STUilIAISLAilIIKA Volume 4, Number 3, 1997

ISLAM AND INDONESIAN NATIONALISM THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HAJIACUS SNLIVI Erni HarYanti Kahfi

KYA\ AND JnpRn esr M t ltrnnv Kobayashi Yasuko

ItrtOOrurStRrrt lSLRHI BETWEEN PnnrtCUmnlTY AND UrutVrRSRitrv Johan Hendrik Meuleman

lssN 021 5-0492 STI]ilIA ISTAIIII|A lndonesian Journal for lslamic Sludies Volume 4. Number 3, 1997

EDITORIAL BOARD: Harun Nasution Mastubu M. Quraisb Sbibab A. Aziz Dablan M. Satria Effendi Nabilah Lubis M. YunanYttsuf Komaruddin Hidal,at M. Din Syamsuddin Muslim Nasution \Vabib Mu'thi EDITOR-IN.CHIEF: Azyumardi Azra EDITORS: Saiful Mujani Hendro Prasetyo Joban H. Meuleman Didin Syafruddin Ali Munbanif ASSISTANTS TO THE EDITOB Arief Subban Oman Fathurrabman Heni Nuroni ENGLISH LANGUAGE ADVISOR: Kay Bridger AMBIC LANGUAGE ADVISOR: Nursanacl COVER DESIGNER:

S. Prinka

STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0211-0492) is a journal published quarterly by the Institut Agama Islam Negerl (IAIN, The State Institute tbr Islamic Studies) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. (STT DIPPEN No. 1291SK',DITJENfPG/STT/1976) and sponsored by the Department of Religious All.airs of the Republic oflndonesia. It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies, and is intended to conrntuni- cate original researches and current issues on the subiect. This journal warmly welcomes contributions liom scholars of related disciplines. All articles published do not necessarily represent the views of the journal, or other institutions to which it is afliliated. Theyare solely the views ofthe authors. The articles contained in this iournal have been relereed bv the Board of Editors. & oi and J apanese Military

Abstraksi: Selama perang dunia kedua di Asia Tengara, tenara Jepang berusaha mendapat dukungan dan kerjasama dari rakyat yang diduduki' nya. Dalam hal tnt kebijakan politik Islam meniad.i wngat penting di Indonesia, dan satu ciri khas yang menonjol dari politik Islam lepang adalah mementingkan perandn pdra @ai. Namun seuaktu mendarat di Indonesia, militer lEang belum merurnuskan politik Islam yang perlu dilaksan akan. Maka segera dinyaukzn bahua pemrrintah militer Jepan g rn e n gh ar gai agam a p en duduk.

s m e n ge n a i Aoi b adan in te I ad.a s e or an g M us lim J ep an g y an g d'n 7dt I keadaan di laua, yaitu Abdul Hamid Ono' Dialah yang mengusulh'an rakyat' supaya Jepan I rnetnpergunakan pengarub kyai utuk memerinah Pada ahap perarna Jepang mengfokuskan pengumpulan informasi ren- ung Islam dan mengadakan pertemuan dengan para pemirnpin Islan, dan juga dengan para kyai di setiap daerah. Tokoh-tokoh Islam cEat bereaksi rerbadap propaganda Jepang teru- tdrna pdrd pernirnpin PSII yang mengambil inisiatif. Mereka mengaku sebagii *okil u*ot Islam yangtergabung dalam MIAI, tapi sebenarnya sudah tidak aktif tagi pada waktu itu, dan mereka berhasil ditempatkan dan diakui oleh pada'yang badan pirnpinan MIAI yang direorganisasi Jepang -rrrr)ro*belwn rnernaharni situasi. Para pemimpin PSI ingin membentuk departemen agdmd dengan dukungan lepang dan mengontrol urusdn dgama Islam. MIAI memulai projek baitul-mll, namun usaha ini rnengundang kecurigazn dari pihak Jepang ydng segerd menghenti- kannya,-Pa^da uaktu iru, lepang sudah bisa menilai bahwa MIAI tidak mdmpu berperan sebagai jembatdn dntdra pemerintah dan rakyat, dan karena itu MIAI dibubarkzn. Setelah rnengeahui siapa yang bisa berperan untuk rakyat, Jepang rnen gernban gkzn politik Iskmnya dcngan fokus untuk menjalin keriasarna dengan para foiai. Banyak byai dan ukma diikutserukan dalam latihan rniliter; rnereka rnendapat indoktrinasi ideologi Asianisme yang rnen un' dikurnan dan gkzn Jepan g dan iuga diai arhzn fubagai subiek' Untuk

65 Studia Islamiha, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997 Kobayashi Yasuho

jukknn rtsa hormat k pod" kalangan fuiai, I{yai Hasyim Asy,ari ditunjuk sebagai ketua shumtsbu dan juga dijadikan sebagai pernirnpin utarnd Masyumi, organisasi baru Islam. Sekin itu, dibentuk pula shumuka sebagai kantor daerah Shumubu, dan para foiai yang telah tarnat dari /atihan rnen- duduki jabaan di situ. Hubungan Masyumi denganshumubu sangaterat, dan Masyumi juga mendirikan cabang di senap daerah. organisasi-organi- sasi tni dipergunakan untuk, mmyampaikan propaganda dan ptnuh Jepan g hppada rakVat Ketika situasi medan perong sr*ikin burui, Jepang sdngat nternbutuhkan urnbahan tenagamiliw, dan anak-anak kTai uesa, aiip- rut sebagai opsir PETA dan jugadibentukHizbullahyangterdii dari para pemudz sanrri. Ummat klarn Indonesta sebaliknya mmyampaikan harapan, permo- bon an atau tuntutdn kepada pthak lepang le(eat shumubu auu pia perce- rn ua de n n gan kyai. Sebagi an perm o h o n an dipen uh i pm erin uh, i i r itn korr - na begrru Jelang mengantungkzn diri pada para pemimpin Iskm. Jepang rnisalnya mendirikan perpusakaan hkm, gedung balai Muslimin, un iuer- sitas Islarn, dan rnmceak AlmanakJaua Baroe (kzlendn hlarn), memulai sistern setmgah hart kerja pada hari lumat dan lain-lain. Konsesi terbesar ya,ng diproleh urnat adalah terbentuknya shumuk4 yang sudah krna di- idart kan untuk rn ern udah kan wusn administrasi agarno (wuwrno *asalah pernikzhan). Ini merupakan salah satu bentuk politisasi kyai. I(yai yang (ulunya rcrisolir dzn rneniauhknn diri daii pemmnalt, berubah'mmlai berani bersuara politik dan menuntut sistern sosialyangmelancarkan hidup reed847n44n. wahid Hasyim adalah pemirnpin klam yang paling men onj o r pada akhir masa.pendudukan Jepang. Tampaknya lvahid Hasyim ingin riernanfaar kan kesempaan,yang diberikan kpong untuk rneinbangrn do, lnengor- ganisasi umat Islarn dengan munbayangkan masd depan Indonesia Mide Po1isnya sebagai fa- foiai dari psanrrm ydng telmasyhur di Jaua menjadi. fu? 4* mempunyai jaringan yang luzs dan-erat dengan para kVai di setu ruh Jaua dan.pahngpanus berperan dakm menghadapi permainan pori- tt! Wirlr*alt Jepang. Para alumni psantren yirg pr"didikonnyaielah (iperbahnryi meniadi pemirnprn Masyumi donoh, d)n shumuka dijabat 41i yan g dia ken al. Hizbul lah bisa juga dipersiaphzn un tuk rnernberon tak terbadap Jepang. setelah Proklantasi Indonesia, Kernenterian Agama (bekasShumubu /zn shtmuka) Masyurn i (direorgan isasi) dan Hizbutkh ftetn udian sebagian pin - d,h kE ABR, merupakan kndasan bagi pma pemimpin Islam urtik bnp. ran di_pntas politik Indonesia- Ini salah satu jasa dari para pemimpin hkrn yan g bereaksi terhadzp pendudukan militer Jepan g.

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67 Studia Islamiha, Vol. 4, Na 3, 1997 Kobayasbi Ya*ko cSJ ..,-:-r JLj" \rLf )J42.J1 .S ri-r JLJ1 c-r el*;!2 1a,Q-; "-L=Jt *,)\-!t d.J'=Jl .'li JU-i- .'-rt+Ul cE-r-J rtt; 4i)Gl r- .llt]t -jHl ,-.'-iJlJ A-J (>lst) eUj5 dr ,,.'j,Jl 1U-rJl 1.;ir;) .,i )\ ,f-*, .ajl.Jl -r.oLJl lqi,/ .:lii -';(;, g;-ril aul ,!t ;g* i,r-r.i;J L.-l\ G;i a*u r) .'r;nJ*^Jl ;-4, ,a1-zJt g- oL-oL.-*!l -r.:p rt a=rr-rjt jJ*il --rt- Jyj * ;Ll,ll ;)*!t cL*, .,Jc t-dut ,#,y 4J1 c.JT U 1_,tr - iUUl c+r,a,:-l, a ;i.lt rf-rl t g.",; ft t-*t1 UJ A - jr.L*Jl .;U,:*l L-ssyos

StKlid Isl4mikd, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997 Kyai. and JaPanese MiLitam 69

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9u,lia lslantika, Vol. a, Nu. 3, 1997 Kobayashi Yastbo

