sangre en el cuello de Gadafi y sobre sus ropas -se piensa en esos instantes de confusión- debe de ser el resultado de las graves heridas recibidas durante el ataque de la Alianza Atlántica, y a las que supuestamente habría sucumbido. Nuevos vídeos, sin embargo, desmintieron con descarnada contundencia todas las versiones previas: Gadafi había sido apresado con vida, linchado por sus captores y, al parecer, asesinado de un tiro en la sien. No era, con todo, el final, sino el comienzo de un espectáculo macabro que se prolongaría durante cuatro días en una improvisada morgue de la cercana ciudad de Misrata; en realidad, la cámara frigorífica de un mercado en la que semidesnudo sobre un colchón, primero a solas y después en compañía del cadáver de su hijo Mutasim, Gadafi sería expuesto al escarnio público hasta el amanecer del pasado martes, cuando fue enterrado en algún lugar del desierto. Además de los vídeos que registran los instantes finales de Gadafi, fueron apareciendo otros que recogen los de su hijo Mutasim, detenido en lo que parece un salón doméstico con la pared empapelada y bebiendo agua de una botella de plástico. Alguien lo increpa desde detrás del objetivo,

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él responde con altanería. El vídeo se detiene en ese momento, y la siguiente imagen de Mutasim es aquella en la que aparece muerto junto a su padre. Gadafi expuesto sin vida en la cámara frigorífica de un mercado de Misrata ha pasado a formar parte, no ya de la nómina de los dictadores derrocados, sino de otra más escalofriante y estricta en la que se encuentran los que, además de derrocados, fueron linchados antes de morir y su cadáver mostrado como trofeo y librado a la profanación. Los hechos de los que dan testimonio los vídeos grabados el 20 de octubre dejan en mal lugar al Consejo Nacional de Transición, bien porque los consintió, bien porque careció de autoridad para impedirlos. En el primer caso, el asesinato de Gadafi y los suyos harían presagiar que, si nada lo remedia, la tiranía sobreviva al tirano, reponiendo a otro en el puesto vacante; en el segundo, que la guerra civil contra Gadafi pudiera ser el preámbulo de otra entre las diversas milicias armadas y solo unidas hasta ahora por la existencia de un enemigo común. El líder del Consejo Nacional de Transición, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, pronunció el primer discurso tras la muerte de Gadafi y el final definitivo de su régimen en la plaza de los Mártires en Trípoli, y muchos libios se preguntaron por qué no lo hizo en otras ciudades que habían participado con más determinación en la lucha. También afirmó que la sharía inspiraría la nueva legislación, y, de nuevo, muchos libios se preguntaron por qué Abdel Jalil tomaba en solitario una decisión que no le correspondía. Las razones políticas detrás de estas inquietudes, de estas preguntas, son fácilmente reconocibles, y tienen que ver con el origen territorial de los grupos rebeldes y con su diferente adscripción ideológica. Ahora bien, la respuesta a por qué Abdel Jalil se creyó legitimado para decidir en solitario un asunto crucial en el futuro de Libia está relacionada con un problema clásico de la teología que, al secularizarse los fundamentos del poder, pasó al ámbito de la filosofía; tiene que ver, en fin, con la teoría y con la práctica del tiranicidio. El jesuita Juan de Mariana (1536-1624) es reconocido como uno de los principales defensores del derecho a deponer a un monarca y, en general, a un gobernante, cuando incumple las obligaciones más elementales con los gobernados, en la estela de santo Tomás. Como este, Mariana concentra el grueso de sus argumentos en el momento previo a la ejecución del tiranicidio, en la controversia acerca de si puede ser o no justificado. No presta tanta atención, en cambio, al momento posterior, al derecho que adquiere, o cree adquirir, quien ha acabado materialmente con el tirano, y que se concreta como derecho a decidir ante sí y por sí el orden político que se instaurará a continuación. Al haber arriesgado su vida, el autor de un tiranicidio siente que este derecho suyo es superior al de quienes se mantuvieron pasivos ante el tirano, por connivencia, por temor o por cualquier otro motivo. Este y no otro es el razonamiento que hace Lorenzino de Médicis, el Lorenzaccio de la obra homónima de Alfred de Musset, en Apología de un asesinato, un texto en el que el autor de un tiranicidio explica abiertamente sus sentimientos y razones. En 1537, Lorenzino da muerte a su primo Alejandro, duque de Florencia, con quien había compartido las juergas y arbitrariedades que sumieron en el desgobierno y el caos a la ciudad. En respuesta a quienes le condenan por haber asesinado a su primo, Lorenzino defiende en la Apología que su acto obedecía a un deseo de libertad, el más noble de todos los deseos humanos, y que, por tanto, debía ser considerado como un tiranicidio, no como un crimen común. Pero añade, no sin un punto de provocación, que una vez ejecutado, y viendo las reacciones, llegó a resultarle difícil decidir si Alejandro merecía

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mayor castigo por su maldad que el pueblo de Florencia, al que acusa de cobarde, por haberla soportado. "Aceptar el statu quo", prosigue Lorenzino, intentando justificar que la situación de Florencia fuera a peor después del asesinato de Alejandro, "era más peligroso que enrolarse, con alguna esperanza de éxito, en la tarea de liberar la patria". Abdel Jalil, lo mismo que tantos caudillos, tantos hombres providenciales en tantas épocas y lugares, suscribiría seguramente las palabras de Lorenzino acerca de "la tarea de liberar a la patria". Quién sabe si, además, no se habrán sentido acosados en algún momento difícil de las guerras que libraron por las palabras anteriores, en las que Lorenzino se confiesa atrapado en el dilema de decidir si Alejandro era más culpable por sus maldades que el pueblo de Florencia por soportarlas. Desde la perspectiva hacia la que apunta vagamente Lorenzino, arrogarse el derecho a decidir el orden que sucederá al derrocado, según hizo Abdel Jalil en su primer discurso tras el linchamiento y muerte de Gadafi, puede ser expresión de la fe que empujó a la lucha, sea una fe religiosa o política. Pero podría ser también una fórmula para evitar que el autor del tiranicidio no sucumba a la sospecha de haber puesto la vida en juego por la libertad de un pueblo que no lo merecería del todo, culpable de haber soportado al tirano. Si el autor del tiranicidio no se debe a su pueblo, sino a la fe que le empujó a la lucha y que se apresura a imponer tan pronto el tirano ha perecido, entonces el dilema, la sospecha de Lorenzino pierde cualquier vigencia: el pueblo podrá ser culpable de haber soportado la tiranía; la fe, nunca. La oratoria de Abdel Jalil en el discurso de Trípoli sugiere, solo sugiere, que este podría ser el caso del Consejo Nacional de Transición. Abdel Jalil gritó literalmente "alzad bien vuestras cabezas, sois libios libres", no "alcemos bien nuestras cabezas, somos libios libres", y la multitud estalló en gritos de júbilo. El posible mensaje subrepticio, el posible eco del dilema que expresó Lorenzino en la Apología y que solo el tiempo y los acontecimientos determinarán si alentaba o no en el discurso de Abdel Jalil, era, podría ser: "Nosotros, miembros del Consejo Nacional de Transición, ya la teníamos alzada y, si ahora sois libios libres, a nosotros nos debéis la libertad. Haremos con ella lo que mejor convenga, según nuestro criterio". El diferente ánimo con el que se contempla la revolución libia, por un lado, y la tunecina y la egipcia, por el otro, responde a la manera en que se desarrollaron las respectivas revueltas y, en definitiva, los respectivos tiranicidios. La caída de Ben Ali y de Mubarak fue obra de las manifestaciones en las plazas, de todos y de nadie, por lo que el orden que suceda al derrocado tendrá que surgir, en principio, de un pacto que no puede ser en exclusiva de nadie y que, por eso mismo, tendrá que ser de todos. En Libia, por el contrario, y desde el momento en que Gadafi optó fatalmente por la violencia y la guerra, la caída del tirano exigió acciones militares de una vanguardia armada. De esa vanguardia armada hay que esperar, ahora, que se dirija a los libios, participaran o no en la guerra, y lo hicieran en el bando que lo hicieran, para decirles generosamente: "La victoria es vuestra", y no lo que parece deducirse del primer discurso de Abdel Jalil: "Es verdad que conseguimos la victoria en vuestro nombre, pero sus únicos propietarios somos nosotros". El espectáculo macabro que se prolongó durante cuatro días en la cámara frigorífica de un mercado de Misrata pudo obedecer a irrefrenables sentimientos de venganza, sin descartar, además, el simple morbo. Era, sin embargo, un espectáculo conocido, en el que cambiaban los protagonistas pero el guión permanecía invariable. En Misrata, Gadafi y los suyos recibieron el mismo trato que Mussolini y su amante, Clara Petacci,

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en Italia, expuestos cabeza abajo desde el dintel de una gasolinera; que Elena y Nicolae Ceaucescu, cubiertos de polvo y derrumbados uno contra el otro tras el fusilamiento en Rumanía; que Samuel Doe, depuesto y ejecutado en Liberia, mientras una cámara filmaba las imágenes que luego se esparcirían por el mundo. Son todos ellos espectáculos que dicen mucho de la condición humana, pero también de los fundamentos del poder. En Tótem y tabú, Freud aventuraba la hipótesis, luego recogida sumariamente en Psicología de las masas, de que la vida social tendría como origen el asesinato de un padre totémico y un banquete ritual entre los hijos. No son banquetes, desde luego, ni se trata del origen de la vida social sino de cambios políticos, pero los espectáculos macabros en torno al cadáver de los dictadores tienen algo de totémicos. Quienes participan con más entusiasmo, quienes más se burlan y más se exhiben, parecen apurar el último momento para demostrar que ellos no soportaron la tiranía, cancelando sin saberlo el dilema que acosaba a Lorenzino de Médicis. También para dejar constancia ante el nuevo poder que ha emanado del tiranicidio, y del que esperan, si no una participación, sí al menos que no les reserve la suerte atroz de quienes colaboraron con el tirano depuesto. Profanando los cadáveres de Gadafi y su hijo en la cámara frigorífica de un mercado de Misrata, los libios que filmaban vídeos y se fotografiaban afirmaban ostentosamente de qué lado estaban, quién sabe si confiando en que así nadie les preguntaría de qué lado estuvieron. Distintas formas de acabar con un déspota - Benito Mussolini, 1945. El primer ministro y dictador de Italia fue ejecutado a tiros el 28 de abril de 1945 cerca de Como, al norte del país, junto a su amante, Clara Petacci. Los partisanos que se habían rebelado contra el dictador decidieron ejecutarlo en medio de un ambiente de gran confusión. Sus cadáveres fueron trasladados a Milán y, allí, escarnecidos por la multitud. - Elena y Nicolae Ceaucescu, 1989. El expresidente de Rumanía, Nicolae Ceaucescu, y su esposa y mano derecha, Elena, fueron ejecutados en diciembre de 1989 después de un juicio sumarísimo ante un tribunal militar. La pareja -ella fue vicepresidenta del Gobierno y presidenta de la Comisión de Control del partido- dirigieron el país durante 24 años con mano de hierro. El Frente de Salvación Nacional les condenó por genocidio, demolición del Estado y acciones armadas contra el Estado y el pueblo, destrucción de bienes materiales y espirituales, destrucción de la economía nacional y evasión de 1.000 millones de dólares hacia bancos extranjeros. - Samuel Doe, 1990. Fue el presidente de Liberia durante 10 años. En septiembre de 1990 fue brutalmente torturado y finalmente ejecutado por un grupo de rebeldes; el país vivía una guerra civil desencadenada por un antiguo colaborador de Doe desde el año anterior. La tortura se grabó en un vídeo que luego fue difundido, y el cadáver de Doe fue expuesto en un hospital de Monrovia. - Sadam Husein, 2006. El dictador iraquí fue ejecutado en diciembre de 2006 tras ser condenado por cometer crímenes contra la humanidad. Fue juzgado dos veces: por el asesinato de chiíes y por la matanza de kurdos. Las imágenes del ahorcamiento se vieron en las televisiones de todo el mundo. Husein había gobernado Irak durante más de dos décadas, desde 1979 a 2003. José María Ridao Teoría y práctica del tiranicidio28/10/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Teoria/practica/tiranicidio/elpepusoc/20111028elpepisoc_1/Tes

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Internacional ANÁLISIS Los cadáveres más buscados también son incómodos El exhibicionismo en la muerte del tirano se combina con curiosas dosis de censura.- CeAucescu, Gadafi y Bin Laden comparten algo más que su fin Berna González Harbour 28 OCT 2011 - 13:37 CET4 Los rebeldes rumanos se tomaron la molestia, en su lucha contrarreloj por finiquitar a Nicolae Ceaucescu antes de que les cazara la temible Securitate, de celebrar y filmar un juicio sumario en el que el dictador y su esposa escucharon la infinidad de cargos sin posibilidad alguna de defenderse. No eran tiempos de móviles, ni cámaras, ni youtube. La tecnología aún no se había adaptado a nuestra necesidad casi fisiológica de contar a los demás todo lo que está pasando en tiempo real. Y los periodistas aún teníamos que luchar a golpe de propinas, colonias o maquillaje para lograr un télex en algún rincón escondido del hotel y retransmitir lo que veíamos. Pero verán que, tecnologías aparte, hay algo que se repite de forma ineludible cuando de acabar con tiranos se trata: y es el exhibicionismo con curiosas dosis de censura. En aquella fría Navidad de 1989, unas imágenes de la pareja dictatorial perpleja ante sus improvisados jueces bastaron para colocar a los rumanos y al mundo entero ante el televisor. El suspense generado cuando ambos fueron condenados y se produjo el corte en la emisión puede asemejarse a los que provocaban las películas censuradas durante el franquismo cuando llegaba el beso que iba a ser invisible. Lo siguiente en la pantalla, tras un salto abismal, fue la imagen de ambos cadáveres ensangrentados en el suelo, fríos para siempre dentro de sus cálidas pieles, ejecutados por sus crímenes. Tardamos mucho en ver la sesión completa del juicio en youtube y los detalles más sorprendentes de esa ejecución: cómo un soldado les ata las manos a la espalda con una vulgar cuerda de esparto o cómo, ya muertos, un supuesto médico con bata y estetoscopio les mete los dedos en los ojos y les encuentra la carótida bajo los ropajes de astracán para verificar su muerte. En Libia, todo ha sido aparentemente más salvaje. No ha habido médicos ni batas blancas, no ha habido juicios ni gritos, pero los vencedores han grabado la pulverización del dictador (pueden verse aquí los vídeos) con ánimo casi forense, conscientes de que grabarlo era enseñarlo y enseñarlo era vencer, demostrar la victoria y avisar a sus secuaces de la suerte que les puede deparar. Lo narra aquí magistralmente José María Ridao, que recoge cómo el tiranicida se arroga el derecho de decidir sobre la vida de otro frente al derecho de quien se mantuvo pasivo ante el malvado. Los rebeldes rumanos emplearon jueces, uniformados, actas, médico y pelotón. Los combatientes libios cambiaron la acusación formal en el banquillo por un grito - "Misrata"- que resumía las torturas que infligió el dictador. Y en ambos casos, curiosamente, la exhibición de la victoria se ha visto contenida, en medio de la barbarie, por la censura del momento exacto de la ejecución. ¿Es por respeto al último momento? ¿O por deseo de proteger a quien dio el tiro de gracia? Queremos pensar lo primero, nos tememos lo segundo.

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La muerte de Gadafi nos lleva a otra, la de Bin Laden, liquidado por agentes de Estados Unidos en una de esas operaciones que pone a la palabra "legalidad" en estado de alerta. Su rápida sepultura en el mar tenía como objeto: 1) evitar debates de cuerpo presente y 2) evitar un lugar de peregrinaje que contribuyera a la mitificación del héroe antioccidental. El entierro de Gadafi en un lugar desconocido del desierto persigue el mismo fin, igual que hace 20 años el consejo rumano de transición logró mantener en secreto el escenario del entierro de la pareja Ceaucescu. En todos los casos, tras lograr la muerte llega la incomodidad: ¿Qué hacer con el cadáver? Semanas después de aquella ejecución, quienes estábamos en Bucarest escuchamos el rumor que corrió como la pólvora: el conducator y su esposa habían sido enterrados a escondidas en un cementerio de la capital. Acudimos. La tierra estaba fresca sobre las dos tumbas a la que empezaron a peregrinar algunos curiosos. Y, 20 años después, los análisis de ADN confirmaron que así era. Pero conocer la tumba del dictador nunca sirvió para convertirle en mártir, como tampoco seguramente Gadafi será honrado como héroe por mucho que se descubra el lugar del desierto en el que está enterrado. Y es que la tecnología de ambas épocas es distinta. Los métodos, muy diferentes. Pero la muerte del tirano, su exhibición y la posterior incomodidad que causa el cadáver no son los únicos puntos en común: el calor del pueblo que aclamaba a Gadafi se desvanecerá seguramente con la misma rapidez que las palmas rítmicas que saludaban a Ceaucescu en el Comité Central. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/28/actualidad/1319801839_74576 3.html

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ELECCIONES EN TÚNEZ Ennahda promete construir la democracia en Túnez El partido confesional obtuvo el 41,47% de los votos, según el recuento oficial Modelo a seguir, ¿el FIS argelino o el AKP turco? Ignacio Cembrero Madrid 28 OCT 2011 - 18:32 CET14

Violentas protestas el viernes en Sidi Bouzid (Túnez) por la cancelación de los resultados de una lista. / MOKHTAR KAHOULI (AFP) Ennahda, la formación islamista que ha ganado las primeras elecciones democráticas en Túnez, se ha mostrado conciliadora tendiendo la mano a sus rivales al ser anunciada hoy oficialmente su victoria, cinco días después de que se cerrasen las urnas. Obtuvo el 41,47% de los sufragios y 90 escaños -42 ocupados por mujeres- de los 217 de la Asamblea Constituyente que deberá redactar la Constitución en el plazo máximo de un año. Coincidiendo casi con ese anuncio el líder islamista, Rachid Ghanouchi, lanzó su discurso más apaciguador hacia los tunecinos que no le han votado y hacia aquellos que en Occidente le observan con desconfianza. “La democracia es para todo el mundo, nuestros corazones están abiertos a todo el mundo y pedimos a nuestros hermanos, cualesquiera que sean sus orientaciones políticas, que participen en la redacción de la Constitución y en la instauración de un régimen democrático”, declaró.

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En los siete siguientes puestos de la clasificación electoral figuran media docena de partidos laicos más bien de izquierdas y, a veces, con un ligero barniz nacionalista encabezados por el Congreso para la República y Ettakatol (socialista). Juntos suman menos votos que Ennahda, pero en número de diputados se le acercan (82) porque la ley electoral aventaja a las pequeñas formaciones. Veintiséis partidos entran en la Asamblea. “Ennahda se compromete (…) a respetar todos los compromisos de Túnez”, anunció Ghanouchi quién ha presentado a su “número dos”, Hamadi Jebali, como candidato a primer ministro. “La revolución no ha destruido al Estado, solo destruyó al régimen”, añadió. “Estamos abiertos a las inversiones de todas partes y nos comprometemos a respetar los intereses de los inversores”, añadió al tiempo prometió luchar contra la corrupción. Europa no deberá ya “preocuparse” por la emigración. El jefe islamista también lanzó un mensaje conciliador hacia esa mayoría de mujeres que, al menos en la capital, no se cubre la cabeza con el hiyab (pañuelo islámico). “Ennahda no va a cambiar el modo de vida. Dejará el asunto en manos de las mujeres tunecinas. Habrá mujeres en el nuevo Gobierno que lleven o no lleven velo”. En una semana o diez días estará listo en nuevo Ejecutivo y Jebali, el islamista encargado por Ghanouchi de formarlo, informó de que está negociando con partidos laicos. “El elemento prioritario en nuestras discusiones es el programa económico”, precisó. En una entrevista con la agencia Reuters Ghanouchi se mostró partidario de que el dinar sea una divisa convertible. La fiesta islamista quedó empañada por el asalto y saqueo de la sede de Ennahda, el ayuntamiento y los juzgados de Sidi Bouzid, la ciudad del interior donde empezó la revolución en diciembre pasado. Las manifestaciones violentas, en las que fueron quemados varios vehículos policiales, obligaron al Ministerio del Interior a decretar el toque de queda en toda la provincia. En Sidi Bouzid y, en menor medida, en otras capitales de provincia los manifestantes protestaban por la anulación por el ISIE, el órgano independiente que organizó las elecciones, de los resultados de seis listas de Petición Popular. La financiación privada de los votos granjeados por cinco de ellas (Sidi Bouzid, Sfax I, Jendouba, Kasserine, y Tataouine) se ha caracterizado por irregularidades manifiestas y la sexta lista, que concurría en la circunscripción formada por la inmigración en Francia, figuraba un responsable del anterior régimen no autorizado a participar en la vida política. Petición Popular cosechó en Sidi Bouzid 48.022 votos, casi el doble que todos sus rivales juntos, pero su candidatura fue invalidada. De ahí las protestas. Aun así ese partido fundado por el millonario tunecino Hechmi Haamdi, residente en Londres, obtuvo 17 escaños (8,76% de los sufragios) en todo el país y se convierte en el cuarto partido. El éxito de Haamdi es sorprendente porque prácticamente no ha hecho campaña electoral sobre el terreno aunque sí ha utilizado, en apoyo a Petición Popular, la televisión vía satélite (Al Mustakilla) que emite desde Londres para Túnez. Al conocer hoy la anulación de sus listas Haamdi anunció que se retiraba de la Asamblea. Ghanouchi no tuvo reparos en denunciar que, detrás de los disturbios en Sidi Bouzid, estaba “la sombra del Reagrupamiento Constitucional Democrático”, el antiguo partido hegemónico en tiempos de la dictadura.

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Ignacio Cembrero Ennahda promete construir la democracia en Túnez28 OCT 2011 - 18:32 CET14 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/28/actualidad/1319818640_94391 1.html libération.fr MONDE Aujourd'hui à 7h32 28-10-2011 En Tunisie, le parti islamiste officiellement vainqueur Ennahda remporte 41,5% des sièges de la nouvelle assemblée constituante. En réaction, des violences ont éclaté hier soir à Sidi Bouzid.

Une femme célèbre la victoire du parti Ennahda, le 25 octobre à Tunis. (© AFP Fethi Belaid) Le parti islamiste Ennahda a remporté les élections du 23 octobre en Tunisie avec «41,47% des sièges» de la nouvelle assemblée constituante, neuf mois après la chute de l'ex-président Ben Ali, selon le résultat final provisoire annoncé jeudi soir par la commission électorale (Isie). Ennahda obtient ainsi 90 sièges dans l'assemblée qui comprend 217 membres, un score correspondant à ce qu'espéraient les islamistes eux-mêmes. Le parti Ennahda, durement réprimé sous l'ancien régime de Ben Ali, et légalisé après la révolution, fait ainsi une entrée par la grande porte sur la scène politique tunisienne et pèsera sur toutes les grandes décisions concernant l'avenir du pays. Il devance le Congrès pour la République (CPR, gauche nationaliste) avec 30 sièges (13,82%) et Ettakatol (gauche), avec 21 sièges (9,68%), a précisé le président de la Commission M. Kamel Jendoubi, quatre jours après les premières élections libres dans l'histoire du pays. Un concert d'avertisseurs a salué la victoire d'Ennahda et se poursuivait peu avant minuit dans les rues de Tunis.

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Selon l'Isie, les formations politiques disposent désormais d'un délai de deux jours pour introduire, si elles le souhaitent, un recours contre le résultat du scrutin. La liste surprise de ces élections, «La pétition populaire pour la justice et le développement» d'Hechmi Haadmi, un richissime homme d'affaires tunisien basé à Londres, se positionne en quatrième position avec 19 sièges malgré son invalidation dans six circonscriptions pour "irrégularité de financement". Toutefois, en raison de cette invalidation, Hechmi Haamdi a annoncé à l'AFP qu'il se retirait de l'assemblée. Hamadi Jebali candidat L'annonce de cette mesure a également provoqué une vague de violences à Sidi Bouzid, ville du centre de la Tunisie où avait commencé la révolution en décembre 2010, et dont Hechmi Haamdi est originaire. Des groupes de jeunes ont notamment mis à sac le local d'Ennahda et jeté des pierres sur les forces de l'ordre. "Une protestation violente est en cours, les forces de l'ordre essaient de la contenir", a confirmé à l'AFP un porte-parole du ministère de l'Intérieur. Peu après le scrutin de dimanche dernier, les islamistes et les principaux partis de gauche ont engagé des tractations pour la mise en place d'un gouvernement d'union nationale souhaité par Ennahda.

Le numéro deux du parti islamiste, Hamadi Jebali, 62 ans, a indiqué qu'il se porterait candidat à la direction du prochain gouvernement et fait part de son intention de composer avec les principales formations de gauche. Toutefois, le nouveau chef du gouvernement ne pourra être désigné que par le prochain président de la république par intérim, qui, lui-même, sera élu par la future assemblée constituante. L'ensemble du processus devrait s'étaler sur plusieurs semaines. Dans une interview accordée à l'agence tunisienne de presse (Tap), Hamadi Jebali a en revanche rejeté toute alliance avec "la Pétition populaire" d'Hechmi Haadmi. Ennahda reproche notamment à M. Haamadi, l'un des fondateurs du mouvement des étudiants islamistes en Tunisie dans les années 70, d'avoir renié ses convictions. «Situation juridique de la femme» Pour dissiper la vive appréhension que suscite sa prochaine accession au pouvoir, Ennahda multiplie les déclarations selon lesquelles la future Constitution, l'une des priorités de la prochaine assemblée issue de l'élection, ne pourra voir le jour "sans un consensus avec les partis et les partenaires qui y sont représentés".

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Il n'est pas question, pour le numéro deux d'Ennahda, d'"imposer une Constitution (...) qui abroge certaines libertés comme la liberté de croyance, les libertés individuelles, la situation juridique de la femme et sa place dans la société". "Il n'est en outre pas question, a-t-il insisté, de faire revenir la femme au foyer comme cherchent à le propager des ennemis" d'Ennahda, ni de remettre en cause les acquis du secteur touristique qui représentait 7% du PIB tunisien en 2010, mais a subi une chute spectaculaire depuis la fin du régime de Ben Ali en janvier dernier. "Est-il raisonnable, a lancé M. Jebali, de paralyser un secteur vital comme le tourisme en interdisant les boissons alcoolisées et le port de maillots de bains ou autres pratiques ? Ce sont des libertés individuelles garanties aussi bien pour les étrangers que pour les Tunisiens", a-t-il martelé. De même, selon M. Jebali, Ennahda n'a nullement l'intention de démanteler le système financier en vigueur en Tunisie ni de restreindre les activités des hommes d'affair (Source AFP)es.

http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012368319-U en-tunisie-le-parti-islamiste- officiellement-vainqueur U libération.fr MONDE Hier à 0h00 27-10-2011 Al-Aridha, surprise parti de Hechmi Hamdi La formation populiste d’un presque inconnu serait troisième du scrutin. par ELODIE AUFFRAY (à Tunis) A Tunis, tout le monde cherche à comprendre : comment se fait-il que les listes Al- Aridha Al-Chaabia aient rencontré un tel succès au scrutin pour élire les 217 députés de l’Assemblée constituante ? Totalement absents du débat politique national, les candidats de Al-Aridha, la «Pétition populaire», décrocheraient pourtant un grand nombre de sièges : 19, selon le décompte partiel du quotidien la Presse de Tunisie. Soit en troisième position, à égalité avec le Congrès pour la République (CPR) et même devant Ettakatol, le parti de centre gauche. A Sidi Bouzid, berceau du printemps arabe, Al-Aridha remporte trois sièges et devance même Ennahda, selon les résultats officiels. C’est la seule circonscription où les islamistes n’arriveraient pas en tête. C’est aussi la région d’origine de Hechmi Hamdi, qui se trouve derrière Al-Aridha. Cet homme d’affaires est le propriétaire d’une chaîne de télévision populaire, Al-Mostakilla, diffusée par satellite depuis l’Angleterre. Farfelues.«Les élites ne la regardent pas, c’est pour ça qu’elles n’ont rien vu venir», observe le journaliste Zied Krichen. Candidat déclaré à la présidence de la République, il avait exprimé, en début d’année, son hésitation, en cas d’élection, à s’installer au palais présidentiel de Carthage ou de résider dans un quartier populaire. Hamdi joue donc à fond sur la veine populiste même s’il n’a pas remis les pieds en Tunisie depuis le 14 janvier.

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Il n’était d’ailleurs pas personnellement candidat à la députation pour les élections du 23 octobre. Mais ces derniers mois, sa chaîne, Al-Mostakilla, n’a cessé de faire la propagande des listes d’Al-Aridha, son parti, martelant des promesses farfelues : des soins gratuits, une allocation de 200 dinars (100 euros) pour les chômeurs en contrepartie d’heures de travail pour la collectivité. D’aucuns soupçonnent également les anciens RCDistes, les partisans du Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique de l’ex-président Ben Ali, aujourd’hui dissous, de tirer les fils de ce parti. En effet, ancien islamiste proche d’Ennahda, Hechmi Hamdi avait chanté les louanges de Ben Ali. Al-Aridha a mené une campagne active sur le terrain, loin des regards. Ainsi, à Sidi Bouzid même, ce parti ne s’est pas tellement montré, selon le blogueur Smari Farouk, qui habite la ville. Mais originaire du coin, Hamdi y est très connu, depuis longtemps. Dans le gouvernorat voisin de Kasserine, où Al-Aridha décrocherait un siège, «ils sont allés dans des villages, ont fait beaucoup de porte-à-porte, alors que les autres partis ont fait une campagne avec des intellectuels et des meetings. On dit aussi qu’ils auraient donné de l’argent, fait des cadeaux», rapporte Ridha Abassi, membre du conseil municipal provisoire de la ville. Loi. Al-Aridha a également fait campagne à l’intérieur même des usines, ce que proscrit la loi électorale : croisé dans une entreprise textile de Ksar Hellal, la capitale de la confection tunisienne (Libération de mardi), la tête de liste locale, un docteur, expliquait tranquillement ambitionner de «devenir ministre de la Santé». Le cas Al-Aridha embarrasse la classe politique comme les autorités : plusieurs voix s’élèvent pour demander que les listes soient invalidées, notamment en raison de la propagande menée via la chaîne Al-Mostakilla. Reste à trouver le motif. Le code électoral ne prévoit pas l’annulation en cas de publicité depuis les chaînes satellitaires étrangères. Seul un financement illicite permettrait de faire tomber les listes, a rappelé Boubaker Bethabet, le secrétaire général de l’instance électorale, l’Isie. En cas de sanctions, Al-Aridha laisserait derrière elle une conséquente manne de sièges, pour les autres partis. http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012368055-al-aridha-surprise-parti-de-hechmi-hamdi

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THE STATESMEN'S DEBATE La hora de Palestina Michel Rocard 2011-10-27 La hora de Palestina

PARÍS – El pasado septiembre, Mahmoud Abbas, presidente de la Autoridad Palestina, dio un paso audaz al pedir directamente ante las Naciones Unidas el reconocimiento oficial del Estado palestino. Los 193 miembros de la ONU parecen estar listos para votar sobre esa petición en el transcurso de los próximos meses. La atención mundial está puesta en Palestina. Pasaron casi dos décadas desde que el “cuarteto” (la ONU, los Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y Rusia) acordó que la Autoridad Palestina y el gobierno israelí lograran la paz mediante su coexistencia como dos Estados separados. Pero aunque el presidente de los Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, dijo que la decisión del cuarteto es el principio por el que se guía para la acción diplomática en torno al conflicto palestino-israelí, la situación es tan desesperante como siempre, porque, como suele decirse, el diablo está en los detalles. Los palestinos quieren un Estado independiente, pero con la condición de que incluya a Jerusalén como capital y de que Israel deje de ampliar los asentamientos en el territorio que tiene ocupado desde la Guerra de los Seis Días, en 1967. Sin embargo, Israel jamás tuvo intenciones de ceder Jerusalén a Palestina, aunque muchos esperan que tendrá en cuenta esa solución bajo la presión de la reforma de los límites municipales. La cuestión de los asentamientos es todavía más difícil de resolver. A pesar de la presión de la comunidad internacional y, sobre todo, de los Estados Unidos, Israel se negó sistemáticamente a frenar la expansión de sus asentamientos en Cisjordania. Por desgracia, la firme resistencia de Israel y de la diáspora judía llevó a que Obama reconociera abiertamente su impotencia en este conflicto y que, por consiguiente, cesara la presión política estadounidense sobre Israel. Esto dio vía libre a un pequeño grupo de congresistas proisraelíes para amenazar y presionar a los países que probablemente voten a favor del reconocimiento del Estado palestino.

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En cualquier caso, los líderes de Israel no tienen un interés auténtico en lograr la paz con condiciones realistas. Por el contrario, parece que desean una solución con reminiscencias de Irlanda en el siglo XIX, una situación que condujo a un siglo de pérdidas humanas en ambos bandos del conflicto. En definitiva, lo que Israel pretende es la desaparición de la identidad palestina. El resto del mundo no puede quedarse de brazos cruzados ante esa pretensión, incluso si Estados Unidos lo hace. Todos los países saben lo difícil y costoso que es un conflicto explícito con los Estados Unidos. Pero si la fragilidad de su situación política interna impide a Estados Unidos asumir el liderazgo internacional, no por ello otros países deberían imitar su ejemplo. Abbas sabe muy bien que su estrategia es arriesgada: puede haber represalias brutales por parte de Israel. Pero la perseverancia con que busca esta última oportunidad para la paz le ha valido un claro aumento de la popularidad entre los suyos y un mayor respeto de la comunidad internacional. Es indudable que Hamas, el rival de la Autoridad Palestina en Gaza, procurará empequeñecer el intento de Abbas. Una organización como Hamas, que apoya un estado de guerra permanente y que obligó a Israel a negociar durante cinco años para lograr la liberación de un único soldado israelí secuestrado, Gilad Shalit, a cambio de más de mil prisioneros palestinos, es exactamente el enemigo que necesita Israel para justificar su postura inflexible. Los líderes israelíes han procurado durante mucho tiempo el apoyo de simpatizantes que, como yo, a partir del Holocausto defendemos el derecho del pueblo judío a la seguridad y la soberanía. Pero con sus tácticas en relación con Palestina, Israel se extralimitó: fortaleció a Hamas, un actor hostil que se opone a la paz; empujó a los Estados Unidos a votar contra el Estado palestino por cuyo nacimiento abogan; y se negó de plano a cualquier aceptación de condiciones que pudieran destrabar el conflicto. Ningún país civilizado puede admitir este comportamiento. Palestina debe obtener reconocimiento legal para que, por lo menos, su pueblo tenga acceso a los tribunales internacionales, dándose por entendido que se necesitará el respaldo internacional para asistir y defender a este joven Estado. Los estadounidenses han perdido el derecho moral al liderazgo en la solución del conflicto palestino-israelí. Ya es hora de que Europa tome cartas en el asunto. Michel Rocard fue primer ministro de Francia y dirigente del Partido Socialista http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rocard36/Spanish

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A la Une Idées La Libye, la charia et l'embarras occidental Chronique "International" | | 27.10.11 | 13h20 • Mis à jour le 27.10.11 | 20h18 par Natalie Nougayrède (Chronique "International") L'annonce a provoqué une grande onde de frissons. Le 23 octobre, le jour où était proclamée la "libération" complète du territoire de la Libye, et où, à Paris, Londres et Washington, était saluée une victoire qui, avec la mort de Mouammar Kadhafi, signait la fin de plus de quarante ans de dictature brutale, le président du Conseil national de transition (CNT), Moustapha Abdeljalil, annonçait l'"adoption de la charia comme loi essentielle". Il n'en fallait pas plus pour alimenter les critiques de ceux qui, depuis le début, ne voyaient dans l'intervention armée en Libye qu'une nouvelle boîte de Pandore islamiste s'ouvrant dans le monde arabo-musulman, ou encore l'effet pervers de calculs de dirigeants occidentaux en mal de nouvelles conquêtes... Et il faut bien reconnaître que les propos de M. Abdeljalil ont jeté un sérieux froid. L'intéressé fut manifestement prié par ses partenaires occidentaux de corriger le tir. Le lendemain, il précisait : "Nous sommes des musulmans modérés." Ajoutant cependant que "la charia, à l'appui d'un verset du Coran, autorise la polygamie". La charia sert de référence dans la législation de plusieurs pays : dans les Etats sunnites du Golfe, en Iran, au Pakistan. Son interprétation connaît des variations, et celles-ci ne contredisent pas toujours les normes internationales protégeant les droits fondamentaux. C'est toute l'ambiguïté de la situation en Libye : une intervention armée menée au nom des valeurs démocratiques peut-elle laisser carte blanche aux nouveaux acteurs de la scène libyenne pour forger leurs propres concepts politiques et décliner, à leur guise, la loi coranique en fonction de traditions locales rigoristes ? Quels mécanismes concrets les en empêcheraient au juste, en sachant que les Occidentaux n'ont jamais eu beaucoup d'influence sur l'Arabie saoudite ni sur d'autres pays piliers de l'Organisation de la conférence islamique, où se pratique une lecture très particulière de l'universalité des droits de l'homme ? C'est, au fond, toute la difficulté de la définition de l'objectif final des entreprises militaires en terre musulmane, validées par l'ONU, qui se retrouve posée, de manière spectaculaire. A la différence du débat sur le poids du parti islamiste Ennahda en Tunisie, l'affaire de la charia en Libye survient avant la tenue du moindre exercice électoral et dans la foulée d'une action armée internationale qui a permis le renversement du tyran. L'ingérence armée en Libye établit un rapport de responsabilité occidentale directe sur ce qu'il adviendra en Libye. La Tunisie s'était débarrassée seule de son dictateur. En Afghanistan, pays libéré des talibans et d'Al-Qaida par une coalition déployée en 2001, l'"empreinte" des Occidentaux et leur capacité à établir une démocratie durable n'ont pas été sans accrocs, loin s'en faut. Le récent rapport de l'ONU sur la torture dans les prisons afghanes l'a rappelé. Le reflux du contingent international à l'horizon 2014, et les tractations avec les talibans qui l'accompagnent, font craindre pour le droit des 286

femmes dans ce pays et, au-delà, nourrissent la peur d'une reprise de la guerre civile. La charia sert déjà de repère juridique dans l'Afghanistan du président Hamid Karzaï, obligé de composer avec un courant traditionaliste et - rappelons-le - contraint par les Occidentaux en 2009 d'abroger une loi islamique autorisant le viol d'une femme par son époux. On pouvait donc comprendre le malaise d'Alain Juppé, le ministre français des affaires étrangères, déclarant, à propos de la sortie de M. Abdeljalil, que la France serait "vigilante". "Nous avons des lignes rouges : l'alternance politique, les droits de l'homme, l'égalité hommes-femmes. (...) La polygamie n'est pas la conception que nous nous faisons de la dignité de la femme", ajoutait-il. Les parrains occidentaux du CNT peuvent brandir, comme l'a fait M. Juppé, le levier de la "conditionnalité" des aides européennes aux transitions arabes : plus les préceptes démocratiques seront respectés, plus l'assistance se concrétisera. Mais en Libye, le pays d'Afrique avec les plus grandes réserves de pétrole, l'argument peut-il porter tant que cela ? L'architecture politique de l'Afghanistan d'aujourd'hui est due, pour une grande part, à la présence d'un contingent occidental massif, dont le pouvoir de Kaboul a largement dépendu pour tenir. Rien de tel en Libye - et pour de bonnes raisons -, où tout va s'échafauder en partant de zéro. Le contexte libyen est difficile, car s'y joue un bras de fer évident, sur le terrain, entre les tenants d'un certain libéralisme politique et des groupes islamistes, forts de leur rôle dans la victoire militaire. Le message de M. Abdeljalil semblait destiné à composer avec les hommes du gouverneur militaire de Tripoli, Abdelhakim Belhadj, qui a la particularité d'avoir un passé de djihadiste en lien avec Al-Qaida. Le puissant chef de guerre a certes répété qu'il avait tourné cette page. Mais la lutte pour le pouvoir bat son plein en Libye, sur fond de clivages régionaux et de délicate répartition de la manne pétrolière. Les retards dans la formation d'un gouvernement transitoire l'attestent. S'ajoute un autre facteur de complication : le jeu du Qatar. Grand parrain financier et militaire des forces anti-Kadhafi, l'émirat joue la carte islamiste en Libye. L'aile politique du CNT lui a reproché de continuer ses livraisons d'armes aux hommes de Belhadj. La France est gênée aux entournures par ces agissements d'un allié devenu encombrant. Le Qatar a fourni, avec les Emirats arabes unis, le "vernis" arabe indispensable à l'intervention en Libye. Il entend aujourd'hui récolter les dividendes politiques - voire pétroliers - de cette mise. Il vient de le montrer de la manière la plus directe en révélant, mercredi 26 octobre, que plusieurs centaines de ses soldats avaient soutenu les rebelles libyens au sol. "Je suis chez moi" en Libye, déclarait en septembre l'émir du Qatar. Dont le régime est loin d'être, chez lui, un parangon de vertus démocratiques... En Libye bien plus qu'en Afghanistan, les lendemains de l'intervention dépendront aussi des partenaires extérieurs que les Occidentaux se sont choisis dans leur entreprise.

Natalie Nougayrède La Libye, la charia et l'embarras occidental le 27.10.11 | 20h18 http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/10/27/la-libye-la-charia-et-l-embarras- occidental_1594923_3232.html#ens_id=1481986

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Turquía desafía a Siria al acoger a combatientes contrarios a El Asad Desertores del Ejército sirio organizan ataques desde un campamento protegido por las fuerzas armadas turcas LIAM STACK (NYT) Antakya (Turquía) 27 OCT 2011 - 22:12 CET25 Antaño uno de los aliados más cercanos de Siria, Turquía cobija ahora a un grupo armado que impulsa la rebelión contra el Gobierno del presidente Bachar el Asad, proporciona cobijo al comandante y a docenas de miembros del grupo, el Ejército Sirio Libre, y les permite organizar ataques a través de la frontera desde un campamento protegido por el Ejército turco. El apoyo a los insurgentes se da en medio de los esfuerzos turcos por socavar el Gobierno de El Asad. Turquía estudia imponer sanciones a Siria y ha intensificado su apoyo al Consejo Nacional Sirio, que agrupa a varios grupos opositores y que se constituyó en Estambul. Pero albergar a los jefes del Ejército Sirio Libre, una milicia formada por desertores de las fuerzas armadas sirias, puede ser el desafío más sorprendente lanzado hasta ahora a Damasco. El miércoles, el grupo, que vive en un campo de refugiados en Turquía, fuertemente protegido, reivindicó la muerte de nueve soldados sirios, incluyendo un oficial, en un ataque en la inestable región central de Siria. Los funcionarios turcos describen su relación con el jefe del grupo, el coronel Riad el Asad y con los 60 o 70 compañeros que viven en el "campamento de oficiales" como puramente humanitaria. La principal preocupación de Turquía, dicen, es la seguridad física de los desertores. Preguntado por las actividades militares organizadas bajo la protección turca, un funcionario del Ministerio de Exteriores dijo que su única inquietud era la protección humanitaria, y que no podían prohibirles que expresaran sus opiniones. Por el momento, el Ejército Sirio Libre es demasiado pequeño como para suponer una amenaza al régimen de El Assad "Cuando toda este gente escapó de Siria, no sabíamos quién era quién, no llevaban escrito en su frente ‘soy un soldado’ o ‘soy un miembro de la oposición", dijo un portavoz de Exteriores. "Estamos facilitándoles residencia temporal por motivos humanitarios, y seguiremos haciéndolo". Por el momento, el grupo es demasiado pequeño para suponer una amenaza al Gobierno de El Asad. Pero el apoyo turco subraya cuán inflamable y resistente ha resultado el levantamiento sirio. El país está ubicado en una intersección de influencias regionales —con Irán, Hezbolá en Líbano, Arabia Saudí e Israel—, y la implicación de Turquía será seguida muy de cerca por los aliados y los enemigos de Siria. "Combatiremos al régimen hasta que caiga y construiremos un nuevo periodo de estabilidad y seguridad en Siria", dijo el coronel Asad en una entrevista coordinada por el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores turco, y realizada en presencia de un funcionario de

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ese departamento. "Nosotros somos los líderes del pueblo sirio y estamos con el pueblo sirio". La entrevista se celebró en la oficina de un funcionario del gobierno local, y el coronel Asad llegó protegido por un contingente de diez soldados turcos fuertemente armados, incluyendo un francotirador. El coronel llevaba puesto un traje que un funcionario de Exteriores dijo haberle comprado esa mañana. Al final del encuentro, y apelando a razones de seguridad, el coronel y el funcionario recomendaron que cualquier otro contacto con el grupo se canalizara a través del ministerio. En su día, Turquía consideraba sus estrechos lazos con Siria como su mayor logro en política exterior. Pero las relaciones se hundieron a raíz de los ocho meses de protestas antigubernamentales y la brutal represión que, según la ONU, ha causado más de 3.000 muertos. El primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, se sintió personalmente ofendido porque El Asad le había garantizado reiteradamente que emprendería una amplia reforma, algo que nunca cumplió. El Gobierno turco predice que el régimen de El Asad puede caer en los dos próximos años. La entrevista con el jefe de los desertores fue coordinada por el Ministerio de Exteriores turco "Esto lleva a la política turca hacia una intervención activa en Siria", dice Hugh Pope, analista del International Crisis Group, que define como "un territorio completamente nuevo" la relación de Turquía con el Ejército Sirio Libre. "Está claro que Turquía se siente amenazada por lo que está sucediendo en Oriente Próximo, sobre todo en Siria", dice Pope, que destaca que, en algunos discursos, Erdogan "ha hablado de lo que pasa en Siria como un asunto interno turco". Los funcionarios turcos aseguran que su Gobierno no ha facilitado armas ni apoyo militar al grupo insurgente, ni el grupo lo ha pedido directamente. Sin embargo, el coronel Asad, que agradeció a Turquía su protección, dejó claro que estaba buscando mejores armas, asegurando que su grupo podría causar daño a un liderazgo sirio que se ha mostrado extraordinariamente unido. "Pedimos a la comunidad internacional que nos facilite armas para que, como ejército, el Ejército Sirio Libre, podamos proteger al pueblo de Siria", dijo en la entrevista. "Somos un ejército, estamos en la oposición, y estamos preparados para llevar a cabo operaciones militares. Si nos dan armas, podemos derrocar al régimen muy muy pronto". Estas declaraciones parecen más farol que una amenaza. La represión ha frenado por ahora las protestas, y el Gobierno sirio parece en una posición más fuerte que este verano. El coronel Asad dijo que huyó a Turquía tras el estallido de la rebelión en su pueblo, Ebdeeta, al norte, después de que las tropas leales mataran a varios de sus familiares. Y también porque "había mayor potencial para dirigir operaciones" desde un lugar libre. Dijo que todos los residentes del campamento son miembros del Ejército Sirio Libre, muy organizados, y con las armas que tenían cuando desertaron. No concretó el número de combatientes, pero aseguró que son más de 10.000. La cifra no pudo ser verificada. Aunque muchos analistas aseguran que los ataques de los desertores en Siria no están coordinados y son muy locales, el coronel Asad asegura tener el control operativo y estar en contacto con los mandos sobre el terreno a través de un ordenador portátil conectado a uno de los cuatro teléfonos (uno de ellos por satélite) que le han facilitado expatriados sirios. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/27/actualidad/1319746361_268834.html 289

Internacional LA TRANSICIÓN EN LIBIA La ONU revoca el mandato que permitió la intervención en Libia El CNT anuncia que los que mataron a Gadafi serán juzgados Agencias Trípoli / Nueva York 27 OCT 2011 - 16:19 CET307

Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, vicepresidente del CNT, anuncia el juicio de quienes mataron a Gadafi. / ABDULLAH DOMA (AFP) El Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU ha decidido por unanimidad poner fin el próximo 31 de octubre al mandato que permitió la operación de la OTAN en Libia. De esta manera se pone fin en el plano político a la operación de la Alianza Atlántica en el país norteafricano, aprobada el pasado marzo con la resolución 1973. Esa resolución, en la que se abstuvieron Rusia y China, permitía el uso de la fuerza para proteger a la población civil libia de los ataques de las fuerzas de Muamar el Gadafi y detener así su ofensiva contra los rebeldes alzados contra su régimen desde el mes anterior. También permitía la imposición de una zona de exclusión aérea, una tarea para la que se dio mandato a la OTAN. El Consejo Nacional de Transición (CNT) ha anunciado hoy que las personas que mataron al antiguo dictador libio Muamar Gadafi serán llevados a juicio, según ha informado la edición digital de la cadena de televisión Al Arabiya. En su primera versión de los hechos, el CNT afirmó que el dictador murió porque se resistió a ser capturado. Pero cuando se conocieron los primeros videos, en los que 290

Gadafi aparecía vivo y en manos de los rebeldes, el CNT cambió la declaración. "Se produjo un tiroteo tras la captura", alegaron. La confusión sobre las violentas circunstancias en las que murió Gadafi y las polémicas desatadas al respecto enfriaron la euforia que desató el fin de sus 42 años de dictadura. Según diferentes testimonios de los rebeldes, Gadafi murió el pasado día 20 por dos disparos de sus captores, que previamente le pegaron cuando le encontraron mientras intentaba huir de Sirte y los aviones de la OTAN bombardearon el convoy del dictador. El Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la Naciones Unidas expresó la semana pasada que se arrojara luz sobre las “circunstancias” que rodean la muerte de Gadafi. “Hay cuatro o cinco versiones distintas”, señalaron desde el organismo, con sede en Ginebra, que esencialmente quiere determinar si fue ejecutado por sus captores. La preocupación en la ONU es evidente, por eso reclama ahora un “investigación amplia” porque se trata de una “cuestión muy seria” que debe aclararse. Y para apuntalar la solicitud, se fijan en las imágenes tomadas con teléfonos móviles, que muestran como los rebeldes la emprenden con un Gadafi herido, aún con vida, y sin posibilidad de defensa. El CNT podría pedir la ampliación del mandato En París, un portavoz del ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores ha afirmado que el Consejo debería adoptar hoy una resolución que ponga fin el 31 de octubre a las autorizaciones de la resolución 1973. La misma fuente ha precisado que, "en conformidad con esa resolución, el Consejo del Atlántico Norte tomará muy pronto una decisión sobre el cierre de la operación 'Protector Unificado". El embajador adjunto de Libia, Ibrahim Dabashi, declaró ayer ante ese mismo órgano de decisión de la ONU que para el Consejo Nacional de Transición el 31 de octubre es la fecha "lógica" para que finalice ese mandato. "Los libios quieren que la zona de exclusión aérea sobre Libia y el mandato del Consejo de Seguridad para proteger a los civiles termine tan pronto como sea posible", dijo el diplomático. Dabashi, sin embargo, no descartó que el CNT pida una ampliación del mandato, y se refirió a que las autoridades de transición "evalúan" aún algunas ideas sobre la seguridad incluidas las fronteras. En Libia, el presidente del CNT, Mustafa Abdulyalil, pidió ayer a la OTAN que continuara su operación en Libia hasta final de año. La ONU revoca el mandato que permitió la intervención en Libia. El CNT anuncia que los que mataron a Gadafi serán juzgados. 27 OCT 201 - 16:19 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/27/actualidad/1319725176_15170 9.html

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OCT26 L'HOMME QUI A LANCE LA REVOLUTION TUNISIENNE Auteurs: Julien Pain et Sarra Grira Les médias ont choisi de porter au pinacle les jeunes blogueurs et les « Twittos » de Tunis qui ont participé à la révolution. Pourtant, c’est par une poignée de quadragénaires de Sidi Bouzid que tout à commencé. L’un de ces militants, inconnu du grand public, revient sur ces quelques mois qui ont changé la Tunisie et le monde arabe. Pour de nombreuses raisons, il a le sentiment qu’on lui a volé sa révolution. Nous avions rencontré Slimane Rouissi six mois avant la révolution tunisienne. Il nous avait alertés sur la mobilisation de paysans, dans la région de Sidi Bouzid, qui protestaient contre un programme d’expropriations. Une affaire qui à l’époque n’avait pas été relayée par les médias internationaux car son impact paraissait uniquement local. Il s’avère pourtant que c’est de cette région, et de ce mouvement de protestation, qu’est ensuite née la révolution tunisienne. Car le 17 décembre, lorsque le jeune Mohamed Bouazizi s’immole devant la préfecture de Sidi Bouzid, c’est un petit groupe de syndicalistes, les mêmes qui avaient soutenu les paysans quelques mois auparavant, qui monteront au créneau. Cette poignée d’hommes va alors sciemment utiliser l’affaire Bouazizi pour soulever le peuple dans leur ville. Ils sont toutefois loin d’imaginer que leur mouvement aboutira un mois plus tard à la chute de Ben Ali. Et que près d’un an après, l’onde de choc s’en ferait encore sentir jusqu’au portes de Damas. Slimane Rouissi est un de ces quelques syndicalistes par qui tout à commencé. La cinquantaine bedonnante et joviale, il ne correspond pas au portrait type du révolutionnaire tunisien dressé par les médias. Avec le recul, on peut pourtant affirmer qu’il a eu une influence déterminante sur cette révolution qui a changé la face du monde. Notre première question a porté sur l’immolation de Mohamed Bouazizi à Sidi Bouzid. Les médias ont toujours parlé de cet acte terrible comme de l’étincelle qui a enflammé la région, puis tout le pays. La version de l’incident qui circulait au début de la révolution voulait que Mohamed Bouazizi ait été giflé par une policière et que ce soit ce geste qui a poussé le jeune vendeur ambulant, écœuré par des brimades à répétition, à s’immoler. Pourtant, en avril dernier, la policière censée avoir giflé Bouazizi, Fadia Hamdi, a été innocentée et libérée après quatre mois de prison. J’ai donc demandé à Slimane s’il avait des remords concernant le sort de cette policière, qui n’était pas le monstre qu’on avait dépeint à l’époque. « Certains ont affirmé que Bouazizi était un ivrogne et un voyou. C’est faux. »

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« Nous n’avons jamais eu l’intention de rendre Fadia Hamdi responsable de la mort de Mohamed Bouazizi. Après tout, elle aussi est en quelque sorte victime de ce système, elle n’avait pas d’autre choix que d’obéir aux ordres. Il ne faut pas oublier que l’ancien régime harcelait même ses propres fonctionnaires. D’après les informations que j’ai pu recueillir auprès de témoins de la scène, il y a certes eu une altercation entre Mohamed Bouazizi et Fadia Hamdi, mais elle ne l’a jamais frappé. Je pense toutefois que cet épisode n’est qu’un détail et que le plus important demeure le sentiment d’oppression qui a poussé Bouazizi à commettre cet acte. J’ai rencontré Mohamed Bouazizi le 15 juillet 2010, lors de la mobilisation des agriculteurs de Regueb [dans les environs de Sidi Bouzid]. Son oncle faisait partie des paysans qui ont été privés de leurs terres. Cette histoire est en relation directe avec l’immolation de Bouazizi car ce dernier travaillait depuis 2006 avec son oncle à Regueb et que toute sa famille a été obligée de se déplacer à Sidi Bouzid après cette spoliation. Je connais bien Mohamed, qui était un jeune homme courageux qui n’avait pas froid aux yeux. Certains ont prétendu par la suite que c’était un ivrogne et un voyou. Cela n’est pas vrai et ces rumeurs ne sont que le fait de contre- révolutionnaires ou de soutiens de Fadia Hamdi qui cherchaient à l’innocenter par tous les moyens. Certains se sont également demandé si Mohamed Bouazizi avait toute sa tête pour commettre un tel acte désespéré. Personnellement, je pense que cette immolation n’était pas tout à fait intentionnelle : Mohamed s’était versé du dissolvant en menaçant de s’immoler si on ne le laissait pas voir le Gouverneur [Préfet]. Il proférait toujours ces menaces en allumant le briquet. Ce n’est qu’une interprétation, mais je pense que Mohamed Bouazizi menaçait de s’immoler, mais n’avait pas réellement l’intention de le faire. » Nous avons ensuite demandé à Slimane si lui et les syndicalistes de Sidi Bouzid avaient intentionnellement monté en épingle l’affaire Bouazizi. Et comment ils étaient parvenus à faire de cet incident, somme toute mineur, le déclencheur de la révolution. « Mohamed Bouazizi n’était pas le premier à se suicider dans la région. Mais son acte a pu être utilisé car il avait une dimension symbolique » « Les conditions d’un soulèvement étaient réunies à Sidi Bouzid depuis plus de deux ans. Durant les dernières semaines qui ont précédé le 17 décembre [date de l’immolation de Bouazizi], il y avait des mobilisations quasi hebdomadaires où j’étais présent avec mes camarades militants. Il y a eu par exemple un sit-in d’ouvriers à Meknassi [petite ville de la région de Sidi Bouzid] en juillet 2010. Des travailleurs qui avaient été licenciés sans être payés par un des membres de la famille Trabelsi [la belle- famillle de l’ancien Président Ben Ali]. Mais la mobilisation déterminante demeure sans aucun doute celle des agriculteurs de Regueb. Je considère pour ma part le 15 juillet comme la véritable date du début de la révolution tunisienne. En tout cas, il faut bien comprendre qu’une révolution n’arrive jamais par hasard. Mohamed Bouazizi n’était pas le premier à se suicider dans la région, il y a eu d’autres cas avant lui. Mais son acte a pu être utilisé par les militants pour enclencher une révolution car il avait une dimension symbolique : il s’était immolé devant le siège du gouvernorat de Sidi Bouzid et sa situation était intimement liée à la cause des agriculteurs de Regueb. Dès lors, il a personnifié le cumul des injustices dont beaucoup souffraient comme lui. Cela fait des années que nous nous mobilisons et nous avons beaucoup appris des événements précédents. Nous avons par exemple retenu des leçons données par les blogueurs iraniens en 2007 et nous avons compris que la toile pouvait être un bon moyen de mobiliser les citoyens. Nous avons aussi tiré des leçons des événements du bassin minier en 2008 [des ouvriers chômeurs s’étaient mobilisés pour dénoncer la 293

corruption et les conditions dans lesquelles ils vivaient. Une mobilisation violement réprimée]. Nous avions expérimenté les limites du régionalisme qui avait fait avorter notre mouvement. De même, les confrontations entre les habitants de Ben Guerden et Dhehiba et les forces de police en août 2010 nous ont appris à mieux faire face à la police. Nous avons compris qu’il fallait être sur le terrain, mais également sur Facebook et Twitter, sans oublier de nouer des relations avec les médias. Ayant conscience de tout cela, nous nous sommes réunis le 24 décembre 2010 à Chebba [petite ville au nord de Sidi Bouzid] au siège du PDP (le Parti Démocrate Progressiste) avec différents militants politiques et syndicalistes. C’était au lendemain de la mort de Mohamed Ammari à Menzel Bouzayane [région de Sidi Bouzid], le premier tué de la révolution. C’est ce jour là que nous avons décrété que cette mort ne passerait pas et que nous irions jusqu’au bout. » Nous avons ensuite interrogé Slimane sur ces militants qui ont su utiliser l’affaire Bouazizi pour lancer la révolution. Qui sont-ils ? Combien étaient-ils ? « Les leaders du mouvement se comptaient sur les doigts d’une main. J’en faisais partie. » « Quand je parle des militants politiques et syndicalistes qui ont lancé le mouvement, je fais référence à un groupe qui ne dépasse pas 50 personnes, mais qui avait une grande capacité de mobilisation. Nous avions acquis une crédibilité auprès des habitants et nous étions écoutés quand on appelait à des actions militantes. Au sein de ce groupe d’une cinquantaine personne, il y avait bien sûr des leaders, qui se comptent sur les doigts d’une seule main. J’en faisais partie. Il y a beaucoup de choses à dire sur la véritable manière avec laquelle nous avons mené cette révolution, comme par exemple sur la façon dont nous sommes parvenus à élargir notre champ d’action et ne pas le cantonner à Sidi Bouzid. Nous avons par exemple encadré les jeunes et leur avons conseillé de se mobiliser de nuit. Mais nous ne pouvons pas encore tout révéler. Les forces contre- révolutionnaires sont encore là et il faut rester prudent. Le ministère de l’Intérieur n’a toujours pas été réformé et les snipers du RCD sont toujours en liberté. Nos noms sont peut-être méconnus du grand public, mais la police politique elle nous connaît très bien.» Nous avons donc demandé à Slimane comment il vivait la médiatisation des « héros » de Tunis, les blogueurs et les activistes de la capitale qui ont été portés aux nues par les médias ? « Je ne nie pas la participation de ceux que l’on voit à la télé, mais leur apport à la révolution n’a pas été déterminant » « Certains sont conscients de l’impact que nous avons eu : au lendemain de la fuite de Ben Ali, je recevais personnellement des messages et des coups de fil d’Egyptiens qui me demandaient conseil pour leur mobilisation contre Moubarak. Mais il y a un jeu politique. A l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur du pays, des gens fabriquent des symboles révolutionnaires et les médiatisent. Le fait même de retenir la date du 14 janvier [le départ de Ben Ali] pour cette révolution, au lieu de celle du 17 décembre [l’immolation de Bouazizi] qui en est le point de départ, n’est que de la désinformation. Je ne nie pas la participation de ceux qu’on voit à la télé, mais leur apport à la révolution n’a pas été déterminant. On marginalise les figures qui ont réellement été à l’origine de cette révolution. Nous autres militants de Sidi Bouzid, nous sommes donc aussi marginalisés que notre région. Les médias n’ont pas cherché à nous contacter après le 14 janvier. Pour ma part, je n’ai pas d’ambition politique ou médiatique. Tout ce qui m’importe c’est la réalisation de nos objectifs révolutionnaires.»

