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Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981

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I iii:;;;:P Ii II tl : I:U: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1981 HAROLD BROWN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN TO THE CONGRESS ON THE FY 1981 BUDGET, FY 1982 AUTHORIZATION REQUEST AND FY 1981-1985 DEFENSE PROGRAMS JANUARY 29, 1980 For sale by the Superintendent 01 Documents, u.s. Government Printing omce, Washington, D.C. 20402 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION I THE CONDITIONS OF SECURITY 1 Chapter 1 Overview 2 I. The FY 1981 Defense Budget 2 II. The Soviet Union ..... 3 III. International Turbulence. 5 IV. The Strategic Nuclear Problem. 5 V. The Theater Nuclear Problem 6 VI. The Non-Nuclear Problem 7 VI I. The Programs 9 VIII . Conclusions . 13 Chapter 2 The Defense Budget 15 I. The FY 1981 Defense Budget 15 II. The Long-Range Projection for Defense 16 III. Trends in the Defense Budget . 17 IV. The Defense Posture . 19 V. Approaches to the Budget. .... .. 23 Chapter 3 The Conditions of U.S. Security 26 Chapter 4 International Politics and Defense 30 I. The Soviet Union 31 A. Problems 31 B. Posture . 32 C. Policies 39 II. Cooperation with the Soviet Union 39 A. SALT 39 B. Other Negotiations 42 III. Worldwide Developments 44 IV. Regional Developments 45 A. Western Europe 45 B. Asia ..... 49 C. The Middle East 53 D. Africa .... 56 E. Western Hemisphere 59 V. International Trends and the Role of Defense. 61 VI. Defense Issues and Assumptions. 62 Chapter 5 The Nuclear Capabilities 65 1. U.S. Strategic Policies. 65 A. Deterrence: The Countervailing Strategy. 65 B. Other Object ives. .. 68 1. Essential Equivalence. 68 2. Stability.. ..... 69 3. Arms Control ..... 69 4. The TRIAD. 70 C. Summary 70 II. Current U.S. Strategic Capabilities. 70 III. Soviet Strategic Capabilities. 73 A. Offense . 74 B. Active Defense. 76 C. Passive Defense 77 D. Force Improvements. 79 1. Offense. 79 2. Defense. 82 E. Soviet Doctrine 82 IV. Other Nuclear Capabilities. 84 V. Adequacy of the U.S. Strategic Capabilities. 85 VI. Strategic Programs . 88 VII. Theater Nuclear Capabilities 91 A. Current U.S. Capabilities 92 B. Soviet Capabilities 92 C. Allied Responses. 94 Chapter 6 The Non-Nuclear Capabilities 97 I. Determining Strategy and Posture 98 II. Implementation 98 III. Changing Conditions 99 A. Old Conditions 99 B. New Conditions 100 l. Soviet Capabilities. 100 2. The Situation in Europe. 108 3. The Situation in Asia. 108 IV. The U.S. Response 110 V. Where We Stand 112 ii A. Central Europe 112 B. Asia 113 C. Sea Cont rol .. 113 VI. Other Contingencies 114 A. Th e Prob 1em ...... 114 B. Actions Taken ..... 115 C. Rapid Deployment Forces 115 VIr. Adequacy of the Programs 117 SECTION II U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAMS 122 Chapter 1 Strategic Forces 123 I. Strategic Offensive Forces 123 A. Program Basis ... 123 1. U.S. Strate?ic Force Objectives. 123 2. The Strategic Balance ..... 123 3. Key Needs for Strategic Forces 127 B. Program Description . 127 Reducing the Vulnerability of Land-Based ICBMs. .... 127 2.' Stren?thening the SLBM Force . 131 3. Maintaining the Air-Breathing Leg 132 II. Strategic Defensive Forces . 136 A. Program Basis . 136 B. Program Status and Description 136 l. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) R&D. 136 2. Air Defense 137 3. Space Defense 138 4. Civil Defense 139 III. Strategic Command, Control & Communications. 140 A. Program Basis ............... 140 B. Strategic Command, Control & Communications 140 1. Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems (WWMCCS) 140 2. The Advanced Airborne Command Post (AARNCP) Program ........ 141 iii 3. Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) System . 141 4. Improved Airborne Naval Strategic Communications Systems (TACAMO) Operations . 141 c. Strategic Surveillance and Warning 142 1. Missile Attack Warning and Attack As ses sment . 142 2. Bomber and Cruise Missile Warning 142 3. Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection System (IONDS) 143 Chapter 2 Theater Nuclear Programs 145 1. Program Basis 145 A. Force Structure 145 B. Program Objectives 145 1. Improving the Military Effectiveness of Battlefield Theater Nuclear. Forces (TNF) . 145 2. Improving NATO's Long-Range TNF Capability . 145 3. Improving TNF Safety, Security and Survivabil ity . 146 4. Improving the Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C 3I) Systems Supporting TNF 146 II. Program Description and Status 146 A. Battlefield TNF . 146 B. Long-Range TNF . 147 C. Land-Based Defensive Systems. 148 D Fleet Systems ........ 148 E. TNF Safety, Security and Survivability. 148 F. C3 I Systems Supporting TNF . 149 Chapter 3 Land Forces 150 1. Program Basis .... 150 A. Missions and Functions. 150 B. Forces. ..... 150 1. Composition. 150 2. Disposition. 150 lV II. Program Description. 152 A. Objectives. 152 B. Initiatives 152 1. Improved Combat Capability 153 2. Improved Responsiveness. 153 3. Improved Sustainability. 153 C. Force Modernization 154 1. Close Combat 154 2. Helicopters 157 3. Air Defense. 159 4. Artillery Fire Support 161 5. Procurement of Artillery Ammunition. 164 6. Chemical Warfare and NBC Defenses. 164 7. Tactical Communications. 165 Chapter 4 Naval Forces. 