The Dissolution of the Union in 1905 a Comparison Between the Swedish and Norwegian Arguments

The Dissolution of the Union in 1905 A Comparison between the Swedish and Norwegian Arguments

Reprint from Evert Vedung, Unionsdebatten 1905. En iiimfiirelse mellan argumenteringen i Sverige och Norge, pp. 415-447. Summary

This thesis contains (1) a discussion of theory and methods in the contem- porary analysis of political ideas, (2) a framework for the study of decision-making in the field of foreign policy, and (3) an application of this framework to the discussions about the dissolution of the Unioo between Sweden and Norway in 190). The subject-matter has been treated in the form of a comparative study of Swedish and Norwegian discussions, as they can be followed in newspaper articles, pamphlets, aod records of parliamentary sessions and party meetings. I have also drawn upon a considerable amount of private material (diaries, letters, minutes and me- moranda).

l. Tbeoretical point of departure My point of departure has been the theory of. tcientilic oalue relatiaitm. This value theory has been well established at Swedish universities since the appearance of the Uppsala School of Philosophy at the beginning of this century. As Arnold Brecht's great work on value relativism, Political Theory: The Foundatiou of Twentietb-Centary Political Thought shows, this theory of value has several implications. In my opinion, there are at least two reasons for the study of political ideas within this tradition. Ideas can be studied for the sake of their content, with the intention of constructing theories which are to govern the collection, classification and explana- tion of empirical data. But they can also be studied because they have played a considerable role in the political discussions in a certain country. By critically examining their value bases, their logical structure, their empirical contents and their causes and functions, the analyst can play an important role in modern society. Pertinent, stringent and careful inquiries can improve the standard of the political debate. They can have a purifying effect and make it easier for decision-makers and ordinary people to master the problems posed by their environment. But - and this is a crucial point - one cannot study ideas in the hope of finding the essence of reality.

43' Scientific value relativism is directed against all forms of essentialistic thought. It implies a radical break with the classical tradition of $Testern political thought, which stood and still stands on a value objectivistic ground. It also takes a firm stand against the Marxist tradition of political thought and its claim to be able to establish "complete rationality" by scientific methods. Furtermore, in my opinion this theory of value takes a cooceptualistic view of concepts or universals. Social scientists working within this paradigm distinguish between terms, concepts and reality, as Ogden and Richards did in their book, Tbe A4eaning of Meaning. They do not assert, however, as defenders of the doctrine of conceptual realism do, that universals have an absolute existence outside the mind. The universals are human constructs, which, as such, do not exist in empirical reality. Consequently, concept formation always implies some elements of value, some elements which are not thoroughly rational. The logical conclu- sion from this is the adoption of thinking by means of models. As one cannot find the concepts in reality, one must construct them oneself. This kind of work is basically subjectivistic, a fact that must be explicitly admitted. Scientific value relativism, the theory of conceptualism and model building are - and this is my point - branches of the same tree. They constitute the foundation upon which the greater part of modern social science is based.

2. Some zuays ot' analysing ideas within the paradigm ot' s cientit'ic'ua.lr4e r elatiztism. I$Tithin the paradigm of scientific value relativism, it may, as I see it, be useful to make a distinction between two kinds of approaches to the study of political ideas. One may be called contentual and the other rela- tioxal. Contentual analysis focuses on the intellectual content of ideas. Relational analysis means linking ideas to something outside of themselves, such as other ideas, the personality of the people who embrace them or the societal environment. Relational analysis is concerned with various kinds of coonections between ideas and other ideas, personality and society, e. g. the causes or the functions of ideas. Thus we have the following types of analysis of political ideas: 1. The contentual analysis of ideas 2. The relational analysis of ideas (a) in relation to ideas, (b) in relation to personality and (c) in relation to society.