Introduction tWorld \War, uring the course of the Second Japan occupied the lands which consrirure the oresent Indonesia. from whence it conscripted forced laboi. and commandeered rice and other materials to further Japanese war efforrs. One of the most important tasks for the Japanese military was ro propagandize Japan's war aims, i.e. to build 'the Greater East Asia', and to win over its inhabitants to its side. In this straregy, Islamic policy was pivotal since more than ninety percent of the inhabirants of Indonesia were Mus- lims. Soon after the war, rhe Dutch intelligence agency wrore a reporr concerning hlam during the Japanese occupation, in which it was pointed out that Japan made use of religion, especially hyai's great influence over people ."1 l(yaisare religious teachers who usually keep apaantren (traditional klamic boarding school) in rural areas in Java, and they never appeared on the political scene during the Dutch colonial period. The Dutch authorities, who had to withdraw from Indonesia for three and a half years, were seriously concerned when they realized what changes this Japanese Islamic policy had wrought. In this field of study HarryJ. Benda's work2 is well-known and is still esteemed as the most valuable even though his research was con- ducted more than 40 years ago. Benda concluded that Islamic leaders were more affected by theJapanese occuparion than any other group such as nationalists and priyayi (bureaucrats), and that they came ro develop their bargaining power in the political arena, from which they were largely isolated under the Dutch colonial administration, and that they gained political power as a resuh of the Japanese mobi- iization policy during rhe war, which gre tly influenced the direc- tion of Indonesian politics after independence. Benda approached this problem with regard ro rhe development of Islam, presenring three points which still provide inspiration for those studying Indo- nesian Islam. First, he emphasized the dynamism of Islam, and said that santri (pious Muslim) civilization was more developed in Java whenJapan surrendered, than it was before the war. Secondly, he showed that the Japanese military realized the influenc e of kyai and ularna,] and regarded'the rraditionalist Muslims' as more important than 'the modernist Muslims'a because they did indeed have great potential in rural societies. Benda himself also rated their role highly. Thirdly, he pointed out thar Isiamic ieaders had consistently demanded the estab- lishment of social institutions or sysrems enabling Muslims to pracrice syariat (Muslim law) in every day life, since.the Dutch colonial period.

Studia klamiha, l/ol. 1, No. 3, 1997 Kyai and Japanese Militaw 7 )

since Benda's work gained its considerable reputation, we have had very few academic publications in this field5 until Kurasawa pub- lished her Ph.D. thesisi in which she succeeded in adding to existing (courses f.or knowledge by finding actual cases of ktihan kTai .hyai) and in showing how ihe Japanese military tried to make use of kyai as a bridge between the military government and Javanese peasants. It must be remembered that the maneuvering of kyai was the core of longest project of Japanese Islamic policy, and latihan byaiwas the iruining courses and aiso the most important in that it was expected to expand "im influence over the whole population".z Kurasawa ques- tioned Benda's assertion of the existence of a Japanese 'divide and rule' policy among Indonesian elites, and emphasized thatJapan tried to ,rnlt. them in order to proceed with the war, and thatthe priyayi's role in the administration was not replaced by Islamic grouPs.In this respect Kurasawa's assertion is right, however, the point at issue seems not quite that raised by Benda. Benda attached great importance to the fact that the gareway to rhe political $age was firstly opened for Islamic leaders and they gained an influential voice therein; he recog- nized that the role played by them or that expected by Japan was different from that of other eiites. The present author also wishes to study the period of the Japa- nese occupation from the point of view of the development o{ Islam. This article will endeavor to focus on how Indonesian Muslims re- acted to or against Japanese propaganda; it will also try to find out how they visualized the future of Muslim society, on the supposition that they based their actions on their own visions. Benda could not describe these problems of Muslim self-direction thoroughly enough because of the iimited materials available in his day . My treatmenr of this topic is based on materials written by Islamic leaders, and Japa- nese documents of the time, and is iimited in scope to Java, where Mus- Japanese Islamic Policy was most thoroughly carried out and lim movements were specifically developed.

Before the Occupation: Japanese Islamic Propaganda and Indonesian Muslim Movements

The Beginningof the Manipulation of Muslims It was in the mid+hirties, only a few years before Japan landed in Indonesia (called the Dutch East Indies at that time) that Japan first turned her eyes to Muslim territories. Vith the front in China dead-

.Studi4 Isldmihd, VoI 4, No. 3, 1997 Kobayashi Yasuho locked after the China Incident, and also stimulated by the Chinese Muslim movements, Japan began to pay attention to Muslims. Fur- thermore, almost at the same time Nanshin (southward advancement) fever grew gradually in Japan and as Nanshin policy came to be in- creasingly supported, preparations were made for the coming inva- sion of Muslim countries. First, several Japanese, supported by the army, were sent to the Middle East to study Islam or to perform a pilgrimage.8 They were expected to grasp the situation in the Muslim world, and moreover to become mediators between Japan and Muslims. Second, some events were held to attract Muslim sympathy to Japan. For example, a mosque was built in Tokyo and 45 Muslim delegates from abroad, including a prince of Yemen attended its inauguration ceremony in May, 1938.e Furthermore, an Islamic exhibition was held in Tokyo and Osaka. 41 Muslim guests who were largely from China and Cen- tral Asia were invited to it, and were requested to atrend a Muslim conference at the same time (l.trovember 1939).10 Third, Dai-Nippon Kaiky6 Ky6kai (the GreaterJapanese Islam Association) was founded with the support of the army in September 1938. The fact that Gen- eral Hayashi SenjurO was installed as its president made it clear that this association was not a purely religious one, but was meant to further the strategy of the forthcoming military occuparion of Mus- lim regions. According to its bulietin, its activiries were ro promote fraternity and trade with Muslim areas, to undertake research and cultural propagation, to train staff and ro support and contact vari- ous Islamic organizations. It emphasized the need of a Muslim policy to further Japan's southward development and ciearly its purpose was to contribute to rhe Nanshin policy.l1 The above mentioned Islamic exhibition was organized by this association. Furthermore, full-scale Islamic studies began in Japan, although late in the day. Kaiky6ken Kenkyr-rjo (the institute of Islamic Stud- ies) was newly established and other existing institures also set up a section specializing in Islamic studies. Enormous energy was spent in order to understand Islam. As for Islam in Indonesia, a number of articles appeared just afterJapan finally turned ro rhe Nanshin policy in 1939. However, as far as can be ascertained from the above men- tioned work, it should be concluded that what Japan knew about Indonesian Muslims was rarher limited before the invasion. isiamic studies had just begun and were still in the process of gathering basic knowledge. Very few referred to rhe influence of. kyais, to whom

,Studia Islamilea, Vol, 4, No. 3, 1997 Kvai and Japanese Military 7l grear imporrance was arrached during the occupation. It is almost impossible to hit on an idea ro make use of kyaiwirhovt first obtain- ing deep insight into Javanese Muslim society. Furthermore, Japan diiected attention to Muslim movements only because it vaguely un- derstood they represented one type of nationalist movement, not caring about religious aspects. Therefore, this pre-war Japanese at- tempt to influence Muslims was symPathetic towards movements oP- posed to Western colonialism rather than to Islam as such.

Indonesian Muslim Movernents before the lVar Before we look into the Indonesian Muslims' reaction to Japanese propaganda, we shouid assess the situation of Muslim movements before the war. In Indonesia there were two large religious organiza- tions, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatui Ulama (I'{U, Renaissance of 'ulamA). Muhammadiyah was a reformist or modernist movement, founded in Yogyaka rain !912 and developing mainly in cities, with its activities concentrated on religion, education and social welfare. On the other hand, NU was founded in 1926 and was an association of 'ulamA' who defended the authority of the four orthodox rnadhhab (school of law). So NU is usually considered as a 'traditionalist' move- ment. Contrary to Muhammadiyah, NU was based in rural areas, but was not yet organized well and was influential only in East Java. These two displayed competing religious doctrines, but neither of them was involved in politics. Moreover, there were several other Isiamic organizations which were concerned with political isues. The most vociferous was Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII , Indone- sian Islamic Union Party). This was continuation of Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), which had once been a great vehicle for Indo- nesian nationalist activity but split repeatediy, then declined into a small politi cal party without any mass suPPort. However, PSII was trying to make an impression with its determined noncooperation policy towards the Duteh government. Vhen Japan began to pay attention to Muslim areas in the mid- thirties, Muslim movements in Indonesia had come to a turning point' Firstly, the rivalry between Muhammadiyah and NU was declining, not only because of the personal appeal of Kyai Haji Hasyim Asy'ari, the supreme leader of NU, but also because of the tense situation both inside and outside the country. They turned their eyes from conflict among Muslims themselves to the common issues' The most serious problem was the interference with Muslim law made by the

.Studia Islanika, Vol. 4, No, 3, 1997 74 Kobayashi Yasuho

Dutch colonial governmenr wirh the renewal of marriage laws in 1937. Furthermore, trials concerning problems of inheritance were

t ransfe rred {r o m r aad agam a (Muslim I aw courts) rc I an dr azd (se cu I ar couns). Faced with this crisis, Islamic organizations convened and decided to protest in unison, and the Majelis Islam A'11 Indonesia Mnt, Supreme Indonesian Council of Islam)wasfounded inSurabaya in September,Ig3T.MIAI tried to unite all Muslim political efforts, and organized Kongres Al-Islam/Kongres Muslimin Indonesia (the Indone- sian Muslims'Conference) where various religious problems were dis- cussed and action was decided on. MIAI declared supporr for the Pales- tinian Muslims, and also demanded that the Dutch governmenr aid In- donesian pilgrims stranded in Mecca in returning to Indonesia in I94I. Moreover MIAI joined the federation of political parries, Gabungan Politik Indonesia (the Political Federation of Indonesia), founded in 1939, and spoke and acted rogether with the other members, on various po- litical issues such as the establishment of parliamenr and conscriprion.12 In short, at the time when Islamic groups had just entered the political arena, Japan began its efforts to win Muslims' supporr. Now we may see how Indonesian Muslims reacted to Japanese propaganda. Muhammadiyah was invired to the above mentioned inauguration ceremony of the mosque in Tokyo. However, Muham- madiyah declined this inviration for the following reasons as pub- lished in its bulletin, "firstly, we the Muhammadiyah did nor dare to upset Chinese Muslims by sending a delegation to Japan because the China Incident was not yet resolved; secondly, Muhammadiyah can- not understand what Japan means by this invitation, and would not like to become a propaganda tool of theJapanese governmenr; thirdly, it is difficult to prepare even if Japan invites us in friendship as Mus- lims and has no other ambitions, because time is so limited".u ft seems it was very hard for Muhammadiyah to judge the real intention of Japan. After ali, only one Indonesian Muslim attended, and he was an unknown rnember of Sarekat Sumarera (Sumatran Association).1a MIAI showed a rather different attitude by appointing three people to the section for organizing relations with foreign countries, ar ;he second congress. Two of them had been to Japan before.15 The next year MIAI senr a delegation of five members ro 'rhe Muslim Exhibi- tion', but there they were bewildered to see an Indonesian national fTag rnerab'purih (red and white) displayed, which was still forbidden by the Dutch East Indies government. They refused to arrend 'the V'orld Conference of Muslims', which was held at the same rime.16

