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Countering Violent Extremism in Libya a Peacebuilding Perspective

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Countering Violent Extremism in Libya a Peacebuilding Perspective SESRIC COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN LIBYA A PEACEBUILDING PERSPECTIVE Talha Köse & Bilgehan Öztürk This report was conducted by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN LIBYA A PEACEBUILDING PERSPECTIVE © 2020 Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) Address: Kudüs Cad. No: 9, Diplomatik Site, 06450 Oran, Ankara –Turkey Telephone +90–312–468 6172 Internet www.sesric.org E-mail [email protected] All rights reserved High standards have been applied during processing and preparation stage by the SESRIC to maximize the accuracy of the data included in this work. The denominations and other information shown on any illustrative section or figure do not imply any judgment on the part of the SESRIC concerning the legal status of any entity. Besides it denies any responsibility for any kind of political debate that may arise using the data and information presented in this publication. The boundaries and names shown on the maps presented in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the SESRIC. The material presented in this publication is copyrighted. By the virtue of the copyright it claims and as it encourages dissemination of its publications for the sake of the OIC Member Countries, SESRIC gives the permission to view, copy, download, and print the material presented provided that these materials are not going to be reused, on whatsoever condition, for commercial purposes. For permission to reproduce or reprint any part of this publication, please send a request with complete information to the Publications Department at Kudüs Cad. No: 9, Diplomatik Site, 06450 Oran, Ankara –Turkey. All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to the Publications Department, SESRIC, at the above address. ISBN: 978-625-7040-82-2 No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers. Printed in Turkey, İstanbul by Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., (October 2020) CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7 FOREWORD 11 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 FIRST CHAPTER INTRODUCTION SUMMARY OF OUR FINDINGS OF SOURCES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN LIBYA (PUSH FACTORS) 32 OBJECTIVES & THE STEPS OF COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN LIBYA RATIONALE 38 THE VISION OF CVE IN LIBYA 39 CONDITIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF CVE 42 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF MAIN CONCEPTS 44 CVE 45 THE METHODOLOGY OF CVE IN LIBYA 46 DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH 47 IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY 49 CHAPTER TWO UNDERSTANDING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN LIBYA PRE-QADHAFI PERIOD 55 THE QADHAFI PERIOD 55 POST-QADHAFI/REVOLUTION PERIOD 66 THE QUEST FOR SELF-SECURITY 79 CHAPTER THREE VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS (VEOs) IN LIBYA DAESH 87 ANSAR AL-SHARIA 93 MADKHALI SALAFIS 98 COMMONALITIES WITH DAESH AND ANSAR AL-SHARIA 99 NARRATIVES & FRAMING OF THE VEOs IN LIBYA 109 CHAPTER FOUR A HOLISTIC CVE STRATEGY FOR LIBYA THE NEXUS OF STATE FRAGILITY AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM 133 DEFINING THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE CVE MODEL: NATION-BUILDING, STATE-BUILDING, AND PEACEBUILDING 147 ACTIONABLE INTERVENTION LIST FOR A CVE MODEL IN LIBYA 164 CHAPTER FIVE CVE PRACTICE IN SPECIFIC SECTORS EDUCATION & CVE 169 LEGAL SYSTEM & LAW ENFORCEMENT 178 STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY CAPACITY 184 SMEs & PRIVATE SECTOR 190 WOMEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEBUILDING & CVE EFFORTS 196 STRATEGY FOR THE YOUTH 200 STRENGTHENING OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS & PROMOTION OF MODERATE RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 207 THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CVE 213 PREVENTING EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS 218 ESTABLISHING AN INCLUSIVE NATIONAL DIALOGUE PROCESS 223 INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION 235 REFERENCES 245 APPENDIX 1: LIBYA PLATFORM 259 APPENDIX 2: NATIONAL DIALOGUE 271 APPENDIX 3: QUESTIONNAIRE ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN LIBYA 281 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in Libya Project allowed our team of researchers to investigate Libyan society during a very tur- bulent period (2018-2020). This period will probably be one of the critical turning points in the country’s political history. We have ob- served both hope and despair during this turbulent time. Our team of researchers was also influenced by developments and was transformed during the research period. Ongoing events and the gradual destabili- zation of Libya during this time stimulated our team to work in a more dedicated manner. The Bina Program is a very comprehensive effort that aims to bring sustainable peace and stability to Libya. We wanted to be part of an initiative to bring peaceful change to Libya. The CVE team would like to thank Mustafa el Sagezli, Emrah Kekilli, Murad Fayad and SESRIC for allowing us to be part of this constructive effort. This report is an outcome of a collective endeavor. We had very con- structive dialogues with many segments of Libyan society during our two-year research and writing period. The honest and dedicated com- ments, insights, and contributions of our local partners were key to our understanding of the realities on the ground in Libya. Those resources were also the fundamental pillars of our report. We had opportunities to go to Tripoli, Misrata, Zliten and we had honest conversations with Lib- yan actors while General Khalifa Haftar lay siege to the country’s capital. 