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Slimane est loin de considérer que la révolution tunisienne a abouti. Et les résultats des élections dans sa région semblent lui donner raison. A l’heure où j’écris cet article, les résultats définitifs n’ont pas été annoncés, mais d’après les estimations, ce sont d’anciens membres du RCD, le parti de Ben Ali, qui sont arrivés largement en tête. « Les résultats des élections à Sidi Bouzid m’ont choqué et déçu » « Je n’ai pas voté dimanche car je constate que les forces contre-révolutionnaires sont toujours présentes. Mais je n’ai pas encouragé les gens à boycotter le scrutin. Selon les derniers résultats à Sidi Bouzid, Ennahdha aurait recueilli 25% des et La Pétition populaire 50%. Cette dernière liste est conduite par Hechmi Hamdi, patron de la chaîne privée « Al Mostakella », qui est un ancien du RCD, comme d’ailleurs bon nombre de ses partisans. Les 25% restant reviennent à une liste indépendante conduite par un certain Iléhi, lui aussi ancien membre du RCD. Ces résultats m’ont choqué et déçu. J’ai fait le tour des villages de la région de Sidi Bouzid : Manzel Bouzayen, Regueb, Wled Haffouz ou Ben Aoun. Là-bas j’ai rencontré des personnes qui avaient voté pour la Pétition parce que son leader promettait 200 dinars [100 euros] de prime aux chômeurs, ou simplement parce qu’il était de Sidi Bouzid et qu’ils ne voulaient pas d’un président qui vienne de la région côtière du Sahel [région dont sont originaires les deux anciens présidents tunisiens]. Et puis la machine du RCD [parti dissout] s’est mise en branle et ses partisans ont encouragé les gens à voter pour cette liste. Enfin, je ne pense pas que les électeurs sachent tous que La Pétition était une liste d’anciens membres du RCD. Ils ont juste été attirés par ses promesses.» Alors que Slimane et ses confrères syndicalistes ont réussi à déclencher une révolution il y quelques mois, ils semblent aujourd’hui incapables d’enrayer le retour en force des acolytes de Ben Ali. Comment en si peu de temps ont-ils perdu leur capacité de mobilisation ? « Je suis le seul à ne pas avoir rejoint de parti. Les leaders ont déserté le terrain » « Du temps de Ben Ali, la situation était plus simple : il y avait le peuple contre le RCD et il suffisait d’appeler à manifester pour que les gens viennent. Mais depuis, les leaders de la contestation ont rejoint des partis. Et désormais ils doivent demander la permission de leur organisation pour lancer un mot d’ordre. Il est aujourd’hui impossible de rassembler tout le monde sous une même bannière. Les leaders de Sidi Bouzid ont déserté le terrain, la rue est désormais orpheline. Je suis le seul à ne pas avoir rejoint de parti. Et je me sens en danger car il y a eu une campagne contre moi. J’ai même été menacé par les milices de l’ancien régime, qui existent toujours. Aujourd’hui, ils me traitent d’agitateur et me demandent de repartir vers ma région, car je suis originaire du sud ouest. Cependant, je reste fermement décidé à ne pas céder à la contre-révolution. Il ne faut surtout pas se laisser abattre. Nous ferons pression sur l’Assemblée constituante pour garantir la réalisation des objectifs de la révolution. J’ai encore de l’influence aujourd’hui sur les jeunes de Sidi Bouzid et je compte sur eux pour rester vigilants. Les médias ont exporté notre révolution en en faisant un modèle du printemps arabe. Il faut que ses objectifs soient atteints pour qu’on puisse vraiment parler de révolution. » Source: France24 Julien Pain et Sarra Grira L'homme Qui A Lance La Revolution Tunisienne 26 Oct. http://www.sentinelle-tunisie.com/societe/item/l-homme-qui-a-lance-la-revolution-tunisienne

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Modelo a seguir, ¿el FIS argelino o el AKP turco? I. C. - Túnez - 26/10/2011 La victoria de En Nahda es la tercera de una formación islamista en un país árabe en el que se han celebrado elecciones calificadas por la comunidad internacional de limpias y transparentes. En Jordania, en Marruecos o en el Egipto de Hosni Mubarak, donde competían partidos islamistas en las legislativas, su participación estaba de antemano cercenada o se falseaban los resultados. Los islamistas del Partido de la Justicia y del Desarrollo (PJD) rara vez han podido concurrir en Marruecos en todas las circunscripciones electorales cuyo trazado estaba hasta ahora diseñado para perjudicarles. Prueba de ello es que con más votos que el Istiqlal, primera fuerza parlamentaria, obtuvieron en 2007 menos escaños. En cuanto al otro gran movimiento islamista, Justicia y Espiritualidad, ni siquiera puede presentar candidaturas. Si se deja de lado Líbano, donde la minoría cristiana ostenta buena parte del poder político, la primera elección democrática árabe tuvo lugar en Argelia, en diciembre de 1991, pero cuando quedó claro que el Frente Islámico de Salvación (FIS) iba a ganar por mayoría absoluta, el sistema electoral le resultaba ventajoso, en una segunda vuelta, esta no llegó a celebrarse. El Ejército la impidió con un golpe de Estado. El FIS inquietaba no solo por sus discursos, sino por sus iniciativas. En el poco tiempo que, en los años noventa, gobernó Ayuntamientos en Argelia, el FIS empezó a segregar en sus dependencias a hombres y mujeres y quería que viajaran separados también en el transporte público. La segunda elección, muy vigilada por la comunidad internacional, se desarrolló en Cisjordania y Gaza en enero de 2006. Los islamistas de Hamás derrotaron a Fatah, y la UE y EE UU les pidieron de inmediato que reconocieran a Israel. Rehusaron hacerlo y Occidente se olvidó de la legitimidad democrática de Hamás y les sancionó: cortó la ayuda financiera a la Autoridad Palestina. Estalló además la guerra entre vencedores y vencidos del bando palestino. Hamás gobierna ahora solo en Gaza y Fatah en Cisjordania. En Túnez no hay unas Fuerzas Armadas dispuestas a abortar el proceso y cabe esperar que esta vez europeos y norteamericanos respetaran la opción escogida por el pueblo tunecino, que deberá ser revalidada como muy tarde dentro de un año, cuando se celebren las primeras legislativas. Las del domingo sirvieron para elegir una Asamblea Constituyente y, de paso, determinar el peso de cada partido. Queda por ver ahora si, como dice En Nahda, han aprendido la lección de los errores del radicalismo de antaño. Su programa electoral es aceptable, como también lo son los discursos que sus dirigentes hacen en público en los que prometen preservar el acervo laico y respetuoso de la mujer heredado de los tiempos de Habib Burguiba, fundador del Túnez independiente. Su modelo, insisten hasta la saciedad, es el de los islamistas turcos del AKP, que gobiernan ininterrumpidamente desde 2002. Se sabrá en breve si son sinceros o si esconden sus verdaderas intenciones, como sostienen sus detractores.

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http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Modelo/seguir/FIS/argelino/AKP/turco/elpepiint/20111026elpepiint_1/Tes

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Internacional LA TRANSICIÓN EN LIBIA Occidente ve el futuro de Libia con creciente preocupación “No sabemos lo que va a pasar”, dice una fuente europea.- La OTAN decide el viernes si confirma su retirada el día 31 El Gobierno libio pide a la OTAN que mantenga la misión militar Barack Obama lamenta la falta de “decoro” en la muerte de Gadafi Ricardo Martínez de Rituerto Bruselas 26 OCT 2011 - 20:49 CET217

Mustafá Abdel Yalil, presidente del CNT, y el príncipe catarí Sheij Tamim bin Hamad al- Thani, en Doha. / KARIM SAHIB (AFP) El salvaje modo en que acabó su vida Muamar el Gadafi, la proclamación de la sharía como fundamento constitucional de la nueva Libia, y la incertidumbre que pesa sobre la formación del Gobierno y cómo puedan evolucionar la situación en el país preocupan a la UE y a la OTAN, que oficialmente pasan de puntillas sobre las atrocidades de las últimas jornadas y expresan su confianza en una Libia democrática y respetuosa con los derechos humanos. Las declaraciones públicas enmascaran otra realidad. “No sabemos qué va a pasar en Libia”, comenta una fuente europea.

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A Anders Fogh Rasmussen, secretario general de la OTAN, personalmente, y a Catherine Ashton, Alta Representante para la Política Exterior de la UE, a través de una portavoz, se les ha requerido opinión sobre el atroz fin de Gadafi. Sin entrar en la forma, ambos aluden a la necesidad de “que las nuevas autoridades respeten los principios del derecho internacional, los derechos humanos y la transparencia”, en palabras de Rasmussen que, en lo relativo a la transparencia, Maja Kocijancic, portavoz de Ashton, traduce como “que las autoridades libias investiguen” lo ocurrido. Lo mismo se aplica a las denuncias de asesinatos en masa en Sirte, último feudo de Gadafi. Ashton ha llamado a la mesura y a la reconciliación nacional y los jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Unión, en la declaración que siguió a su reunión del domingo en Bruselas, señalaron que “la muerte de Gadafi marca el fin de una era de despotismo y represión que el pueblo libio ha sufrido durante demasiado tiempo”. Distanciamiento interesado y vergonzante de las circunstancias de la muerte de Gadafi y del hecho de que una parte significativa de los signatarios del comunicado (o sus predecesores) visitaron o recibieron con todos los honores al dictador libio, incluida la propia Comisión Europea en 2004. La confusión sobre el futuro de Libia se cierne sobre la OTAN, a la que por un lado el líder del Consejo Nacional de Transición (CNT), Mustafá Abdelyalil, ha pedido que siga hasta finales de año para hacer frente a eventuales intentos desestabilizadores de las fuerzas progadafistas mientras uno de sus representantes ante Naciones Unidas reclamaba el fin de la intervención aérea. La Alianza acordó el viernes de forma provisional dar por concluida la Operación Protector Unificado el próximo día 31, a la espera de confirmar esta semana la fecha. La reunión prevista hoy para ello se dejó para el viernes. La propia Alianza está dividida entre quienes quieren dar ya por resuelto el caso y volver a casa (grupo en el que están EE UU, España y otros muchos) y quienes prefieren seguir en el empeño, encabezado por Francia y Reino Unido. El viernes deberá cuadrar el círculo el Consejo Atlántico, integrado por los 28 embajadores aliados. Primacía de la sharía Los hoy triunfadores, y entonces rebeldes libios, recibieron su primer gran respaldo internacional en la conferencia organizada el pasado 29 de marzo en Londres. Allí hicieron pública su Visión De Una Libia Democrática, como se titulaba el documento, cuyo contenido era suscribible al 100% por cualquiera de las decenas de países y organizaciones presentes en la conferencia. Lo único que llamaba la atención era el énfasis en la confesionalidad del futuro Estado, “un Estado que saca fuerza de nuestras sólidas creencias religiosas en la paz, la verdad, la justicia y la igualdad (…) un Estado constitucional que respeta la santidad de la doctrina religiosa y condena la intolerancia”. Pero no se hablaba de sharía. Abdelyalil defiende ahora la absoluta primacía de la sharía “contra cualquier ley que vaya contra los principios del islam”. “Esperamos que se aplique conforme al derecho internacional, respetando los derechos humanos y los principios democráticos, como las autoridades libias han dicho que harán”, señala la portavoz de Ashton, para quien “Libia se enfrenta a un período muy difícil”. Aunque la UE reitera en público su compromiso de apoyar en todo lo necesario el nacimiento de una Libia democrática y airea como un hecho la promesa del CNT de

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formar un nuevo Gobierno interino dentro de un par de semanas y de celebrar elecciones dentro de ocho meses, en los despachos la impresión es otra. “No sabemos lo que va a pasar en Libia”, comenta una fuente europea, que, por hablar solo de las elecciones, dice: “No hay censo ni nadie que lo pueda hacer; no hay partidos ni cultura de partidos; no hay Ministerio del Interior que se ocupe del procedimiento electoral, y no hay ley electoral”. En resumen, “si dentro de 20 meses hubiese elecciones, estaría muy bien”. Ricardo Martínez de Rituerto Occidente ve el futuro de Libia con creciente preocupación26 OCT 2011 - 20:49 CET217 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/26/actualidad/1319651426_23653 5.html

HISTORY IN MOTION The Responsibility to Protect Comes of Age Gareth Evans 2011-10-26

NEW YORK – Good news not only sells less well than bad news, but also often seems harder to believe. Reaction to Harvard psychologist Stephen Pinker’s majestic new book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, is a case in point. In 800 meticulously argued and documented pages, Pinker shows that, over the course of history, there has been a dramatic decline in violence, both domestically and internationally – and that this downward trend is continuing through the post-Cold War years. But the response of many reviewers to Pinker’s work has been incomprehension, denial, or a tenacious focus on individual horror stories, as though they somehow change the larger picture. Many will be similarly slow to accept that when it comes to the most conscience-shocking classes of violence – genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other mass atrocities – dramatic progress has been made recently. Those gains culminated in the interventions, unthinkable a decade ago, that the United Nations Security Council authorized this year to stop unfolding human-rights catastrophes in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. With progress like 300

this, it is no longer fanciful to hope that never again will there be another Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda, or Srebrenica. It is ten years since an international commission that I co-chaired gave birth to the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (“RtoP”), and six years since more than 150 heads of state and government endorsed it unanimously at the UN’s World Summit in 2005. The core idea was simple: stop arguing for a “right to intervene,” which inevitably generates a backlash, and talk instead about “responsibility” – that of every state to protect its own citizens from atrocities, but also that of the wider international community to act if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. The new concept also made clear that international protective action meant military coercion only in extreme and unavoidable cases. The normal sequence would be assistance, persuasion, and non-military pressure like sanctions and criminal prosecution. For some time after 2005, it was possible to argue that all of this was hot air, and that fast, decisive action to respond to genocidal atrocities would remain as unlikely as ever. The jury remained out even after Kenya in early 2008, when horrific post-election violence was widely considered an RtoP case, and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan led a successful diplomatic mission to persuade ethnic-group leaders to quell the storm. But it was in Côte d’Ivoire, and especially in Libya early this year, that RtoP really came of age. The two Security Council resolutions on Libya in February and March were textbook examples of a phased response to an increasingly desperate situation. Invoking RtoP, that response began with a warning and the threat of sanctions and prosecution at the International Criminal Court, and only subsequently allowed military force to protect civilians. The threat was real, and the response – in terms of many thousands of lives saved – was unquestionably effective. Other developments, both before and since, have reinforced and embedded the RtoP norm. Even as the NATO-led intervention in Libya was being widely criticized for overreaching its narrow mandate, a major General Assembly debate in July 2011 reaffirmed overwhelming support among UN member states for the RtoP concept, in all of its dimensions. The arguments now are not about the principle, but about how to apply it. In particular, unlike previous situations – ranging from the Burmese response to Cyclone Nargis to the Sri Lankan military’s civilian massacres masquerading as a legitimate response to terrorist insurgency – there is little conceptual disagreement now about what are, and are not, “RtoP cases.” For all of the lamentable inadequacy of the Security Council’s response to the situation in Syria, no one has seriously argued that it is not an RtoP case. Moreover, there have been important institutional developments in terms of early- warning mechanisms and civilian and military preparedness, not least with President Barack Obama’s recent initiation in the United States of an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board. Nobody denies that challenges remain in ensuring that RtoP is applied effectively and consistently. An immediate need is to counter the perception that any condemnatory response to an unfolding RtoP situation means stepping onto a slippery slope to military confrontation – a perception that Russia and China heavily milked in seeking to justify their vote against an early-stage Security Council resolution on Syria. It is crucial in this context that RtoP advocates continue to emphasize that coercive military force can be contemplated only in the most extreme and exceptional circumstances. The best way to make that point would be to revive the dormant debate about adopting narrow

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guidelines for military intervention, as recommended by my commission and Secretary- General Annan prior to the UN vote in 2005. Clear criteria like “last resort,” “proportionality,” and “balance of consequences” would make it harder to use cynical diversionary tactics in the Security Council and elsewhere. I have learned from long experience that to be optimistic about almost anything in international affairs is to run the risk of being thought ignorant or naïve, if not demented. But, on the issue of mass-atrocity crimes – where the international community has long had good reason for shame – real optimism is now justified. That is very good news indeed. Gareth Evans, a former Australian foreign minister and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group, co-chaired the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. He is the author of The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All. The Responsibility to Protect Comes of Age Gareth Evans 2011-10-26 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/evans11/English

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Des négociations s'ouvrent en Syrie sur fond de violences continues LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 26.10.11 | 17h32 • Mis à jour le 26.10.11 | 18h22

Nabil Elaraby (à droite), le secrétaire général de la Ligue arabe, espère mettre fins aux violences en Syrie, en négociant avec Bachar Al-Assad. REUTERS/MOHAMED ABD EL GHANY Une délégation ministérielle de la Ligue arabe dirigée par le Qatar est arrivée à Damas et a aussitôt rencontré le président Bachar Al-Assad pour engager une médiation en Syrie, mercredi 26 octobre.

Les partisans de Bachar Al-Assad ont massivement manifesté, mercredi, dans le centre de Damas.REUTERS/KHALED AL-HARIRI L'objectif de cette mission est de mettre fin aux violences et d'empêcher une intervention internationale en Syrie. Dans des déclarations publiées par le quotidien panarabe Al-Hayat, le secrétaire général de la Ligue arabe, Nabil Elaraby, a exprimé "l'espoir que les dirigeants syriens accepteront cette initiative et engageront des réformes politiques véritables". 303

Au sortir de cette première réunion, le ministre des affaires étrangères qatari et principal négociateur, Hamad ben Jassem, a annoncé la tenue d'une deuxième entrevue dimanche. Selon lui, le gouvernement syrien veut parvenir à une solution, sans en préciser les contours. L'OPPOSITION MANIFESTE ET APPELLE À LA GRÈVE GÉNÉRALE A l'occasion de la visite de la commission arabe, des manifestations appelant à la chute du régime ont eu lieu dans plusieurs localités de la province d'Idleb, à Hamourié, à Hama, dans le quartier de Kafar Soussé à Damas et à Deraa, selon l'Observatoire syrien des droits de l'homme (OSDH) et les comités locaux de coordination (LCC) qui animent les protestations sur le terrain. Dans le même temps, un mouvement de grève était suivi dans une partie du pays. L'opposition avait appelé sur les réseaux sociaux à une grève générale mercredi, affirmant qu'elle n'accepterait "rien de moins que la démission" du président Assad "et sa traduction en justice". Le Conseil national syrien (CNS), qui réunit la quasi-totalité des courants de l'opposition, avait invité "toutes les catégories du peuple" à se joindre à ce mouvement "en prélude à des grèves plus générales et à la désobéissance civile qui sera à même de renverser le régime". "La grève a été entièrement suivie dans plusieurs régions, dont Deraa, dans les quartiers Qaboune et Barzé à Damas, dans plusieurs localités des provinces de Damas, d'Idleb, de Hama et de Homs", ont affirmé les LCC dans un communiqué accompagné de vidéos montrant des rues désertes et des magasins fermés. Parallèlement, des dizaines de milliers de Syriens agitant des drapeaux et des portraits du président Assad se sont rassemblés sur la place des Omeyyades, en plein cœur de Damas, pour affirmer leur soutien au régime. "Le peuple veut Bachar Al-Assad", scandaient-ils. Selon l'agence officielle SANA, le rassemblement a réuni "plus d'un million de Syriens" sous le slogan : "Vive la patrie et le chef de la patrie, le peuple syrien est une seule famille." DIX-NEUF NOUVEAUX MORTS La journée de mercredi a également été marquée par de nouvelles violences, qui ont fait dix-neuf morts. "Neuf militaires, dont un officier de l'armée régulière syrienne, ont été tués par une roquette tirée par des hommes armés, probablement des déserteurs", a indiqué l'OSDH, en précisant que les soldats se trouvaient "à bord d'un véhicule dans le village al-Hamrat", dans la région de Hama, au moment de l'attaque. Six soldats ont été blessés lors "d'affrontements violents" entre l'armée régulière et probablement des déserteurs, près de Maaret al-Noman, dans le gouvernorat d'Idleb, selon l'OSDH. D'autre part, dix civils, dont un bébé et un enfant de 12 ans, ont été tués par des tirs des forces de sécurité : sept dans la région de Homs, un des fiefs de la contestation, un à Saraqeb dans la région d'Idleb, un à Abou Kamal (Est) et un à Douma, près de Damas. Des négociations s'ouvrent en Syrie sur fond de violences continues26.10.11 | 18h22 http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/10/26/des-negociations-s-ouvrent-en- syrie-sur-fond-de-violences-continues_1594185_3218.html#ens_id=1481132

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Après Ben Ali et Kadhafi, un "printemps islamiste" ? Alexandre Najjar, | 26.10.11 | 13h17 • Mis à jour le 26.10.11 | 16h38 Il aurait pu finir en exil au Venezuela, chez Hugo Chavez ; il aurait pu se suicider à l'instar d'Hitler ou de Goebbels. Mais il est mort à Syrte, sa ville natale, là où il se terrait depuis des semaines, un peu comme ces "rats" qu'il évoquait souvent pour qualifier les jeunes insurgés qui réclamaient sa chute. Il est mort lynché par des rebelles survoltés qui, en appliquant la loi de la jungle, n'ont pas su se comporter plus dignement que lui ; il est mort au terme d'un siège qui a provoqué la perte de centaines d'insurgés et de civils, parce que, enfermé dans cette bulle qui l'empêchait de regarder la vérité en face et d'admettre sa déraison et sa défaite, il y croyait encore, obstinément, parce que sa mégalomanie ne lui permettait pas de s'avouer vaincu, parce qu'il restait persuadé que des armées de mercenaires africains voleraient à son secours pour retourner la situation en sa faveur ! Certains se félicitent de sa disparition, estimant qu'un procès aurait réveillé les vieux démons, jeté de l'huile sur le feu et éclaboussé dirigeants locaux et étrangers. Ils oublient que juger Kadhafi était nécessaire pour en savoir davantage sur les actes terroristes qu'il a commis depuis quarante-deux ans (les attentats de Lockerbie et du DC-10 d'UTA, l'explosion dans la discothèque La Belle à Berlin-Ouest en 1986, l'enlèvement de l'imam chiite Moussa Sadr... la liste est trop longue !) et pour rendre justice aux familles des victimes : en disparaissant, le tyran emporte avec lui de très lourds secrets... Aujourd'hui, une page est tournée. La libération vient d'être officiellement proclamée à Benghazi. Mais tout reste à faire : la réconciliation nationale sans règlement de comptes, le désarmement de la population et la création d'une armée régulière, la formation d'un gouvernement provisoire selon les termes de la déclaration constitutionnelle, l'élection d'une Assemblée constituante, la rédaction d'une Constitution, le choix d'un président, la refonte des lois, la réforme des institutions, la mise en place d'un plan de redressement économique, la reconstruction... Le Conseil national de transition (CNT) sera-t-il en mesure de rassembler les Libyens alors que ses détracteurs prétendent qu'il n'a aucune emprise sur les chabab dans la rue ? Comment édifier la démocratie dans un pays qui, à cause de l'ancien système mis en place par Kadhafi, en ignore les principes les plus élémentaires ? Quel sera le rôle des puissances occidentales - et orientales ! -, bien décidées à réclamer leur part du gâteau économique ? Et quid des pétrodollars que le tyran planquait dans des comptes à l'étranger et de ses investissements en Afrique et ailleurs, propriété d'un peuple libyen appauvri par la guerre ? A ces questions graves, une interrogation, plus préoccupante encore, vient s'ajouter : court-on le risque d'une confiscation de la révolution par les islamistes ? La déclaration maladroite et prématurée du chef du CNT à propos de la charia et d'un retour à la polygamie a semé le trouble dans les esprits - et scandalisé la plupart des femmes 305

libyennes qui ont activement participé au succès de la révolution. Conjuguée avec la victoire du parti Ennahda en Tunisie et avec le rôle accru des Frères musulmans en Egypte, elle illustre éloquemment le raz-de-marée islamiste qui déferle sur les pays récemment libérés de la tyrannie. Ce raz-de-marée était-il prévisible ? Sans doute. Depuis des années, une "religiosité" galopante gagnait les populations arabes confrontées à la misère et à l'étouffement engendrés par les dictatures. Refuge et exutoire, la religion est devenue la planche de salut de millions d'Arabes, soumis, par ailleurs, au matraquage méthodique des chaînes satellitaires pratiquant le prosélytisme télévisé. Du reste, plusieurs régimes dictatoriaux n'ont pas hésité à instrumentaliser les partis islamistes, les utilisant tantôt pour exercer leur traditionnel chantage ("La dictature ou l'intégrisme"), tantôt pour créer un embryon d'opposition donnant l'illusion d'un semblant de démocratie... Face à cette situation, les opinions divergent. Les uns estiment que toute révolution passe fatalement par une phase de fanatisme et que la démocratie a besoin de temps pour s'enraciner. D'autres pensent que les islamistes sont acculés et devront composer avec les forces progressistes et modernistes, tout en prenant le modèle turc pour exemple. Dans le cas libyen, la situation est d'autant plus délicate que les groupes islamistes, qui ont longtemps souffert des persécutions de Kadhafi, sont armés jusqu'aux dents et voudront aller plus loin encore que ce que le chef du CNT a jugé bon de leur proposer lors de son malheureux discours de Benghazi. Encouragés par le succès d'Ennahda en Tunisie, ils voudront certainement imposer leurs idées aux modérés du nouveau régime... On le voit : les défis à venir seront difficiles à relever. La France, qui a joué un rôle essentiel dans la libération de la Libye et qui a toujours été très concernée par cette région stratégique qui englobe la Tunisie, l'Algérie, le Tchad, l'Egypte, le Soudan et le Niger, et qui, ne l'oublions pas, constitue la plaque tournante de l'immigration clandestine, véritable calamité pour l'Europe, devra veiller, dans la mesure de ses moyens, à ce que la nouvelle Libye se construise sur des bases saines et qu'elle ne redevienne pas le nid du terrorisme international. Forte de cette victoire, elle devra aussi redoubler d'efforts pour mettre un terme au génocide du peuple syrien, commis par un régime qui se croit intouchable à cause du soutien scandaleux que lui apportent encore la Russie et la Chine, et qui recule chaque jour impunément les limites de l'horreur. Désormais débarrassée de Kadhafi, la communauté internationale se doit de voler au secours des insurgés syriens, écrasés par les chars, l'aviation et la marine, ou parqués dans de véritables camps de concentration. Car elle risquerait de perdre tout le crédit qu'elle a tiré de la campagne libyenne si elle fermait les yeux sur les crimes du tyran de Damas - un tyran qui, tout bien considéré, n'a rien à envier à son homologue libyen.

Ouvrages : "Anatomie d'un tyran : Mouammar Kadhafi" (Actes Sud, 254 p., 20 €) et "Kadicha" (Plon, 230 p.,19 €). Alexandre Najjar, écrivain et avocat, responsable de "L'Orient littéraire" , Article paru dans l'édition du 27.10.11

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Alexandre Najjar, Après Ben Ali et Kadhafi, un "printemps islamiste" ? 26.10.11 | 16h38 http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/10/26/apres-ben-ali-et-kadhafi-un-printemps- islamiste_1593997_3232.html

Au Yémen, la trêve n'empêche pas les tueries à Sanaa et Taëz LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 26.10.11 | 14h08 • Mis à jour le 26.10.11 | 17h34

Au moins dix-neuf personnes, partisans et adversaires du régime, ont été tuées dans la nuit de mardi 25 à mercredi 26 octobre dans la capitale Sanaa et à Taëz. REUTERS/STR Malgré la trêve annoncée mardi 25 octobre entre forces gouvernementales et opposition, au moins vingt et une personnes, partisans et adversaires du régime, ont été tuées dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi dans la capitale Sanaa et à Taëz. Ce bilan, avancé par des sources médicales, inclut une femme et un bébé, morts quand les troupes gouvernementales ont bombardé leur maison à Taëz et deux civils tués mercredi dans le bombardement de zones résidentielles à Sanaa Au moins sept partisans du chef tribal Sadek Al-Ahmar, qui a rallié l'opposition, ont été tués dans des combats à al-Hassaba, quartier du nord de Sanaa où il réside, où une dizaine de soldats ont également trouvé la mort, selon le ministère de la défense. Plusieurs accords similaires ont échoué par le passé au Yémen. Selon l'agence officielle SABA, "le cessez-le-feu est entré en vigueur [mardi] à 15 heures et doit être suivi par le retrait des hommes armés des rues, le démantèlement des barrages et des barricades et le retour à la normale". L'accord a été négocié sous les auspices d'une commission yéménite présidée par le vice-président Abd-Rabbou Mansour Hadi. SALEH PROMET À NOUVEAU DE PARTIR Le président Ali Abdallah Saleh, dont les manifestants réclament le départ, a "réaffirmé son engagement à signer" le plan des monarchies du golfe, qui prévoit sa démission en 307

échange d'une immunité, selon le département d'Etat américain en lui demandant de "tenir cet engagement". M. Saleh a déjà promis à plusieurs reprises de signer le plan du golfe et de quitter le pouvoir, mais s'est à chaque fois ravisé. La répression au Yémen a fait au moins 861 morts et 25 000 blessés depuis janvier et le début des manifestations, selon une lettre du Mouvement de la jeunesse yéménite envoyée début octobre aux Nations unies. Au Yémen, la trêve n'empêche pas les tueries à Sanaa et Taëz26.10.11 | 17h34 http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/10/26/au-yemen-la-treve-n-empeche-pas-les-tueries-a- sanaa-et-taez_1594122_3218.html

Au Yémen, Saleh signe une trêve avec son général rebelle LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 25.10.11 | 14h56 • Mis à jour le 25.10.11 | 21h46

Vendredi 21 octobre, le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU a adopté une résolution exhortant le président Saleh à préparer son départ. REUTERS/HO Il semble proche du départ. Le président yéménite, Ali Abdallah Saleh, a assuré à l'ambassadeur américain à Sanaa qu'il comptait se conformer à un plan qui prévoit son retrait du pouvoir, a indiqué la porte-parole du département d'Etat, Victoria Nuland, mardi 25 octobre. Mme Nuland a salué ces propos, tout en soulignant que M. Saleh devait tenir parole. Car ce dernier a déjà promis à plusieurs reprises de quitter le pouvoir mais s'est ravisé à chaque fois. Cet entretien survient quatre jours après une résolution du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, vendredi, qui condamnait pour la première fois les violences au Yémen. Le Conseil exhortait le chef de l'Etat, au pouvoir depuis 1978, à signer l'accord de transfert du pouvoir mis au point par les médiateurs du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG), qui prévoit la composition d'un gouvernement de coalition, la démission du président un 308

mois après en échange d'une immunité et enfin l'organisation d'une élection présidentielle dans les soixante jours. Le président Saleh a refusé de signer cette "feuille de route" déjà à trois reprises. TRÊVE AVEC LE GÉNÉRAL REBELLE Plus tôt dans la journée, le gouvernement yéménite avait signé avec le général rebelle Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar un cessez-le-feu prévoyant la libération par les deux camps des personnes enlevées durant les mois de contestation politique. "Le cessez-le-feu est entré en vigueur à 15 heures et doit être suivi par le retrait des hommes armés des rues, le démantèlement des barrages et des barricades et le retour à la normale" dans la capitale, a précisé l'agence officielle Saba. Cet accord a été négocié sous les auspices d'une commission yéménite présidée par le vice-président Abd- Rabbou Mansour Hadi. Mais plusieurs accords similaires ont échoué par le passé au Yémen. 861 MORTS DEPUIS JANVIER De violents affrontements opposent par intermittence à Sanaa les forces fidèles au président Saleh à la première division blindée de l'armée commandée par le général dissident Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, chef de la puissante confédération tribale des Hached, notamment aux abords de la place du Changement où campent les contestataires qui réclament le départ du président depuis la fin janvier, et dans le quartier nord d'Al- Hassaba.

Des manifestants demandent le départ du président Saleh à Sanaa, mardi 25 octobre.REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah Mardi, quinze personnes ont encore été tuées dans des violences à Sanaa et à Taëz, dans le sud-ouest du pays, en dépit de la trêve. La répression a fait au moins 861 morts et 25 000 blessés depuis janvier et le début des manifestations, selon une lettre du Mouvement de la jeunesse yéménite envoyée début octobre aux Nations unies.

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Au Yémen, Saleh signe une trêve avec son général rebelle25.10.11 | 21h46 http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/10/25/au-yemen-saleh-signe-une- treve-avec-son-general-rebelle_1593666_3218.html

http://www.lemonde.fr/international/infographie/2011/10/25/ou-en-est-le-printemps- arabe_1592152_3210.html

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EDITORIAL

Islamismo en Túnez Los comicios han destruido la idea de un laicismo mayoritario asentado en Túnez 25 OCT 2011 - 23:27 CET La victoria del partido islamista moderado En Nahda en las históricas elecciones de Túnez, primeras democráticas y libres en el país norteafricano, representa un hito en el mundo árabe, a falta de resultados definitivos. El civismo y entusiasmo mostrado por los votantes tras décadas de represión están llamados a ser el espejo en que se miren otros países de la región que se han desembarazado de sus tiranos o están en trance de conseguirlo. Los comicios han destruido la idea simplista —y turística— de un laicismo mayoritario asentado en Túnez. El partido que necesariamente va a aglutinar la dispar coalición que escribirá una nueva Constitución —perseguido despiadadamente durante décadas por el derrocado Ben Ali— ha insistido durante los últimos meses, sobre todo su jefe, Rachid Ganuchi, 22 años en el exilio, en que protegerá los derechos de todos (también los conseguidos por las mujeres tunecinas) y defenderá las libertades. La Asamblea Constituyente de 217 miembros que se reúna en unos días, fragmentada por la representación proporcional y la multitud de partidos concurrentes a las elecciones, deberá designar a un Gobierno que reemplace al interino actual o impulsar remedios para la alarmante crisis económica y el desempleo en Túnez. Pero, sobre todo, tendrá que organizar un Estado y una sociedad nuevos. Al islamismo comedido de En Nahda, que según su líder quiere parecerse mucho más al que gobierna Turquía que a los Hermanos Musulmanes egipcios, le aguardan retos como perfilar las relaciones entre poder político e islam o señalar el rumbo de Túnez entre los árabes o respecto a Occidente. Y de hacerlo frente al escepticismo de muchos tunecinos, especialmente de su clase media, sobre las intenciones de Ganuchi o su capacidad para hacer buena su promesa preelectoral de poner en pie una “sociedad democrática y modélica en el mundo árabe”. Islamismo en Túnez http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/25/actualidad/1319578043_06571 5.html

Internacional TRIBUNA Libi-únez No puede haber casos más dispares que el Túnez de la ‘revolución de los jazmines’, y la Libia de la refriega civil Miguel Ángel Bastenier 25 OCT 2011 - 23:12 CET1 El “primero de la clase” —Túnez— como lo calificó en estas páginas Lluís Bassets, y no necesariamente el último —Libia—, pero sí uno de los casos más enrevesados, acaban de dar un gran paso hacia el futuro. En Túnez se votó el domingo con disciplina ejemplar a la Constituyente que ha de decidir qué quiere ser el país, gobernación 311

islamista incluida; en Libia, la victoria de los sublevados pone fin a un prólogo político, aunque la ejecución sumaria del coronel Gadafi no sea buen augurio. No puede haber, sin embargo, casos más dispares que el Túnez de la revolución de los jazmines, que está al principio del fin, y la Libia de la refriega civil bajo las alas de la OTAN, al fin del principio. Túnez ha ido forjando una identidad nacional desde el beylicato que gobernó el país bajo el Imperio Otomano hasta la ocupación francesa a fin del siglo XIX; es una nación moderna de alta cohesión social y una clase media educada, a la que Habib Burguiba, el menos islámico de todos los padres árabes de la patria, hizo tan laica como fuera verosímil en los años cincuenta. Así, prohibió la poligamia y en su mausoleo se lee: “Libertador de la mujer”. En contraste, Libia está dividida en más de 140 tribus de las que unas 20 tienen auténtica influencia; en el tiempo otomano apenas era un nido de corsarios que hostigaban el tráfico marítimo internacional —en un conocido himno militar norteamericano, se habla de las “arenas de Trípoli” por una acción punitiva desarrollada en el siglo XIX contra piratas berberiscos—; la provincia oriental o Cirenaica, con capital en Bengasi, se ha sentido siempre ajena a la parte occidental o Tripolitania, y en la primera arraigó un credo islámico rigorista, el de la cofradía de los Senussi, de la que un descendiente fue el primer rey del país, Idris I, coronado a la independencia en 1951, y depuesto por Gadafi en 1969. Si Ben Ali mantenía la carcasa de instituciones de corte occidental, partidos, Parlamento, elecciones, en la última de las cuales —2009— tuvo la desfachatez de asignarse la victoria con 99,9% de sufragios, el líder libio lo había abolido todo, hasta el Gobierno, que sustituyó por un comité, en la cúspide de una pirámide de otros comités populares que hacían supuestamente superflua la existencia del Estado. Túnez era una economía liberal aunque mafiosa, mientras que en Libia, Gadafi, que, especialmente tras la publicación en 1976 de su Libro Verde, daba serias pruebas de inestabilidad mental, lo había nacionalizado todo en nombre de la llamada yamahiriya o estado de las masas. Las dos economías se asimilaban, sin embargo, a la hora de la corrupción, y sobre todo en el dominio de sendas familiocracias: la de los Ben Ali Trabelsi (apellido de su segunda mujer) y la gadafiada. Y si la dictadura tunecina había jugado alternativamente a reprimir el islamismo y tratar de negociar con él, el libio había tratado de sustituirlo con su propia versión de la vía coránica. Hoy, el partido más importante de Túnez es En Nahda (Renacimiento), islamista, que debería estar en condiciones de formar Gobierno, y en Libia es difícil adivinar otro fermento de unión —aparte del soborno-subsidio petrolero— que el senusismo. Las apariencias en la formación de sus respectivos aparatos militares son engañosas. Ni uno ni otro dictador querían un Ejército poderoso que les inquietara, razón por la cual la milicia tunecina se limitó a no reprimir la protesta popular, sin visibles aspiraciones de dominación política; pero Gadafi había trufado Libia de milicias paralelas, entre ellas una guardia personal de 15.000 hombres, de los que una parte ha luchado a su lado hasta el fin. Los dos dictadores han acabado como corresponde a sus diferentes personalidades. El tunecino subiendo a un avión para el exilio, porque ni él se había creído lo del 99,9%, y el coronel libio, estupefacto de que parte de su pueblo se le sublevara, como el gran líder nacional que estaba convencido de ser. Pero en ningún caso está garantizado nada. El pueblo tunecino no ha experimentado jamás la vida en democracia, aunque cuando menos tiene el mérito de existir como nación, en tanto que una Libia unificada está aún por inventar. La revolución de los 312

jazmines tiene, por añadidura, la virtud de ser profeta lejos de su tierra. El Gobierno chino ha prohibido la importación de semejante flor, por si le da a alguien ideas (La lección tunecina, Sami Naïr). Libi-únez No puede haber casos más dispares que el Túnez de la ‘revolución de los jazmines’, y la Libia de la refriega civil http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/25/actualidad/1319577045_59 0831.html

Internacional Washington acelera sus planes para contener a Irán tras su salida de Irak EE UU intenta evitar que el régimen islámico de Teherán ocupe el vacío dejado Antonio Caño washington 25 OCT 2011 - 20:43 CET35

El presidente iraní se dirige a sus simpatizantes en un acto al este de Teherán. / AFP Ante el peligro de que Irán trate de llenar el vacío que Estados Unidos va a dejar dentro de pocas semanas en Irak, la Administración norteamericana ha redoblado los esfuerzos para aislar internacionalmente al régimen islámico, que vuelve a aparecer como el principal enemigo exterior, por encima incluso de una devaluada Al Qaeda. Un emisario estadounidense, David Cohen, subsecretario del Tesoro para asuntos de espionaje y financiación del terrorismo, recorre esta semana varias capitales de Europa (Londres, Berlín, París y Roma) tratando de buscar consenso en busca de una acción concertada para imponer nuevas sanciones a Irán.

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Al mismo tiempo, la Agencia Internacional de Energía Atómica (AIEA) está a punto de publicar un nuevo informe en el que se recogen los progresos hechos por Irán en el desarrollo de su programa nuclear, así como nuevas y más fundadas sospechas de que ese país está tratando de construir una bomba atómica. La preocupación de EE UU por Irán ha ido creciendo en los últimos meses en la medida en que fracasaban todos los intentos de negociación con ese Gobierno. Pero la alarma saltó al descubrirse este mes, según los investigadores norteamericanos, que el régimen de los ayatolás había financiado y respaldado un complot para matar al embajador de Arabia Saudí en Washington y probablemente cometer otros actos terroristas. La urgencia de hacer algo para contener Irán cobra una nueva dimensión tras el anuncio, la semana pasada, de la completa retirada de Irak. En su declaración sobre el tema, Barack Obama hizo una advertencia implícita a las autoridades iraníes para que “respeten la soberanía iraquí” y no intenten aprovechar la situación para incrementar su influencia en el país vecino. Pese a ese aviso, es difícil que Teherán no interprete la retirada norteamericana como un pequeño triunfo y que no disfrute de un papel más destacado en el futuro de Irak. Como mínimo, Irán tiene hoy en Bagdad un equipo gobernante al que conoce desde hace tiempo y con el que conserva lazos de cierta amistad. Tanto el presidente iraquí, Yalal Talabani, como el primer ministro, Nuri al Maliki, pasaron en Irán parte de su exilio durante la dictadura de Sadam Husein. Muchos políticos iraquíes comparten esa circunstancia, y uno de los principales socios en la coalición que sostiene a Maliki, el clérigo chií Muqtada al Sáder, vivió en Irán durante el tiempo de la invasión militar estadounidense. Aunque existe una rivalidad tradicional entre los dos países, que libraron una sangrienta guerra entre 1980 y 1988, actualmente gobierna en Irak la generación más proiraní de la historia. Eso puede representar un problema para EE UU si Maliki, cuyo Gobierno sigue siendo objetivo de la violencia terrorista, se debilita más en el futuro. En el caso de que Maliki necesite ayuda militar para su Ejército y no cuente con los soldados norteamericanos, ¿a quién va a acudir? La respuesta es obvia: solo tiene a Irán. No todas las circunstancias son desventajosas para Washington. EE UU cree que las sanciones de los últimos años han debilitado económicamente a Irán, que puede aún sufrir mucho más si se le imponen nuevos castigos. Más importante aún, el régimen ha dado numerosas muestras de división entre su mando político, el presidente Mahmud Ahmadinejad, y su mando religioso, el líder supremo Ali Jamenei. Aunque esas tensiones parecen estar resolviéndose a favor de Jamenei, eso no despeja las incertidumbres que pesan sobre el futuro político de Irán. Jamenei es un hombre de 72 años que lleva 30 en la cúspide del poder y que compite con un político, como Ahmadinejad, que cuenta con un considerable respaldo popular. Irán, por tanto, no goza, de acuerdo al cálculo norteamericano, de la vitalidad que mostraba en los primeros años de la revolución y está menos capacitado para aventuras tan arriesgadas como la que significaría un enfrentamiento directo con EE UU. La situación es, pese a todo, enormemente volátil. A la fragilidad del Gobierno iraquí, se unen ahora la crisis creciente en Siria, otro aliado de Teherán, y las dificultades para la sucesión en Arabia Saudí, el mayor enemigo iraní. Por no mencionar el riesgo permanente de que Israel, que siente su supervivencia amenazada por Irán, intente una acción por su cuenta. 314

Obama trata de navegar en medio de esa tormenta intentado controlarla para que no le estalle en medio de la campaña electoral ya inminente. La estrategia es contener a Irán sin llegar hasta el extremo de la guerra. Pero Obama no tiene plenamente bajo control esa estrategia. Antonio Caño Washington acelera sus planes para contener a Irán tras su salida de Irak25 OCT 2011 - 20:43 CET35 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/25/actualidad/13195682 26_244550.html

Internacional ELECCIONES EN TÚNEZ Los islamistas buscan un pacto en Túnez En Nahda se muestra dispuesto a gobernar en coalición con dos partidos laicos Los islamistas ganan las elecciones en Túnez Ignacio Cembrero Túnez 25 OCT 2011 - 21:54 CET13 Archivado en:

Partidarias de la formación islamista En Nahda celebran la victoria el lunes en Túnez / ZOUBEIR SOUISSI (REUTERS) Los resultados definitivos de las elecciones de Túnez no se conocen aún —los parciales apuntan a una arrolladora victoria de los islamistas de En Nahda—, pero aún así empieza ya a configurarse la futura alianza que gobernará el primer país árabe en el que triunfó la revolución, hace ya algo más de nueve meses. Túnez será presumiblemente dirigido por una amplia coalición entre En Nahda y un par de partidos laicos, más bien de izquierdas y con un barniz nacionalista: Ettakatol, dirigido por Mustafá Ben Jaafar, perteneciente a la Internacional Socialista, y el 315

Congreso para la República (CpR), fundado en el exilio parisino por el médico Moncef Marzouki, muy dolido con el trato amable que Europa otorgaba a la dictadura de Ben Ali derrocada en enero. A medida que se divulgan los datos del recuento se confirma el triunfo electoral de En Nahda con algo más del 40% de los sufragios, aunque en alguna circunscripción, como la bereber de Tataouine, llamada la puerta del desierto, la victoria es aún más aplastante. Sus votos cuadriplican los de todos sus rivales juntos. En el conjunto del país CpR y Ettakatol se sitúan en segundo y tercer lugar. “La emergencia de estos tres partidos como los tres más votados ilustra el empeño de los tunecinos en romper tajantemente con el pasado”, aseguran las profesoras tunecinas Khadija Mohsen-Finan, de la Universidad de París VIII, y Malika Zeghal, de la Universidad de Harvard. La victoria de la formación de Ganouchi ha sido arrolladora en el sur del país La victoria de En Nahda en escaños —la Asamblea Constituyente elegida el domingo cuenta con 217— es algo menor porque la ley electoral perjudica a las grandes formaciones y les impide alcanzar la mayoría absoluta. Acaso por esa razón y porque intentan no asustar a nadie, los responsables de En Nahda repiten hasta la saciedad desde el lunes que son moderados, que respetarán el acervo casi laico de la República y que desean formar una amplia coalición. “Estamos preparados para formar una alianza con el CpR y Ettakatol, ya que sus opiniones no están alejadas de las nuestras”, declaró Ali Larayed, responsable de En Nahda, pese a que se trata de dos partidos laicos. “Está bien que se asocien esos tres para gobernar y redactar la Constitución”, asegura el profesor francés Pierre Vermeren, autor de dos libros sobre Túnez. “Así construirán un edificio más sólido”. De la Asamblea deberá emanar un Gobierno y el jefe del Estado. Ayer surgió el primer candidato a la presidencia, el socialista Mustafá Ben Jaafar, de 71 años, líder del partido Ettakatol, que lo anunció al diario belga Le Soir. Médico, casado con una francesa, ya intentó en 2009 presentarse contra Ben Ali, pero el Consejo Constitucional rechazó su candidatura. Para ganar ahora necesita el apoyo de los islamistas, que probablemente no presentarán candidato. Su líder, Rachid Ghanouchi, ni siquiera ha concurrido a las elecciones del domingo. La primera piedra del edificio democrático, las elecciones del domingo, es ya de por sí sólida. La misión de observadores de la UE, la más numerosa de las extranjeras, señaló ayer que se habían desarrollado con “transparencia” y que las regularidades detectadas en el 3% de los colegios visitados eran “menores”. Omitieron precisar que la mayoría de ellas fueron protagonizadas por En Nahda. La Fundación Carter, que desplegó a 70 observadores, también alabó la “transparencia”, así como el “entusiasmo” ciudadano. El socialista Mustafá Ben Jaafar, de 71 años, se presenta como candidato a la presidencia de la República Pese a todo unos 400 tunecinos, en su mayoría jóvenes, se concentraron ayer ante el centro de prensa para denunciar supuestas manipulaciones de En Nahda. Exigían además que se investigue su financiación, que procede, en parte, de mecenas privados y públicos del golfo Pérsico. La pureza democrática no está reñida, sin embargo, con un enorme retraso a la hora de dar a conocer los resultados. Al cierre de esta edición, 48 horas después de la clausura 316

de los colegios, el organismo independiente encargado de organizar las elecciones (ISIE) solo había facilitado resultados completos de 12 de las 27 circunscripciones —en todas ellas ganaba En Nahda— y ni siquiera había proporcionado el dato global de la participación. En los colegios donde votaron los ciudadanos inscritos como votantes superaba el 90%, pero se ignoraba cuántos lo hicieron en los centros especiales para no inscritos. Ignacio Cembrero Los islamistas buscan un pacto en Túnez. En Nahda se muestra dispuesto a gobernar en coalición con dos partidos laicos25 OCT 2011 - 21:54 CET13 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/25/actualidad/1319572196_921197.html a

¿El triunfo islamista en Túnez es una amenaza para el proceso democrático? La clara victoria del partido En Nahda en las elecciones tunecinas ha relegado a los partidos laicos a posiciones secundarias. La moderación de los islamistas y su papel relevante en la oposión a la dictadura de Ben Alí han sido claves de su éxito. ¿Deben gobernar en coalición los islamistas durante el proceso constituyente? ¿Cuáles deben ser los ejes de la futura Constitución? ¿Se impondrá el laicismo en las leyes?

Cristina Manzano El triunfo de En Nahda en Túnez no tiene por qué ser una amenaza para el proceso democrático. Según su discurso, sus postulados políticos están cerca de la socialdemocracia. Son firmes, por ejemplo, en la defensa de los derechos humanos, después de que muchas de sus principales figuras fueran perseguidas, torturadas y encarceladas por Ben Ali. Gobernar en coalición con dos partidos laicos puede ser un importante factor de estabilidad y de consenso. Su victoria se ha debido en buena medida a la fragmentación del resto de opciones. No ha sido fácil en Túnez levantar un entramado de partidos tras décadas de represión y cuando los que tenían alguna experiencia en el régimen anterior han sido expulsados del proceso. En Occidente miramos con sospecha todo lo que tenga el apellido islamista, pero En Nahda afirman que mantendrán los avances sociales -lo relacionado con la mujer, por ejemplo- que ha habido en Túnez. Ahora bien, su principal desafío será darle la vuelta a una economía maltrecha y a las disparidades regionales. La lucha por un futuro con oportunidades fue el origen de la primavera árabe.

Kattya Cascante

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El proceso democrático iniciado en Túnez es ya una muy buena noticia y el hecho de que hayan sido capaces de legitimar unas primeras elecciones con una participación tan amplia, demuestra que están en marcha. ¿Amenazas? Probablemente todas, pero no creo que vengan exclusivamente de la mano de un partido que (teóricamente) liderará el proceso de elaboración de la Constitución (para lo que además, necesita de consenso de los divididos laicos) durante un sólo año. La represión de Ben Alí pide revancha y si la mitad de la población considera representativo un partido de este corte confesional, debe darse el tiempo robado de la dictadura y calmar ánimos (incluido los nuestros). Decía, que las amenazas no vendrán sólo de la mano de la política interna, sino de los procesos regionales de sus vecinos y de la propia incertidumbre de la economía internacional. Hace unos meses estuve en Túnez, un país que debe superar 20 años con la mitad de su juventud (muy formada) en paro y un 40% de su población por debajo del índice de la pobreza. Un reto enorme para cualquier partido en una recién estrenada democracia.

Ignacio Cembrero Si En Nahda cumple sus promesas, si es lo que dice ser, si carece de ese doble lenguaje del que le acusan sus enemigos, no es un peligro. Si es así la que fue la sociedad más laica del norte de África se orienta paulatinamente, con matices, hacia el modelo turco. Turquía no es la democracia ideal, pero su sistema político es más democrático e incorpora mayores dosis de Estado de derecho que cualquiera de los regímenes norteafricanos. No olvidemos que la victoria islamista esproporcional a la persecución que esa corriente padeció durante la dictadura de Ben Ali que les reprimía bajo los aplausos de Occidente con Francia a la cabeza. Respaldó a la dictadura hasta el último momento secundada por los países del sur de Europa, entre ellos España, que el 14 de enero de 2011 por la mañana aún creía que el autócrata podía salvarse. Huyó del país horas después. Confiemos en que Occidente no cometa los mismos errores. Confiemos en que En Nahda, en Túnez, tampoco cometa los mismos atropellos que sus correligionarios argelinos del FIS que hace 20 años estuvieron a punto de llegar al poder en Argelia.

Joaquín Roy Tras el triunfo de llamado islamismo moderado en Túnez, En Nahda, las fuerzas democráticas en toda la región y en Europa deben sentirse satisfechas y esperanzadas. La alternativa radical, de momento no factible, hubiera sido peor. Los que desearían que la fuerza hegemónica fuera una formación que garantizara el laicismo a toda prueba, pueden estar apostando por una utopía, probablemente inalcanzable en toda la región, sobre todo si se tiene en cuenta que es precisamente ese país el que aparentemente tendría mejores probabilidades de cobijar un partido mayoritario libre de connotaciones religiosas, un poco como el modelo turco de Mustafá Kemal, Ataturk,

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fundador de la Turquía moderna, bastión de la separación entre la iglesia y el estado. Curiosamente el modelo para un futuro democrático en Túnez puede venir también de Turquía, con unos aderezos de la Europa que consiguió la reconstrucción y contribuyó al éxito de la Unión Europea. El partido tunecino puede inspirarse en el AKP de Recep Erdogan: ambos pueden replicar la experiencia de la Democracia Cristiana en Europa.

Laura Ruiz de Elvira Varias reflexiones. En primer lugar deberíamos felicitar todos a los tunecinos por diferentes razones: por haber sabido organizar estas elecciones transparentes relativamente rápido, por haber participado en masa (90% de participación) y por haberlo hecho sin incidentes. En segundo lugar, la victoria de al-Nahda, partido de inspiración islamista moderada, y no integrista como se puede leer en algunos medios, es relativa, puesto que no ha obtenido la mayoría, lo que quiere decir que más de la mitad de los tunecinos que han votado se han decantado por otros partidos no religiosos, la mayoría laicos y de izquierda. En tercer lugar, sus buenos resultados son en parte el reflejo de la división de los partidos de izquierda y de las rivalidades personales de sus líderes. Por último, el modelo turco pone de manifiesto que el gobierno de un partido de corte islamista moderado no tiene por qué poner en peligro los procesos o sistemas democráticos.

