J'he fuse .\ Rule oi Sinsle P:rrtr- St:rtcs

King-retained his o The statuto remained ltaly's constihrtion and the ' Mussolini was p"riti,ons as Head of stat'e and Commander-in-Chief. hesignated Head of Government and Duce of the Fascist Party.

were still dominated o The civil service, including the prefects, and police " Bocchini, a tt;";eer-offici-aLs, rather tXan by Fascists; for ixample, Arturo l|rr nbn-Fascist, was Chief of Police (1926-40).

(from 783,000 in 1923 to o The PNF',s membership expanded massively GT-I I,85i.,000 by 1934) and'mosl of those joining were careerists ancl public of officials. Consequently, the PNF became increasingly an organisation bureaucrats and'proie-ssionals,rather than militant activists. ;! over the Mussolini now created a personal dictatorship, extending his control Party bY: Fascist EI:I o Appointing ,one of the Ras,in 1925 as PNF SecretarY with instructions to impose greater discipline on the unrulY elements .I within the PartY. lEI o sacking Farinacci as PNF Secretary(April 1926) when Farinacci proved :I too independent-minded. t:qll:: o Appointing the compliant-Augusto Turati as PNF Secretary!o Farinacci.furati then set about, over the next three years,purging 60,000 :I FI members of the PNF. Most of those expelled were radicals or militant Mussolini loyalist, Achille squad members. During th9 l!3^0s unolh"r Starace,occupied the post of PNF Secretary' ;! were to be appointed o- A Party statuteof 7926laiddown that all.party posts from u'bo,u"(PNF headquartersin ),rather than electedfrom below or appointedby local Fascistbosses. c! Mussolini now dominated the FascistParty. Furthermore Mussolini was not -I entirely dependent on the PNF's suPPort b".urrt" he had close relations with tu,-\Ft non-Fascistcentres of power such as ihe Church, the King, the armed forcesand big; business.From t6zs a personality cult of the 'Duce' developed 1"+.thtt further elevated MussoliniS position above that of any other individual, whether a govemment or Party member.

Soby 7929the FascistParty had been zubordinated to the state and centralised :i ,tnJdt the personal control of Mussolini. Its role now had effectively been limited to oiganisingpropaganda and rallies,overseeing mass organisations like Dopolavoro"(in chirge bf-recreation and sport) and supervising the youth :G fi,* organisations.

I'I-J FASCIST RULE :r }= The CorporateState

F-:T Fascistpropaganda suggested that what distinguishedlvlussolini's regime from the rest of the *orlf," was . Indeed, there is no doubt that, In t internationally,the 'CorporateState'established in had m91y adllers. theory, Corporatism wai a third way between Communism and Capitalism and Corporatismwas an influential *oufi'Uring aboutharmonious labour relations. '_aE,i t32 w -fhc Risc cetRule of Singlc Ptrtv Statcs

idea in pre-war ltaly, particularly associated with Filippo Corrodoni, an anarcho-syndicalist. Some leading Fascists had for a_long time been passionate advocates of Corporatism, including Michele Bianchi and Edmondo Rossoni, Secretary of the Cbnfederation of Fascist Syndical Corporations (the Fascist trade unions).

Syndicalists wanted to- transform society by reorganising it on the basis of ciifferent economic spheres of activity. In each sPhere, synclicates would represent both workeis .rnd employers and these joint-representatives would reiolve issues concerning both working conditions and economic management. Syndicalists envisaged ih" cotpotutions having a- major_ say in clirecting the eiono-y and, ultimately, Corporations replacing the trac-litional parliamentary system; instead representatives from different corporations would wield political power.

In the early to mid-1920s, opinion within the Fascist movement was- strongly divided about how far a Corporate state should be established. This reflected the wider debate about the nature of Fascism and the Pressures being placed on Mussolini by the various factions among his supporters. Mussolini needed the support of industrialists and landowners but sections of the PNF demancled a fascist revolution. ln 7925, Rossoni organised a strike by 100,000 workers in Lombardy, which alarmed employers and Mussolini.

In contrast to the syndicalists, many other Fascists were decidedly hostile to Corporatism as it riised the prospect of much greater power for the working classes.Conservatives like Alfredo Rocco sought to use Corporatism simply as a way of keeping the workers in order and supporting the interests of the big employers. Ultimately, although the structures of a corporate state were erected, Mussoiini came down decisivEly in favour of a neutered version of corporatism that chimed in with Rocco's views.

