ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol22, No 1, pp 99 – 114, 2001

Democracy@internet.asia?The challengesto the emancipatory potentialo fthenet: lessons f rom Chinaand Malaysia

JASONPABBOTT

ABSTRACT It is acommonlyheld view that,given the uniquecharacteristics of the internet, it provides real opportunities for democratisationand political transformation,especially in societies where freedomof speech and expression is constrainedby government controls. This article challengesthis assumption byexamining the impactof the internet in Asia with speciŽc reference to China andMalaysia. In particular the article arguesthat to understandthe impactof the internet ondeveloping economies it is essential toexamine the political economyof the internet—locally, regionally andglobally. While the net may providea newmedium for dissent andopposition, its impactis offset bytwo principal factors. First, the existence ofa markeddigital divide betweenNorth andSouth (as well as the discrepancies that exist within speciŽc countries in terms of gender,education and wealth) andsecond, by growing commercialisa- tion.

New informationtechnologies threaten sovereigns that depend on maximum politi- cal,economic, and cultural control over their peoples … nolonger can totalitarian regimesensure themselves a safe environmentby controlling the newspapers, radio andtelevision stations because the World Wide Web remains beyond their control andmanipulation. 1 Libertarian supportersof the internet arguethat the mediumis auniversal space allowingaccess to unŽltered owsof inf ormation,that it lacks established hierarchies ofpower and that it is ‘araucousand highly democratic worldwith nooverlords or gatekeepers’ . 2 Formany cyberspace resembles the 19thcentury AmericanWest: vast, unmappedand legally ambiguous.Increasingly easy access toemail andthe worldwide web globally allows politically disenfran- chised groupsto communicatewith like-mindedor sympathetic audiences. Furthermore,particularly inregimes wherethe freedomof the mainstream media is restricted either bydirect regulationand legislation orindirectly as aresult of conservativecorporate ownership, the internet has becomean alternative me- diumthrough which opposition groups have been able to havea voice.Indeed, as the openingquote from Dean Henry Perrit, Jr suggests, in suchregimes the

JasonP Abbottis inthe Department of International Studies at Nottingham Trent University, CliftonLane, NottinghamNG11 8NS, UK.

ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 01/010099-16 Ó 2001 ThirdWorld Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/01436590020022600 99 JASON PABBOTT internet is notonly a mediumof communication, it is effectively avehicle for political changeand trans formation. This article examines whetherPerrit’ s claims are valid,whether across Asia, andin particular in Chinaand Malaysia, the internet is amediumlargely free of governmentregulations andcontrols. Furthermore, if this is the case, doesit presents real opportunitiesfor greater liberalisation anddemocratisation? How- ever,the article thensuggests that suchquestions must beposed within the overall contextof the political economyof the internet—locally, regionallyand globally.In particular Isuggest that social scientists shouldbe waryof accepting atechnologicalutopian vision of the internet fortwo principal reasons.First, the Internet is botha representational space anda representation ofspace. 3 In terms ofaccessibility andusage it is patently clear that vast discrepancies exist in terms ofgender, education and wealth andbetween a wiredcore and a less wired periphery.Secondly, the internet has becomeincreasingly commericalised and privatised, transformingthe universality ofthe medium. 4 Boththese trends threaten at best toreduce the progressivepotential ofthe internet andat worst toreinforce existing structural inequalities withinthe globalpolitical economy.

Theinternet as avehicle forpolitical changeand democratisation Thelibertarian possibilities ofthe internet haveraised the prospectthat it canbe usedas aTrojanhorse by activists andcampaigners in authoritarian regimes to effect political changeand reform. The many progressive uses ofthe internet includethe dissemination ofdocuments, audio and video Ž les, communication amonglike-minded people, email petitions, software,and as amediumfor organisingmore traditional forms ofprotest. Globallyinnumerable groups use the internet fortheir ownpolitical interests andagendas— from civil andhuman rights activists tospecial internet groups,political parties, religious movements andterrorist groups. 5 Inthe developingworld the internet offers the potential ofcheap access to sympathetic counterpartsabroad and the ability foralmost instantaneous trans- mission ofnews, reports, and AV footage.Beginning with the TiananmenSquare incident in1989 the Chinese governmenthas beenparticularly waryabout the use ofthe internet bydissident groupsboth within and outside China.During the events ofJune 1989 the Communist leadership wereparticularly stungby students’use ofemails andf axes andby the ChinaNetnewsgroup based at StanfordUniversity in the USA.Conservatives within the CommunistParty fearedthat the Internet representeda technologythat was simply aweaponof US domination. 6 Toillustrate the scopeof progressive net sites abrief search was conducted usingcommon keywords for progressive causes. Rather thanlist the numberof actual webpages, Table 1 instead lists the numberof actual sites available. In orderto demonstrate the use ofthe net as aprogressiveforce in Asia a comparisonis madebetween the most popularinternet search engineYahoo and its region-speciŽc engine. This imperfect illustration also implies that, while issues ofprogressive politics are well representedon the webas awhole,within Asia concernwith 100 DEMOCRACY@INTERNET .ASIA?

TABLE 1 Internet sitesfor progressive causes: region speciŽ c andgeneral

Numberof sites Numberof sites atYahoo.com Keywords atYahoo! Asia (general)

Humanrights 188 1270 Civilrights 11 436 Democracy 57 545 Freedomof speech 2 52 Press freedom 1 37 Labourrights 10 86 Women’s rights 22 177 Religiousfreedom/ rights 3/1 107/125 Environmentalrights/ protection 5/25 103/407 Minorityrights 6 20 Racial equality 0 18 Disabledrights 2 45 Gay rights 0 243 Children’s rights 4 112 Comparison Marketing 490 14 002 Electroniccommerce 66 1911

