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The Gulf War Than Had Been Deployed Since World War II, the Gulf War Involved Few Tests of the Unique Capabilities of Seapower

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The Gulf War Than Had Been Deployed Since World War II, the Gulf War Involved Few Tests of the Unique Capabilities of Seapower GW-10 Naval and Amphibious Forces October 15, 1994 Page 860 Chapter Ten: Naval And Amphibious Forces While Seapower played a dominant role in enforcing the UN sanctions and embargo during Desert Shield, it played a largely supportive role in Desert Shield. In spite of the fact that the Coalition deployed more seapower during the Gulf War than had been deployed since World War II, the Gulf War involved few tests of the unique capabilities of seapower. In many areas, lessons are more the exception than the rule. Naval airpower played an important role in supporting the Coalition air campaign, but the unique capabilities of sea- based and amphibious air power were only exploited in missions against a weak Iraqi Navy. Sea control and the campaign against Iraqi naval forces presented only a limited challenge because the Iraqi Navy was so small, and the Coalition's amphibious capabilities were not used in combat. While the Gulf War demonstrated the importance of low cost systems like naval mines and countermine capabilities, the countermine campaign is difficult to analyze because Iraq was allowed to mine coastal waters without opposition during Desert Shield. Naval gunfire supported several Coalition land actions, but its value was never fully exploited because the Coalition had such a high degree of air supremacy, and Iraq was forced to retreat for other reasons. This makes it difficult to draw broad lessons about the role of sea power in contingencies involving major surface actions, sea-air-missile encounters, and actual amphibious landings. at the same time, naval forces did illustrate As a result, the Gulf War's lessons apply more to the details of actual operations than broad doctrinal and operational issues. There are, however, important lessons that can be drawn regarding rapid deployment, naval air, cruise missiles, naval gunfire, preparing for amphibious operations, and sealift. Naval operations illustrated the importance of sea control and the flexibility of naval power. They showed the importance of combined arms capabilities and jointness. They illustrated the value of carrier task forces, naval air power and long range strike capabilities, precision warfare, and night/all-weather capabilities. They also illustrated the importance of readiness, high training standards, and initiative. The Role of Seapower in Deploying and Protection Coalition Forces Chapter Two has shown that Seapower played a critical role in enforcing the UN sanctions and embargo during Desert Shield, and provided some of the first elements of US power projection capabilities to arrive on the scene. The two British and eight US naval Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved GW-10 Naval and Amphibious Forces October 15, 1994 Page 861 forces in the Gulf on August 2 were rapidly reinforced by the carrier battle group led by the USS Independence in the Indian Ocean, and by the carrier battle group led by the USS Eisenhower in the Eastern Mediterranean. Both carrier battle groups and their embarked air wings were placed under the control of USCENTCOM on August 7, which began the build-up of the largest naval task force since World War II.1 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) proved to be of particular value in supporting rapid power projection.2 The first three MPS ships coming from Diego Garcia were ordered to leave for the Gulf on August 7, 1990 and arrived in a matter of days. The three 755 foot ships carried more cargo than would have been possible with 3,000 C-141 airlift flights. They not only carried military equipment and cargoes, but maintained the equipment, made it combat ready, and off-loaded in a stream that allowed rapid "marry up" with the Marine personnel arriving by air. It was the Maritime Prepositioning Ships that allowed the 16,500 Marines of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to fly into Saudi Arabia, marry up with all their combat equipment, and be combat capable by August 25, 1990. Naval forces played a major role in deploying land forces. Sealift carried 95% of all the cargo used to equip and supply the US and European land forces. The US Navy deployed a total of 11 afloat prepositioned ships (APS) with ordnance, fuel, and supplies for the Army and Air Force plus one carrying a field hospital. A total of thirteen Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) were eventually deployed from Diego Garcia, Guam and the Atlantic, and carried the unit equipment and supplies for three USMC expeditionary brigades and two hospital ships that were deployed to the area. The Navy made extensive use of a force of eight SL-7 fast sealift ships and of 40 of the 96 