The establishment of the 'Corporate state' was a rather haphazard Process a1d_it took until 1939 before the corporate edifice was complete. However, beneath the structures, the Corporate state was essentially a sham: the-tribunals set uP 9y t\q Syndical Law (1926) favoured the industrialists and the Charter of Labour (7927) was mere window dressing in terms of safeguarding workers' rights'

The Creation of the'Corporate State'

1925 Vidoni Palace Pact . The Fascist Labour Confederation (Fascist trade unions) and Confindustria (Confederation of Industry), agreed to recognise only each other as representatives of workers and employers in negotiations. Fascist unions were delighted that this excluded the free trade unions (Catholic, Socialist and Communist) from labour relations. Employers were pleased that elected factory councils were abolished. However, they were unhappy at the Drospectof bindins arbitration in labour disputes. 1926 Alfredo Rocco's Labour and Anti-Strike Law . Confirmed that only syndicates could engage in labour negotiations. . Divided the economy into 7 branches of activity (agriculture, transport etc) and created separate syndicates to represent the workers and the employers. Radical Fascistshad wanted mixed or'integrated' syndicates to include employers and workers. . Set up special tribunals to provide compulsory arbitration in industriai disputes. But, in practice, the tribunals favoured the

133 The Rise .t Rule trf Sinsle Pertv Stetes

employersand dealt with very few cases. . Bannedstrikes and lockouts (employerslocking out workers).

This advantaged the employers as they were not subiect to state or PNF supervision. In disputes, officials represented the workers, whereas employers represented themselves. A Ministry of Corporationswas established,with Mussolini as Minister. However, only 1 corporationreally functioned at this stage,the corporation for artistsand intellectuals. Ir 1927 Charter of Labour t Affirmed private enterprise. a Reaffirmedthat strikesand factory councilswere illegal. lr.:. I . Set out guarantees of workers' rights, but these were not k. I honoured. 1928 Rossoni was sacked as Secretary of the Confederation of Fascist I Syndicates. The Confederation was broken up into 6 confederations x; I of syndicates, thereby weakening their bargaining power. Radicals within the PNF were disappointed. I I 1.930 The National Council of Corporahons was set up € . In theory it established representatives of workers, the PNF and employers to regulate the economy. The National Council I appeared to have the power to fix wages, settle disputes and €, I advise on the economy. However, in practice the Council did verv little. 1934 The 'Corporate State' was finally established (on paper) I I . 22 'mixed' corporations were set up - each consisting of s; employers and employees. However, the system continued to favour the employers. I . The corporations lacked any real power. State institutions and I big business interests made all the major decisions conceming the economv. *t I 1939 The Chamber of Fascesand Corporationsreplaced the Chamber, the tr I lower house of parliament. It had no real power and was purely a propagandaexercise on Mussolini's part. I € The Economv under the Fascists I- e - Q. Wt were Mussolini's aims? "t I t Mussolini had little understanding or knowledge of economics when he came to e power. Although the original Fascist programme had an anti-capitalist character, by the time Mussolini was appointed Prime Minister, this had been I dropped by him and Fascism from then on was committed to the capitalist € - system. In theory, the Fascists pursued'Corporativism' as a third way between capitalism and socialism but in practice this was mere window-dressing. t Fascism was supported by, and in tum, protected big business and the agrari € I (large landowners). I Under Fascism, economic poliry was inconsistent and erratic; broadly speaking, G" it was laissez-faire (minimum of state intervention) during the period 1922-25 - and then was increasingly marked by state intervention thereafter. The pursuit I of 'autarky' (economic self-sufficiency) characterized the mid to late 1930s as € J Mussolini's foreign policy became more aggressive. Mussolini sought to build up Italy's industry to support foreign wars of conquest. However, in that respect I ni faitea miserabiy as eionomically Italy was far from ready to go to war at the C a end of the 1930s. I € 134 - aT €, a ) 'l'he Rise& Rulc of Sinsle panv Stetes 3

Much of Fascist 'Policy' was posturing, with little substance.Mussolini asserted ) that what mattered in,economics, ,will-po*"., as in ail spheres of life, were *a 'struggle', so he launched ,battles, a series of economic -.o.np"uigr,,- e.g, the g"tti" ro, ci;i" ancl the Battle for the Lira. These grandiose were largely 3 misconceived and tended to damage the economy. 1922-25: Laissez - fai re

9 The period leading up to the establishment of the Fascist dictatorship saw Italv depression.This.was largely the resutt of an upturn rnef:tY::j,TT_:1:.g_*uryor world ii economyfrom 1923.Mussolini's Finance Minister, De 'stefani, 9 followed the same etonomic policies as previous liberal go,n".r,-"rts: batancing the.bucl-get, cutting taxes and governrirent spending urra .."Ju.i.,g ;;;;;;';fi trade' He also privatised severaTnationalised'i.,a.rstiies s,r.t, u, tnE t*l.ph";; ? company. t Protectionism and increasing state intervention rn 1925, the Italian economy was suffering a balance of payments imports,particularry.of crisis as grairyincreased. This, combi""a, *iir, in" i"iir"g ;"r"; t of thelira led Mussoliniio: L. Replace o" t*li:l_Ii!h, giy.r:ppeVolpi, who had stronglinks with rtaly,s financiersand big industrialisti.' l 2' Increase tariffs on foreign imports in order to rprotect -----' Italian industries. Tariffs were increasedin 4l 1925,l92g and1929. I 3. Launch the Battle for Grain (1925). 4. Revaluethe lira (1926).