Source:Author’s searches conductedduring July/ August2000. humanrights anddemocracy far exceedsmore issue-speciŽ c andminority group concerns.This conclusionwould broadly support arguments that emphasise that suchissue-oriented politics developmost readily withinmature democratic regimes with established strongcivil societies. Inauthoritarian/ transitional regimes issues to effect democratic transition orsecure rights andfreedoms are moresalient andcivil society moreembryonic. 7 Forexample, in Malaysia the principal reformnewsgroups and websites championedthe cause ofthe former DeputyPrime Minister AnwarIbrahim. Indeed, the dismissal fromofŽ ce and subsequentarrest ofAnwar on charges of corruption and sodomy acted as a catalyst forthe formationof coalitions amongMalaysia’ s vibrant NGO sector.8 Nonetheless evenwhere limited regionally, 9 the resources andinf ormation available onthe webas awholeis readily available globally(there are an estimated 1000000 human rights-related webpages). Dozens of country speciŽc studies (AmnestyInternational, Article XIX,Friends ofthe Earth, Greenpeace,etc) reportactions andevents in authoritarian political systems aroundthe world,of ten providingmaterials that are notavailable through traditional media.Several sites stand outas important ‘jump’stations for progressiveuses ofthe internet: TheInstitute ofGlobal Communications, The Electronic DemocracyInf ormationForum, and the National Endowmentfor Democracy. Underthe Presidencyof Jiang ZeminChina has attempted to harness internet technologiesto generate continued economic growth and development while tryingto limit anypolitical harmthat might accompanythe growthof Internet use.10 This cautious supportfor the internet has nonetheless led toa phenomenal 101 JASON PABBOTT growthin the numberof users overthe past fouryears. It is estimated that in 1996there wereonly 4 0000internet users in China,whereas by June 2 000this Žgurehad risen to 12.3million. 11 However,alongside this cautious supporthave beenconcerted efforts tocontrol and regulate internet access andcontent. Tobegin with China’ s internet andintranet are completely state-ownedand anyonewho wishes to set upor use anetworkneeds prior approval from the government. 12 Additionally,individuals hadto followonerous registration proce- dures,including providing detailed personaland employment inf ormation,agree- ingto sign apledgenot to access informationthat threatens state security, and in some cases users wererequired to register with the police forthe intent to surf.13 Thereality has provenvery different, however. As well as hundredsof ‘unofŽcial’ and ‘ unregistered’internet cafes (particularly prevalentin Shanghai), ofŽcial providershave been openly  outingthe regulations.In 1997, for example,Beijing Telecomlaunched a service entitled Capital Online( 263.net) whichallegedly allows users to access the internet withoutany paperwork (real orvirtual). 14 While the numberof these sites has increased,most ofthem only allow access toweb sites within Chinaon the broadbandmultimedia 169 Network.Although most allow emails tobe exchanged globally, users wishing toaccess sites outside Chinahave to set upindividual accounts with China Telecom’s Chinanetservice, whichserves as oneof the fourportals foraccess tothe global WWW.15 InDecember 1997 the State Councilpassed the ComputerInf ormation Networkand Internet Security Protection andManagement Regulations in an attempt to‘ register, monitorand censure’ . 16 This requires that all internet service providers (ISPs)pass users’personal details ontothe government’s ChinaInternet NetworkInformation Centre; that all international gatewaysor nodes remain understate control; andlists the types ofsites that ISPsandindividuals are effectively ‘banned’from accessing. Theseinclude pornographic material and sites ‘inciting to overthrowthe governmentor the social system, inciting division ofthe country,harming national uniŽcation andinjuring the reputationof the state organs’. 17 Alongsidesuch regulations the Chinese governmenthas beenaccused in the West ofactively blocking‘ politically sensitive’websites. 18 Althoughof Žcially denied,these includethe BBC,the Voiceof America, the NewYork Times , the WashingtonPost and CNN to namebut a few. 19 However,there appearsneither tobe any pattern towhich sites are blocked,nor any uniformity over whether suchsites are completely 20 orpermanentlyblocked. 21 Oneexplanation for this is that, accordingto one commentator, ‘ [m]ost professionals inthe industrybelieve that the list ofblocked sites is intendedonly to convincethe Internet-illiterate oldguard, with the exceptionof net savvyJiang Zemin,that the Internet canbe controlled,and is notto befeared’. 22 Inaddition most commentators suggest that the blockingof sites is largely ineffective becausethe natureof internet technologymakes it easy tocircumvent such ‘ Žrewalls’. Themost commonway is byusing one of thousands of proxy servers that exist outside China(eg www.proxymate.com)orthe growingnumber of routing services (eg www.anonymizer.com). 23 Otherwebsites routinelyblocked by state security agencies are sites runby 102 DEMOCRACY@INTERNET .ASIA? dissident groupsoperating outside the country,such as the US-basedDemocracy Network,Human Rights inChina, and China News Digest. DemocracyNetwork andsimilar groupsnot only operate their ownsites butalso act as intermediaries forunderground dissident groupswithin Chinaitsel f.Groupssuch as Tunneland VIP Reference24 sendreports to US-basedgroups via electronic mail, wherethey are thenredistributed backto Chinavia email to subscribers’individual mail- boxes.25 Inan anonymous email sent to the HongKong-based South China MorningPost ,the editors of TunnelMagazine 26 claimed that theywere not a dissident group,but ‘ atechnology-drivenmeans ofobtaining f reedomof speech …freedomof the press andour natural basic rights’. 27 Whethersuch attempts represent aconcertedeffort, or are largely perfunctory, the concernsof the ‘Internet-illiterate oldguard’ appeared to be well foundedon 27October 1998, when a California-based hackercalling him/herself ‘Bronc Buster’broke into anddefaced the website ofthe governmentsponsored Chinese Society forHuman Rights Studies. 28 Since thenthe Chinese governmenthas takena tougherstance onthe internet andparticularly onissues suchas hacking, encryptiontechnologies and f oreignownership. On 4 December1998 Shanghai businessman LinHai was jailed fortwo years forallegedly providing30 000 Chinese email addresses to VIP Reference,29 twohackers were sentenced to death forbreaking into the computersystem ofa Chinese bankand in February1999 the State InformationSecurity Appraisal andIdentiŽ cation ManagementCom- mittee was set upto guardsecurity onthe Internet. 30 Duringthe last 12monthsthis harderline has continued.Across China municipal authorities haveroutinely carried outraids onso-called ‘illegal’ internet cafes ostensibly forfailure either to paytaxes orbecause they dissemi- nate pornographic CDs. Forexample, between April 1999and February 2 000 Shanghaimunicipal authorities closed 127unlicensed caf es, seizing computers andother equipment. 31 Furtherconcerns were raised bythe use ofthe internet byfollowers ofthe bannedFalun Gong sect, 32 resulting in anannouncement by the authorities in Beijing in September1999 that foreigninvestment in the internet was to bebanned. 33 On25 January 2 000,withoutwarning, the State Bureauof Secrecy published rules that orderedthat all websites must undergo security checksand that madeit acriminal offenceto leak ‘state secrets’on the web.The deŽ nition of‘ state secrets’, however,is bothvery wide and vague, to the extent that it couldinclude anything that didnot receive ofŽcial approvalfor publication, 34 furthermorethe newregulations also makeoperators of internet bulletin boards,chat roomsand newsgroups responsible forany such ‘ security breach’. Othermoves of concern centre onregulations to beincluded in a proposedf utureTelecommunications Act. These rules threaten to forbid‘ unac- credited reporters’from publishing internet news; to restrict Chinese internet contentproviders using stories fromthe web;and to banthe sale offoreign encryptionproducts within China unless foreigntechnology Ž rms ‘surrender’the encryptionkeys to the authorities. 35 Manyindustry insiders, while concernedat this Žrmer stance byBei jing continueto believe that suchactions will fail to work.As onecommentator observed,‘ the governmenthas tried to builda digital Great Wall to separate the Chinese peoplefrom free information,but its ability toimpose this censorship 103 JASON PABBOTT is limited. Anyonewho has some knowledgeof the Internet canŽ nda way around’.36 However,while controlmay effectively bebeyond the ability of governments—monitoring is not.Contrary to the popularimage ofthe internet it is possible totrace all youractivities, discover everything youhave looked at, andwhat you have downloaded to look at off-line.If youare connectedvia a local server,your administrator/ managercan monitor your activities, while anyonewith technical skills caneasily readyour email. 37 Inthis light the harder line takenby the Chinese governmentmay serve adifferent purpose,as MandanmohanRao remarks:

