US Army Sustainment Command

Interview with Mr. Ronald Sikorski UNCLASSIFIED

Abstract

In 2003, the Army Field Support Command (AFSC) and the Joint Munitions Command (JMC), collocated at , Illinois, began a comprehensive oral history project aimed at chronicling a full-spectrum slice of the commands’ role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) broadly defined. Because the command was over 90 percent Department of the Army (DA) civilians and heavily augmented by contractors, the command realized by 2003 that they were managing the largest ever deployment of DA civilians and contractors into a combat area, and so, over 150 interviews were conducted focusing on the GWOT-related experiences of DA civilian members of the two commands during 2003 and 2004. Starting at the same time, Mr. George Eaton, currently command historian at US Army Sustainment Command (ASC), has conducted to date almost 200 more interviews with DA civilians, contractors and uniformed military personnel. This oral history project aims at delivering an overall picture of the activities and duties of the various components of AFSC and JMC and their combined efforts to support the Army’s worldwide operations. The interviews look at growing trends in areas of both success and concern, while also accounting for how logistics support commands have completely transformed operational- and strategic-level logistics since 2003. ASC personnel are forward deployed at every forward operating base in , Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar and Djibouti, among others. Indeed, what began as a small operation in 2003 has become a robust organization, globally deployed, and is now a key player in all four of the Army’s materiel imperatives: to sustain, transform, reset and prepare. The following interview with Mr. Ronald Sikorski, Chief of Arsenal Programs and Control Office, covers such topics as the arsenal programs and the control office’s involvement in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/DS).

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Interview with Mr. Ronald Sikorski

TS: I’m Tom Slattery (TS), Armament Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) historian, here to interview Mr. Ronald Sikorski (RS), Chief of Rock Island Arsenal (RIA) Programs and Control Office regarding RIA’s role in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/DS) and in particular the involvement his office had in that role. Mr. Sikorski, what were your initial feelings and concerns as Chief of Arsenal Programs and Control Office upon hearing the possibility of war with Iraq?

RS: The first thing that comes to mind is what role the arsenal would play in any kind of conflict regardless of whether it was Iraq or a more limited conflict such as Grenada. Our role in the Arsenal Programs and Control Office was to assist the RIA in preparing a wartime footing. Primarily the office coordinated emergency orders for parts to aid the readiness of troops scheduled for deployment to . Initially, my concern was how we prepare ourselves to accept orders on an emergency wartime basis. That is where the Arsenal Program and Control Office’s involvement in the war effort started. The second part of my concern was whether Arsenal Program and Control Office was prepared, from an administrative standpoint, to handle the various types of request that we’d receive. Even those requests that were “off-the- wall” had to be handled without turning the individual away before resolving their problem. Let’s face it; our customer’s problems are the arsenal’s problems in a conflict situation. It’s the Arsenal Programs and Control Office’s responsibility to take care of RIA’s customers and make sure they’re satisfied.

TS: The was the largest single deployment of troops and equipment since World War II. Yet unlike WWII where RIA did not need emergency construction for facilities, nor did the arsenal needed to hire thousands of employees to gear up for the war. RIA only hired approximately 133 temporary employees. What does this say about RIA’s state of readiness and the role of the Army’s arsenal system in preparing the Army for war?

RS: When you refer to WWII you’re talking about a war in which the nation mobilized totally. We were at all out war. In the instance of Iraq, at least from an industrial stand point, RIA was able to change the resources it was already producing to what was necessary at the time of the conflict. RIA did that on a number of occasions. The resources that were established during rearm, RIA’s modernization effort over the past ten years, were essentially in place and operational. RIA merely switched resources from one area to another. These resources primarily being manpower, funds, facilities and equipment. In a number of cases during the surge, RIA was already making, on a peacetime basis, the parts the military require for wartime. So the interruption in the factory was negligible. It was merely the acceleration of parts that were already in the process of being manufactured. During the Iraq situation, RIA was already producing most of the hardware the Army needed. So in a sense, rearm helped RIA get our facilities and equipment in a state of readiness. Our RIA employees were producing on a peacetime footing, maintaining what we call a warm base. For some of the parts it was just an extension or fulfillment of the Army’s requirement almost on a routine basis. But on other parts not already in production the arsenal had to switch resources and go into production on a new item.