.l The Battle for Grain (1925)

Mussolini's goal was to make Italy self-sufficientin wheat production. Tariffs on , i.mportedgrain were raised and the governmentprovided iinancial incentivesto farmersto switch production from oiher crops to grain. i\ '' Q. Wf,ut were its results?

r Grain production nearly , doubled (7g23-3g)from 4.5 million metric tons p.a. to 8.2million metrictons p.a.

r Grain imports fell by 75,/,, t in the sameperiod. Although successful ' in increasing grain outpu! this was achieved at the expenseof other crops, q,ndsg dam"ag"edItaliai Exports of citrus I fruit, olive oil, and wine all fell heavily." "[ri""it".".

policy was particurarry :^Jl" damaging in the south where the soir was not conoucrveto wheat-production but wasbetter suited to fruit and wine gro*ing-.- o Livestocklevels fell.sharplytoo as farmersswitched land-usage trom pasture to arable;e.g. the number oi iattle in the South ar"[p"aiyiU,l,,-. Furthermore, ' Italian consumerssuffered from higher food prices. As the historian Martin.Clark puts it so well, 'Mnssolini'sroheat policy maclelittle economicsense' But tlrcnit wasiot ttn ccortomicpoticy. tt wat po,tiiiisttnd propngnrrda, Iikeaz,arything else he did: not bread,btrt circtrses.,

135 fhe Rise & Rule of Sinsle Penv Stttcs n The Battle for the Lita 11926) F+'- in economic policy prior to the Great -"r Mussolini's one major intervention Depression (7g2g), #as his decision to revalue the lira- Rising prices and inci"uslt g import levels accompanied a sharp fall in. the lira's value' For r*I:I Mussolini thii was a cluestionof prestige;he announcedthat 'I slutlldcfe.ltd t.l1e Italia lira t'omy lastbreaih'. This proved disastrousas it was fixed at an artificially high rate of gb lire to the pound (haa been 154 to the pound) and so was known &'I-I as the quotanoaenta.

The revaluation hit Italian exports which became much more expensive as a lor,r"qn"tt.e. Exports were fuither hit by the tit-for-t1t war with other ;! "policy larilf .o,rnt.i"t that Mussolini's protectionist provoked' Consequently, the value of Italian exports was halved in the period 1925-38;from 44 million lire to :l 22 million lire. :3- Italian consumersshould have benefited from cheaper imports resulting from :l the revaluation but this was not the casebecause the Fascistgovernment raised F, I tariffs. Moreover, in7927, the government introduced alo% wage cut. Further wage cuts occurredin 1930' ;! Agriculture (seeabove also the Battle for Grain)

with the exceptionof the Battle for Grain, Fascisteconomic policy did ;! Overall, little to try to address'thebackward agricultural methods which characterised much of ituly'r farming or widespreadpeasant poverty. Fascistpropaganda presentedruial life as the ideal but the reality was that the.government sPent ;! (except for Grain)' iittl" ti*" or money on agriculturalissues for the Battle 1l o Mussolini virtually ignored the South where these problems were most *:: r acute. labourers' J:l-l o Living standardsdeteriorated for peasantsand agricultural \.,t o Nor could poor southernersso easily seekan escaPe-routeby emigrating,to the USA is immigration controls-were tightened considerably by the e7 American authorities.

o with growing underemployment and unemployment in rural areas, Ft- increaslnglyp"oor farmers-migrated to the citiesin spite of Fascistattempts to restriclthii'night from the land'; about 500,000agricultural labourers or peasantfarmers did so during Mussolini'srule. t"::T o The Fascistsclid nothing to challenge the interests of the traditional big landowners.In the 1930s;20,000families owned half of ltaly's arableland. }I-I

IT I :I t.\.t r. \li-- {j 136 .#fr, The Rise & Rule of Single Panv Stetcs

Land Reclamation

In 7928 the 'Muss

Little was achieved in terms of land reclamation but there was real successin the clraining of the Pontine Marshes, south of Rome. This had been a malaria- infesteiarea but the much publicised reclamation scheme transformed it in to farmland suitable for cultivation. New smallholdings and villages were established there. It also provided much-needed jobs during the. Depre.ssion' H"*"""r, this scheme was'really the exception as little was achieved elsewhere.

1n7934 the government announced that 4.75 million hectares of land had been or were in thJ process of being reclaimed. Martin Clark estimates that the real iigure or,ly about 250,0-00hectares. The cost of the reclamation schemes amounted-us to almost 8 billion lire.