167 1. Basis for Planning 167 A. Functions of General Purpose Naval Forces 167 B. Programmed Force Levels ...... 168 1. Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups 168 2. Amphibious Forces 168 3. Surface Combatants .. 169 4. Underway Replenishment and Support Forces ..... 169 5. Attack Submarines 169 C. Force Structure .... 169 D. Deployments of Naval Forces 171 E. Objectives for FY 1981-1985 172 II. Force and Program Status 172 A. Improving Fleet Air Defense Capabilities. 172 1. AEGIS Ships .... 173 2. CG and DDG Modernization 173 3. DDG-993 Acquisition 173 4. DDGX/DD-963 Air Defense Backfit. 174 5. Land-Based Aircraft .... 174 B. Improving Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabilities . 175 v l. Attack Submarine Programs 175 2. Patrol Aircraft .... 177 3. Surface Warship Tactical Towed Array Sonar (TACTAS) ....... 177 4. Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS MK III) .... 177 5. Torpedo Programs ..... 177 6. Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) 178 7. CAPTOR ..... 180 C. Maintaining Worldwide Presence and Crisis Management Forces . 180 l. Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups 180 2. Amphibious Lift Capability .. 180 D. Improving Fleet Balance and Weapons Modernizat ion .. .. .... 182 l. Surface Combatants 182 2. Underway Replenishment and Support Ships ........ 183 3. Mine Warfare Forces 184 4. Weapons Modernization 185 E. Improving Fleet Readiness 187 l. Materiel Readiness . 187 2. Personnel Readiness 187 3. Training Readiness 187 Chapter 5 Tactical Air Forces 190 1. Program Basis 190 A. Force Structure 190 l. U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Forces 190 2. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces ..... 190 B. The Basis for Planning 192 C. Major Needs. .... 193 II. Program Description 194 A. Increasing Combat Readiness . 194 B. Modernizing the Active and Reserve Com- ponents of the Air Force . 195 C. Modernizing the Active and Reserve Com­ ponents of the Navy and Marine Corps . 198 VI D. Enhancing Defense Suppression, C3 and C3 Countermeasures Capabilities 201 E. Improving Target Acquisition, Sur­ veillance, Warning and Reconnaissance Capabilities . 203 Chapter 6 Mobility Forces 205 I. Program Basis 205 A. Force Structure 205 B. Mobility Objectives 205 1. Objectives for Reinforcement of Europe ....•.. 207 2. Objectives for Non-NATO Contingencies. 207 C. Major Mobility Deficiencies and Needs 208 II. Program Description 208 A. Improved Capability for Rapid Reinforce- ment of NATO ... .... 208 1. Airlift and Sealift Improvements 208 2. Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) 210 B. Improving Ability to Deploy and Support Forces for Non-NATO Contingencies 211 1. USMC Prepositioning Afloat 211 2. Airlift ..... 212 C. Other Mobility Programs 213 Chapter 7 NATO Related Actions and Programs 215 I. Introduction ............. 215 II. NATO Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) 215 III. European Military Construction and the NATO Infrastructure Program .... 215 IV. Rationalization/Standardization/lnter­ operability ........... 217 A. General Procurement Memoranda of Under­ standing (MOV) •• 217 B. Families of Weapons . 217 Vll C. Co-production ..... " .... 218 D. NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) Program 219 V. NATO Common Training . 219 VI. Sharing the NATO Defense Burden 220 VII. The Three Percent Commitment 222 VIII. Host Nation Support 222 Chapter 8 Security Assistance 223 I. Introduc t ion ...... 223 II. The Conventional Arms Transfer Restraint Policy 224 III. The Arms Export Control Board .... 225 iV. Regional Security Assistance Programs. 226 A. Near East and South Asia 226 B. Europe 227 C. East Asia and Pacific 227 D. Latin America 228 E. Africa 228 Chapter 9 Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence 229 I. Program Basis 229 A. Objectives and Requirements 229 B. Major Needs .. 229 II. Program Description 229 A. Strategic, Theater, and Tactical C3I Initiatives 229 l. Overview 229 2. Joint and Multi-Service Programs 231 B. Intelligence Programs ... 233 l. National Intelligence 233 2. Indications and Warning Intelligence 234 3. Tactical Cryptological Program (TCP) 234 4. Intelligence Support to Tactical Forces ..... 234 5. Intelligence Oversight .. 235 C. Navigation and position-Fixing 235 D. Base and Support Communications 236 E. Common-User Communications 236 Vlll 1. The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) ........... 236 2. The Defense Satellite Communications System Ground Component ..... 236 3. The Defense Communications System 237 4. Other Initiatives .... 239 F. Communications Security (COMSEC). 240 G. Information Systems . 240 1. WWMCCS Automated Data Processing (ADP) 240 2. Automated Message Handling Systems 241 3. Computer Security 241 Chapter 10 Research, Development and Acquisition 242 1. Summary of Defense Research, Development and Acquisition . 242 II. Strategic and Tactical RD&A Objectives 242 Ill. The Science and Technology Program 244 A. Policies "...... 244 B. Program Description ... 244 C. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) ..... 246 1. Objectives . 246 2. Technology Opportunities Programs 246 D. Defense Nuclear Agency 247 IV. Defense-Wide Mission Support 248 A. Supporting Space Developments ...
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