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TS: What difference did rearm, the modernizing of RIA manufacturing facilities, and CIMIS, the updating of RIA equipment with computer integrated manufacturing systems, make in RIA’s effort during the Gulf War?

RS: It made a great difference. For example, rearm and CIMIS made possible RIA’s production of ammunition spacers that were required for M-109 self-propelled (SPHs), a mainstay piece used in the Gulf War. The M-864 and M-825A1 projectiles were too short to be properly stowed in the bustle rack of the M-109 SPH. The two 155mm shells rattled around in the turrets when the SPH bounced over sand dunes. This small little piece of equipment called a spacer stabilized the round while stored in the bustle and thereby eliminated a problem in the field. The US government had suppliers manufacturing the spacers for the Army but they couldn’t produce enough of them in time to be there when the Gulf War actually started. During Desert Shield, during the build-up, the Army approached RIA and asked if it could produce them. The arsenal reviewed the technical data and established what its equipment could do with the project. RIA’s new technical equipment, like the numerically- controlled bearing (?) lazar cutter that cuts pieces of metal at a rate of 200 inches per minute, made the project possible. As a result RIA was able to provide a welded assembly. A relatively simple welded assembly produced in the same timeframe that it took the money to arrive at Rock Island Arsenal. In two weeks RIA produced over 7,000 spacers for the Army. In the old days, it might have taken a month to get the money to RIA, and may have taken the arsenal four or five months to produce the part. RIA was able to complete the spacer project in a matter of two weeks.

TS: Was RIA involved in the designing of the spacer?

RS: No, I don’t believe so. What RIA did do was to modify the options on the drawings. Those options on the drawings were not necessarily what material that the arsenal had on hand. So the Arsenal Programs and Control Office called in the engineers, and the engineers worked with our office (the Arsenal Programs and Control Office) to identify the material that RIA had in stock as possible substitutes. By using material already on hand, RIA didn’t have to go out and buy new material. In many cases the acquisition of raw material caused the longest lead time for our produced parts. It might take four or five months to buy the material and get it shipped to the arsenal. In this case (spacer project) the engineers found an alternate material that the arsenal already had in stock for another job. By using that alternate material the arsenal was able to just turn the machines on and turn the people on. The arsenal does design the process. How we are going to make the item and the tooling used to make it? RIA has control over the process because they are in-house resources and we have the skills to accomplish that.

TS: Dealing with the spacers, they were a new manufactured item, correct?

RS: That’s correct. The spacers were brand new manufacturing which had never been manufactured by RIA before. It was a welded assembly consisting of two parts: a curved shaft or shank welded to a disk base. The spacer was designed to fit snuggly against the projectile and fill the gap left in the bustle rack by the two shorter 155mm shells.

TS: Besides the spacer, did RIA perform any other new manufacturing during the Gulf War?

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RS: No, the rest of the components that the Army had requirements for were parts previously manufactured by RIA and arsenal operations was already in the process of producing them.

TS: Isn’t RIA’s production of the spacer a good example of the arsenal’s traditional role as a job lot arsenal? RIA, if necessary, acquires the equipment and sets up the whole operation from scratch then begins producing the urgently needed item.

RS: Yes, that’s a perfect example. RIA has done that a number of times. We’ve also done this a number of times for the Army during peacetime. RIA has responded in the past to emergencies when the Army needed to have an item very quickly because of a unit being deployed or because of activation or because of training. It may be for a large organization like a division. When equipment is not there on time you can really mess up a schedule for a large . So we have produced a lot of that kind of thing, onesy, and twoesy. It kind of goes with RIA’s prototype capabilities where we can make one or two of anything. The arsenal uses recommendations from the shop floor in proving out the technical data to make sure that it’s a more producible product. RIA (Arsenal Programs and Control Office?) prides itself in being able to go into a technical data package and be able to make it more producible.