The Great Depression: the ltalian Economy in the 1930s

The Wall street Crash in America (1929)hit Italy, like the rest of Europe, hard' Unemployment rose to over 2 million by 7933.-The statisticssuggest that the Fascisi regime coped marginally better than most other Western European governmentsin tackling the effectsof the Depression.

Italv Western European average "/r,DroP n GNP 5.4 7.1 fi, Drop in 22.7 23.2 industrial output Source: P Ciocca and G Toniolo, L'Economia ltaliana durante il Fascismo,Bologna' 1976

Severalmajor banks were threatenedwith-collaps_e_in 1931 in.ltaly during 1 worldwide'banking crisis stemmingfrom the Wall StreetCrash' The Bank of Italy itself was at rist. th" Fascistgovernment effectively respondedby creating the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano $giD; IMI provided financial help to shore up ailing banksand industries.

Even more importantly, the regime set up the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) in 19S5in order*to rescue6anks and firms and take over their late 1930s,the governmentcontrolled20% of thecapital shares.By the -t^f^ll"]y': industriai firms, especiallyiniteel, shipping and electricity. only the USSRhad a largerpublic sector.

intended as a temPorary holding comPany, the The IRI had been initially -with task of sorting out firms ind then returning them to the private sector.However, by 7937,the iiil had becomea permanentagency led by the non-fascist,Alberto B'eneduce.It becamea training ground for a new progressivegeneration.of who later contributed"slgnificantlyto Italy's'eConomicmiracle' of the -unog"r,1950sand 1960s.

137 Ihe R.ise& Rule of Sinsle Panv States

Fascisteconomic successes: r' There was significant infrastructure investment, e.g. the autostrada (motorway) network was built. However, minor roads were neglected. r' IRI did much to mitigate the worst effects of the Depressionby rescuing banks and companiesthreatened with financial collapse' r' Hydro-electric power was successfullydevelopecl; by 1937, 74.8 billion kilowatt-hours were being produced. r' 5000km of railways were electrified. r' Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by an averageof 7.2% pa between 7922and 1940,in spite of the GreatDepression' r' There was particular growth in the chemical, electrical and machine sectors. Italy became the largest exporter of artificial fibre (rayon). Industry overtook agriculture in the 1930s,making up the largestshare of GNP (GrossNational Product). r' Mussolini at last recognisedthe need to devalue the lira, which he did in "1936.

Howevet there were also seriouseconomic failings in the 1930s:

I Huge budget deficits mounted up - 72,750million lire (1938-39)- because of the cosiof the Abyssinian War (1935-36)and Italy's intervention in the Spanish Civil War (7936-39). t The Abyssinian invasion led to damaging League of Nations' sanctions, which caused severeraw material shortages.In L936-38,Italy's imports were only a one third of the 1913level. Also Italian exports were affected, with a major reorientation of Italy's trade relations; after 7936,25% of Italy's exports went to Africa and another 25% went to Germany.

I The regime failed in its increased drive for autarky (economic self- sufficiency), although there was some successin aluminium and oil. Mussolini had to inform Hitler in 1939 that Italy was not ready to go to war.

I Small businesseslost out to a number of huge companies(e.g. Fiat) that virtually monopolisedparticular economicsectors, e.g. SNIA Viscosaand Montecatinicontrolled almost the whole chemicalsindustry'

t Mussolini failed to make Italy into a great industrial power. In 1939,Italy produced iust2.4 million tons of steel;Britain, by contrast,produced 13.4 million tons and Germany22.5 million.

I Increasedstate interferenceand a growing Fascistbureaucrary were not only very costly but hamperedbusiness by the introduction of a lot of 'red tape', regulationsand paperwork.

t Living standardsfor most ordinary Italians fell. The govemment obliged industrial workers to accept wage cuts in 7927, 1930 and 1'934- Agricultural wagesdropped by between20 to 40%during the 1930s.

138 p 'fl-re Rise ct Rule of Sinqle per-tvstates I

1}1 who benefitedmost from Fascisteconomic policies were9:::ll1:. the big industrialists:::lll.groups I and large landowners. Their interests were protected, for example by the imposition- oigreater discipline on the workforce and the removal of free trade unions. The m-iddle-classgained from an expansion of jobs I in the expandeclbureaucracy. As pointed out above,.living stanclards fell for most of the inc-lustrial ancl agricultural labourers. The Faicists did bring in welfare *"urrr", in the 19t0;; 3 largely as. a response .to the, Depression."In 1934 fa;iit"oilo-ur,."s were introduced and, later, schemes for insurance against accidenis ancl sickness were ac-lded.These initiatives prgu:.{ v€ry expensi-ve to the state, but Mussolini, as 3 ever/ was more concernec-lwith public image. 3 Fascism and Italian Society 3

