Marines from Mike Battery, 4th Battalion, 14th Marines, operate 155mm M198 howitzer in support of Operation Phantom Fury, November 2004 (U.S. Marine Corps/Samantha L. Jones)
certain trumpet for friends and allies to heed. In our messy democracy, domes- Toward a Future tic politics and bureaucratic politics will often frustrate strategy, but, in the end, national strategy retains its importance. National Strategy For the entire Cold War, we had one overarching national strategy: the containment of our principal enemy, the A Review Essay Soviet Union. Strategic debates on how to contain the Soviet Union were severe By Joseph J. Collins and constant, but the aims and framework of the strategy were widely accepted. Containment activities ranged from hat could be more important national policy, but, in turn, strategy military operations to subtle diplomacy or than a nation’s strategy? A guides subordinate plans and policies. foreign aid to the more than occasional W strategy brings together ends, It provides a framework that can help covert operation. When the Cold War ways, and means. It assesses costs and us comprehend contextual develop- ended, some claimed that history (and risks and establishes priorities. It takes ments, which, in turn, can reshape the strategy!) had ended, but others argued basic guidance and direction from strategy. A consistent strategy is also a that the United States had to exploit its “unipolar moment” or otherwise behave, in Madeleine Albright’s phrase, as the world’s “indispensable nation.” Dr. Joseph J. Collins is the Director of the Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. A retired Army colonel, he was formerly Deputy The predominant national strategy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. that emerged has been called primacy or
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Collins 93 liberal hegemony. During the years of the Trump should choose one of three strate- of overlapping commitments, interests, Bill Clinton administration, this strategy gies: Independent America, Moneyball and rivalries demands the kind of long- featured engagement and enlargement America, or Indispensable America. After term strategic thinking that a Moneyball of the number of democracies, especially quizzing the readers about their views, approach, with its focus on limited in Europe. After failures in Somalia Bremmer artfully takes a chapter to investment in limited goals for near-term and Rwanda, the domestically focused advocate for each of the strategies, later results, can never produce. How many Clinton team fought low-casualty air wars matching the readers’ views to their pref- American (and global) problems are the in Bosnia and Kosovo, followed by peace erences on his quiz. result of short-term thinking” (137)? enforcement operations, which were Independent America, what some Advocates of Indispensable America are followed by what came to be known as would call neo-isolationist America, ar- globally focused, activist, and oriented on nation-building. The George W. Bush gues that America is overextended abroad both standing up to and engaging China administration initially rejected nation- and underfunded at home. In the future, and Russia. American values loom large building and tried to focus on great it should forget about being the leader of in this strategy, and expanding the num- power relations, but fate had another the free world, lead by example at home, ber and vitality of democracies around path in mind. After the 9/11 attacks, be far less active abroad, and concentrate the world is also part of the approach. President Bush conducted a retaliatory on improving its infrastructure and Bremmer’s advocacy for this option war against al Qaeda and the Taliban economy. This strategy option, as written, concludes: government in Afghanistan, and less than even rejects regional and global trading 2 years later, a preventive war against arrangements. For Independent America, Seven U.S. presidents, Democrats and Iraq, presumed to be both a supporter of “national security begins at home,” and Republicans, followed their [Truman international terrorism and the holder of to protect the homeland, we have to and Eisenhower’s] lead. When Soviet weapons of mass destruction stockpiles invest in public infrastructure, border communism finally collapsed, democracy, and research programs. That misestimate protection, and homeland defense. freedom of speech, and free-market capital- led to a still-compounding tragedy in the Moneyball America—despite the ism began the next phase of their global Middle East. catchy title—is actually a strategy guided advance. Imagine the cost to the world if The Barack Obama administration by finite, prudent realism, “a cold- America decides that the job is now fin- made it quite clear that its priorities were blooded, interest-driven approach that ished—that Americans will no longer fight ending the war in Iraq and first surging redefines America’s role in the world in a for these values (158). and then drawing down in Afghanistan. way designed to maximize the return on The new President was all about exit the taxpayer’s investment” (89). Aiming Bremmer, an internationalist, sur- strategies, with the accent mark on exit directly at both security and prosper- prises the reader in his last chapter when and less so on strategy. U.S. strategy en- ity simultaneously, Moneyball America he—almost reluctantly—opts for the neo- countered a host of new problems. Allied demands more prudent intervention- isolationist, Independent America, with dissatisfaction with the Obama adminis- ary choices, a focus on vital