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The London School of Economics and Political Science The London School of Economics and Political Science American Perceptions of Destalinisation and Leadership Change in the Soviet Union, 1953-56: From Stalin’s Death to the Hungarian Uprising Weston Conrad Ullrich A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, December 2014. Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 99,837 words. 1 Abstract Destalinisation was the process of enormous change that began in the wake of Stalin’s death. Whilst it has been heavily studied from the Soviet perspective, it has not been examined from the American standpoint. This thesis fills that gap. It took until 1956 for Eisenhower and Dulles to alter their perceptions of the USSR and its ideology despite the years of change that followed Stalin’s death. This thesis explains how the majority of policymakers rejected signals of change in the USSR until 1956. There were numerous reasons for this: domestic politics, relations with allies, and public opinion all played a role. But the key factor in preventing a change in mindset was an engrained perception of the Soviet leaders as Stalinists. While the Soviet leadership after 1953 rejected the hallmarks of Stalinism, the Eisenhower administration understood such signals of change within a mindset that saw the Soviets as unreconstructed communists, expansionist in aims, conspiratorial in methods, and, above all, out to destroy the West. This perception was in effect a mental ‘dam’, which held back any substantial perception change in Washington. By 1956, however, a new perception of destalinisation, and by extension Soviet Communism, came into being. The Eisenhower administration no longer rejected out of hand the changes the Soviet leadership enacted both domestically and in foreign relations. Eisenhower and Dulles found sufficient evidence to question whether the rigid view of Soviet Communism and its aims was accurate or useful. The 20th Party Congress caused serious cracks in the ‘dam'. Two of these ‘cracks’ were in the minds if Eisenhower and Dulles, who by the end of 1956 had changed their view of the Soviet leaders, and no longer regarded them as Stalinist. This change in perception would ultimately allow détente to take hold. 2 Table of Contents Table of Contents Acknowledgements ...........................................................................................................................7 Abbreviations......................................................................................................................................8 Introduction............................................................................................................................10 Some Definitions..............................................................................................................................10 The Argument ...................................................................................................................................12 Thesis Scope and Structure ......................................................................................................... 16 Stalin’s Death and the Initial Leadership Transition, 1953-54....................................17 Destalinisation as a Source of Increased Danger...............................................................18 The 20th Party Congress and the Genesis of a Changed Perception of the USSR .19 Sources................................................................................................................................................ 21 Archives...............................................................................................................................................21 Memoirs and Contemporaneous Literature ........................................................................23 Historiography and Literature Review.................................................................................... 24 Examining Stalin’s Death..............................................................................................................24 Major Works Addressing the 1953-60 Period....................................................................28 Foundations of American Perceptions of the USSR..........................................................32 Personalities ......................................................................................................................................36 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 44 Chapter 1: Stalin’s Death and the Change in Soviet Leadership............................47 Perceptions of the Transfer of Power through 1953 .......................................................... 48 The Initial Reshuffle .......................................................................................................................48 Malenkov’s ‘Demotion’..................................................................................................................50 Hopes of a PoWer Struggle...........................................................................................................53 The Confusion over Beria............................................................................................................. 54 Malenkov in Control?.....................................................................................................................56 “a series of cheap gifts”, “talk of conversations”, or “something that cannot be dismissed”: Reactions to the Soviet New Course ................................................................. 58 The Soviet ‘Peace Initiative’ .......................................................................................................58 So Much Change, So Much the Same .......................................................................................62 Chapter Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 68 3 Table of Contents Chapter 2: Divining the Power Structure and the Ascent of Khrushchev, 1954...........................................................................................................................................71 The Military after Stalin, 1954...................................................................................................75 Reading into Soviet Domestic Affairs: The Danger of Suggestion..............................76 Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy and U.S. Perceptions...................................................... 81 The Union of Social Soviets .........................................................................................................84 The Influence of Public Opinion and Domestic Politics..................................................86 Chapter Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 88 Chapter 3: What the Leadership Changes Meant for the U.S. .................................92 Malenkov Ousted............................................................................................................................. 92 Perceptions of the Kremlin Power Structure and Collective Leadership .................... 98 U.S. Debates about Soviet Policy and the Leadership Changes......................................105 Khrushchev on Top- A New Threat or More of the Same?...............................................111 Disagreement over the Meaning of Soviet changes...........................................................112 Chapter Conclusion ......................................................................................................................118 Chapter 4: Challenges to Existing Perceptions......................................................... 119 The Re-Emergence of Lenin.......................................................................................................120 Slowly Modifying Perceptions and Resistance to Change ...............................................121 The Shift to ‘peaceful coexistence’...........................................................................................128 A Glacial Shift in Perceptions? ..................................................................................................130 Chapter Conclusion ......................................................................................................................137 Chapter 5: To the 20th Party Congress ........................................................................ 138 U.S. Assessments and Influencing Change ............................................................................138 Initial Reports of the 20th Party
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