theChinese government’ s positionregarding the Net has been oscillating over the yearsbetween ‘ pro-Ecommerce’and ‘ pro-censorship’positions. They may not be veryeffective in termsof enforcement but are very effective in sendingout a strong messagethat they mean business. Posturing issometimes asimportant as actual enforceabilityin authoritarian environments. 38

Indeedone should not underestimate the use off ear ofarrest andimprisonment as ameans ofenforcement. As the FarEastern EconomicReview ’s Beijing CorrespondentLorien Holland commented, ‘ there are anumberof surveillance groupschecking out the Internet,but none seem to havebeen particularly effective …[however]most sites that operateinside China(ie chat sites and discussion forums) police themselves sothat theystay outof trouble.’ 39 InMalaysia whenthe governmentwas examiningthe issue ofcensorship a decision was madethat, unlikethe strict controls that appliedto mainstream television andprint media, 40 regulations wouldbe minimal. While acknowledg- ingpublicly his concernsabout the availability ofpornographic material and dissident voices onthe net,Prime Minister Mahathir was determinedto give Malaysia acompetitive advantageover its neighbourSingapore, where stringent controls hadbeen imposed on ISPs. Consequentlyin 1996it was announcedthat there wouldbe no censorship of material onthe Internet 41 andthis pledgewas written intothe Multimedia SuperCorridor’ s ( MSC)‘Bill ofGuarantees’ . 42 Despite this morerelaxed attitude the internet didnot become a signiŽcant alternative media until the sackingof then Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahimin September1998. Before the beginningof the Anwar‘ saga’fewer thana halfamillion hadaccess to the internet in apopulationof 2 0million. Thesacking and subsequent arrest ofAnwar led increasing numbersof Malaysians to turnto the webin protest. 43 Within afewmonths over 50 pro-Anwarweb sites hademerged, circulating Anwar’s letters fromprison, eyewitness accountsof demonstrations, and foreign news reports ofthe political crisis. Inthe wordsof the webmaster ofthe site AnwarOn-Line, ‘ the Website’ s success was enormous… there weren’t alot ofgraphics, but access became slow becauseof the trafŽc. I didn’t expectso manyresponses’ . 44 Indeed,several commentators nowargue that the internet has becomeboth the main means of communicationfor the oppositionand increasingly asourceof news for Malays.45 Someestimates suggest that overtwo million Malaysians nowhave access tothe web, 46 andit becameclear bothduring the ‘reformasi demonstra- tions’and the November1999 election campaignthat manyof these in turn 104 DEMOCRACY@INTERNET .ASIA? printed,photocopied, f axedor mailed copies ofinternet material to thousands more. Initially the Malaysian government’s attempts tocounter the use ofthe internet byopposition forces revealeda great deal ofignorance of how the internet works.To quote from veteran journalist andpolitical commentator MGGPillai, the government, doesnot know how it works, nor how it canbe usedto spread information, nor how itcan be a usefularmoury in the cultural battle for thehearts and minds of the Malaycommunity. Its opponentssaw itas a practicaltool to overcome the ofŽ cial andgovernment control of the mass mediaand took to it like ducks to water. 47 Forexample, when attempts weremade by the governmentto ‘Žlter’Malaysian ISPs, proreformgroups simply either movedtheir websites to non-Malaysian hosts48 orset upmirror sites there in case their Malaysian sites wereclosed down.(The list ownerof the reformsite Malayisa. Net forexample lives in Sydneyand uses aserver basedin the USA).Other attempts to regulate the internet in Malaysia haveranged from actually closing down ISPs (albeit temporarily) to‘ unofŽcially’ sanctioned attacks ondiscussion groupsand reform sites with viruses ordenial ofservice attacks ( DoS).49 Inaddition a special panel oflawyers was set upto scrutinise internet contentfor possible legal action using libel anddefamation laws. Whatis interesting to notein the case ofMalaysia is that, since the Anwar affair Žrst hit the headlines,pro-reform websites havematured from a cacophony ofaccusatory and insulting diatribes into analternative, independentmedia. Examplesof the latter nowinclude Aliran,FreeMalaysia , TheMalaysian and Saski.Inaddition, taking advantage of the government’s ofŽcial position that it will notcensor the net,Steven Gan launched the country’s Žrst commercial onlinenewspaper, Malaysiakini on2 0November1999. Because the newspaper onlyexists in anonline format it avoidsthe regulations that restrict press freedomwithin Malaysia. Whatis also interesting to noteabout Malaysiakini is that it was fundedby a grantf roma coalition ofjournalists’ associations in Indonesia,Thailand and the Philippines—the Southeast Asian Press Alliance— created topromote media freedomthroughout the region. 50 InMarch 2 000the Malaysian governmentacted to restrict the rights ofthe Islamic party PAS to publishmaterial onthe internet. Inrenewing the publishing permit forthe party’s newspaper Harakah,DeputyHome Minister ChorChee Heungstated that Harakah couldnow publish only twice amonthinstead ofits currentbiweekly status. 51 Furthermore,he suggested that the governmentwould extendthese restrictions to the internet versionof the paper.Although the story was reportedby the ofŽcial Malaysian newsagencyBernama, the Prime Minis- ter’s Departmentquickly ordered news editors to kill the story andChor was forcedto issue anewstatement claiming that hehad been misquoted. 52

