DOCSLIB.ORG

Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in the War on Terror: Bridging the Gap Sandra L

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in the War on Terror: Bridging the Gap Sandra L American University International Law Review Volume 22 | Issue 4 Article 5 2007 Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in the War on Terror: Bridging the Gap Sandra L. Hodgkinson Edward Cook Thomas Fichter Christian Fleming Jonathan Shapiro See next page for additional authors Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Hodgkinson, Sandra L. et al. "Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in the War on Terror: Bridging the Gap." American University International Law Review 22, no. 4 (2007): 583-671. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Authors Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Edward Cook, Thomas Fichter, Christian Fleming, Jonathan Shapiro, Jon Mellis, Brandon Boutelle, Stephen Sarnoski, and Gregory P. Noone This article is available in American University International Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol22/ iss4/5 CHALLENGES TO MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN THE WAR ON TERROR: BRIDGING THE GAP SANDRA L. HODGKINSON EDWARD COOK THOMAS FICHTER CHRISTIAN FLEMING JONATHAN SHAPIRO JON MELLIS BRANDON BOUTELLE STEPHEN SARNOSKI GREGORY P. NOONE* The authors are currently assigned to Navy Reserve Civil Law Support Activity 104, which is the reserve unit that supports the Office of the Judge Advocate General, United States Navy, International and Operational Law Division, in Washington D.C. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government, the Department of States, the Department of Defense, the United States Navy, or any other governmental or nongovernmental entity. All information obtained for this article was gathered through open sources or unclassified interviews and briefings. Lieutenant Commander Sandra L. Hodgkinson (JAGC, USN; J.D., University of Denver School of Law, 1995; M.A., Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1995; B.A., Tulane University, 1992) is the Deputy for War Crimes Issues at the U.S. State Department. 584 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. [22:583 IN TR O D U C TIO N ........................................................................... 587 I. LAW OF THE SEA PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE BOARDING OF VESSELS UNDER THE FLAG OF A FO REIG N STA TE ................................................................ 590 A. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND EXCEPTIONS TO EXCLUSIVE FLAG STATE JURISDICTION, INCLUDING Commander Edward J. Cook (JAGC, USN; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1989; A.B., College of William and Mary, 1986) is an attorney with the United States Department of Homeland Security. Commander Thomas Fichter (JAGC, USN; J.D., Seton Hall Law School, 1990; B.S., Fordham University, 1987) is a Monmouth County Assistant Prosecutor in Freehold, New Jersey assigned to the Special Prosecutions Unit. Lieutenant Commander Christian P. Fleming (JAGC, USN; J.D., Rutgers University School of Law - Newark, 1996; B.A., Gettysburg College, 1993) is a partner with Jabin & Fleming in East Brunswick, New Jersey. Lieutenant Commander Jonathan I. Shapiro (JAGC, USN; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1994; B.A., University of Michigan, 1989) is a Senior Institutional Integrity Officer for the Department of Institutional Integrity in the World Bank Group. Lieutenant Commander Jon Mellis (JAGC, USN; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School, 1995; B.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1992) is an Assistant General Counsel with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Lieutenant Brandon Boutelle (JAGC, USN; J.D., Albany Law School, 2000; B.S., Rochester Institute of Technology, 1997) is the Deputy Public Defender for Essex County, New York. Captain Stephen Sarnoski (JAGC, USN; J.D., University of Connecticut, 1985; M.P.A., University of Hartford, 1980; B.S., University of New Haven, 1975) served as Commanding Officer for this unit. Commander Gregory P. Noone (JAGC, USN; J.D., Suffolk University Law School, 1990; M.A., The Catholic University of America, 2002; B.A., Villanova University, 1987) is teaching at University of West Virginia and completing his Ph.D. The authors would like to express their gratitude to Commander (Select) John V. Danner, Jr., JAGC, USN, and Lieutenant Commander John Fojut, JAGC, USN, who served as editors for this article. Additionally, the authors would like to express appreciation to: Captain (Ret.) Ashley Roach, JAGC, USN, and to the Office of the Judge Advocate General, USN, International and Operational Law Division, in Washington D.C., for its guidance and support in this article. 2007] BRIDGING THE GAP MASTER'S CONSENT TO BOARDINGS ............................... 