Haizam Amirah-Fernández La amenaza para el proceso democrático en Túnez no es la victoria del partido islamista moderado En Nahda, sino la llegada al poder de cualquier partido o dirigente que imponga sus políticas a la sociedad y no crea en la alternancia en el poder. Ben Ali sí fue algo más que una amenaza para la democracia en Túnez. Se sabrá si En Nahda también lo es en función de sus hechos y declaraciones. Hasta el momento, sus dirigentes insisten en que su modelo es Turquía. He tenido la oportunidad de reunirme con algunos de sus líderes. Sus posturas me parecieron pragmáticas, pues decían que Túnez no puede vivir aislado del mundo. Necesitan los ingresos del turismo y las inversiones extranjeras para crear trabajo y prosperidad. Me preocupan más las bases rurales del partido. Por el momento, necesitarán pactar con otras fuerzas políticas en la Asamblea Constituyente. La sociedad tunecina ha dado un ejemplo fascinante de democracia que hay que respetar. Las democracias deben denunciar cualquier abuso de poder de los nuevos gobernantes tunecinos, no porque sean islamistas, sino porque no sean demócratas. ¿El triunfo islamista en Túnez es una amenaza para el proceso democrático?http://eskup.elpais.com/*eldebateinternacional20111026

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Internacional La UE concentrará la ayuda al desarrollo en la democracia y los derechos humanos La inversión europea se centrará en menos países y sectores, para aumentar el impacto Estados que han pasado a ser de renta media dejarán de ser receptores de ayuda presupuestaria Gloria Rodríguez-Pina Bruselas 25 OCT 2011 - 13:34 CET

El comisario europeo Andris Piebalgs y una misión de la UE, en un visita a Afganistán. / EC que la Unión Europa (UE) ha extraído de la primavera árabe es que sin democracia y respeto a los derechos humanos el crecimiento económico no alcanza a toda la población. La nueva política europea de cooperación y desarrollo, que se pondrá en marcha en 2014 pero ya se ultima en los despachos de Bruselas, favorecerá a los países que se comprometan con esos principios. La UE, el mayor donante de ayuda al desarrollo -en 2010 aportó 54.000 millones de euros-, pretende también que su trabajo y su dinero tengan "más impacto", un concepto que se repite como un mantra en la capital europea. Como explicaron funcionarios de la Comisión Europea a periodistas de varias nacionalidades la semana pasada en Bruselas, entre 2014 y 2020 la inversión se concentrará en menos sectores y en menos países.

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Según el comisario europeo Andris Piebalgs, "es demasiado ambicioso intentar ayudar en todas partes, y el impacto no es suficientemente fuerte". La ayuda presupuestaria se dedicará a cooperar con países que respeten los valores europeos Europa dedicará su programa de ayuda presupuestaria -por el que el dinero se integra directamente en las arcas de los Estados receptores- a cooperar con países que respeten los valores europeos y ratifiquen tratados internacionales que los recojan. Si el compromiso del país receptor con la democracia, la transparencia y los derechos humanos se deteriora, la UE le avisará antes de cortar el grifo. En los países considerados "frágiles", la ayuda se dedicará a la construcción de instituciones democráticas, a través del debate político entre donante y receptor. Piebalgs, que apuntó a Túnez como ejemplo, adelantó que se aplicará el principio de "más por más", es decir, "más reformas, más ayuda". A pesar de estos incentivos, como señaló un alto funcionario de la Comisión, "al final, responder a las demandas de los ciudadanos es una opción que corresponde a los países". Aquellos donde persistan las dictaduras, señaló otro, seguirán contando con el apoyo de Europa -canalizado a través de la sociedad civil-, mediante la financiación de proyectos en sectores como la educación o la sanidad. China y Brasil, excluidos Junto al filtro democrático, la UE planea excluir de la lista de receptores de ayuda presupuestaria a países que considera que ya no la necesitan y que pueden, por sí solos, ocuparse de erradicar la pobreza dentro de sus fronteras. La Comisión todavía no ha concretado aún de qué Estados se tratará, aunque Piebalgs, responsable de la política europea de cooperación y desarrollo, apunta a aquellos que han pasado de ser de renta baja a renta media, como Brasil, China e India, pero no solo. En estos territorios, señalan las ONG, habita todavía el 75% de la población mundial que vive por debajo del umbral de la pobreza. En los nuevos países de renta media, como China e India, habita todavía el 75% de la población que vive por debajo del umbral de la pobreza Natalia Alonso, responsable de la oficina en Bruselas de Oxfam Internacional, coincide en que China "es un caso muy obvio en el que la cooperación europea supone una gota en el océano, y no la necesita". Advierte, no obstante, de que países como Angola aún registran altos índices de desigualdad. "A otros, que están en transición y comienzan a crear riqueza, hay que ayudarles todavía a generar recursos y movilizar su sistema impositivo", defiende Alonso. Hasta que el documento que plasma la futura política europea sea aprobado por los 27 Estados miembros de la Unión -se calcula que en mayo de 2014- puede sufrir modificaciones. En una reunión para presentar la Agenda para el Cambio, como la ha bautizado la Comisión, Piebalgs insistió, sin embargo, en que aunque en estos países quedan focos de pobreza, "ellos mismos son quienes se encuentran en mejor situación para erradicarla y deben ser responsables de crear sus propias redes sociales". El comisario recordó, con ánimo tranquilizador, que el objetivo último de la cooperación al desarrollo es "ayudar a las personas a salir de la pobreza, es decir, proporcionarles seguridad y oportunidades para llevar comida a casa". "La gente que más lo necesita seguirá siendo la prioridad", prometió, independientemente de quiénes les gobiernen. 321

Sector privado como agente de desarrollo Otra de las novedades de la Agenda, el fomento de la participación del sector privado en la política de cooperación, fue otro de los temas más controvertidos debatidos en una mesa redonda con ONG, representantes de países en desarrollo y otros organismos como el Banco Europeo de Inversiones. Piebalgs fue rotundo: "Si el sector privado no se implica, se pierde la lucha contra la pobreza". Núria Molina, directora de la Red Europea sobre Deuda y Desarrollo, señaló la necesidad de asegurar que "las compañías con dinero en paraísos financieros no reciban ni un euro" de dinero público, y de que este se dedique, en cambio, a las pequeñas y medianas empresas, que son las que tienen dificultades para acceder al crédito. En la misma línea, otras condiciones que la sociedad civil pide a la UE que imponga es que las compañías respeten principios básicos, como los derechos de los trabajadores y la protección de la infancia. La sociedad civil exige que se regule y vigile al sector privado si ha de participar en los programas europeos de ayuda al desarrollo John Rwangombwa, ministro de Economía de Ruanda, afirmó durante el encuentro que "la ayuda por sí sola no es suficiente". "Necesitamos también inversión privada", sostuvo. Las ONG reconocen que el sector privado es importante, pero insisten en que si quiere ser un actor de desarrollo, debe cumplir con el objetivo de acabar con la pobreza, como apuntó Alonso en un encuentro posterior con periodistas. La responsable de Oxfam en Bruselas recuerda que 500 millones de pequeños agricultores alimentan a 2.000 millones de personas que viven en la pobreza. "Sí queremos ese tipo de inversión", afirmó a este periódico. "Lo que no queremos son actuaciones como el land grabbing", aclaró. Un tema recurrente, junto a las patentes farmacéuticas, cuando se habla de la intervención de grandes empresas en países en desarrollo. Consiste en transacciones a gran escala por las que países o empresas que buscan asegurarse su propio suministro agrícola adquieren enormes extensiones de tierra en países más pobres. Para ilustrarlo, no faltan ejemplos, como el de una empresa china que compró un vasto terreno en Etiopía, del que expulsó a la población nómada que lo habitaba y que no tenía derechos de propiedad sobre la tierra. En lo que todos, ONG, países receptores y la Dirección General que encabeza Andris Piebalgs coinciden es en su deseo de incrementar el presupuesto de la UE para alcanzar los Objetivos del Milenio. Y en la necesidad de que cada euro genere impacto, a través de una mayor coordinación entre los Estados miembros para evitar duplicar esfuerzos. En tiempos de dificultades económicas y recortes como los que atraviesa Europa, pedir una porción más grande del pastel de los impuestos de los europeos para gastarlo fuera no se antoja fácil. Con esa misión, Piebalgs apela no solo a razones morales como la necesidad de reducir el hambre y la mortalidad en los países más pobres. El desarrollo de estos territorios, asegura, repercute en Europa y sus ciudadanos, porque permite exportar a estos lugares, reduce la inmigración ilegal y erradica las razones para el terrorismo. "Invertir en el desarrollo futuro del mundo es invertir en nuestro futuro", reiteró el comisario. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/21/actualidad/1319204902_63688 5.html

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Internacional La transición en Libia La nueva Libia nace marcada por el desgobierno y los excesos de los rebeldes Las atrocidades perpetradas por las fuerzas del Gobierno interino comienzan a aflorar Juan Miguel Muñoz Trípoli 25 OCT 2011 - 23:40 CET123 El desgobierno, la incapacidad palmaria para someter a las anárquicas brigadas de alguna ciudad libia, las pugnas territoriales, la división entre liberales e islamistas y el vacío político – “Tampoco nosotros sabemos bien quiénes forman la clase política”, comentaba ayer a este diario un diplomático occidental-- marcan el nacimiento de la nueva Libia, una vez enterrados hoy, en un lugar secreto en las profundidades del desierto, el dictador Muamar el Gadafi y su hijo Mutasim. Que ambos fueron asesinados resulta evidente, por mucho que el primer ministro dimisionario, Mahmud Yibril, asegurara, nada más conocerse la muerte del déspota, que a este no le metieron un tiro en la cabeza. Las atrocidades perpetradas por los rebeldes comienzan a aflorar en un país en el que los derechos humanos fueron pisoteados con saña durante 42 años. Para algunos insurgentes –al menos para las brigadas de Misrata que conquistaron Sirte y apresaron a Gadafi— ha prevalecido el rencor hacia quien casi les despojó de su condición humana. Al menos 76 cadáveres de fieles a Gadafi fueron hallados el domingo en Sirte, ciudad natal del autócrata, muchos de ellos maniatados. La reacción de las autoridades, enfrascadas en la formación de un nuevo Gobierno, es tibia. Se anuncia una investigación oficial, pero casi todos los dirigentes eluden el asunto. La ausencia de autoridad ha sido notoria en la gestión del entierro de Gadafi. Después de que Yibril fracasara en su empeño por convencer a los milicianos de que se entregaran los cuerpos de los difuntos al Gobierno interino, los cadáveres comenzaron a pudrirse a la vista de miles de curiosos que han visitado el mercado de Misrata. El macabro escarnio de los restos de Gadafi y su vástago concluyó ayer. Hoy, antes de ser trasladados a su tumba, el clérigo que acompañaba al dictador y dos familiares detenidos junto a él han presenciado los rezos musulmanes previos al entierro. Después, los cuerpos fueron entregados a dos “funcionarios de toda confianza”, según explicó a Reuters Abdel Majid Mletga, un portavoz del Consejo Nacional Transitorio (CNT), el organismo que dirigió el alzamiento y la transición a una democracia cuyo arraigo puede costar un mundo. Gadafi y Mutasim ya reposan bajo tierra. Como lo hacen otros muchos leales al régimen depuesto. Human Rights Watch afirma que en Bengasi se produjeron linchamientos en primavera. Y también en Trípoli ha denunciado la persecución de los negros, muchos sospechosos de ser esbirros del régimen. Los llamamientos proferidos por el pío presidente del CNT, Mustafá Abdel Yalil, para un tratamiento decente de los capturados han caído en terreno yermo. Ignorantes de las consecuencias que puede acarrear la comisión de un crimen de guerra, el presunto asesino de Gadafi se vanagloriaba de su `hazaña’. Muchos otros milicianos pugnan en los vídeos difundidos por aparecer exultantes, unos vídeos en los que el tirano es vejado y golpeado.

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Los libios están ebrios de libertad, a menudo mal encauzada. Jóvenes se dedican a hacer trompos con sus vehículos en calles concurridas; el hachís en las calles –fumar drogas en la vía pública era antes un riesgo inasumible- es fácil de olfatear. Pero también han florecido más de 200 nuevas publicaciones, y los bereberes, discriminados por el régimen, abren escuelas para enseñar su lengua prohibida durante cuatro décadas y pasean orgullosos con su bandera por Trípoli. El trasiego de camionetas dotadas de ametralladoras y baterías antiaéreas –símbolo de la rebelión que nació en la oriental Bengasi en febrero— se difumina a pasos agigantados. Es, tal vez, la única señal de que los ciudadanos comienzan a obedecer a unas autoridades ausentes, criticadas ayer por decenas de milicianos que se preguntaban a gritos a las puertas de un hotel donde se alojan miembros del CNT: “¿Dónde está el ministro de Sanidad?”. Son miles los heridos y amputados que carecen de la necesaria atención. El Ejecutivo todavía no se ha trasladado a una capital, Trípoli, que recobra el pulso ante un panorama político sembrado de incógnitas y una certeza. Ninguna ley podrá contravenir la Sharia, la ley islámica, lo que abre la puerta legal –en la práctica, aunque no es un fenómeno extendido, siempre se practicó durante el régimen-- a la poligamia, una evidente regresión para el estatus civil de la mujeres, que en gran medida abominan de esta tradición, salvo, como explica Malkis Blau, una médico de 25 años, que la esposa esté enferma o no pueda procrear. Abdel Yalil también ha dicho que serán eliminados los intereses bancarios y que esta norma se aplica ya a los préstamos inferiores a los 10.000 dinares (5.000 euros). Juan Miguel Muñoz La nueva Libia nace marcada por el desgobierno y los excesos de los rebeldes25 OCT 2011 - 23:40 CET123 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/25/actualidad/1319567586_45651 5.html

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10/25/2011 01:21 PM The World from Berlin The Arab Spring 'Will Create Strong

Islamist Parties'10 The strong showing by Islamists in Tunisia's elections has raised doubts about the Arab Spring. Will rule by dictators in North Africa be replaced by Sharia law? Islam will have to play a role, say German commentators, but it's not necessarily the end of the world -- and Tunisian secularists are also strong. Tunisians disappointed Western observers this week by giving Islamists a big majority in the country's historic first election. A final count is expected Tuesday afternoon, but the poll was transparent, and Ennahda, a self-described moderate Islamist party, won an estimated one-third of the national parliament seats. Ennahda will have to form a coalition to govern, but the widespread support for the party has disappointed many who hoped for a different outcome when Tunisia, almost by accident, started the wave of "Arab Spring" movements in North Africa this year. Tunisians fed up with joblessness and dictatorship took bravely to the streets and forced the long-ruling autocrat Zine El Abidine Ben Ali into Saudi Arabian exile. 'Freedom is Very Important to Us' Ennahda's leader, Rashid al-Ghannushi, was for many years a London-exiled political dissenter, and he still benefits from popular support among Tunisia's poor. He likes to compare Ennahda to Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ruling Islamist party in Turkey (the AKP) -- or, less obviously, to Germany's center-right Christian Democrats. Last week, before the Sunday poll, he defended the role of Islam in government. "Sharia is not something that is alien or strange to our societies," he said. "For example, in Britain we have Islamic finance and Islamic banking, and Islamic family law can be applied for marriage and divorce. We don't see Sharia interfering in people's private lives or in their freedom to wear what they want. Personal freedom is very important for us." German commentators on Tuesday worry about the prospect of women's rights in Tunisia, but they sound guardedly optimistic about the country's future. The center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "It's no surprise that the Islamist Ennahda party emerged as the strongest power from the some 80 parties that emerged from Tunisia's revolution. Even Tunisia, which is quite secular compared to other Arab countries, and where women continue to find their place in public life, is deeply rooted in Islam and its history." "Still, one will have to pay attention to whether the promises of Ennahda leader Rashid al-Ghannushi, who said his party was moderate and supported democracy and pluralism, were the truth or simply campaign maneuvers. Not a few Tunisians who voted for other parties fear that Ghannushi is a wolf in sheep's clothing." The conservative daily Die Welt writes:

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"Ennahda stands for tradition and enjoys solid organization within its ranks. It also appears to be the only Tunisian party that has received massive financial aid from outside, presumably from the Gulf states. Unlike other parties on the ballot, Ennahda can also claim that it was utterly banned under Ben Ali; its leader had to live in exile. The party enjoys a kind of credibility bonus." "One shouldn't talk (yet) about an end to the Arab Spring in Tunisia. Even if a regime similar to Turkey's AKP seems unsavory to Europeans: Success in founding a new state, even with a Sharia-oriented party in the lead, as long as it accepts the principles of plurality and human rights, will be an enormous step forward." The left-leaning daily Die Tageszeitung writes: "There are two ways (for secularists) to deal with this election. One would be to form an alliance of all the secular powers in order to have a government opposed to the Ennahda party. The other would be to form a national unity government. Neither option is going to be easy. The Ennahda party has already promised to mobilize its followers if the secularists try to stand in its way. But a government of national unity won't be able to represent all major parties." "The politically moderate Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), which is expected to become the second most powerful force in the government, declined offers to form alliances with both the Ennahda party and the Modern Democratic Axis, an alliance of small leftist and independent candidates. But no matter who is ultimately in the government, a number of questions about the new constitution appear resolved after Ennahda's victory. Like the old constitution, the new one will define Tunisia as an Islamic nation. Major setbacks in matters like women's rights seem unlikely, though, because they would only provoke the non-Islamists." Financial daily Handelsblatt writes: "Tunisia ushered in an era of free elections in the Arab Spring countries -- and the Islamist Ennahda party promptly won a clear victory. In Egypt, where the parliamentary election is planned for November, the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to earn the most votes. And for the Libyans, who will likely vote in a few months, the Islamists will also play a big role. After all, the National Transitional Council has said it wants to follow Sharia law." "We should get used to the fact that democracy in many Arab countries will create strong Islamist parties. There are worse things. For too long, fear of Islamists has led the US and Europe to support terrible despots like Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak. Now they should not make the mistake of withdrawing their support of the young democracies due to unwanted results." -- Michael Scott Moore URL: The Arab Spring 'Will Create Strong Islamist Parties'10/25/2011 01:21 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,793876,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links:  Tunisia Tastes Democracy: Early Results Point to Victory for the Islamists (10/24/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,793595,00.html  The Smiling Islamist: Popular Politician Worries Secular Tunisians (10/11/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,791018,00.html  Return of the Islamists: A Questionable Form of Freedom for North Africa (09/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788397,00.html 326

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October 24, 2011 Moderate Islamist Party Heads Toward Victory in Tunisia By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK TUNIS — Tunisia’s moderate Islamist political party emerged Monday as the acknowledged leader in elections for a constitutional assembly and began talks to form a unity government with a coalition of liberals in a rare alliance that party leaders hailed as an inclusive model for countries emerging from the tumult of the Arab Spring.

Moises Saman for The New York Times: Supporters of the Ennahdha party in Tunis on Monday. By Monday afternoon, Tunisian liberal parties said they were entering discussions to form a government led by their Islamist rival, Ennahda, after it swept to a plurality of about 40 percent in preliminary vote tallies. The acceptance of the results by rivals signaled the beginning of a partnership seldom seen in the Arab world, where Islamists’ few opportunities for victories at the voting booth have sometimes led to harsh crackdown or civil war. In neighboring Algeria, an electoral victory by Islamists 20 years ago set off a military coup and a decade of bloodshed, and in the Palestinian territories, the sweep to victory of Hamas in 2006 elections led to a showdown with the West, a split in the government and armed conflict in Gaza.

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Tunisia’s was the first election of the Arab Spring, held to form an assembly that will govern while it writes a constitution, 10 months after the ouster of President Zine el- Abidine Ben Ali. Islamists cheered the results as a harbinger of their ascent after revolts across the region. Islamists in Egypt are poised for big victories in parliamentary elections next month and their counterparts in Libya are playing dominant roles in its post- Qaddafi transition. “This proves that there is no Islamist exception, no Arab exception about democracy,” said Essam el-Erian, a leader of the new political party formed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. “We are as democratic as any country.” In Tunisia and elsewhere some are wary of the Islamists’ surge, arguing that party leaders sound moderate now but harbor a conservative religious agenda. Tunisia, arguably closer to Europe than the other states swept up in the political upheaval of the past year, is widely viewed as having the best chance of establishing a genuinely pluralistic model of government.

Moises Saman for The New York Times: Supporters of the Ennahdha party listened in Tunis on Monday during a press conference by party leaders to announce results in Sunday's elections Leaders of Ennahda noted that their party championed a greater commitment to the principles of Western-style liberal democracy than any other Islamist party in the region, and they said they hoped their example would help lead other Islamists in a similar liberal direction. “We are the most progressive Islamic party in the region,” said Soumaya Ghannoushi, a British newspaper columnist and a scholar at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. She is the daughter of Ennahda’s founder and acts as a party spokeswoman.

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“Accepting each other, accepting pluralism, accepting diversity and trying to work together — this is the lesson Ennahda can give to other Islamic political movements,” she said. In countries like Egypt, where Islamists are more ideologically divided, Ennahda’s victory was sure to embolden those who favor a more liberal approach, including some within Egypt’s mainstream Muslim Brotherhood as well as breakaway groups like the New Center Party or a new party founded by former leaders of the Brotherhood Youth — groups already drawn toward the thought of Ennahda’s founder. But in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood also faces competition from new parties formed by ultraconservatives, known as Salafis, who seek an explicitly Islamic state. Those already inclined to follow the Ennahda example “are not the most important players right now in the Islamist movement in Egypt,” argued Prof. Samer Shehata, a scholar of the region at Georgetown University. As a result, he said, Egypt’s secular liberals are likely to view the strong showing of Tunisia’s Islamists with “great concern.” The final margin of victory for Ennahda remained to be seen Monday as Tunisian authorities continued to tabulate results. In the interest of transparency, officials counted the votes in the presence of observers in each polling place after closing Sunday night and posted the tally on the door, enabling political parties to compile their own rough estimates by Monday afternoon. Though reliable statistics were unavailable, observers said turnout had exceeded expectations. Some voters waited in line for as many as six hours. In a news conference to announce its success, an Ennahda spokesman said the party had confirmed winning a plurality of more than 30 percent of the vote and the largest share in every district. A top party official, Ali Larayedh, said in an interview that Ennahda expected that the final result would be closer to 50 percent. The Progressive Democratic Party, a fierce critic of Ennahda and considered its chief liberal rival, failed to win much support. Instead, Ennahda is discussing a coalition with two less confrontational liberal parties, the Congress for the Republic, founded by the human rights activist Moncef Marzouki, and Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties, known by the Arabic name Ettakatol. Ennahda officials say their interim government will focus on economic development and internal security, not moral issues. Their candidates and leaders focused on the same practical themes on the campaign trail. Acknowledging a strong tradition of women’s rights in Tunisia that is unusual for the region, the party’s officials have repeatedly pledged to promote equal opportunities in employment and education as well as the freedom to choose or reject Islamic dress like the head scarf. The party’s founder, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, often says that Ennahda is not a religious party and claims no special authority in interpreting Islam. Instead, he says, the party’s members merely draw their values from Islam. The party recently decided to call itself Islamic instead of Islamist because the latter term evokes theocracy to Westerners; in practice, however, its members still sometimes call themselves Islamists. But Ennahda has not hesitated to capitalize on Islam’s popularity or prestige in the eyes of voters. Its supporters sing religious songs at rallies, its speakers quote freely from the

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Koran and its leaders often talk about protecting the right to practice Islam after decades of pressure from Tunisia’s secular dictators. Supporters of Ennahda can often be heard encouraging others to vote for “God’s party.” And some have said they expect Ennahda to improve the moral character of Tunisians by imposing restrictions on alcohol and profanity or blasphemy in popular culture, and even on what women are allowed to wear. But in an interview, Ms. Ghannoushi, the party founder’s daughter (she uses a slightly different English spelling for her surname) and a professional woman who wears a head scarf, said that those with such expectations would be disappointed. “That is not in the program of Ennahda,” she said. Hend Hasassi contributed reporting. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/world/africa/ennahda-moderate-islamic-party- makes-strong-showing-in-tunisia-vote.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

Gaddafi's burial and Tunisian election results - live updates • Muammar Gaddafi buried in a secret desert grave, NTC says An-Nahda declares victory in Tunisian elections 12.05pm: In Tunisia, the An-Nahda party says it has obtained "first place" in the country's first free election. The election is to form an assembly that will sit for one year to draft a new constitution. It will also appoint a new interim president and government to run the country until fresh elections late next year or early in 2013. The voting system has built-in checks and balances, making it nearly impossible for any one party to gain a majority, compelling An-Nahda to seek alliances with secularist parties. Today party officials said they were prepared to form an alliance with two such parties: the Congress for the Republic, and Ettakatol. Abdelhamid Jlazzi, An-Nahda's campaign manager, said: "We will spare no effort to create a stable political alliance … We reassure the investors and international economic partners." An estimated 90% of voters turned out for the election on Sunday. Full nationwide results are expected later this afternoon. The seeming success of An-Nahda means its leader Rachid Ghannouchi may become interim president. He was forced into exile in Britain for 22 years under Tunisia's former leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Reuters provides this mini-profile of him:

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A softly spoken scholar, he dresses in suits and open-necked shirts while his wife and daughter wear the hijab. Ghannouchi is at pains to stress his party will not enforce any code of morality on Tunisian society, or the millions of Western tourists who holiday on its beaches. He models his approach on the moderate Islamism of Turkish prime minister Tayyip Erdogan. In Tunis, my colleague Lizzy Davies has been leafing through the francophone Tunisian papers this morning. She says it is clear that the media are reacting in subtly different ways to the anticipated victory of the An-Nahda party - a win which is due to be announced formally later today. La Presse appears to adopt the most sympathetic stance towards the party, pointing out that Rachid Ghannouchi's moderate Islamists have been "chosen democratically in a transparent system which bestows upon them all legitimacy." But there are challenges ahead, it says, one of which is to "definitively wring the neck of the prejudices harboured against them by broad swathes of opinion - those who accuse them of disregarding cultural and political minorities' right to freedom of expression." The editorial in Le Temps, on the other hand, sounds more concerned: "Should we be worried for our rights? An-Nahda claims to be reassuring and says it has no intention of affecting women and no problem with G-strings, tourism or those who don't go to the mosque ... At the end of the day, what is possible and what is impossible with An- Nahda? Let's listen to Sherlock Holmes: 'When we have eliminated all the impossibilities, only the probabilities remain.'" Striking a balance between alarmism and celebration, Le Quotidien fires an implicit warning shot to Ghannouchi's party to stick to its pragmatic campaign image. Those elected, it remarks, have a responsibility that is too important for the "personal interests and visions of those who might think - wrongly - that they have reached nirvana and that from now on they have the right to put their ideology before a social programme along the lines of what the people expect." But, whatever the result, the "big star" of the election was the Tunisian people, it writes. "The main thing is that we have got off on the right foot, and that the Tunisian nation remains, in its confirmed maturity and heightened sense of responsibility, the eternal guard … of our blossoming democracy. Those who are called upon to govern it, whatever their ideological or political leanings, must not lose sight of this." http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/world/africa/ennahda-moderate-islamic-party- makes-strong-showing-in-tunisia-vote.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

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Kadhafi a été enterré mardi à l'aube LEMONDE.FR avec Reuters | 25.10.11 | 10h05 • Mis à jour le 25.10.11 | 10h32

A Misrata, où étaient exposés les corps de Mouammar et Mouatassim Kadhafi dans une chambre réfrigérée.REUTERS/THAIER AL-SUDANI Mouammar Kadhafi a été enterré mardi 25 octobre à l'aube dans un endroit tenu secret, rapporte la chaîne de télévision qatarie Al-Jazira, citant des sources au sein du Conseil national de transition libyen (CNT). L'ex-dirigeant libyen a été tué jeudi alors qu'il tentait de fuir la ville de Syrte. Depuis sa mort, sa dépouille, transférée à Misrata, avait été exposée au public et des milliers de Libyens ont défilé dans une chambre froide de cette ville martyre de la révolution libyenne. Compte tenu des allées et venues incessantes, la réfrigération n'était plus suffisante pour empêcher un début de décomposition des corps. Le CNT avait assuré qu'il s'agirait d'un "enterrement simple" et que le corps de Mouatassim, le fils de Kadhafi tué le même jour, serait inhumé lors de la même cérémonie. Aucun accord n'avait pu être trouvé avec la tribu à laquelle appartenait Kadhafi pour une éventuelle remise des corps. Dans son testament, Mouammar Kadhafi avait demandé à reposer à Syrte, sa ville natale, où il a trouvé la mort dans des conditions qui demeurent obscures après avoir été capturé par les combattants du CNT. Les chefs de celui-ci ont choisi un endroit secret pour éviter que sa sépulture ne devienne un lieu de pèlerinage pour ses partisans. CORPS AUTOPSIÉ Le corps de l'ancien dictateur a par ailleurs fait l'objet d'une autopsie et a été remis à sa famille. A Misrata, le médecin ayant pratiqué l'autopsie, le docteur Othman El-Zentani, chef du service national de médecine légale, a indiqué que Mouammar Kadhafi avait été "tué par balle", se refusant à donner plus d'informations et précisant que son rapport n'était "pas fini". Les Nations unies ont demandé l'ouverture d'une enquête sur les conditions exactes de sa mort. Lundi, pour "répondre aux requêtes internationales", le chef du CNT, Moustapha Abdeljalil, a annoncé la création d'une commission d'enquête sur les circonstances de la mort du dirigeant déchu. http://www.lemonde.fr/libye/article/2011/10/25/kadhafi-a-ete-enterre-mardi-a-l- aube_1593323_1496980.html 332

Amnesty dénonce un "climat de peur" régnant dans les hôpitaux syriens LEMONDE.FR avec Reuters et AFP | 25.10.11 | 08h26 • Mis à jour le 25.10.11 | 09h28 Le régime syrien a transformé les hôpitaux du pays en "instruments de la répression" contre les opposants à Bachar Al-Assad, affirme Amnesty International dans un rapport de 39 pages publié lundi 24 octobre (PDFU en anglais).U L'organisation de défense des droits de l'homme estime que dans les hôpitaux publics les médecins comme les patients constituent des cibles de la répression gouvernementale du soulèvement populaire contre le régime. Dans au moins quatre établissements publics – Homs, Banias et Tel Kelakh, ainsi qu'à l'hôpital militaire de Homs –, des patients ont été torturés ou soumis à des mauvais traitements, y compris de la part du personnel médical, souligne l'ONG, qui dénonce un "climat de peur". Certains employés soupçonnés de prodiguer des soins à des manifestants blessés ont eux-mêmes été arrêtés et torturés, ajoute-t-elle. Amnesty cite un infirmier témoin d'un raid des forces de sécurité et selon qui au moins un patient, inconscient, s'est vu arracher son appareil respiratoire avant d'être emmené vers une destination inconnue. PERSONNEL DANS "UNE SITUATION IMPOSSIBLE" "Effrayés des conséquences d'une hospitalisation, beaucoup de gens ont choisi de se faire traiter soit dans des cliniques privées, soit dans des dispensaires de fortune mal équipés", souligne Amnesty. Les médecins de l'hôpital national de la ville de Homs, haut-lieu de la contestation contre le régime Bachar Al-Assad, ont rapporté une chute des hospitalisations pour des blessures par balle depuis mai, en dépit de l'augmentation vertigineuse de telles blessures lors des violences. "Le personnel hospitalier en Syrie est mis dans une situation impossible, forcé de choisir entre traiter les personnes blessées et préserver sa propre sécurité", ajoute l'ONG. "Il est profondément inquiétant de voir que les autorités syriennes semblent avoir lâché la bride sur le cou des forces de sécurité dans les hôpitaux et que, dans de nombreux cas, le personnel médical semble avoir participé à des actes de torture et de mauvais traitements sur les personnes mêmes qu'elles sont supposées soigner", déclare Cilina Nasser, d'Amnesty. La répression du mouvement de contestation contre Bachar Al-Assad en Syrie a fait au moins 3 000 morts selon les Nations unies. Les autorités syriennes disent pour leur part affronter des groupes terroristes. Amnesty dénonce un "climat de peur" régnant dans les hôpitaux syriens le 25.10.11 | 09h28 http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/10/25/amnesty-denonce-un- climat-de-peur-regnant-dans-les-hopitaux-syriens_1593294_3218.html

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ft.com Comment Analysis October 24, 2011 10:22 pm Burma: At freedom’s gate By Amy Kazmin Rangoon finally begins to open up

Released: a prisoner leaves jail in Rangoon this month, one of 6,359 granted anmesty by Thein Sein, Burma's new president. Among those freed were some 200 dissidents They have decided to change. It’s not what we called for, but there are changes. Even if they are pretending to change, we should push them so the change becomes irreversible. If we keep saying that ‘you haven’t changed the way we want’ and put obstacles in the way, then the changes will never come.” The words are those of Harn Yawnghwe, son of the last hereditary ruler of an ethnic Shan principality in Burma. He went into exile as a teenager in 1963 after the country’s newly rampant military killed his brother and sent his father to die in prison. More ON THIS STORY Editorial Comment Change in Burma David Pilling Signal of a new Burmese dawn Burma dam disruption concerns China Suu Kyi defies regime with ‘political’ trip How sanctions made Burma’s richest man Mr Yawnghwe is these days the director of the Euro-Burma Office in Brussels, established by dissidents to promote democracy in the downtrodden south-east Asian country. This month, he has been making his first return visit to his homeland. Few people, in Burma or the outside world, had high expectations when in March the army handed power to a quasi-civilian government after nearly five decades of repressive rule. The handover followed a tightly controlled – some say rigged – election under a new constitution that preserved much military clout, including the right to appoint one-quarter of the members of a new parliament.

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The man designated as president seemed hardly more promising. Thein Sein, a recently retired general, had made little impact in four years as prime minister in the junta led by Senior General Than Shwe. But his inauguration speech set a fresh tone. He outlined an agenda of inclusive economic development and promised to renew crumbling health and education systems, fight corruption, pass laws to protect human rights and co-operate with those holding “different ideas and concepts” on issues of national interest.

Since then, the long-suffering population of Burma (renamed Myanmar by the generals) has witnessed almost unimaginable change. Censorship has been eased to allow debates, criticism and interviews with dissidents in domestic news publications. On the internet, previously inaccessible foreign news and opposition websites have been unblocked. Political exiles such as Mr Yawnghwe have been invited to return. Experts have been appointed to advise on reviving the economy. Parliament has held robust televised debates, has adopted a law permitting independent trade unions and is considering legislation that would make it easier to protest. In August, Mr Thein Sein met Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Prize-winning democracy leader who was reviled by the junta. She later told diplomats she believed the president was sincere in his desire for reform. In September, Thein Sein risked alienating the country’s long-time patrons in Beijing by suspending a $3.6bn Chinese dam project that would have flooded an area the size of Singapore. This month, the government released nearly 200 political prisoners, beginning what is expected to be a phased release of up to 2,000 dissidents. The pace of change has persuaded many that the president is serious in his ambitions to bring development and greater freedom to a country that has suffered from economic stagnation, political repression and international isolation. The sense of excitement has brought renewed attention to a nation rich in oil and gas, gems and timber, and situated at the strategic crossroads of Asia, wedged between China and India. A country that because of sanctions the west had appeared to have lost to China is suddenly back in geostrategic play.

“There is a fundamental rethinking of the political direction of the country,” says Richard Horsey, who spent five years in Burma with the International Labour Organisation. “We should see this as a transition. It’s not a flick of the switch from authoritarianism to a fully open society. But the intention is to undertake a far-reaching liberalisation of governance in the country.”

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Western capitals, which have long treated Burma as a pariah and subjected it to a range of sanctions, are now scrambling for an appropriate response to developments that are still fraught with uncertainty. Mr Thein Sein is almost certainly no liberal democrat and his initiatives take place within a constitutional framework that will leave Burma far short of the democratic changes for which many western governments, and Burmese exiles, have long pressed. . . . Yet in a region where authoritarian governments such as China and Vietnam have improved their people’s lives by enabling rising prosperity, many argue that the west should support any credible effort at more rational, open policies after decades of erratic military fiat. With its trove of natural gas and a largely untapped domestic market of some 54m, Burma is also of keen interest to western multinationals, which had mostly been deterred from doing business there by sanctions, red tape and reputational risk. ECONOMIC REFORMS: A pariah state takes tentative steps to attract foreign investors U Myint once joked that Burma’s military generals ran a “command economy”. They issued orders, military-style, and expected the economy to obey. The former UN economist, having retired to Rangoon, has now been appointed President Thein Sein’s most senior economic adviser. He is charged with shepherding through reforms to unleash the country’s growth potential and entice investment from foreign companies. “It’s going to be a long haul, with lots of work to be done,” says Professor Sean Turnell of Australian National university, who fears there could be opposition from within the administration, or even from the military. “There are going to be a lot of people who will be unhappy once reforms take place, as their interests will be exposed. So the potential for reaction is there.” Burma holds many attractions for foreign businesses: significant natural gas reserves, roughly equal to Brazil’s; tourist appeal; fertile rice-growing land; and a youthful population, estimated at about 54m, that could be tapped to help offset rising labour costs in China. Chinese, Indian and other Asian companies have established a foothold, especially in natural resource extraction. But aside from Total of France, with its natural gas pipeline from Burma to Thailand, and a few European travel groups, western business has largely steered clear. Sanctions, and the reputational risks of operating in a pariah country, have proved deterrents. But the domestic business climate has been far from congenial. Multiple exchange rates for the local currency – with a black market rate about 200 times weaker than the official level – have complicated trade and banking. Red tape meant every individual import and export shipment, plus the price at which the transaction took place, required high-level approval. The state of the roads, power supply and ports reflects years of neglect and under-investment. Becoming too successful also poses risks for business – the friends and relatives of powerful generals have been known to grab profitable enterprises. “You could never trust that your investment was not simply going to be expropriated,” says Prof Turnell.

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The new government is already moving to improve the climate. The 10 per cent export tax has been cut to zero for most goods, and 2 per cent for others. Approvals for exports are now virtually automatic. Banks are allowed, for the first time, to sell foreign exchange at market rates. The government also wants to move to more market-based exchange rates. Until now, the multiple rate system has allowed the military to tap state gas revenues with little accountability – a practice Prof Turnell says could be ended with the transparency brought by a single exchange rate. “I half wonder,” he asks, “whether the new president knows the implications.” Burma’s recent history of false dawns and dashed hopes gives ample reason for caution. In 2002, Ms Suu Kyi was released from house arrest, raising expectations that the regime was poised to negotiate a transition from military rule. Just a year later, she was attacked by regime thugs and taken into custody. Back under house arrest, she then agreed a deal with Gen Khin Nyunt, the military intelligence chief of the time, for her NLD to attend the regime’s constitutional convention. But at the last minute, Gen Than Shwe vetoed the deal. Gen Khin Nyunt was later purged and put under house arrest himself. Ms Suu Kyi was released only last November. Espen Barth Eide, Norway’s deputy foreign minister, who met ministers and Ms Suu Kyi on a recent trip to Burma, argues that the country could be at the start of a transition similar to those of recent decades in formerly autocratic Taiwan and South Korea. They gradually came to allow more “moderate pluralism” without dramatic ruptures. “This is as good as it gets – a military regime deciding not to be a military regime any more,” he says. “It may be the start of a rough ride. But it’s not fake. There’s something real going on.” Striking the right balance between maintaining pressure and supporting change is a high-stakes game at a time of rising tensions between Washington and Beijing over influence in Asia – and not everyone shares the new optimism. Pro-democracy campaign groups, and some members of Ms Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, dismiss the changes as easily reversible tactical manoeuvres to help win an end to sanctions. Human rights groups and freed dissidents themselves were disappointed by the limited scale of the recent prisoner release, which left many prominent campaigners behind bars. “Thein Sein is on a journey and his destination is not democracy,” says Mark Farmaner, director of the Burma Campaign UK, another lobbying group. “His destination is lifting sanctions and gaining international legitimacy. He is looking around the world and seeing all these other dictatorships that don’t have sanctions and have normal diplomatic relations, and he wants the same. He is prepared to make more compromises to achieve that goal than his predecessors.” Gen Than Shwe is now in retirement. That, say some observers, has given Mr Thein Sein the opportunity to push through important changes, backed by a handful of like- minded former military men. “From the outside, we’ve always seen the regime as if it were some monolithic, coherent whole,” says historian Thant Myint-U, author of two books on Burma. The reality was more fluid. “Thein Sein realises what many people have realised, which is the way that things were going in Burma was not sustainable, and that people in the country deserved a better government,” he adds. “There are ways in which one can improve the government without having a bloody revolution.”

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. . . People in contact with government officials say many in the ruling elite have long been dismayed by how far Burma has lagged behind its neighbours. The country has some of Asia’s highest poverty and malnutrition rates despite possessing some of its most fertile land. Much of the military top brass is also said to be discomfited by the tightening embrace of China. Diplomats say Mr Thein Sein is looking to improve relations with the west to counter dependence on Beijing. “There is a sense that they need to have a more balanced set of external economic and political relations,” says Mr Horsey. “In their mind, they are susceptible to losing sovereignty. They think back to weak Burmese kings who, because of their failure to keep up with political and technical trends of the times, were dominated by foreigners.” One European diplomat who has been visiting the country for years says the government has “come to the conclusion they can’t survive without the west”. Still, Mr Thein Sein’s reform path is fraught with risk. He faces opposition from military hardliners. Many officials are sitting on the fence, reluctant to commit. For now, the president seems to have the upper hand. But analysts fret that any outbreak of social unrest could provide an excuse for hardliners to retake power, through a constitutional provision that allows the army to declare a state of emergency. “The worst case is that there is some big disaster, which he mishandles. Then the army has a reason to come back in,” says Mr Yawnghwe from the Euro-Burma Office. So far, the US and the European Union have responded cautiously to the unfolding events, welcoming the changes but saying the government must release more political prisoners before they will consider a relaxation of sanctions. Renewed fighting between the army and ethnic militias in Burma’s restive minority areas remains another concern. “There are still real questions about how far they are going to go and where this is going to lead,” Derek Mitchell, the US special envoy for Burma, told journalists in Washington last week. “If in fact we do see reform, change, along those lines of democracy, human rights, national reconciliation and development, they will have a partner in the United States.” In calibrating their response to events in Burma, western capitals are likely to take their cue from Ms Suu Kyi, who has struck a cautiously positive tone. Nyan Win, an NLD activist and former political prisoner, says the party is “thinking about how we can co- operate with the government and what we can do for democracy and human rights. We are optimistic that the present government wants to change towards democracy.” Or as Mr Yawnghwe puts it: “If you ask people outside Burma, they’ll say it’s a sham. But if you look at people inside, they are saying, ‘let’s go with it, because this is what we have got’.” Additional reporting by David Pilling http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5576df62-fb37-11e0-8df6- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1bhGhmggR

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Internacional OPINIÓN Islam político 2.0 Los islamistas, aun ganando elecciones, no deben tener carta blanca para devolver sus países al Medievo Zouhir Louassini 24 OCT 2011 - 21:19 CET Quién ha dicho que los fanáticos carecen de sentido del humor? Ayman al Zawahiri, la mano derecha de Bin Laden, ha declarado que la eclosión de una primavera árabe se debe también a Al Qaeda. Al Zawahiri, sin el menor complejo, se declara “padre espiritual” de todo el movimiento, cuando precisamente los líderes de la revolución tunecina y de la egipcia han procurado distanciarse de todo discurso religioso desde un principio. Los jóvenes, en Túnez y en Egipto, han acabado de forma pacífica con regímenes que parecían eternos. La primavera árabe ha supuesto la derrota de Al Qaeda. Un mensaje que ha sido recibido también por los partidos islamistas. La simpatía que los jóvenes han despertado en la opinión pública occidental, junto a otros factores, les ha abierto el camino hacia el cambio, a presentar una imagen totalmente distinta de la que ofrecieron los barbudos de Al Qaeda durante una década. Los movimientos islamistas de índole política, como En Nahda y los Hermanos Musulmanes, no han tardado en darse cuenta de que es su momento. Los jóvenes que aspiraban al cambio mediante un discurso moderno y liberal no estaban bien organizados. El ansia de libertad y de democracia ha sido interpretada por el islam político como una excelente ocasión para encaramarse al poder. Y el islam político sí que está perfectamente organizado. De la democracia acepta únicamente la interpretación más estrecha: la del derecho a votar. La tentación es tan fuerte que los líderes de los Hermanos Musulmanes en Egipto o los del partido En Nahda en Túnez no han ahorrado esfuerzos para demostrar al mundo su espíritu democrático. Declaraciones de apertura hacia los sectores laicos o discrepantes, de respeto por las minorías o por las opciones personales, etcétera, no han escaseado en el vocabulario islamista durante el ápice de la primavera. Escuchar a los líderes de los Hermanos Musulmanes hablar de aceptación del Estado laico era una auténtica novedad. Sin embargo, pudimos darnos cuenta de inmediato de que solo se trataba de una táctica, nada más. No había voluntad alguna de sentar las bases de una democracia sólida. Era únicamente una nueva maniobra en su camino hacia el poder que, según sostienen, es el único medio para conducir a las sociedades hacia el islam puro, el de tiempos del profeta, cuando predominaban “la justicia y la prosperidad”. Y, para acabar, la recuperación del estribillo habitual: el islam es la solución. El problema del islam, sobre todo del de índole política, desde 1798, desde la campaña de Napoleón en Egipto, se cifra en sus continuas tentativas de adaptar la modernidad a los preceptos de la religión, en vez de permitir que el islam se contamine con la modernidad. Este dilema no ha dejado espacio para una auténtica revolución en el seno de las distintas sociedades, una revolución que pudiera cambiar las estructuras sociales y, sobre todo, las mentales. El mundo árabe islámico se ha convertido en rehén de una ideología que cifra su salvación exclusivamente en razonamientos religiosos.

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El académico francés Olivier Roy se ha precipitado pues al hablar del “fracaso del islam político” (L‘Échec de l’islam politique, Seuil, París, 1992). Hubiera resultado más correcto hablar de una ideología que posee una gran capacidad de adaptación. Al Qaeda, los Hermanos Musulmanes en Egipto y en otros países árabes, así como el Estado teocrático iraní son matices distintos de una ideología común, incapaz de confluir con el mundo. Ideología que cambia de táctica, pero no de objetivo. La única excepción, probablemente, sea el caso turco, que es necesario analizar con lupa, sin embargo, dado que son muchos quienes lo ven en Occidente comO un modelo digno de imitación. Se trata, sin duda, del único ejemplo positivo que puede proporcionar el islam político, pero es forzoso señalar que este modelo nació y creció en una sociedad exquisitamente laica. El éxito de Erdogan es, por encima de todo, el éxito de un sistema que debe mucho a su Constitución, la más laica del mundo islámico. En un artículo publicado en el diario panárabe Al-sharq al-awsat, Rafiq Abdessalam (17-10-2011) subraya la capacidad del islam político de convencer a las masas gracias a su organización y a las prestaciones sociales a favor del pueblo, en contradicción con todo su quehacer político, inadecuado para un mundo moderno y globalizado. El islam político, de no cambiar su visión de base, nunca podrá ser un interlocutor válido para construir una verdadera democracia, que busque instrumentos para asentar una convivencia pacífica. Cuando la premisa es la aplicación de la ley divina, toda propuesta orientada hacia un Estado legitimado por la voluntad de los ciudadanos se vuelve poco creíble. Todo indica que las elecciones en Túnez y Egipto llevarán al islam político al poder. Esta vez, las potencias occidentales están dispuestas a aceptarlo como expresión de la voluntad popular, y así debe ser. Occidente, sin embargo, tiene una gran responsabilidad: insistir en el hecho de que ganar las elecciones no significa tener carta blanca por hacer retroceder las sociedades hacia el medievo. Ha llegado el momento de que el islam político comprenda de una vez que en un mundo globalizado nadie puede considerarse una realidad aparte. Zouhir Louassini es periodista marroquí y trabaja en la Radiotelevisión Italiana (RAI). Traducción de Carlos Gumpert.

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ft.com Comment Opinion October 24, 2011 8:35 pm The three spectres at the Arab feast By David Gardner

Any autumn snapshot of this year’s momentous Arab upheavals will certainly capture the wretched end of Muammer Gaddafi. But it will also highlight two radically different ways of doing the business of government, on display this weekend in the Arab spring’s democratic debut in Tunisia and (not at all on display) in the secretive and theocratic kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Electing a constituent assembly in what could set a benchmark for Arab countries that topple their tyrants, about 90 per cent of eligible Tunisians turned out to vote. Great uncertainty lies ahead for their revolution, as well as those they helped to ignite, in Egypt, Libya and Syria. But the joyful embrace of suffrage by people who had suffered decades of despotism has set a tone. More ON THIS STORY Obituary Saudi Crown Prince Sultan dies Saudis warn Iran of strong response Online law curbs Saudi freedom of expression Analysis Abdullah’s agenda Saudi prince’s elevation ends guessing game In Saudi Arabia, the death of the ageing Crown Prince Sultan, by contrast, sets in motion a royal succession reminiscent of the gerontocratic Soviet politburo as Leonid Brezhnev began to fade. The future of the kingdom is pretty much already in the hands of Prince Nayef, the ultraconservative interior minister, 77, now likely to be installed as crown prince and to take the throne once the also aged and frail King Abdullah leaves the scene. Which of these ways of running a country eventually comes to be the norm greatly matters. The battle to shape the future of an Arab world in flux will be fierce – and the Saudis will be in the thick of it. From behind the defensive wall of their puritanical Wahhabi version of Islam, they will deploy petrodollars to steer Arab Islamism in their direction. While to many this is not an appealing version of bread and circuses, the Saudi regime, built upon the twin pillars of absolute monarchy and Wahhabi sectarianism, tends to feel history as well as divine right is behind its cause.

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The religious reform movement in the Arabian peninsula is roughly contemporary with the Arab political reform drive of the 19th century. Tunisia and Egypt, where constitutional reform had sunk roots by the 1860s, were pioneers then as now. But the normal process of nation-building and constitutional politics of the first Arab awakening or Nahda was interrupted, and its proto-democratic expression discredited, by a century of intrusion by the French and British empires. That gave way to the ideological wild goose chase of pan-Arab nationalism, which masked the will to power of militarised local elites, who built national security states that left their opponents only the mosque as an increasingly politicised space in which to regroup. Islamism was guaranteed an important space in Arab politics by a combination of despotism and western intrusion. Yet Islamism is but one of three spectres that haunt the future of Arab democracy; the others are sectarianism and populism. In practice, all these dangers elide and overlap. Islamists typically command the allegiance of up to a third of Arab citizens – more when, like Hizbollah, Hamas or Iraq’s Sadrists, they have the aura of a resistance movement. But they still have to perform – now in competition with broad-based if fragmented democratic movements thrown up by rebellions that, unlike theirs, were successful. Far from monolithic, the Islamic revivalists are split on generational lines. They also have a choice of models to inspire them. Iran’s Islamic revolution is one, but polls suggest this combination of immovable vested interests, violently defended from behind a façade of divine order, exerts little appeal. Though the Saudis can influence through money and mosque-building, their model cannot be replicated outside the Gulf. But the example of Turkey suggests Islamism can be synthesised into a pluralist and secular order. Tunisia’s Ennahda party, way ahead in early vote counts, took inspiration from Turkey. But the success of the second Arab awakening will depend not just on obvious needs: to develop institutions, establish the rule of law and embed a competitive and plural democratic culture. As important will be how it manages and overcomes sectarian, ethnic and (in some cases) tribal tensions. In this deadly terrain, Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia are poisonously sectarian. Mainly Sunni Turkey is not, in its dealings with, say, Lebanon or Iraq, or its outlook. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, told Egyptians and Libyans last month that while he is not secular in the western sense, secularism is a shield of state to protect equally all beliefs (a position he could usefully extend to ethnic minorities such as Turkey’s Kurds). The spectre of populism arises because the “structural” economic reform touted by the Mubaraks and the Ben Alis was a rapacious hoax that discredited the very idea of reform, the more so because it was prescribed in, though not administered by, the west. Here too, Turkey’s dynamic economy, under management by Islam’s equivalent of the Christian Democrats, offers a more appealing prospectus. Yet the best insurance against the three spectres of Islamism, sectarianism and populism is that the young Arabs who drove these revolutions did not risk their lives to embrace new tyrannies or social divisions – or imbibe old snake oil. David Gardner The three spectres at the Arab feast October 24, 2011 8:35 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0U /35ed68bc-fe31-11e0-bac4-

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Tunisie : les islamistes prêts à s'allier avec la gauche LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 24.10.11 | 16h28 • Mis à jour le 24.10.11 | 22h44

Meeting d'Ennahda à la cité populaire d'Ezouhour, à Sousse, avec le secrétaire général du parti, Hamadi Jebali.Nicolas Fauqué / www.imagesd Les islamistes en tête, suivis de deux partis de gauche : le visage de la future Assemblée constituante tunisienne s'esquissait lundi 24 octobre, au fur et à mesure des résultats annoncés par les partis, au lendemain d'unU premier scrutin historique,U neuf mois aprèsU la révolution tunisienne.U Les résultats définitifs et officiels ne devaient pas être annoncés avant mardi par la commission électorale (ISIEU )U mais les premières tendances et déclarations confirmaient l'avancée d'Ennahda, attendue. Le parti islamiste a immédiatement lancé un message pour "rassurer" les partenaires économiques de la Tunisie. "Nous espérons très rapidement revenir à la stabilité et à des conditions favorables à l'investissement", a déclaré Abdelhamid Jlassi, directeur du bureau exécutif. "Nous respecterons les droits de la femme sur la base du code de statut personnel et de légalité entre les Tunisiens quels que soient leur religion, leur sexe ou leur appartenance sociale", a ajouté Nourreddine Bhiri, membre de la direction du parti islamiste, en guise de réponse aux craintes du camp laïque. >> Lire les réponses de Hamadi Jebali, secrétaire général d'Ennahda, aux internautes du Monde.fr, le 18 octobre : "L'essentiel est de respecter les libertés." ALLIANCE AVEC LES PARTIS LAÏCS Au lendemain d'un scrutin marqué par une forte mobilisation, les islamistes ont été les premiers à annoncer leurs propres estimations : "environ 40 % des voix", a déclaré Samir Dilou, membre du bureau politique du mouvement. Soit au moins 60 sièges sur les 217 que comptera la future Assemblée constituante, a précisé un autre dirigeant du 343

mouvement. Lundi soir, le directeur de campagne d'Ennahda (Renaissance), Abelhamid Jlassi, annonçait que le décompte des voix dépouillées jusqu'ici, affiché devant chaque bureau de vote, créditait le parti de 30 % des suffrages. Considérés depuis plusieurs mois comme les grands favoris du scrutin, les islamistes, durement réprimés sous Ben Ali, feront, si ce résultat se confirme officiellement, leur entrée par la grande porte sur la scène politique tunisienne. Conscient qu'il doit nouer des alliances pour gouverner, le parti Ennahda a annoncé dès lundi soir qu'il était prêt à s'allier avec les deux partis de gauche qui se disputent la deuxième place : Ettakatol, emmené par le médecin et ancien opposant Mustapha Ben Jaffar, et le Congrès pour la république (CPR) de Moncef Marzouki. "Nous sommes prêts à former une alliance avec le Congrès pour la république de Moncef Marzouki et l'Ettakatol de Moustapha Ben Jaafar puisque leurs opinions ne sont pas éloignées des nôtres et que ces deux partis ont obtenu un grand nombre de suffrages", a dit à Reuters Ali Larayd, membre du comité exécutif d'Ennahda. Selon les dirigeants d'Ettakatol, leur parti "arrivera en deuxième ou troisième position", avec "autour de 15 % des suffrages". >> Voir notre reportage interactif : "Paroles d'électeurs et de candidats" Le CPR a réalisé une percée surprise, obtenant entre 15 et 16 % des voix, selon des estimations. "On espère être les seconds", a déclaré Moncef Marzouki, ancien opposant à Ben Ali longtemps exilé en France. Moncef Marzouki a démenti avoir pactisé avec les islamistes avant le vote, assurant qu'il n'y avait pas eu "d'alliance avant le vote", tout en se disant "absolument dans l'optique d'une participation à un gouvernement d'union nationale". RÉSULTATS DÉFINITIFS MARDI Les Tunisiens ont élu dimanche une Assemblée constituante dont les 217 membres devront rédiger la nouvelle Constitution du pays et former un nouveau gouvernement provisoire avant des élections législatives et présidentielle prévues l'année prochaine. Aucun résultat officiel n'avait été publié lundi dans la soirée à l'exception du vote des Tunisiens de l'étranger, qui votaient avant dimanche. Sur les 18 sièges concernés, Ennahda en obtient 9, le Congrès pour la république 4, Ettakatol 3, le Pôle démocratique moderniste (gauche) 1 et la Liste pour la liberté et le développement (centre) 1. La surprise est venue en revanche de la défaite du Parti démocrate progressiste (PDP, centre gauche), formation historique qui s'est posée pendant toute la campagne comme principale force alternative à Ennahda. Laminé avec entre 8 et 10 % des voix selon les estimations non officielles, le PDP, fondé par Ahmed Néjib Chebbi, a pris acte de sa défaite. "Les tendances sont très claires. Le PDP est mal positionné. C'est la décision du peuple tunisien. Je m'incline devant ce choix. Je félicite ceux qui ont obtenu l'approbation du peuple tunisien", a déclaré la chef de ce parti, Maya Jribi. "Nous serons toujours là pour défendre une Tunisie moderne, prospère et modérée", a-t-elle poursuivi, estimant que le pays "était en train de vivre un tournant". >> Lire le blog des élections tunisiennes, par la correspondante régionale du Monde. >> Lire le blog #Printemps arabe du Monde.fr

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http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2011/10/24/tunisie-le-parti-du-peuple-prend-acte- de-sa-defaite_1593202_1466522.html Son "Je ne laisserai personne me voler ma liberté" LEMONDE.FR | 24.10.11 | 11h54 http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/son/2011/10/24/je-ne-laisserai-personne-me-voler-ma- liberte_1592903_1466522.html

Tunisie: Ennahda s'engage à respecter les droits des femmes et des minorités LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 24.10.11 | 20h59

Meeting de clôture de Ennahda dans le stade de football de Ben Arous, le 24 octobre.© Nicolas Fauque / www.imagesd pour "Le Monde"

Le parti islamiste Ennahda, donnéU vainqueur des élections tunisiennes U de dimanche, a affirmé lundi 24 octobre son engagement à respecter les droits acquis des Tunisiennes et des minorités religieuses dans le pays. "Nous respecterons les droits de la femme sur la base du code de statut personnel et de légalité entre les Tunisiens quels que soient leur religion, leur sexe ou leur appartenance sociale", a déclaré Nourreddine Bhiri, membre de la direction du parti islamiste. La percée d'Ennahda sur la scène politique a fait craindre dans le camp laïque une remise en question du statut des femmes en Tunisie. Les Tunisiennes disposent d'un statut juridique enviable dans le monde arabo-musulman : la loi en vigueur interdit la polygamie et la répudiation, permet l'avortement libre et donne droit au divorce judiciaire.