Access is aneocolonialissue Earnest claims ofthe unfetteredindividualism ofcyberspace are ironic giventhe verypublic and distinctly government-spawnedorigins ofthe Internet. 53 Further- 105 JASON PABBOTT more,during the 1990sthe internet has sufferedsteady encroachmentby corporationsfor commercial purposes,primarily technical supportand shopping, arguablyto the pointwhere this is fast becomingthe dominantusage of the internet. Thetendency in the popularmedia to drownin atechnocratic utopi- anism largely obscuresthe powerrelations that permeate cyberspace.As men- tionedin the introductionto this article, the Internet is botha representational space anda representation ofspace. Because all representations reect vested interests, there canbe no value-f ree,apolitical discourse,electronic orotherwise. Interms ofaccessibility andusage it is patently clear that vast discrepancies exist in terms ofwealth, gender and race. In the USAinternet users ‘are overwhelminglymale, white andmiddle class, well educatedand in professional occupationsthat demandcollege education.The average age of Net users in the USis 33,and the averagehousehold income is $059000 twice the national average’.54 Althoughthe internet populationboth as awholeand as aproportion ofthe populationis muchsmaller across Asia, the gender,education and income bias ofinternet users is apattern that is repeated.In Chinafor example, 79% of users are male andunder 30 (75.6%), college educatedor above (7 2%) 55 and earnmore than $12 0permonth, with nearlyhalf ofall users livingin the provincesof either Beijing, Guangdongor Shanghai. 56 Across Asia the cost ofaccess remains oneof the biggest obstacles to greater use ofthe Internet.As notedabove the majority ofChina’ s Internet users earn over1000 RMB amonth—roughly US$1 20.While this is byno means an enormousamount of money, the UnitedNations estimates that 57.8%of China’ s populationlive onless than$ 2aday,with nearlya quarteron less than$1. 57 Similar levels ofpoverty are foundin Indonesia and the Philippines, while inthe moredeveloped economies of Malaysia andThailand about are in fourstill exist onless than$2 per day. 58 Compoundingthe problemof poverty is that inrelative terms internet costs in the developingworld are greater thanin the developedworld and in the USAin particular. Astudyby International Data Corporationfound that the average monthlycost ofusing the webin the USAstoodat $25.35comparedwith an averageof $3 1.26in the Asia – PaciŽc as awhole(excluding Japan). 59 The cheapest access inthe Asia – PaciŽc was foundin Singapore and Malaysia, where costs stoodat $26.88and $27.14 respectively. Theaverage cost rose to $29.73 in China,$30.0 2in HongKong, and $3 2.09in SouthKorea (expenditures based on ISP,telephoneand phone line fees). However,it is notonly income di fferentials that are ofconcern here. Lack of access to the skills, equipmentand software necessary to gainentry to the electronic highwaythreatens to create alarge minority that is substantially disenfranchisedfrom the beneŽts ofcyberspace in the developedworld. Perhaps moresigniŽ cantly thanincome, access is limited bythe level ofliteracy bothin terms ofgeneral literacy andspeciŽ c ITliteracy. InChina and Southeast Asia, despite decadesof dynamic economic growth, there remain signiŽcant minorities that are effectively illiterate andf emale illiteracy is particular signiŽcant (see Table 2). Inaddition to basic literacy andsome level ofIT literacy, giventhat English is the principal languageof use onthe net,access is furtherlimited in the 106 DEMOCRACY@INTERNET .ASIA?

TABLE 2 Illiteracyrates in China and southeast Asia a

Maleilliteracy Female illiteracy Country %ofpopulation % ofpopulation

Cambodia 20 47 China 10 27 Indonesia 10 22 India 35 62 Laos 31 56 Malaysia 11 22 ThePhilippines 5 6 Singapore 4 14 Thailand 4 8 Vietnam 4 9