interests, the addition of an added plank on more tration appeared to rise as overseas policy prudent negotiations, the use of sanc- international trade. In the conclusion, problems increased and compounded one tions, and, occasionally, leading from however, he puts aside his own prefer- another. Today, the United States finds behind. It takes its direction on using ences and insists that the key thing for the itself war-weary and deficit-ridden, with force from the Colin Powell and Casper Trump administration is to choose a sin- much of the world dissatisfied with our Weinberger doctrines. In Bremmer’s gle strategy and to follow it consistently: leadership. We are at a strategic inflec- formulation, this strategy emphasizes “The worst choice of all is to refuse to tion point. What we have been doing trade, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. choose, because I don’t believe we can no longer works, and the need for a new Overall, Moneyballers argue for humility: continue to improvise our foreign policy. strategic course is overwhelming. “America is not an exceptional nation. We’re confusing our allies, our rivals, and Three books have performed seri- America is the most powerful, but that the American people with an incoherent ous strategic critiques that range from doesn’t mean that it’s always right. We approach to an increasingly dangerous the theoretical to the micro-analytical. are not all-knowing, and the universal world” (191). Together, they have produced a set of benefit is never our concern” (119). Bremmer’s short book is earnest, books that should be read by the incom- Indispensable America, which takes clever, and appeals to a wide audience. ing national security team. its names from Madeleine Albright’s Its laser-like focus on the elements of The first book is Ian Bremmer’s oft-used phrase, is a strategy that is ori- each of the three strategies is terrific, but Superpower: Three Choices for America’s ented on global leadership, engagement, the student of international affairs and Role in the World.1 Bremmer, the founder and, where necessary, intervention. This the policy wonk need more detail to add of the Eurasia Group and a prolific strategy is frequently referred to as liberal meat to the strategic frameworks that he author, argues that we have become in- hegemony or primacy. It is long-term in so artfully builds. creasingly directionless and that Donald its perspective: “Today’s globalized world
94 Commentary / Toward a Future National Strategy JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Barry Posen’s Restraint: A New entail a reduction in “political commit- Posen’s recommendations, however, Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy ments and military deployments” and made sense for his restraint strategy when adds theoretical and practical detail to transitioning many regional burdens to it was written, but may need to be modi- the debate over future strategy.2 It also our allies over a decade. Posen treats fied to take into consideration aggressive goes one step further than Bremmer: every region of the globe in some de- changes in Chinese and Russian behav- Posen includes a military strategy, a force tail, but in all, U.S. allies receive tough iors, as well as operations against ISIL. structure, and a useful risk analysis. Posen love under the strategy of restraint. For Similarly, writing in 2012–2013, Posen is a senior professor at the Massachusetts example, over time, Israel would lose its might want to reconsider his argument Institute of Technology and a prolific multibillion-dollar U.S. defense subsi- that U.S. troops should be withdrawn on academic writer on national security is- dies. Posen also concedes that some of schedule from Afghanistan, “no matter sues. His book, published in 2014, is a our major allies might have to become what develops” (127). Posen is wary of cousin to Bremmer’s Moneyball strategy. nuclear powers in the process of reestab- China, but does not support suggestion Motivated by perceived failures such as lishing regional balances. His proposals by “offensive realists” to contain it or fos- the enlargement of the North Atlantic for fighting violent terrorist movements ter a “preventive cold war” (171). Treaty Organization (NATO), the war are balanced, even if less detailed than his The strategy of restraint is a potential in Kosovo, and the Iraq War, Posen thoughts about major powers. (The ad- alternative to liberal hegemony, selective concludes that “the United States has vent of the Islamic State of Iraq and the engagement, or a “fortress America” ap- grown incapable of moderating its ambi- Levant [ISIL] occurred after this book proach. Posen’s approach is consistent, tions in international politics. Since the was written.) well-reasoned, and comprehensive. He collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a Posen’s national strategy of restraint also has owned up to the risks inherent in grand strategy that can be called ‘Liberal comes with a military strategy that fo- changing strategies and implicitly encour- Hegemony,’ which is unnecessary, cuses on “command of the commons,” aging nuclear proliferation. It is a book counterproductive, costly, and wasteful” sea, air, and space, an idea that he put for the serious student of global affairs, (xi). Posen’s prescription is a strategy of forward in 2003. (He says little about while Bremmer’s breezier tone is better restraint that is focused on realism, vital cyberspace, although it could easily suited to the general reader. interests, and prudence. be adapted to his strategy.) A focus on In the past few years, President In