436 In the contentual method of analysing ideas one has first to solve a semantic problem. One has to decide the meaning of the words and sentences in the texts analysed. At this point I have related my concepts to those developed by Arne Ness. I distinguish between interpretation, plausible interpretation and more precise formulation. In this context it would be going too far to enter into the exact definitions of these concepts. It must suffice to say that in consequence with scientific value relativism I am only speaking of plausible interpretations. It is of little use to talk of true interpretations, as it is impossible for us to specify scientifically the >>real> meaning of. aoy coocept in a deeper sense. The second approach may be called the logical method of analysis. One may examine how well somebody's arguments correspond with the intel- Iectual demand for logical consistency. One may investigate whether the Patterns of argumentation are logically consistent or not. The third approach may be called the tenability method of analysis. Are the propositions made in descriptive sentences (probably) true or (probably) false with regard to reliable empirical data? To answer this question is, however, no simple task. Descriptive sentences not only contain propositions about things directly observable in reality, but also teem with genera- lizations from simpler propositions about reality, mixed with explanations of these propositions on varying levels of abstraction. In order to give reliable answers, one is forced to cary out very extensive empirical research. In the other main way of examining political ideas, relational analysis, one may, first of all, study one structure of ideas in relation to other structures of ideas. In pursuing what I call a genetic analysis of ideas, one starts from certain ideas and draws attention to their precursors. One investigates to what extent elements of thought correspond with the doc- trines of former thinkers and schools of thought. Sometimes one may go further than demonstrating similarities and dissimilarities and try to de- monstrate direct influence. If such an investigation is to be meaningful, it must deal with faidy distinct and abstract conceptions. To search for precursors for trivial ideas seems to be rather pointless. Secondly, one may study the relations between the ideas and the perso- nalities of the people who embrace them. One may study in what ways the personality exerts an influence on the ideas held or study what functions certain ideas fulfil for the personality. This may be called the psycbo- logical analysis of ideas. The third type of relational analysis of ideas may be called sociological; the ideas are related to the surrounding society. One may make a quantita-

437 tive study and try to find out if there any statistically significant connec- ^rc tions between the arguments of the proponents and their social back- grounds. As independent variables ooe may choose, for instance, class, pro- fession, level of education, income, wealth, age and residence. This has been done in electoral research. But one may also explore the qualitative connections between ideas and society. In the field of foreign affairs it seems to be natural to study the connections between ideas and the international political system. One may investigate what functions some specific ideas or recommendations for action fulfil in the international system and their proponents' own views of these functions. Furthermore it seems to be natural to study the party strategic functions of ideas. One may also investigate connections qualitatively by using a socio-psychological approach. One may proceed from a fairly well-known concePt in social psychology or the sociology of knowledge, which has been given such names as the belief system or perception. I have borowed a concePt of perspective developed by Villiam Connolly in his book, Political Science G Ideology. Through a very complicated interaction between himself and his social environment, every man develops a perspective, i. e. a way of looking at the world around him. Connolly describes it as "the implicit scheme the individual brings to inquiry; it is the culturally rooted lens through which we interpret our observations". This perspective makes the individual perceive the world around him selectively. The evident fact that the phenomena surrounding him are innumerable makes it necessary to be selective. In a decision-making situation, interpretations of reality must usually be based on very fragile pieces of information. In many cases it is necessary to make predictions about the behaviour of other countries. Here much scope is left for arbitrariness. The hypothesis is that men make an image of the surrounding wodd which suPPorts the evaluations and conceptions of reality aheady integrated in their perspectives. Following Karl Mannheim, Connolly emphasizes that "the perspective . . . orients the investigator to the political environment in ways that tend to protect high- level commitments from destruction". He also asserts that "the concepts we employ to organize and explain the political environment are sliced and shaded in ways that allow us to retain commitments and values aheady developed". At least three cases of perspective influence may be considered:

1. Different schools of thought use different sets of concepts in describing reality, so that a segment of reality which is thoroughly

48 scrutinized in the one is completely or almost completely ignored in the other. 2. By using different sets of concePts, these different schools of thought perceive different asPects of one and the same reality.