Source:WorldDevelopment Report 1998/ 99. Note: aIlliteracyas proportionof population 15 andabove. non-Englishspeaking world since atleast some knowledgeof English is almost aprerequisite forthose whowish fully to access the worldwide web. Although non-Englishlanguage use has increased sharply,it still accountsfor less than half ofall users connectedto the net (43%)and more signiŽ cantly only31% of all webpages. 60 After Englishthe most widelyused language for web pages was Japanese (5.85%)followed by German (5.77%), Chinese (3.87%),French (2.96%)andSpanish ( 2.42%).However, with the exceptionof Spanish and French(where a proportionof the internet users will beofnon-European origin) the growthof non-English languages currently re ects the growthof internet use in otherparts ofthe developedworld. For example, excluding English, 2 3ofthe top30 languages for web pages were European. There are forinstance moreweb pagesin Icelandic thanin Arabic,while, despite the growthin the numberof users inChina, currently only a paltry 3.87%of web pages are inMandarin. 61 Noneof this shouldcome as asurprise since the net was devisedprincipally forAmerican use bythe military andgovernment so nothoughtwas givenin its designto howto ensureaccess fora rangeof alphabetic andnon-alphabetic scripts. Forexample, non-phonetic languages (such as Mandarinand Japanese) haveto betransmitted as images rather thantext. 62 This raises serious problems with bandwidth,since oldslower landline telecommunication networksare less able to handlehigher bandwidth than Ž bre-opticcable andsatellite networks; furthermoretraditional landline networksare affected bygreater noise levels, whichalso adverselyaff ects downloadtimes. As Sassen notes,this creates an unequalgeography of access where‘ those whocan pay for it will havef ast speedservicing, and those whocannot will increasingly Žndthemselves in very slow lanes’. 63 However,before we get tooconcerned about bandwidth and access speeds we needto remember that the worldas awholeis not as wiredas the proponents oftechnological utopianism wouldlike us to think.In fact accordingto NUA Internet Surveysthere are only33 2million internet users—which, put more starkly, onlyequals 5.4%of the world’s population. 64 Ofthese 332million users 107 JASON PABBOTT

TABLE 3 Number ofinternet users(millions) in selected Asian countries

Country Nousers As %populationDate of survey

Australia 7 36.5 May 2000 Bangladesh 0.007 0.005 Sept 99 China 12.3 0.97 June 2000 Hong Kong 1.85 26 June 2000 India 4.5 0.45 March 2000 Indonesia 0.08 n/a May 98 Japan 27.06 21.38 May 2000 Malaysia 1.1 6 Dec 99 New Zealand 1.27 33.25 May 2000 ThePhilippines 0.32 0.03 Sept 98 Singapore 1.74 41.91 May 2000 South Korea 10 21.3 Dec 99 Taiwan 4.79 21.6 Dec 99 Thailand 1 1.65 March 2000 Vietnam 0.04 0.05 May 2000

72%are located inEurope and North America (excludingMexico), with 44%in Canadaand the USAalone.By comparison there are 75.5million inthe Asia– PaciŽ c65 (see Table3 ),13.1 million users inSouth America, 66 and only 2.7 million in Africa. 67 Inmany developing world countries the formercolonial telecommunication structures hinderfurther expansion of the net andaccess toit. Forexample, there are there are moretelephone lines onManhattan island thanin sub-Saharan Africa (excludingSouth Africa) as awhole. 68 Furthermore,in Africa, as adirect result ofthe legacyof colonial rule,incompatibilities exist betweennational telephonesystems that meanthat ‘acall placedfrom Dakar in Senegal to Lusaka in Zambiahas to berouted f romDakar to Banjul in Gambia,from Banjul to London,then London to Lusaka’ . 69 Suchproblems inevitably increase the cost andspeed of access. Additionallythe ageand reliability ofthese systems creates furtherproblems, including bandwidth issues discussed earlier. Thegrowth of mobile phoneuse worldwidemay provide a solutionto the problemof ageing andcostly landline telecommunication infrastructure. In1993 ,forexample, Cambodiabecame the Žrst countryin the worldwhere the numberof mobile phoneusers surpassed Žxed-lineusers. 70 Althoughthe use ofvisual andaural channelsof communication through RealAudioand similar narrow-casttechnologies is changingthe wayinf ormation is providedover the net,the dilemma forAsian countries is that the debateover the net,by weight of numbers is, overwhelminglybeing generated in relation to Western values,Western culture andWestern economicagendas. Furthermore there is also the dangerof a newkind of Orientalism 71 since as Everard comments,‘ whereverthere is communication,cultural dominationand the exercise ofpower there is always an other whois the recipient, the dominated, the disempowered’. 72 Giventhe predominanceof Western voices onthe net,much of what is 108 DEMOCRACY@INTERNET .ASIA? publishedon it aboutdeveloping world countries is written ‘onbehalf’ of the developingworld. Information about the developingworld is primarily written frominformation and research producedin the developedworld. In such circumstances there is areal dangerthat, rather thanencouraging the openingof discursive spaces, existing stereotypes andidentities will simply bereinf orced. Indeed,concerned that toomuch of the informationon the net aboutAsia was sourcedfrom the West, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir called on ASEAN members to becomemore assertive abouttheir presenceon the net andto producemore content from an Asian perspective. Increasinglythe developingworld has also becomethe ‘dumpingground’ for the West’s obsolete communicationsand computing technologies. 73 Companies Žndingtheir existing systems renderedobsolete bynewerones are facedwith the choiceof either simply throwingthem awayor selling them to countries for whomthe technologywould still represent anupgrade, often at inated ‘real worth’prices. 74 Recently NGO groupshave also joinedthe act collecting ‘obsolete’technologies to ‘donate’to the developingworld. While arguably some technologyis better thanno technology, such ‘ obsolete’systems still maintain asigniŽcant technologicalgap, since the systems are oftenno longer compatible with newermachines, allow limited access (egto graphics and video-loadedwebsites) orat best ensurelonger download times andhence higher telephonecosts. Clearly the newest computerequipment is the fastest andmost versatile andalthough much of this equipmentcan be found in some developing countries,where it is available the averagedisposable incomeensures that such systems are beyondthe reachof all buta small proportionof the country’s population.With the exceptionof Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan this is certainly the case in Asia. Evenin countries suchas Malaysia and Thailand PC penetrationrates are low,same 6%inthe former,while incountries suchas India,despite the remarkablesuccess ofsoftware developmentin and aroundBangalore, ‘ apart froma fewnon-governmental organisations that use the net todisseminate information,the computerand the net are alien torural India’.75 Manydeveloping countries, including Asian developingeconomies, also impose hightari ffsonimported telecommunications andcomputing equip- ment. Finally, inorder to upgrade existing telecommunication systems (andalleviate problemssuch as that illustrated within Africa above),a growingnumber of developingworld countries are turningto private transnational companiesto build,operate and manage their networks(eg Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand). Thepattern that is emergingis that suchcompanies are keento upgrade urban networksbut are less willing to establish networksin rural areas, potentially creating aclassic dualistic economy.Furthermore proŽ ts are repatriated offshore andthere is the dangerthat suchstates becomehostage to monopolistic practices anddependent on a single telecommunications supplier.The provision of internet services onmobile phonesmay undermine such monopolies but is unlikelyto present remedies fortechnology dependence, since the manufacturers ofsuch equipment and the provisionof networks will invariablybe f oreign- owned. 109 JASON PABBOTT