his tightly reasoned book, Posen control of the commons would reduce Obama captured some of the spirit of is concerned with international relations military personnel strength by 20 the restraint strategy with little of its theory, strategy development, and the percent, and spending from around 4 rigor or consistency. He has drastically record of current efforts to secure our percent of gross domestic product to reduced forces fighting in the Long War national security. He takes the reader about 2.5 percent. He would reduce from a few hundred thousand to less through the ascent of liberal hegemony, all the Services, including the Navy, the than 20,000, total, in Iraq, Syria, and the rise of neoconservativism, and keystone in his maritime strategy. Posen Afghanistan. While the inelegant “lead- changes in the international system, admits that a strategy of restraint might ing from behind” was never officially which he maintains will further frustrate encourage nuclear proliferation. He doctrine, Obama tried to give allies and liberal hegemonists. He finds our large wisely posits at least a decade for transi- partners greater space to exercise initia- Armed Forces and frequent interven- tionary activities. tive. On his watch, however, the security tions overseas to be costly and ill-advised, In my view, Posen’s military strategy situation in Iraq and Afghanistan deterio- especially in the Middle East. In many and force structure are risky. The military rated, the civil war in Syria turned Europe places, U.S. forces, a potential solution, strategy relies on the good offices of allies and the Middle East upside down, can easily become a significant problem.3 whom we no longer would serve with on and ISIL, the successor to al Qaeda in He is also tough on our “cheap riding” the ground. A smaller, mostly mobile off- Iraq, established a proto-caliphate and or “reckless driver” allies (35–44). Posen shore force would be a weaker deterrent extended its tentacles into Asia and concludes that the costs of liberal hege- and a reactive warfighting entity. Such a North Africa. As its battlefield prospects mony have far exceeded its benefits and force would have less slack for multiple have worsened, ISIL has expanded its that the overactive strategy is “unneces- contingencies and carry with it an in- anti-Western terrorist operations with sary given our strong, inherent security creased risk of running out of means even dedicated operatives or otherwise with position” (65). when pursuing limited ends. Accordingly, Internet-inspired actors or small groups. Posen argues that this wasteful, dys- a markedly smaller force also carries a On President Obama’s watch, Libya and functional strategy should be replaced by higher risk of defeat if it arrives too small Yemen also fell into turmoil. The last a strategy of restraint that is focused on or too late to get the job done. Today, book in this trilogy—Robert Kaufman’s the balance of power in Eurasia, manag- markedly building down U.S. forces as Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama’s ing the threat of nuclear weapons, and China and Russia improve theirs may cre- Grand Strategy Weakened America—ad- “suppressing terrorist organizations that ate an impression of weakness. dresses this problem set.4 have global ambitions” (69). This would
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Collins 95 Kaufman argues that Obama flubbed U.S.-Russian relations and handled Putin poorly. He concludes, “President Obama fundamentally misjudged the character of Russia’s increasingly nasty, authoritarian, and assertive regime, the grandiosity of Russia’s swelling ambitions, and the in- ability of democratic Europe to counter them without strong American leadership stressing muscular deterrence rather than conciliatory engagement” (72). Kaufman finds that Obama has failed to lead our European allies or even maintain their trust. (Of late, NATO has begun to beef up its presence in Eastern Europe, but Kaufman would likely see it as too little and awfully late.) In the Middle East and Afghanistan, Kaufman finds Team Obama focused on strategic withdrawal and not war winning. In Libya, President Obama led from behind, and despite the Arab Spring, the President gave a low priority to promoting democracy. Where he did Nuclear weapon test Dakota on Enewetak Atoll, 1956 (National Nuclear Security Administration) support a democratically elected govern- Professor Kaufman is on the faculty •• Use force sparingly, proportionally, ment in Egypt, he was slow to see the of Pepperdine University. His book is a multilaterally, for limited goals, with danger of its Islamist bent. He has cozied scholarly, conservative, and polite but limited means, and only as a last up to Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan in Turkey powerful critique of the Obama grand resort. and ignored his authoritarian tendencies. strategy. He rejects notions that Obama •• Rely more on soft power rather The security situation in Iraq deteriorated is either a pure realist or idealist, and he than on hard power. Focus more rapidly in Iraq during the Obama ad- asserts—like Bremmer in his advocacy on the danger of terrorism, nuclear ministration. In Afghanistan, the security for an Indispensable America—that proliferation generally, humanitarian situation today is even more troubled “President Obama has imprudently aban- concerns, and unconventional threats than when Obama took office. Kaufman doned the venerable tradition of muscular rather than on the imperatives of decries the Iran deal, but some of his internationalism emblematic of Presidents traditional geopolitics. more