591 1. The Master's Authority in UNCLOS ......................... 593 2. The Master's Authority Under the International Maritime Organization Conventions (IMO) .............. 595 3. The Master's Authority in Custom, Practice (and Lore) in Commercial Shipping .................................. 601 B. MASTER'S CONSENT TO SEARCHES OF HIS VESSEL ........... 604 C. MASTER'S CONSENT TO THE CAPTURE OF BIOMETRIC DATA FROM A CREWMEMBER .......................................... 606 II. UNSCRS AS A BASIS FOR BOARDINGS AND SEARCHES: HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR USE OF MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS ................... 609 A . R H O D ESIA ......................................................................... 6 10 B . IR AQ .................................................................................. 6 14 C. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ...................................................... 617 D . H A ITI ................................................................................ 6 18 III. MODERN MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN THE W AR ON TERROR ................................................ 621 A. LEADERSHIP INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN A FGHANISTAN ................................................................. 622 B. ISRAELI NAVY KARINE-A INCIDENT ................................. 623 C. WAR ON TERROR MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS OTHER THAN AFGHANISTAN ....................... 625 D . PIRATES IN SOMALIA ......................................................... 628 IV. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE BASIS TO AUTHORIZE B O A R D IN G S ........................................................................ 630 A. MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS ON T ERRORISM ...................................................................... 630 B. THE ACHILLELAURO INCIDENT .......................................... 632 C. PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION (SUA) AND ITS 2005 PROTOCOL ............................................................... 633 D. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE SHIP MASTER AND THE FLAG STATE UNDER SUA AND ITS 2005 PROTOCOL ............................................................... 636 V. U.N. AUTHORITIES FOR MARITIME INTERCEPTION O PERA TIO N S ...................................................................... 638 AM. U, INT'L L. RE v. [22:583 A. SELF-DEFENSE UNDER U.N. CHARTER, ARTICLE 51 ........ 639 B. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON COMBATING TERRORISM POST 9/11 ................................ 644 VI. LAW ENFORCEMENT REGIMES AND AUTHORITIES FOR MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS ........... 648 A. COUNTER-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS REGIME .................... 649 B. HUMAN SMUGGLING OPERATIONS REGIME ....................... 654 C. THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) ............. 655 VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS INTO MORE EFFECTIVE TOOLS IN THE WAR ON T ER R O R ............................................................................... 662 A. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN THE WAR ON T ERR OR ............................................................................ 662 1. A U.N. Security Council Resolution is Golden ......... 662 2. Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter A lw ays Trum ps ......................................................... 663 3. When in Doubt, Obtain Flag-State Consent .............. 664 4. BoardingAgreements Save Time ............................... 665 5. There Are No Treaties Exactly on Point .................... 665 6. The IMO Has Yet To Solve the Problem ................... 666 B. EXPANDING AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN THE WAR ON TERROR ..... 666 1. Seek or Interpret U.N. Security Council Authority to Conduct Maritime Interception Operations to Prevent Terrorism ..................................................... 667 2. Conduct Non-ConsensualBoardings and the Taking of Biometrics as Consistent with the U.N. Charter ...................................................................... 668 3. Seek Expanded Authorities Under the InternationalMaritime Organization(IMO) ............. 668 4. Continue to Pressfor PSI and Other Bilateral BoardingAgreements ................................................ 669 5. Seek an InternationalConvention that Authorizes Non-ConsensualBoarding of Vessels, and the Taking of Biometrics, when Appropriate
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Palingenesis of Maritime Piracy and the Evolution of Contemporary Counter-Piracy Initiatives