Thee-commercialisation of the internet Fromits early beginningsthe commercialisation ofthe internet principally involvedboth the developmentof competitive, private networkservices, andthe developmentof commercial productsimplementing the internet technology. Since the establishment ofthe worldwide web in 1995 we havewitnessed anew phaseof commercialisation, 76 inwhich the internet has becomea ‘commodity’ service increasingly utilised to supportother commercial services, frominternet bookshopsto home-deliverygrocery services. In1999 e-commerce transactions in the USAamountedto $8billion andare forecast to growto $108billion by 2003. Inrecognition of the growingimportance of e-commerce on 16 January1999 leadingtransnational corporationsfrom across the globeformed a lobbygroup to discouragegovernments from imposing internet taxes andother measures that couldhurt business overthe internet. TheGlobal Business Dialogueon E-Commerceincludes amongothers, IBM,Time Warner,Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi, Fujitsu, NEC,Nokia,France Telecom, Bertelsmann andMarks & Spencer.The group, representing businesses intechnology, media andŽ nance, plans to present suggestions onpolicy to governmentsaround the worldas well as to senda generalmessage against governmentregulation of the exploding medium.77 Thereis nodoubt that the main reasonfor corporate interest in the internet lies in the fact that it is seen asopeningup vast newmarkets. However,many f ear that, ‘commercialisation maywell dampenthe impact ofthe Internet in terms of political practices’, 78 Žrst because,as alludedto earlier, counter-hegemonic groupswill Žndthemselves unableto compete with private commercef oraccess tofast broadbandwidth, 79 secondbecause information itsel fwill increasingly becomea commoditytraded on the internet. As Bill Gates himself comments:

Thereare those who think that the Internet has shown that information will be free …Althougha greatdeal of information, from NASA photosto bulletin board entriesdonated by users, will continue to be free, Ibelievethe most attractive information… willcontinue to be produced for proŽt. 80 However,perhaps the greatest challengeto civil society is that, as the internet becomesmore and more dominated by commercial activities, wewill see, ‘the informationsuperhighway grafted onto a capitalist system alreadycharacterised byinequality,economic stagnation, market saturation, Žnancial instability, urban crisis, social polarisation, gradedaccess to informationand ecological degra- dation’.81 Rather thana representational space the internet will simply cometo reect boththe hierarchies anddivisions ofthe existing globalcapitalist system andthose borneout of the newenvironment of cyberspace. 82

Conclusions This article set outto examinewhether across Asia the internet has provideda largely unregulatedmedium for non-elites to mobilise politically andeffect political change.By examining the twovery di fferent cases ofChina and 110 DEMOCRACY@INTERNET .ASIA?

Malaysia Ishowedthat vibrantsocietal groupsexist largely regardless ofthe regulatoryenvironment. While suchgroups have had little mass impact within China,in Malaysia, andin countries suchas Indonesia,opposition groups have successfullyutilised the internet as analternative medium,contributing in the latter case to the overthrowof General Suharto and the creation ofa democratic regime.83 Suchconclusions seem to supportarguments about the positive democratic effect ofthe internet evenin essentially illiberal regimes. However,questions must beraised abouthow effective the internet canbe as avehicle forpolitical transformation whenit is clear that across Asia asawhole onlya small minorityof the populationhave access to it. Inparticular, giventhe stark inequalities interms ofrace, gender, education and income, internet activism is predominantlyan elite pasttime. Oneof the problemswith this is that the audienceof users represents apre-selected elite that forthe most part may alreadybe sympathetic to suchmessages. As aconsequence‘ those whomay beneŽt the most fromcounterhegemonic uses ofthe Net maybe precisely those whohave least access to it’. 84 Furthermore,while the internet allows politically disenfranchisedgroups an alternative mediumof communication, dissemination andorganisation, it cannotbecome a substitute formore traditional forms of political mobilisation andaction— the loudspeakerwill always bemore intrusive thanthe internet will everbe. Developingfrom this notionof a division betweenthose withaccess andthose withoutthis article demonstratedthat asimportant as inequalities within speciŽc countries werethe growinginequalities betweenthem. While the internet maybe growingrapidly in the developingworld, and in particular in countries suchas Chinaand Malaysia, currenttrends suggest that weare witnessing the creation ofan International Division ofInformation Technologies with awiredcore and aless wiredperiphery. In this context,while the internet mayprovide a new mediumf oractivists in the developingworld, their voicemay be drownedboth bythe sheer weightof voices emanatingf romthe developedworld and by the commercialisation ofthe internet. 85

Notes

Anearlier versionof this article, entitled‘ [email protected]? Vehicle forpolitical change and transformation,elite playgroundor new commercial frontier?’was presentedat theInternational Studies AssociationAnnual Convention, Los Angeles, 14 –18March 2000 and supported by an overseas conference grantfrom the British Academy. 1 DHPerrit,Jr, ‘ Theinternet as athreatto sovereignty? Thoughts on the internet’ s rolein the national and globalgovernance’ , IndianaJournal of Global Legal Studies ,5(2),1998, p 431. 2 B.Warf &JGrimes, ‘Counterhegemonicdiscourses and the internet’ , TheGeographical Review , 87 (2), 1997, p 261. 3 HenriLefebvre, TheProduction of Space ,Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1991. 4 SaskiaSassen, ‘ Onthe internet and sovereignty’ , IndianaJournal of Global Legal Studies ,5(2),1998, pp 545– 559. 5 Warf &Grimes, Counterhegemonicdiscourses and the internet; p 263. 6 SGreen, ‘Thepen, the sword and the networked computer’ , TheWorld Today ,March2000, pp 13 – 15. 7 Samuel Huntington, TheThird Wave Democratization in the late Twentieth Century ,Norman,OK: 111 JASON PABBOTT