TS: Because of the long lead time of 30 days or so, units that were in country (in Saudi Arabia) were able to reach peak level of readiness by undertaking depot level maintenance and repair, including major work on gun mounts and recoil mechanism. Was Arsenal Program and Control Office or RIA involved in providing parts or special aid to these units performing depot level activities in Saudi Arabia?

RS: Indirectly RIA’s customer is the national inventory control point (NICP); either at this headquarters or what ever NICP RIA happens to be making parts for. They are the people (NICP) who disburse the product that RIA manufactures. So yes, many of the parts that RIA was manufacturing eventually were shipped to addresses in Southwest Asia (SWA). But in fact, the parts were already being manufactured at RIA from other orders. RIA merely changed the address to divert them to somewhere else. Many of those parts are still being sent to a B14 account which is the headquarters holding account for its material. The B14 account is management from the headquarters and the completed orders are then distributed elsewhere. RIA feeds the B14 account. Headquarters (HQs), AMCCOM does what they wish with the items. On occasion some of those parts went directly from RIA to SWA. But in most cases they went to a unit such as at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that was preparing to go overseas or some other destination in the . These items were prepositioned for units going overseas during Operation Desert Shield. But during Desert Storm most of the parts were going into the NICP and the NICP would ship the items directly to the Gulf in large consolidated containers. These items found their way to those depots in country (Saudi Arabia) that the US Army was building there. Matter of fact, RIA had many employees who volunteered to serve in SWA and who served in these rebuild facilities overseas.

TS: Were there any improvements suggested on RIA-supplied equipment or weapons as a result of their performance in the Gulf War?

RS: No, I’m not aware of any improvements. However, from what I understand from certain Army units, the M-198 towed 155mm experienced some trouble with its travel lock.

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The Marine Corps used the same weapon system but they didn’t experience this problem. One of the commanders of a Marine unit in this area, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Wood, dropped by RIA to see how the weapon was built. During our conversation, LTC Wood mentioned that when his troops moved from one location to another they used a pin on the traversing mechanism that locked the mechanism preventing the weapon from traversing during travel. The travel lock was designed to hold the weapon in an upward position and not necessarily to absorb the torque out of a weapon which was not locked in traverse. It was designed to take a downward force rather than a sideway force. In talking to LTC Wood, it was obvious that in the heat of battle and in the heat of moving, many of the units were not locking the traversing mechanism. They were merely depending on the travel lock to take care of the torque during moving. The Marines didn’t have this problem because they locked the weapon system in traverse before they departed in the firing position (?). That’s about the only thing I recall. I only heard accolades regarding the M198 towed howitzer and the M109 SP howitzer from everybody I spoke to during the conflict. Those two and the M1A1 of course, which everyone knows performed well in the desert, are systems RIA produced or helped to produce and shipped to units being deployed in Saudi Arabia.

TS: CNN television filmed the firing of the M198 towed and the M109 SP howitzers virtually every evening during their broadcasts of the war. These larger weapons were very impressive on film. Because of their performance in the war, did these weapons that RIA produced or produced components for gain any additional status?

RS: I think so, weapons systems such as the M1A1 tank gained great notoriety and since the Gulf War, I understand from the Army, that there’s interest from some of the SWA nations in acquiring some additional M1A1 . I’m not sure of the exact country but there are some countries that have inquired about purchasing M1A1 tanks. If so the new production orders would help the arsenal.

TS: What effect did the success of the 155mm weapons have on production of such weapons as the new 105 mm M119 howitzer? Isn’t it correct that the M119 howitzer was not field in Gulf War?