    THE PALINGENESIS OF MARITIME PIRACY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONTEMPORARY COUNTER-PIRACY INITIATIVES BY ROBERT COLM MCCABE, M.A. THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF Ph.D. DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND, MAYNOOTH HEAD OF DEPARTMENT Dr Jacinta Prunty SUPERVISOR OF RESEARCH Dr Ian Speller December 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS Contents............................................................................................................. i Dedication.......................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments............................................................................................. v Abbreviations.................................................................................................... vii List of figures..................................................................................................... x INTRODUCTION............................................................................................ 1 CHAPTER I - MARITIME PIRACY: A TWENTIETH-CENTURY PALINGENESIS? 1.1 Introduction and general context...................................................... 20 1.2 Early legal interpretations and historical evolution......................... 22 1.3 Twentieth century legal evolution.................................................... 25 1.4 Resurgence of maritime piracy in the nineteenth century................ 31 1.5 Suppression of maritime piracy in the nineteenth century............... 37 1.6 Pre-war period (1900-14)................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Thunder and Lightning Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates
    Thunder and Lightning Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates Edward C. Mann III, Colonel, USAF Volume two of a two-volume series Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama April 1995 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mann, Edward C., 1947− Thunder and lightning: Desert Storm and the airpower debates / Edward C. Mann III. p. cm. Includes index. 1. Persian Gulf War, 1991—Aerial operations, American. 2. Airpower United States. DS79.724.U6M36 1995 95-3971 956.7044′248—dc20 CIP First Printing January 1995 Second Printing May 1995 Third Printing August 1996 Disclaimer This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or pos ition of the Department of Defense or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release. For the Troops Those who have, those who would, and, especially, those who may yet have to. My confidence in you is total. Our cause is just! Now you must be the thunder and lightning of Desert Storm. May God be with you, your loved ones at home, and our country. Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf January 1991 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK To preach the message, to insist upon proclaiming it (whether the time is right or not, to convince, reproach, and encourage, as you teach with all patience. The time will come when people will not listen to sound doctrine, but will follow their own desires and will collect for themselves more and more teachers who will tell them what they are itching to hear.
    [Show full text]
  • USNS Shoshone
    NATIONAL REGISTER ELIGIBILITY ASSESSMENT VESSEL: ex-USS Vancouver (LPD-2) USS Vancouver underway off the coast of Oahu, Hawaii in 1967. U.S. Navy photo by PH3 D.R. Hyder. http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/09/0902.htm Vessel History The amphibious transport dock ship USS Vancouver (LPD-2) was laid down on November 19, 1960 at the New York Naval Shipyard in Brooklyn, New York. It was launched on September 15, 1962, and commissioned on May 11, 1963. Vancouver was the second of three Raleigh-class LPDs; USS La Salle (LPD-3) was the third and last of the class. LPDs are named for cities that honor celebrated pioneers and explorers. Vancouver was named for the town of Vancouver, Washington. George Vancouver (1757-1798), British naval officer and explorer, commanded a British expedition that explored Puget Sound in 1792. After completing builder’s trials off New York n the summer of 1963, Vancouver proceeded to Norfolk, Virginia for shakedown training. On August 14 Vancouver steamed from there to its new homeport of San Diego, California via the Panama Canal. Following a brief stop at Acapulco, Mexico after assisting a disabled fishing vessel, Vancouver arrived in San Diego on 2 August 31. That fall Vancouver conducted amphibious operations and visited its namesake, Vancouver, Washington. In December, Vancouver displayed its capabilities for the new Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze and several high-ranking naval officers. From February to May 1964, Vancouver underwent post-shakedown maintenance and repairs in Long Beach, California. In late June it steamed north to Vancouver, Canada for that city’s annual maritime festival prior to spending the July 4th holiday in San Francisco.