Universityof Oklahoma Press, 1991;and E Rueschemeyer, EHStephens& JDStephens, Capitalist Developmentand Democracy ,Cambridge:Polity Press, 1992. 8 Thearrest ofAnwar Ibrahimproved to be a catalyst forco-ordination and co-operation among the NGO community.On 27th September 1998, 18 parties andorganisations formed a new coalitionto campaignfor greater politicalfreedom. Gagasan (TheCoalition for Peoples Democracy) announceda 10-pointjoint declarationwhich demanded the rights to freedom ofspeech andassembly, the right to a fair trialand impartialhearing in a publiccourt of law andthe abolishment of the Internal Security Act. 9 Forexample YahooChina only has twohuman rights sites. Inaddition Chinese authorities regularly block access tospeciŽ c sites anduse contentlimiting software toŽ lter access tocertain sites consideredsensitive. 10 Thecentral governmenthas investedheavily in telephone lines and announced programmes toget 80% of localauthorities and 80% of companies online by the end of 2001. S Lawrence, ‘Surf’s up’, Far Eastern EconomicReview ,4March1999, pp 10 –12. 11 Figurecourtesy of NUA InternetSurveys, 2000, accessed 25July 2000. 12 JCShaw,‘ Internetcensorship in China’ , OnlineJournalism Review ,6May1998, http:/ /oir.usc.edu/. 13 Ibid;andS Lawrence, ‘Wideningweb’ , FarEastern Economic Review ,18November 1999, pp 54 – 55. 14 ByMarch 1999 some 400,000email accountshad been opened with 263. net. (Shaw, ‘ Internetcensorship in China’). 15 Formore informationsee Lawrence, ‘Wideningweb’ . 16 Green, ‘Thepen, the second and the networked computer’ , p.14. 17 Citedin Shaw, ‘ Internetcensorship in China’ . 18 ‘China“ blocks” BBC website’, BBC News OnlineNetwork ,12October 1998, http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk. 19 Ibid;andShaw, ‘ Internetcensorship in China’ . 20 Inits report on China’ s blockingof its main website,www.bbc.co.uk, the BBC reportedthat other sites operatedby itsonline service fromother addresses continuedto be available. BBC News Online,12 October 1998). 21 JoyShaw reported that the Voice ofAmerica site was blockedbetween September1996 and January 1997, accessible untilAugust and then blcoked again. Shaw, ‘ Internetcensorship in China’ . 22 KennethFarrall, president of a China-basedInternet consultancy, quoted in ibid. 23 E-interviewswith Lorien Holland, Beijing correspondent, FarEastern Economic Review ,4,8, 9 March 2000and with Madanmohan Rao, internet consultant and journalist based in Bangalore, India, who writes for the EconomicTimes newspaperand ElectronicMarkets magazine, 8March2000. 24 http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Parthenon/4422/. 25 MFromson,‘ Chinaand the internet: people will talk’ , OnlineJournalism Review ,4July1998, http:/ / ojr.usc.edu/. 26 http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/ Bay/5598/index.html. 27 Fromson,‘ Chinaand the internet’ . 28 C.Bickers,& SLawrence, ‘Agreat Žrewall: surgein networking creates new securityneeds’ , Far Eastern EconomicReview ,4March1999, p 14. 29 DHewitt,‘ Chinacasts acybernet’ , BBCNews OnlineNetwork ,7February1999, http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk. 30 DHewitt,‘ Chinaplays net nanny’ , BBC News OnlineNetwork ,12February 1999, http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk. 31 ‘Chinacracks downon internet cafes’ , BBC News OnlineNetwork ,2February2000, http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk. 32 KCooke,‘ Thecomplex web ofFalun Gong’ , BBC News OnlineNetwork ,22July 1999, http:/ / news.bbc.co.uk.See alsohttp:/ /www.falundafa.org/. 33 ‘Chinabans internet investment’ , BBC News OnlineNetwork ,15September 1999, http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk. 34 LHolland& TSaywell,‘ Plugginga sieve: Beijingfaces frustrationin itsbid to regulate the internet’ , Far EasternEconomic Review ,10February 2000, p 20. 35 Thislatter banfollowed a governmentban on purchases of Microsoft Windows 2000 (January 2000). The Chineseauthorities are concernedthat Microsoft products contain hidden back doors and, because thenature ofMS software issuch that programmers can’t access theunderlying source codes, such claims are impossibleto corroborate. ‘ Thepen the sword and the networked computer’ Green, pp14 – 15;Holland & Saywell,‘ Plugginga siere’, pp20 – 21;‘ Chinacracks downan internet cafe ´s’. 36 Fromson,‘ Chinaand the internet’ . 37 Itis veryeasy tomonitor email, especially withthe co-operation of local ISP/telecommunicationproviders andadministrators within organisations (eg university). The simplest way is totap the phone line linking theuser toan ISP,inspectingmessages toand from particular individuals as theypass throughan ISP. 38 E-interviewwith Mandanmohan Rao, 8 March2000, emphasis added. 39 E-interviewwith Lorien Holland, 8 March2000, emphasis added. 40 InMalaysia all themain newspapers andTV stationsare eitherstate-owned or closely connected to the UnitedMalays National Organisation ( UMNO),thedominant political partner in the governing coalition. In additionThe OfŽ cial Secrets Act givesthe government punitive powers to prosecute any journalist who publishesofŽ cial informationwithout authorisation. For more detailsee JasonP Abbott,‘ Bittersweet victory,the 1999 Malaysian General Electionand the Anwar Ibrahimaffair, TheRound Table: The CommonwealthJournal of International Affairs ,354,2000, pp 245 – 258. 112 DEMOCRACY@INTERNET .ASIA?