RS: The new M119 howitzer was not taken to SWA. From what I understand the 82nd Airborne was equipped with the M119 just prior to going over to Saudi Arabia. So they were beginning the transition period to the M119 howitzer but were still using the M102 howitzer as their standard issue 105mm howitzer since the Vietnam War. But because the M119 howitzer was so new and probably because the crew had not fully developed its training policy and procedures, or built up enough history with the weapon to become comfortable with it, the unit decided to take the old standby M102 which was from our Southeast Asia days. The M102 worked very well during the Gulf War.

TS: The M119 was designed for use by rapid deployment forces used to put out brush wars in tropical climates. Was there really a place for the M119 in desert warfare?

RS: The M119 howitzer has the same role in a sense that the M102 howitzer does. The M102 is designed for airmobile operations primarily be air transportable, get in and out of an area rapidly. The problem with the M102 is that it’s an older weapon system and it doesn’t have the

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 6 UNCLASSIFIED range of the M119 howitzer. The M119 was a non developmental item, designed and built initially by the Brits. The US searched the world market when it was looking for a replacement for the M102, rather than spending a lot of research and development dollars and designing something from scratch. The US Army evaluated many foreign weapon systems and it apparently like what it saw in the British designed weapon. The Army put it through extensive field trials by both the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions, at Fort Lewis, Washington and Fort Ord, California. The units applauded the weapon so the Army bought an increment from the British to field its units. The Army had a US base established at RIA for the balance of the weapon system, so potentially there were about 140-plus weapon systems purchased from the British and about 400 will be built in the United States. The total AAO (?) for the 105mm for the Army was about 540 to 550, something like that.

TS: Was Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm a true test of RIA’s manufacturing capabilities? No US cargo ships were sunk nor cargo planes shot down. So the US didn’t lose weapons due to combat. The weapons the US sent to the Gulf War were not necessarily replacement for items lost to battle? Was the Arsenal supplying units with more modern equipment?

RS: No. What RIA was doing was giving them the ability to maintain and repair the equipment they already had in country (Saudi Arabia). Much of the Army’s weapon systems were developed and produced here at RIA and were delivered over a period of many years before Desert Storm. RIA was ready and went into it to maintain those weapons in the field. Just like your automobile, when you have a flat tire you have to replace that tire. It’s the same with a weapons system. When a system is used, parts will wear and other parts may be damaged. The weapon system might have been rolled (over) during a training exercise. The Army has to repair that weapon system so it’s ready for combat when it’s needed. RIA’s job is to make sure the pipeline is filled with the necessary spare parts so those weapons can be at 100 percent readiness.

TS: Was this a huge undertaking by RIA?

RS: No, not a huge undertaking. RIA did have to accelerate, in some areas, to make sure the pipeline (supply line) was full. Arsenal Program and Control Office made sure that the Arsenal Operations Directorate didn’t miss critical repair parts schedules that we had established. The arsenal accelerated the production of many of the parts that were in fact needed over there. Many of the artillery systems, their spare and repair parts, that RIA builds as major items, were diverted into spare (storage?) categories so that the units in the field could quickly repair a weapon system that went down for any reason. So Arsenal Programs and Control Office worked with the NICP who determined the requirements. Our office coordinated the production of a list of the parts and the date the NICPs needed them by. Arsenal Programs and Control Office would receive the orders review our (RIA) other orders to determine if arsenal operations could manufacture that part and delivery it by the required dated. If RIA could fit the new order in its production schedule they’d do so. If arsenal operations couldn’t produce the new order by the required time, Arsenal Programs and Control Office would look at the possibility of removing the item from a previously produced howitzer order. Arsenal Programs and Control Office coordinates the production order requests with higher headquarters who determine the requirements. HQ, AMCCOM tells the Arsenal Program and Control Office what