    [Show full text]
  • Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne US Navy
    Oral History Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne U.S. Navy (Retired) Conducted by David F. Winkler, Ph.D. Naval Historical Foundation 16 July 1998 26 August 1998 Naval Historical Foundation Washington, DC 2000 Introduction I first contacted Vice Admiral Bayne in 1996, it was in relation to another series of interviews I had intended to conduct with Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth. Bayne had served as Korth’s Executive Assistant and thus could provide an overview of the issues. He invited me to Irvington and was gracious with his time, providing me with good background material. At that time it became obvious that Bayne would be a good interview subject, however, he politely declined. Unfortunately, Korth fell ill and subsequently passed away so the planned interviews were never conducted. However, Bayne had a change of heart and agreed to a biographical interview that included the period that he served as Korth’s EA. Besides serving as a SecNav EA, Vice Admiral Bayne’s career is significant as he served in the Submarine Service during a period of transformation from WWII diesel boats to a force including nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. In his interviews, Bayne details a career serving as a junior officer on a Fleet Boat in the Western Pacific battling the Japanese Empire to command of a missile boat flotilla in the Mediterranean Sea in the late 1960s. In addition, he served in several political-military posts, with his most important being Commander, Middle East Force. As COMIDEASTFOR, Bayne negotiated with the Bahraini government for an American naval shore presence there that continues to the present.
    [Show full text]
  • Naval Postgraduate School Graduation Exercises / Class of June 1996
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Institutional Publications Commencement Ceremony programs 1996-06 Naval Postgraduate School Graduation Exercises / Class of June 1996 Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.) Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40783 ~~~~~~~~~.REF v NAVAL !I V.4 POSTGRADUATf~~6E SCHOOL --- Graduation &erases 10:30A.M. Thuntlay 20June1996 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION Superintendent RADM MARSHA J. EVANS, USN Provost DR. RICHARD S. ELSTER i Dean of Students and Director of Programs CAPT JAMES J. MILLER, USN -- Dean of Management and Security Studies DR. JAMES S. BLANDIN Dean of Engineering and Computational Sciences DR. JOHN P. POWERS Dean of Operational and Applied Science DR. PETER PURDUE Dean of Research (Acting) DR. GORDON E. SCHACHER Director of Military Operations CAPT JON B. SCHMIDT, USN \ • ~ 2 3 REAR ADMIRAL MARSHA JOHNSON EVANS Superintendent Naval Postgraduate School A native of Springfield, Illinois, Rear Admiral Marsha Johnson Evans graduated with high honors from Occidental College in June 1968. Two months later she was commissioned an Ensign at Women's Officer School, Newport, Rhode Island. Ear1y assignments included duty at the Defense Intelligence Agency, on the Commander, Fleet Air Western Pacific staff in Atsugi, Japan, and in the Office of lo the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-04). In 1973, she became the first woman Surface Assignments Officer in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Concurrently, she served as Senior Social Aide to the President of the United States. Following selection as a Chief of Naval Operations Scholar in 1975, Rear Admiral Evans earned a Master's Degree in Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
    [Show full text]
  • Naval Accidents 1945-1988, Neptune Papers No. 3
    -- Neptune Papers -- Neptune Paper No. 3: Naval Accidents 1945 - 1988 by William M. Arkin and Joshua Handler Greenpeace/Institute for Policy Studies Washington, D.C. June 1989 Neptune Paper No. 3: Naval Accidents 1945-1988 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 Overview ........................................................................................................................................ 2 Nuclear Weapons Accidents......................................................................................................... 3 Nuclear Reactor Accidents ........................................................................................................... 7 Submarine Accidents .................................................................................................................... 9 Dangers of Routine Naval Operations....................................................................................... 12 Chronology of Naval Accidents: 1945 - 1988........................................................................... 16 Appendix A: Sources and Acknowledgements........................................................................ 73 Appendix B: U.S. Ship Type Abbreviations ............................................................................ 76 Table 1: Number of Ships by Type Involved in Accidents, 1945 - 1988................................ 78 Table 2: Naval Accidents by Type