41 Jerry Everard, VirtualStates ,London,Routledge, 1999, p 60.For an analysis of government attempts to controlthe internet in Singapore, see Gary Rodan,‘ Theinternet and political control in Singapore’, Political Science Quarterly ,113(1), 1998, pp 63 – 89. 42 The MSC is anotherof Prime MinisterMahathir’ s mega-projects.Launched in 1997 the Malaysian governmentannounced a series ofgenerous Ž scal terms toestablish a SiliconValley-style enclave about 30km south of the capital Kuala Lumpur.Among the incentives to attract foreigninvestors and joint venturesinto the MSC is thegovernment’ s ‘nocensorship’ commitment Interviewwith MGC Pillai, veteran Malaysianjournalist and political commentator, 7 March2000. 43 Ironicallythe ease bywhichthousands of pro-Anwar supporters were able toaccess theinternet can partily beattributed to the promotion by Mahathir himself ofthe so-called Multimedia Super Corridor project. 44 Citedin Sabri Zain, ‘ Howthe internet is mouldingpublic opinion in Malaysia’ , postedon GERAK-NET, 10August 1999. 45 Telephoneinterview with Anil, Editor of Aliran (a Malaysianpolitics and human rights periodical) 27 April 2000,Kuala Lumpur. 46 Telephoneinterview with Anil (see note45). 47 MGG Pillai,quoted in Zain ‘ Howthe internet is mouldlingpublic opinion’ . 48 Themost common hosts are Geocities (Yahoo)and Tripod (offered by the Lycos network). 49 A DoS attack isanattack onanetworkthat is designedto bring the network to its knees by oodingit with useless trafŽc. 50 SJayasankaran,‘ Testingthe limits: web papertakes Mahathir’s wordon free speech on-line’, Far Eastern EconomicReview ,20January 2000, pp 18 – 19. 51 ‘Harakah cannothave internet version more thantwice amonth’, Bernama,2March2000. 52 Interviewwith MGC Pillai,7 March2000. Chor subsequently said that the government hoped PAS would notabuse the government policy of not censoring the internet. See NGraves, ‘Malaysia says itwill not censorthe net’ , Reuters Online ,3March2000, http:/ /live.altavista.com/scripts/edi- torial.dll?ei 5 1560288&ern 5 y2000;and ‘ Harahah cannothave internet version’ . 53 Theorigins of the net can betraced tothe immediate aftermath ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis. Concerned aboutthe possible impact ofa limitednuclear strike upon the US communicationsinfrastructure the US Air Forcesponsored a studyby the RAND corporationon howto maintain communications in such an event. Paul Baran’s response(1962) laid the foundations for the Ž rst networkof information message processorsby the AdvancedResearch ProjectsAgency of the Department ofDefense in1969 (Apranet). For further details see Everard, VirtualStates , esp ch. 2). 54 Warf &Grimes, ‘Counterhegenomicdiscourses and the internet’ . p262. 55 Iamasia Survey,22 June 200, accessed 1July2000. 56 21%,12.9% and 11.2%, respectively. Figures from China Internet Network Information Center, 2000. 57 WorldDevelopment Report 1998/ 99 ,accessed onlineat http://www.worldbank.org/. 58 Ibid. 59 http://www.idcresearch.com/. 60 Fordata onthe language of internet users see ‘Theglobal reach express’, http://glreach.com/eng/ed/gre/ 230400.php3(accessed 2August2000); and ‘ CyberAtlas’http:/ /cyberatlas.internet.com/bigpict … aphics/ print/0,1323.5901408521.00.htm (accessed 2August2000). 61 See bothwebsite at footnote60. 62 Thisis aparticularproblem for email use. 63 Sassen,‘ Onthe internet and sovereignty’ , p.552. 64 http://www nua.ie/surveys/howmany online/ index.html. 65 Of these abouta thirdare Japanese users,13% South Korean, 9% Australian and 6% Taiwanese. If we take Australia,Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,Hong Kong, Singapore and New Zealandout of the Ž gures,there are only21 million users inthe Asia – PaciŽc (http://www.nua.ie/surveys/howmany online/ index.html). 66 Brazil has themost users inthe developing world, with some 6.5million online (50% of the total number ofusers inSouth America). 67 Roughlytwo-thirds of all African users are SouthAfrican. 68 CDoole,‘ Is theweb wideningthe poverty gap?’ , BBCNews OnlineNetwork ,29January 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk. 69 Everard, VirtualStates , p 34. 70 See ITU, http://www.itu.int/journal/200006/E/html/indicat.htm (p5 of7). A similar feat was achievedin LatinAmerica byParaguay and Venezuela in1999, while Uganda and the Ivory Coast became theŽ rst African countriesto achieve a50%penetration rate. ITU p 6 of 7. 71 Orientalism here is understoodas botha conditionof relations between twocultures and a habitof mind inthe study of their relations such that a hegemonicculture simpliŽ es, exoticisesand stereotypes the dominatedculture and its representative forms, ideas andimages. 72 Everard, VirtualStates ,p66(my emphasis). 73 ManuelCastells, TheRise ofthe Network Society ,Oxford:Blackwell, 1996, p 133. 113 JASON PABBOTT

74 Everard, VirtualStates , p 35. 75 E-Interviewwith V GJaideep,senior correspondent for Indian daily newspapers TheAsian Age , 9 March 2000. 76 Sassen ‘Onthe internet and sovereignty’ , p548. 77 DEKalish,‘ Globalcompanies form group to curb government regulation of Internet’ , NaplesDaily News , 16January 1999, http:/ /law.about.com/newsissues/law/gi/dyanmic/offsite.htm?site 5 http://www.naplesnews. com/today/business/d297418a.htm. 78 Sassen,‘ Onthe internet and sovereignty’ , p556. 79 As Sassen notes,while these technologiesmay notbe that expensive, they still involve costs thatcannot be affordedby the underfunded sectors ofcivil society. Ibid, p 557. 80 B Gates, TheRoad Ahead ,New York:Viking, 1995, p 100. 81 MDawson& BFoster,‘ Virtualcapitalism: thepolitical economy of the information highway’ , Monthly Review,48(3), p 55. 82 Sassen,‘ Onthe internet and sovereignty’ . 83 Despite there beingabout 800 000 Indonesians online in 1998 (only about 0.4% of the total population) the internetbecame anactive playeras Indonesianssought alternative sources ofinformation while the authoritiestightened media controls. 84 Warf &Grimes, ‘Counterhegemonicdiscourses and the internet’ , p270. 85 ComputerIndustry Almanac, http://www.c-i-a.com/.

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