dire projections have not come to Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Reagan, •• Realize that the emergence of other pass. Finally, Team Obama delivered the and both Bushes” (4). He notes that power centers makes a substantial Libyan people from Muammar Qadhafi’s Obama has turned his back on the U.S. devolution of American responsibili- oppression into chaos. The debacle in role, in Josef Joffe’s term, “as the world’s ties possible. Benghazi was in part the result of a fail- default power” (4). Kaufman writes that •• Build bridges to engage and con- ure to follow up a successful multilateral the “Obama Doctrine” of retrenchment ciliate actual and potential rivals humanitarian intervention with effective has the following tenets: (10–26). assistance to the new government of Libya. Protect the world and the United Kaufman runs this doctrine up •• By the sixth chapter, the reader is States from the arrogance of Ameri- against international relations theories not surprised to read that Kaufman can power too often justified by and concludes that Obama’s “original believes that Obama’s pivot toward Asia extravagant claims of American and largely coherent synthesis draws on has been a bust. He argues, “President exceptionalism. multiple sources and experiences” (60). Obama’s Asia policy has de-emphasized Embrace multilateralism rather than He concludes later that this synthesis •• traditional geopolitical rivalry, elevated unilateralism or narrow coalitions of “appropriates the most problematical climate change as a priority rather than a the willing. features of these paradigms without their peripheral security issue, and emphasized Minimize the salience of regime type countervailing values” (183). •• diplomacy rather than hard power in or ideology. Having addressed theory, Kaufman fashioning an Asian pivot that remains takes the reader around the world. more rhetoric than reality” (145). Like
96 Commentary / Toward a Future National Strategy JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Bremmer and Posen, Kaufman is wary of consistent yet flexible strategy, but if his- •• How can the United States ensure China’s growing power, but he empha- tory is a guide, the President is not likely that its allies do their fair share? sizes that the roots of this problem are to follow a specific international relations •• How should the United States in China’s authoritarian political system. theory. The result may well look like balance its defense priorities among In any case, Kaufman rails against China some sort of combination of the recom- preparing for great power contingen- for behaving aggressively and Obama for mended strategies in these three books cies, continuing to fight terrorists, focusing on spreading optimism and soft and the other sources mentioned, above. and contending with rogue regional power in the region. He cites influential What prudent strategic advice can we powers? sources that assert that the United States leave for President Trump and his na- •• What role should regional and global is losing its military edge in the region. tional security team? First, the next U.S. trading arrangements play in U.S. Kaufman also notes that a “neglect of strategy will not be like the Cold War’s strategy? India ranks high on the list of the Obama containment. It will not have a single, •• What percent of U.S. national administration’s foreign policy mistakes” primary focal point. U.S. domestic needs product can we afford to spend on (178). He concludes that the Asia pivot, will compete with security challenges, national security, and how will we like the Syria red line, was typical of which will emanate from major powers, control entitlement spending and Obama’s “words without meaning . . . like Russia and China; revisionist regional the national debt to allow for a commitments without follow-up, phrases powers, like Iran and North Korea; and robust defense, improvements to our without plans” (184). transnational threats, like international crumbling infrastructure, and other In his conclusion, Kaufman returns to terrorist movements and illicit criminal validated Federal programs? Josef Joffe’s phrase and recommends that networks. The pace of change also seems Third, with an eye to the future, the United States behave as “the world’s to be accelerating. Strategy and the secu- strategists should also mine the past for default power,” strengthen its defenses, rity environment are interactive. Change lessons. In the past year, a team at NDU and conduct its affairs with a keen sense in one will be reflected in the other. worked on the strategic lessons of the of regime types, that is, favoring democ- President Dwight Eisenhower was wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ef- racies and furthering democratic values. fond of repeating an old Army adage: fort has borne great fruit and deserves He recommends a “grand strategy an- plans are nothing; planning is everything. to be replicated for other cases.8 Henry chored in moral democratic realism” that In that regard, a future strategy will have Kissinger tells us that history teaches by embraces American exceptionalism and to have relatively constant objectives with analogy.9 Strategic wisdom can come only behaves with prudence as its paramount the flexibility to change ways and means. from the knowledge of many cases and value (191–198). Needless to add, Posen Strategists will have to become masters the ability to compare them contextually. and Bremmer would take issue with these of multi-scenario thinking.7 Strategy will International relations theory is a useful conclusions. For Posen, Kaufman’s