    [Show full text]
  • The Lessons of Modern
    IX. Phase Six: Expansion of the tanker war in the Gulf to include Western navies, while the land and air war of attrition continues: MARCH 1987 to DECEMBER 1987 9.0 The Increasing Importance of the War at Sea Important as the fighting around Basra was in shaping the future of the land war, developments in the Gulf were leading to a new major new phase of the war. January involved more Iraqi and Iranian attacks on Gulf targets than any previous month in the conflict. Iraq struck at Kharg Island, Iran's transloading facilities at Sirri, and Iran's shuttle tankers and oil facilities. These strikes did not make major cuts in Iran's oil exports, but they did force Iran sent another purchasing mission to Greece, London, and Norway to buy 15 more tankers. Iraqi aircraft continued to strike at tankers and the Iranian oil fields. They hit Iran's Cyrus and Norouz fields in late March and April, as well as the Ardeshir oil field, and they continued attacks on Iranian shipping to Sirri. Nevertheless, Iraq still did not score the kind of successes it had scored against Kharg and Iraq's tanker shuttle the previous year. Iran's exports remained relatively high. Figure 9.1 Patterns in Iraqi and Iranian Attacks on Gulf Shipping: 1984 to June 30, 1987 Month Iraqi Attacks Iranian Attacks Total Attacks Deaths Ship Loss 1984 36 18 54 49 32 1985 33 14 47 16 16 1986 October 1 3 4 - - November 9 2 11 - - December 5 0 5 - - Total 1986 66 41 107 88 30 1987 January 7 6 13 - - February 6 3 9 - - March 3 3 6 - - April 2 3 5 - - January-June 29 29 58 10 4 Source: Adapted from the Economist, April 25, 1987, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm Vol. 1, July 1992
    Description of document: US Navy Salvage Report Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm Vol. 1, July 1992 Requested date: 20-December-2007 Released date: 17-December-2008 Posted date: 05-May-2009 Title of document T0800-AE-RPT-010/SUPSALV, 0910-LP-500-5800 U.S. Navy Salvage Report Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm Volume 1 Source of document: Department of the Navy Naval Sea Systems Command [email protected] The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. T0800·AE·RPT·010/SUPSALV 0910·Lp·500·5800 U. S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM VOLUME 1 PUBLISHED BY DIRECTION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND JULY 1992 FOREWORD This report reviews the salvage events of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, reflects on the Navy's current salvage force preparedness, and presents a strategy and agenda for meeting similar challenges in the future.
    [Show full text]
  • Table of Contents
    BAHRAIN COUNTRY READER TABLE OF CONTENTS George Quincey Lumsden 1972-1974 Desk Officer for Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates, Washington, DC Wat T. Cluverius, IV 1976-1978 Ambassador, Bahrain Charles L. Daris 1987-1988 Deputy Chief of Mission, Manama Kenneth A. Stammerman 1989-1992 Consul General, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia Nancy E. Johnson 1990 Temporary Duty, Manama Lawrence H. Hydle 1991 Political/Military Officer, Manama Arthur H. Hughes 1994-1997 Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA, Washington, DC David M. Ransom 1994-1997 Ambassador, Bahrain Johnny Young 1997-2001 Ambassador, Bahrain GEORGE QUINCEY LUMSDEN Desk Officer for Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates Washington, DC (1972-1974) Ambassador George Quincey Lumsden was born in 1930 in Montclair, New Jersey. He graduated from Princeton in 1952 and also attended the Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island, graduating in November 1652. He entered the Navy in 1952 and then went on to join the Foreign Service. He held positions in Turkey, Germany, Jordan, and Kuwait before becoming the US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 11, 2000. Q: What about in your area - I’m really thinking of the Gulf states, including Oman - what was happening? Were the Iranians sending mullahs or the equivalent thereof to stir the population up? There is a sizeable Iranian population in all those. LUMSDEN: They didn’t have to send mullahs. The mullahs from the area went to Tehran and were energized. Certain key areas in the Gulf have very large Iranian communities. You can go to parts of the souk in places like Bahrain and Dubai and suddenly you don’t hear any Arabic.