\tutlia [slamiha, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1992 Kyai and lapanese Military showing that they would not easily fall into a Propaganda trap. Some responses to Japanese policy can be found in Indonesian Islamic magazines. In NU's bulletin BeriaNahdlatul Ularna (Septem- ber 1 and September 15, 1938), there appeared an article titled 'The Voice of Japan' which was a translation of Japan's propaganda. It emphasized Japan's respect for Islam and anti-'l7estern tendencies. Thi editor commented that it was published to obtain an unbiased understanding of the international situation since only voices pro- claiming open hatred of Japan had been heard.tr In Muhammadiyah's bulletin, Mutiara, there once appeared an'anti-Japan' news item in October 1938, mentioning that there was a secret agreement between Japan and Germany to divide the Dutch East Indies.18 On the other hand in 1940, news of quite a different tone appeared in the same periodical, entitled 'The Japanese Help to Islam".1e The situation was changing. Before the Japanese invasion, Indonesian nationalists advccated 'Western democracy and tried to gain concessions from the Dutch government by calling for the forming of a common front against Facism. On the other hand, Islamic grouPs were rather sympathetic to the Axis powers panly because the Palestinian Muslim leader, Amin al-Husayni had just,gone into exile in Berlin, and also partly because they came to have a vague notion that Japan was benevolent to Is- 1am.It is said that pro-Japanese sentiment prevailedamongpesantren people just before the war.F Furthermore, Dutch unwillingness to meet the political demands of Indonesians disappointed even those advocating co-operation.

Formation of Japanese Islamic Policy and MIAI

Abdoel Chamid Ono's Suggestions Japanese forces landed in Java on March 7,1942 and immediately began to organize the administration. There were tv/o sections con- cerned with Muslim affairs in the Japanese military government, Shumubu (the Reiigious Affairs Office, Kantor lJrusan Agama), and Kaiky6-k6sakuhan (Islam Maneuvering Section) of Beppan (Separated Office). The former was set up at the end of l94tbef.ore the invasion of the 16th army, and on arrival in Java it came under Gunseibu (since August 1942 Gunseikanbu: the Military Administration of- fice), and was in charge of religious administration, propaganda and

Stuelia Islamiha. Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997 Kobatasbi Yasxbo the supervision of Muslim leaders. This was somerhing like a con- tinuation of the Dutch colonial Kanroor voor Inlandsche Zaken (Of- fice for Native Affairs), whose Indonesian staff were indeed assigned to this new organization with Japanese officers under Colonel Horie Chozo.21 To a large exrenr the activities of Beppan were srill unknown since it was a b6ryaku-kikan or tokumu-kikan (destabilizing organ ization or intelligence office), and its exisrence was kept clandestine. The name of Kaiky6-k6sakuhan of Beppan cannor be found in the re- ports made by the Allies' intelligence agenrs after the war, nor in works dealing with the Japanese occuparion of Java, including Benda's. They could not differenriate berween the activities of Kaiky6-k6saku- han and those of Shumubu because Beppan's organizarion was not officiaily announced. Kaiky6-k6sakuhan was organized in November 1942 and headed by Captain Maruzaki Yoshio who was a graduare of Nakano schooi (a school for espionage training), and consisted pf intelligence officers and army civilian employees.z Its tasks were gath- ering information and political maneuvering. Although the relation- ship between Shumubu and Kaiky6-k6sakuhan was vague enough, the latter was much involved in decision making with regaid to Islamic policy. Several Japanese Muslims were assigned to these rwo secrions.l, Six days after rhe invasion of Java, Japan issued its first communi- que declaring her 'respect for religion'. However, the Japanese army did not have any concrere plans to carry our although the impor- tance of an Islamic policy was fully recognized. Thus, they meiely made gestures of sympathy towards Islam and tried ro arrracr Mus- lims' attention. Mosques were issued with papers guaranteeing thar as religious buildings, they would nor be used for military purposes.2o Some Japanese soldiers' clothing resembled rhe costum e of haji (a person who has undertaken a pilgrimage to Mecca) which roused enthusiasric expecrarions that Japanese Musiims had arrived on Java. Also, Japanese soldiers prayedar mosques.l, On the other hand, their superficial understanding of Islam caused the Japanese ro make fun- damental errors at the same rime. Firstly, Japan forbade the use of foreign languages excepr Japanese but including Arabic ar school.26 Secondly, K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari of Pesantren Tebuireng, the most venerable kyai in Java was imprisoned." Thirdly, the Japanese en- forced saikeirei, a salute towards Tokyo with a low bow as a token of obedience ro the emperor which marked the commencement of ev- ery officiai Japanese funcrion and which rarher resembled one of the

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bodily movements of Islamic worship.28 All this Provoked resent- ment of and suspicions against the Japanese among Javanese People' Harsh criticism of these blunders came from within the Japanese army itself. It was Ono Shinji that criticized the Japanese for their lack of understanding of Javanese Muslims. He had long been resi- dent in Java, had converted to Islam and married a Javanese woman who was from a family of. juru kunci (tomb guardians) of Sunan Kalijaga, one of the Javanese Islamic saints. He had an Islamic name, Abdoel Chamid, and ran a toko Jepang (]apanese shop) near Surabaya. He returned to Japan in December 1942, but five months later, on his way back to Java he was recruited by the army as a civilian em- ployee and was later assigned to Kaiky6-k6sakuhan.P His views on Islam can be found in his three essays which appeared in two Japa- nese periodicals.-rc Ono said that Muslims inJava sometimes had different customs from those of the Middle East because of a different historical background, but basically they cleaved to the Islamic doctrines. He emphasized that Javanese were also pious Muslims, and denounced those Japanese who did not consider Indonesian Islam vrorth serious attention.rl He explained Muslim affairs in Java, and mentioned just fwo representative Muslim organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, aptly pointing out that the former influenced the greater number ofJavanese Muslims.12 He further introduced foai's unique life style,I and laid emphasis on people's im- plicit reliance on kyai,! and said, "A kyai is like a king and is also a favorite with God, so he lives well and his influence is great regardless of the number of his followers."35 He pointed out the mechanism ofJavanese Muslim societywhich revolves around human relationships. From these essays we can see that Ono had indeed experienced iife among Javanese Muslims, and was far more knowledgeable about the Musiim world than any other Japanese Islamic experts. He suggested the following five points with regard to Islamic policy:

1. Leave the Javanese completely free to believe in their religion, Islam. 2. In the case of conservatives (note; NLI), trust a kyai entirely be- cause of his popularity and make him a puppet. 3. In the case of progressives (note; Muhammadiyah), set up aJapa' nese department in their schools. 4. Introduce Japanizarion by means of military discipline (can be done rapidly).

Studid Islam;kd, Vol. 4,No. 3, 1997 Kobayasbi Yasuho

5. Pay heed to those issues which cause hatred towards infidels (for- eigners fsic]). "For example, give them time for prayer (only ten minutes) and prepare separate tableware for their own use.... If such things can be permitted, they accept employment from foreigners even rhough they are unbelievers."s

There are no documents revealing the Japanese military govern- ment's reaction to Ono's views. However, considering that no one other than Ono was well informed about the Javanese Muslims, and also that byais were regarded as very important after that, it can be said that his suggestions became a principle guide in rhe formation of Islamic policy. Ono could menrion several famous kyais whom he had met.37 In fact NU leaders appealed for help to Ono, who was their old acquaintance, and K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari was released in Au- gust 1942.38 Ono's name was srill weli remembered by pesantren people after the war. He was thought to be a key person in the development of Japan's strategy with regard to foais. In the first period of the occuparion, Japan placed srress on selling her policy of 'respecr for Islam' and collecting data and informarion. Shlmubu staff visited Islamic leaders and made speeches ar mosques and schools citing phrases from the Qur'ln.re Moreover, the office organized meetings with kyais in each residence from December 1942 until February,1943, and Ono and otherJapanese Muslims accom- panied Horie. Arrangemenrs were made to explain Japanese war aims, to call for collaborarion, and to hear the local'ulamA's voice.{ In the capital, too, Japan showed irs attitude clearly. The supreme com- mander received Muslim leaders in audience, and K. H. Mas Mansur, Muhammadiyah's chairman, was appointed to a position of. Ernpat Serangkai (the four execurive staff) of Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakjat; Center of People's Strength) in Decembe r, 1942. Furrhermore, ir was announced that planning to found an Islamic university and a Mus- lim iibrary was underway, and the latter actually was ser up.+1 As a result Muslims were beginning ro be reconciled to Japan. In the meantime all political parties were dissolved including Is- lamic organizations. There was srill one crucial assignment iefifor Japan, namely, how to ser up a Muslim organization and whom to choose as leaders. It was still difficult for Japan to decide and so as a compromise, the pre-war association MIAI was officially recognized as a representative Muslim union, and was reorganized, mostly by

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PStr leaders. Its headquarters were moved from Surab aya to Batavia (]akarta) in Septemb er, !942. However, after collecting information from Islamic leaders, and also the producing of a research rePort un- der the heading Zen laua Kaik76 16k76 Ch6sasho (Survey on the Situ- ation of Islam in Java ), by Osamushudan Shireibu (headquarters of the Osamu Group [16th Army]),ot in February, 7943,lapan gradu- ally grasped the situation and understood who could play a vital role in her policy. In July 1943 the first latiban byaiwasstarted, an indica- tion that Japan had made up her mind to make specific use of. kyais.