ships in its Ready Reserve Force (RRF). About 75% of all US military cargoes were carried on this force. Only 4.4% of the cargo that they carried went to the US Navy forces in the Gulf. The US military Sealift Command (MSC) delivered more than 2,000 tanks, 2,200 armored vehicles, 1,000 helicopters, and hundreds of self propelled artillery weapons.3 At the peak of Desert Storm, the US deployed six carriers and a total of more than 165 ships.4 Allied nations deployed more than 65 ships to Southwest Asia, including those in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.5 These forces included surface combatants from the Southern Gulf navies, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The British, Kuwaiti, Spanish, Saudi, and US navies engaged in offensive anti-surface warfare against the Iraqi Navy. The Southern Gulf navies patrolled their coastal waters, and other Coalition navies provided fleet defense and protected logistic ships and carriers. For example, France placed one Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved GW-10 Naval and Amphibious Forces October 15, 1994 Page 862 frigate under US operational control on February 15 to provide escort missions for logistic ships, although it was not authorized to carry out offensive operations.6 Coalition naval forces were placed under the command of USNAVCENT as the Coalition naval commander, and performed a number of combat roles in addition to maintaining sea control , attacking Iraqi naval forces, and supporting the countermine campaign. As has been discussed in Chapter Seven, naval forces launched cruise missiles in support of the air campaign and strategic bombing. They played a major role in both the defensive and offensive air campaign. They, provided naval gunfire support, and an amphibious capability that played a major role in tying substantial amounts of Iraqi land forces to coastal defense positions, and also provided a contingency capability to seize a line of communication into Kuwait. The Role of Naval Airpower in the Air Campaign Although the Coalition did not need to rely on the unique capabilities of sea-based air forces during Desert Storm, Chapters Six and Seven have shown that it relied heavily on carriers and on naval air forces. The US Navy initially deployed three carriers with a total of 60 F-14s, 60 F/A-18s, 45 A-6Es, 15 EA-6Bs, and 30 S-3s, for a total of 210 aircraft. By Desert Storm, it had deployed a total of six carriers with 100 F-14s, 10 F/A-18s, 95 A-6Es, 24 A-7Es, 26 EA-6Bs, and 50 S-3s, for a total of 395 aircraft. The USMC air wing had 72 F/A-18s, 60 AV-8Bs, 20 A-6Es, 15 EA-6Bs, 24 OV-10s, and 24 KC-130s for a total of 215 aircraft. The Marines also had 325 helicopters, including 50 AH-1Ws, 25 AH-1Js, 50 UH- 1s, 120 CH-46s, and 80 CH-53s.7 The US Navy and USMC each flew more sorties than the two largest allied air forces combined, and they flew a total of nearly 30% of all US sorties and 25% of all Coalition sorties. As Table 10.1 shows, US Navy aircraft flew a total of 18,303 sorties by the time Desert Storm ended, or 18% of all US sorties flown, and 16% of all sorties flown during the Gulf War. US Marine Corps aircraft flew a total of 10,683 sorties during Desert Storm or 11% of all US sorties flown, and 9% of all sorties flown during the Gulf War.8 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved GW-10 Naval and Amphibious Forces October 15, 1994 Page 863 Table 10.1 The Impact of US Navy and Marine Corps Forces on the Air Campaign Major Combat Missions Strike Attack______________ Country Interdiction Air Support Counter-Air___ TOTAL Interdiction Battlefield Total CAS FAC Total Defensive Offensive Total US Navy 5,060 0 5,060 21 0 21 4,245 1,936 6,181 11,262 Marine Corps 4,015 249 4,264 2,937 1,019 3,956 0 757 757 8,977 Total Naval 9,075 249 9,324 2,958 1,019 3,977 4,245 1693 6,938 20,239 Total US 32,863 785 33,648 4,427 1,701 6,128 8,803 9,115 17,918 57,693 Total Coalition 36,717 1,560 38,277 4,427 1,701 6,128 13,075 10,670 23,745 68,149 Electronic Warfare and C3 Missions Reconnaissance C3____ ____ Electronic Warfare___ Recce SLAR Observ. Total ABCCC Early C3 Total ECM ESM EW Total Warning US Navy 1,190 0 241 1,431 1,143 0 0 1,143 5 260 0 265 Marine Corps ___ 3 0 0 3 157 0 0 157 0 17 326 343 Total Naval 1,193 0 241 1,431 1,300 0 0 1,300 5 277 326 608 Total US 2,064 147 683 2,894 1,501 379 24 1,904 11 1,014 1,813 2,838 Total Coalition 2,406 147 683 3,236 1,501 464 24 1,989 11 1,094 1,813 2,918 Refueling and Support Missions Refueling________ Refueling Tanker Total Airlift Special Support Training Surface Other GRAND Forces CAP TOTAL US Navy 0 2,782 2,782 0 3 41 262 198 916 18,303 Marine Corps 453 8 461 9 1 714 14 0 4 10,683 Total Naval 453 2,790 3,243 9 4 755 276 198 920 28,986 Total US 11,533 2,790 14,323 17,657 946 1,022 526 198 1368 101,370 Total Coalition 13,105 2,790 15,895 22,064 948 1,071 686 238 1,466 117,838 Note: The data cover the period from January 16, 1991 to February 28, 1991.
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