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 7 UNCLASSIFIED the Army needs from RIA. Because they also have assets around the country they may be able to fulfill those needs with a part stored at New Cumberland or Letterkenny, or any of their other locations that store parts for them. Rock Island Arsenal is just one of the areas that store parts for AMCCOM. A great portion of RIA’s support to Desert Shield/Desert Storm had to do with the shipment of parts that were already manufactured and stored at the Arsenal. RIA had something in the neighborhood of over 2,000 material release orders (MROs) that came from the arsenal. That’s over 2,000 individual shipments of products which were shipped by RIA during the Gulf War. RIA shipped over 41,000 parts, valued at over $13 million dollars, in support of Operation Desert Storm. There was a lot of activity on RIA that happened in the logistics arena. Another remarkable thing about RIA during Desert Storm was the spirit of Rock Island Arsenal. Its “can do attitude” was demonstrated in the assistance the arsenal provided units that had received orders to deploy overseas. Units with vehicles painted forest green suddenly needed them repainted in desert sand-colored chemical protective paint. Logistics and manufacturing did a super job getting those trucks painted for those mobilized Iowa reserve medical units. RIA did little things too. For example, RIA helped Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, get Reserve units ready for mobilization. They ran out of material and call RIA for assistance. Arsenal loaned them paint. Little things like that really helped the war effort. People don’t realize it, or talk about them, but there was a lot of little things that aided the war effort. A certain “can do attitude” surfaces when you’re part of the military and there’s a crisis like ODS/DS. That kind of makes you feel good.

TS: To a certain extent it reminds me of the same attitude RIA employees had during Word War II.

RS: To a small extent, yes.

TS: What about Vietnam, you were employed at RIA during the Vietnam War. Do you recall the arsenal workforce having that same can do attitude?

RS: I do, except there was a difference. Vietnam lasted so long. The emergency orders RIA received during the Vietnam War were coordinated quite well at the beginning of the war. It was handled similar to red ball express during World War II. RIA had a special code for those items that had to go overseas and required special attention. At the beginning of the war that system was not abused, it was used. Only those parts which had to be urgently shipped overseas were marked with that red ball. People initially did a great job expediting items to get them overseas. The problem was that the war lasted so long. It was an unpopular war and it was a war of attrition rather than one that was designed to go towards a quick and firm decisive victory. As the war was prolonged, more troops were mobilized, more supplies were needed, more emergencies ensued and suddenly everything became a red ball or high priority item. Of course, if everything is a high priority item then nothing really has a priority. So Vietnam and the Gulf War were two entirely different situations. The other thing about Vietnam versus the recent Gulf experience was that there was such controversy about Vietnam regarding whether or not we should be there. Are we going in there with the resolve to win or are we just going in as a police action? RIA employees during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm went home each night proud of their days work. People in the quad cities were interested and supportive of RIA’s efforts during the Gulf War. Our objectives during the war with Iraq were so much clearer than in Vietnam. The Vietnam War and the fiasco the US had when we tried to rescue

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 8 UNCLASSIFIED the hostages in Iran were two lessons that the military and industrial complex really took to heart, especially in the area of communications between services and having a single person in charge of all the services. Being able to do radio communications between the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army prior to the fiasco in the desert of Iran was difficult. We had different languages on the radio, different ways of communicating and different equipment in those services. Now that’s all changed, and you could tell the tremendous coordination that occurred during ODS/DS. It was just a beauty to behold.

TS: Returning to RIA manufacturing support to the Gulf War, was there anything RIA did differently pertaining to fire control systems, night vision etc.?

RS: I honest do not remember any RIA effort related to night vision. You might contact RIA engineering or quality assurance in the inspection of some parts. After the interview, I could check our records for an order.

TS: Does the arsenal have an evaluation yet on RIA-manufactured items such as the M198 Howitzer verses the reliability of other source manufacturers?

RS: There’s no other source manufacturing for the M198. RIA is the sole producer of that weapon system.

TS: It’s not being manufactured by a contractor in St. Louis, Missouri?