8 / COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN LIBYA: A PEACEBUILDING PERSPECTIVE We invited many Libyan actors and international experts on Libya to our workshops in Istanbul and Ankara. The dialogues and networks we developed during and after the field research gave us some hope and optimism about the future of Libya. Without the support and the insights of our local partners, research counterparts, and friends in Libya, we would not have been able to comprehend the complexities of post-revolutionary Libyan society. Every conflict has its specifics and its unique features that can both mitigate or exacerbate it. We are espe- cially thankful for our Libyan partners’ help understanding the details of the Libyan realities in such a difficult time. Local and international developments and interventions did not help stabilize Libya after the revolution that toppled Colonel Muam- mar Qadhafi’s 42-year reign. The country has been dragged into a civil war due to internal and external reasons. Unfortunately, most of the in- ternational actors and interventions deepened the country’s instability rather than helping fix the root causes of the problems that destabilized Libya. As a team of researchers, we passionately focused on stabilizing and stimulating sustainable and inclusive peace in Libya. Struggling to focus on inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding efforts may sound naïve in a time of escalated tensions. However, that is the only formula that can bring peace and reconciliation to the country. The group of experts at SETA, our researchers, and research assistants actively sup- ported our research. We want to thank General Coordinator of SETA Burhanettin Duran, and our team of researchers at SETA, Dr. Murat Yeşiltaş, Can Acun, Bilal Salaymeh, Sibel Koru, and Gizem Gezen for their remarkable contributions. Lastly, I would like to thank my assistants at Ibn Haldun University Zulkarnein Mohammed and Ahmet Safa Hüdaverdi who helped me during the research process. We hope that this report and our efforts will inspire the process of a peaceful change in Libya. Our dedication to our Libyan friends’ struggle to live in a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous country will ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS / 9 continue. We hope that this project will also contribute to the friend- ship and strengthen the deep cultural and historical ties of the Libyan and Turkish people. Associate Professor Talha KÖSE Rapporteur and team leader of the CVE Project FOREWORD FOREWORD The Bina Program was established by the Libyan Program for Rein- tegration and Development (LPRD), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), and the Statistical, Economic and Social Research Train- ing Center for Islamic Countries (SESRIC). The Bina Program is a state-building initiative that aims to support Libya and fragile con- flict-affected countries in rebuilding their institutions. The Bina pro- gram has three important pillars one of which is research development. Research is essential for analyzing the current situation in Libya and providing Libya’s decision-makers with recommendations, policies, and solutions to overcome the challenges of state-building. One of the main challenges that the Libyan people face in their endeavor to rebuild Libya’s institutions is the security issue. Libya as many other countries in the region has been suffering from violence and terrorism caused by extremist groups such as DAESH. For this reason, Bina has launched its research project on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). The main goal of the CVE research was to analyze the root causes of violent extremism in Libya and recommend solutions for preventing and countering the spread of violent extremism in the country. The research looked into the deep root causes of violent extremism (VE) in Libya and how to overcome these causes. The perspective of the study is based on a peacebuilding approach which aims to strengthen the 12 / COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN LIBYA: A PEACEBUILDING PERSPECTIVE involvement of local actors as well as strengthening societal resilience. The CVE approach adopted by the research team was in accordance with the Bina Program’s vision of the combination and intersection of peacebuilding, state-building, and “nation-building.” Another important objective of the Bina research project is the transfer of knowledge and international best practices to the Libyan side. Bina chose to partner with SETA Foundation for Political, Eco- nomic and Social Research seeking to learn from the Turkish and in- ternational experiences in tackling VE by dealing with its root causes. The project team was formed in a unique manner where Libyan, Turkish, and international researchers worked together for months to conduct good quality research that suggests clear policies and solutions. The policies and solutions that are suggested to the challenges of the Libyan case benefitted from the Turkish and international experiences on CVE.
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