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ACQUIS ENRACINÉS Ces acquis introduits par le père de l'indépendance, Habib Bourguiba, sont enracinés dans la pratique sociale et ont permis aux femmes, qui représentent 50 % de la population, d'être présentes dans tous les domaines d'activités. L'islam est la religion officielle de la Tunisie où cohabitent avec les musulmans sunnites (qui représentent plus de 90 % de la population) des minorités religieuses, dont un millier de juifs. M. Bhiri a aussi affirmé la détermination du parti islamiste à respecter les engagements internationaux de la Tunisie, pays lié notamment par un accord de libre-échange avec l'Union européenne et signataire de la convention de l'ONU contre toutes formes de discrimination à l'égard des femmes. "MAIN TENDUE" "Quel que soit le nombre de sièges qui nous reviendra dans l'assemblée constituante, nous ne gouvernerons pas seuls et nous ne permettrons à personne de monopoliser le pouvoir", a assuré en outre le dirigeant islamiste. "La légalité sera rétablie sur la base du consensus. Nous tendons la main à tous pour tourner la page de la tyrannie et de l'injustice", a-t-il dit en réponse à une question sur une alliance possible de sa formation avec le parti Ettakatol (centre gauche). Ce parti talonnait Ennahda avec le Parti du congrès pour la république (gauche nationaliste), selon les résultats préliminaires non officiels, l'instance électorale indépendante devant annoncer les résultats officiels mardi. Plus de 7 millions d'électeurs étaient appelés dimanche à élire une assemblée nationale constituante, neuf mois après la chute du président Ben Ali. >> Pour aller plus loin : lire les réponses de Hamadi Jebali, secrétaire général d'Ennahda, aux internautes du Monde.fr, le 18 octobre : "L'essentiel est de respecter les libertés."  Paul Magellan 00h01 C'est effrayant : après un dictateur, ce sont désormais des religieux qui vont prendre le relais, et là une révolution ne suffira pas à sortir nos amis tunisiens de l'obscurantisme que mettront en place les islamistes. Ne les laissez pas, sans quoi, comme en Libye, autre catastrophe là aussi, c'est la charia qui attend tout le peuple tunisien. Les temps à venir vont être difficiles pour les femmes, et toutes les minorités ne plaisant aux religieux, et la liste risque d'être très très longue... http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2011/10/24/tunisie-ennahda-s-engage-a-respecter- les-droits-des-femmes-et-des-minorites_1593270_1466522.html

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Quand Kadhafi demandait à Berlusconi d'"arrêter les bombardements" LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 24.10.11 | 20h09 • Mis à jour le 24.10.11 | 20h48

Silvio Berlusconi et Mouammar Kadhafi en mars 2009.REUTERS/HO Une lettre de Mouammar Kadhafi au chef du gouvernement italien, Silvio Berlusconi, demandant d'"arrêter les bombardements" en Libye a été publiée, lundi 24 octobre par l'hebdomadaireU Paris Match,U cinq jours après la capture et la mort de l'ancien dictateur. "Cher Silvio, peut-on lire dans cette missive. Je te fais parvenir cette lettre par l'intermédiaire de tes concitoyens, qui sont venus en Libye nous apporter leur soutien dans un moment aussi difficile pour le peuple de la Grande Jamahiriya. J'ai été surpris par l'attitude d'un ami avec qui j'ai scellé un traité d'amitié favorable à nos deux peuples. J'aurais espéré de ta part au moins que tu t'intéresses aux faits et que tu tentes une médiation avant d'apporter ton soutien à cette guerre. Je ne te blâme pas pour ce dont tu n'es pas responsable car je sais bien que tu n'étais pas favorable à cette action néfaste qui n'honore ni toi ni le peuple italien. Mais je crois que tu as encore la possibilité de faire marche arrière et de faire prévaloir les intérêts de nos peuples". UNE AGENCE D'HÔTESSES POUR INTERMÉDIAIRE "Arrête ces bombardements qui tuent nos frères libyens et nos enfants. Parle avec tes amis et vos alliés pour parvenir à ce que cesse cette agression à l'encontre de mon pays. J'espère que Dieu tout-puissant te guidera sur le chemin de la justice", poursuit le document, selon la traduction mise en ligne par Paris Match. Cette lettre aurait été remise début août à Rome aux autorités italiennes par un couple d'amis italiens de Mouammar Kadhafi, qui dirige une agence d'hôtesses d'accueil en Italie.

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L'Italie, qui était le premier partenaire commercial de la Libye sous Kadhafi, avait été réticente à lâcher le colonel Kadhafi, avec lequel elle avait signé en 2008 un traité d'amitié et de coopération économique. Cet accord, signé à Bengazi par Silvio Berlusconi, enterrait le contentieux colonial entre les deux pays et engageait l'Italie à investir 5 milliards de dollars (3,9 milliards d'euros) sur vingt ans en Libye, en échange de quoi Tripoli promettait de surveiller ses côtes pour empêcher le départ d'immigrés vers la rive italienne de la Méditerranée et d'accepter les clandestins refoulés. >> Lire notre éclairage L'Italie craint de perdre, au profit de la France, sa place de premier fournisseur de la Libye (édition abonnés).

"SIC TRANSIT GLORIA MUNDI" Après l'annonce de la mort de l'ancien dictateur, Silvio Berlusconi avait déclaré "Sic transit gloria mundi", expression latine qui signifie "Ainsi passe la gloire du monde" avant d'annoncer que la guerre en Libye "était terminée". Lundi, les Etats-Unis ont demandé aux autorités libyennes de respecter les droits de l'homme et d'enquêter sur des exécutions sommaires présumées de combattants loyaux à Kadhafi, qualifiant les allégations évoquant de tels fait "d'extrêmement dérangeantes". Jusqu'ici, le CNT a annoncé la formation d'une commission d'enquête sur les circonstances de la mort de Mouammar Kadhafi lui-même. Le département d'Etat américain a aussi appelé la Libye à respecter les droits des femmes, après les propos du président du Conseil national de transition, Moustapha Abdeljalil sur l'application de la charia dans son pays. Des déclarations qui ont également été reçues avec prudence par la France et l'Union européenne. http://www.lemonde.fr/libye/article/2011/10/24/quand-kadhafi-demandait-a-berlusconi- d-arreter-les-bombardements_1593267_1496980.html

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Internacional LAS PRIMERAS ELECCIONES DE LA PRIMAVERA ÁRABE Los islamistas moderados se atribuyen la victoria en las elecciones de Túnez El partido confesional En Nahda gana holgadamente las elecciones, según los resultados parciales Los islamistas inquietan al sector laico de la sociedad Entrevista con Rachid Ghanouchi, líder de En Nahda 110 partidos se presentan a las elecciones IGNACIO CEMBRERO (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) Túnez 24 OCT 2011 - 08:45 CET82

Una mujer soldado resguarda el exterior de un colegio electoral donde varias personas esperan su turno para entrar a votar el domingo. / EFE Marea islamista en Túnez. El partido confesional En Nahda ha ganado holgadamente las primeras elecciones democráticas celebradas en Túnez desde que hace más de medio siglo el país accedió a la independencia. Cuando aún no está acabado el escrutinio, los datos parciales de los que disponen los partidos políticos y los observadores apuntan a que la formación que lidera Rachid Ghanouchi obtendría más del 40% de los sufragios y podría incluso alcanzar la mayoría absoluta en la futura Asamblea Constituyente, que contará con 217 escaños. En la ciudad de Sfax, la segunda del país con más de medio millón de habitantes, el recuento ya acabado atribuye a En Nahda el 43% de los votos, pero en otras localidades de la costa, como Sousa, o del interior, como Mededine, alcanzaría incluso la mayoría absoluta. Los primeros en votar fueron los emigrantes tunecinos en el extranjero, a los que están reservados 18 escaños, cuyo escrutinio ya está acabado. En Nahda conquistó la mitad de esos escaños seguido por el Congreso para la República, un partido liberal fundado en el exilio parisino. 349

“No queremos entrar en detalles, pero queda claro que En Nahda tuvo un éxito [dentro del país] que en algunos casos iguala a los resultados de la votación en el extranjero”, declaró Abdelhamid Jlazzi, jefe de la campaña islamista. “Los resultados son francamente buenos para En Nahda”, recalcó. La formación islamista da a entender que obtuvo la mitad de los sufragios El organismo encargado de organizar la consulta, la Instancia Superior e Independiente para las Elecciones (ISIE), no dará a conocer hasta mañana martes los resultados, pero algunos medios de comunicación tunecinos y los propios partidos los están anticipando a lo largo de la mañana. A última hora de la mañana el escrutinio no había, sin embargo, acabado en numerosos lugares del país. El retraso se debe no solo a la inexperiencia sino a la gran afluencia de votantes que obligó a cerrar algunos colegios hasta casi tres horas después de la hora establecida (las siete de la tarde). El presidente del ISIE, Kamel Jendoubi, indicó que la participación electoral rebasó el 90% de los electores que se habían tomado la molestia de inscribirse en las listas de votantes (el 54% delos 7,2 millones de tunecinos adultos), pero no dio cifras sobre la de los no inscritos que tenían, sin embargo, la posibilidad de ejercer su derecho con un documento de identidad y en colegios especiales generalmente situados en su mismo barrio. La abrumadora victoria islamista no permitirá probablemente formar en la Asamblea ninguna mayoría laica. En Nahda será el eje de cualquier coalición gubernamental. Ghanouchi ha repetido hasta la saciedad que cualquiera que fuera su resultado no quería gobernar en solitario sino mediante una coalición que durase al menos cinco años. Si los principales partidos laicos no desean asociarse con él le será fácil encontrar a alguna pequeña formación de izquierdas con la que completar su mayoría para no formar un Ejecutivo monocolor. El desenlace de estos comicios constituye un auténtico mazazo para las elites tunecinas que estaban convencidas de que el acerbo de un Estado casi laico había calado en la sociedad desde hace más de medio siglo y que los islamistas no superarían en ningún caso el 25% de los sufragios. Sin dar porcentajes Ghanouchi siempre vaticinó su victoria. En mayo pasado la anticipó, por ejemplo, a EL PAÍS. En Nahda es un partido afín a los Hermanos Musulmanes de Egipto, aunque ahora insiste en que se quiere inspirar del modelo turco. Ha sido la principal víctima de la represión de la dictadura de Zine al Abidine Ben Ali que mandó a prisión, a lo largo de los últimos 24 años, a cerca de 30.000 de sus militantes. El propio Ghanouchi estuvo más de 20 años exiliado en Londres y solo regresó a Túnez a finales de enero. En febrero En Nahda fue por fin legalizada tras haber estado prohibida durante 22 años. En Túnez la clase política no islamista aún no quiere reaccionar ante los datos parciales del recuento que circulan por el país.Yussef el Kardaoui, el más célebre de los predicadores del mundo árabe porque lanza sus proclamas a través de la televisión Al Jazeera, sí lo hizo hoy. Lanzó un llamamiento a la unión de Túnez, Egipto y Libia para formar juntos una “república democrática islámica”. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/24/actualidad/1319438700_301103.html

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Le Figaro.fr Retour à Sidi Bouzid, berceau du printemps arabe

Par Thierry Oberlé Publié le 23/10/2011 à 06:49

Sidi Bouzid, la ville où commença la protestation arabe. (Crédits photo: AP) REPORTAGE - La Tunisie a vécu dimanche une journée historique avec son premier vote démocratique. À Sidi Bouzid où Mohamed Bouazizi s'était immolé par le feu en décembre dernier, certains pronostiquent une nouvelle insurection si les promesses ne sont pas tenues.

L'histoire les a happés à Sidi Bouzid, une ville maussade du «pays inutile», l'intérieur des terres appelé ainsi en opposition aux riches régions côtières. Fayda Hamdi, Lamine Bouazizi (un homonyme de Mohammed Bouazizi, le «premier martyr de la révolution», NDLR) et Nsiri Bouderbala sont des acteurs en apparence ordinaires des bouleversements tunisiens. La première est agent municipal, le deuxième anthropologue et le troisième médecin de famille. L'auxiliaire de police a réprimandé Mohammed, 26 ans, le vendeur à la sauvette qui s'est immolé par le feu le 17 décembre. Elle est indirectement associée à la chute de Ben Ali et au déclenchement du printemps arabe. L'intellectuel est l'un des animateurs des émeutes de Sidi Bouzid, un soulèvement qui a fini par submerger par vagues successives la dictature. Le docteur est un opposant de toujours. Il a été nommé pour superviser dans le gouvernorat de Sidi Bouzid le premier rendez-vous avec la démocratie.

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Fayda Hamdi n'arrête pas de se repasser un film qui la dépasse. Souriante, le visage cerclé par un foulard chamarré, elle revoit l'interpellation le matin du 17 décembre de Mohammed Bouazizi, un marchand ambulant de quatre saisons. «Il était en infraction, j'ai appliqué le règlement», dit-elle. Elle se remémore les cris, la bousculade, la dispute pour la balance qu'elle essaye de lui arracher des mains et de confisquer. Elle apprend plus tard par un appel téléphonique la tentative de suicide du jeune chômeur. «J'ai eu peur. J'ai eu le pressentiment que quelque chose de terrible allait arriver», confie-t-elle à cinquante kilomètres de Sidi Bouzid, au domicile de ses parents, une maison en lisière de champs d'oliviers où, depuis le drame, elle vient souvent se réfugier. L'affaire de la gifle Elle se souvient de son arrestation la nuit du 28 décembre sur ordre personnel d'un président Ben Ali aux abois. De la prison de Gafsa où les matons la faisaient passer pour une institutrice qui avait battu un élève pour qu'elle échappe à d'éventuelles représailles. De ses difficultés psychiques. «J'avais la main bloquée, je ne pouvais même plus me faire des sandwichs.» De l'impression d'avoir été oubliée pendant des semaines. Et enfin de la sortie du cauchemar. Le 19 avril, elle passe en audience devant le tribunal de la ville. L'affaire de la gifle occupe une bonne partie des débats. Un oncle de Mohammed Bouazizi est le seul témoin à confirmer avoir vu l'agent frapper le petit vendeur de fruits et légumes. Un témoignage insuffisant selon la cour. À l'annonce du non-lieu, les applaudissements d'un public venu nombreux la soutenir fusent. Après tout n'est-elle pas, elle aussi, la victime de l'arbitraire? Mais sa réputation la poursuit. «Lorsqu'Obama a commenté la mort de Kadhafi à la télé, il a répété que j'ai tapé le marchand. Mais qu'est-ce qu'il en sait? Moi, je jure que jamais je n'ai fait une chose pareille», lâche-t-elle. Fayda Hamdi a repris ses fonctions d'auxiliaire de police en juin. Elle reste depuis enfermée dans son bureau comme les autres employés municipaux car «la situation sociale ne permet pas de travailler dans la rue». Elle se déclare «heureuse de la révolution». Dimanche, elle n'a pas voté. «C'est trop tôt. Je n'y vois pas clair avec tous ces partis, mais je me déplacerai la prochaine fois pour la présidentielle», promet-elle. Vigies de la révolution Lamine Bouazizi, l'activiste, a participé au scrutin malgré le «désenchantement» des jeunes qui espéraient un changement plus rapide. «L'élection paraît loyale mais les gens n'ont pas d'expérience de la démocratie. Certains demandent qui est le chef pour déterminer leur choix. Ils sont un peu désemparés», observe-t-il. Installé à la terrasse du café Salamandre, un bistrot aux tables et aux chaises en plastique disposées dans le jardin d'une place publique, il pronostique une «deuxième insurrection si les promesses ne sont pas tenues». Ici on discute politique, encore un peu plus qu'ailleurs. Des instituteurs, des petits fonctionnaires et des jeunes chômeurs diplômés se prennent pour les vigies de la révolution. Quatre ou cinq listes sur un total de 65 défendent, selon ces purs et durs, les principes du «17 décembre». «C'est difficile de s'y retrouver au milieu de tant de candidats, on va avoir des surprises», pronostique, pour sa part, Nsiri Bouderbala, le président de l'Instance supérieure indépendante des élections (ISIE) du gouvernorat de Sidi Bouzid. Ce médecin généraliste a abandonné son cabinet pour sa nouvelle mission. «J'ai considéré que j'étais plus utile pour la victoire de la démocratie en servant l'ISIE plutôt qu'en 352

entrant dans le combat politique dans les rangs d'un parti», affirme-t-il. «J'ai une double chance: celle de participer à des élections libres comme aucun pays arabe n'en a encore connu et d'exercer ce privilège du lieu d'où est partie la première étincelle», ajoute le vieux militant des droits de l'homme. Les locaux qui abritent son quartier général hébergeaient dans un passé pas si lointain le siège du RCD, le parti de Ben Ali. Nsiri Bouderbala se déclare particulièrement «fier» de les avoir transformés en «maison de verre». Thierry Oberlé Retour à Sidi Bouzid, berceau du printemps arabe Publié le 23/10/2011 à 06:49 http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/10/23/01003-20111023ARTFIG00248-retour-a-sidi-bouzid- berceau-du-printemps-arabe.php

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Internacional LAS PRIMERAS ELECCIONES DE LA PRIMAVERA ÁRABE Los comicios de Túnez arrancan con una gran afluencia de votantes Los tunecinos hacen colas de entre tres y cuatro horas para sufragar en medio de fuertes medidas de seguridad Ignacio Cembrero Túnez 23 OCT 2011 - 12:15 CET

Varias personas esperan su turno para entrar a votar / EFE Con una enorme afluencia de votantes y fuertes medidas de seguridad abrieron esta mañana los colegios electorales en Túnez, el primer país que celebra elecciones después de haber sido también el primero en empezar las revoluciones árabes. Hasta el mediodía no se habían registrado incidentes importantes en las mesas y aunque la gente tardaba entre tres o cuatro horas en votar, el ambiente era muy bueno. El país amaneció fuertemente custodiado, tanto por la policía como por el Ejército tunecino, que había sido desplegado por varios barrios de la capital. En la historia de las transiciones democráticas probablemente nunca hubo tantos observadores e interventores de partidos para impedir el fraude. Nueve meses después del derrocamiento del dictador Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, 7,2 millones de tunecinos han sido convocados a las urnas para elegir una Asamblea Constituyente de 217 miembros encargada de elaborar, en el plazo de un año, la primera Constitución democrática y designar a un gobierno. La tarea ha sido titánica. La desconfianza hacia un Ministerio del Interior, que siempre manipuló los resultados, ha incitado a la sociedad civil a prescindir por completo de esa institución a la hora de organizar las elecciones. Una comisión electoral (Instancia Superior Independiente para las Elecciones) se ha encargado de ello. La fiebre democrática tras 24 años de dictadura -para algunos ha durado desde la independencia en 1956- ha complicado la preparación electoral. Nada menos que 11.686 candidatos, la 354

mitad de ellos mujeres porque así lo obliga la ley, de 80 partidos y también en listas de independientes, compiten por obtener un escaño. “Hemos tenido otras sorpresas que dificultan aún más las cosas como descubrir que el 24,3% de los adultos con derecho a voto son analfabetos”, explica Moez Bouraoui, de 42 años, presidente de la Asociación Tunecina para la Integridad yla Democracia de las Elecciones que colocará sobre el terreno a 2.000 observadores. El 69,3% de los analfabetos son mujeres. “Es un dato que el régimen anterior había escondido”, añade, y que explica que en las papeletas figure también el símbolo de cada partido. Pese a todo, Túnez en el país norteafricano con el más alto nivel de instrucción. 14.000 observadores Aún así “saldremos airosos”, vaticina Bouraoui rodeado de voluntarios que reciben las últimas consignas antes de desplegarse hoy. Su eslogan es: “Seamos testigos de la historia”. En total habrá en los 7.361 colegios electorales, unos 14.000 observadores de los que 600 serán extranjeros enviados por la Unión Europea y la Fundación Carter. A ellos se les añadirán unos 35.000 interventores de partidos políticos y 40.000 policías y soldados. La campaña electoral, más bien tímida en sus inicios, se ha desarrollado sin incidentes si se exceptúan los provocados por los salafistas que no se presentan. “Y durante las votaciones será, con los mecanismos que a punto, prácticamente imposible hacer trampa”, asegura Michel Ghaler, jefe de los observadores de la UE. El único que ha advertido públicamente sobre el riesgo de fraude ha sido Rachid Ghanouchi, el líder del partido islamista En Nahda, al que los sondeos otorgan una mayoría relativa. Sus principales rivales son el Partido Demócrata Progresista (centrista), Ettakatol (miembro de la Internacional Socialista),Ettajdid (excomunista), y el más a la izquierda, el Partido Comunista de los Obreros de Túnez, tan reprimido como los islamistas durante la dictadura. Era llamativo ver ayer el despliegue del partido islamista, eran los único que tenían hasta dos fiscales por mesa electoral. El discurso islamista es, no obstante, tranquilizante. Ghanouchi explicaba en mayo que en Túnez había mucho que aprender del modelo político turco. Ha asumido el “estatuto personal” del que goza la mujer tunecina desde 1956, el más avazado del mundo árabe con la excepción de Líbano. Ha aceptado la paridad de ambos sexos en las listas electorales. En su programa de gobierno recalca el derecho de la mujer a la “igualdad, educación, trabajo y a participar en la vida pública”. En su línea conciliadora Ghanouchi apostaba, en otra entrevista en verano, “por la formación”, después de las elecciones, de un Gobierno de coalición con los demás partidos durante los cinco próximos años”. En su programa también promete la creación de cerca de 600.000 puestos de trabajo durante el próximo lustro pese a que desde el estallido de la revolución, el crecimiento, el más sostenido del norte de África durante años, está estancado. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/23/actualidad/1319364926_22248 1.html

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JOHN CARLIN Gadafi, ETA y el 'Niño' Torres JOHN CARLIN 23/10/2011 - "La pasión imperante siempre conquista a la razón." -Alexander Pope, poeta inglés del siglo XVII. Un pequeño test. ¿Cuál de estas tres es la noticia más feliz de la semana? a/ Gadafi murió; b/ ETA se rindió; c/ Fernando Torres resucitó. La respuesta debería de ser, a primera vista, bastante obvia. En cuanto a repercusión mundial, en cuanto al número de seres humanos que ha sentido el impacto de estos acontecimientos, a/ gana por goleada. Si ETA hubiera elegido mejor el momento de su rendición incondicional quizá alguien de fuera de España se hubiera fijado, pero la verdad, como demuestra un repaso a los medios internacionales, la noticia ha pasado prácticamente desapercibida en el resto del mundo. Podemos estar bastante seguros también de que, si se pudiera hacer una encuesta global, veríamos que bastante más gente se interesó por el hecho de que el Niño Torres acabó esta semana con su larga sequía goleadora en la Champions, alimentando la esperanza de que el más famoso de los españoles que militan en la liga inglesa vuelva a ser el grandísimo delantero que fue antes del Mundial de Sudáfrica. Pero nos alejamos del detalle clave de la pregunta inicial. ¿Cuál fue la más feliz de las tres noticias? Si no hubiéramos visto las grotescas imágenes televisivas de los últimos momentos de Gadafi quizá estaríamos más contentos. Pero, para los que no somos libios, semejante carnicería no puede ser motivo de festejo. Si nos limitamos a España (y hagámoslo), lo lógico sería pensar que la desaparición final de la sombra salvaje de ETA sería motivo de unánime celebración, relegando el caso Torres a un merecidísimo y lejano segundo plano. Pero resulta que no. Resulta que, según leemos, vemos y oímos en los medios, hay una cantidad importante de españoles que considera que celebrar el anuncio del cese del fuego definitivo de la banda terrorista más absurda de planeta tierra, la que ha tenido menos razón por existir durante los 26 años desde la muerte de Franco, es cosa de tontos. Lo cual nos obliga, no por primera vez, a recurrir al fútbol como oasis de sensatez y cordura en un mundo cegado por los odios y prejuicios que despierta la política. Sí, sí, es verdad que muchos seguidores del Barcelona o del Athletic de Bilbao odian al Real Madrid, y viceversa. Pero son sentimientos pasajeros, sin mayores consecuencias. Incluso quizá tengan su utilidad, como terapia social. El hábito mental que impide una visión fría y positiva de lo que ha ocurrido con ETA, en cambio, no solo es inútil, sino que es peligroso. Podría, por un lado, llegar a provocar en los próximos meses o años la aparición de una ETA disidente, un organismo demencial como el Real IRA, cuya esporádica presencia sigue empañando la paz en Irlanda; por otro lado, es al menos debatible la proposición de que si más personajes del mundo político hubieran demostrado en España un cierto pragmatismo, si se hubieran empeñado en buscar soluciones prácticas en vez de deleitarse en la indignación, se podría haber acabado antes con la bochornosa lacra del fenómeno ETA.

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Con lo cual nos quedamos con la aparente vuelta a la vida del Torres goleador. No es motivo de euforia, como ha sido el final de ETA en muchos hogares del País Vasco, pero sí de una tranquila alegría de cuya legitimidad nadie duda. Torres es un buen chaval que representa bien a España en el exterior y un jugador que en su mejor versión es capaz de aportar mucho a la gloria de la selección española de fútbol. En esto hay consenso. La felicidad que han generado sus dos goles esta semana, junto a la tendencia en alza de su juego desde que comenzó la temporada, no la compartirá la totalidad de los españoles, ya que curiosamente hay individuos por ahí que no se interesan por el fútbol, pero es indiscutible entre aquella sana mayoría que sí se fija en estas cosas. Entonces, ¿cual es la respuesta correcta a la pregunta del comienzo? Pues claramente, para bien o para mal (aunque más para mal, siendo sinceros), la respuesta es c/. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/deportes/Gadafi/ETA/Nino/Torres/elpepidep/20111023e lpepidep_12/Tes

Africa

October 23, 2011 Tunisians Vote in a Milestone of Arab Change By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK TUNIS — Millions of Tunisians cast votes on Sunday for an assembly to draft a constitution and shape a new government, in a burst of pride and hope that after inspiring uprisings across the Arab world, their small country could now lead the way to democracy. “Tunisians showed the world how to make a peaceful revolution without icons, without ideology, and now we are going to show the world how we can build a real democracy,” said Moncef Marzouki, founder of a liberal political party and a former dissident exile, as he waited for hours in a long line outside a polling place in the coastal town of Sousse. “This will have a real impact in places like Libya and Egypt and Syria, after the fall of its regime,” he added. “The whole Arab world is watching.” In another first for the region, a moderate Islamic party, Ennahda, is expected to win at least a plurality of seats in the Tunisian assembly. The party’s leaders have vowed to create another kind of new model for the Arab world, one reconciling Islamic principles with Western-style democracy. Results are expected to be tallied within days. In the meantime, those still struggling through the postrevolutionary uncertainty of places like Libya and Egypt watched Tunisia “with a kind of envy,” said Samer Soliman, a professor at the American University in Cairo and an Egyptian political activist. Libyans and Egyptians acknowledge that Tunisia was not only the first but also the easiest of the Arab revolutions, because of its relatively small, homogenous, educated 357

population and because of the willingness of the Tunisian military to relinquish power. The success of Tunisia offers inspiration, but perhaps few answers, for Egyptians or Libyans who hope to follow in its footsteps. Libya’s interim leaders on Sunday proclaimed their revolution a success and laid out an ambitious timetable for the election of their own constituent assembly. But they have yet to solve the problem of unifying the loosely organized brigades of anti-Qaddafi fighters under the control of an interim authority to govern Libya until then, much less lay the groundwork for elections. And with Egypt a little more than a month away from a vote for a new Parliament, its interim military rulers have so far balked at adopting many of the election procedures that enabled Tunisia’s election to proceed smoothly. Among them are inking voters’ fingers to ensure people vote only once, transparent ballot boxes, a single election day rather than staggered polls, and weeks of voter education before the balloting. Also, in Egypt, the interim military rulers have not agreed to relinquish any of the army’s power over either the next Parliament or a planned constitutional panel. For Tunisians, though, the scenes at the polls on Sunday — a turnout far above expectations, orderly lines stretching around blocks, satisfied smiles at blue-inked fingers — already seemed to wipe away 10 months of anxiety and protests over the future of the revolution that ousted Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. For the first time in their history, many Tunsians said, they expected an honest count of their ballots to determine the country’s future. “Today is the day of independence,” said Amin Ganhouba, 30, a technician. “Today we got our freedom, and our dignity, from the simple act of voting.” In a statement issued after the polls closed on Sunday, President Obama congratulated Tunisians for “the first democratic elections to take place in the country that changed the course of history and began the Arab Spring.” Many people expressed faith that the act of voting itself would change Tunisia for the better, no matter who won. Some argued that democracy would make public officials more accountable. “The people in power know that we are keeping a watchful eye,” said Kamel Abdel, 45, a high school philosophy teacher voting in the crowded slum of Tadamon. Others predicted an almost magical transformation. “There is going to be social justice, freedom, democracy, and they are going to tackle the unemployment issue,” Mohamed Fezai, a jobless 30-year-old college graduate, declared confidently. At least one woman celebrated a vote she cast at random. Beaming with pride, Fatima Toumi, 52, an illiterate homemaker, said that she had done her civic duty, but did not know which party’s box she had checked. “Whoever I pick doesn’t matter,” she said. “I hope it will improve the situation of Tunisia’s youth.” About 25 percent of Tunisians are illiterate, a lower rate than many countries in the area, and several voters said they expressed their choice by marking the box next to the logo of the party they favored: a star and bird for the Islamic party, or an olive tree for a liberal rival. Some people declined to vote. Sitting in a cafe in Sousse, Mr. Ben Ali’s home town, Saber Kaddour, 44, a coffee wholesaler, argued that voters were too caught up in politics to think about the issues. “Everything is disguised, and people think they 358

understand what is going on, but they don’t,” he said. He predicted chaos after the results were announced, with the losing party taking to the streets in protest. “But that is not democracy,” the cafe’s owner, Nedra Elkhechime, replied earnestly. “Even if you lose, you have to accept it.” In interviews this week along Tunisia’s affluent coast and in its impoverished interior, most voters said their biggest concerns were the economy, jobs, and finding candidates with integrity. In Tadamon, the poor neighborhood, several voters said they were repulsed by a party that tried to tell them it would lower the price of bread and other staples, or the tycoon whose newly founded party brought a rap singer to a rally in a ploy for votes. But some said they appreciated that Ennahda, the moderate Islamist party, gave away sheep for poor people to sacrifice for the feast at the end of Ramadan. Nasreddin Mnai, a 22-year- old student, called it evidence that “they are going to help the poor people.” Ennahda had a long history of opposition to the dictatorship before Mr. Ben Ali’s persecution eviscerated it in the 1990s, and its leaders have said that they hope to establish a durable, pluralistic democracy that will protect the rights of individuals and minorities regardless of who is in power. They often cite the model of Turkey, a secular democracy now governed by a party with an Islamic identity. At stops across the country in the final days of the campaign, Ennahda’s founder, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, stepped up his religious appeals. “When you go into the polls, God’s presence will be there with you,” he said at a rally in the impoverished city of Kasserine. “God wants you to vote for the party that will protect your faith.” But at every stop, Mr. Ghannouchi and others from Ennahda repeated their commitment to women’s rights, including equality in education and employment and the freedom to adopt or reject Islamic dress, like women’s head scarves. Ennahda supporters, though, were divided over how much regulation of personal morality the party should seek to impose. Some agreed that women ought to be able to reject the veil, and that Tunisians should be able to buy alcohol — widely available here now — despite an Islamic prohibition. “We don’t want the Islamists to attack the secularists, or vice versa,” said Belhsan Menzi, 31, an Ennahda supporter waiting to vote in Tadamon. But his friend Lotfi Nasri, 35, said he expected Ennahda to make sure Tunisians complied with Islamic moral codes, including rules about alcohol and head scarves. If Ennahda wins power, he said, Tunisia “will be more of an Islamic country.” Others said they expected it to do more to restrict profanity or blasphemy in the popular culture. The uprising that unseated Mr. Ben Ali began when a fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in the impoverished inland town of Sidi Bouzid to protest his lack of opportunity and the disrespect of the police. On Sunday, his mother, Manoubia Bouazizi, 53, told Reuters that the elections were “a moment of victory for my son, who died defending dignity and liberty.” Hend Hasassi contributed reporting. This article has been revised to reflect the following correction: 359

Correction: October 24, 2011 An earlier version of this article misidentified the founder of a liberal political party quoted in the story. He is Moncef Marzouki, not Marcel. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/africa/tunisians-cast-historic-votes-in- peace-and-hope.html?src=recg

Middle East October 23, 2011 Palestinian Bid for Full Unesco Membership Imperils American Financing By STEVEN ERLANGER PARIS — The Palestinian bid for full membership in Unesco — the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization — has put both Washington and the organization into an urgent bind. United States legislation dating back more than 15 years mandates a complete cutoff of American financing to any United Nations agency that accepts the Palestinians as a full member. Unesco depends on the United States for 22 percent of its budget, about $70 million a year. Neither the Obama administration nor Unesco wants the cutoff to happen, and diplomats are desperately negotiating with Congress, the Palestinians and other Unesco member states to find a resolution that will preserve the agency’s budget. But with a vote on membership coming as early as this week, time is running out. Unesco, perhaps most famous for designating world heritage sites, is a major global development agency whose missions include promoting literacy, science, clean water and education, including sex education and equal treatment for girls and young women. To some degree, a senior American official said, Unesco helps promote Western values under an international umbrella in places where an American one might be resented or misunderstood. That is one reason, the official said, that the United States rejoined the organization under President George W. Bush after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Unesco membership “is in the core security interests of the United States,” the agency’s director general, Irina Bokova, said in an interview here. “I think the United States should take a very careful look at this legislation, in their own interests. I don’t believe it’s in the U.S. interest to disengage from the U.N. system as a whole.” The irony is that the Obama administration agrees and has been a strong supporter of Ms. Bokova. But lawyers at the State Department see no way around the laws, which date from 1990 and 1994 and provide no possibility of a presidential waiver.

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American officials have criticized the Palestinian move, part of its bid for full membership in the United Nations, as “premature.” They fear it will lead to more conflict with Israel and further undermine the possibility of peace talks. Despite American objections, Unesco’s 58-nation executive board approved the Palestinian application this month. The agency’s general assembly meets here starting Tuesday; the 193 member countries are scheduled to vote on Palestinian membership during the two-week meeting and are expected to approve it. Unesco has long been viewed in the West as politicized, corrupt and anti-American, antipathy that came to a head in 1984 when President Ronald Reagan withdrew American membership. Since then, the agency has been much reformed, both in terms of its finances and its embrace of values like freedom of the press and education for women. Hillary Rodham Clinton was the first American secretary of state to visit Unesco, coming this year to support an initiative on education for girls and young women, and Ms. Bokova emphasizes that since 9/11, Unesco has run its largest education project in Afghanistan, opening literacy centers for civilians as well as Afghan police officers. It cooperates on teacher training with American companies like Microsoft, she said, and has organized training for Tunisian and Egyptian journalists since the Arab Spring revolts. Only this month, the United States made separate voluntary contributions to Unesco programs for education and clean water; Washington praises its work on behalf of universal literacy, gender equality and disaster preparedness. If the United States withdrew its financing, it would still retain a seat at the agency for another two years, but even then its influence would be weakened. “In a world where soft power is so important, the United States is counterproductively compromising its position in a forum that really matters,” said Ronald Koven, who monitors Unesco for the World Press Freedom Committee, an American nongovernmental organization. Peter Yeo, vice president for public policy at the United Nations Foundation, which supports the organization’s goals, said that “what’s maddening is that this is not your grandfather’s Unesco — it is better managed, more efficient and U.S. leadership in Unesco has made it a better organization.” Mrs. Clinton has asked the American special envoy to the Middle East, David M. Hale, to negotiate with the Palestinians and Arab countries to break the impasse. The State Department has said it hoped to press the Palestinians to withdraw their request. There have been discussions about inviting the Palestinians, longtime nonstate observers at Unesco, to sign three major conventions — including the World Heritage Convention, which could list key sites currently under Israeli control as Palestinian — as a nonstate signatory, the way the European Union has done. Such a move would give the Palestinians some of the advantages they seek in joining Unesco without full membership. Repeated requests to interview the Palestinian ambassador to Unesco or his deputy were declined. Palestinian officials have previously said they see membership as part of the recognition they seek as a state, which the Palestinian envoy to Unesco, Elias Wadih Sanbar, referred to as “a new era in which Palestine is recognized.” 361

An Arab ambassador, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said there was also discussion of approving full membership for the Palestinians but delaying it for six months, although that would not prevent a cutoff of American money. There is also talk that other Arab states could make up the shortfall in the Unesco budget. But Arab representatives say that it will be very difficult for Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, to compromise. Any “package deal” short of membership, one of them said, “would look like bribery.” Unesco has a two-year budget of $643 million for 2010-11 and a projected budget of $653 million for 2012-13. Since the United States normally pays its 22 percent share toward the end of the year, a cutoff could mean no payment for 2011, another $70 million blow to the budget. The result would be immediate cuts in programs and personnel. Ms. Bokova is hopeful for a resolution, but she said that on a recent visit to Washington she found “skepticism and lack of knowledge” about today’s Unesco. Likewise, American officials doubt Congress will alter the legislation. Many Republicans, who control the House, are hostile to both the United Nations and the Palestinian statehood bid. “We have a very strong case to make,” Ms. Bokova said. “Unesco is very different from 25 years ago.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/middleeast/palestinian-bid-to-join-unesco- could-imperil-us-funds.html?src=recg

Africa October 22, 2011 In His Last Days, Qaddafi Wearied of Fugitive’s Life By KAREEM FAHIM MISURATA, Libya — After 42 years of absolute power in Libya, Col. Muammar el- Qaddafi spent his last days hovering between defiance and delusion, surviving on rice and pasta his guards scrounged from the emptied civilian houses he moved between every few days, according to a senior security official captured with him. Under siege by the former rebels for weeks, Colonel Qaddafi grew impatient with life on the run in the city of Surt, said the official, Mansour Dhao Ibrahim, the leader of the feared People’s Guard, a network of loyalists, volunteers and informants. “He would say: ‘Why is there no electricity? Why is there no water?’ ” Mr. Dhao, who stayed close to Colonel Qaddafi throughout the siege, said that he and other aides repeatedly counseled the colonel to leave power or the country, but that the colonel and one of his sons, Muatassim, would not even consider the option. Still, though some of the colonel’s supporters portrayed him as bellicose to the end and armed at the front lines, he actually did not take part in the fighting, Mr. Dhao said, 362

instead preferring to read or make calls on his satellite phone. “I’m sure not a single shot was fired,” he said. As Libya’s interim leaders prepared Saturday to formally start the transition to an elected government and set a timeline for national elections in 2012, sweeping away Colonel Qaddafi’s dictatorship, they faced the certainty that even in death the colonel had hurt them. The battle for Surt, Colonel Qaddafi’s birthplace, was prolonged for months by the presence of the fiercely loyal cadre he kept with him, delaying the end of a war most Libyans had hoped would be over with the fall of Tripoli in August. Mr. Dhao’s comments, in an interview on Saturday at the military intelligence headquarters in Misurata, came as the final details of the colonel’s death, at the hands of the fighters who had captured him, were still being debated. Residents of Misurata spent a third day viewing the bodies of Colonel Qaddafi and his son at a meat locker in a local shopping mall. Officials with the interim government have said that they will conduct an autopsy on the bodies and investigate allegations that the two men may have been killed while in custody, though local security officials have said they see no need for such an inquiry. Mr. Dhao, who is said to be a cousin of Colonel Qaddafi, became a trusted member of his inner circle. As head of the People’s Guard, he presided over a force accused of playing a central role in the violent crackdowns on protesters during the uprising, including firing on unarmed demonstrators in Tripoli’s Tajura neighborhood. The guard’s volunteer members harassed residents at checkpoints throughout the city. Mr. Dhao was believed to have kept weapons and detainees at his farm, according to Salah Marghani of the Libyan Human Rights Group. In a separate interview with Human Rights Watch, Mr. Dhao denied that he had ordered any violence. On Saturday, he spoke in a large conference room that served as his cell, wearing a blanket on his legs and a blue shirt, maybe an electric company uniform, inscribed with the word “power.” A few guards were present, but they spoke only among themselves. He said his captors had treated him well and had sent doctors to tend to injuries he sustained before his capture, including shrapnel wounds under his eye, and on his back and left arm. Many of his statements appeared to be self-serving; he said, for instance, that he and others had repeatedly tried to convince Colonel Qaddafi that the revolutionaries were not rats and mercenaries, as the colonel was fond of saying, but ordinary people. “He knew that these were Libyans who were revolting,” he said. Other times, he seemed full of regret, explaining his failure to surrender or escape as his way of fulfilling “a moral obligation to stay” with the colonel before adding, “My courage failed me.” His account of the battle did not address the accusations made by the former rebels of abuses by loyalist forces inside Surt. Ismael al-Shukri, the deputy chief of military intelligence in Misurata, said that loyalists had used families as human shields and that there were reports that loyalist soldiers had detained daughters to prevent families from leaving. The former rebels have also said that the Qaddafi forces executed soldiers who refused to fight. 363

Colonel Qaddafi fled to Surt on Aug. 21, the day Tripoli fell, in a small convoy that traveled through the loyalist bastions of Tarhuna and Bani Walid. “He was very afraid of NATO,” said Mr. Dhao, who joined him about a week later. The decision to stay in Surt was Muatassim’s; the colonel’s son reasoned that the city, long known as an important pro-Qaddafi stronghold and under frequent bombardment by NATO airstrikes, was the last place anyone would look. The colonel traveled with about 10 people, including close aides and guards. Muatassim, who commanded the loyalist forces, traveled separately from his father, fearing that his own satellite phone was being tracked. Apart from a phone, which the colonel used to make frequent statements to a Syrian television station that became his official outlet, Colonel Qaddafi was largely “cut off from the world,” Mr. Dhao said. He did not have a computer, and in any case, there was rarely any electricity. The colonel, who was fond of framing the revolution as a religious war between devout Muslims and the rebel’s Western backers, spent his time reading the Koran, Mr. Dhao said. He refused to hear pleas to give up power. He would say, according to Mr. Dhao: “This is my country. I handed over power in 1977,” referring to his oft-repeated assertion that power was actually in the hands of the Libyan people. “We tried for a time, and then the door was shut,” the aide said, adding that the colonel seemed more open to the idea of giving up power than his sons did. For weeks, the former rebels fired heavy weapons indiscriminately at the city. “Random shelling was everywhere,” said Mr. Dhao, adding that a rocket or a mortar shell struck one of the houses where the colonel was staying, wounding three of his guards. A chef who was traveling with the group was also hurt, so everyone started cooking, Mr. Dhao said. About two weeks ago, as the former rebels stormed the city center, the colonel and his sons were trapped shuttling between two houses in a residential area called District No. 2. They were surrounded by hundreds of former rebels, firing at the area with heavy machine guns, rockets and mortars. “The only decision was whether to live or to die,” Mr. Dhao said. Colonel Qaddafi decided it was time to leave, and planned to flee to one of his houses nearby, where he had been born. On Thursday, a convoy of more than 40 cars was supposed to leave at about around 3 a.m., but disorganization by the loyalist volunteers delayed the departure until 8 a.m. In a Toyota Land Cruiser, Colonel Qaddafi traveled with his chief of security, a relative, the driver and Mr. Dhao. The colonel did not say much during the drive. NATO warplanes and former rebel fighters found them half an hour after they left. When a missile struck near the car, the airbags deployed, said Mr. Dhao, who was hit by shrapnel in the strike. He said he tried to escape with Colonel Qaddafi and other men, walking first to a farm, then to the main road, toward some drainage pipes. “The shelling was constant,” Mr. Dhao said, adding that he was struck by shrapnel again and fell unconscious. When he woke up, he was in the hospital. “I’m sorry for all that happened to Libya,” he said, “from the beginning to the end.” Suliman Alzway contributed reporting. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/world/africa/in-his-last-days-qaddafi-wearied-of- fugitives-life.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2 364

Internacional LA CAÍDA DEL RÉGIMEN LIBIO Libia arranca dividida la era tras Gadafi Los cadáveres de Gadafi, de su hijo Mutasin y del general Abu Baker Yunes Jaber siguen sin ser enterrados 24 horas después de su muerte Juan Miguel Muñoz Misrata 22 OCT 2011 - 16:05 CET213

Hombres y niños hacen cola en una sala de Misrata para ver los cadáveres de los Gadafi. / PHILIPPE DESMAZES (AFP) Muerto no ganará batallas, pero incluso desde la cámara frigorífica del mercado de carne y verduras de Misrata en la que yace, Muamar el Gadafi es capaz de generar discordia entre quienes hacían piña cuando combatían el dictador libio. Solo un día después de su fallecimiento, muy probablemente una ejecución sumaria, el primer ministro, Mahmud Yibril, visitaba el lugar el viernes por la tarde. Se trataba de enterrar el cadáver del tirano y cerrar el expediente. Pero los militares que custodian el cuerpo y Yibril no lograron pactar, por muy devotos musulmanes que todos se declaren y por vencido que estuviera el plazo de 24 horas que marca el Corán para sepultar a todo musulmán. Los soldados de Misrata, que soportaron un asedio atroz durante meses y combatieron en agosto para liberar Trípoli, pretenden que el cuerpo de Gadafi sea enterrado en un emplazamiento secreto. Yibril prefiere que se conozca el lugar de la tumba e impedir que sea visitada. El primer ministro prefiere que se conozca el lugar de la tumba e impedir que sea visitada Es la primera fisura grave en la era posgadafi, en un país que no ha conocido durante medio siglo el significado de la palabra compromiso. En Misrata, donde ya se expone el

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puño de hierro que aplasta un avión estadounidense -uno de los símbolos de Bab el Azizia, el bastión de Gadafi en Trípoli, que los luchadores de Misrata trajeron a su ciudad-, no falta quien desea que el coronel que rigió Libia durante 42 años sea enterrado en esta población a 200 kilómetros al este de la capital. La tribu del tirano (Gadadfa) ha reclamado el cuerpo para darle digna sepultura en Sirte, su localidad natal. Sin éxito. La romería para ver el cadáver no se había disuelto anoche. Cientos de hombres esperaban disciplinadamente su turno protegiéndose del sol bajo una hilera de árboles. Sobre un colchón yace el cuerpo ensangrentado de Gadafi con la cabeza ladeada. A su izquierda, el jefe de su ejército, Abu Baker Yunes Jaber; y a la izquierda de este Mutasim, hijo del tirano y detestado como pocos por su papel en la eterna represión que se sufrió durante el régimen defenestrado. Nadie quería verlos detenidos. Retumba el “Dios es grande” en la sala frigorífica que gritan quienes no querían perderse algo que habían esperado ver durante años: el dictador muerto. Porque resulta imposible encontrar a una sola persona que prefiriera un juicio al dictador. No les importa nada si fue asesinado a sangre fría. “No había otra opción. Mejor la muerte que el juicio, porque un proceso daría esperanzas a sus partidarios de que todavía podrían recuperar el poder”, explica Hasan al Osta, un economista que saluda a un joven menudo de 26 años, estudiante de religión islámica. Se llama Ismail Abdula Shanab. Y es uno de los héroes de la procesión masculina. “Yo estaba en el grupo que encontró al general Yunes Jaber en Sirte. Me metí en la tubería donde se escondía y le disparé. Creo que yo le maté”, comenta sonriente, como todos los visitantes de la morgue improvisada. El poderío de Misrata En algunos detalles da la impresión de que Misrata, la ciudad más castigada, la que más víctimas ha padecido, cuya avenida principal está repleta de edificios plagados de boquetes, apuesta por demostrar poderío. En el control militar a la entrada a la provincia, los milicianos piden documentación y al extranjero le reclaman el pasaporte para sacar fotocopias; los ‘check-points’ son mucho más frecuentes que en el resto del país. Como si pretendieran enviar un mensaje al Gobierno interino. No perdonan en Misrata la intervención de Yibril, días después de la conquista de Trípoli. “Exigió a nuestros combatientes que devolvieran lo que se habían llevado de Bab el Azizia. Pero solo se apoderaron de coches y gasolina para seguir luchando en Bani Walid. Y Yibril lo pidió en televisión, sin haber hablado antes con nosotros”, afirma Ahmed, un ex funcionario de la Administración de Gadafi. “No había otra opción. Mejor la muerte de Gadafi que el juicio"

Hasan al Osta No es la única señal que sugiere que las disputas territoriales, arraigadas históricamente, comienzan a aflorar. El plan previsto por el Consejo Nacional Transitorio (CNT), el organismo que dirigió la guerra, establece que el presidente del CNT, Mustafá Abdel Yalil, pronuncie una declaración de liberación de Libia que daría inicio al proceso democrático. Se ha pospuesto un par de veces. Está prevista para hoy domingo, y aunque se había anunciado que tendría lugar en Trípoli, finalmente se celebrará en Bengasi. Tiene su lógica. Y su carga simbólica. La oriental Bengasi se entregó a mediados de febrero a la tarea de derrocar a Gadafi, y después se sumaron las demás ciudades.

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Si a las disputas territoriales se suman las tribales -que parecen más mitigadas a estas alturas del siglo XXI en un país en el que los jóvenes son mayoría entre sus seis millones de habitantes- y la lucha por el poder que ya se atisba entre islamistas y liberales educados en Estados Unidos y otros países occidentales, el panorama político puede enturbiarse si no se gestiona con extrema habilidad. Con el agravante de que en Libia hay un arma en cada casa. Y no acaban ahí las semillas que pueden hacer aflorar nuevos escollos. Este país árabe es inmensamente rico en petróleo, e infinitos los potentísimos intereses que entrarán en juego. En Trípoli, los hombres de negocios extranjeros ya pululan a la búsqueda de contratos. Y poderosos personajes del exilio que organizaron guerrillas y golpes fracasados contra Gadafi no han dicho todavía esta boca es mía. Va a ser necesario un delicado encaje de bolillos para que la democracia y la prosperidad se hagan realidad. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/22/actualidad/1319291850_59201 4.html

Internacional "Todos queríamos que lo mataran" Los libios hacen cola en Misrata para ver el cadáver de Gadafi Juan Miguel Muñoz Misrata 22 OCT 2011 - 20:06 CET

Hombres libios con mascarilla médica esperan para ver el cuerpo muerto de Muammar Gaddafi. / Guillem Valle (EFE) “Prefiero que lo hayan matado. El mundo es mucho mejor sin Gadafi. Es un criminal, y si fuera juzgado podría seguir creando problemas en Libia. Creo que la inmensa mayoría de los libios piensa como yo, y también hay hombres en el Gobierno que temen mucho lo que pudiera desvelar. Además, Sadam Husein fue sometido a un proceso y para muchos se convirtió en un héroe en Irak”, se explaya Ashraf, un comercial de material agrícola tripolitano que celebraba la noche del viernes en la plaza de los Mártires de Trípoli (antes plaza Verde) la desaparición del dictador. Mohamed, un

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amigo egipcio que le acompaña, envidia a Ashraf: “A mí me gustaría que al presidente Hosni Mubarak le hubieran hecho lo mismo”. Bajo el Castillo Rosado de la céntrica plaza tripolitana en la que el sátrapa pronunció algunas de sus amenazas más estridentes, cientos de mujeres bailaban y cantaban – separadas por barreras metálicas de los hombres— locas de alegría. Nadie siente remordimiento por el posible crimen de guerra perpetrado por los rebeldes. Muy probablemente porque el concepto del derecho a la defensa les resulta más que ajeno. Los libios no han disfrutado de él ni por asomo. El Gobierno interino calcula que 30.000 personas han perecido durante los ocho meses de la guerra que nació en febrero en Bengasi. Se ignora cuántas son las víctimas de cuatro décadas de terror. Un régimen en el que las madres eran forzadas a aplaudir el ahorcamiento público y televisado de su hijo; los padres no se atrevían a hablar de Gadafi en su hogar por miedo a que sus pequeños repitieran alguna frase escuchada en casa; las humillaciones eran el pan nuestro de cada día; las detenciones se prodigaban por criticar el estado de una cañería, y los prebostes del régimen se regodeaban en su arbitrariedad. A nadie le importa que Muamar el Gadafi haya asido asesinado a sangre fría. Y no falta quien esboza una mueca de estupefacción cuando se le dice que cualquier criminal merece un juicio justo. El Gobierno interino calcula que 30.000 personas han fallecido durante los ocho meses de conflicto En Misrata, a las puertas del mercado donde los milicianos protegen el cadáver de eventuales excesos -los uniformados no permiten detenerse a nadie en la cámara frigorífica donde reposa el cuerpo del tirano porque algunos lo han pisoteado-, todo son sonrisas. El odio remite un ápice ante la inminencia de lo que constituye un acontecimiento histórico para los libios, algunos venidos de otras ciudades, que quieren ver sus propios ojos que Gadafi nunca podrá amenazarles otra vez. Algunos hombres cargan con sus hijos pequeños a cuestas porque quieren que graben en su memoria el rostro de quien tanto les hizo sufrir. “Pregunta a quien quieras. Todos queríamos que lo mataran”, advierte Hakim al Misrati, enfermero de 44 años. A su lado, el estudiante Jaled tiene otros temores: “Pudiera ser que un abogado consiguiera una condena breve o que el dictador pudiera pasar el resto de sus días en buenas condiciones en una prisión”. Para el Gobierno interino, sin embargo, las circunstancias del fallecimiento de Gadafi - al que se ve vivo en varios vídeos minutos antes de que se declarara su defunción- son una patata caliente. La gestión de la investigación de la muerte será una prueba de las credenciales del nuevo Estado, que se afana por proclamar que la nueva Libia será un Estado democrático en el que los ciudadanos gozarán de garantías jurídicas. El primer ministro, Mahmud Yibril, insiste en que Gadafi no fue asesinado. Pero su mensaje debe calar entre los organismos internacionales. A los ciudadanos de Libia les importa un comino que al autócrata le descerrajaran un tiro en la sien. Juan Miguel Muñoz "Todos queríamos que lo mataran"22 OCT 2011 - 20:06 CET http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/22/actualidad/1319306795_72 8961.html

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Libya prepares for liberation ceremony Governing National Transitional Council plans declaration as Nato announces it will end military operation on 31 October David Batty and agencies guardian.co.uk, Saturday 22 October 2011 11.08 BST

Libyans embrace ahead of a planned formal declaration of liberation. Photograph: Abdel Magid Al-Fergany/AP Libya's transitional government is to finally declare the country liberated following the capture and killing of the ousted dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Military official Abdel-Rahman Busin said the governing National Transitional Council (NTC) had begun preparations for a liberation ceremony on Sunday in the eastern city of Benghazi, birthplace of the Libyan revolution. The declaration comes as military commanders in Misurata rejected international calls for a post-mortem on Gaddafi's body, amid signs of tension among some of the revolutionary factions. In another step towards transforming the former dictatorship into a democracy, the interim prime minister Mahmoud Jibril said on Saturday that Libyans should be allowed to vote within eight months to elect a national council that would draft a new constitution and form an interim government. In the meantime, the priority was to remove weapons from the country's streets and restore stability and order, Jibril said at the World Economic Forum in Jordan. "The first election should take place within a period of eight months, maximum, to constitute a national congress of Libya, some sort of parliament," he said.

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"This national congress would have two tasks: draft a constitution, on which we would have a referendum, and the second to form an interim government to last until the first presidential elections are held." Jibril said that he expected to step down on Saturday, a move he had planned to make once his government took full control of the country. He also warned Libya's next government not to allow politics to influence the award of oil contracts, saying: "I can advise the coming interim government that the economic rule should be the rule. It's very dangerous to have contracts based on politics." His comments could be seen as cautioning against giving western powers who intervened in the Libyan civil war any preferrential treatment. Nato announced last night it would officially end its seven-month operation in Libya on 31 October. The Nato secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said late on Friday that the 31 October end to the alliance's operation would be confirmed formally next week. Diplomats said Nato air patrols would continue over Libya for the next nine days as a precautionary measure to ensure the stability of the new regime and would be gradually reduced, assuming there were no further outbreaks of violence. Meanwhile, Libyan authorities face questions from international human rights organisations about Gaddafi's death in Sirte on Thursday. There appears to be disagreement over what to do with the ousted dictator's corpse, which has been put on display in a refrigerated meat store in Misrata. Misrata fighters who captured Gaddafi refuse to accept any blame for the killing and have rejected demands for a medical report into the cause of his death. But NTC officials said they were trying to arrange a secret resting place for his body that would avoid loyalists turning it into a shrine. Wounds on Gaddafi's body appeared to confirm he was killed in cold blood in the chaotic minutes following his capture . There was a bullet wound on the left side of his head that appeared to have been shot from close range. Blood stains showed another bullet wound to his thorax. His body, subsequently driven to Misrata and publicly paraded, was barefoot and stripped to the waist. Amnesty International has called on the NTC to investigate. It said that if Gaddafi was deliberately killed, this would be a war crime. The NTC's position is that it will support an investigation because the new Libya is a law-abiding country, but officials seemed sceptical that it was necessary. Gaddafi's bloodied corpse has become a gruesome tourist attraction and a macabre symbol of the new Libya's problems. Hundreds of ordinary Libyans have queued to see the dead dictator. One of the biggest challenges facing the interim government in the runup to elections is managing the many tensions between different cities and regions of Libya – Benghazi, Misrata, Tripoli and the Nafusa mountains – all of which will want to stake a claim in any new political order. There is also potential for inter-militia violence and clashes between secularists and Islamists.