stra- chart the course, but change will be con- tool, but Goethe tells us in Faust that “all tegic recommendations are the source of stant and often discontinuous. Of course, theory, my friend, is gray, but green is America’s problems abroad. there is a danger here: a strategy that the golden tree of life.” The danger may Merlin the Magician could not square changes rapidly or dysfunctionally can risk arise if cases are made to fit into existing all the contending circles drawn by these appearing feckless or confuse friend and theories rather than being used to refine three authors. While they all recommend foe alike. or modify them. strategic change, they disagree widely on Second, the next strategy should Fourth, strategic analysis teaches the that change, with Bremmer advocating begin with an exhaustive analysis of the importance of assumptions, from the an inward-looking Independent America, security environment, including chal- grand to the petty. Strategic assumptions Posen calling for a realist strategy of lenges and opportunities. Next, it will must be continually tested and strate- restraint, and Kaufman recommend- need to have an elaborate, prioritized set gies adjusted appropriately. Opinions ing a strategy akin to primacy, which he of national security objectives. The hard and assertions can also be problematic. calls moral democratic realism. Other arguments in the next national strategy For example, Posen, in arguing for his scholars have added to the list of possible development are likely to come in de- strategy of restraint, asserts on the first strategies: Brandeis’s Robert Art, writing termining the “hows” of the strategy. page of his book that the United States is in 2003, rigorously evaluated various Bremmer, Posen, and Kaufman’s work “incapable of moderating its ambitions in options and recommended a strategy would suggest that some of the key ques- international politics” (xi), but President of selective engagement, which falls tions include: Obama has made a serious attempt to between restraint and liberal hegemony.5 Does the United States maintain do just that. Some, like Kaufman, might Frank Hoffman of the National Defense •• global engagement and force pres- add that Team Obama has often been University (NDU), a decade after Art, ence, limit its presence to a few key too restrained. Moreover, Bremmer and had his own hybrid strategy, which he regions, or adopt a fully offshore Posen both assert that NATO expansion called forward partnering.6 President posture? has been dysfunctional and is a factor in Trump will and should choose a single
JFQ 84, 1st Quarter 2017 Collins 97 steps of God sounding through events, then leap up and grasp the hem of His garment.”10 Here is hoping that President Trump is listening and ready to leap. JFQ
Notes
1 Ian Bremmer, Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015). 2 Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foun- dation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). 3 This theme is nicely developed in David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), xiii–38. 4 Robert Kaufman, Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama’s Grand Strategy Weakened America (Lexington: University Press of Ken- tucky, 2016). 5 See Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for Remains of “Iron Curtain” in Czech Republic, 2014 (Courtesy Marcin Szala) America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Russia’s increasing aggressiveness. There press is sharply curtailed. The growing 6 Frank Hoffman, “Forward Partnership: A are other possible explanations. Instead, assertiveness of Putin and Xi Jinping add Sustainable American Strategy,” Orbis (Winter 2013), 20–40. For an additional source that Russian policy may be motivated by to this concern. The United States must argues that the United States has much conti- Putin’s misguided machismo, or its his- be wary of such states, even when they nuity in its grand strategy, see R.D. Hooker, Jr., torical habit of attempting to dominate its temporarily act in consonance with our The Grand Strategy of the United States, INSS neighbors, or a desire to control its near interests. At the same time, these three Strategic Monograph (Washington, DC: NDU abroad and restore territory lost at the books have each given testimony to the Press, October 2014). 7 The classical text that employs multiple- dissolution of the Soviet Union. For my difficulties of nation-building or attempt- scenario long-range planning is Peter Swartz, part, I could not imagine the evolution ing to export democracy. The danger Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future of democracies in East Europe without of false democrats, like Egypt’s Muslim in an Uncertain World (New York: Currency NATO expansion and the Partnership Brotherhood ruler Mohamed Morsi and Doubleday, 1996). 8 for Peace, which both have allowed East now Turkey’s Erdo˘gan is yet another Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning European militaries to evolve beyond the complicating problem. from the Long War (Washington, DC: NDU Soviet model. In strategic affairs, facts Finally, even the best of strategies Press, 2015). are often illusive or subject to complex cannot be an infallible guide for a future 9 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: qualifications, far beyond what will fit President to make specific decisions. Simon & Schuster, 1994), 27. 10 on a bumper sticker or a talking point. Often, a reasonable strategic initiative, This quotation can be found at BrainyQuote.com, available at
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