    [Show full text]
  • Vice Admiral Herman A. Shelanski Naval Inspector General
    2/5/2018 U.S. Navy Biographies - VICE ADMIRAL HERMAN A. SHELANSKI Vice Admiral Herman A. Shelanski Naval Inspector General Vice Adm. Herman Shelanski holds a Bachelor of Science in Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology from the University of Colorado and a Master of Science in Electrical and Space Systems Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, the Navy Nuclear Power School and Prototype, the Naval Reactors Commanding Officer Nuclear Engineer Course, as well as the Naval War College. At sea, he served as the assistant navigator aboard USS Independence (CV 62), and completed several deployments in the E-2C Hawkeye. His first squadron, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) 117, won two consecutive Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Battle “E” Awards, Safety Awards and the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Excellence Award, and he personally was selected as the 1985 Hawkeye of the Year. He commanded VAW-121, the “Bluetails”, aboard USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) and was again awarded the CNO Battle “E” Award, Safety Award and the AEW Excellence Award. He commanded, then decommissioned the U.S. 6th Fleet’s fighting command ship, USS La Salle (AGF 3), and served as the first executive officer aboard USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) before commanding USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) including a seven-month deployment to the Arabian Gulf in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Harry S. Truman was awarded the 2008 CNO Safety Award, Battle “E” Award and the Secretary of Defense Large Category Maintenance Award. He also commanded Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 10, consisting of Harry S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Iran-Iraq War - Chapter XIV 05/01/90 Page XIV - 1
    The Iran-Iraq War - Chapter XIV 05/01/90 Page XIV - 1 XIV. THE TANKER WAR AND THE LESSONS OF NAVAL CONFLICT 14.0 The Tanker and Naval Wars The Iran-Iraq War involved two complex forms of naval conflict: Iraq's attempts to weaken Iran by destroying its ability to use tankers to export oil, and a U.S.-led Western naval presence in the Gulf that was intended to ensure the freedom of passage for tankers to Kuwait and the overall security of shipping to and from neutral Gulf countries. Both forms of conflict led to substantial escalation. Iran reacted to Iraq's tanker war by putting increasing military and political pressure on the Southern Gulf states to halt their support of Iraq. The U.S. and Western European presence in the Gulf led to growing clashes with Iran that escalated steadily to the point where they were a major factor in Iran's decision to agree to a ceasefire. The history of these two naval conflicts, and their overall impact on the war, has already been described in some detail. The naval fighting involved the use of a wide range of naval, air, missile, and mine warfare systems, however, and presents a number of interesting lessons regarding the use of these systems in naval warfare. It also provides important insights into the effect of strategic air attacks on naval shipping, and the problems of conflict management and controlling escalation. The key lessons and issues raised by the war may be summarized as follows: • The tanker war was the most important aspect of the fighting at sea, but it never produced a major interruption in Iran's oil exports.
    [Show full text]
  • The Gulf War Than Had Been Deployed Since World War II, the Gulf War Involved Few Tests of the Unique Capabilities of Seapower
    GW-10 Naval and Amphibious Forces October 15, 1994 Page 860 Chapter Ten: Naval And Amphibious Forces While Seapower played a dominant role in enforcing the UN sanctions and embargo during Desert Shield, it played a largely supportive role in Desert Shield. In spite of the fact that the Coalition deployed more seapower during the Gulf War than had been deployed since World War II, the Gulf War involved few tests of the unique capabilities of seapower. In many areas, lessons are more the exception than the rule. Naval airpower played an important role in supporting the Coalition air campaign, but the unique capabilities of sea- based and amphibious air power were only exploited in missions against a weak Iraqi Navy. Sea control and the campaign against Iraqi naval forces presented only a limited challenge because the Iraqi Navy was so small, and the Coalition's amphibious capabilities were not used in combat. While the Gulf War demonstrated the importance of low cost systems like naval mines and countermine capabilities, the countermine campaign is difficult to analyze because Iraq was allowed to mine coastal waters without opposition during Desert Shield. Naval gunfire supported several Coalition land actions, but its value was never fully exploited because the Coalition had such a high degree of air supremacy, and Iraq was forced to retreat for other reasons. This makes it difficult to draw broad lessons about the role of sea power in contingencies involving major surface actions, sea-air-missile encounters, and actual amphibious landings. at the same time, naval forces did illustrate As a result, the Gulf War's lessons apply more to the details of actual operations than broad doctrinal and operational issues.
    [Show full text]