The Fascisttakeover was only partial, Italy became much less of a totalitarian state than 9 ; existing instituti.ns (the monarJy, ,n" senate) elites (generals, and big landowners] industriaristrl ."^"i""J,'".g. th" p."r".i, retaineda key role in local governmentand most were not Fascists.Fascist influenceoveieducation, ? parti'cularlythe universities,was limited. as the,liberal Just under governments,rhe south #as badry negrectedbf in"'nur.irts, reclamation e.g.rand schemes and Dopolavoro were i"neffectivein ,h"."Slr,li.'ih; ? illiteracy rate in Calabriawas still nearly 50,/nin the 1930s. t 9 The Church-StateRift Healed $g2g)

one of the gr_eatest weaknessesof 'Liberal Itary, had been the long-term rift t between the Italian state and the vatican. tnitiatty, Muslorini would have seemedan unlikely candidate for resolving.the 'Roilun e""rtior,, as, prior to 7922, he had shown himself to be stron[ly anti-clerr.ui u.,a had written a t pamphlet entitled, 'God DoesNot Exist'. Fo*"rr"r, tvtursotini recognised the potentialgains- he .grld.make by meansof an agree.n"ni-*itn the Vatican. showing lris characteristic- a pragmatism,he remariied his wife Rachelein a church wedding in lgZSand hadhis chiliren baptised. Healingthe Church-r!L* was arguabryMussorini's most important triumph. By reaching-a series lf, pop; 3 of agreements"wtth'the l;'itt;; M"rr"tini won the approval of millions of ltalian Catholicsand'reassu.ed'many conservative Italians,particularly membersof the establishme"t,thuiih"'r"gi-" had turned its back on the radical origins-of the Fascistmovement. 3 'Roman The resolution of the Question' also won the regime prestige abroad. The pope famously referred to Mussolini as,'the ,non,rniby priaitlenie,. t The signing of the Lateran (1929),. .Tqeaty however, angered many radical Fascistswho were deeply anti-cleriial'and ihe .onti"ui"g inalp"r,a"rrce of the CatholicChurch sev"rely-underminedthe Fascists'claim-to totalitarian l rule. The Catholic chuich remained a rival source or autho.iiy"""..ir" and Fascism. values to

; Pope Pius XI was keen to reachan accommodation with Mussolini. The pope was fiercely anti-Socialist ancl Communist and welcomed the Fascists,

739 The Ri1 .\. Rule o[ Single Panl- States destruction of the left in Italy. The Pope had been encouraged by early concessionsto the Church made by Mussolini in the early to mid-1920s,e.g. exempting the clergy from paying taxes. In return, Pius XI had forced ttie resignationof Dom Sturzo, the leaderof the Popolari, who had been a powerful opponent of Fascism.

Tl'reLateran Pactscontained three agreements signed in1929: &- l. The Lateran Treaty involved the recognition of the pope's sovereign rule over the Vatican City.

2. The Concordatrecognised Catholicism as the sole state religion. Church marriages were made legal and religious education in secondary schoolsbecame compulsory (Mussolini had already made it compulsory in primary schools).Catholic Action could continue to operate as long as it carried out its 'actiuitiesindependently of all political parties and Br immediatelysubordinate to the Clurch hierarchy,for the diffusion ttnd realizationof Catholicprinciples.'

3. The Vatican received compensationfor the loss of the Papal States (1860)and Rome (1870)to the tune of 750 million lire in castrand 1000 million lire in governmentbonds

In spite of these agreements,there was significant friction between the Fascist government and the Catholic Church in the 1930s.In particular, the Fascists were_worried by the activities of Catholic Action, the Catholic lay organisation which had over 1 million members.A major row erupted in 1931over Catholic Action's involvement in sport, which the FascistYouth organisation, the Balilla, claimed a monopoly over. On this occasion,the Vatican climbed down but Catholic youth movements(under the umbrella of Catholic Action) continued to rival the Fascistyouth and studentorganisations.

The Catholic student organisation,FUCI, was very influential'and many of its members, for example Aldo Moro, in the 1930sbecame leading figures in the Christian DemocraticParty in Italy after 1945.

In the late 1930s,the Pope was critical of the anti-semitic laws introduced by Mussolini. Nevertheless, Mussolini's relations with the Church remained reasonablycordial asboth sideshad much to gain from the Concordat.The Pope applauded the Fascistinvasion of Abyssinia (1935-36)as a 'crusade' and praisid Mussolini's intervention in the SpanishCivil War (1936-39)against the 'godless' forcesof the Left.

Propaganda,Control of the Media and the Arts

Unsurprisingly given his experience and skill as a iournalist, Mussolini saw control of the media as vital. Prefects were given the power to censor newspapers in 7923 and the opposition press was suppressed in 7926. However, the Fascist govemment did not seek to take over the-press and only owned 10o/o of newspapers. Mussolini was, however, determined to control what the newsPaPers wrote and reported. Journalists and editors who stepped out of line could be fined or banned from joumalism, but in practice most editors conformed to the guidelines laid down by the government. The Fascist Press

r40 'Ihc Rise & Rule of Sinslc Pertv States

Office instructed newspapers about how events should be reported and insisted on the need to avoid reporting bad news such as crime stories.