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/22/libya-liberation-ceremony-nato- withdrawal/print EDITORIAL Sin Gadafi Una Libia fragmentada tiene por delante la titánica tarea de construir un Estado democrático 22/10/2011 La captura y muerte del coronel Gadafi en el asedio de Sirte, su ciudad natal y último baluarte, cierra un capítulo trascendental en la historia de Libia, más allá de las dramáticas circunstancias que hayan concurrido en ella, incluida la participación de la OTAN en los ataques que facilitaron la captura del dictador por las tropas rebeldes -la ONU ha exigido una investigación-. El régimen de Gadafi se había desplomado meses atrás, pero la desaparición de quien lo encarnaba sella irremisiblemente una larguísima era de despotismo y represión de la que un pueblo todavía alzado intenta librarse ansiosamente. Para mantenerse en el poder 42 años, Gadafi, un manipulador nato, desarrolló un enfermizo culto a la personalidad y controló férreamente un Estado policiaco, que extirpó cualquier libertad y recurrió sistemáticamente a la cárcel, el asesinato y la tortura. En el escenario internacional dejó una terrible huella en forma de patrocinio de casi cualquier intriga terrorista. Pero la muerte de Gadafi en una Libia en armas no representa presumiblemente más que el final del principio. Los insurgentes libios y su poder interino, en el que existen divergencias de calado, hacen frente a la tarea titánica de insuflar algún orden en lo que básicamente es un rompecabezas dispar de milicias, civiles armados, grupos religiosos y políticos y representaciones regionales y tribales, compitiendo por separado por un lugar al sol en el nuevo horizonte. Lo que ha aglutinado a los sublevados, en la estela de la llama prendida primero en Túnez y Egipto, ha sido la liquidación de la tiranía. Cumplido este objetivo, lo demás está por hacer en el país norteafricano que mana petróleo, unos 32.000 millones de dólares en 2010. Misión inmediata del Consejo Nacional interino es manejar las enormes expectativas de seis millones de libios, entre las cuales no es la menor obtener algún bienestar después de ocho meses de guerra civil. Y en otro plano, también decisivo, la de intentar poner en pie el embrión de un Estado democrático. La agenda anunciada el mes pasado por el primer ministro de hecho, Mahmud Jibril -un laico formado en Estados Unidos y en quien se concitan muchas enemistades-, estipula que a la caída de Sirte se formará en un mes un Gobierno provisional, lo que implicaría tanto la dimisión de Jibril como la del líder islamista Abdel Hakim Belhaj, su adversario, cuyas fuerzas controlan Trípoli, y la del propio presidente del Consejo provisional, Mustafá Abdel Jalil. En ocho meses, un Congreso Nacional de 200 miembros daría vía libre a elecciones multipartidistas y una nueva Constitución, en 2013. Cumplir ese ambicioso programa resulta muy difícil. Implica ser capaz de controlar y desarmar a una plétora de milicias, encauzar rivalidades ideológicas entre islamistas y laicos o desactivar aspiraciones de poder regionales e incluso locales, alimentadas en los agravios infligidos durante años por el déspota desaparecido. La manera en que se ha desarrollado la revuelta libia, su dispersión geográfica y su carácter localista alimentan

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un serio potencial de conflicto, al que no ayudará el hecho de que la intervención armada occidental haya sido decisiva en la caída y muerte de Gadafi. Libia debe aplicarse desde este momento a dirigir por sí misma una transición preñada de obstáculos, en la que hay que evitar tanto un vacío político como la pugna abierta entre quienes hasta ayer tenían un objetivo común. El maná petrolífero -que se espera recupere en poco más de un año los 1.600.000 barriles diarios previos a la guerra- y el progresivo reintegro internacional de los más de 50.000 millones de dólares congelados durante el conflicto, deberían resultar palancas decisivas en el empeño. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Gadafi/elpepuopi/20111022elpepiopi_1/Tes

Internacional EE UU celebra el triunfo de la estrategia compartida en Libia Biden destaca que no se han perdido vidas de estadounidenses en la misión de la OTAN en Libia.que ha costado 2.000 millones de dólares Antonio Caño Washington 21 OCT 2011 - 20:20 CET Una bandera de Libia monárquica en un edificio dañado en Sirte. / THAIER AL- SUDANI (REUTERS) 11 “La misión de la OTAN en Libia funcionó tal y como estaba previsto, costó un total de 2.000 millones de dólares, no se perdió ninguna vida norteamericana y la responsabilidad fue compartida entre varios. Este es el modelo”, declaró el vicepresidente Joe Biden poco después de confirmarse la muerte de Muamar Gadafi y el éxito, por tanto, de la estrategia escogida por la Casa Blanca para acabar con su régimen. Muchas cosas pueden ocurrir aún hasta que se pueda hablar de Libia como un país estabilizado —y los expertos no tienden a ser optimistas al respecto—. Pero, por el momento, Barack Obama asume lo sucedido como un ejemplo del acierto de su política exterior. “Hemos alcanzado nuestro objetivo sin poner a un solo soldado norteamericano sobre el terreno”, destacó el presidente para resaltar el contraste con las guerras heredadas de George Bush. Estados Unidos invirtió un billón de dólares en Irak y murieron más de 4.400 soldados. En Afganistán se lleva gastado otro tanto y han muerto ya casi 1.800. En ambos casos, EE UU perdió, además, prestigio internacional y gastó recursos que hoy necesita invertir en su propia economía. Como alternativa, Obama diseñó para Libia una guerra en la que EE UU, después de unos primeros días en los que, haciendo uso de sus inigualables recursos militares, dirigió los ataques aéreos, dejó el protagonismo en manos de los países europeos, cuyos intereses son los más directamente afectados por Libia. Buscó también el respaldo de la Liga Árabe e impulsó el involucramiento directo de algunos de los países de la región, como Catar. Sus aviones sin tripulación (drones) ayudaron a los cazas y bombarderos franceses y británicos a hacer su trabajo, quizá incluso en el ataque final contra la caravana en la que Gadafi trataba de huir. Pero fueron los europeos quienes llevaron el peso militar durante la mayor parte de la misión. 372

Obama puede tener más o menos que ver con esa situación, pero lo cierto es que va a acudir a la reelección con un mundo muy distinto al que encontró a su llegada. Obama tuvo que soportar numerosas críticas en casa por esa estrategia. Importantes figuras del Partido Republicano le acusaron de haber renunciado al liderazgo que le corresponde a EE UU y de abandonar a los libios a su suerte. Varias veces, cuando el avance de los rebeldes parecía lento y condenado al fracaso, se reclamó en Washington el uso de fuerzas militares terrestres. Obama soportó la presión, tuvo paciencia y advirtió que una intervención más directa de EE UU daría a Gadafi la excusa que necesitaba para plantear su lucha por la supervivencia en una guerra antiimperialista. Ahora puede celebrar la caída de Gadafi como un triunfo propio y así se le ha reconocido. “Hay que darle a Obama el crédito que le corresponde por esto”, ha admitido el senador John McCain. Quizá el modelo empleado en Libia no vale para cualquier conflicto. No parece servir, por ejemplo, en Siria, donde la Administración norteamericana ha descartado por ahora acciones militares y no cuenta con consenso ni europeo ni árabe para llevarlas a cabo. Pero Libia sí sirve como argumento en una campaña electoral. La política exterior no suele ser un asunto central de debate electoral. No en los últimos años, por lo menos. Pero sí es un aspecto que los votantes tienen en cuenta para decidir la viabilidad de un candidato. Obama, que no tenía experiencia en ese terreno antes de ser presidente, está bien valorado por el manejo de los asuntos internacionales. Su respaldo a la gestión en esa área supera habitualmente el 60%, más de veinte puntos del que tiene en los temas económicos. La caída de Gadafi le completa un panorama de cambio muy profundo ocurrido durante su Administración: Mubarak preso, Ben Ali en el exilio, los líderes de Siria y Sudán arrinconados. Obama puede tener más o menos que ver con esa situación, pero lo cierto es que va a acudir a la reelección con un mundo muy distinto al que encontró a su llegada. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/21/actualidad/1319221052_02562 9.html

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Internacional De la guerra tradicional a la contrainsurgencia La batalla que Bush dijo haber ganado en Irak en 2003 se ha prolongado casi nueve años Obama anuncia la retirada total de Irak David Alandete Washington 21 OCT 2011 - 21:41 CET3

Un hombre quita escombros tras la explosión de un coche bomba en el barrio de Karada, en Bagdad, el pasado martes. / MOHAMMED JALIL (EFE) El Pentágono invadió Irak en 2003 con 200.000 soldados, 148.000 de los cuales eran de Estados Unidos. Les acompañaron contingentes menores de Reino Unido (45.000), Australia (2.000), Polonia (194) y España. En principio, la cúpula militar de EE UU bautizó la misión como Operación Liberación de Irak, que pronto cambiaría por Operación Libertad Iraquí. Los soldados entraron a Irak por tierra, desde el sur, en Kuwait. El Pentágono intentó reforzar las operaciones desde el norte, haciendo uso de la frontera turca, algo a lo que Ankara se opuso. Finalmente, optó por desplegar un pequeño contingente de paracaidistas sobre el norte de Irak. En el primer día de guerra, el 20 de marzo de 2003, la División de Operaciones Especiales de la CIA atacó por aire la capital, Bagdad. Desde aquel momento, el Gobierno de Irak y su cúpula militar tardaron solo tres semanas en caer, lo que llevó a George W. Bush a proclamar una prematura victoria. Bush y los generales entraron en Irak con una mentalidad de guerra tradicional, defendiendo que habían ganado la guerra por medios tradicionales: ataques aéreos e infantería. No contaban entonces con que, a

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la larga, su mayor enemigo no serían Sadam y sus generales, sino grupos insurgentes que intentarían humillar a EE UU, con apoyo de elementos externos, como la red terrorista Al Qaeda o el Gobierno de Irán. Bagdad cayó en abril y Bush proclamó victoria en mayo. En agosto, un camión bomba estalló en la sede de la ONU en Bagdad y aniquiló al enviado de esa organización a la zona, Sergio Vieria de Mello. Posteriormente, otra bomba en Najaf mató a 125 civiles. Aquellos ataques, propios de un grupo terrorista, más que de un enemigo en guerra, se convirtieron en la tónica a la que se enfrentaba EE UU a diario. Su labor era pacificar el país, pero sus enemigos no lo atacaban directamente. Optaban por matar civiles. La Casa Blanca aseguraba que acudía a Irak a salvar a una mayoría chií del yugo de un dictador suní. No contaba con que una buena parte de esa mayoría chií se convertiría en uno de sus peores enemigos. La milicia a las órdenes del clérigo Muqtada Al Sáder, aliado de los ayatolas de Irán, comenzó sus ataques contra las tropas de EE UU un año después de que comenzara la guerra. Entonces emprendieron sus retiradas varios países que habían apoyado inicialmente al Pentágono, entre ellos España, por decisión del nuevo Gobierno del presidente José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. A medida que pasaban los años, a los estadounidenses se les hacía más difícil evitar los ataques a civiles En 2004, las tropas aliadas cercaron el bastión insurgente de Faluya en dos ocasiones: en abril y en noviembre. La segunda batalla, bautizada como Operación Furia Fantasma, todavía se recuerda como uno de los combates más feroces por parte del cuerpo de Infantería de Marines, solo comparable a la batalla de Hue City en Vietnam en 1968. En el bando norteamericano murieron 95 soldados. En el insurgente, 1.200, según cifras oficiales del Pentágono. A medida que pasaban los años, a los estadounidenses se les hacía más difícil evitar los ataques a civiles. La situación empeoró notablemente en 2005. En el mes de mayo de aquel año, el nuevo Gobierno iraquí dijo que los atentados suicidas y con coches bomba habían aniquilado a unas 672 personas, una cifra sin parangón hasta la fecha. Aquel caos dio paso a un nuevo estado comparable a la guerra civil: chiíes y suníes mortalmente enfrentados. En febrero de 2006 los suníes, apoyados por Al Qaeda, provocaron una matanza haciendo explotar una bomba en una mezquita chií de Samarra. Entre mayo y junio, 100 civiles murieron cada día, según datos de Naciones Unidas. La cifra total de civiles muertos en 2006 fue de 34.000. A EE UU solo le quedó la opción de cambiar su estrategia por una gran operación contrainsurgente, apoyada por un incremento de las tropas en 2007. Cinco brigadas, 20.000 soldados, fueron desplegadas en la provincia de Al Anbar y en Bagdad. En total, el número de soldados de EE UU sobre el terreno quedó en 144.000. Fue David Petraeus, que ahora lidera la CIA, el general que quedó al mando de las tropas en Irak para semejante transición. Su labor se consideró un éxito, que luego aplicaría al segundo gran refuerzo de tropas en Afganistán. Con el cambio de gobierno de 2009, el presidente Barack Obama ordenó el final de las operaciones de combate en agosto de 2010. Entonces quedaron sobre el terreno 50.000 soldados con una única labor: entrenar a las tropas nacionales iraquíes y supervisar la seguridad en la zona. Son esos los soldados que se replegarán antes de enero, aun en contra de la opinión de algunos generales norteamericanos al respecto. En total, 4.479 soldados de EE UU han muerto en combate en Irak. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/21/actualidad/1319225039_276931.html 375

Internacional Los islamistas de Túnez inquietan al sector laico de la sociedad Por primera vez en 55 años, el país celebrará el domingo unas elecciones democráticas "Mi sueño es conjugar islam y modernidad" “Si los islamistas ganan en Túnez, reducirán las libertades” Ignacio Cembrero Túnez 21 OCT 2011 - 19:31 CET

Tunecinos votan en un colegio electoral de la embajada de Túnez hoy en Berlín, Alemania. / EFE “Si ganan, pierdo el trabajo y el local cierra o se reconvierte”. Samir, 25 años, hace este pronóstico tajante sobre lo que sucederá después del domingo si ese día el partido islamista En Nahda gana las elecciones en Túnez. Para pagarse sus estudios, sirve copas en un local cerca de la playa de Gamart, un acomodado suburbio de la capital. Por primera vez en la historia de Túnez desde la independencia, hace 55 años, el domingo se celebrarán unas elecciones democráticas para elegir una Asamblea Constituyente que deberá redactar una nueva Constitución, pero de la que surgirá también un nuevo Gobierno de transición. Los sondeos y los analistas prevén una victoria islamista. Samir ha crecido, como otros muchos jóvenes de las grandes ciudades costeras, en el país menos impregnado de religión del norte de África. “Desconfío del discurso apaciguador de los barbudos”, prosigue. “Sé que si resultan vencedores se acabó mi sustento porque en el mejor de los casos el alcohol solo se podrá consumir en hoteles para turistas”, añade. 376

El discurso islamista es, desde luego, tranquilizante. Rachid Ghanouchi, el líder de En Nahda, explicaba en mayo a este corresponsal que en Túnez había mucho que aprender del modelo político turco. Ha asumido el “estatuto personal” del que goza la mujer tunecina desde 1956, el más avanzado del mundo árabe con la excepción de Líbano. Ha aceptado la paridad de ambos sexos en las listas electorales. En su programa de gobierno recalca el derecho de la mujer a la “igualdad, educación, trabajo y participar en la vida pública”. En su línea conciliadora Ghanouchi apostaba, en otra entrevista en verano con la prensa extranjera, “por la formación”, después de las elecciones, "de un Gobierno de coalición con los demás partidos durante los cinco próximos años”. En su programa también promete la creación de cerca de 600.000 puestos de trabajo durante el próximo lustro pese a que desde el estallido de la revolución el crecimiento, el más sostenido del norte de África durante años, está estancado. Ghanouchi se ha dejado además maniatar. En ese parlamento en la sombra que ha sido durante estos meses la llamada Alta instancia para la realización de los objetivos de la revolución, el líder islamista suscribió, con los partidos y sindicatos allí representados, un Pacto Republicano con tintes laicos del que debería inspirarse la nueva Constitución. Pese a tantas garantías los dirigentes En Nahda se decantan, y su número dos Ali Larayeh lo reconoció en los foros a puerta cerrada a los que asistió en Madrid y Ginebra, por reforzar la identidad musulmana en el sistema político, educativo y hasta en el judicial, pero sin forzar imposiciones. Hace más de un cuarto de siglo que renuncióa la violencia. Las bases de En Nahda, sobre todo en el Túnez profundo, son “mucho más rigoristas que su cúpula”, advierte el sociólogo Alaya Allani. Destacan los imanes que, aprovechando el desconcierto de la transición, ha colocado al frente de muchas mezquitas. En Feriana, en el centro del país, uno de esos cleros dedicó su sermón del viernes en la mezquita a pedir la dimisión del Gobierno y la aplicación de la sharia (ley islámica). Parte de los fieles se marcharon, pero él que sí permaneció en el templo fue el jefe local de En Nahda. Con motivo de las violentas protestas salafistas contra la cadena de televisión privada Nessma, que difundió hace dos semanas la película Persépolis, una sátira del régimen iraní, la dirección de En Nahda tuvo una actitud algo ambigua. Larayeh condenó, por ejemplo, la violencia, pero también la “provocación” de la cadena y de la directora, Marjane Satrapi, que rodó el largometraje de animación en la que Alá aparece con aspecto de anciano bonachón. El islam prohíbe su representación. Ayer fue el propio primer ministro, Beji Caid Essebsi, el que enmendó la plana a Ghanouchi por advertir, el miércoles, que sacarían a sus fuerzas a la calle sí se producía un fraude electoral que le fuera desfavorable. Estas van a ser probablemente las elecciones más vigiladas de la historia por la comunidad internacional a la que se ha sumado la sociedad civil tunecina. Por eso, le dijo, “no es posible que haya fraude”. “Los que dudan del procedimiento electoral es como si dudasen de sí mismos”, concluyó. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/21/actualidad/1319218303_07375 5.html

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ENTREVISTA: PRIMAVERA ÁRABE Rachid Ghanouchi Líder del Movimiento Islamista de Túnez "Mi sueño es conjugar islam y modernidad" IGNACIO CEMBRERO 29/05/2011 Hace 16 años Rachid Ghanouchi fue expulsado de España cuando asistía, en Córdoba, a un congreso sobre "el islam ante el desafío de la modernidad": al parecer se le consideraba sospechoso de ideología extremista. Es probable que dentro de poco regrese y tenga derecho incluso al salón de autoridades del aeropuerto, porque sea ya ministro en el primer gobierno democrático de Túnez. Ghanouchi, de 69 años, es el líder del movimiento islamista tunecino En Nahda (Renacimiento) que fundó, con otro nombre, hace 30 años y cuyas actividades le valieron dos condenas a prisión y a trabajos forzados -la primera en 1981 y la segunda en 1987- y una estancia de más de tres años en la cárcel. Formado en teología en la universidad de Túnez, y en filosofía en Damasco, Ghanouchi también estudió en la Sorbona (París), pero como otros tantos opositores musulmanes eligió Londres, en 1991, para ponerse a salvo de la dictadura de Ben Ali derrocado en enero pasado por la primera de las revoluciones árabes. Se le considera afín a los Hermanos Musulmanes egipcios con los que mantiene estrechos lazos. Tras 20 años de exilio regresó a Túnez el 30 de enero, donde fue acogido por más de 3.000 militantes. Fue el exiliado que tuvo el recibimiento más multitudinario. Acaso por eso muchos temen que sea también el que coseche más votos en las elecciones democráticas, las de la Asamblea Constituyente, fijadas para el 24 de julio. Sus palabras revelan el pensamiento de los islamistas que, junto con otras corrientes políticas, se han echado a las calles del mundo árabe para acabar con la autocracia. Pregunta. Se ha salido con la suya y finalmente habrá elecciones dentro de menos de dos meses, según decidió el Gobierno esta semana. Respuesta. Llamé al primer ministro y le pedí que respetase la fecha a la que se había comprometido. La transición democrática es un periodo propenso a los disturbios. Empezó hace cuatro meses y medio y si se alarga la situación puede empeorar. La seguridad deja que desear. Sé que es difícil organizar las elecciones en menos de dos meses sin contar, además, con el Ministerio del Interior, pero no es imposible. P. ¿Qué resultado espera lograr en el estreno democrático? R. Somos el mayor partido y seremos el más votado. Confío en obtener un 30% de los sufragios. No solo ganaremos allí donde se cree que estamos mejor implantados, en el interior del país, donde arrancó la revolución, sino en la costa. En Sfax, la segunda ciudad, hubo 25.000 personas en mi primer mitin. Vamos a cosechar los frutos de nuestra larga y abnegada lucha contra la dictadura. Somos las primeras víctimas de la represión. Le daré un dato entre otros muchos: en las dos últimas décadas tuvimos 30.000 detenidos. En este país pequeño con familias amplias no hay familia alguna que no haya sufrido la represión, de lejos o de cerca. No hay una familia que no sepa que fuimos las principales víctimas de la matraca del régimen. P. En las únicas elecciones a las que pudieron presentarse, en 1989, solo alcanzaron el 17% de media y un 30% en la capital. ¿Tanto van a subir? R. Estuvieron manipuladas y todo el mundo lo reconoce hoy en día. Obtuvimos más del 60%. Algún día se sabrá con precisión porque Interior guarda aún en sus archivos el verdadero recuento. P. ¿Entrarían en el Gobierno si ganan? ¿Con qué intenciones? 378

R. Claro que sí. Lo haríamos con una primera prioridad: ganar la guerra a la corrupción. La Administración, el país en general, están enfermos de corrupción. Es una lacra que perjudica al desarrollo. Nuestro principal problema socio-económico es el paro con más de 700.000 desempleados, muchos de ellos licenciados, en un país con una población activa que apenas rebasa los tres millones. Para espolear el crecimiento y crear empleo hay que acabar con la corrupción. Nuestra segunda prioridad es fomentar el desarrollo de las zonas más desheredadas del interior del país. Hay que acabar con los desequilibrios regionales. Si no se hace la revolución continuará. P. ¿Qué significará ese programa anticorrupción para el inversor extranjero? R. Son bienvenidos y podrán hacer negocios con mayor seguridad jurídica. Ya no tendrán que sobornar a nadie para instalarse en Túnez. Se acabaron las "comisiones" a la familia presidencial. Dicho esto, la corrupción no es una exclusividad del mundo árabe. Por culpa de otra modalidad de corrupción el capitalismo estuvo a punto de hundirse hace dos o tres años y aún no salió del todo de la crisis. P. ¿Qué papel atribuye al islam en el Túnez del futuro? R. La corrupción se combate con una prensa libre, una justicia independiente, pero también con la religión. Hay que utilizar la religión para luchar contra la corrupción y fomentar el trabajo bien hecho. Ser honrado y trabajar bien son deberes religiosos de primordial importancia. ¿Cómo se consigue que el pueblo lo interiorice? Pues con educación, apoyándose también en las mezquitas y con gobernantes que sean ejemplares. Ben Ali y su familia eran corruptos. Daban un pésimo ejemplo que facilitó la propagación de la corrupción a todos los niveles. P. La Asamblea Constituyente que saldrá de las urnas decidirá si en Túnez se implanta un sistema presidencialista o parlamentario. ¿Aspira a ser presidente? R. Creo que los tunecinos están escaldados del presidencialismo y prefieren un sistema parlamentario. Es la mejor solución. Si no fuese así me doy por satisfecho, a mi edad, con que Túnez sea una democracia. Pero el partido sí presentaría un candidato a las presidenciales. P. ¿Hasta qué punto la nueva Constitución de Túnez y las leyes deben inspirarse en la sharia (cuerpo de derecho islámico)? R. Hasta algunos académicos musulmanes se equivocan con relación a la sharia. No es un código que estipula castigos. Es más bien una manera de prevenir el delito. Los delincuentes deben ser considerados, exceptuando los casos patológicos, como víctimas de la sociedad a las que hay que ayudar a reinsertarse. La actual Constitución estipula que el Estado tunecino es islámico. Con mantener ese primer artículo basta. P. ¿Hay algún modelo? ¿Y un ejemplo que reprueben? R. La Turquía gobernada por el Partido de la Justicia y del Desarrollo nos inspira en muchos aspectos. Viajo con cierta frecuencia a Turquía desde 1995. He aprendido de ellos y ellos también algo de mí. ¿Sabe usted que se me ha leído más en Turquía, donde mis obras fueron traducidas, que en Túnez? Mi sueño es convertir a Túnez en un modelo que conjugue islam y modernidad. El ejemplo a no seguir es el de Argelia con todos los errores que allí se cometieron hace 20 años. P. ¿Es decir, el extremismo que asoló el país en los noventa y causó cerca de 200.000 muertos? R. Luchamos contra el extremismo. Es una enfermedad que han padecido todas las civilizaciones en algún momento, incluida la nuestra. Nació en las cárceles de Egipto y se desarrolló en un entorno insano. La imagen del islam resultó muy dañada. Se equipara a nuestra religión con la antidemocracia, la violencia, el terrorismo. Se nos supone enemigos del arte, de la belleza, de los derechos de la mujer. Falso. P. Sus detractores dicen que usa un doble lenguaje, que no cree en lo que dice. 379

R. Me combaten con malas artes. No utilizan argumentos sino que difunden sospechas. Se asemejan en eso a Ben Ali. Él empleó la policía. Ahora nuestros adversarios utilizan los medios de comunicación. Solo les pido una cosa si no se creen nuestro discurso: que nos juzguen por los hechos. Somos un movimiento no violento y apoyamos la paridad de hombres y mujeres en las listas de candidatos a las elecciones. P. ¿Hay que creerse también que respetarán el "estatuto personal" que consagra una cuasi igualdad entre hombres y mujeres en Túnez desde 1956? R. Sí. Mire, tengo cuatro hijas. Todas han estudiado muchos años, en Quebec, en Cambridge, en la Universidad de Londres. Son profesionales que trabajan e investigan en centros de prestigio. Una de ellas, Soumaya, colabora con regularidad con el diario The Guardian. Así las he educado. ¿Qué más tengo que demostrar? P. El "estatuto personal" prohíbe la poligamia en Túnez mientras que la ley islámica permite a un hombre tomar hasta cuatro mujeres. ¿Cómo resuelve esa contradicción? R. Túnez es un país golpeado por el paro y con bajos salarios. Es ya de por sí harto difícil, para un hombre, disponer de recursos para fundar un hogar con una sola mujer. Así que olvidemos a las demás mujeres. P. ¿Se sigue torturando en las comisarías? ¿Qué hacer con todos los policías que cometieron exacciones? R. Ya no es sistemática la tortura aunque las malas costumbres no se acaban de un día para otro. Durante la revolución pedimos a nuestros militantes que no cayeran en la venganza personal, que no aprovecharan el desorden para ajustar cuentas. Ahora preconizamos que perdonen a sus verdugos, pero si optan por denunciarles y sentarles en el banquillo también lo aprobamos. Están en su derecho. Anhelo una solución global a la surafricana en la que los verdugos pidan perdón a las víctimas y estas se lo concedan. También deseo para ellas que reciban una compensación pecuniaria. P. ¿Sigue habiendo un problema de seguridad en Túnez como lo repite el Gobierno? R. Sí, pero en parte causado por la policía. Antes reprimía brutalmente en la calle sin respetar la ley, a lo Rambo. Ahora se le ha exigido que su actuación sea proporcionada. Su primera reacción fue de negarse a colaborar: si no me dejan hacer mi trabajo como sé hacerlo allá se las arreglen ustedes con gamberros y violentos. Ahora, gracias a la labor de Interior, han recapacitado y mantienen el orden con mesura. - "Mi sueño es conjugar islam y modernidad" http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/sueno/conjugar/islam/modernidad/elpepusocdmg/201 10529elpdmgrep_4/Tes?print=1

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ft.com comment The A-List

Mark Malloch-Brown October 20, 2011 Foreign Policy • Middle East

Gaddafi’s fall is a moment for relief, not for euphoria The humiliating death of Muammer Gaddafi, gunned down and apparently dragged through the streets of his home town Sirte, would seem at first sight to be a final punctuation point in the tumultuous change of power in Libya. Another dictator, like Saddam Hussein before him, found cowering in a bolt hole. Finally, Libyans can breathe easier knowing this monstrous and unpredictable figure is gone from their lives. But his shadow will only be truly lifted if the new Libyan leadership draws the right lessons, not the wrong ones, from his demise. The right lesson is that it is a cathartic moment that clears the ground for Libyan politics to move forward. The wrong one would be to assume that with the death of Gaddafi all those supporters, whose reasons for so tenaciously defending Sirte are now clearer, will fall in line behind the new government in Tripoli. The first statement from interim prime minister Mahmoud Jibril hit all the right notes on reconciliation. But his words have to compete with the powerful image of Col Gaddafi’s body being dragged through the streets. This is much uglier. The removal of a leader who capriciously threatened his country and its people as if they were his personal property lifts the fear and loathing that had deep frozen any kind of normal politics in Libya for more than 40 years. This now allows a political space free from the fear of disappearance and life-imprisonment that had been the lot of any dissenter for so long. And, given Col Gaddafi’s lingering hold on the minds of his countrymen, nothing less than his very public end was likely to release them from his last padlock on their freedom. But if the manner of his going is interpreted by part of the country or the region as a crude revenge – as a summary execution not a combat death, let alone the result of a proper justice process – then it could revive, even in death, Col Gaddafi’s power to divide. Martyrs cast long shadows. Those former leaders cooling their heels in The Hague or elsewhere, such as Charles Taylor of Liberia, assorted former Yugoslavian leaders or Manuel Noriega of Panama, are better managed alive than dead, as court exposure of their misdeeds often aids national healing. But Libya today is where it is: Col Gaddafi is dead. The good news is politics can move on; the question remains how. The leadership of the National Transitional Council has always stressed its temporary character. Now is the time for an act of magnanimity: now its battlefield success is secure, it should form a government of all Libyans, including clans close to Gaddafi and Berber groups who have felt under-represented. There was a long tail to this conflict after Col Gaddafi’s fall, not only because of a residual

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emotional loyalty but because of the very real stakes his extended kinsmen had in the old system. When I last visited Sirte, well before the conflict, it showed Col Gaddafi’s beneficence to relatives as well as his capriciousness as a ruler. He had built out the town, once his home village, with fully-fledged ministries, imagining he could make it his Washington. However he had forgotten to include hotels, so had placed many African foreign ministers he was hosting on an Italian cruise ship he had rented for the occasion, an African Union summit. When it looked as though they would vote against his proposal for a united Africa, he briefly tried to ship them out to sea. This vindictive anger against opponents was felt more seriously by African leaders, who often found he armed and funded their opponents when they opposed him. So with one or two exceptions, few tears will be shed in Africa’s presidential palaces, even though – like all of us – they will be uneasy at the manner of his going. Like his remaining supporters at home, they will want his death to presage a new chapter of reconciliation and healing rather than revenge and score settling. The Arab world, too, will view the violent end of an authoritarian leader who was widely disliked with relief but also disquiet at the violent precedent for regime change in the region. For Libya’s western backers, particularly France, the UK and US, this is not therefore a moment for euphoria but for quiet relief, and a public call to Tripoli for restraint and reconciliation. The writer is chairman for Europe, Middle East and Africa at FTI Consulting, and former UN deputy secretary-general. http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/10/20/gaddafi%e2%80%99s-fall-is-a-moment- for-relief-not-for-euphoria/#axzz1bmXlBuUL

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News World news Libya A new chapter for Libya, but will the victors stay united? Splits between victorious factions that brought about Gaddafi's downfall could lead to power struggle Julian Borger, diplomatic editor guardian.co.uk, Thursday 20 October 2011 20.31 BST

Libyans celebrate the fall of Sirte and the death of Muammar Gaddafi. Photograph: Mohamed Messara/EPA "Everyone can now draw a line. This is the final curtain. This is the beginning of a new chapter," declared Guma al-Gamaty after Gaddafi's death was confirmed. The drawing of the line, predicted by the UK-based co-ordinator for Libya's National Transitional Council, will be made official when the head of the council, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, proclaims the formal liberation of Libya. That should set in motion a long-planned chain of events, starting with the formation of an interim government that will run the country for about a year while overseeing preparations for elections. Western diplomats involved in these plans said the interim government would include representation from across Libya, bringing together the various factions that brought about Gaddafi's downfall. The acting prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, reinforced the message of unity, declaring: "We confirm that all the evils plus Gaddafi have vanished from this beloved country. I think it's for the Libyans to realise that it's time to start a new Libya, a united Libya, one people, one future." Most diplomats agreed on Thursday that Gaddafi's death would help stabilise the position of Libya's new leaders, particularly if his followers now gave up the fight. 383

Before the final shootout in Sirte, there were reports that Gaddafi was recruiting mercenaries from across Africa, paid with looted gold, for his fightback. The spectre of a drawn-out guerilla war loomed. That threat has receded, although the possibility remains that Gaddafi's death might make him a martyr for armed diehards, who will not have been encouraged to hand themselves in by their leader's televised fate. The bigger threat now is likely to be the prospect of splits among the victorious factions – the NTC leaders who first raised the banner of revolt in Benghazi at the start of the year, the Misrata militia who did much of the fighting, lost the most people and see themselves as the deserving "Spartans" of the new Libya, and the fighters from the Nafusa mountains in the west, who tipped the balance against Gaddafi in August. The Misrata brigades, in particular, have used their military successes to arm themselves to the teeth, driving away tanks and artillery on huge lorries from every Gaddafi loyalist bastion they overran. "I don't think there is any way there won't be a power struggle," said Rosemary Hollis, professor of Middle East policy studies at City University, London. "You have those who did the bulk of the fighting and lost lives and limbs, and those who did the necessary task of doing the diplomacy and so spent much of the time abroad, and those who have cropped up in the last week – those for whom capture or trial is an appalling prospect. There will be score settling." Al-Gamaty, however, rejected predictions that the revolution would now devour itself in internecine conflict. He said such internal strife had been forecast for months, but had yet to materialise. "Our co-operation is going smoothly, and now things will be easier. We will be even more organised." British diplomats say that, behind the scenes, the NTC has been making strenuous efforts to ensure the interim government will be inclusive and geographically representative, and has had concrete successes in restoring some services, such as getting the water flowing again in Tripoli. Daniel Korski, who runs the Middle East programme at the European Council for Foreign Relations, said: "There are cleavages, but they are not as deep-rooted as so many others in other countries, and they are not as politically salient. You have not had the generations of bloodletting we have seen elsewhere. It's more Albania than Bosnia." The celebrations surrounding Gaddafi's fall provide another unifying moment, but the departure of the one man who united much of the country in fear will pose fresh challenges. Libya's new rulers now have to find different reasons to stick together. Julian Borger A new chapter for Libya, but will the victors stay united? 20 October 2011 20.31 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/new-chapter-libya- victors/print

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Comment is free Muammar Gaddafi's violent death leaves Libya at a crossroads The dictator's legacy is a broken country with no political parties, no tradition of civil rights and democracy an idea without roots

Simon Tisdall guardian.co.uk, Thursday 20 October 2011 21.57 BST Simon Tisdall looks back at the life of the man who had led Libya since 1969 Link to this video

Muammar Gaddafi, who dominated Libya with merciless single-mindedness for 42 years, was a liar, a murderer and a cheat. But in one respect, at least, he stayed true to his word. When the Libyan uprising began in February and led swiftly to Nato's military intervention, Gaddafi vowed to fight to the death. He would not give himself up to his pursuers like Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi declared in radio addresses, nor would he flee, like Tunisia's ousted president, Zine el- Abidine Ben Ali, the first "victim" of the Arab spring. There would be no capitulation, no surrender, no private jet into pampered exile. On Thursday, amid the ruins of his home town of Sirte, the insurgent fighters of the National Transitional Council, backed by Nato bombers, took him at his word. Gaddafi had pledged a last stand, so he stood and fought. And he was, it transpired as the smoke cleared, no invincible behemoth – but ordinary flesh and blood after all. He died painfully, beaten with a pistol according to some reports, then shot at close range. But die he did. And after all the waiting, the killing and the tears, the wheel of history turned inexorably, and all who watched knew it would never turn back. The Arab spring had claimed another infamous scalp. The risky western intervention had worked. And Libya was liberated at last. When it comes, the fall of a famous despot sends a shiver that is felt across the world. Thus it was with the Shah of Iran in 1979, Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania in 1989 and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt earlier this year. And thus it was with Gaddafi: no longer feared or fearsome, no longer the brash, bragging villain, no more the showman turned monster – just another slain tyrant hitting the dust with a thud. Jubilation across Libya will be matched by relief among western governments that, in recent days, have fretted over the prospect of an ongoing insurgency by forces, Libyan and foreign, mercenary and otherwise, loyal to the old regime. Now they will congratulate themselves that Libya has been "saved for the west" and may be moulded to western political and free market paradigms. Their confidence may be misplaced.

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"We hope he can be captured or killed soon so that you don't have to fear him any more," Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, said in Tripoli on Tuesday. "The most important thing now is to make sure that Gaddafi and his regime are finally prevented from disrupting the new Libya. We want to do everything we can to prevent him from causing trouble." State department officials quickly explained that Clinton's words did not mean that US policy had switched in favour of deliberately eliminating Gaddafi. Washington wanted him brought to justice, they said. But there is no disguising the fact that, for governments including those in London and Washington, Gaddafi's sudden, final departure must be vastly preferable to the prospect of a prolonged desert guerrilla war, costly Nato engagement, continuing instability affecting Libya and neighbouring states, a lengthy, high-profile trial, wrangling over the jurisdiction of the international criminal court, or any of the other possible scenarios that might have played out should he have lived on. Conspiracy theorists are bound to wonder at the apparent neatness of the Osama bin Laden-style solution implemented in Sirte. Others may see in Gaddafi's death the creation of a martyr to the cause of Arab and African independence from colonial-style, external oppression. But these, for the most part, are unpersuasive concerns, of minority or peripheral interest. The larger point of interest for Libyans and a watching Arab world – driven home by Thursday's videos and photos apparently showing Gaddafi's bloodied body – is that the dictator is dead and that Libya and its people are finally free to move on. What direction they will go is the next big question. The answer will not be quick in coming, in no small part due to Gaddafi's poisonous legacy. Gaddafi leaves behind a country with no proven governmental institutions or political parties, little or no independent civil service and civil society, no tradition of civil rights, free speech or free media, a one-track economy almost wholly dependent on oil export revenues and a system of national administration based on the fickle favour of the "Brother Leader", family ties, patronage and corruption. Its army broken, its borders defiled, its sovereignty outraged, Libya's future direction is, as of this moment, more a matter of fond hope than settled policy. Democracy in Libya is an idea. It has as yet no roots and no substantive presence. Islamism, of various shades, and tribalism are, on the other hand, vibrant forces that may now feed on the power vacuum. Much of this dysfunctionality is a direct result of Gaddafi's personal style, which was as open to power-sharing as Caligula was to reasoned debate. During his 42 years in power, following the overthrow of King Idris in 1969, Gaddafi sought to be all things to all men, thereby negating the need for any other man at all. Thus he was, variously, a Bedouin tribesman, a colonel and self-styled revolutionary, an Arab and an African, a nationalist and a socialist, a Muslim, a poet and a would-be philosopher king. Gaddafi awarded himself various titles, including Brother Leader, Supreme Guide, mentor of the masses, patriarch and uncle. As his confidence grew, so too did his arrogance and his eccentricity. This was manifested by his famous Bedouin tent, pitched

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in the parks of foreign capitals, his heavily armed all-female bodyguard and speeches so apparently endless and rambling as to put Fidel Castro to shame. As if following a deliberate, self-aggrandising policy of splendid isolation, Gaddafi managed to alienate nearly all his fellow African and Arab counterparts, with telling exceptions, such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. His plan to preside over a new EU-style union of African states went down particularly badly. Even as he handed out wads of petrodollars to impoverished developing countries, their leaders mocked him behind his back for being a buffoon and a clown. But it was Gaddafi's malign, murderous side that isolated him, and Libya, in the eyes of western governments. His backing for groups such as the IRA and Eta, his links to numerous terrorist attacks, and his crowning atrocity – the 1988 Lockerbie bombing – ensured his pariah status. Ronald Reagan declared him the "mad dog of the Middle East" and bombed Tripoli in 1986 in a calculated attempt to kill him. Even after Gaddafi supposedly turned over a new leaf in 2003 and surrendered his weapons of mass destruction, he was never really trusted (except perhaps by Tony Blair, who held a friendly tent summit with Gaddafi outside Tripoli in 2004). Recent reported finds of chemical weapons in the southern desert seemed to confirm his reputation for double-dealing. When the Arab spring uprising in Libya took shape in February, Britain and France, who had suffered more than most western countries from his depredations, saw a chance to settle with him. They took it – and the indirect result was yesterday's bloody mess on the road out of Sirte. The post-Gaddafi road ahead for Libya is fraught by any estimate. Tens of thousands may have died in the war; the numbers could take years to verify. Many more again have been wounded, both fighters and civilians caught up in the violence. Already these maimed survivors are attacking the NTC for its failure to bring them speedy relief. Much of the country's infrastructure is damaged or in need of repair, including vital oil installations on whose services Libya's short-term salvation rests. Heavily armed militias, manned by young men with no obvious allegiance to anything other than their own idea of freedom, dominate in Tripoli and other cities. Already there are reports, from Amnesty International and others, of violent score- settling, revenge killings, human rights abuses and the mistreatment of detainees. With luck, it will all settle down. Without luck, some analysts foresee a mini-Iraq in the making, a new miasma of civil war, fragmentation and sectarian conflict. Much depends now on the NTC's ability to get a grip, first and foremost, on security – and then move quickly to form a transitional government, before greater freedom leads to an ever greater taking of liberties. Despite its recognition by the great powers, the council's authority is open to question and challenge. Some fear Islamists hold too great a sway. Its leaders seem divided and unconvinced by their own success. Prominent figures such as the acting prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, are eager to throw in the towel and leave the job of nation-building to hardier souls. Aware of the size of the challenge, Clinton and William Hague have been at pains to stiffen backbones and offer helpful advice. "Of course we do want to see the various militias all brought under one central system and central control and I think that will 387

happen when a transitional government is formed," Hague said this week. In a reference to the mistakes made in Iraq after Saddam fell, Clinton said: "From long experience, one factor we know has to happen … is unifying the various militias into a single military … Getting a national army under civilian command is essential." Like the US, Britain is offering a range of practical security-related assistance measures, including tracking down Gaddafi's vast missile stores. But only Libyans can decide what happens next. The euphoria of the day obscures the fact that hatred of Gaddafi, while he lived, united most of them in a single cause. Democracy-building provides a less certain glue. Simon Tisdall Muammar Gaddafi's violent death leaves Libya at a crossroads. The dictator's legacy is a broken country with no political parties, no tradition of civil rights and democracy an idea without roots20 October 2011 21.57 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/20/gaddafi-death-leaves-libya- crossroads?intcmp=239

Haroon Siddique, Adam Gabbatt y Paul Owen, “Libya uprising - live updates”, a partir del 28 Febrero, 2011 08.21 GMT ( y sucesivas entregas) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/feb/28/arab-and- middle-east-protests-libya#block-60

Peter Beaumont , “Zawiyah: 30 miles from Tripoli, the city on the frontline of Libya's revolt. The city of Zawiyah, controlled by rebels but surrounded by Gaddafi loyalists, is a metaphor for the current stalemate.” 27 February 2011 20.40 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/27/libya-30-miles- from-tripoli?intcmp=239

Véase Reuters, “Libyan protesters clash with police in Benghazi. Arrest of human rights activist triggers demonstrations in Libya's second largest city”, 16 February 2011 08.02 GMT, disponible en: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/16/libyan-protesters-clash-with-police Garry Blight, Sheila Pulham y Paul Torpey, “Arab spring: an interactive timeline of Middle East protests” : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive- timeline (20-Octubre-2011)

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News World news Muammar Gaddafi Muammar Gaddafi, the 'king of kings' dies in his hometown Libya's former leader killed by rebels in Sirte in wake of French air strike, although precise details of his death remain unclear guardian.co.uk, Thursday 20 October 2011 21.54 BST Muammar Gaddafi is pulled from a truck, seemingly alive Link to this video Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was born near Sirte, and when he became the ruler of all Libya, he transformed it from an insignificant fishing village into the country's sprawling second city. On Thursday, after a brutal – and ultimately hopeless – last stand, it was the place where he died. For the past three weeks, with Gaddafi's whereabouts still unknown, government fighters had been puzzled by the bitter and determined resistance from loyalist fighters. Trapped in a tiny coastal strip just a few hundred metres wide, they had refused to give up, even when a victory by the forces of Libya's National Transitional Council seemed inevitable. Here at last was the answer: they had been fighting to the death with their once-great leader in their midst. The emergencies director of Human Rights Watch, Peter Bouckaert, was one of those in Sirte during the final battle. "A very heavy bombardment started at midnight with shelling of the remaining strongholds with Grad rockets that went on until 6am," he told the Guardian. "I went down to the city centre at 9am and went in with the fighters from Benghazi who said the whole city was free. "I went to the hospital and a fighter arrived with a gold pistol he said he had taken from Gaddafi. He said there had been a fight with a convoy of people trying to flee. Mansour Dhou [Sirte's pro-Gaddafi military commander] was also in the clinic, shot in the stomach. He said they had been trying to flee and were caught in gunfire, which is when he lost consciousness. He confirmed Gaddafi was with him." While details of the precise circumstances of Gaddafi's death remained confused and contradictory last night, it appears he was trying to flee the city in a convoy of cars when they came under attack from Nato jets. Last night the French claimed responsibilty for the airstrike. The convoy was then apparently caught in a gun battle with fighters loyal to the National Transitional Council, Libya's interim government. Possibly wounded in the shootout, Libya's former ruler crawled into a drain; later he was set upon by revolutionary fighters, one of whom beat him with a shoe. Witnesses said he perished pleading for mercy after being dragged out of a hiding place inside a concrete drain. According to one fighter, the dying Gaddafi demanded: "What have I done to you?" Abdel-Jalil Abdel-Aziz, a doctor who accompanied Gaddafi's body in an ambulance as it was taken from Sirte, said he died from two shots, to the head and chest. "I can't 389

describe my happiness," he told the Associated Press. "The tyranny is gone. Now the Libyan people can rest. Amid the swirl of contradictory reports, one thing was clear: Gaddafi's death was a humiliating end for a man once used to surrounding himself with cheering crowds of supporters. Video images that emerged showed him being bundled bloodied on to the back of a pick-up truck, surrounded by fighters waving guns and shouting "Allahu Akbar" (God is great). At first Gaddafi was apparently able to walk with assistance before being lifted on to the truck's tailgate. A second clip, however, showed him lifeless. In the second sequence, the tunic over one of his shoulders was heavily bloodstained. Also killed was one of Gaddafi's sons, Mutassim, a military officer who had commanded the defence of Sirte for his father, according to NTC officials. Gaddafi's second son, Saif al-Islam, was also said to have been arrested, although the news could not immediately be confirmed. After his death, Gaddafi's body was taken – accompanied by a huge convoy of celebrating revolutionaries –to Misrata, two hours away. In Misrata – which itself went through a bitter siege during Libya's eight-month civil war – the body was paraded through the streets on a truck, surrounded by crowds chanting, "The blood of the martyrs will not go in vain." Bouckaert said: "I followed the convoy with the body to Misrata, where it was displayed. I have seen a lot of celebrations in Libya but never one like this." Across Libya, as the news broke, there were celebrations. "We have been waiting for this moment for a long time," the Libyan prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, told a news conference. In Tripoli there were volleys of celebratory gunfire as vast crowds waving the red, black and green national flag adopted by the NTC gathered in Martyr's Square – once the setting for mass rallies in praise of the "Brother Leader". Jibril said: "We confirm that all the evils, plus Gaddafi, have vanished from this beloved country. It's time to start a new Libya, a united Libya. One people, one future." A formal declaration of liberation would be made by Friday, he added later. The death of Gaddafi and the fall of Sirte opens the way to national elections which – it had already been announced – would take place eight months after "full liberation" had been achieved. In London, David Cameron hailed Gaddafi's death as a step towards a "strong and democratic future" for the north African country. Speaking in Downing Street after Jibril officially confirmed the death of the dictator, Cameron said he was proud of the role Britain had played in Nato airstrikes to protect Libyan civilians after the uprising against Gaddafi's rule began in February. Cameron added that it was a time to remember Gaddafi's victims, including the policewoman Yvonne Fletcher, who was gunned down in a London street in 1984, the 270 people who died when Pan-Am flight 103 was destroyed by a bomb over Lockerbie in 1988, and all those killed by the IRA using Semtex explosives supplied by the Libyan dictator. Nato commanders will meet on Friday to consider ending the coalition's campaign in Libya.

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Gaddafi, 69, is the first leader to be killed in the Arab spring, the wave of popular uprisings that swept the Middle East demanding the end of autocratic rulers and greater democracy. He was one of the world's most mercurial leaders. He seized power in 1969 and dominated Libya with a regime that often seemed run by his whims. But his acts brought international condemnation and isolation to his country. When the end came for Gaddafi it was not as his son Saif al-Islam once promised, with the regime fighting to "its last bullet". Instead, the man who once styled himself "the king of the kings" of Africa was cornered while attempting to escape with his entourage in a convoy of cars after a final 90-minute assault on the last few loyalist positions in Sirte's District Two. Last night the charred remains of 15 pickup trucks lay burned out on a roadside where Gaddafi's convoy had attempted to punch through NTC lines. Inside the ruined vehicles sat the charred skeletons; other bodies lay strewn on the grass. Gaddafi and a handful of his men appear to have escaped death, and hidden in two drainage pipes choked with rubbish. Government troops gave chase, said Salem Bakeer, a fighter who was on the scene at the last moment. "One of Gaddafi's men came out waving his rifle in the air and shouting surrender, but as soon as he saw my face he started shooting at me," he told Reuters. "Then I think Gaddafi must have told them to stop. 'My master is here, my master is here', he said, 'Muammar Gaddafi is here and he is wounded'," said Bakeer. "We went in and brought Gaddafi out. He was saying 'What's wrong? What's wrong? What's going on?'. Then we took him and put him in the car." With its fall, the city of Sirte was transformed from a potent image of Gaddafi's rule to the symbol of his gruesome end. Even as Gaddafi's body was being driven away, the drain where he was found was being immortalised in blue aerosol paint. On it, someone wrote: "The hiding place of the vile rat Gaddafi." Muammar Gaddafi, the 'king of kings' dies in his hometown20 October 2011 21.54 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/muammar-gaddafi-dies-city- birth?CMP=EMCGT_211011&

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New Libyan government recognizes Syrian opposition council Thursday, October 20, 12:26 AM AMMAN, Jordan — Libya on Wednesday recognized Syria’s opposition National Council as the country’s legitimate authority, as tens of thousands of Syrians rallied in support of President Bashar al-Assad in the northern city of Aleppo and Assad’s troops pressed an ongoing offensive to crush the seven-month-old uprising against his rule. The opposition council has pledged to seek international protection to stop civilian deaths and has called for the uprising to remain peaceful. “We ask other countries .Ԝ.Ԝ. to take the same path as Libya,” Syrian opposition activist Wael Razak said at a news conference in Tripoli, the Libyan capital. The state-organized rally in Aleppo, Syria’s commercial hub, came a week after a similar gathering in the capital, Damascus. Meanwhile, the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said 20 people were killed Wednesday across central Homs province, including seven soldiers. Seven people were also killed in army raids in the villages around the town of Qusair, near the Lebanese border, activists said. — Reuters http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/new-libyan-government-recognizes-syrian- opposition-council/2011/10/19/gIQAJ3kVyL_print.html

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Internacional El Ejército turco invade el norte de Irak tras el brutal ataque de la guerrilla kurda Ankara envía 22 batallones, más de 10.000 soldados, para acabar con las bases del PKK en el norte de Irak en una de las mayores incursiones fuera de su territorio Turquía persigue en Irak al PKK tras la matanza de 26 soldados Blanca López Arangüena Estambul 20 OCT 2011 - 15:29 CET

Un grupo de soldados de las fuerzas turcas estacionadas en la provincia de Hakkari, en el sureste de Turquía. / EFE A pesar de las llamadas a la calma del Ejecutivo tras el brutal ataque de la guerrilla separatista del Partido de los Trabajadores del Kurdista (PKK) de la madrugada del martes, el Estado Mayor turco anunció a mediodía de ayer la movilización de 22 batallones en cinco zonas a lo largo de la frontera iraquí. El objetivo, acabar con los últimos refugios del PKK en las montañas del Kandil en el norte de Irak. La televisión turca mostraba ayer por la tarde la entrada de los tanques en territorio extranjero. Días antes, las autoridades de la región autónoma del Kurdistán iraquí habían comenzado a evacuar a la población de la zona para evitar la muerte de civiles en caso de una incursión turca. En ese momento todavía no se preveía una represalia de Turquía, que llegó tras el ataque de centenares de guerrilleros kurdos a varios puestos del Ejército en la provincia suroriental de Hakkari. El saldo final de una de las peores matanzas de las últimas décadas fue de 26 soldados muertos y 18 heridos.

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Ankara ha enviado comandos de fuerzas especiales con apoyo aéreo "La organización terrorista se ha suicidado", dijo el primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, tras dar a conocer la operación, en la que participan alrededor de 10.000 soldados. En un comunicado publicado en su página web, el Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas Armadas turcas precisó que en la ofensiva se han desplegado "22 batallones de comandos de las fuerzas espaciales del Ejército y la Gendarmería con amplio apoyo aéreo". Erdogan prometió informar sobre el resultado de las operaciones "tan pronto se reciba información", pero quiso destacar que su objetivo era "obtener resultados". No es la primera vez que fuerzas de Turquía penetran en suelo iraquí en busca de guerrilleros. En 2008, 10.000 militares turcos destruyeron siete bases del PKK en las montañas del norte de Irak. Pero la presión internacional, especialmente de EE UU, forzó su repliegue en pocos días. La zona de incursión, la región autónoma del Kurdistán iraquí, tolera la presencia de los guerrilleros del PKK en las montañas del macizo Kandil, en la triple frontera de Turquía, Irak e Irán. Sin embargo, en esta ocasión no se esperan protestas del Gobierno de Bagdad. Erdogan, que ayer se entrevistó en Ankara con Nechirvan Barzani, sobrino del presidente del Kurdistán iraquí, Mashud Barzani, y dirigente del Partido Democrático del Kurdistán, aseguró que la Administración del norte de Irak deseaba cooperar con Turquía. En una rueda de prensa celebrada antes de la reunión, Erdogan dijo que él mismo había llamado a Barzani y que consideraba posible que los peshmergas (milicianos) kurdos del norte de Irak trabajen junto al Ejército turco en su lucha contra el PKK. Estados Unidos, que aún mantiene una destacada presencia militar en Irak y que cuenta con importantes bases aéreas en el norte del país, ha exigido contención a las fuerzas turcas para evitar daños a la población civil, y se ha comprometido a colaborar con el Estado Mayor de Ankara para facilitar información de sus servicios de inteligencia sobre las bases del PKK. A pesar de su solicitud, no se espera que Ankara dé marcha atrás sin antes acabar con el mayor número de bases del PKK. Con EE UU planeando la retirada de sus tropas de Irak, Ankara espera contar con tiempo suficiente para poder dañar gravemente las infraestructuras de la guerrilla en Irak. Mientras, en la calle, el sentimiento nacionalista ha aflorado tras la matanza. En Estambul, los taxistas bloquearon el miércoles algunos puentes de la ciudad e hicieron sonar sus bocinas en señal de duelo. Mientras, los barrios kurdos de la ciudad fueron cercados por la policía para evitar enfrentamientos con grupos ultranacionalistas turcos. Blanca López Arangüena El Ejército turco invade el norte de Irak tras el brutal ataque de la guerrilla kurda 20 OCT 2011 - 15:29 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/20/actualidad/1319113173_64919 0.html

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Internacional El PKK vuela los últimos puentes La guerrilla separatista desentierra el hacha de guerra mientras el partido nacionalista kurdo trataba de participar en la reforma constitucional turca La guerrilla kurda mata a 24 militares turcos en varios ataques cerca de Irak La minoría kurda se suma al debate constitucional Juan Carlos Sanz 19 OCT 2011 - 20:39 CET La ofensiva de Hakkari, el peor ataque de la guerrilla kurda sufrido por el Ejército turco desde 1993, parece haber dinamitado los últimos puentes tendidos entre el nacionalismo kurdo y el Gobierno de Ankara. Unas enigmáticas palabras lanzadas desde prisión por su líder histórico, Abdalá Ocalan, sugerían el martes que el diálogo de paz solo puede reanudarse si Turquía “abre la puerta”. Tal vez Apo, el fundador del PKK que se alzó contra el poder central en 1984, se refería a su eventual excarcelación del penal de la isla de Imrali, en el mar de Mármara, donde cumple condena a perpetuidad desde 1999. El PKK ha redoblado sus ataques contra las fuerzas de seguridad turcas tras la arrolladora victoria electoral en junio de Recep Tayyip Erdogan, la tercera consecutiva del primer ministro, y el Ejército turco ha respondido en cada ocasión con duras represalias contra las bases de la guerrilla en el norte de Irak, en una dinámica de acción y reacción que se sucede desde hace tres décadas. La principal expresión política del nacionalismo kurdo, el partido de la Paz y la Democracia (BDP), boicoteó el nuevo Parlamento surgido de las urnas en una estrategia de ruptura con el Estado. Pero el inicio del proceso constitucional prometido por Erdogan supuso un nuevo acercamiento. La dirección del BDP, cuyos lazos con el aparato militar del PKK se han ido difuminando en los últimos años, se apresuró ayer a expresar su pesar por el ataque contra los militares turcos en la provincia fronteriza con Irak. “Turquía necesita la paz, no tiene otra opción”, aseguraba el líder nacionalista Selahattin Demirtas. Erdogan no sirve de modelo para los árabes sin resolver la cuestión kurda Cuando el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP) de Erdogan llegó al poder en 2002, aún humeaba la política de tierra quemada del Ejército turco para vaciar las aldeas del sureste de Anatolia y eliminar las bases logísticas de la guerrilla. El Gobierno de Erdogan abolió el Estado de excepción vigente en la región kurda. Pero la caída del régimen de Sadam Hussein y la consolidación del autogobierno en el Kurdistán iraquí mostró pronto la insuficiencia de las medidas políticas del AKP. Erdogan cambió de estrategia para centrarse en el control político del Kurdistán turco, y a punto estuvo de conseguirlo en las elecciones de 2007, cuando sus diputados fueron los más votados en Diyarbakir y en otras circunscripciones, gracias a la política de inversiones masivas del Gobierno en la región. Pero los más de 15 millones de kurdos de Turquía dieron una fría acogida a los candidatos del AKP en los últimos comicios. El nacionalismo político reivindica

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ante todo la implantación de la enseñanza en lengua kurda en las escuelas y el reconocimiento de una identidad cultural propia. El propio Erdogan experimentó este rechazo en un mitin, celebrado precisamente en Hakkari, al que apenas asistieron un millar de personas. Mientras, todos los comercios de la ciudad permanecían cerrados en protesta por su visita. “La comunidad kurda le ha pasado factura a Erdogan por no cumplir sus promesas. En 2009 anunció la llamada Apertura Democrática, pero la iniciativa fue paralizada”, aseguraba entonces Mehmet Yegin, experto en asuntos kurdos dentro de la Organización de Estudios Estratégicos Internacionales (USAK) de Ankara. Sin solucionar la compleja cuestión kurda en casa difícilmente la emergente Turquía de Erdogan podrá aspirar a servir de modelo a los países de la primavera árabe. Juan Carlos Sanz El PKK vuela los últimos puentes La guerrilla separatista desentierra el hacha de guerra mientras el partido nacionalista kurdo trataba de participar en la reforma constitucional turca19 OCT 2011 - 20:39 CET http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/19/actualidad/1319049550_01484 3.html

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Egypt’s souring transition Khalil al-Anani, 19th October 2011 For the junta, the transition is not and maybe should never be a complete rupture with the old system, inevitably at their expense and a threat to their entrenched economic and social privileges. About the author Khalil al-Anani is a scholar at the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University in the UK and a former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute. Recent bloody clashes between the Egyptian military and Christian protesters have left the country on a brink of a rapidly-souring transition. Not only has the military, the only coherent institutional survivor from Mubarak's epoch, lost its credibility after opening fire on civilian protesters, but it is also facing mounting accusations of partiality and lack of neutrality in managing the transition. The last thing Egypt needs now is a biased arbitrator. Through its heavy-handed involvement in political conflict, which contradicts its role as caretaker power and facilitator to the transition, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) is pushing Egypt towards a political impasse. The larger context surrounding Sunday’s unprecedented violence [7] is the utter failure of SCAF in running the country in the post-Mubarak era. Democratization theorists tell us that the quality of a political transition is contingent upon the rationality of those who supervise it. The more they restrain their own political ambitions, the more smoothly the genuine transition can proceed, and the less mistakes they will commit. They also tell us that the military’s involvement in political conflict degrades the quality of democracy and hampers the potential for democratic consolidation. After eight months of ruling the country, it’s pretty clear that Egypt’s military is keen neither to transfer power to an elected civilian government nor to construct real progress towards a sustainable democracy. “Black Sunday”, whereby 25 Egyptians have been killed and some 300 wounded, is a watershed in Egypt’s lengthy transition. It reveals how fragile Egypt has become after the revolution and casts doubt over the capacity or will of the incumbent elite to ensure a peaceful transition. Three major mistakes the SCAF has committed over the past few months have resulted in the current political crisis. First is this attitude towards the transition. For the junta, the transition is not, and maybe should never be, a complete rupture with the old system, inevitably at their expense and a threat to their entrenched economic and social privileges. Instead, they envisage a fresh round of military domination over the political space, one that is less coercive and more discreet. Ironically in this regard, SCAF is itself perpetuating a familiar aspect of Mubarak’s regime, and one which the revolution sought to eradicate.