MIAI\ Planfor tbe Ministry of Religious Affairs How did Muslims see Japanese aPPeasement? Islamic groups re- acted quickly. Shumubu, to which it was thought Japanese Muslims had been assigned to take care of Muslim affairs, was visited by a flock of Muslim leaders from the beginning of the occuPation. As a post-war Dutch report put it "Indonesian officials of mosques, lead- ers of religious organizations, and a number of Arabs thought it wise to go and pay a visit of respect to their Japanese co-religionists, and to congratulate them on the occasion of the Japanese victories".a3 Also in one Japanese document it was recorded "everyday more than a hundred persons came to Shnmubu either as rePresentatives of Mus- lims or individually, in the expectation that their requests would be accepted".# Among these people the leaders of PStr took the initiative- 's7ondoamiseno On May 7, !942 MIAI leaders, (former chair of PStr), Mas Mansur and Faharuddin al-Hairi (an Arab Indonesian) vis- ited Colonel Horie for discussions. After that these three accompa- nied Horie to Surakarta and Surabaya. ln Surakartaapesdntrenteacher protested to Horie about the prohibition of the use of the Arabic language in Islamic education, and later he was forced to cancel this ban.a5 Their journey continued to Surabaya, where a large meeting was held with Muslim leaders in which Horie was introduced by 'Wondoamiseno.{ It was the beginning of Japanese contact with Is- lamic leaders. 'We can follow the movements of Muslims in the first period of the Japanese occupation from the letters written by\ilondoamiseno, who began to distinguish himself as a leader of PStr in the 1930's and was one of the Islamic nationalists who insisted on the non-cooPera- tion line before the war. Probably he was captured as a suspected war collaborator after the war and his files were confiscated. Thev pro- vide the materials I use here.az

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'What'Wondoamiseno and his group were thinking can be found in a draft titled "Rentjana: Pendjelasan Permohonan MIAI (Pian: Explanation of the requests of MIAD". This draft consists of typed papers with memoranda on them and also notes handwritten in pen- cii . This seems to be a manuscript of request which was going to be submitted to Gunseikanbu. It is not dated, but ir can be deduced from the contents, which refer to the meeting wirh Horie in Jakarra and also to his speech in Surabaya, that this was written at the earliest at the end of May, 7942 or at the latest before the reformation of MIAI in September of that year. It is clear that Muslims rarher welcomed the Japanese policy of 'respect for religion'. At the meeting with Horie MlAi leaders said they were ready to cooperate with the Japanese military. Furrher- more, the draft mentioned the desire of. ummat Islam (the Muslim community) to administer religious affairs themselves. It said, "MIAI would like to tell the head of Shumubu and Your Excellency, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese military, the problems pertain- ing to Muslims which have been on our minds during this period" and went on to refer to several issues touching on religious adminis- tration, namely, 1. marriage affairs, 2. succession and inheritance matters, 3. mosques, a. uaqf (pious endowmenr), 5. religious educa- tion 6. zakat $rearly religious tax),7. Mecca pilgrimage. In each case present difficulties were pointed out, and improvements proposed. The inconvenience concerning marriage affairs caused by rhe colo- nial administration system came under particular atrack, and demand was made to transfer marriage registration from the supervision of regent (the administrative head of rhe regency) to an especially desig- nated office. So the need to set up a new badan oeroesAn agama Islarn (a reiigious office) headed by a Muslim to be appointed by the Japa- nese Military was stressed. Furthermore, it was proposed that Departemen Agama Islam (a Ministry sf Muslim Religious Affairs)+8 be formed to cover and control the whole specrrum of religious prob- lems relating to rhe pracrice of Muslim law. The intention was ro establish an institution devoted to Musiim affairs managed by Mus- lims in the government organization, in short to win autonomy for religious administration. It cannot be ascertained whether this request was submitted to the Japanese military government. Even if it had been, it was quite im- possible for the Japanese ro meer this requesr and to manage ro set up within their military governmenr an organization devoted to the

ttud;d Isldm;ba, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997 Kyai and Japanese Militam 81 administration of Muslim affairs, not only because Japan had only inten- just arrived in Java, but also because originally Japan had no tion of dealing with such a religious administration' perhaps it was after this draft was written that vondoamiseno sent a letier dated August 6th,7942, to a colleague of the Pare-pare (south Sulawesi) branch of PStr, in which he displayed a cautious attitude of waiting and seeing what action the Japanese would take. This letter r..-.d to be written with an eye on the censor since the some sentences Japanese Imperial calendar dating was used, and also *iri.h fawned on Japan, for instance, "thanks to the guidance and prorection of our big brother Japan...". Nevertheless, we can discern iome of his real intentions in it. For example, he said "we, those who have been in Java, have been facing radical changes of the times, from March 8, 2602 (nore: 1942) until today, that is, since the Japanese military .nt.r.d and began to rule our country". He particularly menrioned his shock at seeing the decline in the lives of Dutch people. Moreover, he mentioned the foundation of Persiapan Persatoean Oemmat Islam (the Preparation for the Union of Muslims) led by Abikusno as chairman and Harsono Tiokroaminoto as secretary (both were leaders of PStr), saying that in Practical terms it was not yet very active. So he cautiously advised restraint and said, "we PSII members must keep diam (silent)". On the other hand, on the very same date Vondoamiseno wrote a report to a Japanese official named Hashizume of the Gunseikanbu in which he provided information on Islamic organizations in Java. In this he mentioned 15 organizations belonging to MIAI, and ex- plained the specific aims and gave rhe total number of members and location of the branches of PStr, Muhammadiyah and NU' Natu- rally, Wondoamiseno provided special details of his own party, PS[, and emphasized that it was a nationwide organization. Clearly he was he trying to promote his own Party. On the contrary, concerning NU ;(compared said, with Muhammadiyah) NU consisted of people who are illiterate and still fanatical foai, that is to say, not educated yet"' His rather low opinion of NU might have been shared by other Indonesian parties of the time. Also, possibly he tried to distract Japa- nese attention from NU, for there is still one more letter explaining NU's organization, which is dated one day before the above-men- tioned report, and begins with the sentence, "In response to your request, I answer your questions as follows". The addressee is not given, but clearly this letter was written to a Japanese official and

Studia [slamika, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997 82 Kobayashi Yasubo

suggests that the Japanese miiitary had inquired specifically about NU. vondoamiseno and probably the PStr members associated with him pretended to wait and see while they were trying ro grasp the initiative for the forthcoming Muslim federation. It is not certain to what exrenr Vondoamiseno influenced theJapa- nese but in the foliowing month of September, MIAI, which had been inactive, was recognized as representative of Indonesian Mus- lims and began its activities anew. \wondoamiseno was appointed to the chair, with an execurive committee largely consisting of other PSII ieaders. MIAI's organ soeara MIAINo.T (]anuary 1943) carried on its last page the parry's program, entitled'MIAI's Aims'. a. To safeguard and maintain the dignity and advancemenr of reri- gion and believers in this world and also in the hereafter. b. To build a new society among Muslims which can maintain peace and order, and also the prosperity of community life. c. To improve all matters of vital importance to believers, namely, 1. Marriage affairs 2. Succession and inheritance matters 3. Mosques 4. Religious endowments 5. Payment of religious tirhes 6. Instruction and education 7. Publicity and propaganda 8. Social affairs (aid) 9. Mecca pilgrimage d. under Japanese guidance to work together with all our mighr for Greater Asia. of these irems a. and b. were expressions of the basic ideorogy of lwhat the Muslim organization. arrracm our attention is the conrenrs of clause c items which show concrete demands, and are closely cor- \wondoamiseno's reiated with the above mentioned drafi. It can be said that point d. was mere diplomatic language to soothe Japan, and MIAI was expecting to attain irs inirial goals. No documents show whether MIAi tried to ser uD an office for religious affairs in the governmenr body. on the contia.y, Shr-rmubu sometimes bypassed MIAI, and conracred kyai and ulama directly.+e since MIAI was rarher made light of byJapan, MIAI tried to asserr its existence. The bayt al-rnil(Islamic treasuiy) campaign might be the first and the last trial to realize its ideal although im ae"rign.i function was limited to collecting religious tirhes and .iding poo"r people with

iu,lia lslnntika. Val. 4, No. 3, lg97 Kyai and Japanese Militan 8l the proceeds. soearaMIAI spared a larger space for the bait al+n^l campaign from February 1943. The MIAI executives succeeded in setting up bayt al-ntdl in more than half of the regencies on Java, and tried to organize a network among them, that is, to take over a part of the religious administration.s However, the Japanese anticipated this and the project was forced ro cease. Japan had aiready more or less grasped the Islamic situation in Java and was intending todiscard the iather useless MIAI headed by its PStr leaders, and to found a new Muslim federation instead.