Initially Mussolini did not place a great emphasis on the importance of radio, partly because only 40,000 Italians owned a radio in the mid-1920s. However, this changed in the 1930s,as government broadcasts increased and ownership of radios went up to 1 million by the late 1930s. Similarly, at first, the Fascist government did not see film as a particularly important medium. In 1924 a government film agency, Istittrto Luce, was created to produce newsreels and documentaries. In 1937 the government funded an ltalian film studio, called Cinecitta. Yet, even then, there was not too great an emphasis on propaganda until the late 1930s.

Mussolini was constantly on the look out for propaganda opportunities to sell himself and the Fascist movement to the Italian people. Fascism concentrated on conveying an image of action and energy. Fascism's aim was to ireate a new type of Italian - more virile, heroic and selfless - and propaganda was one means the regime sought to use to promote that purpose. From 1925, the cult of the Duce was launched. This was aided by the publication of the best-selling biography of Mussolini by his mistress Margherita Sarfatti, entitled Dux (1926). As the historian Denis Mack Smith has put it, Mussolini was a 'stupendous poseur' and many Italians appeared to like this! Mussolini was presented as a superman who excelled at all sports, worked relentlessly and was loved by the people. The Fascists regularly organised mass parades and developed elaborate \ rituals, often using classical Roman imagery. Mussolini sought to revive the t Roman spirit.

\ Mussolini's use of propaganda was never as systematic as in Germany. The { Ministry of Popular Culture (popularly known as Minculpop) was not set up until 1937. Historians now largely agree that, particularly in the years 7929-36, \ the Fascist regime did enjoy widespread support. This'consensus' was partly t, the result of successful policies such as the Concordat with the Pope but also because of propaganda. However, the limitations of Fascist propaganda can be seen in the regime's failure to win popular support for the German alliance I a being promoted by Mussolini from the mid-1930s or the anti-semitic policy launched in 1938. During this more radical phase of Fascism, support for Mussolini began to ebb away and this process accelerated once Italy joined the I I Second World War in 1940.

The Arts , Compared to Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, Fascist control of the arts was t relatively limited and no major artist felt obliged to leave Italy. Fascists were d divided over what style of art to encourage. This reflected the radical and conservative factions within the Fascist movement. Neo-classicists preferred art i and architecture that drew its inspiration from ancient Rome, whereas a modernists encouraged abstract and experimental art. In 1939 these rival tendencies led to the creation of two major artistic prizes - the Cremona Prize \ and the Bergamo Prize. The Cremona Prize favoured traditional art and art as j propaganda and was established by Roberto Farinacci. In 1940 the themes included 'Listening to a speech by the Duce on the radio'. The Bergamo Prize was set up by Bottai to promote experimentation. s The Fascist Eovernment organisecl an average of 50 art exhibitions a year, to try to broaden popular accessto art. \ {,

) I r41 'l-hc Risc& Rule ,,t Sinqle Penv Stetes

Sport

The Fascistregime sought to use sport as a way of keeping the masse-shuPPI (seethe section on Dopolavoro) and also for piopaganda purposes' Mussolini was helped in this respectby the fact that Italy won the football world cup in 1934and 1938.

The Battle for Births $927)

In common with many other clictators,Mussolini ecluateda large population with power. Mussolini,in his desireto make-Italyinto u gTu! Power,sought to increise Italy's population. In 1927he launched-the so-calledBattle for Births, with a targeiof incieasingltaly's population ttom37 million to 60 million'

To encourage marriage and larger families, the government,imposed. higher taxeson bairelors ani awarded iredals to mothers who bore the most children' Italians with 10 or more children were exemPtedfrom income tax' Loans were time a child was !i"en to married couples,which-were pa*iafly :u"::l:d-:uch 6orn. Family allowanceswere also introduced in 1934.The Criminal Code of 1932banned contraception,abortion and sterilisation'

The Fascist regime had a very traditional view of women; seeing_their role purelv in termJof rearinglarge families and looking after the home.One Fascist Itoeur, described them is 'angels of the hearth'. However, the Fascistswere .rr,ibl" to reversethe trend of lrowing numbers of women attending university and getting public sectorjobs.

The Battle for Births was a failure. The birth-rate continued to fall in ltaly; in 191Lthere had been 147.5births for every 1000women of child-bearing age but bv 1936this had fallen to 102.7births. The overall population rose to just 44 ,riitlion (1940). This compares with 48 million in Britain and 68 million in Germany.