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Second is the significant shift in SCAF’s discourse since the downfall of Mubarak and their assumption of power. By insisting on prolonging the transition and postponing any power transfer to civilians until 2013, according to the shaky road map SCAF has outlined, the military is deeply suspicious of civilian competence in ruling the country. SCAF’s leaders have inherited the old narrative and mindset from Nasser’s era which celebrated military supremacy over the civilian elite. Nasser’s doctrine [8] was: Nasser for the Army, the Army for Egyptian People, and the Egyptian People for Arabian People (Walker 2011 [9]). However, neither the field marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the head of SCAF, nor his deputy the Chief of Staff Sami Anan have Nasser’s gifted charisma that can allow them to manipulate the public. Not surprisingly, such lack of confidence in civilians’ ability to run the country underlies the restricted and limited powers of Essam Sharaf’s government which has become the scapegoat of SCAF’s blunders. The third major mistake lies in SCAF’s tendency to manipulate political forces. Since last March’s referendum which set provisional constitutional amendments for the transitional period, the military sought to co-opt the old, as well as the new, political parties. Two weeks ago the military shrewdly persuaded some 15 parties to sign a document that granted SCAF another two years in power. Clearly, the military does not side with one party against the other, however, it manipulates all the actors involved in order to slow down the revolutionary momentum of change. SCAF replicates Mubarak’s constant recourse to the tactic of divide and rule in dealing with the oppisition. The junta believes that the more you keep the opposition fragmented and divided, the less the public will push for civilian rule. Political factions are all too complicit with this tactic, entering into bargains with SCAF at the expense of the longer term goals of the transition. They all know how to criticize SCAF: however, they are blatantly incapable of agreeing on how to enforce it to leave power. Nevertheless, it would be quite wrong to presume, as many commentators and analysts have concluded, that what the recent clashes in Egypt tell us most about is a sectarian or religious conflict between the military and the Egyptian Copts. Rather it uncovers the sense of empowerment and self-inflation of the SCAF in the face of all Egyptians, regardless of their religion or political affiliation. While the religious dimension cannot be ignored in such a pious society, the main message is about the costly nature of Mubarak’s legacy. Those who protested on Sunday bear many of the same grievances as those who rally to Tahrir Square every Friday, calling for civilian rule. They are all victims of the chronic problems inherited from Mubarak’s reign. It would be unrealistic as well as unfair to portray the Egyptian army as a sectarian entity with respect to the Copts. This may be a subtle distinction, between the habit of divide and rule and sectarianism, but a crucial one to understand in the Egyptian context. To conclude, for many Egyptians, public good will towards the military is at its vanishing point, and the only possible way out of this terrible situation is to transfer power to civilian rule before next June. But this is unlikely as long as the junta believes that Egypt cannot thrive without being led by a person in a military uniform.

Source URL: Khalil al-Anani, Egypt’s souring transition19th October 2011 http://www.opendemocracy.net/khalil-al-anany/egypt%E2%80%99s-souring-transition Created 10/19/2011 - 09:09 398

Links: [1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/international-politics [2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/democracy-and-government [3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/conflict [4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/egypt [5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/freeform-tags/arab-revolutions [6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/khalil-al-anani [7] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15242413 [8] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_Revolution_of_1952 [9] http://www.rhetoricalens.info/images/Nasser_Philosophy.pdf [10] http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ [11] http://www.opendemocracy.net/about/syndication

Room for Debate The Psychology of Occupy Wall Street There's a common thread in the Occupy protests worldwide: everyone is mad. Do they have more in common than anger? It Can't Be All Anger

Updated October 19, 2011, 12:30 AM Jeffrey O.G. Ogbar, a professor of history and the associate dean for the humanities at the University of Connecticut, is the author of "Hip-HopU Revolution: The Culture and

Politics of Rap."U The Occupy Wall Street movement, with its cross-section of activists (including "1 percenters" like Russell Simmons), reflects an impulse of empathy for everyday people who are hurting under a system that has increasingly awarded more to those with the most, while the poor are forced to do less with less. Many of the Occupy activists have expressed great anger at the increasing bifurcation of wealth in the United States. But whether this movement, or any, is more durable when it develops out of a visceral anger is hard to tell. A compassion for justice precipitates anger, but it is the empathetic impulse that inspires people to remain committed to a movement. History is full of examples of people who are drawn to a single movement for a host of reasons. There are some who were attracted to the Civil Rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s because of visceral anger at having a loved one die because a white hospital refused to treat him or her, or because the daily indignities of racism (denied voting, jobs, etc.) were too pressing for the spirit. But anger cannot be the driving force for a durable struggle.

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Movements and people are complicated. People must also be motivated by profound notions of the good that can come from struggle. Love, empathy and compassion must also energize. One of the most celebrated activists in history, Mohandas Gandhi, said that, "anger and intolerance are the enemies of correct understanding." Anger alone can open one to policies and tactics that are less about freeing the oppressed and more about punishing the oppressor. While punishment may be cathartic on many levels, it may or may not bring freedom for the oppressed any faster. Ultimately, it can shift the gaze away from what the movement can do for your people, but toward what the movement can do to the other. Many people in the Civil Rights movement would have argued that they were motivated by a deep visceral sense of love for freedom, justice and democracy, and that that love emboldened women, men and children to face police attack dogs, water hoses, arrests and beatings. Even the famed Latin American revolutionary Che Guevara insisted that, "the true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love." In the end, it is the compassion for justice that precipitates anger, but it is the empathetic impulse that inspires the people to remain committed to any movement. Anger alone cannot do.

Topics: WallU Street,U demonstrationsU and protests U Debaters A Shrewd Slogan

Ilyana Kuziemko, Princeton University and Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School October 18, 2011

IlyanaU Kuziemko U is an assistant professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton

University. MichaelU I. Norton U is an associate professor at the Harvard Business School. In the 1950s, the psychologists Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif randomly assigned 24 campers at an overnight camp to two groups – and then watched as chaos unfolded. The two groups instantly developed an “us” versus “them” mentality, raiding each other’s cabins, calling each other names and even refusing to eat together. Then the Sherifs did something ingenious: they introduced problems that required the combined efforts of all 24 campers, such as moving a broken-down truck. As quickly as they developed the “us” versus “them” mentality, the campers developed a superordinate “us” mentality. By saying 'We are the 99%,' Occupy Wall Street frames itself as part of a vast 'us' along with most of the public, against a tiny 'them.' What does summer camp have to do with the Occupy Wall Street movement? Plenty. Our recent research suggests that low income Americans show a curious tendency to compete against each other (like the campers) in an effort to ensure that they stay out of “last place,” rather than bond together against those in power. Our results show that Americans who make just above the minimum wage are the least likely to support an increase in the minimum wage – precisely because such an increase would mean that they would now be “tied” for last place in the wage distribution. Occupy Wall Street attempts to alter this dynamic by shifting lower-income Americans from this antagonistic stance towards each other to an “us” mentality (the 99%) – while simultaneously encouraging a “them” mentality towards the wealthy (the 1%). Will the rhetoric work? Competing frames have already arisen, such as the “We are the 53%” site, which breaks 400

Americans into those who pay federal income taxes and those who do not. In other words, the “us” versus “them” mentality is powerful, but also malleable. The extent to which these different breakdowns prove enduring has the potential to shape debates on wealth retribution and economic policy in the coming years. A Deep Well of Discontent

Jerrold M. Post, political psychologist Updated October 18, 2011, 07:57 PM

JerroldU M. Post U is the director of the political psychology program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is the co-author (with Robert

Robins) of "PoliticalU Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred."U In its inchoate form, the Occupy Wall Street movement expresses a discontent with economic and social inequality. The spread of the movement has been remarkable, clearly finding this discontent to be widespread: by last Saturday, the protests included tens of thousands of demonstrators in 78 countries. Where this movement goes will depend on whether healing leadership can mobilize the forces to reform governments. But as yet, there is no agenda, no fixed demands, and assuredly no organization to this now undirected mass movement of protest. Elias Canetti, the Nobel laureate who wrote “Crowds and Power,” likened the spread of a mass movement to a forest fire or a flood that becomes ever more powerful and difficult to control. Similarly, in “The True Believer,” the longshoreman philosopher Eric Hoffer wrote in the 1940s about the ability of hatemongering leaders like Hitler to “manipulate the slime of discontented selves,” a vivid contrast to the healing leadership of Martin Luther King Jr. Where this will go is as yet unclear. The movement has been likened to the Arab Spring, and there are similarities. When a citizen journalist posted his cellphone photo of a despairing Tunisian vegetable peddler setting himself afire, the photo went viral. This, like the idea of occupying Wall Street, also tapped into widespread discontent. The Occupy movement has spread through modern technology, but it is calling for reform, not revolution. In both cases, the forces unleashed are powerful. And the voices of protest are being heard. Where this movement goes — how it channels the strong current of discontent — will depend upon whether healing leadership can mobilize these forces to reform governments to respond to the needs of all their people. 'Haves' and 'Have Nots'

'Haves' and 'Have Nots' Updated October 18, 2011, 07:57 PM

AndrewU Kohut U is the president of the PewU Research Center.U He is the co-author of four books and a frequent commentator on polls for National Public Radio. The American public is beginning to take notice of the "Occupy movement." The Pew Research Center's polling this week finds a growing number of people paying attention to news about the movement. And the Gallup Poll found that among the minority of its respondents who are

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paying very close attention to the story, there is significantly more approval than disapproval of the Occupy movement's goals. The public has come to see government policies as catering to the rich and powerful. This may well be an indicator of how a broader slice of the public comes to view the movement, given the climate of opinion about the issues being raised. Three themes in the data suggest that the public may respond positively to the goals of the Occupy movement, but not necessarily its tactics. First, fundamental views about economic inequality are long standing. Over the past two decades we have found a very large majority of respondents agreeing with the statement that "this is a country in which the rich get richer and the poor get poorer." And, since the late 1980s, a growing number of citizens have begun to see the U.S. as a nation divided into two groups: the “haves” and the “have nots.” Secondly, the public has come to see government policies as catering to the rich and powerful. A forthcoming Pew Research Center report will show large majorities saying that while the government does not do enough for both the middle class and poor people, two in three think it does too much for the wealthy. Unlike the Republican Party, President Obama is not seen by most as catering to the rich. However, just 29 percent of respondents think the president is doing more to help the "have nots" than to help the "haves.” The third factor is of course the economic climate. Anxiety about economic conditions, and jobs in particular, puts the whole question of fairness front and center for the average American. The public expressed strong disapproval of bank bailouts and auto bailouts, as well as coming to the aid of home owners who took on mortgages they could not afford. Little wonder that even in an anti-government era, a large majority approved of the financial regulation legislation of 2009. And today the public looks at Wall Street and questions its contribution. Nearly half of Americans (47 percent) say that Wall Street hurts the U.S. economy more than it helps, while 38 percent say it helps more than hurts. (The other 15 percent offer no opinion.) http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/18/the-psychology-of-occupy-wall- street/occupy-wall-streets-taps-into-longstanding-conce

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Democracy in revolution: the Mediterranean moment Mehmet Dosemeci, 18th October 2011 By showing us the possibility of democracy in revolution, they have ignited a revolution in democracy, one that is redefining the meaning of both terms. About the author Mehmet Dosemeci is a post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University in New York. His research interests include Turkish-European dialogue in the 20th century and the history of radical democracy. If accounting begins from the self-immolation of the Tunisian fruit seller, Mohamed Bouaziz, on 17 December 2010, we have entered the tenth month of the Mediterranean revolutions. The mercurial speed with which this impulse has spread is a testament to both the global spread of human discontent and the equally global resonance of a local act of resistance. That this resonance has sliced through the global democratic divide, cascading through Madrid, Cairo, Benghazi, Manama, Athens, and Damascus alike, is perhaps the greatest sign of its profundity. That these global connections, so evident to the protestors, have been mostly ignored by the western press is equally striking, if not symptomatic of a larger structural flaw in western political epistemology. Revolution and democracy More than anything else, the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings have reawakened the foundational and historical connection between mass popular uprising and democracy. In doing so, the first revolutions of the twenty-first century, in under two months, annulled the historical baggage the term had acquired from the century before: the violent overthrow of a political regime in an orchestrated (or hijacked) action, commanded by a secular (1917) or religious (1979) revolutionary vanguard. Bypassing this legacy, Tunisia and Egypt reached back to the American and French revolutions of the late eighteenth century, to the era in our collective history soon to engross both Haiti and Egypt, where the two terms, revolution and democracy, were mutually and simultaneously instated. Ironically enough, the present-day heirs to these revolutions understand the relations between these terms very differently from the Egyptians in Tahrir Square. The approach of the mainstream western media and the US Administration to the Egyptian revolution affords us a telling portrait. From the outset, President Obama and the western press repeatedly described the crowd revolting in Tahrir Square as the “will of the Egyptian people”. Alain Badiou [14] has correctly pointed out the irony of the west in this regard, which nominated 500,000 protestors as legitimate representatives of 80 million, when within their own societies, 403

reasonable people living under the law express their will through opinion polls or elections. When similar numbers of Americans protested against the Iraq war in 2003, George Bush condemned the demonstrators to insignificance with a single sentence. “That’s what’s so great about America, we are a democracy and these people have the right to express their opinion.” When things get a little nastier, as Erik Swyngedouw [15] points out, participants of mass uprisings in the global North are described as rebels or anarchists and every effort is made to assure that the ‘rioters’ are not identified with The People. Yet the reference to Tahrir Square as the will of the people was made even more problematic by another continuous refrain: the repeated exhortations by western governments to ensure an ‘orderly transition to democracy’. Taken together, these statements attest to the conceptual separation of democracy, in both time and practice, from the revolutionary event that precedes it. The Egyptian revolution might or might not lead to democracy, and will be judged as a democratic revolution if a democracy is established as a result of it. The same will of the Egyptian people, expressed during the revolution through their occupation of Tahrir Square, following the ‘transition to democracy’ would now have to be vocalized through orderly polls and politics. This response is not owing to western geo-strategic thinking (both the US and EU states were caught completely off-guard by the events) but rather expresses the same conservative periodization with which the west now interprets its own foundational past. This dominant, though by no means hegemonic, narrative of the American and French Revolutions bounds revolution as a period enabling, but also distinctly before, democracy. Revolutionary acts, from the Boston Tea Party and the Declaration of Independence, to the Tennis Court Oath [16] and the storming of the Bastille, are given their due importance, but also separated from the actual functioning of the democracy that follows it. Hence the dominant interpretation of the crushing of the Whiskey Rebellion [17] as the (necessary) assertion of federal power and sovereignty, or the continued intrusion of the “will of the French people” through mass popular uprisings after 1789 as the descent of the French Revolution into demagoguery and terror. The democratic space of revolutionary occupation Yet, returning to Tahrir square, there was a lot more going on during the three weeks of mass uprisings that brought down Mubarak’s regime. Starting on January 25, hundreds of thousands of people from all over Egypt descended onto one square in Cairo – and what’s more – decided to stay. As the state apparatus withdrew (though not before committing 800+ murders), upwards of a million people, left to their own devices, had to figure out how they would live together in a square in order to sustain a revolt aimed outside of it. Badiou [18] once wrote that: In the midst of a revolutionary event, the people is made up of those who know how to solve the problems that the event imposes on them. The people of Tahrir square organized and orchestrated their own security, dealt with human and regular waste, and created services for the elderly and poor. They set prices for vendors, established supply networks for food and information, handled hired agitators, and protected each other’s religious practices. The importance of these gestures cannot be overemphasized; they stand as the critical communal complement to the political presence of Egyptians within the square, a presence expressing the ‘withdrawal of their consent’ [19] from Mubarak’s regime. The Egyptian people first defined themselves through their political occupation of the square 404

and increasingly, as the days passed, by how they occupied and existed within it. Tahrir Square [20] was not the coming together of a million atomized and individuated Egyptians but rather the stage on which the new Egyptian society was performed and presented. In their generosity, their tolerance, their humour, camaraderie, and song, the Egyptian people asserted their values and boundaries both to themselves and the whole world. The continuous occupation of the square conjoined the political and communal forms of expression, allowing each to be understood through the other. In this way, Tahrir square, if temporarily, became the site of a political revolution and the democratic institution of the revolutionary subject(s). This interdependence and simultaneity of democracy and revolution was perhaps best expressed by a young Egyptian who was among the first to occupy the square, when he said: “Starting today, the 25th of January, I take charge of the affairs of my country.” To the extent that it also privileges the political over the communal, the leftist response has been guilty of a similar blindness to that of the world’s authorities. The theoreticians of the left greeted the North African revolutions with open arms. They spoke of ‘unprecedented possibilities’, ‘reconfigurations’, and insisted on the absolute indeterminateness and contingent beauty of revolutionary creation. With the fall of Mubarak and the dispersal (voluntarily and forced) of the square, their initial optimism has sobered, insisting on the need for vigilance against (or displaying bitterness towards) the hijacking of the revolution by the military or Muslim Brotherhood. Some have tried, very cautiously it must be added, to pinpoint the underlying meaning of this revolutionary spirit (rejection of neo-liberalism [21], anti-corruption, social justice, etc.), while others have harped on the very “wordless” nature of the modern social space, linking the now declared “end of the Egyptian revolution” with the London riots, both expressing (and crippled) by a spirit of revolt without revolution [22]. Yet all of these responses miss the true revolutionary (re)creation of 2011: continuous occupation of a physical space as a social/political act. The self-organization and self- institution of Tahrir Square as a running and functioning society, one that cannot be separated from the political expression conditioning the occupation in the first place, proved not to be an isolated or enclosed event. Rather than end with the dispersal of the square, this new form [23] has resonated across the Mediterranean (and beyond), taking on new expressions and dynamics in its translation. The Mediterranean moment Within months, Tahrir Square inspired large occupations of similar central squares in Bahrain, Libya, Greece, and Spain. The latter two, staged against a democratic backdrop, bring the relation of democracy and revolution into particularly stark relief. Both the Indignados across Spain and the Greeks occupying Syntagma Square are revolting against a democracy they feel affords them no voice or control over their lives, calling for a new type of society which “treats its members as people not commodities.” While both participants and their commentators have rightly questioned the inadequacy of this political agenda (one explicitly shying away from positive programs of sociopolitical change), this focus on political articulation has taken attention away from the square itself. In and through the occupation of the very space of their revolt against a ‘democratic’ society that denies their existence, they are putting into practice the democracy they believe should take its place.

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The institution of nightly general assembly meetings, of various sub-committees charged with food, protection, outreach, horticulture, information, tattoos, and web- presence - each creating plural (physical and conceptual) spaces informed by and daily redefining the revolution - have all drawn public attention [24]. Yet, perhaps even more telling has been the extreme detail these occupations have paid to the structure of participation itself. In this respect, the minutes of the People's Assembly of Syntagma Square [25] make for fascinating reading. There is as much attention devoted to the how of political/social life in square: the ban on party and union insignia, the drawing of lots and time limits governing speech in the assembly, the coordination of meetings with public transit to assure greater participation, etc.; then there is to the what: articulating political manifestos and the position of the Assembly to its outside (whether in relation to the protests in the upper square or Greek society more broadly). Most importantly, the minutes attest to the profound interdependence of these two dimensions, one equally present in Cairo and Madrid. The positioning of the square in relation to national and/or international politics and the institution of the society within it, the entwining of the ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ of the square, stands as the defining feature of these occupations. The common link uniting Tahrir Square to all the others that have taken from its example is the inseparability of the political act from the collective organization of the space through where this act is performed. In fact, the longer these continuous occupations persist, the more deeply embedded one has become in the other. A new script Regardless of their final political outcome, the 2011 revolts have already reestablished mass continuous occupation as a political/social form: the coming together of people who have both withdrawn their consent to be governed by the existing order and equally importantly, discovered the responsibility, dignity, difficulty, and above all, joy, of instituting a society outside of it. They have, through these occupations, reaffirmed not only that democracy and revolution are co-extensive, but have challenged us all to think about why we have separated them as well as the consequences of doing so. In this respect, they have managed to wipe out, in less than ten months, the legacy of the twentieth century. By showing us the possibility of democracy in revolution, they have ignited a revolution in democracy, one that is redefining the meaning of both terms. Even if all of the 2011 occupations fizzle out, they have already accomplished two things. First, for the occupiers themselves, participation alone has enacted a collective self-education in the most profound sense, forming, as Stathis Gourgouris [26] has argued, a new generation of citizens. Second, the squares of 2011, closely watched by activists worldwide, stand as a seismic challenge to the strategies and imaginations of contemporary social ‘movements’. From licensed protests with pre-defined march routes to illegal direct actions, from flash mobs to the cyber-attacks of Anonymous, a logic of collection and dispersal came to define how we thought of resistance in recent years. Against this logic (one mimicking, coincidentally, the investment and withdrawal of international capital itself), the Mediterranean moment has reintroduced the continuous occupation of a physical space as a social and political form [23]. One of the most striking aspects of the 1871 Commune was how quickly the Parisians organized themselves. The moment the call of revolution went up (and later, was threatened) they knew exactly what to do. It was as if they were acting out a script that 406

had been written in 1789, a script reenacted and revised in 1792, 1832, and again in 1848. There is little doubt in my mind that the occupiers of the Mediterranean squares are the collective playwrights of a new script that will, in the decades to come, be globally performed and altered over and over and over again.

Source URL: Mehmet Dosemeci, Democracy in revolution: the Mediterranean moment18th October 2011 http://www.opendemocracy.net/mehmet- dosemeci/democracy-in-revolution-mediterranean-moment Created 10/18/2011 - 17:00 Links: [1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/international-politics [2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/ideas [3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/democracy-and-government [4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/conflict [5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/civil-society [6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/united-states [7] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/france [8] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/greece [9] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/spain [10] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/tunisia [11] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/egypt [12] http://www.opendemocracy.net/freeform-tags/arab-revolutions [13] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/mehmet-dosemeci [14] http://joshuajkurz.wordpress.com/2011/03/01/badiou-on-egypt-and-tunisia/ [15] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erik_Swyngedouw [16] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tennis_Court_Oath [17] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whiskey_Rebellion [18] http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alain-badiou/biography/ [19] http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/02/15/withdrawing-consent/ [20] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tahrir_Square [21] http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201122414315249621.html [22] http://www.lrb.co.uk/2011/08/19/slavoj-zizek/shoplifters-of-the-world-unite [23] http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/deterritorial-support-group- editorial/egypt-bahrain-london-spain-tahrir-square-as-meme [24] http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/20116199328337907.html [25] http://real-democracy.gr/en/minutes/2011-05-30-peoples-assembly-syntagma- square-30052011 [26] http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/07/201171985335665864.html [27] http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ [28] http://www.opendemocracy.net/about/syndication http://www.opendemocracy.net/freeform-tags/arab-revolutions

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"El 15-M es emocional, le falta pensamiento" Zygmunt Bauman advierte del peligro de que la indignación termine evaporándose - El padre de la 'modernidad líquida' publica un nuevo ensayo en forma de 44 cartas "La emoción es apta para destruir, pero inepta para construir nada" "Las protestas suplen la falta de política global con oposición popular" "El movimiento no aceptaría un líder. Su potencia es su horizontalidad" "Frente al actual individualismo, los indignados se sienten iguales" VICENTE VERDÚ - Madrid - 17/10/2011 Zigmunt Bauman, el filósofo y sociólogo polaco famoso por su concepto de la modernidad líquida, tan fértil que ha sido aplicado al amor (líquido), al arte (líquido), al miedo (líquido), al tiempo (líquido) y así hasta cualquier cosa, publica el ensayo 44 cartas desde el mundo líquido (Paidós). Además, el premio Príncipe de Asturias de Comunicación y Humanidades 2010 ha estado en Madrid para pronunciar una conferencia en el Matadero bajo el título ¿Tiene futuro la solidaridad? El sábado por la tarde, a la misma hora de la manifestación internacional de los indignados, mantuvimos una charla en un hotel a menos de 100 metros de la plaza de Atocha donde, entre la multitud, ya no cabía un alfiler. Le pregunto a este profesor emérito en la Universidad de Leeds (Inglaterra) si le parece que estas grandes manifestaciones masivas, pacíficas y tan heterogéneas lograrán combatir los abusos de los mercados, promover una democracia real, reducir las injusticias y, en suma, mejorar la equidad en el capitalismo global, pero, como profesor que es, no responde a la cuestión de un solo golpe. En su parecer, el origen de todos los graves problemas de la crisis actual tiene su principal causa en "la disociación entre las escalas de la economía y de la política". Las fuerzas económicas son globales y los poderes políticos, nacionales. "Esta descompensación que arrasa las leyes y referencias locales convierte la creciente globalización en una fuerza nefasta. De ahí, efectivamente, que los políticos aparezcan como marionetas o como incompetentes, cuando no corruptos". "El movimiento del 15-M trataría de suplir la falta de globalización de la política mediante la oposición popular". ¿Una oposición eficaz? En opinión de este sabio de 86 años, el efecto que puede esperarse de este movimiento es "allanar el terreno para la construcción, más tarde, de otra clase de organización". Ni un paso más. Bauman califica a este movimiento, como es bien evidente, de "emocional" y, en su parecer, "si la emoción es apta para destruir resulta especialmente inepta para construir nada. Las gentes de cualquier clase y condición se reúnen en las plazas y gritan los mismos eslóganes. Todos están de acuerdo en lo que rechazan, pero se recibirían 100 respuestas diferentes si se les interrogara por lo que desean".

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La emoción es (¿cómo no?) "líquida". Hierve mucho pero también se enfría unos momentos después. "La emoción es inestable e inapropiada para configurar nada coherente y duradero". De hecho, la modernidad líquida dentro de la cual se inscriben los indignados posee como característica la temporalidad, "las manifestaciones son episódicas y propensas a la hibernación". ¿Se necesitaría un líder acalorado? ¿Varios líderes temperamentales? "El movimiento no lo aceptaría puesto que tanto su potencia como su gozo es la horizontalidad, sentirse juntos e iguales, lo que, en importante medida, les niega el superindividualismo actual". La superindividualidad (de la modernidad líquida) "crea miedos, desvalimientos, una capacidad empobrecida para hacer frente a las adversidades". El estrés es la enfermedad que acompaña a esta sevicia. "Las gentes se sienten solas y amenazadas por la pérdida del empleo, la disminución del sueldo, la dificultad de adaptación al riesgo. El estrés es corriente entre los parados pero también en los empleados, acosados por los cierres y despidos, las prejubilaciones o los salarios cada vez más bajos. En Estados Unidos el estrés produce tantos daños económicos como la suma conjunta de todas las demás enfermedades". Las bajas laborales por estrés llegan a costar, dice Bauman, 300.000 millones de dólares (216.600 millones de euros) al año y la cifra no deja de crecer. ¿Llegará todo esto a provocar un giro en el sistema, un colapso o algún cambio sustantivo? Su respuesta es que, en estos momentos, prefiere hablar de "transición" y no de "cambio". Necesitaría hechos más netos para pronunciarse sobre el alcance de los actuales trastornos. "Antes, hacía falta mucho tiempo para preparar unas protestas masivas como las del 15-M, pero hoy las redes sociales permiten enormes concentraciones en muy poco tiempo". Pero volvemos a lo mismo: de igual manera que se concentran y actúan con velocidad, muy poco después se detienen. El movimiento crece y crece pero "lo hace a través de la emoción, le falta pensamiento. Con emociones solo, sin pensamiento, no se llega a ninguna parte". El alboroto de la emoción colectiva reproduce el espectáculo de un carnaval que acaba en sí mismo, sin consecuencia. "Durante el carnaval todo está permitido pero terminado el carnaval vuelve la normativa de antes". Puede decirse, declara el profesor, que "nos hallamos en una fase especialmente interesante, como en un laboratorio de acción social nuevo". Tarde o pronto la crisis terminará y, sin duda, las cosas serán diferentes pero ¿de qué modo? "No me pida que sea profeta", implora Bauman. "En algunos lugares, no en todos, el movimiento ha logrado conquistas importantes pero no es extensible a todos los países". Lo líquido sigue siendo válido para la previsión del porvenir. La modernidad líquida se expresa, obviamente, en su falta de solidez y de fijeza. Nada se halla lo suficientemente determinado. Ni las ideas, ni los amores, ni los empleos, ni el 15-M. Por eso teme que tal arrebato acabe también, finalmente, "en nada". No es seguro, pero siendo líquido, ¿cómo no pensar en la evaporación? http://www.elpais.com/articulo/cultura/15- M/emocional/le/falta/pensamiento/elpepicul/20111017elpepicul_1/Tes

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Middle East

October 17, 2011 In Crowded Cairo Quarter, Islamists Try to Seize Mantle of a Revolution By ANTHONY SHADID CAIRO — In one of Cairo’s most crowded quarters, where streets are so filled with trash that bulldozers scoop it up, the Muslim Brotherhood has opened not one but two offices. Its most conservative counterpart has followed suit. An Islamist do-gooder with forearms as broad as the Nile has vowed to win a seat in Parliament. Egypt’s parliamentary election may be more than a month away, but the contest has already begun in the neighborhood of Imbaba, where the arc of the Egyptian revolution is on display. The clarity of the revolt has given way to the ambiguity of its aftermath, and Islamic activists here who failed to drive the popular uprising — some, in fact, opposed it — are mobilizing to claim its mantle amid the din of protests, confusion and, last week, violence. Imbaba may not be Cairo — it is more like a distilled version of the city — but it says a lot about where an anxious country may be headed as it approaches an election that will help decide the future character of an unfinished revolution. From the caldron of frustration the revolt represented, Islamic activists here have built on their formidable charity across a landscape where liberal and secular forces have made almost no impression. Residents debate programs but often have only the agendas of religious parties to go on. Even the most secular voices — the few there are — wonder if it is not time to give the Islamists a chance. “They’re the only ones organized, and they’re the only one who deliver to people in need,” Amal Salih, a 24-year-old resident of Imbaba, said with a measure of regret. Ms. Salih came of age when Imbaba was in the throes of militant Islamists, who earned her neighborhood along the Nile the nickname of the Islamic Republic of Imbaba. Embarrassed, the government eventually deployed 12,000 troops, arrested a man called Sheik Gaber who had imposed his notion of order here and occupied the neighborhood for six weeks. The government offered promises that typically proved illusory; just a year before the revolution, a leading official promised that Imbaba would soon look like Cairo’s most upscale neighborhoods. It never did, and by the time the revolution began, Ms. Salih joined the protests against her parents’ wishes. She wears a veil, but she calls herself secular. She laments the resurgence of religious forces, but she clings to the hope that her time in Tahrir Square symbolized. “We can’t be impatient,” she said. “Every revolution in the world takes time.” In Imbaba, as elsewhere in Cairo, those memories of Tahrir Square represent an ideal that seems to grow more pristine the longer the ruling military council delays the transition to civilian elected government. During the revolution in Imbaba, youths made 410

the point that religion rarely drove their demands, even in a pious locale like this one. As security collapsed, neighborhoods banded together, almost spontaneously, to face any provocation, imagined or otherwise. Residents said a rich businessman who operated boats on the Nile helped organize popular defense committees. In a neighborhood named for blacksmiths, family elders abstained from their usual evenings over coffee in cafes and set up checkpoints. A spice seller named Sheik Salama and butchers from the Qut family helped organize guards for a stretch of street that hosted a branch of Bank Misr and the Munira Police Station. “It was spontaneous,” said Magdy Obeid, a young academic in Imbaba. “We participated as Egyptians. We did not know someone was puritanical, Muslim Brotherhood, or whatever. We were just Egyptian, and there was no distinction between us.” Mr. Obeid sat in a dingy apartment that was dark but for the glow of the late afternoon. He sipped a soft drink as he remembered those days, then turned to the present. “Now it’s only the Islamic currents,” he said, nodding. “Without a doubt, until now, they’re the only ones who have emerged. No one else is on the scene.” Imbaba is as proud as it is crowded — by some estimates, it is three times as dense as Manhattan. One resident estimated its population at 15 million, a vast overstatement given that Cairo itself is only 18 million or so. But the exaggeration underscored the sheer challenge of bringing relief to a neighborhood where no one walks a quiet street. Three-wheeled motorized buggies known as tuk-tuks ply the streets. Since the revolution, builders have ignored codes, piling floor atop floor on red-brick buildings never high enough to escape the din. In February, some of the most puritanical Islamists here handed out fliers urging people to support President Hosni Mubarak; with his fall, they seek to replace him with one of their own. Posters on mosques outline a program no different from any liberal agenda, save for item No. 1 — Islamic law — and a number listed at the bottom reserved for female callers. “The people here are poor, and they have no idea about democracy or politics,” said Ayman Abdel-Wahab, a Brotherhood member sitting in the group’s office, which opened here in July. “They’ll side with whomever they think can offer them help.” On the walls of mosques like Furqan and Tawba, posters beckon residents to come and get to know the Brotherhood, still the most potent of Egypt’s Islamist currents. Mr. Abdel-Wahab said the group tried to serve as an intermediary between residents and overwhelmed local officials, and that it regularly distributed sugar, oil and rice to hundreds of the most needy. A banner hangs over one of Imbaba’s main thoroughfares trumpeting a Brotherhood celebration of the neighborhood’s best students. (Each received a watch and certificate.) Youths are offered summer trips to beaches. Other Islamist charities provide monthly payments — $15, sometimes a little more — to widows. Of course, there is nothing new in Islamist activists’ taking the lead in offering charity in Cairo, but only now is it so intertwined with the fortunes of coming elections. “Some people say that the services I provide are equivalent to that of 50 members of Parliament,” declared Yasser Suleiman, known by everyone here as Sheik Yasser.

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In an office adorned with a plaque that reads “The Koran and nothing else,” Sheik Yasser oversees a staff of 20 employees providing help to 1,500 orphans with a budget, he says, of $330,000. His short-sleeve shirt reveals arms that seem too stout to belong to the accountant that he is. A failed candidate in the last election for Parliament, he is determined to win this time around, campaigning on his 25 years of charity work here. “That’s the fruit of freedom and democracy,” he said. Under Mr. Mubarak’s long rule, the divergent currents of Islamists were often grouped under the rubric of “the religious.” That is no longer the case. The Brotherhood now openly competes with groups that have lately become more assertive: the Salafists, the most puritanical current, along with the once-militant Islamic Group, which renounced violence in the late 1990s. Not even the Brotherhood claims to know the relative weight of each, though some residents blame the Salafists for a new current of intolerance in Imbaba as well as sectarian clashes that erupted this summer with Christians. Rumors are traded furiously of Salafists’ administering vigilante justice. In one version, a youth stealing tuk-tuks had either his hand amputated or his ear sliced off. Ayman Abdel-Aziz, a pharmacist whose office abuts the new headquarters of the Salafist Nour Party, nodded with approval at the story. Though calling himself secular, he had grown weary of the crime wave in Cairo; even his business had been broken into. “These days, you have to deal with those people and instill fear,” Mr. Abdel-Aziz said. “Yes, it’s savage, but it’s the perfect way to deal with all those thugs among us.” He vowed not to vote for the religious currents, but he understood the logic these days. After decades of repressive rule sometimes conflated in the street with the notion of secular liberalism, he said, people were willing to consider alternatives, however austere. “The argument goes like this,” he said. “Give them a chance. Let’s try them out.” On a night in which an autumn breeze offered respite from Cairo’s pollution, Sayyid Abdel-Khaleq joined his friend Khaled Said on a trip to the Brotherhood’s office. In the past week they had paid visits to two liberal parties and the Nour Party, as they tried to figure out whom to vote for. The liberals seemed dated, they said, and the Salafists felt as though they were still “in the kindergarten of politics.” That left the Brotherhood, although Mr. Abdel-Khaleq said “a lot can happen between now and then.” “During the revolution, we adhered to no membership,” he said. “We were motivated by ourselves, for ourselves, and we were driven by what was inside us.” “Now,” he added matter-of-factly, “it’s the time for parties.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/middleeast/in-cairo-quarter-islamists-try-to- profit-from-revolution.html?src=recg

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Jailed Egyptian blogger on hunger strike says 'he is ready to die' Maikel Nabil Sanad declares he would prefer suicide to being tried by military junta for criticising the army in his blog Jack Shenker guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 18 October 2011 19.28 BST

Sanad has been on hunger strike for 57 days and is said to be in critical condition. An Egyptian blogger jailed for criticising the country's military junta has declared himself ready to die, as his hunger strike enters its 57th day. "If the militarists thought that I would be tired of my hunger strike and accept imprisonment and enslavement, then they are dreamers," said Maikel Nabil Sanad, in a statement announcing that he would boycott the latest court case against him, which began last Thursday. "It's more honourable [for] me to die committing suicide than [it is] allowing a bunch of Nazi criminals to feel that they succeeded in restricting my freedom. I am bigger than that farce." Sanad, whom Amnesty International has declared to be a prisoner of conscience, was sentenced by a military tribunal in March to three years in jail after publishing a blog post entitled "The people and the army were never on one hand". The online statement, which deliberately inverted a popular pro-military chant, infuriated Egypt's ruling generals who took power after the ousting of former president Hosni Mubarak, and have since been accused of multiple human rights violations in an effort to shut down legitimate protest and stifle revolutionary change. The 26-year-old was found guilty of "insulting the Egyptian army". The case helped spark a nationwide opposition movement to military trials for civilians, and cast further

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doubt on the intentions of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Scaf), whose promises regarding Egypt's post-Mubarak transition to democracy appear increasingly hollow. Earlier this month, a military appeals court bowed to public pressure and ordered a retrial of Sanad. But they insisted it would once again take the form of a military tribunal, which international human rights organisations have condemned as falling short of the basic standards of legal justice. Up to 12,000 civilians are believed to have been tried in such courts since the fall of Mubarak, and the practice has continued despite a commitment this month from Egypt's de facto leader, Field Marshal Tantawi, to bring such trials to an end. The military retrial opened in the absence of Sanad, his family and his lawyers. Sanad's younger brother Mark said they were refusing to participate in a "soap opera". "Military tribunals are one of the most important tools used by Scaf to put an end to the ongoing wave of protests against them," claimed Mona Seif, a cancer researcher who has helped lead a campaign against the practice. "Sanad's case was one of the earliest, and it was a warning message to anyone thinking of exposing Scaf's crimes." Sanad's health is believed to be in critical condition, and Amnesty has warned that his life "hangs in the balance". Amnesty said: "Maikel Nabil Sanad's trial has been rife with flaws and unnecessary delays, and the decision of the appeals court for a retrial brings him back to square one, cruelly toying with his life. The charges against him must be dropped and he should be released immediately and unconditionally. He should never have been tried in the first place, let alone before a military court." Mobilising support for Sanad has been hampered by the fact that he previously expressed pro-Israeli sentiments on his blog. "Scaf targeted him in particular because they knew it would be difficult to get a groundswell of sympathy for him, but the tide has turned now," argued Seif. "Most people are opposed to Scaf's military tribunals, and Sanad himself would rather walk slowly to death than acknowledge their legitimacy." In his latest blog post, Sanad reiterated his refusal to engage with the military's legal "theatrics", saying: "I don't beg for my freedom from a group of killers and homeland- stealers." He went on to denounce an apology his father made on his behalf to Scaf in an unsuccessful effort to secure his release. "The military council is the one that has to apologise for my imprisonment, my torture, silencing my mouth, spying on my life, my relatives and my friends," he wrote. "The military council is the one that has to apologise [for] its crimes of killing, torturing and unlawful prosecutions." http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/18/jailed-egypt-blogger- hungerstrike?CMP=EMCGT_191011&

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Reports of more deaths in Yemeni protest

Witnesses say forces loyal to President Saleh fired on protesters, killing at least seven in capital, Sanaa. Last Modified: 18 Oct 2011 15:59

Witnesses say protesters were attacked as they marched from Change Square to Al-Qaa neighbourhood [Reuters]

At least seven people have been killed and dozens wounded after armed men loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh opened fire on demonstrators in the Yemeni capital, witnesses say. Residents of Sanaa told Al Jazeera on Tuesday that several injured people were kidnapped after protesters calling on Saleh to step down were trapped by security forces inside the Al-Qaa neighbourhood. According to the witnesses, armed men loyal to the embattled president had erected tents in the street to block an anti-government march. The protesters came under attack as they marched from Change Square to Al-Qaa, a

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district where government buildings are located. The latest violence came as the United Nations condemned the killing of peaceful protesters in Yemen. UN condemnation "We condemn in the strongest terms the reported killing of a number of largely peaceful protestors in Sanaa and Taez as a result of the indiscriminate use of force by Yemeni security forces since Saturday," Rupert Colville, a spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said. "We are extremely concerned that security forces continue to use excessive force in a climate of complete impunity for crimes resulting in heavy loss of life and injury, despite repeated pledges by the government to the contrary," he added. Earlier on Monday, Tawakkul Karman, Yemen's Nobel Peace Prize laureate, urged the UN to act "immediately and decisively" to halt a deadly government crackdown on protesters. In a letter to Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary-general, she said: "This is the only thing that will give Yemenis... confidence that international justice exists... and that it extends far enough to reach Saleh, his gang and all the despots who continue to kill innocents." Karman and tens of thousands of other pro-democracy activists have for months been camped out in Sanaa's Change Square, demanding an end to Saleh's long rule. The crackdown by government troops on anti-government protests has killed hundreds since the mass protest movement, inspired by uprisings in other countries in the region, began in late January.

http://english.aljazeera.net/nU ews/middleeast/2011/10/2011101811132991846.html U

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Middle East So, what do you think of your husband's brutal crackdown, Mrs Assad? What did Syria's First Lady, supposedly a force for compassion, say when aid workers confronted her about the bloody crackdown? Alastair Beach reports Tuesday, 18 October 2011 Vogue magazine famously called her a "rose in the desert", while Paris Match proclaimed she was the "element of light in a country full of shadow zones". But when Syria's glamorous First Lady invited a group of aid workers to discuss the security situation with her last month, she appeared to have lost her gloss. During the meeting, British-born Asma al-Assad – who grew up in Acton and attended a Church of England school in west London – came face to face with aid workers who had witnessed at first hand the brutality of her husband's regime. Yet according to one volunteer who was present, the former investment banker and mother of President Bashar al-Assad's three children appeared utterly unmoved when she heard about the plight of protesters. "We told her about the killing of protesters," said the man, who asked not to be named for fear of retribution. "We told her about the security forces attacking demonstrators. About them taking wounded people from cars and preventing people from getting to hospital ... There was no reaction. She didn't react at all. It was just like I was telling a normal story, something that happens every day." Syrians working with aid agencies to try to help the thousands injured as Mr Assad's security forces unleash tanks, guns and airpower to crush a seven-month uprising against his rule had hoped for a lot more. The First Lady's office contacted them and said she wanted to hear about the difficulties they faced in the field. She met the humanitarians in Damascus. "She asked us about the risks of working under the current conditions," he added. But when she was told about the abuses of power being committed by her husband's notorious secret police, Mrs Assad's blank face left them unimpressed. "She sees everything happening here. Everything is all over the news. It's impossible she doesn't know," said the volunteer. Yet even if Mrs Assad does know about the worst of the violence and the 3,000 civilians human rights groups accuse the regime of killing, many people who have met her question what she could possibly do about it. "Whatever her own views, she is completely hamstrung," said Chris Doyle, the director of the Council of Arab-British Understanding. "There is no way the regime would allow her any room to voice dissent or leave the country. You can forget it." Mrs Assad, who achieved a first class degree in computer science from King's College University, was brought up in Britain by her Syrian-born parents, who were close friends of Hafez al-Assad, the former President of Syria. She started dating Bashar al-

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Assad in her twenties, and they eventually married in 2000, when she moved to Syria for the first time. According to one prominent Western biographer of the Assad family, Bashar chose Asma against the determined opposition of his sister and mother. "He had lots of beautiful girlfriends before her," said the journalist, who asked not to be named. "He faced opposition when he wanted Asma because she was Sunni and he is Alawite. Here was Bashar al-Assad marrying outside the clan." She championed several development initiatives, and delivered genuine change by helping to create NGOs in Syria, as well as highlighting the plight of disabled children and laying the groundwork for plans to rehabilitate dozens of Syria's ramshackle museums. For some, she is the modern, made-up face of a former pariah state; to others, an aloof, 21st-century Marie Antoinette. Either way, nothing perhaps crystallised the fate of Syria's First Lady better than the disastrously-timed interview run by Vogue magazine in its March issue this year. Amid obsequious descriptions of Chanel jewellery and her matey banter with Brad Pitt during the Hollywood star's 2009 visit to Syria, the article described how the Assad household was run on "wildly democratic principles". According to Mrs Assad: "we all vote on what we want, and where." Naturally, many outraged Syrians were left asking why the Assads could not extend them the same courtesy.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/worldU /middle-east/so-what-do-you-think-of- your-husbands-brutal-crackdown-mrs-assad-2372008.html?service=Print U

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TENDENCIAS INDIGNADOS La voz de los ciudadanos 18 octubre 2011 FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG BERLIN

"Especuláis con nuestras vidas" rezaba una pancarta desplegada ante la torre del BCE en Fráncfort, el 15 de octubre de 2011. AFP Los movimientos de indignados que proliferan en todo el mundo representan una nueva vía de participación política. Esta forma no organizada exige a las instituciones como los partidos políticos o los sindicatos un diálogo permanente que pone en entredicho su autoridad. A primera vista, se trataba de una manifestación como cualquier otra, una marcha de protesta clásica en la vía pública. El sábado 15 octubre, en todo el mundo, la gente respondió a la llamada de los “indignados”, que invitaban a la población a tomar las calles. En Fráncfort, varios miles de ciudadanos se reunieron y caminaron hacia el barrio financiero, hasta el edificio del Banco Central Europeo (BCE). La marcha comenzó y acabó con las declaraciones habituales. Pero el interés de esta jornada era otro. Lo que se gestaba en Internet se manifestó en la calle. Se vieron muchas parejas, en particular gente de cierta edad. Si los partidos políticos estaban poco representados, los sindicatos estaban directamente ausentes. Eran pocos los grupos de más de cinco personas. Esta manifestación agrupaba a personas que habían optado por salir de una sociedad anónima para acceder a una comunidad integrada por desconocidos. Sus motivaciones parecían diversas. Un persona de edad avanzada comentaba su temor a la guerra. Un grupo de jóvenes se negaba rotundamente a quitarse las máscaras inspiradas en el personaje de V de Vendetta. En las filas de manifestantes, se encontraba tanto gente de broma como ciudadanos que cumplían seriamente una misión. Resulta difícil determinar el perfil y las reivindicaciones de los indignados. Pero esta pregunta

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quizás no es la que más importe. Hay otras dos que sin duda tienen más peso: ¿cómo ha surgido esta forma de protesta? ¿Y cómo puede aprovechar la sociedad su potencial? En este movimiento, la protesta en la vía pública ya no es un medio para apoyar la lucha de un sindicato o de un partido político. Son los ciudadanos mismos los que se representan.La protesta se dirige contra las instituciones, pero ellos tienen buen cuidado para no institucionalizarse.Cada uno toma la iniciativa individual de manifestarse y, con este acto de protesta, entra en una comunidad. El presidente estadounidense Barack Obama, que siempre reaccionó a las reivindicaciones políticas de los ciudadanos planteando la misma pregunta, "Where is the movement?" [¿Dónde está el movimiento?], se enfrenta hoy a una corriente que no reúne reivindicaciones comunes. El proceso tradicional de protesta se ha invertido.Este diagnóstico,realizado hace quince días por el catedrático de periodismo estadounidense Jeff Jarvis a propósito del movimiento neoyorquino, también se puede aplicar a Alemania: en este caso nos encontramos ante una "revolución mediante hashtag". La expresión es una hipérbole, porque el movimiento no es una revolución. Aunque muestre una mutación estructural interesante. Un debate continuo El hashtag [palabra o frase que comienza por “#”], utilizado en las redes sociales para clasificar por temas las noticias y los comentarios, se ha convertido en un eficaz modo de coordinar la comunicación y debilita otra lógica centralizadora hasta ahora en vigor: la autoridad del autor. Se discuten cuestiones de fondo, o mejor aún: se asocia cada vez con más frecuencia al ciudadano, allí donde aparece el hashtag correspondiente, sin depender de los medios de comunicación dominantes. De momento, la función del hashtag en el debate público parece aún limitado. Pero la innovación suscita interés en Alemania, sobre todo entre los partidos oficiales. Los programas políticos, desprovistos desde hace tiempo de sentido, actualizados en función de los plazos electorales e ideados para que sean válidos a medio plazo, deberían perder la poca credibilidad que les queda. En su lugar surgen nuevas formas de comunicación entre la política y la opinión, basadas en el debate continuo. Llevando el análisis un poco más lejos, podría decirse que el movimiento de los indignados no es una revuelta como las que suelen verse, sino el rostro de una nueva forma de implicación política. Si bien esta participación ciudadana se orienta aún hacia formas de acción conocidas, se basa en mecanismos totalmente nuevos. Representa ya un potencial de movilización considerable. Y se distingue sobre todo por un aspecto: triunfa ante el desencanto que se siente con respecto a la política. http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/1070311-la-voz-de-los-ciudadanos

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DEBATES FRANCIA La larga historia de una masacre olvidada 17 octubre 2011 LE MONDE PARIS

Quai de Conti, en París, días después de la masacre del 17 de octubre de 1961. Pintado en el muro: "aquí se ahoga a los argelinos". DR Jean Texier Hace 50 años, entre 100 y 200 argelinos que se manifestaban pacíficamente en París fueron asesinados por la policía. Hecho que fue durante largo tiempo ocultado por el poder, el 17 de octubre de 1961 entra a formar parte de la memoria colectiva poco a poco. Ariane Chemin Durante los años setenta y ochenta, el recuerdo del 17 de octubre de 1961 se envolvió en un grueso sudario. ¿Quién se acordaba entonces de que un día de otoño, hombres, mujeres y niños que se manifestaban en familia, desarmados, por las calles de París fueron asesinados a golpes por la policía, arrojados vivos al Sena o encontrados ahorcados en los bosques? "Se trata de una de las contadas ocasiones desde el siglo XIX en las que la policía ejerció la fuerza contra los obreros de París", constata el historiador Benjamin Stora. En las semanas posteriores, se rescataron en el Sena decenas de cadáveres de argelinos con los rostros tumefactos. Benjamin Stora cree que la represión causó un centenar de muertos, el historiador inglés, Jim House "como mínimo" 120 o 130, Jean-Luc Einaudi, autor de La batalla de París, más de 150. Ese día, los "franceses musulmanes de Argelia" se manifestaban tras la llamada de la federación de Francia del FLN contra el toque de queda que les había impuesto el prefecto de la policía de París, Maurice Papon. Relegados a los barrios de chabolas de los suburbios, más de 20.000 hombres, mujeres y niños desfilan pacíficamente por las

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calles del barrio latino, por los Grandes Bulevares, por las inmediaciones de los Campos Elíseos. La violencia policial que se ejerció fue inaudita: los agentes les esperan a la salida del metro y en las calles para molerles a golpes e insultarles. "Se cebaban con los más débiles, los que ya estaban ensangrentados, hasta matarles, yo lo vi", contó Saad Ouazen en 1997. Aunque no oponen ninguna resistencia, decenas de manifestantes son asesinados a disparos, a otros les ahogan en el Sena. En total, detienen a más de 11.000 argelinos y los transfieren al Palacio de Deportes o al Estadio Pierre-de- Coubertin. El silencio ocultará la verdad Apiñados durante varios días en condiciones higiénicas espantosas, son golpeados con violencia por los policías, que los califican de "moros sucios" y de "ratas". En el Palacio de Deportes, los detenidos, aterrorizados, ya no se atreven a ir al servicio, porque la mayoría de los que se arriesgan a ir son asesinados. Al día siguiente por la mañana, la jefatura contabiliza oficialmente tres muertos, dos argelinos y un francés de la metrópoli. La mentira se afianza. El silencio ocultará la verdad. Durará más de veinte años. Esta larga ausencia en las conciencias de la masacre del 17 de octubre de 1961 no sorprende a Benjamin Stora. "En esos años, en Francia existía una inmensa ignorancia de lo que se denomina el indígena o el inmigrante, es decir, el otro. Cuando se tiene esa percepción del mundo, ¿cómo quiere que la gente se interese por los inmigrantes que viven en los barrios de chabolas de la región parisina? Los argelinos eran los "invisibles" de la sociedad francesa". En los meses posteriores al 17 de octubre, a esta indiferencia de la opinión pública se añade la operación de disimulo que llevan a cabo los poderes públicos. Se censuran los relatos que ponen en duda la versión oficial. La amnistía que acompaña a la independencia de Argelia en 1962 sella posteriormente en silencio de la sociedad francesa: todas las denuncias se archivan. A pesar del silencio, la memoria del 17 de octubre sobrevive por un lado y por otro, fragmentada, rota, enterrada. Sigue viva, por supuesto, entre los inmigrantes argelinos de la región parisina. "Estos hombres hablaban entre ellos, pero la mayoría no transmitió la memoria de este suceso a sus hijos", explica el historiador inglés Jim House. "En los años ochenta, son conscientes de que sus hijos se van a quedar en Francia y tienen miedo de poner en peligro su futuro al contarles las violencias policiales que sufrieron". Las autoridades se aferran a la verdad oficial Será necesario llegar a la edad adulta de la segunda generación de la inmigración argelina para dar forma al paisaje de la memoria. Estos jóvenes asistieron al colegio de la República, son electores y ciudadanos franceses, pero intuyen que los prejuicios y las miradas despectivas de las que son víctimas están relacionados con las guerra de Argelia. Poco a poco, la memoria se despierta: en los años ochenta, Jean-Luc Einaudi emprende un inmenso trabajo de investigación. Cuando se publica su libro, año del treinta aniversario del 17 de octubre, llega la conmoción: La batalla de París, que recoge hora por hora el desarrollo de los hechos y el silencio posterior, suscita un debate sobre la represión contra los argelinos.

