Interview with Mr. Ronald Sikorski UNCLASSIFIED
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US Army Sustainment Command Interview with Mr. Ronald Sikorski UNCLASSIFIED Abstract In 2003, the Army Field Support Command (AFSC) and the Joint Munitions Command (JMC), collocated at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, began a comprehensive oral history project aimed at chronicling a full-spectrum slice of the commands’ role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) broadly defined. Because the command was over 90 percent Department of the Army (DA) civilians and heavily augmented by contractors, the command realized by 2003 that they were managing the largest ever deployment of DA civilians and contractors into a combat area, and so, over 150 interviews were conducted focusing on the GWOT-related experiences of DA civilian members of the two commands during 2003 and 2004. Starting at the same time, Mr. George Eaton, currently command historian at US Army Sustainment Command (ASC), has conducted to date almost 200 more interviews with DA civilians, contractors and uniformed military personnel. This oral history project aims at delivering an overall picture of the activities and duties of the various components of AFSC and JMC and their combined efforts to support the Army’s worldwide operations. The interviews look at growing trends in areas of both success and concern, while also accounting for how logistics support commands have completely transformed operational- and strategic-level logistics since 2003. ASC personnel are forward deployed at every forward operating base in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar and Djibouti, among others. Indeed, what began as a small operation in 2003 has become a robust organization, globally deployed, and is now a key player in all four of the Army’s materiel imperatives: to sustain, transform, reset and prepare. The following interview with Mr. Ronald Sikorski, Chief of Arsenal Programs and Control Office, covers such topics as the arsenal programs and the control office’s involvement in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/DS). Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2 UNCLASSIFIED Interview with Mr. Ronald Sikorski TS: I’m Tom Slattery (TS), Armament Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) historian, here to interview Mr. Ronald Sikorski (RS), Chief of Rock Island Arsenal (RIA) Programs and Control Office regarding RIA’s role in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/DS) and in particular the involvement his office had in that role. Mr. Sikorski, what were your initial feelings and concerns as Chief of Arsenal Programs and Control Office upon hearing the possibility of war with Iraq? RS: The first thing that comes to mind is what role the arsenal would play in any kind of conflict regardless of whether it was Iraq or a more limited conflict such as Grenada. Our role in the Arsenal Programs and Control Office was to assist the RIA in preparing a wartime footing. Primarily the office coordinated emergency orders for parts to aid the readiness of troops scheduled for deployment to Saudi Arabia. Initially, my concern was how we prepare ourselves to accept orders on an emergency wartime basis. That is where the Arsenal Program and Control Office’s involvement in the war effort started. The second part of my concern was whether Arsenal Program and Control Office was prepared, from an administrative standpoint, to handle the various types of request that we’d receive. Even those requests that were “off-the- wall” had to be handled without turning the individual away before resolving their problem. Let’s face it; our customer’s problems are the arsenal’s problems in a conflict situation. It’s the Arsenal Programs and Control Office’s responsibility to take care of RIA’s customers and make sure they’re satisfied. TS: The Gulf War was the largest single deployment of troops and equipment since World War II. Yet unlike WWII where RIA did not need emergency construction for facilities, nor did the arsenal needed to hire thousands of employees to gear up for the war. RIA only hired approximately 133 temporary employees. What does this say about RIA’s state of readiness and the role of the Army’s arsenal system in preparing the Army for war? RS: When you refer to WWII you’re talking about a war in which the nation mobilized totally. We were at all out war. In the instance of Iraq, at least from an industrial stand point, RIA was able to change the resources it was already producing to what was necessary at the time of the conflict. RIA did that on a number of occasions. The resources that were established during rearm, RIA’s modernization effort over the past ten years, were essentially in place and operational. RIA merely switched resources from one area to another. These resources primarily being manpower, funds, facilities and equipment. In a number of cases during the surge, RIA was already making, on a peacetime basis, the parts the military require for wartime. So the interruption in the factory was negligible. It was merely the acceleration of parts that were already in the process of being manufactured. During the Iraq situation, RIA was already producing most of the hardware the Army needed. So in a sense, rearm helped RIA get our facilities and equipment in a state of readiness. Our RIA employees were producing on a peacetime footing, maintaining what we call a warm base. For some of the parts it was just an extension or fulfillment of the Army’s requirement almost on a routine basis. But on other parts not already in production the arsenal had to switch resources and go into production on a new item. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 3 UNCLASSIFIED TS: What difference did rearm, the modernizing of RIA manufacturing facilities, and CIMIS, the updating of RIA equipment with computer integrated manufacturing systems, make in RIA’s effort during the Gulf War? RS: It made a great difference. For example, rearm and CIMIS made possible RIA’s production of ammunition spacers that were required for M-109 self-propelled howitzers (SPHs), a mainstay artillery piece used in the Gulf War. The M-864 and M-825A1 projectiles were too short to be properly stowed in the bustle rack of the M-109 SPH. The two 155mm shells rattled around in the turrets when the SPH bounced over sand dunes. This small little piece of equipment called a spacer stabilized the round while stored in the bustle and thereby eliminated a problem in the field. The US government had suppliers manufacturing the spacers for the Army but they couldn’t produce enough of them in time to be there when the Gulf War actually started. During Desert Shield, during the build-up, the Army approached RIA and asked if it could produce them. The arsenal reviewed the technical data and established what its equipment could do with the project. RIA’s new technical equipment, like the numerically- controlled bearing (?) lazar cutter that cuts pieces of metal at a rate of 200 inches per minute, made the project possible. As a result RIA was able to provide a welded assembly. A relatively simple welded assembly produced in the same timeframe that it took the money to arrive at Rock Island Arsenal. In two weeks RIA produced over 7,000 spacers for the Army. In the old days, it might have taken a month to get the money to RIA, and may have taken the arsenal four or five months to produce the part. RIA was able to complete the spacer project in a matter of two weeks. TS: Was RIA involved in the designing of the spacer? RS: No, I don’t believe so. What RIA did do was to modify the options on the drawings. Those options on the drawings were not necessarily what material that the arsenal had on hand. So the Arsenal Programs and Control Office called in the engineers, and the engineers worked with our office (the Arsenal Programs and Control Office) to identify the material that RIA had in stock as possible substitutes. By using material already on hand, RIA didn’t have to go out and buy new material. In many cases the acquisition of raw material caused the longest lead time for our produced parts. It might take four or five months to buy the material and get it shipped to the arsenal. In this case (spacer project) the engineers found an alternate material that the arsenal already had in stock for another job. By using that alternate material the arsenal was able to just turn the machines on and turn the people on. The arsenal does design the process. How we are going to make the item and the tooling used to make it? RIA has control over the process because they are in-house resources and we have the skills to accomplish that. TS: Dealing with the spacers, they were a new manufactured item, correct? RS: That’s correct. The spacers were brand new manufacturing which had never been manufactured by RIA before. It was a welded assembly consisting of two parts: a curved shaft or shank welded to a disk base. The spacer was designed to fit snuggly against the projectile and fill the gap left in the bustle rack by the two shorter 155mm shells. TS: Besides the spacer, did RIA perform any other new manufacturing during the Gulf War? Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 4 UNCLASSIFIED RS: No, the rest of the components that the Army had requirements for were parts previously manufactured by RIA and arsenal operations was already in the process of producing them. TS: Isn’t RIA’s production of the spacer a good example of the arsenal’s traditional role as a job lot arsenal? RIA, if necessary, acquires the equipment and sets up the whole operation from scratch then begins producing the urgently needed item.