Politicaliza tion of Ky ai

Det:elopment of Strategy touards l(yais Aftlr concentrating on promoting Japanese war aims and spend- ing over one and a half years in understanding the Muslim situation, the Japanese recognized that " (kyais and 'ulami) have not only reli- gious, but also to some extent, local political influence."51 The mili- tary governmenr srarted various projects aimed at kyai to make use of their influence. Shumubu was in charge of this task, and in prepara- tion for it, its office was twice reorganized and enlarged in October 7943 andJdy ga4. At the same time its head was changed to sym- bolize its reorgani zation. Horie's successor, Hoesain Djajadiningrat was from a famous prryaN family of Banten, West Java. He was a protege of the late Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch Islamologist, and the lirst Indonesian to win a Ph.D. (in Oriental History) from Leiden University. He was also the first non-Japanese to occupy a vital posi- tion in the military government. However, he was brought up in a 'Western milieu. and was isolated from Islamic leaders.": In that sense, the installment of K.H. Hasiim Asi'ari as the third head of Shtmubu showed how importantly kyai were regarded. However, naturally the position was merely symbolic and for all practical purposes Shumubu was controlled by the Japanese. After August or Septem- ber 1942, Japanese projects touching on their Islamic policy were roughly divided into four categories, i.e. unification of Muslim orga- niralions, training, recruitment of manpower (laborers and soidiers), and propaganda activities. First, in November 1943 Japanfounded a new Muslim federation, Madjelis Sjoera Moeslimin Indonesia (Masjoemi, or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) in place of MIAI. The preceding

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official recognition of Muhammadiyah and NU foreshadowed the new foundation. K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari was installed as chair of Masyu- mi, but in practice Mas Mansur (Muhammadiyah), Wahid Hasyim (Hasjim Asy'ari's son, NU), Zainul Arifin (I.{U) and Anwar Tjokro- aminoto (PSII) were in charge of the practical administrative affairs of the body. Later these four leaders were named 'collaborators' in the Dutch intelligence report,53 an indication of their apparent close connection with the Japanese military government. In April, 1944, Shumuka (a local religious office) was installed in each residency gov- ernment, and influential kyais or 'ulamA' were appointed to this of- fice in each area. Through these local offices Shumubu would come into close contact with local Muslims, on the other hand the supervi- sion of religious administration was trusted ro rhe Islamic leaders.a Shumuka were linked to branches of Masjoemi, and thus Masjoemi could begin their involvement in local governmenr .55 l(yaisor'ulamX', who were isolated from political authority during the Durch colo- nial era were thus brought into in the process of administrarion. Another project produced local staff needed at the lowest level of Masyumi to enforce its organization. As mentioned before, in July, L943 latihan kyai started. This was intended ro re-educar e kyaisand to make them pro-Japanese, and rhey were expected to conveyJapanese wishes and intenrions to the local inhabitants. "The Japanese thought that such a course was like a mirror in which people's lives was re- flected".$ This project lasted for almost two years, the iongest of all, and the training course was held sevenreen times so that more than one thousand students were rrained. Candidates were recommended not only by each resident government but also somerimes by local branches of Masyumi because more or less local, influential kyais or 'ulami'had relations with Islamic organizations which were under the influence of Masyumi. NU members were especially dominant amongst those attending. Many of the kyais and 'ularnk' who com- pleted this training were appointed to Shumuka offices.5/ Besides this, latiban guru rnadrasah (trainingfor Islamic schools' teachers) was or- ganized with young Muslim leaders as its target. However, it was held only two or three times.s8 Until that time Japan depended much on Islamic leaders, espe- cially in the mobilization of manpower. In October, 1943 Pembela Tanah Air (PETA, Fatheriand Defense Force), an Indonesian unit, was organized to reinforce the Japanese military, vrhich was sorely needed by Japan. This force was under Indonesian command, and

Stsdia lslamika, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1997 Kyai, and lapanese Militam the sons of influenti al kyais were recruited and aPPointed as battal- ion commanders.5e Furthermore, in February 7945, a Muslim army Hizbullah (the Ranks of God), was founded, composed of Muslim youths, mainly santri (pnpils) from pesilntren under the guidance of Masyumi. ZainulArifin became the commander-in-chief, and about twenty kyaiswere involved in training, including Wahid Hasjim'6 As for p rop aganda, S oeara Mo e s limin Indonesia, Masyumi's organ, was pubiiihed every monrh to bring home to people the significance of thi war and to win their co-operation. Besides this, a twice monthiy magazine Assjoe,lalt,which was wrirren in lndonesian in Arabic script, wai pub lished from (?), t9 44.6t It was exp ected that the message would be further carried through kyairo the people. To facilitate this task, religious teachers were allowed to "give guidance more than scrip- tural instruction to peopie," (]anuary, 194ia that is, to provide po- liticai instruction. In this way kyaiswere indeed changing into local politicians.

Muslims'Dernands to the lapanese Military Governrnent Benda regarded theJapanese Islamic poiicy thus, "Nippon (]apan), then would not make Indonesia a Muslim State, but it would bequeath to its successors a more truly Islami cJava, a Java closer to the ideals of the santri civilization, than had existed inMarch L942".6However' many of the Japanese policies towards Muslims seem to have been suggested by Indonesian Muslims themselves, indicating that the Japanese side more or less grasped what Indonesian Muslims desired. I have .toi y.i found any documents which provide evidence of exchanges between Japanese and Indonesians, nevertheless there is one record that testifies that Japanese policy was not always a one way process. That is, Jaua Gunsei-ka ni Okeru Kaiky6to K6saku J6ky6 (The situation regarding the manipulation of Muslims in Java under the military government), written by a certain Miyamoto Hideo. This is a hand-written document, dated February, Sh6ua 19 (19aa)' Miyamoto was a member of Dai Nihon Kaiky6 Ky6kai, and he was rather critical in his report, of Japanese policy towards Isiam.s One part of this document describes the demands Indonesian Muslims submitted to Japan. They were made at the above mentioned meet- ing with kyais whtchwere held throughout Java from December 1942 to March, 7943, or through Japanese Muslims o{ Kaiky6 K6sakuhan ' This part was titled, "Muslims' requests directed towards the mili- tary government,"65 and first, Miyamoto explains several problems

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arising from the Japanese inability with the Indonesian language or difference of customs. For example, Japan ordered those who worked in the government to doff their headwear, but Indonesian Muslims resisted because religious propriety demanded theywear the ropl S4us- lim hat). Also it was protested that in newspapers the honorific title nabi (rhe prophet)was omitted before the name of Muhammad. Af- ter these introductory paragraphs, Miyamoto itemized 98 requests. He classified these into two categories, namely, 'requests concern- ing instruction in collaborating ro prosecure rhe war' (t: items) and 'zeal for the furthering of religion' (85 items). The former demanded information and explanations concerning the war situation , and was rather vague about what was really intended, indicating, perhaps, that these requests were submitted only to show an opportunistic pro-Japanese attitude. On the contrary, the latter consisted of con- crete and practical requests, so they were more reaiistic or serious. It was not written when, where and from whom these requests were submitted. So it may be rather difficult ro rrear them evenly since the requests varied, depending on rhe time, situation and the position of the supplicants. However, the requesrs listed in 'zeal for the further- ing of religion' have nothing to do with the war efforr, and are frank opinions in which the Japanese bias is hardly recognized. Therefore, we are abie to see through these requests what Muslims really desired. Miyamoto again classified those 85 items into t2 caregories; 'af- fairs of religious teachers' (S items),'religious educational affairs' (9), 'propagation and propaganda' (3), 'the enlargement of byai's influ- ence' (28), 'requests on administrarion affairs' (12), 'the Friday issue' (1), 'training for youth' (1), 'reiigious publications' (3), 'religious ad- ministration affairs' (7), 'issues concerning religious policy' (6), 'prob- lems of national development' (6), 'problems that need reconcilia- tion' (4). The number of items does not always reflect their serious- ness, nor the urgency of the problem. However, demands concern- ing the position and activities of. kVais can be found in another 6 items beside 'affairs of religious reachers' and 'the enlargement of kyai's influence', so requests concerning kyais occupy more than 40 percent of the total. Partly this was caused by the fact that this infor- mation was gained through meetings wirh kyais or through influen- tial individual byai. Even so, whar attracrs our artention is that most of the requests listed in 'the enlargemen t of. fo,ai's influence' can virtu- aily be categorized into'religious administration affairs'. For example, "Oust prostitutes from the cities and villagqs", "Mosque fund should be

Studia Islamiha, Vol. 4,No. 3. 1997 Kyai arul Japanese Military used for relief", "Allow public servants to attend Friday prayers", "Equate the position of. kyais with Christian preachers', etc. Probably Miyamoto interpreted these requests as the way in which kyai de- manded administrative competence or a sort of authority of supervi- sion. This view sugge*s that kTais engaged in political discourse with the Japanese, and gives us rather a different image of. kyais from that of the Dutch colonial period, when kyais were informal leaders of the Muslim society and proud of not being involved in politics. How- ever, viewed from another perspective, it shows how kyaiswere frus- trated by the colonial administration of religious affairs, and that chan- nels for expressing their opinions were completely denied to them. On the other hand, demands which directly concerned the Japa- nese Islamic policy were listed in 'problems that need reconciliation' like; "The Japanese military government and native officials (note: regent) are required to learn Islam". "Saikeirei is quite anti-Islam", "Regulations on saluting should be relaxed", and "The salute of Mus- lim students should be altered in an Islamic way". These demands show how frustrated Muslims were because of the Japanese lack of understanding of Islam, and also how they felt repelled by the en- forcement of militaristic customs. As mentioned before, saikeirei caused an especially bitter denouncement, and is still remembered as a symbol of the Japanese lack of sympathy towards Islam. Further- more, practical demands were made like; "Oil should be provided for Islamic lectures", and "'S(hite cotton should be provided for wind- ing sheets"; "Rises in prices and difficulties of obtaining commodities shouid be regulated" which had, in fact, nothing to do with religious affairs, but together with the above mentioned demands testify that people were suffering from hardships caused by the Japanese occuPa- tion. Discontent with the military government was rising. If.we analyze these 85 items according to the above-mentioned classi- fication of reiigious administration affairs which appeared in the 'MIAI's aims', we can see that although some redundancies cannot be avoided, two items belong to 'marriage affairs', one to 'succesion and inherit- ance matters', seven to 'mosques (including religious ofiicials)', two to 'payment of religious tithes', 14 to 'instruction and education', six to 'publicity and propaganda', four to 'social affairs (aid)', lt to other gen- erai religious administration affairs, 15 to problems concerning the Posi- tion of. kyais, and 1.3 other political demands which were brought about specifically under the Japanese occupation. In these demands, the first tv/o categories account for only a few items, but strong demands had