The slight rise in ltaly's population was the result of the falling death rate-and the hufe drop in on average233,000 Italians emigrated to the USA yE"r in ine perio"d"-igtu'tion;1901-10 but, in"the 1920s,this fell to 42,000and, in the "".t1930s, to just 11;500.The regime's attempt to promote earlier marriage also failei, witir the averageug" ut.hich ltalians married rising in the 1930s.

Anti_Semiticlaws (1938)

laws? Q. Wt y did Mussolini introduce anti-semitic

Historiansare very divided in their interpretationsof lvlussolini'sreasons for introducing anti-semiticlegislation in 1936.Fascists had shown racist attitudes towards Af"ricansin Libya ind Abyssiniabut there had been no evidenceof anti' semitism in Mussolini'i earlier careeror indeed within Fascismas a movement (with the exceptionof individuals like Farinacci).There were only 56,000.Iew1j1t (up L935), ituty {O.t%, oi the population) and Mussolini's mistress until MargheritaSarfatti, was Jewish.

142 'Il-re Rise & Rule of Stngle l''.lrt\' Stxtcs

r One theory put forward is that as Mussolini, in the late 1930s,was contemplatingwar, he wanted to weaken the Jewish community because he was not sure they could be trusted to be loyal'

. By 1938,Mussolini was leaning closerand closerto Nazi Germany-and, while there is no sign of Mussolini coming under Pressurefrom Hitler to adopt anti-semitisri, Mussolini's introduction of these laws_probably stemmed from a desire to establishcloser links with Hitler. It is tluite iit"ty tnut their timing (November 1938),coinciding with Kristallnacht by a (attackson Jewish shois ancl synagogues)in Germany, is-explained clesireon Mussolini'spart tob; in;t+ with the Fiihrer.The introduction of the passoRomatro (goose step) into the Italian army can be seenas Part of this trend.

An article written by Mussolini, published in February 1938,first heralded the the ;;;;;i;; ugui"rt ttt" 1"*r. In it,'Mussolini wrote about the need to reduce The_anti-semitic laws banned 'clisprop"ortioiatenumbler of lews in public .life.' marriase between Iews and non-|ews and barred fews from jobs in the civil t"r"i."?"a teaching(with the exceptionof Jewish war veterans).Iews were also barred from PNF"membership. Jiwish children were excluded from state schools.Up to 10,000non-Italian Jews were deported from Italy'

Historians are unanimous in iudging the anti-semitic laws to be a disastrous .r,irtuku by Mussolini. The laws r.,ierJdeeplyunpopular, even within the Fascist F;t. *ti"r" one third of ltalian jews were members. The Roman Catholic Church criticisedthe anti-semiticlaws. 6,000Italian fews left Italy by 1941,many Ma-ny-Italians \ of them successfulbusinessmen, professionals and academics._ J tu*, tigntry or wrongly, the anti-iewish campaign as the result of Mussolini 'kowtowing'to Hitler. \ I Youth policies q t The Fascistsencouraged a cult of youth; the party song was 'Giov.inezza'- 'Youth'. All totalitariXn regimes haue a particular toncein to indoctrinate the A next generation;Italian Fascismwas I vouns in grder to captureihe minds of the ir" JiFf"i""t in this rdspectfrom Hitler's German! orStalin's Russia.In 1926,the Fascists established the Opera Nazionale Balilla, bringing to-getherexisting pur.ist youth organisationsand providing state fundilg. The Balilla was placed t under tire contro"lof the Ministryof Educition in 1929.Rival youth_organisations were closeddown, althoughCatholic youth grouPsdid survive.Membership of the Balilla becameobligatJry in 1932.However, it is estimatedthat 4O%'ol Italian , children never joined."tvt"ttbetthip was low in rural areas,particularly in the South. 't There were different sectionsfor boys and girls and for different ages:

Age Boys Girls ., 6-8 'The Sons of the She-Wolf 'The Dauehtersof the She-Wolt' 8-1.3 t{nanta PiccoleItaliano 3 L4-18 TheAuancuurdisti Gioaqni ltqliane In 7937 the ONB joined with the Young Fascists (Fasci Giovanili) to create a 'a\ I single youth organisation, GIL (Gioventu*Italiana del Littorio) , fot 6-27 year olds. 9 t43 t -fhc Rise & Rule of Sinsle Partl' States

The Balilla was highly militarised and political indoctrination was a maior characteristicof the"movement.However, there were alsoextensive sporting and recreational activities organised by the Balilla and these did appeal to many children.

Education

At first ltalian schools retained considerablefreedom over what they taught' appointed the philosopher Giovanni Gentile as his first Minister for iuf"rrofl"i 'Gentile Education. clraftbd the' 1923 Education Act, which reformed the education system but more in the spirit of humanism than Fascism.Gentile's reforms incieased the elitist nature of the school system, promoting grammar schools (g,innasio),and encouragingphilosophy and classicalstudies. He gave lessempfiasis to technicaland vocationaleducation'

In order to ensure that the schoolsdid not propagateanti-Fascist ideas, anti- Fascistteachers were removed in the 1920sand all leachershad to take an oath of lovalw to Mussolini. In 1929 the Ministry of Public Instruction was i-a"rig"Jt"d the Ministry of National Educationi this was a significant change because in Italian 'educazione'means 'upbringing' and so is a more comprehensiveterm.