RS: No, originally the M198 howitzer’s carriage was manufactured by Continental Diesel Electric, but only the carriage portion of the howitzer. That was when the quantities of the M198 howitzers were substantial and the Army was trying to fill its acquisition objective. When the order started to trickle down to roughly 300, and when there was great interest, the Army started buying 40 to 50 howitzers a year. Then the interest to produce them on the outside waned because there wasn’t a lot of profit in making 40 and 50 of an item. Private contractors would like to have good use of their facilities, a good investment for all their overhead. It takes a substantial amount of money in both floor space, equipment, tooling and skills to build one of these howitzers. They’re not just thrown together. As a result there’s a high overhead and an intricate structure which needs to be taken care of. Usually an industrial activity likes to have turnover going through their shops so they can keep products going out the door and keep people employed. That helps their economics keeping something like that operational. It doesn’t really work when only 40 or 50 of an item is being built. RIA’s claim to fame is that the arsenal does this (making small job lot quantities) for a lot of different weapon systems. RIA is concurrently manufacturing the M119 howitzer while the arsenal is building the M198 howitzer, while arsenal operations is building gun mounts for the M1A1 tanks, we’re building M109 SP howitzer. Plus, the arsenal is doing rebuild on the M110 eight-inch howitzer. That’s our thing. We do small lots, small quantities but we do it in a generic area of manufacturing and that is large caliber weapon systems. That’s RIA’s specialty.

TS: Who were the key people in your organization, Arsenal Programs and Control Office, who was heavily involved in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm? I know Mr. Ken Hall was in charge of RIA’s Emergency Operations Center, and Mr. Don Keck, was your spacer man. Is there somebody else I should possible consider interviewing?

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RS: Don Arp might be able to contribute to the history. Besides Don Arp there are two persons who work for him who I think were key employees of the Arsenal Programs and Control Office during the Gulf War. It’s not easy to deal with the finances associated with something as large as the recent war effort. How does the Arsenal Programs and Control Office properly coordinate the production orders that RIA receives? How does RIA distribute the work assignments properly to everyone? If RIA doesn’t have money, how do they get commitments that the Arsenal will be funded for the project? The administrative work was done by two individuals in this office (Arsenal Programs and Control Office): Cathleen McMahon and Ali Callear. Those two played a very important role in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm - not that anyone else in that office did not as well. Everyone in this section (?) processes the orders. But those two individuals made the decisions. They were the ones who kept our (RIA) customers happy, the ones who knew how to get the financial aspects of a program like this rolling, so that finances wouldn’t in any way delay the responsiveness of the manufacturing activities or the engineering activities. Cathleen McMahon and Ali Callear coordinated all the orders not just the orders for the spacers, but also the peripheral orders that RIA receives annually. The Gulf War created a sudden surge of orders that these two employees were able to coordinate and process much faster than the routine business.

TS: Was the Arsenal Programs and Control Office able to process these orders without additional people?

RS: We (Arsenal Programs and Control Office) did not bring on any additional people to accomplish its mission during the desert conflict.

TS: Was overtime used to process this work?

RS: Yes, some overtime, but most of the extra time was done on compensatory time or just on the employees own time.

TS: I know you have prepared a lesson learned report. I’d like to know if you think it would be of value to put it in the appendix of this history, separately printed in the appendix for reference purposes.

RS: I’d have to think about that. I’ll get back with you. I have no druthers whether it’s included or not. One thing about lessons learned is that they’re not really worth anything unless you share them with someone. So the more places you can put a document that say these are the lessons, the more there’s a chance someone can pick up on that and be able to use that lesson. I don’t have any heartburn with it.

TS: Rather than me taking one and two items from it, I’d prefer to include the entire item.

RS: I believe Ken Hall is putting it together right now? Is he not, I’m not sure. I thought we already went through a lessons learned on the war and published it. Maybe we ought to try to have him dig that up for you.

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TS: That would be fine. Thank you for your time, it’s a pleasure to interview such a long and respected member of the RIA commander’s staff. You’ve always taken time for the historical office and I appreciate your thoughtfulness.

RS: You’re very welcome.

END OF INTERVIEW

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