Studia Islaniha, VoL 4, No. 3, 1997 Kobayasbi Yasrbo

earlier been made rhat "exemption from marriage registration fee" and "trials of succession and inheritance mafiers be transferred back to s6ryo- h6in (razd agarna:Muslim law courrs)". Demands were also made con- cerning 'instruction and education'; "Improvemenr of facilities of pesdntren and religious schools", "non-religious education at pesantren and religious schoois", "religious education at national schools", reflect- ing the trend towards innovation in religious education. As for general religious administration afrairs, "exemprion from slaughtering rax on the feast day of sacrifice", "the Friday off isue", and "fixing of the begin- ning and the end of the fasr: who should determine it, the governmenr or Muslims?" were listed. These were problems which would inevitably occur in a Muslim society. In summing up rhese demands, ir can safely be said that what Muslims desired or demanded was the formation of a new social system which would enable and secure the practice of Mus- iim law, that is ro say, a better organization of the religious affairs ad- ministration. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the formation of a new office, which would take charge of religious administration was expected. The demand said, "an institution dealing with Muslim affairs should be set up in each residency, governmenr office or city hall", implying a local religious office, as was suggested in the above mentioned MIAI's request. Here again the idea of forming shumuka, a local branch of Shumubu, was suggested by Muslims themselves. Some of the above mentioned requests were mer by the Japanese military government. Saikeireiwas nor enforced any ionger from Oc- tober, 19+3(?), the slaughtering tax on rhe feast day of sacrifice was exempted in December !943,shumuka, was ser up in April, !944,the introduction of Friday afrernoons off was begun in May 1944, rhe Qur'Xn was printed in June, 1945. Besides all this, in Septembe r,1943, a special distribution was made on the occasion of the ceiebrarion marking the end of RamadXn (the fasting monrh) and a subsidy was provided to Isiamic schools, AlrnanakJaua Baroe (a Muslim calendar) was printed in late 19+3(?), and finally in July, 1945 aMuslim assem- bly hall Balai Moeslimin Indonesia was opened and a Muslim univer- sity was set up. Thus Japan tried hard to appease Muslims. Further- more, it was acknowledged that wearing a hat is a religious cusrom, and also that fresh consideration should be given to the japanese habit of beating because it was quite alien ro Javanese.,* This might indi- cate that the Japanese had a deeper appreciation of Islam, but it is more precise to say that there was no other course open to Japan save to yield to Muslims' demands. The worsening of the miiitaiy situa-

Srudia Islantiha, Vu/.4, .\'o. 3, t t - Kyai, and Japanese Militan

tion caused enormous difficuities, andJapan depended more and more on Muslims' collaboration in the civil administration, conscription of laborers and the commandeering of rice paddies.

lY/abid Hasjim and Masyumi, Sh,nnuka, Hizbullah After the proclamation of independence, three organizations, which were created or formed during the Japanese occupation, be- came the basis for Muslims' political voice in Indonesian society: Masyumi, Shumubu, and shumuka (the forerunner of the Ministry of Religious Affairs) and Hizbullah.s Vahid Hasyim was the Islamic leader involved in these three organizations. Benda called him "per- haps the most prominent representative of Indonesian Islam at the close of the Japanese era".d'Who was this Wahid Hasyim, who was regarded as the leader of Indonesian Muslims when he was only about thirty years old? As mentioned before, \ilahid Hasyim was a son of K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, the supreme leader of NU. He was born in Jombang, East Java in 7914 and was educated at his father's Pesantren Tebuireng. He did not undergo what is called formal education, but he taught himself to become familiar enough with Western tongues to be able to read Dutch and E.nglish. Later he went to Mecca and studied there (1932-33). After his rerurn to Java, he formed a madrasah (Islamic school with \X/estern-style instruction) at Tebuireng, and introduced secular subjects, including the Indonesian language to a pesantren where previously only religious subjects had been taught. He edited an educational magazine, SuluhNahdlatulUlarna (The Torch of NU), and in the pesantren milieu he was known as an innovator of. pesantren education. At the end of the 1.930's, about 1.,500 santri, *.r. study- ing at Pesantren Tebuireng where newspapers and magazines writ- ten in Indonesian, Arabic and Dutch could be read. Wahid Hasyim himself subscribed to these, but this was out of the ordinary in a setting where ordinarily the only field of study was religious works in Arabic. He had led not only NU, but also its youth organization Ansor (Helper) since before the war, and he served as chairman of MIAI from September 1940 for one year. During the Japanese occu- pation, he successively held various posts in the military governmenr, such as member of Chuo Sangi-in (Central Advisory Council, Octo- ber 1943), vice-chairman of Masyumi (I.{ovember 1943), member of the Central Office of Jawa H6k6kai (People's Service Association on Java, March, I94+), and an adviser of Sh0mubu (July lgaa?).6e The

St*lia [slamiha, r'ol. 4,No. 3, 1997 Kobayashi Yasubo above-mentioned Ono seems ro have been in close contact with Wahid Hasyim. On the Indonesian side, it was thought of Ono that "his task was to accompany or (to be more precise) to follow Vahid Hasyim like a shadow",7o in a Dutch document after the war it was *\ilahid recorded that Hasyim was a secretary o{ Ono".71 As usual, with a son of a kyai, \fahid Hasyim was called 'Gus Vahid', and was well known among the pesantren people. Not much is known about Gus \ilahid's activities during the Japanese occupa- tion, and it is hard to confirm whether some of them are facr or fiction. As far as I can tell, he himself did nor leave any records about this period although he was an excellent wrirer. His essays appeared sporadically in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, but narurally he could not express his opinions frankly under the threat of the censorship of the military government. We can only ascertain some part of his thought through people who had conracr wirh him. Saifuddin Zuhri was one of these, and he recorded some of lVahid Hasyim's words of this time in his autobiographies.z2 According to Saifuddi n Zuhri, Wahid Hasjim possessed a FIAT and drove ir himself.Tr He was very active and contacted many people. He always gained much informa- tion and he also sent his opinions abour the situation to many hyais. Saifuddin Zuhri was one of the santris who worked as his messen- gers. Some confusion of time and memory are found in these books, but they still prove useful material for investigating how \fahid Hasyim tried to deal with the Japanese occupation. First, concerning the collaboration with Japan, when he was asked if his principle was to help Japan, he said, "...In any struggle murual deception goes on. ...Among santis 'Nippon' which is the Japanese pronunciation, must be pronounced'Nippong'. It means nipu wong (in Javanese: to deceive a person). They say they want to liberate us from Dutch colonialism. Probably ir's rrue we shall nor be colonized by Holland again, but they don't tell us whether we wiii become independent or if they will colonize us afrer we are freed from Hol- Iand. This is just a deception. Why don't we deceive rhem?".7+ Then he answered the question, "Our principle is to help ourselves. We help ourselves through opportunities which they give us. Possibly, they will make use of us as their tool. But we are not silent tools. What is important is to use opportunities which rhey give us, as much as possible...".zs Indeed Japan badly needed Indonesians' help, so he thought this was a good chance ro become free from coloniilism. As for concrete straregy, he seemed to have an idea concerning an

Stuclia Islamiha, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997 Kyai awl lapanese Milinry 9l organization to mobilize peoPle. He observed that Pergerakan 3 A (ttre Triple-A Movement)s did not succeed because of the lack of popular suppon. He said, "If a new body is formed, we will ask Ja- pan, or to be precise, we will persuade Japan to form an organization specifically consisting of members of urnmat Islam".z He was design- ing an Islamic Union before MIAI was formed. He had more to say about the creation of shumuka . " ...Hadlraius Syaikh (Haslim Asy'ari) and I have been asked to form KantorJawatan Agama Pusat (the Centrai Office for Religious Affairs; Shumubu). I have already offered my opinion to Saik6sbikikan (the Supreme Com- mander) that it is impossible if local branches of that office are not created throughout Java and Madura. My opinion was accepted by Japan..."78 He admitted that he himself suggested the creation of shumuka in each residency. Moreover, he had suggested appointing 'ularni'to head them, i.e.,shnnukachd, because theywould take charge of religious affairs and there were no Islamic experts other than 'ulamX'. He continued his words with a note of some relief, "I feel grateful that we have brought innovation into the pesantre,? system before. ...As you know, many years ago, we organized the learning of reading and writing of Latin letters, the Indonesian language, ge- ography, Indonesian history, and arithmetic. Afterwards, other pesdntren followed this. Santriswho have graduated from Tebuireng have been scattered. This will certainly make our efforts to form local offices of religious affairs easier"./e He foresaw and expected that graduates of the reformed pesantrens would be appointed to shumuka offices, apparently thinking that Shlmubu and Masyumi would uphold a stable network of local shumuka which were occu- pied by kyais and 'ulanti', or their disciples. Furthermore, with regard to the formation of Hizbullah, Saifuddin Zuhri was by chance present when Ono visited Vahid Hasyim at Saik6-sbikikan's request. At first, the Japanese military demanded that sdntrisyouth should also join Heiho (the Auxiliary Forces), but Vahid Hasyim submitted another opinion and asked Japan to give military training to Indonesian youths. He answered, "... Entrust national defence to the sons of the homeland, while Japanese soldiers here should be sent to the war front and to face the Allied Forces".s He also suggested to Japan, through Ono, that a Hizbullah especially for santri youth like PETA should be formed. Ono accepted this offer, requested a detailed plan from him.81 According to Saifuddin Zuhrr, Wahid Hasyim kept in mind the idea that this milirary training for

\turlia Islanihd,l'ol. 4,No. 3, 1997 Kobayasbi Yawbo

santriswould be a part of the preparations for an insurrection against Japan.v Pesantrenswere changed into the headquarters of Hizbullah.sl According to the Japanese survey, rhere were 18,466 religious teach- ers who were called byais or 'ularnL'in Java.e There may be some exaggeration in Saifuddin Zuhri's accounr. However, as a son of Tebuireng which was amongsr rhe first of the pesantren, \Wahid Hasyim had a close relationship with many influential kyais, andhe was in a position ro garher information and mobilize manpower by using the pes4ntren network. \Vas there any orher leader who was more capable of recruiting persons for Masyumi, Shumuka and Hizbullah than Vahid Hasyim? Clearly he aimed ar organizingurnmdt politically, administrarively and militarily. He reacted to the Japa- nese occupation with his own prospects for the future Indonesian Muslim society, that would be independent and self-determined urnrn4t.