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Con este y otros libros, la memoria del 17 de octubre de 1961 empieza a adentrarse en el espacio público. Más tarde, dos documentales alimentan más la memoria del 17 de octubre: El silencio del río, de Agnès Denis y Mehdi Lallaoui, en 1991, y Un día que desapareció, de Philip Brooks y Alan Hayling. Sin embargo, las autoridades de la época se aferran a la verdad oficial. La justicia entra en escena Después de los historiadores y los militantes de la memoria, la justicia es la que entra en escena: durante el proceso en 1997 del antiguo responsable de Vichy en Burdeos, los magistrados se detienen sobre lo acontecido el 17 de octubre de 1961. El ex prefecto de la policía, enfrentado a Jean-Luc Einaudi, acaba admitiendo "quince o veinte muertes" durante esa "fatídica noche", aunque los atribuye a ajustes de cuentas entre argelinos. Por primera vez, el poder realiza un gesto positivo: el primer ministro, Lionel Jospin, abre los archivos. Al basarse en un solo registro de entrada del Instituto médico- jurídico, pues la mayoría de los archivos de la prefectura y de la brigada fluvial desaparecieron misteriosamente, en 1998 reconoce la existencia de al menos 32 muertos. Dos años más tarde, Maurice Papon decide demandar a Jean-Luc Einaudi por difamación. Esta vez, Papon admite una treintena de muertes, pero el tribunal no le da la razón: al considerar el carácter "serio, pertinente y completo" del trabajo de Jean-Luc Einaudi, los jueces constatan que "algunos miembros de las fuerzas del orden, relativamente numerosos, actuaron con una violencia extrema, bajo el dominio de una voluntad de represalias". A partir de entonces, se hace pedazos la versión oficial del 17 de octubre. Llegó el momento de la conmemoración. Durante el 40 aniversario, en 2001, el alcalde de París, Bertrand Delanoë, colocó en el puente Saint-Michel una placa "en memoria de los numerosos argelinos asesinados durante la sangrienta represión de la manifestación pacífica del 17 de octubre de 1961". En la región parisina, una veintena de placas o de estelas graban ahora esos días de otoño en la memoria colectiva. El rompecabezas de la memoria colectiva acabó por reconstruirse, pero para muchos aún falta una pieza: el reconocimiento por parte del Estado. Ariane Chemin La larga historia de una masacre olvidada LE MONDE 17 octubre 2011 http://www.presseurop.eu//es/content/article/1066391-la-larga-historia-de-una-masacre-olvidada Au pont de Clichy, Hollande rend hommage aux Algériens morts en 1961 LEMONDE.FR | 17.10.11 | 17h00

FrançoisU Hollande,U accompagné du maire d'Asnières, SébastienU Pietrasenta,U rend hommage aux Algériens jetés dans la Seine en 1961, sur le pont de Clichy-la-Garenne, le 17 octobre 2011. AFP/PATRICK KOVARIK 423

Au lendemain de son élection au second tour de la primaire, François Hollande a rendu hommage aux Algériens morts lors de la manifestation du 17 octobre 1961 : le candidat socialiste à la présidentielle a déposé une gerbe, lundi 17 octobre, à 11 heures, au pont de Clichy, où des Algériens furent jetés à la Seine, il y a cinquante ans, par des policiers. Au cours de cette manifestation appelée par la Fédération de France du FLN, qui protestait contre le couvre-feu imposé par le préfet Maurice Papon aux "Français musulmans d'Algérie", environ une centaine d'Algériens qui défilaient pacifiquement dans les rues de Paris ont été tués par la police. Certains ont été roués de coups, d'autres noyés dans la Seine, d'autres encore tués par balles. François Hollande, qui était accompagné de l'historien Benjamin Stora et de son conseiller Faouzi Lamdaoui, a expliqué qu'il avait prévu depuis longtemps d'être présent à ce rendez-vous. "Je voulais être là, fidèle à la promesse que j'avais faite. Je suis venu témoigner de ma solidarité aux enfants, petits-enfants de ces familles endeuillées par ce drame", a-t-il déclaré. "CET ÉVÉNEMENT A ÉTÉ OCCULTÉ" Autour de M. Hollande étaient présents les maires PS de de Clichy-la-Garenne, Gilles Catoire, et d'Asnières-sur-Seine, Sébastien Pietrasanta. Le candidat du PS pour la présidentielle a jeté des fleurs dans la Seine en hommage aux victimes, relevant que "trop longtemps cet événement a été occulté des récits historiques". "Il est important de rappeler ces faits", a-t-il dit encore. Le geste de François Hollande intervient le jour du 50e anniversaire du 17 octobre 1961, alors que la mémoire de cet événement commence à revenir. Une plaque commémorative a été inaugurée au pont de Clichy, une autre au pont de Bezons (Val- d'Oise) et une place doit être baptisée "17 octobre 1961" au Blanc Mesnil (Seine-Saint- Denis). Une manifestation organisée par le collectif "17 octobre 1961-17 octobre 2011" devrait en outre partir lundi soir, à 18 heures, du cinéma Le Rex, à Paris, où de nombreux Algériens furent tués en 1961. Enfin, une cérémonie de commémoration du cinquantenaire a eu lieu, à midi, devant la plaque apposée en 2001 par le maire de Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, sur le pont Saint-Michel. "LA VÉRITÉ EST EN MARCHE" A l'occasion de ce 50e anniversaire, nombre d'associations, d'historiens et de militants de la mémoire demandent que les plus hautes autorités de l'Etat reconnaissent le drame qui s'est produit ce jour-là. "Cinquante ans après, la vérité est en marche, écrit ainsi le comité 17 octobre 1961-17 octobre 2011, Vérité et justice. Cependant, la France n'a toujours pas reconnu sa responsabilité dans les guerres coloniales qu'elle a menées – en particulier la guerre d'Algérie – non plus que dans le cortège de drames et d'horreurs qu'elles ont entraînés, comme ce crime d'Etat du 17 octobre 1961. Certains osent encore aujourd'hui continuer à parler des 'bienfaits de la colonisation', célébrer le putsch des généraux à Alger contre la République et le pouvoir encourage les nostalgiques de l'Algérie française et de l'OAS." En 1997, lors du procès de Maurice Papon, à Bordeaux, les morts du 17 octobre 1961 étaient revenus dans la mémoire collective : Jean-Luc Einaudi, auteur de La Bataille de Paris (Seuil, 1991), était venu témoigner à la barre à la demande des parties civiles. A

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l'époque, le gouvernement de Lionel Jospin avait décidé d'ouvrir les archives afin de faire la lumière sur les violences policières mais aucun discours n'avait été prononcé sur la responsabilité de la France. Depuis, une plaque a été apposée par le maire de Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, mais aucun représentant des plus hautes autorités de l'Etat n'a jamais évoqué publiquement la responsabilité de l'Etat dans les morts du 17 octobre 1961. Anne Chemin http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/10/17/hollande-rend-hommage-aux- algeriens-morts-en-1961_1589233_823448.html

Blogs 17 octobre 2011 17 OCTOBRE 1961- Dans le JT de l’ORTF, pas un mot sur les morts

A cinq mois de la fin de la guerre d'Algérie, le 17 octobre 1961, Paris a été le lieu d'un des plus grands massacres de gens du peuple de l'histoire contemporaine de l'Europe occidentale. Ce jour-là, des dizaines de milliers d'Algériens manifestent pacifiquement contre le couvre-feu qui les vise depuis le 5 octobre et la répression organisée par le préfet de police de la Seine, Maurice Papon. La réponse policière sera terrible. La version officielle parlera de 3 morts. En réalité, des dizaines d'Algériens, peut-être entre 150 et 200, seront exécutés. Certains corps sont retrouvés dans la Seine.

Pendant plusieurs décennies, la mémoire de cet épisode majeur de la guerre d'Algérie a été occultée. Une amnésie organisée par les autorités de l'époque, la censure de la presse et une certaine indifférence. En témoigne le journal télévisé du 25 octobre 1961, qui, s'il évoque 11 500 arrestations, ne dit pas un mot des morts...

Lien du film sur Internet : http://youtu.be/IMjrgPboMj0 http://bigbrowser.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/10/17/17-octobre-1961-dans-le-jt-de-lortf-pas- un-mot-sur-les-morts/

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Middle East Assad, his raids on Lebanon, and Syria's slow slip into civil war In Damascus, the regime presents a picture of vast rallies of support. But as tensions rise on the nation's borders, cracks are showing. In Beirut, Robert Fisk peers behind the propaganda

Robert Fisk, Monday, 17 October 2011 Cross-border tank incursions; four Syrian opponents of the Damascus regime kidnapped in Lebanon, supposedly in a vehicle belonging to the Syrian embassy in Beirut; a truckload of ammunition and rocket-propelled grenades destined for President Bashar al-Assad's opponents on the other side of the Lebanese frontier seized by the Lebanese army – not to mention the mass rally in favour of Bashar in Damascus last week, which Syrians arriving in Lebanon say really – really – did count a million people on the streets. Every tragedy has its mystery, I suppose, but this one is taking on Gone With The Wind proportions. Above that huge mass of Bashar supporters flew Syrian military helicopters carrying massive national flags of Russia and China – Syria's two friends in the Security Council, who vetoed UN sanctions against the Damascus government last week. It was the perfect antidote to all those YouTube pictures of dead protesters and dying children, not to mention the infamous photograph of a girl allegedly beheaded by the Syrian secret police who turned out – deus ex machinus on Syrian television – to be very much alive and obviously well and even wearing a modest veil. Confusing? At least we now know, from the very lips of Assad's opposition, that the "armed gangs" that the regime says it is fighting really do exist, albeit that they wear uniforms. But first, the incursions. After enjoying the benefits of Syria's 29-year military presence in Lebanon – the army left in 2005 – the Lebanese are a bit sensitive when Bashar's lads appear near their border, apparently looking for gun-runners of the kind who were driving the truck near Halba last week. And when a Syrian drives a few metres across the frontier and fires a shell into an abandoned battery factory, it all becomes a little more serious. There have been at least three recorded Syrian incursions into Lebanon – a further eight are suspected – and during one of them, near the village of Ensal, a man was killed. He turned out to be a local Syrian resident. The border, needless to say, is notoriously difficult to locate. One R. Fisk even crossed it by accident years ago, but opponents of Lebanon's Hizballah-inclusive (and thus pro-Syrian) government raged against this supposedly massive incursion upon Lebanese sovereignty. They cared a lot less about the lorry-load of weapons on its way to the unofficial border crossing at Wadi Khalek where the "armed gangs" were presumably waiting for it, a bit of an incursion into Syria's sovereignty although opposition newspapers in Beirut – largely representing the Sunnis and part of the Christian community – sarcastically asked why Lebanese security services were so good at finding smugglers but so slow in driving Syrian armour back over the frontier. 426

On now to the case of 86-year-old Chibli al-Aysoouni, a founder of the original Baath party who left Syria in 1966, before the Assad family even came to power. Against the regime but inactive since 1992 – he had also exiled himself in Egypt, Iraq and the US – he disappeared from his home in the Lebanese mountain town of Aley on 24 May and was never seen again. Then three Syrian brothers from the Jassem family were grabbed by "unknown men" outside a police station in east Beirut when they came to collect their brother, Jasem Merii Jasem, who had been seen handing out flyers calling for "democratic change" in Syria. At the time, no one paid much attention to these disappearances, although EU ambassadors had already complained to the Beirut government when the Lebanese army sent back to Damascus three Syrian military deserters. Fearing that the latter were not greeted by their officers with tea and cakes by the fire, the ambassadors warned that this could amount to a crime against humanity. But then last week came a political explosion. Lebanese MPs revealed that at a closed parliamentary committee meeting, General Ashraf Rifi, the friendly, beatle-eyed head of Lebanon's paramilitary Internal Security Force, claimed that Syrian embassy vehicles in Beirut were used in the abductions and that documents and security cameras in the embassy parking lot in west Beirut – along with "security agents" – had all confirmed this. Indeed, it appears that some of Rifi's own ISF were driving the cars. The plot thickened – in fact, it virtually turned to glue – when it transpired that the Syrian embassy guard unit is run by Lebanese First Lieutenant Salah Hajj, the son of Major General Ali Hajj, one of four Lebanese officers imprisoned for four years by the UN on suspicion of involvement in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri – until the UN decided that it had been conned by false evidence and freed the four men. Explosions of fury could then be heard from the office of Syria's intelligent ambassador to Lebanon, Ali Abdel Karim Ali – he has just finished reading a book about Lebanon by the author of this article – who transmitted to Lebanese Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour his anger that these extraordinary allegations had been made against him. He denied them all, and demanded proof from General Rifi, an undeniably pro-opposition top cop who has since remained silent. Syria and Lebanon, Mr Ali announced, were the victims of "an American-Zionist plot". Syria would come stronger out of these troubles than it had been before. And yet there was the UN this weekend, warning of a "full-blown civil war" in Syria – a distant cousin, I guess, of ordinary civil war of the Libyan variety – as the death toll in seven months of anti-Assad protests rose, again according to the UN, to 3,000, 187 of them children. On Saturday, the Lebanese press published photographs of a 14-year-old Syrian boy, Ibrahim al-Chaybane, whom it said had died in a Syrian hospital after being shot in the chest by Syrian security forces. Again, the picture was on YouTube. A unit of Syrian army deserters, claiming they were several thousand strong – a statistic which probably belongs in the ho-hum department – has now emerged on the internet, along with pictures of some of the uniformed men; an audacious act which also proves that the opponents of Assad, while they may not be "gangs", are very definitely armed. Robert Fisk Assad, his raids on Lebanon, and Syria's slow slip into civil war17 October 2011 http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/assad-his-raids-on- lebanon-and-syrias-slow-slip-into-civil-war-2371624.html

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Middle East Arab leaders put pressure on Assad as repression in Syria continues By Alastair Beach Monday, 17 October 2011 Middle Eastern leaders turned the screw on President Bashar al-Assad yesterday as officials from across the region met to decide whether to suspend Syria from the Arab League. In the first show of widespread co-ordinated action among Arab rulers, diplomats called an emergency session at the League's headquarters near Cairo's Tahrir Square to debate whether to freeze Syrian membership. It came on yet another day of violence across the country as thousands of protesters took to the streets to denounce the Assad regime. In the eastern city of Deir el-Zour security forces opened fire on the funeral of a slain activist, while in the suburbs of the capital Damascus, dozens of civilians were arrested. The United Nations says more than 3,000 people have now been killed since demonstrations against the government began in mid-March. Some activists said that the Arab League meeting would not necessarily have any impact on Syria's Baathist regime. "The government is going to keep fighting to the last second," said Adib Shishakly, a member of the newly formed Syrian National Council (SNC) opposition group. Earlier this month, President Assad dodged a diplomatic bullet when Russia and China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution which would have paved the way for punishing sanctions. The threat of co-ordinated Arab action will now redouble the pressure on his regime. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain have withdrawn their ambassadors from Damascus – a response to Assad's brutal crackdown during Ramadan in August – but until yesterday other Arab leaders had been reluctant to follow suit. Given how instrumental the Arab League was in toppling Colonel Gaddafi – paving the way for Nato's bombing campaign – Syria's suspension could have far-reaching effects. Radwan Ziadeh, a prominent Syrian exile, said: "It will send a strong message to Assad that if he continues the repression then there will be consequences among the Arabs." Alastair Beach Arab leaders put pressure on Assad as repression in Syria continues17 October 2011 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/arab-leaders-put- pressure-on-assad-as-repression-in-syria-continues-2371625.html

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MIDDLE EAST NEWS OCTOBER 17, 2011 Tiny Kingdom's Huge Role in Libya Draws Concern By SAM DAGHER and CHARLES LEVINSON in Tripoli and MARGARET COKER in Doha Three weeks after rebel fighters drove Libyan strongman Col. Moammar Gadhafi from power in Tripoli, military leaders gathered on the leafy grounds of an Islamic institute to hash out a way to unite the capital's disparate fighting groups. The Tripoli chiefs were nearing a deal on a unified command when two visitors stepped in.

Osama Faisal/Associated Press NTC Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, in blue tie, in Doha in August. He has sought to have supplies from Qatar sent through NTC-approved channels. One was Abdel Hakim Belhaj—a former Islamic fighter briefly held in 2004 by the Central Intelligence Agency, who had led one of the militias that marched triumphantly into Tripoli. Now the city's most visible military commander, he accused the local militia leaders of sidelining him, say people briefed on the Sept. 11 meeting. Regional Upheaval: Track events day by day in the region.View Interactive: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204002304576627000922764650.html?mod =world_newsreel#project%3DMIDEASTTIMELINE1102%26articleTabs%3Dinteractive "You will never do this without me," he said. Standing wordlessly behind him, these people say, was Maj. Gen. Hamad Ben Ali al- Attiyah—the chief of staff of the tiny Arab Gulf nation of Qatar. Mr. Belhaj won a tactical victory: The meeting broke up without a deal, and efforts to unite disparate Tripoli militias, including Belhaj's Tripoli Military Council, remain stalled to this day. The foreign military commander's appearance in Tripoli, which one person familiar with the visit said caught Libya's interim leaders by surprise, is testament to Qatar's key role in helping to bring down Libya's strongman. Qatar provided anti-Gadhafi rebels 429

with what Libyan officials now estimate are tens of millions of dollars in aid, military training and more than 20,000 tons of weapons. Qatar's involvement in the battle to oust Col. Gadhafi was supported by U.S. and Western allies, as well as many Libyans themselves.

European Pressphoto Agency Qatar flew at least 18 weapons shipments to anti-Gadhafi rebel forces this spring and summer. But now, as this North African nation attempts to build a new government from scratch, some of these same figures worry that Qatar's new influence is putting stability in peril. At issue, say Libyan officials and Western observers, are Qatar's deep ties to a clique of Libyan Islamists, whose backgrounds variously include fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s and spending years in jail under Col. Gadhafi. They later published a theological treatise condemning violent jihad. With Qatar's support, they have become central players in Libyan politics. As they face off with a transitional authority largely led by secular former regime officials and expatriate technocrats, their political rivals accuse Qatar of stacking the deck in the Islamists' favor. With the blessing of Western intelligence agencies, Qatar flew at least 18 weapons shipments in all to anti-Gadhafi rebel forces this spring and summer, according to people familiar with the shipments. The majority of these National Transition shipments went not through the rebels' governing body, the National Transitional Council, but directly to militias run by Islamist leaders including Mr. Belhaj, say Libyan officials. Separately, approximately a dozen other Qatari-funded shipments, mostly containing ammunition, came to Libyan rebels via Sudan, according to previously undisclosed Libyan intelligence documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal as well as officials. Qatar Connection

Sabri Elmhedwi/European Pressphoto Agency

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Abdel Hakim Belhaj Leader of Tripoli Military Council After fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, he from 1995 led the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, whose members say it is disbanded but remains on U.S. list of terrorist organizations. Captured in a CIA operation in Malaysia in 2004 and eventually handed over to Col. Gadhafi's regime after being interrogated in Thailand and Hong Kong. Role in Uprising: His troops, trained by Qatari special forces in Libya's Western Mountains, marched on Tripoli.

Jarret M. Brachman Ali al-Sallabi Cleric Born in 1963 in Benghazi to a family with Islamist ties, he was jailed in Tripoli's Abu Salim prison among other Islamists for most of the 1980s. After studying theology in Saudi Arabia and Sudan, he joined fellow clerics hosted by Qatar. Role in Uprising:Key conduit for Qatari humanitarian aid, money and arms.

Gianluigi Guercia/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images Ismail al-Sallabi Deputy commander, Tajamuu Saraya al-Thuwar Born in 1976, he was accused in 1997 of working with Islamists to topple Col. Gadhafi's regime. Not religious at the time, he said he began memorizing the Koran in prison. Released in 2004 as part of his brother's Qatari-encouraged détente with regime. Role in Uprising: Deputy commander of an umbrella group of militias in eastern Libya; received Qatari aid and arms.

Eric Feferberg/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images 431

Jalal al-Dugheily NTC Defense Minister A Libyan army veteran, he grew up in the same Benghazi neighborhood as the Sallabis. Became rebel defense minister in May with backing from the Sallabis, says a militia leader. Role in Uprising:His support among former army officers in the rebel ranks decreased because they felt he favored Islamist militia leaders. Some Tripoli officials allege Qatari arms have continued to flow straight to these Islamist groups in September, after Tripoli's fall, to the open frustration of interim leaders. "To any country, I repeat, please do not give any funds or weapons to any Libyan faction without the approval of the NTC," said Libyan Oil and Finance Minister Ali al- Tarhouni, when asked last week about reports that Qatar had sent weapons directly to Tripoli-based militias. Qatari military and diplomatic officials deny they have played favorites or armed any rebel faction at the expense of any other. They declined to address whether they had made weapons shipments to the rebels. They say they support a democratic Libya in which all factions are represented. Islamist leader Mr. Belhaj, in an interview, disputed the account of the Sept. 11 meeting. He said he had merely escorted Mr. Attiyah to provide security and wasn't present during the closed-door discussions. He and other Islamist leaders say they seek only their fair share of power and support a broad-based government. Qatar's defense ministry didn't return calls seeking comment. Mr. Attiyah couldn't be reached. Qatar's role in the Libyan uprising has been a heady diplomatic coming-out party for the emirate, located on a tiny thumb of land jutting off the Arabian Peninsula into the Persian Gulf. Fewer than 300,000 native Qataris control some of the world's largest natural-gas reserves. The country is the world's richest, per capita. Qatar's ruler, Sheik Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani, has dismissed some Libyans' fears that Qatar is angling for influence over Libya's gas reserves, Africa's fourth-largest. Instead, one of Qatar's main goals in supporting popular uprisings in the region, say people familiar with its leaders' thinking, is to promote its political vision—that in a Muslim-majority region, Islamic political figures can help build modern, vibrant Arab nations by being included in new democracies. Qatar sees itself as a showcase for marrying Islamic ideals with modernity—a counterpoint to the more unyielding doctrine of neighboring Saudi Arabia. Qatar, though an absolute monarchy, has helped promote a freer media in the region through the al-Jazeera satellite network, which the ruling family funded and founded in 1996 in the capital, Doha. The al-Thanis have opened branches of U.S. political think tanks, liberal-arts universities and biotech research foundations. Politically, Qatar maintains a seemingly contradictory set of alliances. U.S. officials consider Doha a close ally. Qatar hosts U.S. Central Command and has the Gulf's only Israeli Interests Section.

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But for years, Doha has also openly fostered ties with some of the region's most controversial Islamic militant groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Sheikh Hamad, in a Sept. 7 interview with al-Jazeera, said he believed radical Islamists whose views were forged under tyrannical governments could embrace participatory politics if the promise of real democracy and justice of this year's Arab revolts is fulfilled. If so, the Qatari ruler said, "I believe you will see this extremism transform into civilian life and civil society." Libya presents the biggest test for the Qatar model. Whether Islamist political groups can be the guarantors of democracy in the Muslim world—and whether Qatar has hitched its fortunes to individuals who will make that happen—is being closely watched in Libya and beyond. Qatar has played "a very influential role in helping this [Libyan] rebellion succeed," U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene A. Cretz said in an interview. Asked later about the Islamists Qatar has endorsed, he was more cautious: "We are going to have to take it step by step."

Forces loyal to Libya's new leaders began demolishing Muammar Gaddafi's former home and seat of power in the capital Tripoli. Courtesy of Reuters. Much of Qatar's aid to the Libyan revolt has been guided by an influential Libyan cleric named Ali al-Sallabi. Mr. al-Sallabi, the son of an eastern Libyan banker with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, was jailed at the age of 18 for nearly eight years on charges of knowing about an alleged plot to assassinate Col. Gadhafi. He left Libya in 1988 to study in Saudi Arabia and Sudan. His younger brother Ismail, who now commands a division of rebel fighters, was also arrested and imprisoned by the Gadhafi regime. In 1999, already something of a spiritual leader for a segment of Libyans, Mr. al-Sallabi moved to Doha to join the roster of politically active Islamic theologians hosted by Qataris. When international sanctions were lifted on Col. Gadhafi's regime in 2003, Qatar encouraged Ali al-Sallabi to accept a reconciliation offer guaranteed by the Gadhafi regime, Ismail al-Sallabi said in an interview. Ali al-Sallabi returned to Libya and spearheaded a "de-radicalization program" for imprisoned Libyan militants and those on the run abroad. The effort, which used theological arguments to attempt to delegitimize armed opposition to the regime, culminated in a book co-authored by Mr. Sallabi, "Corrective Studies in Understanding

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Jihad, Enforcement of Morality and Judgment of People," which was published with Qatari funding and promoted on al-Jazeera. Another author was Mr. Belhaj, who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan alongside Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. From 1995, Mr. Belhaj became the emir of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which waged a bloody insurgency against Col. Gadhafi until it was defeated by the regime in 1998. This spring, the Sallabis were among the first to take up the fight against Col. Gadhafi's regime, followed by Mr. Belhaj. Qatar was the first Arab country to recognize the National Transitional Council. It backed a United Nations resolution imposing a no-fly zone to protect Libyan civilians and, later, North Atlantic Treaty Organization air strikes on Gadhafi regime military targets. As violence escalated in Libya, Western diplomats said it soon became clear that without an armed ground effort by the rebels, the NATO strikes would only enforce a stalemate. But U.S. and European governments thought it too risky to directly arm a rebellion against a sitting leader. Qatar volunteered to fill that role, according to people familiar with the situation, who say Doha sent weapons to rebel factions in Libya as far back as April with the consent of the U.S., U.K., France and the United Arab Emirates. Throughout the conflict, representatives of the four nations met regularly with Qatari officials, who kept them apprised of Doha's aid, these people said. "Everyone was quite happy" with the Qatari arms shipments, said a Western observer in Libya with direct knowledge of the diplomacy. "It's what everyone wanted to do but wasn't allowed to." A team of about 60 Qataris helped set up rebel command centers in Benghazi, the mountain city of Zintan and later in Tripoli, according to Qatari Staff Colonel Hamad Abdullah al-Marri, who later accompanied Mr. Belhaj on the march into Tripoli on Aug. 22, broadcast live on al-Jazeera. Mr. Marri said that during the rebel training, he interacted with about 30 Western liaison officers, including Britons, French and several Americans. Between April and the fall of Tripoli, at least 18 cargo planes left Qatar for Libya, filled with assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and other small arms, as well as military uniforms and vehicles, say people familiar with the situation. Qatar funneled much of its aid through Ali al-Sallabi, say NTC-allied officials. They say the cleric's aid network, manned with his associates, allowed affiliated militias to receive the lion's share of both guns and money. Ali al-Sallabi helped to orchestrate more than a dozen of the shipments from Qatar, including 10 through Benghazi, these people say. At least three others went to the Western Mountains, where Mr. Belhaj was a top leader of rebels being trained by Qatari and Western advisers. Ali al-Sallabi couldn't be reached for comment but has said he and his religious colleagues are working to give all Libyans fair representation. Last Wednesday, he agreed to join an organization working under NTC auspices to build bridges between political factions.

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Ismail al-Sallabi said Qatari shipments came through the brothers not out of any ideological solidarity with Doha but because these militias were the most organized and effective forces on the ground. People close to Mr. Belhaj emphasize they operated under the auspices of the NTC's Defense Ministry and that any weapons shipments were blessed by transitional Defense Minister Jalal al-Dugheily. Qatari aid shipments soon appeared to be having unanticipated repercussions within the rebel ranks. By May, rebel commanders outside of Mr. Sallabi's circle were openly complaining they lacked weapons and medical supplies. Defected army officers in particular said they felt they have been squeezed out of the rebel fight. That month, an envoy from NTC Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril set up residence in Doha to lobby for weapons supplies to be sent through him. But of the 18 planeloads from Qatar, only five were sent through this NTC-approved channel, say people familiar with the situation. By late summer, NTC and Western officials began raising concerns to the Qataris that their aid seemed to be empowering primarily Islamist leaders at the possible expense of the embryonic rebel government. After Col. Gadhafi's fall, Libyans renamed a square in Tripoli in Qatar's honor. In Misrata's Baraka Hotel, framed portraits of Qatar's emir and crown prince are displayed where Col. Gadhafi's portrait once hung. But some Libyans are souring. "Our Qatari brothers helped us liberate Libya," said Muktar al-Akhdar, a military leader from Zintan. "But it's now interfering in our internal affairs." Write to Sam Dagher at [email protected], Charles Levinson at [email protected] and Margaret Coker at [email protected] http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204002304576627000922764650.html ?mod=world_newsreel

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Una agenda energética para Libia: seguridad, reconstrucción y gobernanza (ARI)

Gonzalo Escribano ARI 139/2011 - 17/10/2011 Tema: Desde el inicio del conflicto libio se ha especulado mucho sobre las incertidumbres energéticas que plantea una Libia sin Gaddafi. Los retos priorizados hasta la fecha, seguridad de las instalaciones y su reconstrucción, no pueden superarse sin una mejora de la seguridad general y el restablecimiento de los servicios energéticos básicos a la población. Además, una agenda energética comprensiva debe incluir también como prioridad mejorar la gobernanza del sector energético libio, elemento crucial para la propia evolución económica y política del país.[1] Resumen: La caída de Gaddafi ha despejado en parte las incertidumbres referidas a la duración e intensidad del conflicto libio y los temores a una posible partición inmediata del país. No obstante, persisten las dudas sobre la capacidad del CNT para asegurar el territorio, formar un gobierno capaz de gestionar la reconstrucción física e institucional del país y proporcionar un marco político y económico estable y unificado. Dado el dominio casi absoluto de los hidrocarburos sobre la economía libia, la agenda energética del post-gaddafismo resulta un vector clave para la evolución del país. Entre los elementos de esa agenda se encuentran la necesidad de asegurar gradualmente las instalaciones de refino, almacenaje, transporte y extracción; llevar a cabo una evaluación de daños y proceder a la reconstrucción priorizando los servicios energéticos básicos a la población; y, finalmente pero de la mayor importancia, establecer mecanismos transparentes de gobernanza de los hidrocarburos del país. Una mejora de la transparencia en su gestión y distribución puede constituir una contribución fundamental a la estabilidad de Libia. Ello supone además para la UE una oportunidad de alinear valores e intereses en una región que demanda que los compromisos europeos se materialicen con la misma transparencia. Análisis: Desde los primeros descubrimientos de petróleo en 1959, los hidrocarburos han dominado la economía libia. En los últimos años han representado alrededor del 95% de sus exportaciones, el 80% de los ingresos públicos y más de la cuarta parte del PIB en un país en que las tres cuartas partes de la población activa está empleada en el sector público. A pesar de ser descubrimientos relativamente tardíos (en la vecina Argelia se remontan a 1948), la magnitud de las reservas de petróleo libias, su calidad, bajo coste de extracción y la cercanía a los mercados europeos convirtieron en poco tiempo a Libia en un actor importante del escenario energético internacional. En 1962 se adhirió a la OPEP y en 1967 ya era el cuarto exportador mundial de crudo, con una producción de 3,5 millones de barriles/día (mbd). En 2010 Libia fue el 12º exportador

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mundial de crudo (unos 1,5 mbd), contando con las mayores reservas de petróleo de África y abundantes reservas de gas natural. Aunque algunos de los campos más grandes han mostrado tendencia al declive, en parte por los efectos del embargo que impidió introducir mejoras tecnológicas, buena parte del país permanece poco explorado y se cree que el potencial para nuevos descubrimientos sigue siendo importante. Esos recursos convirtieron a Libia, que en 1959 era uno de los países más pobres del mundo, en el país de mayor renta per cápita (14.000 dólares) y mayor índice de desarrollo humano de África y del Mundo Árabe (sólo por detrás de los emiratos del Golfo y en 2010 por delante de Arabia Saudí) y el más próspero del Magreb. Pero también permitieron a Gaddafi comprar voluntades en el exterior, especialmente en África Subsahariana, y financiar una guerra con Chad, revueltas tuaregs en varios países vecinos y conocidas actividades de apoyo al terrorismo internacional que terminaron por costarle un bombardeo y un doble embargo por parte de Naciones Unidas y EEUU. El triple reto que se plantea la Libia post-Gaddafi desde la perspectiva energética (que como se ha indicado representa buena parte de la realidad del país) consiste en restablecer, siquiera gradualmente, las condiciones de seguridad, reconstruir sus infraestructuras y, finalmente, optimizar las rentas procedentes de sus hidrocarburos y establecer mecanismos contractuales y de distribución transparentes de dichas rentas. Seguridad El primer elemento a considerar es, sin duda, restablecer la seguridad en el país, sin la cual no podrá tener lugar una reconstrucción de las infraestructuras ni resultará operativo marco institucional alguno. Las instalaciones energéticas puedan securizarse de manera puntual, pero sin una mejora de la seguridad general no llegarán las inversiones ni el personal de las compañías. Se trata del factor que, en el momento actual, genera mayor incertidumbre y sobre el que pocas proyecciones fiables pueden realizarse. Aunque Gaddafi haya caído y su régimen se haya desmoronado con él, sus tropas y aliados siguen contando con la capacidad de desestabilizar el país manteniendo abierto un conflicto de baja intensidad, mediante ataques y sabotajes a las infraestructuras energéticas, y disputando partes de su territorio. En el momento de escribir estas líneas los frentes de Sirte y Bani Walid seguían presentando una fuerte resistencia por parte de las fuerzas de Gaddafi, todavía en paradero desconocido. Salvo acciones aisladas de sabotaje, hasta la fecha las fuerzas leales a Gaddafi no han aplicado una estrategia de tierra quemada similar a la emprendida por Sadam Hussein en su retirada de Kuwait, pero no puede descartarse una intensificación de acciones de este tipo en el futuro. Los sabotajes podrían aumentar una vez resulta evidente que los gaddafistas no van a retomar el poder, como ocurrió en Irak. A las incertidumbres asociadas a la resistencia que todavía puedan oponer las fuerzas pro-Gaddafi, y que podría permanecer latente durante largo tiempo, deben añadirse las relacionadas con la preocupación sobre la heterogeneidad de las fuerzas rebeldes y la unidad del CNT. Su incapacidad para formar un gobierno, cuya composición se ha pospuesto hasta la conquista de Sirte y Bani Walid, levanta muchas dudas sobre la operatividad del CNT para asegurar el territorio, especialmente las zonas más alejadas de la costa, donde se sitúan buena parte de los campos petrolíferos del país. Ciertamente, los escenarios de victoria de las fuerzas gaddafistas y de partición del territorio entre éstas y los rebeldes han quedado descartadas. Pero los escenarios de inestabilidad interna motivados por disensiones en el seno del CNT y, eventualmente, los de partición formal o de facto del territorio libio entre diferentes facciones rebeldes 437

siguen siendo plausibles. El restablecimiento de la seguridad tiene dos componentes diferenciados. Por un lado, el referido específicamente a las infraestructuras energéticas; por otro, la seguridad general del país. Aunque el énfasis tiende a ponerse en los primeros, resulta difícil imaginar que el sector energético pueda funcionar aislado del resto del territorio, dado que la seguridad general afecta a cuestiones como la seguridad de los trabajadores de la industria, su logística y la propia credibilidad del nuevo gobierno para ejercer el monopolio del uso de la fuerza en todo el territorio. Por consiguiente, la seguridad del sector energético no puede garantizarse de manera aislada, y mucho menos a expensas de la seguridad general de la población. Inevitablemente, cada empresa querría contar con su sistema de seguridad hasta que el nuevo gobierno pueda garantizar la seguridad general. Pero asegurar privadamente los enclaves energéticos sólo sería factible si alguna fuerza internacional garantizase la estabilidad. Mapa 1. Infraestructuras de gas y petróleo en Libia

Fuente: US Energy Information Administration (2011, “Facts on Libya: Oil and Gas”, febrero. La experiencia iraquí muestra que la industria no puede funcionar de manera autónoma y que la estrategia de convertir las instalaciones energéticas en enclaves seguros aislados tiene serias limitaciones logísticas (aprovisionamiento de material, transporte de productos y personal, alojamiento, etc.). En 2010 Irak todavía no había alcanzado el nivel de producción de 2001, y los 2,4 mbd producidos permanecen muy lejos de los objetivos del gobierno de producir 12,5 mbd en 2017, considerado inalcanzable por la industria. La explicación de la incapacidad para aumentar la producción de manera rápida y sustancial se debe básicamente a las condiciones de inseguridad del país, que padece una insurgencia muy intensa, y a las tensiones entre comunidades. Un caso ilustrativo de las posibles tensiones entre territorios que podrían surgir en Libia son las dificultades para producir y exportar en las regiones kurdas de Irak: sólo en mayo de este año, Bagdad y el Gobierno Regional Kurdo alcanzaron un acuerdo para compartir las rentas obtenidas por los campos del Kurdistán; sin embargo, apenas unos meses después las exportaciones estuvieron paralizadas durante una semana entre acusaciones cruzadas que revelan la falta de confianza entre el gobierno central y el kurdo. Como

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veremos más adelante, la descentralización de la gestión de recursos naturales como los hidrocarburos dista de resultar óptima desde la perspectiva económica, pero puede acabar imponiéndose como último recurso político. Respecto a la seguridad de las infraestructuras energéticas, debe a su vez diferenciarse por tipo de infraestructuras y su localización geográfica, que determinan el gradiente de vulnerabilidad. Las instalaciones más sencillas de asegurar son los campos offshore de gas y petróleo, seguidos de las refinerías de la costa y sus instalaciones asociadas de almacenamiento y terminales de exportación. Pese a ello, las instalaciones costeras son susceptibles de convertirse en objetivos de los gaddafistas. De hecho, la refinería de Ras Lanuf, la mayor del país con una capacidad de 200.000 bd, fue atacada por las fuerzas leales a Gaddafi el 12 de septiembre, pocos días después del anuncio del reinicio de la producción en el este del país. El ataque tuvo lugar por sorpresa en una zona que los rebeldes creían segura, y aunque no causó grandes daños muestra la vulnerabilidad de las infraestructuras energéticas del país y la disposición de los gaddafistas a sabotearlas. Los campos de petróleo y gas del este del país, que incluyen los grandes campos petrolíferos de Sarir y Mesla, así como los de Al-Hamra, situados al sur de Trípoli, y todo su conjunto de infraestructuras de acompañamiento, presentan un mayor grado de vulnerabilidad al estar más lejos de la costa y aislados en zonas desérticas. Pero la situación de seguridad más complicada probablemente se da en los campos de Murzuk, situados al suroeste del país, cerca de Níger y de territorio tuareg, cercanos a la ruta todavía transitada por las fuerzas gaddafistas en dirección a Níger y objetivo plausible para ataques realizados desde dicho país. En esos campos es precisamente donde se ubican las concesiones explotadas por Repsol, lo que requiere medidas adicionales de seguridad que la compañía se encuentra evaluando actualmente. Los oleoductos y gasoductos que unen los campos del interior con la costa a través de kilómetros de extensiones desérticas presentan también una mayor vulnerabilidad a los sabotajes. En general, cuanto más al sur, más cerca de al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico. Las compañías internacionales están acostumbradas a trabajar en circunstancias hostiles, pero suelen hacerlo confiando la seguridad de sus instalaciones y su personal a compañías de seguridad privadas. Sin embargo, el gobierno libio no puede aceptar la seguridad privada porque sería reconocer que no controla su territorio y su negativa a permitir la entrada de firmas extranjeras dedicadas a vigilar las instalaciones ha constituido uno de los puntos difíciles de las negociaciones llevadas a cabo hasta la fecha con las compañías internacionales. Hay indicios de que han empezado a surgir compañías libias de seguridad que pueden estar conectadas con redes clientelares locales, lo que puede crear problemas de rivalidad sectaria. En este contexto, el CNT ha creado una fuerza especial para garantizar la seguridad de las infraestructuras energéticas, pero parece que sólo una normalización de la situación podrá permitir el regreso de los trabajadores a todas las instalaciones y contar con los medios materiales necesarios para operarlas. Debe considerarse que en Libia la seguridad (física y jurídica) parte de cero y que probablemente llevará años desarrollarla. Reconstrucción En general, las infraestructuras no parecen haber quedado muy dañadas, si bien las compañías se encuentran todavía evaluando la magnitud de los daños y las necesidades de reparación. El CNT ha apuntado que apenas entre el 10% y el 15% de las infraestructuras han resultado afectadas, pero si se trata de instalaciones de transporte, almacenamiento y terminales de exportación, esos daños pueden constituir cuellos de

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botella para el resto de la industria. Algunas instalaciones han sido minadas, como el complejo de Brega, que incluye una terminal de exportación de petróleo y otra de GNL desde donde se exportaba todo el GNL libio a España, además de una refinería. Los tanques de la terminal de exportación de petróleo de Es-Sider, la mayor de Libia, también resultaron dañados, así como al menos un tanque de la terminal de Brega. Los campos de gas de Hateiba, al sur de Brega, fueron saboteados dejando escapar el gas. En abril las fuerzas de Gaddafi atacaron con misiles una estación de bombeo y varias instalaciones de producción en el campo de Messla, dañándolo gravemente. En mayo atacaron otra estación de bombeo del oleoducto Messla-Tobruk. Además de estos ataques, casi todas las instalaciones han estado abandonadas y sin que se realizasen las tareas básicas de mantenimiento durante buena parte de la guerra, y han sido objeto de robos de material y vandalismo. Los ataques aéreos de la OTAN han evitado en lo posible bombardear las infraestructuras básicas, lo que aprovecharon los gaddafistas para ocultar misiles y otro armamento en complejos petroquímicos que ahora deben ser revisados de manera exhaustiva antes de permitir el retorno de los trabajadores. La reconstrucción de las infraestructuras energéticas dañadas en los casi siete meses de guerra civil corre en paralelo a la situación de seguridad. Total ha anunciado el reinicio de la producción de la plataforma offshore Al Jurf, donde cree que restablecer los niveles de producción previos al conflicto llevará varias semanas. Eni ha anunciado el restablecimiento de la producción en los campos de Abu-Attifel, en la cuenca de Sirte, y pretende reiniciar la exportación de gas a Italia a través del gasoducto Greenstream en las próximas semanas desde la estación de compresión de Mellitah, cerca de Zawia y Trípoli. Una de las compañías estatales libias, Sirte Oil, acaba de anunciar que los campos de gas de Hateiba y Assoumoud vuelven a producir, y que el de Sahl está en proceso de reiniciar las operaciones. Todos ellos se encuentran en la cuenca de Sirte. Sin embargo, todavía no se ha iniciado un proceso sistemático y global de evaluación de daños, y en algunas instalaciones más remotas ni siquiera ha comenzado. Así, Repsol sigue evaluando el estado de sus instalaciones mediante ciudadanos libios y contratistas. Agoco, la empresa filial de la compañía nacional libia que se alineó con los rebeldes al principio del conflicto, ha declarado que las condiciones de seguridad no reúnen los requisitos para reiniciar la producción en algunos de los campos que opera. Recientemente, un operario de ENI llevó a cabo un rápido reconocimiento del campo Elephant, el más grande de los operados en Libia por la compañía italiana en el área de Murzuk (unos 130.000 bd de crudo), descubriendo grandes destrozos en el aeropuerto y las instalaciones, cuyas estructuras de control electrónico habrían sido destruidas por los gaddafistas. Varias compañías están encontrando dificultades para llevar a los trabajadores sobre el terreno, a lo que se suman las dificultades para alojarlos y mantenerlos, y para abastecer las plantas del material y los repuestos requeridos. A pesar de los mensajes optimistas emitidos por el CNT, no parece que la situación de seguridad y el estado de las infraestructuras permitan un regreso a la normalidad en meses, incluso años si la situación evoluciona desfavorablemente en el campo de la seguridad. La AIE cree que la producción libia no volverá a su plena capacidad hasta 2015. En un informe reciente, Goldman Sachs apunta que la producción podría alcanzar casi 600.000 barriles si los campos occidentales pudiesen reconstruirse y asegurarse con rapidez, pero ese parece distar de ser el caso como ha reconocido Agoco. La propia incapacidad de Libia para aumentar de forma rápida su producción tras el levantamiento

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de las sanciones de Naciones Unidas (1999) y estadounidenses (2004) pone en duda las previsiones más optimistas. Al igual que ocurre con la seguridad, la prioridad por reconstruir las infraestructuras energéticas no está sólo en las instalaciones dedicadas a la exportación. En la actualidad, Libia no produce combustible suficiente para abastecer las necesidades de su población y los esfuerzos militares del CNT. Algunas estimaciones apuntan a que apenas refinan el 20% de esas necesidades y en muchas partes del país se reportan situaciones de escasez entre la población civil que no han podido ser solventadas tras su liberación por parte de los rebeldes. El abastecimiento de gas y electricidad debe ser otra de las prioridades, lo que incluye las necesidades de energía para desalar agua y para bombearla desde los acuíferos saharianos. Priorizar la exportación a expensas de restablecer el abastecimiento de los servicios básicos a la población, además de ineficaz técnica y económicamente, podría ser un error político difícil de reparar. Gobernanza La cuestión de cómo gestionar el sector energético libio y redistribuir las rentas que procura de manera más transparente es el tercer reto a corto plazo que afronta el país. Aunque este vector ha sido menos atendido que los de la seguridad y la reconstrucción, su evolución resulta crucial en varios aspectos. En primer lugar, y este ha sido el elemento que más atención ha recibido, de él depende el futuro posicionamiento de las diferentes compañías internacionales en el sector energético libio. A su vez, la evolución del propio sector depende del papel otorgado a esas compañías. Las compañías internacionales, incluyendo a Repsol, ya han iniciado los contactos con las autoridades del CNT, pero resulta evidente que antes de pasar a la etapa de negociaciones es imprescindible que se consoliden los interlocutores clave del país, en concreto los responsables del Ministerio del Petróleo y de la compañía nacional libia. Desde una perspectiva más amplia, los mecanismos y condiciones contractuales que se apliquen en el futuro para otorgar las nuevas concesiones o, eventualmente, renegociar los contratos existentes, así como la manera en que las rentas de las exportaciones de hidrocarburos repercutan en la población, definirán en gran medida la evolución del país. El CNT ha afirmado que respetará los contratos existentes, pero se ha reservado la posibilidad de revisar aquéllos en que se descubran indicios de corrupción, lo que deja un margen de discrecionalidad bastante amplio. En todo caso, la prioridad ahora es recuperar cuanto antes la producción y para ello el CNT necesita que las compañías extranjeras vuelvan a operar en el país, y la mejor manera de hacerlo es en el marco de los contratos existentes. Las revisiones o los términos de las nuevas concesiones sólo deberían empezar a plantearse cuando el futuro de las operaciones existentes esté al menos en curso. Aún así previsible que estos asuntos vayan ganando en importancia conforme mejore la seguridad y avance la reconstrucción, por lo que resulta útil recurrir a las lecciones aprendidas en materia de recuperación y pacificación tras los conflictos en países con recursos naturales abundantes. La literatura académica sobre el impacto de la abundancia de los recursos naturales en los conflictos armados es muy abundante y su análisis detallado excede el objetivo de estas páginas. No obstante es interesante apuntar algunos resultados empíricos, como que una elevada dependencia de las exportaciones de recursos naturales aumenta el riesgo de guerra civil, que éste se reduce cuando se dan contrapesos institucionales al poder y aumenta la transparencia de la gestión de esos recursos, o que un conflicto en un país con recursos naturales valiosos como los hidrocarburos tiene el doble de

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probabilidad de reproducirse durante los cinco años posteriores al mismo.[2] Una gestión adecuada de los recursos naturales es uno de los factores que pueden ayudar a evitar que el conflicto se reproduzca, bien sea con los mismos protagonistas o con contendientes diferentes. Además, los recursos naturales proporcionan una oportunidad para promover la paz tras el conflicto, cuando las prioridades se centran en estabilizar el país, llevar a cabo una transición ordenada y consolidar la pacificación del territorio. Entre las actividades típicas para la creación de confianza tras un conflicto se encuentran las relacionadas con la reconstrucción, la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas y establecer un marco institucional capaz de acomodar posibles divergencias en las preferencias de los actores implicados con el mínimo coste, político y económico. Parte de estas actividades están directa o indirectamente relacionadas con los recursos naturales. La satisfacción de las necesidades básicas de la población es un paso ineludible para crear confianza en el nuevo gobierno y en el proceso de pacificación. La reconstrucción de las infraestructuras debe por tanto orientarse prioritariamente a cubrir dichas necesidades. Establecer una buena gobernanza de los recursos naturales resulta también clave para dinamizar la economía y crear puestos de trabajo, creando expectativas de mejora en la gestión y redistribución de las rentas derivadas de esos recursos. En muchas ocasiones, y desde luego en Libia, tras el conflicto el marco institucional heredado no cuenta con la capacidad ni la legitimidad necesarias para resolver los problemas de corrupción y protección de los derechos de propiedad que atenazan los esfuerzos de reconstrucción. En presencia de tensiones territoriales internas, caso de Irak o eventualmente de Libia, la delegación de la autoridad o establecer mecanismos de autoridad compartida sobre los recursos naturales puede ser un medio de aumentar las probabilidades de éxito de los esfuerzos de pacificación, si bien a expensas de pérdidas de eficiencia en la gestión de recursos a los que el principio de subsidiariedad aconseja mantener bajo control nacional y no regional o local. En muchos casos, compartir las rentas de los recursos naturales es un pre-requisito para la pacificación, como ocurre en Irak, donde la constitución permite que los gobiernos regionales recauden impuestos sobre operaciones relacionadas con los hidrocarburos. En otros casos, como ocurre en Nigeria con el Delta del Níger, un gobierno local puede recibir una proporción fija de las rentas obtenidas. En muchas ocasiones, y Libia parece un ejemplo claro de ello, los conflictos se originan por fallos en la gobernanza de los recursos naturales que se traducen en corrupción, falta de transparencia y de rendición de cuentas, y una redistribución poco inclusiva de sus rentas. Las posibles vías para mejorar la gobernanza de los recursos naturales han sido objeto de numerosos análisis en los últimos años, pero los principales resultados se plasman en la Iniciativa para la Transparencia en la Industria Extractivas (EITI en sus siglas inglesas), apoyada por muchas de las empresas presentes en Libia, como Repsol, Total, Eni y BP, entre otras.[3] La Natural Resource Charter (NRC), apoyada por el Banco Mundial y el FMI, declina los requerimientos de la EITI en 12 preceptos (véase el Cuadro 1) que se resumen en dos: transparencia e inclusividad. La propia UE cuenta con una iniciativa que aplica esos preceptos al ámbito más restringido de la gestión forestal, la iniciativa denominada Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), y las exigencias de la SEC estadounidense de que las empresas cotizadas en ese país reflejen los pagos de forma transparente abunda en ese mismo sentido.

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Cuadro 1. Los 12 preceptos de la Natural Resource Charter (NRC)

(1) La explotación de los recursos naturales de un país debe diseñarse para asegurar el mayor beneficio social y económico para su población.

(2) Una buena gestión de los recursos naturales requiere que el gobierno esté sujeto a la rendición de cuentas y una población informada.

(3) Las políticas fiscales y los términos contractuales deben asegurar que el país obtiene todos los beneficios derivados del recurso, sujetos a las necesidades de atraer inversiones extranjeras para realizar dichos beneficios.

(4) La competencia en la concesión de contratos y derechos de explotación puede ser un mecanismo efectivo para asegurar su valor e integridad.

(5) Los proyectos de explotación de recursos naturales pueden tener efectos locales económicos, medioambientales y sociales significativos que deben identificarse y, en su caso, ser mitigados o compensados.

(6) Las compañías nacionales dedicadas a la explotación de los recursos naturales deben operar de manera transparente.

(7) Las rentas de los recursos deben usarse prioritariamente para promover un desarrollo económico sostenido e inclusivo permitiendo elevados niveles de inversión en el país.

(8) El empleo efectivo de las rentas de los recursos requiere que el gasto y la inversión domésticos progresen gradualmente y tengan en cuenta la volatilidad de los ingresos.

(9) El gobierno debe emplear la abundancia de recursos para aumentar la eficacia y equidad del gasto público.

(10) El gobierno debe facilitar las inversiones del sector privado con el objetivo de diversificar la economía y aprovechar las oportunidades de aumentar el valor añadido generado domésticamente.

(11) Los gobiernos de las compañías extractivas deben exigir el cumplimiento de las mejores prácticas.

Todas las compañías extractivas deben seguir las mejores prácticas en materia de contratación, pagos y operativa.

Fuente: http://www.naturalresourcecharter.org/precepts. En su conjunto, la NRC ofrece un buen punto de partida para diseñar una gobernanza adecuada de los recursos naturales en países como Libia. Lamentablemente, hasta la fecha el compromiso de la comunidad internacional (especialmente de los países más implicados en la operación de la OTAN) y del CNT con esos principios no ha sido muy explícito. Sin embargo, obviarlos supone hipotecar ya en el corto plazo la resolución del conflicto libio en la medida en que no se solventarían los fallos de gobernanza que en buena medida explican su aparición. De hecho, la percepción de que algunas potencias occidentales han iniciado una carrera por capitalizar su apoyo (militar y/o político) al

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CNT puede resultar un elemento muy negativo para la credibilidad de sus declaradas intenciones humanitarias. Si se percibiese que ahora no se quiere transparencia para ocultar privilegios, sería casi como reconocer que se intervino para obtenerlos. Por otro lado, el olvido de cuestiones como la transparencia o la equidad en la redistribución de las rentas de los hidrocarburos devolvería al conflicto a su punto de partida: en ausencia de mecanismos institucionalizados para repartir y compartir esas rentas es previsible que el conflicto se reproduzca, aunque probablemente con distintos actores. Adicionalmente, nada garantiza que en el futuro una mala gobernanza no se traduzca en efectos contraproducentes para los intereses de las compañías occidentales. En ausencia de un marco institucional adecuado es perfectamente factible que las empresas chinas, rusas o brasileñas (hoy penalizadas por su comportamiento poco proclive al CNT) sean capaces de resultar más atractivas en un contexto de mal gobierno y falta de seguridad, en el que algunas de ellas se mueven con mayor facilidad que las occidentales. A este respecto, el ejemplo de Irak vuelve a ser pertinente. En ese caso es posible que los países occidentales implicados vean como no son capaces de proyectar ni sus valores ni sus intereses; es decir, que la falta de compromiso con los primeros termine minando los segundos. Estas consideraciones son especialmente relevantes para la UE, cuyo discurso sobre el buen gobierno puede verse definitivamente desacreditado en Libia y otros países de la región. También lo son para potencias medias como España, que carecen de la capacidad de influencia en Libia de estadounidenses, británicos, franceses e italianos a la hora de defender sus intereses. En ambos casos, la mejora de la gobernanza del sector energético libio permitiría alinear valores e intereses de manera más clara y a más corto plazo de lo que ocurre con los países mencionados. En un entorno más transparente y de mayor exigencia de rendición de cuentas las ventajas políticas se reducen y las económicas se consolidan. Esta reflexión no se aplica sólo a las compañías energéticas internacionales, sino también a las empresas interesadas en participar en la reconstrucción del sector energético del país. Conclusiones: Buena parte del futuro de Libia se juega en el sector energético. De los tres vectores destacados en estas páginas, seguridad, reconstrucción y gobernanza energética, las prioridades del CNT y de la coalición aliada parecen haberse centrado exclusivamente en las dos primeras y, dentro de ellas, en la seguridad de las infraestructuras energéticas y la reconstrucción de las instalaciones necesarias para restablecer las exportaciones. Por el contrario, los apartados anteriores han destacado la necesidad de alcanzar un clima general de seguridad, en la medida en que el enfoque de centrarse en asegurar los enclaves energéticos no parece realista: la seguridad resulta difícilmente divisible: la hay o no la hay. Respecto a la reconstrucción se ha subrayado el imperativo de priorizar las infraestructuras que permitan satisfacer las necesidades básicas de la población libia relacionadas con la energía, que en el caso libio además de combustibles y electricidad se extienden a los requerimientos energéticos que entraña en el país el abastecimiento de agua. Las dificultades para abordar a corto plazo tanto la seguridad como la reconstrucción apuntan a que los ritmos de retorno a la normalidad pueden dilatarse en el tiempo por encima de las proyecciones del CNT y los deseos de las propias compañías internacionales, especialmente en un contexto de incertidumbre sobre el perfil, orientación y composición del gobierno provisional en ciernes. No obstante, el vacío más preocupante se refiere a la ausencia de debate sobre la manera 444

de mejorar la gobernanza del sector energético del país, sin lo cual el riesgo de que el conflicto se reproduzca bajo pautas similares aumenta de manera importante. Cualquier medida que no tenga en cuenta la centralidad del sector energético en Libia y su potencial para alimentar una cadena sucesiva de conflictos corre el riesgo de resultar irrelevante. La comunidad internacional, y la propia UE, tienen a su disposición numerosas lecciones aprendidas que precisan con suficiente nitidez en qué consiste un marco adecuado y sostenible en el tiempo para la gobernanza de los recursos naturales, en este caso de los hidrocarburos. Ese marco proporciona además un ejemplo de alineación de valores e intereses para la UE y los Estados miembros más activos en el apoyo al CNT. En ausencia del mismo, es posible que el pago de traicionar los valores de transparencia, rendición de cuentas e inclusividad sea perjudicar sus propios intereses. Gonzalo Escribano Investigador principal y director del Programa de Energía, Real Instituto Elcano

[1] Agradezco a Félix Arteaga sus comentarios sobre los aspectos de seguridad, que han contribuido a completar este análisis. La responsabilidad de los contenidos del mismo, no obstante, sólo es atribuible al autor. [2] Véase, por ejemplo, la obra de Paul Collier. Sobre pacificación y recursos naturales puede consultarse Nichols, Lujala y Bruch (2011), “When Peacebuilding Meets the Plan: Natural Resource Governance and Post-Conflict Recovery”, Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, vol. XII, nº 1, pp. 11-26. [3] Para más información puede consultarse la página web de la EITI: www.eiti.org.

Gonzalo Escribano Una agenda energética para Libia: seguridad, reconstrucción y gobernanza (ARI) ARI 139/2011 - 17/10/2011 http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CO NTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/economia+internacional/ari139-2011

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Internacional Política LOS INDIGNADOS EN EL MUNDO América toma el relevo de las protestas Nueva York, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile mantienen la tensión tras la marea europea Aplazado el desalojo del campamento de Ocupa Wall Street Guía para no perderse el 15 de octubre El País Madrid 16 OCT 2011 - 02:06 CET América toma el relevo de las protestas mundiales de los indignados. Más de 2.000 personas han protagonizado la protesta en Nueva York, informa David Alandete. Por su parte, Ocupa DC recorrió la mañana del sábado el centro de Washington camino a las sucursales de Bank Of America. En la de Dupont Circle cerraron antes de que llegaran a cerrar sus cuentas como acto de protesta, informa Cristina Fernández- Pereda. En Santiago de Chile miles de ciudadanos de todas las edades y sobre todo jóvenes bajo un calor insoportable participan en la movilización. Están presentes múltiples organizaciones ciudadanas. Incluso hasta hinchadas de equipos de fútbol marchan hacia La Moneda. informa Rocío Montes. En Buenos Aires ya se ha iniciado la protesta, cuyo destino es la plaza de Mayo. MÁS INFORMACIÓN

FOTOGALERÍA: Imágenes de la protesta planetaria Los indignados de todo el mundo han tomado las calles de decenas de ciudades este sábado para protestar contra los bancos y los políticos, a los que acusan de provocar la crisis de la economía global y condenar a millones de personas al desempleo y la pobreza. Las primeras protestas comenzaron en Oceanía y Asia, y ya por la mañana las movilizaciones recorrían las calles de Fráncfort, Ámsterdam y Londres y se propagaron por las capitales europeas.