Mussolini's interferencein schoolswas relatively limited until the mid 1930s; only in 1936 were schools obliged to use Fascist textbooks. In 7936 a,single histry textbook became .o-pilrory, replacing the several,hundred then in ,.6ug"1TheFascists sought to promoti a pirticulir version of Italian history that *o,ild inspire devotioi to the Duce and to the PNF. Phy-sicaleducation was eiven sreiter priority, so that children could become fitter and so better londiti6ned for either-war(boys) or motherhood (girls!)

In 1939 the Education Minister, Giuseppe Bottai, launched a Schools Charter, which introduced far-reachingchanges, including a greateremphasis on.science and technoloqy and the intioduction of manual work into the curriculum. However. thi|ieform had too little time to have much impact as Italy joined in the second world war (1940)and then Fascismcollapsed in 1943.

Fascistindoctrination was certainly more successfulin primary schoolsthan in secondarv schools; in the latter, teachers prioritised academic results and subiectslike philosophyencouraged independent thinking' As discussedabove, it *u, only aiter the'mia-tgg0sttiat the Fiscistsattempted fundamental change-s to the education system.Martin Clark has concluded that, 'Pupilswere not hostile to Fascistideas, inrlced they acceptedthent as nortnal;but they uere not committed enthusiastseitlrcr.'

Italian universitiesenioyed considerable intellectual freedom under Mussolini as long as they outwardly conformed and the vast maiority of academicswere prefared to do so; onty f f /1200 university-professorsrefused to take an oath of ioyitty in L931.Lectures and journals were largely unsupervised'

Opera Nazionali Dopolavoro (19251

most popular of all the Fascist Dopolavoro ('after work') was definitely- the organisations and institutions set up by Mussolini. It was an umbrella organisationfor recreationand was highly successfulin expanding recreational

144 ,q "t .t :i 'fhe Ji Rise ct Rulc oi Sinsle Prrnv St:rtes

av opportunities, particularly for the working classes. Martin Clark points out that e its popularity was also the result of the emphasis being on 'futt, ntttpropagnntla'. Dopolavoro's membership reached 4 million in the 1930s.Dopolavoro owned theatres, libraries, football pitches and billiard halls. It organised free summer i holidays for children from poor families and excursions and holidays for J workers_.Dopolavoro clubhouses were set up in virtually every village and town in North and Central Italy but, in line with most other Fascist agencies, ts Dopolavoro was very much less effective and active in the South.

'3 MU LINI'S FOREIGN POLICY

,{ Mussolini ominated the making of foreign policy in Fascist I ther personally ding the position of Foreign Minister, as l're did t of the 1920s,or du \B the tenure of the foreign ministry by Dino Gra 928-32) or GaleazzoCi 1936-43). nl

e Q. Ho* have hi ns interpretedMussolini's icy? Thereis no rloubt that ini meant'To makcIt respectedand feared.' However, historians are ided over the extent Mussolini'sforeign e policy marked a break that of the libera and how far there was continuity. .\ t Furthermore, there is conside histori te about whether Mussolini's eventual alliance with Nazi wa result of ideology or pragmatism. 'Anti-Fascist' A historians such as and Gentile argue that FascistItaly D could have avoided the 'German ' and entry into the Second World War.

A |' By contrast, historians such as khorn and MacCregor Knox argue that the German alliance and I s agg \n of the late 1930sand early 1940s were the logical outcome of Fascist struggle and violence. Blinkorn q suggeststhat Mussolini war to alive, that Mussolini was I 'his anxious by the early L that moz and regime were Tqrozuingtoo comfortable,too paunchy ff middle-ngednnd neerte@ n challenges.' 'I Macgregor Knox rS put forward an int€ n that stresses the interdependence ascist foreign and domesti 'internsl consolidation '{ uas a prerequisit n conquestand foreign the decis itre p rerequisite { for a reaol . Knox, therefore,sees violent , whether at home or abroad, heart of Fascism. n rS During /1920s,Mussolini's foreign policy had much in with that of i the I governmentsbefore and after the First World he aimed to ; e taly's influence in the Balkans, Near East and East However, j ini's methods were certainly different from those is liberal )ssors.He was hasty and reckless, prone to make grandir res and, all, keen to increase Italian prestige and his own. d Mussolini saw an aggressive foreign policy as essential in order to tranil r the ltalian people - to make them into a dynamic, aggressive and united nati This a aim certainly seems increasingly evident in the mid to late 1930s whe \ the 5 Fascistregime, both at home and abroad, became more radical.

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