Conclusions . The Japanese military landed in Indonesia in the guise of sympa- thizers towards Islam. Its Islamic policy was one of the measures re- quired to keep peace and order in Indonesia, and aiso to obtain mate- rials and labor. The Japanese obtained knowledge of Islam by con- tacting Muslims directly, so much manipulation of Muslims took place, largely in the latter half of the occupation. However, faced with such a siruation, Islamic leaders tried to take advantage of the opportunities offered them. The leaders of PSII took rhe first initia- tives and succeeded in grasping the leadership of MIAI, a Muslim federation. They tried to deal with the Japanese with expecrarions of autonomy of religious administration, and failed. On the other hand, the NU leaders perceived the falseness of the Japanese military gov- ernment, and won considerable concessions by seeing its weaknesses. The most significant result of their bargaining was the establishment of shumuka, which was an indispensable and long desired office for better religious administration. vahid Hasyim and other leaders were laying the foundarions of the future Musiim society. As a result of this process kyais, I who had been thoughr nor ro be involved in gov- ernment affairs, were politicized, and traditionalist Islamic leaders assumed considerable political power. .They took independent action beyondJapanese expectations. Not only Japanese but also other Indonesian politicians and Dutch colo-

Siru,lia lslanika, I ul. a, No. J. 199/ Kyai and .lalrancsc |Vilitary

nial who had long dominated Indonesia, had failed to perceive their political ability. Van der Plas, an experienced Dutch colonial bu- reaucrat, famous as an expert in Indonesian Islam before the war, could not give appropriate advice any longer after he left Indonesia. When he came back to Java with the Allied Army, he was unable to deal with the new situation and fell short of the Dutch government's expectations.s This testifies to how radical a change took piace dur- ing those three and a half years. After the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence, Masyumi was reorganized into a politi cal party, and became a foothold from which Muslims could speak out in politics. Although Masyumi split repeat- edly after that, it offered a parent organization from which new Muslim parties developed. Hizbullah was also reformed and played a role in the revolution, and later, many of its personnel joined the nationai armed forces. Shumubu and shumuka became the Ministry of Religious Affairs and its local offices, and when 'f{ahid Hasyim was its minister (1950-1952), the organization became innovative and the long desired dream was finally realized. Later its name was changed into the Department of Religious Affairs, and it has continued to develop to the present day. It is a most unusual administrative office to find in a non-Islarnic state, and it safeguards people's religious life. As for hyais, some obtained positions in Muslim law courts or in religious offices, others went back to the pesdntrens. However, those established as before in villages were now also expected to serve as bridges between the centrai NU and the villagers, as NIJ consoli- dated its organization. In the first half of the 1950's, an American an- thropologist, Clifford Geertz, observed kltai's activities in explaining the policies of the NU along with religious preaching. Geenz pointed out that foials, whose main role was once to transmit the great traditions of Islam to the Javanese peasantry, were also expected to play the role of local activists.% Although Geertz did not refer to it specifi- cally, the seeds of the changing role of. kyais were firstly planted in the Japanese occupation poiicy which regarded kyais as potential lo- cal politicians. In modern Indonesia, the rivalry between the government and Muslims has in a sense advanced. Vhen the government, realizing Muslim potential, tried to win them over to its side, the Muslims reacted independently. Arguing from this, we can see that the three- and-a-half years of the Japanese occupation was the time during which that process developed most dynamically.

\ru,lia lslanika, Vol, 4, Na. 3, 1997 Kobayasbi Yasuko

Notes: 1. Soeria Santosa, Maj. R.S.'DeJapansche propaganda en de Islam", Notaoan het Politiek Bureau, Allied Milxary Administration Cioil Alfairs Branch, 2 February 1946, p. 7. 1 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun; Indonesian klarn under the Japa- nese Occupation 1942.45 (Ihe Hague and Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1958). In this article I use rhe reprint from Foris Publications Holland, 1983. 'Ularni'is an Arabic loan word which means a scholar of religious sciences in Islam. Kyais are grouped under 'ulamA', but they are especially engaged in reli- gious education. In pracdce hyai ts a title given ro an 'ulami'who is highly respected by the surrounding people. However, there are no clear criteria which apply. Probably because of this the Japanese military often used rhese terms tog,ether wirhout differentiarion. I Concerning the difference between 'modernist' and 'traditionalist', see discus- sion below. 5. only the following has given a rough sketch of Indonesian Islarn in this period: R. de Bruin, klam en Nationalisrnc in door Japan Bezet Indonesie 1942-1945 ('s- Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverii, 1982). 6. Kurasawa Aiko, "Mobilizarion and Control; A Study of Social Change in Rural Java, 1942-1945", Ph.D. (Cornell Universiry, 1988). The Japanese edition is Nihon Senry6.ha n6 Jazua N6son no Heny6 (okyo: S6shi-sha, 1992). The Indonesian edition is: Mobihsasi dan Konvol; Studi tentang Perubahan Sosial di Pedesaan Jawa 1942.194t (Jakarta: Rasindo, 1993). 7. C.A.O. van Nieuwenhijze, Wat the Japanese did to klam in Jaoe, Batavia, May, 1947 (wpublished, p. 13). 8. Kobayashi Tetsuo (O'rar Faisar), who was later engaged in Islamic policy i' S.lawesi, was sent to Cairo, and Suzuki Tsuyoshi (N{uhamrnad Saleh) who alsti worked in Java during rhe war, was senr to Mecca. concerning their experiences see: Kobayashi Tetsuo, Indoneshia no Kaiky6llslarn in Indonesial (f okyo: Aikok. Shinbun-sha, 1941). Suzuki Tsuyoshi, Mehka Junrelki fMemories of a pilg.'rage to Meccal (fokyo: Chihei-sha, 1943). Several other Japanese Mu-slims were senr to Mecca repeatedly. Wakabayashi Han, Kaiky|+ekai to Nippon [The Muslim World and Japanl ffokyo: Dainichi-sha, 1938). 9' At the reception after the inauguration ceremony, Kirnigayo (the national an- them of Japan) was sung, and the exclamation Banzai(all Hail or Live Forever) was rnade to the Ernperor and also to Islam. Kaiky6Jij6 [Muslim Affairs], Vo.1 No. 2, August, 1938, p. 97. Kaihy|.ken [The Muslim Sphere], Vol. 1 No.1, July, 1938' p' 48. The b*siness commnniry contributed a fund and land for the builcl- ing of this mosque. Kawarnura Mitsno, "senzen Nippon no Isurarnu Kenkyu Sh6shi [A Short History of Islamic Studies inJapa nf",Nihon Cha$ Gakkei Nenp6, No. 2 1987, 423-424. 10. At the conference it was decided to exchange srudents berween Japan and Mus- lirn conntries, and again the exclarnatio n Banzai was rnade this :jne to Dai Ni?tpon Teikohu (Ihe .Greater Japanese Ernpire) and to Islarn, also. Kaihy6 Sekai lThe Muslirn Worldl, Vol. 1 No. 9, December, 1939, pp. 87 -rc|. ll. D'ti'Nippon Kaiky| Ky6kai, v.zg,t Nanyo Boehi to Kaihyoto [o*r Trac{e in tire Sonthern Seas and the Muslirnsl, 1939. 12. concerning the inilonesian Muslim Movernents before the war, see the foliow- ing; Benda, o1t. cit., pp,32-99. Deliar Noer, Partai klam tli Pentts N,zsional 1945-