SigueU en vivo las manifestaciones del 15-O en el mundoU En torno a un millar de indignados se reunieron frente a las escalinatas de la catedral de San Pablo, en Londres, al impedir la policía que tomaran la cercana sede de la Bolsa de Londres. Policías y guardias privados cerraron los accesos a la plaza del Padrenuestro alegando que se trata de una propiedad privada y que se ha revocado la licencia que permitía el acceso del público. Los indignados decidieron entonces quedarse de acampada frente a la catedral mientras grupos de ellos iban dando simbólicamente vueltas alrededor de la manzana en la que están las instalaciones de la bolsa. Uno de los momentos cumbre de la protesta fue cuando Julian Assange, fundador de Wikileaks, compareció ante los reunidos, a los que dirigió unas breves palabras en las que criticó la decisión policial de impedir el acceso de los manifestantes a la bolsa de Londres. 446

Pero es en Roma donde la situación se salió de control. Un grupo de violentos lanzó bombas de papel y quemado contenedores de basura y algunos coches, lo que provocó la carga de la policía. La calle Tasso de Roma, cerca del San Juan en Laterán -a dónde estaba previsto llegar la manifestación- se llenó de humo tanto del fuego como de los gases lacrimógenos, informa Lucia Magi. Los indignados pacíficos silbaron y abuchearon a los encapuchados. Unos 200 jóvenes refugiados bajo una estatua de San Francisco gritaban:"No violencia". Muchos aplaudieron cuando la Policía o la Guardia financiera detuvo a algún violento. Los bomberos lograron controlar el fuego que quemó dos plantas de un edificio del ministerio de la Defensa en la calle Labicana de Roma. Se trata de un cuartel ahora vacío, al que se le derrumbó el techo debido a las llamas. En Berlín, el buen tiempo acompañó a los manifestantes berlineses, que recorrieron la avenida histórica de Unter den Linden con parsimonia de paseantes. Esto deslució un poco la protesta, que se dispersó hasta el punto de que nadie era capaz de decir cuánta gente se había reunido, informa Juan Gómez. Está claro que fueron miles, seguramente más de 10.000. Coreaban lemas en griego, en español, en inglés y en alemán. Las pancartas y las banderas también daban testimonio de la diversidad de motivaciones, procedencias e ideologías. Además de algunos radicales de izquierda vestidos de negro, los llamados “autónomos”, había representantes de los partidos parlamentarios de centro-izquierda y gente que se decía “apolítica”. La marcha transcurrió con tranquilidad, con músicas diversas y entre la simpatía de buena parte de los viandantes. Muchos manifestantes eran gente de clase media, mayoritariamente joven y poco radical en su comportamiento o sus puntos de vista. Las únicas situaciones de tensión se produjeron cuando un grupo de manifestantes se acercó al gran edificio del Reichstag, sede parlamentaria federal, al grito de “ocupemos el Reichstag”. La policía les cortó el paso y hubo algunos rifirrafes que no pasaron a mayores. Alrededor de un millar de manifestantes marcharon también por el centro de Fráncfort, en dirección a la sede del Banco Central Europeo (BCE), con pancartas de protesta contra la especulación financiera y el poder de los mercados bancarios. La marcha estuvo encabezada con una pancarta con el lema "Estáis especulando con nuestras vidas", mezclada con otros carteles con frases como "Estáis malversando nuestro futuro". Se trata de la previsiblemente mayor entre las marchas anunciadas este sábado en las principales ciudades alemanas, desde la capital, Berlín, a Colonia, Múnich, Hamburgo, Hannover y Stuttgart con lemas parecidos y en contra del poder banquero. En Holanda, las manifestaciones reunieron alrededor de 2.000 personas entre Ámsterdam y otras grandes ciudades como La Haya, Rotterdam y Utrecht. En la capital, un millar de indignados gritaron en la Plaza de la Bolsa cosas como: “Golpearemos hasta la victoria”, al son de Imagine, la canción de John Lennon, informa Isabel Ferrer. Un sol espléndido animó a la gente a llevar a sus hijos. Algunos pequeños portaban pancartas, como la de una niña, que preguntaba lo siguiente: “¿Para cuándo mi bonificación?”. Un grupo acudió disfrazado con capas oscuras y largas narices postizas. Como si estuvieran actuando, adoraron luego el anagrama de un dólar plantado entre los adoquines. La policía calificó el ambiente de “amable y lúdico”. También permitió que la gente pernocte en la plaza, siempre que no alteren el orden. La circulación solo se cortó en el centro urbano, junto a la estación central de ferrocarril. 447

En La Haya, la protesta se desarrolló una explanada. La ciudad es la sede del Gobierno y residencia de la reina Beatriz. Así que las críticas fueron más políticas, alcanzando a la extrema derecha nacional. También se rechazó la política fiscal del Gobierno. “Vergüenza para la isla del tesoro holandesa”, rezaba un cartel, recordando la posibilidad de crear en el país corporaciones que no tributan. Según las encuestas, un 60% de los ciudadanos simpatiza con la protesta mundial. A pesar de su baja tasa de paro (un 4% en un país con 16 millones de habitantes), la sensación de seguridad es precaria. Cinco horas de marcha sin mayores incidentes y con participación de unas 6.000 personas, según la policía, concluyeron a la caída del sol en Bruselas a plena satisfacción de los indignados llegados de distintos países europeos a la capital de la Unión para protestar contra un estado de cosas que ha acabado en un crisis de la que la inmensa mayoría de los manifestantes son víctimas, informa Ricardo Martínez de Rituerto. “El resultado ha sido excelente”, comentó Susana Sanz, una de las personas que llevan las relaciones internacionales del movimiento. Sanz, no obstante, no cesa en su indignación, ahora con “la puñalada trapera” del cierre sin preaviso de los locales que han servido de cuartel general de los indignados durante toda la semana. Las autoridades han alegado razones sanitarias y de seguridad para la clausura. Concluida la marcha, los indignados iban a celebrar una asamblea para ver dónde pasar la noche, dada la prohibición de acampar a lo salvaje. Cientos de personas desfilaron por la tarde por la calles de un soleado París, partiendo desde diferentes puntos de la ciudad para confluir en la enorme Plaza del Hotel de Ville, donde se encuentra el ayuntamiento. Entre tambores y pitidos, los indignados llegaron al céntrico punto de encuentro donde celebraron una asamblea general con conexiones con diferentes ciudades del mundo. Por la noche estaba prevista una gran fiesta hasta la una de la madrugada, informa Ana Teruel. “Indignados por un cambio mundial, democracia ya”, “Pensamos, luego molestamos” o “somos el 99%, somos los invisibles, somos los indignados” eran algunas de las consignas que lucían las pancartas de las manifestaciones, que se desarrollaron de forma pacífica y sin ningún incidente. A la espera de las primeras estimaciones de participación, los organizadores del movimiento, que en Francia no encuentra el mismo eco que en España, parecían satisfechos. “Aquí en Francia todavía hay un colchón de bienestar, por eso tarde en arrancar el movimiento”, decía Francesca, italiana, de la plataforma Knowledge Liberation Front. “Esperemos que hoy es una inflexión, el principio… del fin, porque si cae Francia, cae todo”. Protestas en más de 80 países Protestas como esta están previstas en más de 80 países de los cinco continentes desde Nueva Zelanda (donde se realizaron de madrugada, como en Tokio, Seúl y Sidney) hasta Alaska, en al menos 951 ciudades. "Llevo tiempo esperando esta protesta, desde 2008", explicó a la agencia Reuters Daniel Schreiber, de 28 años, que trabaja en una editorial en Berlín. "Siempre me he preguntado por qué la gente no se indignaba y por qué no pasaba nada y finalmente, tres años después, está sucediendo", añadía. Dos días después de que el primer ministro de Portugal, el conservador Pedro Passos Coelho, anunciara que los funcionarios y los pensionistas se quedarán sin paga extra el año que viene, los portugueses aprovecharon el movimiento global de los indignados para salir a la calle y protestar contra los recortes que, a su juicio, recaen sobre la 448

población y no sobre quien los ha causado. Según la policía, la manifestación de Lisboa reunió a 12.000 personas. Según los organizadores, más de 25.000. Menos que en el pasado marzo, en el que se contaron 200.000, pero lo suficiente, en cualquier caso, como para certificar que el movimiento de oposición al Gobierno portugués se revitaliza, informa Antonio Jiménez Barca. Hubo gritos contra el sistema, contra el capitalismo en general y contra los banqueros en abstracto, pero la mayoría de los asistentes eligieron blancos más concretos a los que dirigirse: el FMI, los políticos, el Gobierno y el primer ministro, entre otros. “No es nuestra deuda. No la pagaremos”, rezaban muchas de las pancartas. La manifestación acabó al pie del Parlamento portugués, con un estruendoso abucheo a la clase política, a cuyos miembros la muchedumbre llamó, entre otras cosas, mentirosos y ladrones. En Atenas entre 3.000 y 4.000 personas se manifiestaron en un ambiente festivo. Y en Helsinki, un millar de indignados finlandeses se reunieron en la plaza Narinkkatori de la capital para pedir el fin de la dictadura de los bancos y la complicidad de los políticos, informa Adrián Soto. Mientras en Europa las protestas comenzaban a dispersarse, en Estados Unidos arrancan. La concentración de Nueva York se le desborda a la policía. Los concentrados cortan la calle Water St. Para que no se convierta en una concentración ilegal, los manifestantes se deben mantener en marcha en todo momento, y en la acera. La policía les presiona a moverse. Ellos permanecen frente a una sucursal de Chase, desafiantes, informa David Alandete. La policía por ahora ha arrestado a tres personas por saltarse el perímetro de seguridad. En Chile, miles de personas se han congregado en la Alameda en Santiago. La marcha está marcada por las demandas de los estudiantes, movilizados desde hace cinco meses. Pero también se reclama contra el sistema de salud, financiero y político. La gente también grita en contra de la central hidroeléctrica que Endesa quiere construir en la Patagonia, informa Rocío Montes. Las protestas pretenden ser pacíficas, pero anoche un grupo de estudiantes entró por la fuerza en las oficinas del poderoso banco de inversión Goldman Sachs en Milán. Fueron rápidamente dispersados por la policía. Otros manifestantes lanzaron huevos contra la sede de UniCredit, el mayor banco italiano. Según los organizadores, entre los que se encuentran diferentes vertientes del 15-M español como la plataforma Democracia Real Ya, Juventud Sin Futuro o ATTAC, el 15- 0 pretende ser "un punto de inflexión" tanto para el "panorama global" como para el movimiento, que tras cinco meses de vida tiene la vista puesta precisamente en la expansión internacional de las protestas, que este último mes han cobrado fuerza en Estados Unidos bajo el lema Ocupa Wall Street. Principales asambleas ESPAÑA: Barcelona y Madrid: 17.00 y 18.00. FRANCIA: París: 17.00. Hôtel de Ville. http://paris.reelledemocratie.com/ (Twitter: @acampadaparis)

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ALEMANIA Berlín: 13.00 horas. Alexanderplatz am Neptunbrunnen. BÉLGICA Bruselas: 14.00 horas. Gare du Nord ESTADOS UNIDOS: Miami: 13.00 horas. Bayfront Park Amphitheatre Los Ángeles: 10.00 horas. LA City Hall. Nueva York: 17.00 horas. Times Square. Washington: 09.00 horas. McPherson Square. Boston: 12.00 Dewey Square. BRASIL Sao Paulo: 10.00 horas. São Bento Station. Web de brasileros: http://www.democraciarealbrasil.org/#eventos. SANTIAGO: Frontis Universidad de Chile (15:00 hrs) -Ejercito - Parque O'Higgins https://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=175627542511650 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/15/actualidad/1318670174_24315 3.html

Internacional Política LOS INDIGNADOS EN EL MUNDO "Wall Street ha matado el sueño americano" Los indignados toman el corazón financiero de Nueva York. La jornada se salda con 74 detenidos en Manhattan. En Washington, el movimiento no consigue una movilización masiva Indignados de todo el mundo salen a las calles para exigir un cambio David Alandete / Cristina F. Pereda Nueva York 16 OCT 2011 - 05:49 CET Una multitud de indignados ha tomado la noche del sábado uno de los centros neurálgicos del capitalismo, la icónica plaza de Times Square, con sus neones y sus carteles luminosos. Entre los logotipos de las mayores corporaciones internacionales, los manifestantes han clamado contra los bancos, contra los gobernantes y contra la desigualdad de recursos, coreando el que ya es su lema preferido: "Nosotros somos el 99%". Pedían a la ciudadanía norteamericana que les apoyara a privar de su poder político al 1% que más recursos tiene en este país. Una jornada en la que también se han producido detenciones, aunque en un número mucho inferior a los 700 arrestos de hace unas semanas. Fuentes policiales confirmaron a Efe que el total de detenidos a lo largo de la jornada asciende a 74, de los que 42 fueron arrestados por desorden público en el área de Times Square al final del día y "después de haber recibido varias advertencias 450

para que se dispersaran". Dos agentes de la Policía fueron hospitalizados por las heridas que sufrieron cuando los manifestantes intentaban derribar las barreras de seguridad.

La protesta de los indignados, al minuto A excepción de las celebraciones de fin de año, pocas veces se había visto a tante gente en esta plaza, que es una de las más visitadas por los turistas en Nueva York. Aseguraban algunas cadenas de televisión locales que había unas 10.000 personas concentradas, una cifra que la policía no ha confirmado ni desmentido. Cuando los indignados han comenzado a llegar a la plaza, a las cinco de la tarde (11 de la noche en la España peninsular) las marquesinas de Times Square les han recibido con un anuncio: "El movimiento Ocupa Wall Street se convierte en global". Ese titular ha sido motivo de celebración y alegría en una multitud que se ha mantenido festiva durante la concentración, frente a un robusto dispositivo de agentes del orden y diversos arrestos por traspaso del perímetro policial. Los agentes habían delimitado con vallas un recinto muy discreto que en media hora ha quedado toalmente rebasado. Los ocupantes de Times Square han tomado la plaza desde casi todas las calles y avenidas aledañas, parapetados en las aceras en principio, y cortando la Séptima avenida al final. "Es impresionante ver cómo la gente despierta y reacciona", decía Emma Alpert, estudiante de 26 años, que ve un mal futuro laboral por delante. "Espero que el resto del mundo esté contento al ver que, por fin, los americanos hemos despertado, que por fin nos damos cuenta de qué injustas son las cosas. Me gustaría que todo el país reaccione al ver esta concentración". En esta plaza donde lucen los iconos más representativos del consumismo (Starbucks, McDonald's, Levi's, Nasdaq, Toys 'R Us) los indignados exhibían lo que para ellos son los símbolos de la resistencia: caretas del grupo de hackers y activistas Anonymous; chapas con la faz del soldado Bradley Manning y banderas del Che Guevara. "Wall Street ha matado al sueño americano", rezaba una pancarta. Había lemas muy variados. "La deuda es esclavitud", "No somos vuestros esclavos", "No rescatéis bancos, rescatad personas", "Cría bancos y te comerás sus crisis", "Despierta, América", "Más impuestos para los ricos", "Acabamos de empezar". Y la cifra más ubicua: "Todos somos el 99%". La multitud era heterogénea. Sobre todo había jóvenes, pero algunos ancianos también. "Los mayores también estamos hartos de tanta corrupción", decía Michael Miller, un jubilado de 62 años. "Los grandes grupos financieros y sus intereses dominan a los políticos. A todos. Es hora de que la gente, jóvenes y mayores, despierte y cambie esta situación". La concurrencia de hoy ha sido una demostración de fuerza por parte de un movimiento que desde hace un mes ha ocupado una pequeña plaza entre Wall Street y la Zona Cero, en Manhattan. En los mapas se conoce a ese recinto como Zucotti Park. Los indignados lo llaman "plaza de la libertad". Por la mañana, los indignados habían recorrido el espacio entre esa plaza y Washington Square, con un improvisado recorrido por la zona financiera de Manhattan, deambulando de sucursal bancaria en sucursal bancaria, protestando contra los bancos. Algunos de los manifestantes marchaban con trajes y corbatas comprados en tiendas de segunda mano, disfrazados de banqueros, pidiendo a la opinión pública que no les juzgue por su atuendo o sus apariencias. 451

Movilización menor en la capital Unas 500 personas participaron en la “marcha de los bancos” que recorrió por la mañana del sábado el centro de Washington, según estimaciones del Ayuntamiento de la capital. Los manifestantes, siguiendo el ejemplo de Nueva York semanas atrás, pretendían desplazarse a varias sucursales bancarias para retirar dinero y cerrar sus cuentas. No lo lograron. Los portavoces de Ocupa DC informan que los bancos cerraron antes de que llegaran. La falta de un mensaje y objetivos concretos ha podido pasar factura al movimiento Ocupa DC, con mucho menos poder de convocatoria que las concentraciones de hace apenas una semana. En Washington, el movimiento todavía cuenta con dos sedes distintas. Una de ellas permanece en Freedom Plaza, “ocupada” el pasado 6 de octubre con motivo de los primeros 10 años de la guerra de Afganistán y contra el nuevo presupuesto federal. El calendario hizo que coincidiera con las protestas de Ocupa Wall Street en Nueva York, que inspiraron una réplica en la capital. Sin embargo, el grupo Stop the Machine que mantiene un reducido campamento en un parque cercano, todavía no se ha unido a los manifestantes de Freedom Plaza. La separación de los dos organizadores principales ha impedido que este 15 de octubre, cuando había un “llamamiento global por el cambio”, no lograran convocar a los centenares personas que se manifestaron hace una semana por las calles principales de Washington y que llegaron a marchar frente a la Casa Blanca. Tampoco pudieron aprovechar la llegada de miles de personas a la capital con motivo de la manifestación por el empleo convocada por los principales sindicatos del país. Cerca de dos millares de manifestantes se concentraron en el National Mall durante los discursos de personalidades como el reverendo y activista Al Sharpton, el alcalde de Washington Vincent Gray o la Secretaria de Empleo Hilda Solís. El éxito de esta manifestación, por otro lado, no puede vincularse a las protestas del 15 de octubre, al estar convocada desde hace meses con motivo de la inauguración del monumento a Martin Luther King, que tendrá lugar este domingo. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/15/actualidad/1318703601_08777 4.html

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TRIBUNA: NORMAN BIRNBAUM ¿Una revuelta o un movimiento social? En EE UU se abre una brecha en el consenso sobre que el capitalismo es la única vía al paraíso Estos movimientos pueden renovar la persistente y profunda tradición de protesta en EE UU NORMAN BIRNBAUM 16/10/2011 La Edad Media europea estuvo llena de revueltas campesinas y disturbios urbanos. Los franceses llamaban a la agitación en el campo jacqueries, por su protagonista simbólico, el imperturbable campesino Jacques, que se veía abocado a la violencia por las exacciones de la nobleza. En las ciudades, los italianos tenían dos nombres: el popolo grasso frente al popolo minuto, es decir, los gordos, los ricos, frente a los pobres y más flacos. Desde luego, estos antagonismos eran específicos de cada nación y cada región, tenían unas causas y unos resultados complejos y, a menudo, tenían elementos de imaginería religiosa e ideas de justicia. El difunto héroe de la resistencia polaca Bronislaw Geremek era historiador de los movimientos sociales medievales antes de utilizar sus conocimientos como asesor de Solidarnosc y, posteriormente, como ministro de Exteriores. A primera vista, pareció que todos estos movimientos habían fracasado. Para que hubiera representación política y un mínimo de justicia distributiva hubo que esperar a la aparición del concepto de ciudadanía. Los nobles y sus homólogos urbanos perdieron importancia ante la formación de Estados nacionales fuertes, en los que unos monarcas absolutistas utilizaban los nuevos poderes centralizados para supeditar tanto a nobles como a campesinos, a burgueses acomodados y esforzados artesanos. A su vez, las nuevas capas sociales (pequeños agricultores independientes, prósperos comerciantes urbanos y fabricantes) utilizaron los Parlamentos para controlar la arrogancia real. Las jacqueries se convirtieron en un recuerdo del pasado en manos de los historiadores. La industrialización acabó engendrando un proletariado mucho más amplio y con posibilidades de ser más peligroso incluso que los más desesperados de los pobres en las ciudades medievales. La historia no avanza en línea recta. Al fin y al cabo, Inglaterra decapitó a un rey siglo y medio antes de que lo hicieran los franceses. Todavía hace unos días, un columnista del Financial Times, en un artículo positivo sobre las protestas en Wall Street, hablaba de una secta británica del siglo XVII, los Excavadores (Diggers), que, durante la Revolución Inglesa, se resistieron al cierre de las tierras que hasta entonces habían sido comunes. Es muy poco frecuente que el Financial Times publique referencias favorables a una revolución. Recuérdense las energías intelectuales y morales empleadas por los británicos a partir de 1792 para denunciar a los jacobinos. Unas denuncias que iban acompañadas de un relato de lo más orgulloso (y absurdamente distorsionado) en el que la historia británica era una historia de acuerdos y concesiones sin fin. Tal vez los que ocupan una mínima parte de Wall Street (y sus colegas de otras ciudades de Estados Unidos) han tocado fibras sensibles de la memoria en otros lugares. Desde luego, han abierto una brecha en las teorías irrefutables de que en Estados Unidos existe un consenso fundamental sobre que el capitalismo es la única vía al paraíso. ¿Qué

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capacidad de influir a largo plazo tiene el grupo amorfo que ocupa en estos momentos un pequeño rincón del distrito financiero de Nueva York, con el riesgo constante de sufrir la agresión de una policía brutalizada? El grupo que inició la ocupación está formado por personas que trabajan en el sector de las artes y la cultura. Se formó, en un principio, para crear y defender los derechos de los artistas en materia de contratos, empleo, seguros médicos y vivienda. Lo que les empujó a una acción colectiva fue la búsqueda de la seguridad individual. Utilizo el término "artista" pero, en realidad, el grupo incluye también a personas que trabajan en las nuevas tecnologías. Si la afinidad entre creatividad artística y protesta social, que comenzó hace dos siglos, se extiende ahora a los innovadores en las comunicaciones electrónicas, eso debe hacernos reflexionar. Al grupo se unieron enseguida estudiantes, desempleados de todas clases, miembros de sindicatos (que aún tienen una gran presencia en Nueva York) y personas llegadas desde el interior. Como es natural, los medios de comunicación, como por instinto, han dicho que los manifestantes son desechos sociales o jóvenes sin educar. Su desprecio recuerda a la reacción de las clases dirigentes ante las primeras protestas contra la guerra de Vietnam. Si no lo hubieran mostrado, habría sido prueba de que Estados Unidos está de verdad en el umbral de una revolución. No es así, ni mucho menos. Es más, pese a su tendencia a actuar como si fuera el presentador de un programa de variedades, el presidente puede atribuirse en parte el mérito de la protesta. Al alterar por completo su retórica en las últimas semanas, al empezar a reconocer la división de clases, ha empujado a quienes criticaban su frustrada reconciliación con los republicanos a emprender sus propias iniciativas. Ahora tendrá que aceptar que insistan en que siga él también la lógica de ese nuevo rumbo. ¿Podrán los manifestantes unirse con los demócratas que se oponen, en Wisconsin y Ohio, a unas asambleas estatales y unos gobernadores entregados a la soberanía de los mercados? Es posible que la conciencia despertada por las protestas haga que muchos ciudadanos estén más dispuestos a abandonar la pasividad. Uno de los recursos más valiosos de los movimientos sociales es la memoria. La memoria social no es una investigación histórica minuciosa. Es una destilación moral del pasado. Muchos de los comentarios entusiastas sobre las manifestaciones hacen referencias a Estados Unidos durante el New Deal y las décadas posteriores, cuando la economía estaba regulada, la tercera parte de la fuerza laboral pertenecía a sindicatos y las expectativas, tanto individuales como colectivas, no dejaban de crecer. Los participantes más cultos habrán estudiado el New Deal en sus clases de la Universidad. Otros tendrán recuerdos familiares de los años treinta y cuarenta del siglo pasado, transmitidos por unos abuelos ya fallecidos. De lo intensos que sean esos recuerdos puede depender la suerte de las protestas. Pueden convertirse en una jacquerie moderna. O, tal vez, puedan renovar la persistente y profunda tradición de protesta en Estados Unidos y marcar el inicio de una nueva etapa en la política. Aunque sean efímeras, por lo menos, han acabado con la atrofia actual de la cultura estadounidense. Al final, las jacqueries medievales proporcionaron elementos imaginativos a las revoluciones modernas. La historia contemporánea de Estados Unidos ha estado llena de sorpresas, en su mayoría decepcionantes. Cualquier mejoría, por pequeña que sea, sería de agradecer.

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NORMAN BIRNBAUM¿Una revuelta o un movimiento social? 16/10/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/revuelta/movimiento/social/elpepuopi/20111016elpepiopi_4/Tes TRIBUNA: MARÍA DOLORES MASANA Inédita 'primavera feminista' en el mundo musulmán Con velo o sin él, con 'galabeya' o con tejanos, las mujeres participan en las luchas democráticas MARÍA DOLORES MASANA 16/10/2011 Frecuentemente, por no decir a diario, leemos en la prensa noticias que agitan nuestra conciencia por exceder toda lógica o razón. Pero, aun acostumbrados a asumir con impotencia que los derechos humanos son violados en todo el mundo cada día, hay situaciones que no podemos dejar de denunciar como vestigios que hunden sus raíces en usos medievales, como que en pleno siglo XXI, Arabia Saudí, país miembro de las Naciones Unidas desde 1945, condenara recientemente a 10 latigazos a una mujer por conducir su automóvil. Para paliar las negativas repercusiones que esta sentencia tuvo en la prensa internacional, el rey Abdullah bin Abdelaziz al Saud ha perdonado el castigo impuesto a la joven y valiente activista. ¿Hay que aplaudir la magnanimidad del rey saudí cuando su Justicia, con mayúscula, condenó a Shaima Justaneyah a tan humillante y dolorosa pena dos días después de que el monarca dijera: "No se debe marginar el papel de las mujeres en la sociedad saudí"? Ciertamente, Shaima es la "cruz" de una moneda, la de la liberación de la mujer, cuya "cara" se publicó simultáneamente en los medios de comunicación: "Australia autoriza a las mujeres que sirven en el Ejército a participar en operaciones de combate y en las unidades especiales, sumándose así a Canadá, Israel y Nueva Zelanda que hace tiempo eliminaron las restricciones que mantenían a las mujeres en servicios militares no bélicos". Al hilo del escándalo que provoca Arabia Saudí por el hecho de ser el único país del mundo que prohíbe por ley conducir a las mujeres, estamos asistiendo a un hecho inédito en el ámbito árabe musulmán: las mujeres empiezan a echarse a la calle para protestar en defensa de sus derechos. La campaña de las saudíes Women Drive en Facebook puede ser la punta de lanza de una protesta acallada durante años: la de las musulmanas en unos países agitados hoy por múltiples manifestaciones populares contra la corrupción, el nepotismo y la falta de libertades. La revolución del 5 de enero en Egipto llenó la plaza de Tahrir de mujeres con velo, sin él, con galabeya o con tejanos. Allí y aquellos días, los y las cairotas se echaron juntos a la calle para gritar: "¡Basta ya!". Algo impensable en una sociedad que segrega a ambos sexos, desde la mezquita para orar hasta las urnas para votar. Solo las clases altas, cultas, tienen una mayor flexibilidad en cuanto a la discriminación de la mujer. El fenómeno que supuso que hombres y mujeres compartieran el espacio público se repitió en Jordania, Marruecos, incluso en Bahréin donde gobiernan monarquías autoritarias. Antes, fue en Túnez, el país que alzó la bandera de las manifestaciones de

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la primavera árabe, aunque allí no llamó la atención puesto que la condición de la mujer tunecina es la más avanzada del mundo árabe. Algo impensable hace un año porque en las pocas protestas que han tenido lugar en estos países, las mujeres o no están, o marchan separadas detrás de los hombres, como en Irán o en Yemen, hace pocos días, por la indeseada vuelta del presidente Saleh. Es por ello que las manifestaciones mixtas de la plaza de Tahrir resultaron tan novedosas en este mundo. Sin embargo, una vez controlada la revuelta, las egipcias han vuelto a desaparecer de calles y plazas, a menos que vayan acompañadas de algún familiar masculino. El "basta ya" gritado en el corazón de El Cairo, no va con los códigos civiles de estos países que convierten a la mujer en menor de edad toda su vida, sujeta al padre, a los hermanos, al marido, al hijo, al cuñado si son viudas. El caso de las argelinas es paradigmático del uso y abuso de las mujeres por los hombres. En la guerra de independencia que terminó en 1962, tras ocho años de lucha sin cuartel contra la colonización francesa, las argelinas tuvieron un destacado papel desde la resistencia y en el frente luchando codo a codo con los combatientes del Frente de Liberación Nacional, muchas veces al precio de sus vidas. No obstante los muyaidines, una vez llegados al poder, no tardaron ni 10 años en promulgar una "ley de familia", aún vigente, que las encerró de nuevo en sus casas. Algo parecido ha ocurrido ahora en Egipto. Desalojada la emblemática plaza de la Liberación, las mujeres han desaparecido del ágora. Pero aunque fueran pocos días, por primera vez en un país árabe musulmán, sobre la plaza de Tahrir de El Cairo, pareció flotar, entre chadores y niqabs, un cierto aire de reivindicación feminista. Quizá vuelvan a llenarse de gentes indignadas las plazas de Egipto, de Siria, de Yemen y de otros países árabes por la tardanza en llevar a cabo las reformas prometidas y puede ser que entonces volvamos a ver a sus mujeres reclamando libertades. Sería bueno que, visto lo visto, las musulmanas, a la vez que libertades para toda la sociedad, reclamaran para sí igualdad de derechos con los hombres. En ese sentido quizá las saudíes hayan empezado ya a marcar el paso al volante de sus automóviles. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Inedita/primavera/feminista/mundo/musulman/e lpepuopi/20111016elpepiopi_5/Tes

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La question coloniale : une histoire politisée Pierre Nora | 15.10.11 | 15h20 • Mis à jour le 16.10.11 | 12h57

La question coloniale est venue brutalement, depuis une dizaine d'années, faire changer d'échelle les tensions entre histoire et politique; elle a porté sur grand écran la politisation interne de l'histoire. D'autant qu'au même moment, ou à peu près, l'histoire coloniale se trouvait relayée par les problèmes que posait l'avènement d'une histoire mondiale. Deux débats anciens, mais qui ont pris une intensité politique, l'un avec la réalité de la mondialisation économique et financière, l'autre avec la loi Taubira, en 2001, qui criminalisait l'esclavage et la traite atlantique, suivie en 2003 du Livre noir du colonialisme (Robert Laffont), dirigé par Marc Ferro, et surtout par la loi de 2005 sur "la présence positive de la France outre-mer" et la bataille autour de son article 4, qui obligeait les professeurs et les manuels à faire droit à cette vision des choses, lequel finit par être retiré. En un sens, la question coloniale n'est que la dernière venue des explosions mémorielles qui, depuis les années 1980, avaient atteint toutes les minorités, portée principalement par l'immigration africaine et antillaise. Et ce qu'elle paraît réclamer est du même ordre que les précédentes, juive, ouvrière, féministe, corse, etc. Catherine Coquery- Vidrovitch le formule clairement au début de son livre sur Les Enjeux politiques de l'histoire coloniale (Agone éditeur, 2009) : "Notre histoire nationale n'a-t-elle ou n'a-t- elle pas à inclure l'histoire de la colonisation et de l'esclavage colonial français dans notre patrimoine historique et culturel commun ?" Ainsi posée, la question ne souffre guère de discussion. La question va en réalité beaucoup plus loin, en opposant ceux qui pensent que la part coloniale de notre histoire a peu engagé des constantes de l'identité nationale, et ceux qui estiment nécessaire de repenser l'ensemble de cette identité nationale en termes postcoloniaux, l'identité nationale n'étant pas loin de révéler sa vérité dans l'oppression coloniale et dans son déni. Il s'agirait donc non plus d'inscrire la colonisation au grand registre de l'histoire nationale, mais de réécrire cette histoire nationale à la lumière noire de la colonisation. Bonaparte a rétabli en 1802 l'esclavage à Haïti. Or l'esclavage a été déclaré crime contre l'humanité. Donc Bonaparte est un criminel contre l'humanité. Et puisqu'il n'est pas là pour répondre de son crime, les historiens doivent le faire à sa place. Bien entendu, histoire mondiale et études coloniales relèvent de domaines différents, encore que les mêmes interrogations portent sur la manière de les écrire et sur quelles bases les aborder. Si le thème de ces Rendez-vous de l'histoire, l'Orient, permet cependant de les rapprocher, c'est que l'histoire mondiale (ou, comme on l'appelle, "globale", "comparée", "connectée") débouche sur le procès de l'européo- centrisme, comme l'histoire coloniale sur le procès de l'histoire nationale. Et que,

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dans les deux cas, le lien intrinsèque est établi entre nation et histoire comme entre Europe ou Occident et histoire. Cette mise en cause compose un très large spectre de courants de pensée, que, en m'inspirant de l'analyse que fait Krzysztof Pomian des rapports de la "world history" avec l'histoire universelle, je vais m'efforcer, par souci de clarté pédagogique, d'identifier. Ils consistent en effet à : 1 - affirmer que l'essor de la modernité occidentale s'est fait par l'exploitation du reste du monde : argument de base du marxisme et du néomarxisme ; 2 - établir le parallèle entre le développement scientifique et la domination, entre la connaissance ou la fabrication illusoire des exotismes et l'impérialisme. C'est le thème d'Edward Saïd dans son célèbre ouvrage, L'Orientalisme (Seuil), livre pionnier de la critique anti-occidentaliste, en 1978, que le monde arabe a perçu à tort, dit l'auteur dans une importante postface de 2003, comme une défense et illustration systématiques de l'islam et des Arabes ; 3 - minorer les apports de l'Occident et son rôle dans l'unification du monde, et reconstruire l'histoire de manière à en effacer la spécificité occidentale. La démonstration consiste alors à reporter toutes les innovations occidentales à des inventions bien antérieures et faites ailleurs qu'en Europe : en Chine, en Inde, dans le monde arabe, depuis la numération décimale et le zéro jusqu'à l'imprimerie à caractères mobiles, en passant par la boussole et la poudre à canon. Ou en allant jusqu'à contester l'unicité et la modernité du capitalisme ; 3 - refuser d'accepter pour penser l'histoire toutes les catégories d'intelligibilité émanées de l'Occident, en particulier celle de "civilisation" sur laquelle reposent l'oeuvre de Toynbee ou la thèse de Huntington ; 4 - dénoncer l'affirmation, non plus seulement de l'impérialisme politique de l'Occident, mais de son impérialisme historique en prétendant démontrer comment l'Europe a imposé le récit de son passé au reste du monde. C'est ce que veut montrer par exemple Jack Goody dans son livre récent, Le Vol de l'histoire (Gallimard, 2010), à propos de la compréhension de l'Asie. On mesure la distance, sur cinquante ans, de cette position extrémiste avec le relativisme historique de Lévi-Strauss dans son célèbre opuscule de 1952, Race et histoire ; 5 - récuser le concept même de l'histoire au sens moderne, celui, justement, qui s'était donné comme l'Histoire avec un grand "h" et se présentait comme l'étalon pour établir qui était ou n'était pas dans l'Histoire et pour mesurer à quelle distance se trouvait de l'Histoire telle ou telle population lointaine. C'est un écho de cet argument qui, par exemple, a provoqué la réaction négative des Africains au discours de Dakar de Nicolas Sarkozy en 2007, discours qui comportait pourtant de fortes condamnations du colonialisme mais faisait état du "retard des Africains à entrer dans l'Histoire" ; 6 - récuser enfin toute pensée de l'universel au nom du fait que c'est une autoglorification et une autojustification impérialiste de la civilisation qui a inventé et défini les formes de l'universel. Dans cette nouvelle "situation faite à l'histoire", comme disait Péguy, faite d'une tension dilatée entre l'histoire et la politique, la France qui, il y a encore une génération, à la belle époque de l'école des Annales, brillait d'un rayonnement mondial, paraît, Jean-

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François Sirinelli l'a dit fortement dans l'opuscule qui vient de paraître, L'histoire est- elle encore française ? (CNRS éditions, 60 p., 4 euros), se retirer du devant de la scène internationale. S'il est vrai que cette scène est dominée par la recherche d'une histoire du monde, par la "world history", il est clair que ce sont les Américains qui sont à la pointe - peut-être parce que, se souvenant d'avoir été les premiers décolonisés de l'histoire, ils ont une forte raison de s'identifier au refus de l'européo-centrisme. Il est clair également que, si c'est l'attachement à l'histoire nationale qui est la raison du retard à se mettre à l'histoire mondiale, c'est la France qui, de tous les pays européens, a le plus de raisons d'éprouver ce retard. Sur ce point, il est inutile de revenir. En revanche, c'est sur sa difficulté à assumer sans hypertension son passé colonial que je voudrais insister pour finir. La passion qui l'anime, les blocages qui la paralysent me paraissent moins tenir au ressentiment et à la mauvaise conscience qu'à deux circonstances historiques. La première tient sans doute au fait qu'à la différence de l'Angleterre, par exemple, la dépossession coloniale s'est achevée pour la France dans la guerre, la guerre d'Algérie, qui suivait celle d'Indochine. Deux défaites sur fond de défaite de 1940. La fixation sur l'Algérie a de multiples dimensions, moitié colonie et moitié trois départements français. La guerre d'Algérie a pris des allures de guerre de Sécession. Elle a marqué pour la métropole un changement de régime et de République, et c'est l'homme qui avait lavé la France du désastre de 1940 qui a baissé le drapeau en Algérie. Et les conséquences de la défaite algérienne sont aussi loin d'être terminées que les conséquences de la défaite de 1940. La deuxième raison tient à l'attitude de la gauche, hésitante et ambiguë vis-à-vis de la colonisation. L'association rétrospective entre la gauche et l'anticolonialisme est une idée reçue et fabriquée. Bien au contraire. Non seulement les partis de gauche se sont convertis tardivement à l'anticolonialisme, mais c'est au nom des Lumières, au nom de l'idéal révolutionnaire et jacobin que s'est opérée l'expansion coloniale. Ici encore, l'exemple algérien serait probant. Par nature et par définition, le nationalisme algérien a pris à contre-pied la gauche française, qui s'est concentrée sur la défense des petits pieds-noirs de Bab el-Oued; de telle sorte que la lenteur de la guerre d'Algérie tient en partie à la lente et difficile conversion de la gauche à l'idée de l'indépendance algérienne. L'intensité de l'affaire algérienne a rejailli sur l'ensemble de l'affaire coloniale, devenue une crise de conscience vite refermée et mal digérée.

Né en 1931, éditeur chez Gallimard qu'il rejoint en 1965, a dirigé l'entreprise des "Lieux de mémoire". Il a été élu à l'Académie française en 2001. Parmi ses ouvrages récents : "Historien public" (Gallimard, 544 p., 23,50 €). Ce texte est un extrait de la conférence de clôture des Rendez-vous de l'Histoire de Blois, dimanche 16 octobre. Pierre Nora, historien Article paru dans l'édition du 17.10.11// Pierre Nora La question coloniale : une histoire politisée 16.10.11 | 12h57 http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/10/15/la-question-coloniale-une-histoire- politisee_1588400_3232.html

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Les manifestations meurtrières se succèdent au Yémen LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 16.10.11 | 08h41 • Mis à jour le 16.10.11 | 12h20

Des opposants au président yéménite Ali Abdallah Saleh manifestent, samedi 15 octobre, dans la capitale Sanaa.AP/Hani Mohammed Les forces fidèles au président Ali Abdallah Saleh ont ouvert le feu, dimanche 16 octobre, à Sanaa sur une manifestation réclamant le départ du chef d'Etat yéménite, faisant quatre morts et une quarantaine de blessés. Des dizaines de milliers de Yéménites ont marché sur une zone tenue par les forces fidèles au président Saleh, au lendemain de la dispersion sanglante d'une marche similaire. "Allah Akbar (Dieu est le plus grand), notre manifestation est pacifique", ont scandé les manifestants qui brandissaient les portraits de leurs camarades tués lors de la répression de marches précédentes. Des soldats de la Première division blindée, ralliée à la contestation, marchaient devant le cortège. A leur arrivée dans la zone tenue par les forces du président Saleh, les manifestants ont été pris sous les tirs de tireurs embusqués postés sur les immeubles environnants, et les soldats dissidents ont riposté aux sources de tirs. DOUZE MORTS SAMEDI Samedi, les forces loyales au président ont ouvert le feu sur une marche qui réclamait la démission de M. Saleh, faisant douze morts et une centaine de blessés. La manifestation était partie de la place du Changement, épicentre de la contestation protégé par des unités dissidentes de l'armée, et avait marché vers le secteur contrôlé par les pro-Saleh. Les tirs se sont produits à proximité du ministère des affaires étrangères. Malgré des mois de protestations populaires et des pressions internationales et régionales, M. Saleh, au pouvoir depuis 33 ans et accusé de corruption et de népotisme, refuse de partir. Il avait été blessé dans une attaque contre son palais en juin et hospitalisé à Ryad avant de regagner son pays fin septembre. APPEL À LA COMMUNAUTÉ INTERNATIONALE 460

Dimanche, le général dissident Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar a appelé la communauté internationale à "intervenir rapidement pour mettre un terme aux massacres commis par cet ignorant", le président Saleh, et à le forcer à accepter le plan des monarchies du Golfe, prévoyant son départ. Le général dissident, dont les troupes contrôlent une partie de Sanaa, a également proposé une démilitarisation des villes pour éviter de nouvelles pertes parmi les civils. Il propose le retrait des forces armées loyales au chef de l'Etat et des militaires de la 1ère division blindée qu'il commande afin de les redéployer à au moins 200 km des centres urbains. http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/10/16/yemen-nouvelle-manifestation- au-lendemain-d-une-journee-sanglante_1588598_3218.html

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Internacional Política Sol ilumina medio mundo El aliento del 15-M prende de Tokio a Nueva York/ Madrid y Barcelona lideran las protestas/ Fráncfort, Berlín y Bruselas se suman con fuerza/ Disturbios en Roma Joseba Elola Madrid 16 OCT 2011 - 01:56 CET La Puerta del Sol abarrotada, la gente unida y emocionada, los cánticos contra la banca y los políticos, los apretujones, la euforia. El 15-M vivió ayer una nueva jornada histórica. Y ya van tres en su corta existencia, de apenas cinco meses. El movimiento nacido de la indignación en calles de toda España exportó su protesta a medio mundo: Tokio, Sidney, Auckland, Kuala Lumpur, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, Los Ángeles, São Paulo. Y, por supuesto, las principales ciudades de Europa. El 15-M consiguió que su eco sonara bien lejos. En 951 ciudades de 82 países. Los indignados españoles reclaman un cambio de sistema profundo. Consideran que los políticos están en manos de los banqueros. Que la democracia actual no funciona. Que precisa de una revisión urgente. MÁS INFORMACIÓN Los indignados regresan en masa a Sol, epicentro de su protesta Vídeo: Panorámica de la multitud en Sol "Si no salimos en los periódicos, saldremos en los libros de Historia" Madrid y Barcelona fueron las ciudades que lideraron la protesta. El baile de cifras continuaba anoche. Los organizadores aseguraban que se había superado con creces la asistencia al 19-J, que ya fue superior a la del 15-M. En la abarrotada asamblea de la Puerta del Sol se lanzó la cifra del medio millón de asistentes. En Barcelona, las autoridades hablaban de 60.000 mientras los organizadores sostenían que era 400.000. Los tótems del sistema financiero no vivieron ajenos a la jornada de protestas. Más de 5.000 indignados se plantaron frente a la sede del Banco Central Europeo, en Fráncfort, en la que fue una de las movilizaciones europeas con más asistencia. En Londres, más de un millar de manifestantes se dirigieron hacia la Bolsa y acabaron congregados en torno a la catedral de Saint Paul. Entre ellos, el líder de la plataforma WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, que hizo acto de presencia. En Madrid, los manifestantes, que confluyeron en la madrileña plaza de Cibeles, dedicaron sonoras pitadas a su paso por el edificio del Banco de España. Roma puso la nota fea en una jornada que, en líneas generales, transcurrió tranquila. Los enfrentamientos entre la policía y centenares de encapuchados convirtieron las calles de la capital italiana en escenario de una batalla campal de más de cuatro horas. En Bruselas, fueron unos 6.000 los indignados que salieron a la calle. En Berlín, cerca de 10.000. El Movimiento 15-M, al que muchos ya daban por muerto, consiguió internacionalizar su protesta. Reclutó nuevos efectivos más allá de sus fronteras. Una de las claves, sin duda, fue la protesta en Estados Unidos, Occupy Wall Street. Los indignados neoyorquinos han logrado una enorme repercusión desde el pasado 17 de septiembre. El desalojo frustrado de los activistas anteayer y la violencia policial procuró un mayor altavoz a la protesta que se estaba gestando. Miles de personas desbordaban Times 462

Square y sus aledaños por la tarde (madrugada, hora española). La policía practicó al menos 20 detenciones. Jon Aguirre Such, portavoz de Democracia Real Ya, una de las plataformas clave del 15-M, quiso ser claro en su balance de la jornada: “Las personas que han salido a las calles en todo el mundo hoy, 15 de octubre de 2011, han hecho historia”. En Barcelona, la respuesta a las movilizaciones sorprendió a los propios organizadores. En Valencia se sumaron a la cita unas 35.000 personas. El ambiente en las calles de Madrid, desde primera hora, fue festivo, una de las señas de identidad del 15-M. “Hola BBV, Hola Santander, ¿pagaste ya la casa?”, se cantaba con la música de los payasos de la tele en Puerta de Toledo, al confluir dos de las seis columnas de la marcha: las procedentes del templo de Debod y de la zona Sur, de Leganés. “El movimiento ha calado de una manera hermosísima”, declaraba entre el bullicio Manolo, prejubilado de 64 años, miembro de la Comisión de Economía de Acampada Sol. Por las calles de Madrid se veían algunas pancartas con mensajes en francés e inglés. “Perroflauta peligroso”, rezaba una. “De Norte a Sur, de Este a Oeste, la lucha sigue, cueste lo que cueste”, proclamaban los manifestantes. Sobre una plataforma móvil, un tipo en bañador, con camisa y sombrero de paja, animaba la marcha: “Este 15-0, más que ocupar la plaza, ocupa el cerebro”, proclamaba, megáfono en mano. Al llegar a Atocha, Carlos, uno de los portavoces de Democracia Real Ya, se mostraba exultante: “El 15 de mayo no sabíamos qué iba a pasar y descorchamos una botella. Hoy hemos vivido el desparrame de esa botella”. Por la noche, la estatua ecuestre de Carlos III, en plena Puerta del Sol, volvió a verse cubierta de pancartas contra la banca y el aumento del precio de los alimentos. En varias ciudades se manejaba la idea de campar. Así ocurrió en Bruselas, en el barrio europeo. La protesta viajó por todos los husos horarios. Arrancó en Tokio con algo más de 300 personas. En Sydney fueron 2.000. Según avanzaba la madrugada en España, llegaban noticias de miles de activistas saliendo a la calle en Chile. “Al 15-M se le ha asignado una tarea excesiva, es un movimiento de voluntarios y, sin embargo, se le han atribuido poderes que no son reales”. Lo decía Jon Aguirre Such, de Democracia Real Ya, dos días antes de la jornada de protestas. Pero lo cierto es que el movimiento ha pasado su tercera prueba con nota. Ese sencillo y eficaz lema que llevó a la calle a decenas de miles de españoles el pasado mes de mayo, “No somos mercancías en manos de políticos y banqueros”, arrastró a cientos de miles por el mundo en la jornada de ayer. Joseba Elola Sol ilumina medio mundo16 OCT 2011 - 01:56 CET http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/10/16/actualidad/1318723006_351096.html GALERÍAS: La protesta en el mundoy en España: http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/15/album/1318675228_581822.h tml

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Occupy Wall Street protests continue worldwide By Karla Adam, Published: October 16 LONDON — Inspired by the Occupy Wall Street protests that began in New York, protesters here entered a second day of demonstrations Sunday as they reiterated their anger at the global financial system, corporate greed and government cutbacks. Rallies rippled across the globe on Saturday as more than 900 cities in Europe, Africa, Asia, and North America took part in the worldwide demonstration, including Washington, Toronto, Denver, and Chicago, where more than 175 people were arrested early Sunday for failing to leave a park after it closed. In cities around the world, a fraction of the protesters who joined the rallies Saturday were hunkering down for a second night of “occupation.” It’s unclear how long protesters plan to stay, but it could be awhile: for example, according to local reports, hundreds in New Zealand are camping for the next six weeks in Auckland’s Aotea Square, while Toronto’s St. James park is now known as “tent city central.” In London, the cobblestone courtyard of St. Paul’s Cathedral, one of the city’s most iconic buildings, was filled with about 70 colorful tents and demonstrators who vowed to protest indefinitely. Sitting next to her 11-month-old daughter on a blanket covered with toys, Lucy Aitken Read, a 29-year-old charity worker, said she hoped to attend the rally every day. “We hope to last the distance,” she said, adding “I really believe in a kind of fair and equal society and I’m here especially today because I think it’s really within our grasp.” The worldwide uproar was inspired by the Occupy Wall Street movement and Spanish activists, known as “the Indignants,” who began protesting in May, arguing for governments to stop heeding the concerns of financial markets while ignoring the plights of their own people. In New York, thousands of protesters marched through the city’s financial district to Times Square on Saturday, banging drums and chanting, “We got sold out, banks got bailed out!” Police, some in riot gear and mounted on horses, arrested more than 80 protesters. Organizers of the global demonstration said on their Web site that they were demanding a “true democracy.” “United in one voice, we will let politicians, and the financial elites they serve, know it is up to us, the people, to decide our future,” they said.

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The global demonstrations began on the same day that finance ministers and central bankers from the Group of 20 nations met in Paris to discuss solutions to the debt crisis engulfing Europe. On Sunday, Italy began calculating the costs of the protest in Rome, during which a breakaway group clad in black torched cars and smashed bank machines and shop windows. Police hit back with tear-gas grenades and water cannons. Rome Mayor Gianni Alemanno told reporters Sunday that repair costs were estimated at $1.4 million. Violent clashes in the Italian capital left dozens injured, including several police officers. Police were out in force for the rally, which came a day after Premier Silvio Berlusconi barely survived a no-confidence vote in Parliament over his failure to address Italy’s mounting debt crisis. In London, thousands of activists had planned a sit-in outside the London Stock Exchange but were thwarted when police told them it was private property. Laura Martin, 29, said she would camp in the church square, close to the stock exchange, “as long as necessary,” with her group of about 15 Spaniards living in London, and planned to get involved in the many assembly groups that were discussing problems and solutions to the widening gap between the rich and poor, among other things. “It’s up to the people to stand up and say, we need to stop this and change the system now.”

The Washington Post Company http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/occupy-wall-street-protests-continue-worldwide/2011/10/16/gIQAcJ1roL_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

widget de ¿Debe la comunidad internacional presionar más a Siria para su democratización? Medio año después del estallido de las protestas contra el régimen de Bachar el Asad, cuya represión ha causado cerca de 3.000 muertos según la ONU, Siria se encuentra al borde de la guerra civil. ¿Qué medidas pueden tomar las grandes potencias para frenar las matanzas? ¿Aplica Occidente un doble rasero a Siria distinto a otros países árabes? ¿Tiene El Asad capacidad para desestabilizar todo Oriente Próximo?

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Ignacio Cembrero La comunidad internacional debe hacer, a grandes rasgos, lo que pide la oposición siria. Es decir no intervenir directamente, pero sí “apretar las tuercas” al régimen de Bachar el Asad. Debería haber empezado a sancionarle con severidad mucho antes de lo que, en realidad, lo ha hecho y de manera más coordinada entre EE UU, Canadá y Europa. Pero también debe advertir a la oposición, mayoritariamente suní, que, sí derroca al régimen, no aceptará que la comunidad musulmana alauí, que ostenta ahora el poder, o los cristianos, que son una minoría protegida, padezcan su venganza. 14/10/2011, a las 14:53

Jordi Vaquer Concuerdo con Laura Ruiz de Elvira: la presión debe tener como objetivo que el gobierno sirio respete sus compromisos internacionales con los derechos humanos, no la democratización del país. Debe hacerse de modo que facilite la salida a Asad (por ejemplo, no creo que ayudase que la Corte Penal Internacional pidiese su detención), que no cause sufrimientos adicionales a los ciudadanos sirios y a la oposición no violenta, y que sea sostenible en el tiempo, porque la tiranía puede tardar en caer. Y debe hacerse de acuerdo con las condiciones del propio país, sin aplicar soluciones de talla única. En ausencia de conflicto abierto, la mejor herramienta son las sanciones, pero no está clara su efectividad. La protección a los exiliados, por ejemplo, tendría que ser prioridad: si aceptamos que el propio régimen es la peor amenaza a los derechos humanos en Siria, no podemos dejar que Líbano, Turquía y Jordania carguen con todo el peso de los refugiados, o que los servicios secretos y los diplomáticos sirios amenacen a sus conciudadanos en el extranjero, como llegó a pasar en Madrid. 14/10/2011, a las 13:39

Carlos Carnero Sí, la Comunidad Internacional debe presionar más a Siria para su democratización y parar la masacre que está teniendo lugar. De hecho, lo ha intentado recientemente en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Por cierto, a iniciativa de "Occidente", es decir, de la Unión Europea (que ha acordado hasta la fecha numerosas medidas unilaterales) y los Estados Unidos y la oposición activa o pasiva de Rusia, China y otros "países emergentes". Subrayo este último aspecto de la cuestión, porque no es la primera vez que estados como Brasil, Sudáfrica o la India, impecablemente democráticos y en

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algunos casos con gobiernos de izquierdas, se decantan por una interpretación arcaica de la soberanía nacional cuando de condenar o presionar a regímenes autoritarios se trata. En ese sentido, el artículo de Sami Nair en La Cuarta de El País al analizar la reacción de la izquierda latinoamericana sobre la intervención en Libia es excelente. O sea, en este caso no es precisamente el Occidente de Obama y la UE quien aplica un doble rasero. Sanciones, Tribunal Penal Internacional, congelación de acuerdos son medidas a utilizar. 14/10/2011, a las 11:33

Lluís Bassets ¿Debe? Sí. ¿Puede? Hasta cierto punto. Siria tiene su propia cobertura internacional y no va a suceder con su régimen lo que le pasó a Gadafi. Turquía ha avanzado medidas por su lado. Muchos pasos se pueden hacer para que el régimen reciba un mensaje claro y no se sienta autorizado a seguir las matanzas como si fueran gratis o estuviéramos en la época de la guerra fría. Pero hay que evitar nuevas meteduras de pata como el rechazo de la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad, concebida para presionar a Asad y convertida gracias a Rusia y China en un globo de oxígeno para su régimen. Entre las cosas que se pueden hacer es ayudar a la oposición a que tenga más visibilidad en Europa y en las instituciones internacionales. Los argumentos del doble rasero son muy ciertos, pero poco útiles. El rasero es doble porque los intereses y los derechos de veto son muchos. La diplomacia europea y americana debe atender mejor a la rusa para presionar. Buena parte de la imagen internacional del régimen la ha fabricado la prensa del corazón con la pareja presidencial. Ahora al menos podrían deshacer en algo el entuerto. 14/10/2011, a las 10:34

Ángeles Espinosa Estoy de acuerdo con Haizam Amirah-Fernández. El problema es cómo llevar a cabo esa presión. Resulta tentador exhibir el caso libio de medio intervención relativamente exitosa. Sin embargo, nadie entre la dispersa y desunida oposición siria ha pedido el uso de medios militares y cuando se recurre a ellos, nunca se sabe cuál va a ser el resultado. La otra fórmula, la de las sanciones, permite lavar nuestras conciencias, pero mi experiencia en Irak primero y en Irán después, es que sus resultados son cuestionables y, en todo caso, sólo se perciben a largo plazo. Tenemos una situación complicada tal como ha puesto en evidencia el intento de mediación turco. Ankara ha querido utilizar sus buenas relaciones con Damasco y su independencia de Occidente para convencer al régimen de Al Asad de que no recurra a la violencia y ha salido escaldado. Me temo que a estas alturas, la salida dialogada de la crisis ya no es una opción. 14/10/2011, a las 09:18 467

Laura Ruiz de Elvira La “comunidad internacional” debe presionar más, no a Siria, sino al régimen baathista que la oprime desde hace más de 40 años, y no para su “democratización”, que es un proceso que no se puede iniciar desde fuera, sino para poner fin a las matanzas. Dicho esto, el problema es cómo ejercer esa presión concretamente y cómo ejercerla de manera unánime para que debilite al régimen. Por un lado deberían aumentar las sanciones a todos aquellos que apoyan al régimen y a sus empresas, con las que se han enriquecido en los últimos años, y al mismo tiempo se debería apoyar firmemente a la oposición. Por otro lado se debería presionar a países como Rusia, China o Irán, que son los únicos que realmente pueden acortar la vida de los Asad. Dicho esto, el problema es que el régimen sirio, a diferencia del tunecino, egipcio o yemení, tiene un alto grado de autonomía (económica, política, en defensa,…) con respecto a Occidente, lo que disminuye fuertemente la capacidad de presión exterior. ¿Debemos recordar que el régimen sirio no teme el aislamiento, puesto que ya lo experimentó durante años y salió reforzado? 14/10/2011, a las 08:24

Daniel Duquenal ¿Pero, es necesario hacer tal pregunta? Desde Venezuela solo les puedo decir que uno de los mas fervientes apoyos a el Asad (sin mandar nada sino palabras, palabras, como dice la canción) es nuestro queridísimo micomandantepresidente que no puede sino mirarse en el espejo de lo que le aguarda algún día si sigue como sigue. Como residente de Venezuela no puedo sino exigir que las democracias occidentales ejerzan las mas fuertes sanciones posibles contra el régimen sirio. Tal vez después de Libia no se pueda hacer guerra por un tiempo, y el riesgo sería excesivo en estos días dada la cercanía de Irán y el apoyo Ruso-Chino, que nos demostraron este año que son mera tiranías que también se ven en ese espejo. Pero todavía hay muchas opciones a probar. Si, habrá desestabilidad, si, Israel va a tener que repensar muchas cosas, si, hay riesgo de aun mas fundamentalismo islámico. Pero las cartas están echadas y la única manera de tener un chance de evitar lo peor es presionado activamente a el Asad, y el otro tío en Yemen, y la familia real esa del Golfo, etc... No son los jinetes del Apocalipsis. 14/10/2011, a las 06:20

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Cuando Chamberlain y Daladier capitularon ante Hitler en Munich, Churchill pronunció su lúcida frase: "Os dieron a elegir entre el deshonor y la guerra; elegisteis el deshonor y tendréis la guerra". El régimen de los Asad, padre, hijo y demás parentela siempre ha sido hipócrita, tiránico y sanguinario. Ahora convierte en carnicería diaria las manifestaciones democráticas de los sirios. Para evitar no solo el deshonor sino tal vez la guerra, las democracias deben aplicarle a los Asad de inmediato lo más duro que tengan en su panoplia de sanciones diplomáticas, económicas y comerciales. Tal vez así algún sector de las Fuerzas Armadas comprenda que lo que más le conviene es dejar caer a los Asad, que en ellos no hay salvación. Tal vea así se produzca un movimiento interno que detenga o amortigüe la explosión. Allá la autoritaria Rusia y la dictatorial China con su apoyo a esa gentuza. Y sí, puede que la caída de los Asad provoque más inestabilidad temporal en Oriente Próximo, pero, como dice Haizam, no hay retorno, los tiempos de la gendarmería Asad apoyada por la realpolitik no volverán. Remember Munich. 14/10/2011, a las 00:14

Haizam Amirah-Fernández El régimen sirio lleva meses cometiendo crímenes contra la humanidad en su territorio y aterrorizando a su población con métodos gangsteriles. Al principio de las revueltas, el régimen tenía dos opciones: hacer cambios o ser cambiado. Sin embargo, sus cabecillas hace tiempo que han pasado el punto de no retorno y están dispuestos a dejar el país en un estado de enfrentamiento civil y colapso económico. Los gobiernos de países democráticos están siendo objeto de muchas críticas por lo que se percibe como extrema tibieza en su condena de la represión de El Asad. No deja de ser una muestra de debilidad –o de complicidad– repetir que el régimen sirio ya no es legítimo y que debe dejar el poder, al tiempo que no se toman más medidas para impedir o elevar el coste de que siga matando a la población civil. Ante todo, es necesario exigir el libre acceso de medios de comunicación internacionales para obtener más información sobre lo que está pasando en Siria. Seguramente así las opiniones públicas tendrán más elementos de juicio y más argumentos para influir en las medidas que tomen sus gobiernos. 13/10/2011, a las 23:45 ¿Debe la comunidad internacional presionar más a Siria para su democratización? http://eskup.elpais.com/*eldebateinternacional20111014

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