Srudia lslamika, Vol. +, .\o. 3, 1997 Kyai, and Japanese Militam

1965 $akarta: Pustaka Utama Grafitt, 1987), pp. l-21'. Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen klam di Indonesia (jakarta: LP3ES). Martin van Bruinessen, NU; Tradisi Relasi-relasi Kuesa, Pencarian lYacana Baru Sogyrkarta: LKiS, 1994), pp' 17-45. 13. Miyatake Masamichi, "Ranry6 Higashi Indo no Kaiky6to [Muslims in the Dutch East Indiesl", Kaikyo-ken, Vol. 4 No. 6, June, 1940, pp. 454-455. 14. G.H. Bousquet (translated. by Takei Juro), "Shina Jihen to Ranin Minshu [The China Incident and the People of the Dutch East Indiesl", Kaiky6 Sehai,Yol.2 No. 2, February 1940, pp.20-21. 15. Nienwenhuijze, otri. cit., p.26. 1/ 10. Got6 Kenichi, Shbtoa-hi Nihon to Indonesbia [Japanese Relations with Indonesia in the Sh6wa Eral (Iokyo: Keiso-shobo, 1986, pp. 507-509). 17. Beita Nahdlatoel Oelama, Vol. z No. 21, Seprember 1938, p.2. t6. Mutiara, Vol. 6 No. 11, pp. 158-160. 19. Mutiara, Vol. 8 No. 2, No. 3, 194Q, pp.6-9, pp.66-69. 2Q. Saifuddin Zthri, Guruktt; Orang-orang dai Pesantrcz (Bandung: Alnaarif, p. 19). Just before the war the Dutch governrnent also tried to appease Muslirns. Idem, Berangkat dari Pesantren $akarta: Gunung Agung, 1987), pp. 167-169. 21. Initially there were rwo rnore sections concerned with Muslirn affairs, Bunky6- kyoku Shumuka (the Religious Affairs Section of the Educational Affairs Of- fice) and S6uubu Ch6sa-shitu (the Research Section of the General Affairs Of- fice). Both of thern came under Gunseikanbu. The fonner did almost nothing ancl was nrerged into Shanubu in October, 1943, and the latter had no Islarnic specialists nor did it touch on administration. These four offices were detailed rn MiyamotoHideo (Dai-Nihon Kaiky6 Ky6kai), "Jawa Gunsei-ka ni okeru Kaikyoto Kosaku" [The Development of the Strategy towards Muslirns on Java under the Military Governmentl, Febnrary, 1944, pp. I-20. 22. Concerning the organization of Beppan, see: Nakano Koyu-kai [Nakano Alumni Associationl ed., Rihugun Nahano G,z,€Ao [Nakano Anny School] (Tokyo, 1978, p. 505). 23. Although Benda mentionetl 6Japanese Muslims (Benda, op. cit., p. 233), there were only five that could be identified. Those were Mohammad Abdul Munim '!(atanabe, Inada, Abdul Munier Abdul Hamid Ono, and Muhammad Saleh Suzuki. At first, Inada was assigned to Shumnbu, but later he was transferred to Kaiky6-k6sakuhan when it was set up in Beppan. Miyamoto, o1t.cit., pp. 16-18. Nishijima Shigeta and Kishi Koichi, et. al., Indoneshia ni ohcru Nihon Gunsci no KczrATa[Studies on the Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia] (fokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten, 1959), p.237. Nieuwenhnijze, op. cit., p. 4. 25. Ibid., p.6. P.R. van Alderwerelt van Rosenburgh, Kort Ooerzicht oan de Ontaikkeling tlcr Godsdienstige Beuteging tot en met den Japanshcen Tijd, Ne/is (Batavia, Septernber, 1946), p.3. 26. Nieuwenhuijze, o1t. cit., p. 11. Rosenburgh, op. cit., p. 5, 27. It was said that K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari was suspected of having instigated an anti- Japanese rnovernent, but it was not certain. On the capture of K.H. Hasyiur Asy'ari, see: H. Aboebakar etl., Sedjarah Hiduqt K.H.A. Vehid Hasjin d.tn Karangan Tcrsi"zr $akana: Panitiya Buku Peringat an,7957), pp.II2-113; Saifucldin Zrhri, G u ru k u, pp. 1 69 -17 0. Ide m, Beran gka t..., pp. 20 1 -20 2. 28. On the Saikeirei problern, see: Benda, op. cit., pp. 122-126. Hamka, Ay.thku; Rittayat Hidup Dn H. ALtdul Ktirn Arnrullah tlan Perjuangan Kaum Agama di

Studid Isldmihd, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997 Kobayasbi Yasuko

Suntatera, 3rd print (Jakarta, Umrninda, 1982), pp. 219 -222. 29. Et6 Shinkichi ancl Kurusawa Aiko, Intalryu Kirohn; Nihon no Nanp6-kanyo lh- terview Records: Japanese Relations with the Southl (fokyo: Tokutei Kenkyu Bunka Masanu Interview Series, 1980), pp. 3-11. 30. Ono Shinji, "Java Kaikyoto no Shink6 [Beliefs of Javanese Muslims]", Sbin Ajia [New Asia], April, 1942, pp. 1 10-116. Idem, "Java Kaiky6 Jij6; Kiyai Morudato no koto [The Situadon of Javanese Islarn; On Kiyai Mordatu]", Kaikyi-hen,Yol. 6 No. 6, June 1946, pp.39-43.ldem,"Indoneshia Kaiky6 K6saku ni tsuite [On the Strategy towards Indonesian Islaml", Shin Ajia,June 1942, pp. 23-35. Jr.ltxa..D. zJ. 32. Ihid., pp.274a. 33. Iden, "Kaiky6 Jij6". 34. Idem, "Kaiky6 K6saku", pp,27,33. J), lt)td.. o, 16. 36. Ibitl.,pp. 33-3a, J/ . 10t4., pp. :/ -t6. 48. Aboebakar, oqt. cit,, p. 758. 39. Niewenhuijze, oqt.cit., p.7. 40. Miyarnoto,op,cit., pp. 101-102. JauaGunseikanbu,JautaNenhan 2604lJava Ll- manacl (Djakarta, 1944), Reprint, Tokyo: Biblio, 1,973, p. 145. Soerio Sanrosa, o1t. cit,, p. 2. Nieuwenhntjze, o1t. cit,, p ,24, +1. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 42. A reproduction of this report was published recenrly. Osarnushudan Shireibu, with an introduction by Nakarnura Mitsuo, Zen Jaua Kaihyo Ch\saslo (fokyo: Ryukei-shosha , I99I). 43. Nieuwenhnijze, op. cit., p.7. 44, Miyarnoto, op. cit., pp.73. 45. Nieuwenhuijze, o1t. cit., p. 17. Rosenburgh, op. cit., p. 15. 46. Nieuwenhvijze, op. cit., pp.7-8, 47. This rnaterial is kept in "Het Archief van de Procureur Generaal bij het Hooge- gerechtshof van Nederlands-Indie, 1945-1949", < 100/ > , the National Archives, lWondoamiseno rWonosalarn, The Hague. was born in Eastern Java, in 1895. He went to Europeesch Lager School (European Primary School), and got a job at the water supply office in Surabaya where he began his political career in a tracle union. Gunseikanbr, Orang Indonesia jangTerhemoeh"t di Djaua (Djakarar 1944), Reprint, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada Universiry Press, 1986, p .446. Merdeha, Sep- tember 7 1947Q) 48. This term 'Departernen Agama Islarn' can be found in a handwritten paper. MIAI's desire to form a Ministry of Muslim affairs is mentioned by Deliar Noer without showing its source. Deliar Noer, otrl. cit,, p,20. 49. Benda, op. cit., pp. 142-143. 50. Perlraps the core ol:Jte baytal-rnil problem was rharMIAI created it-s inclepen- cient institutio[ apart frorn the government. It is clear that this project tried to take over soure functions of the government as pointed out by Bruinessen, op. cit., p. 54. 51. Osamnshudan Shireibu, op. cit., p,341. 52. According to Ono, Djajadiningrat was disgusted by kyais. Eto and Kurasawa, o?. cit., p. 14. It was only four months after Dfajadiningrat's appointrnent that Miyamoto wrote, "...this appointrnent proved quite a failure on the part of the

Stu,lia Islamika, VoL +, No. 3. lYgz Kyai aul Japanese Military

Japanese headquarters. It was already regarded as only a question of dme before it would be dismissed". Miyamoto, op. cit,, p.7, 53. Soerio Santoso, op, cit., p, 6, 54. Instructions of Gunseikan to the heads of shtrmuha included the supervision of penghuht (religious officials). Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, Vol' 2 No. 9,May 1944, p. 1 Hitherto, penghulu had been under supervision ol ltiyayi. 55. Soerio Santoso, o1t. cit,, p, 4. 56. Ibid.,pp.2-3. 57. Concerninglatihan hiyai,seez Kurasawa (1992),pp.382-418, and (1993)' pp. 291- 340. 58. Gunseikanbr,Jaua Nenkan, p. 145. Soerio Santoso' o1t. cit., p.5. 59. Saifuddin Zrhri, Guruku, p. 192. 60. Soerio Santosa, op, cit., p. 6. Rosenburgh, op. cit., p, 12. 61. This bulletin was for kyais and iilami'who did not read the Roman alphabet. In the ltesantrens of the time the major subject was learting Arabic works, so a large partof. pesantrenpeople\tefe not accustomed to reading the Roman alphabet. 62. Gunseikanbr,Ja

Studid'lsl4miba, Vol, 4, No. 3, 1997 Kobayasbi Yasuho

of MIAI (September 1942). A1so, in another parr, he mendoned \X/ahid Hasyim's words, "Horie was enrrusred with the task of supervising Shurnubu, which was lreacled by Hasjim Asj'ari". (Ibid., p.180) However, when Hasyim Asy'ari was appointed to this position, Horie had already gone back ro Japan. 79. Iltid., pp. 172-I73. Concerning the process of innovation of the pesantren educa- tion -systern, see: Zamakhsyari Dhofier, op. cit., pp.103-1.22. Karel A, Steenbrink, Pesanten, Maclrasah, Sekolah (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986). 80. Saifuddin Zrhrr, Guruku, pp. 190-192.It seems Saifuddin Z$ri again parrly con- fused the fonnation of PETA with that of Hizbuilah. He thought the beginning of. 1944 carne four months after Hizbullah's formation. (Ihid., p.2OO) However, L'ounting backwards, it was PETA rhar was founded around that time. Hizbullah was formally formed in December, 1944. 81. Ibitl., p. 192. 82. Iltul., pp. 195-196. 83. Ibid., p. 211. 84. As rnentioned before, the criteria for determining between hyais and 'ulami' are vague. So it can safely be said that this nunber is quite a rough esdmare. 85. cler Plas van had associations with a7.eis before the war. Just before the Japane-se military landed on Java, he escaped to Melbourne, Ausrraiia, where he wrote reporm on Muslim affairs for the Ailied Forces. Although ire was still able to obtain information from his agents onJava, he seems to have lost track of politi- cal developrnents in Indonesia. Probably the siruation changed so rapidly that he was hardly abie ro assess it. See: Her Archieve van Ch.O. van der plas (1891- 1977), over de Periode 1941.-1973', no. 113 (the National Archive, The Hague). About Van der Plas's career, see \X/illiarn H. Frederick, "The Man Who Knew Tocr Mncir: Ch.O. Van der Plas and the Future of Indonesia, 1927-1950,', in Hans Antlov and Stein Tonnesoon eds., Imperial Policy antl Southeast Asian Na- tion.zlism 19 30"1957 (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1994), pp.34-62. 86. clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The changing Role of a cnltural Bro- ker",ComparatioeStil(liesinSocieryantlHistory,Y ol.2No.2,1960,pp.22g-249.

Kobayashi Yasuko is lecturer at Aichi Gakusen [Jniaersiry , Jdpan.

Stadia lslamiha. Vol. +, No. 3, te97