3. In spite of the fact that they describe the same section of reality in the same terms, they attach varying degrees of importance to it in the final balance of the arguments.

The purpose of this socio-psychological approach is to point out that under the influence of their perspectives men are selective in a distinct way in their views of the world surrounding them.

3. Theoretical frame@orle In constructing my theoretical framework, I have started from the supposi- tion that in every debate about foreign policy we may discern three main components: the obiect discussed, the actors joining the debate and the arguments used. The debate about the Union between Sweden and Norway in 1901 must be characterized as relatively practical. I have formulated the obiect of the discussion as fairly precise recommendations to action. The investigation is concerned with a good ten such recommendations. The actors have been classified in pro and contra groups, according to their attitudes to these recommendations. In classifying the argurnentr, I have started with a simple model of the international political system. In such a system one may distinguish a sender of messages, a receiver of messages, several other units which together form what I call the environment, and finally the relations between all these components. The sender is the unit which takes the initiative or is recom' mended to take the initiative in performing a certain act or in adopting a certain attitude to another unit. The receiver is the unit which the sender's attitude or act is immediately directed at. In this study, this means that Sweden and Norway act as sender and receiver alternately. The concepts of sender and receiver refer to whole countries, while the concept of actor refers to persons or groups of persons within countries. The environment will then consist of the units which have not been classified as sender and receiver, i. e. the rest of the countries which in one way or another were involved in the actual conflict. This yields the following combinations: (a) sender, (D) receiver, (c) relations between sender and receiver, (/)

4)9 environment, (e) relations between sender and environment, and (l) relations between receiver and environment. With the exception of (d),I have used these combinations as a scheme of classification for the arguments in the union debate. Depeoding on the part of the international political systern to which the arguments refer, I have designated them as sender- oriented, receiver-oriented, sender-receiver-orieoted, sender-environment- oriented and receiver-environment-oriented arguments. ttrTithin these catego- ries I have made some additional distinctions. Following Torgny T. Seger- stedt in his book, Tbe Nature of Social Reality, I have distinguished between inclusive norms, which roughly means rules of law, and specific norms, which may be defined as rules of conduct. Arguments referring to real or supposed rules of law or natural law are classified as oriented towards inclusive norms. Arguments referring to rules of conduct are said to be oriented to specific norms. I have also distinguished a group of arguments containing deliberations about party strategy. Following Guonar Sjdblom in Party Strategiet in a Maltiparty System, I have classified them in three groups, according to their political arena: oriented to the internal arena of the parties, the electoral arena and the parliament^ry arcna.

4. Unilateral action and negotiation: two different strd- tegies for cbange Sweden and Norway were politically united in 1g15, after the great European wars against Napoleon. The main features of the Union were the joint monarchy, the joint foreign office with a single minister for foreign affairs, the unified diplomatic corps and the common consular authority. To a certain extent, the two countries also formed a defence alliaoce. The common institutions were dominated by the King and the Swedish Government appointed by the King. The foreign minister was always a swede and the swedish authorities exerted a strong influence on the foreign policy of the Union. As time went by, this state of. affairs aroused dissatisfaction in Norttay, The Norwegians wanted to be on equal terms with the Swedes in the fields of foreign administration, diplomacy and consular authority. Alternatively, they wanted to change the legislative Union into a mere personal union or even to dissolve it completely. Norwegian politics from about 1890 up to the dissolution of the Union io 1905 could be described as a continuous struggle between two different strategies for change. It was held, on the one hand, that disputes on dif-

440 ferent features of the Union should be settled in agreement with Sweden through negotiations. This consensus-oriented strategy was endorsed by the Conservatives (Hoire) and the Moderate Pafiy (De rnoderate) in Norway. It was manifested in the Swedish-Norwegian Union committee of 189r, which aimed at reforming the organization of the Union, especially in the field of foreign and consular affairs. It also found expression in the negotiations on the question of the division of the common consular authority between 79o2 and 1905. It reached its peak at the Norwegian elections of 1903. At that time a group of members of the Liberal Party (Venstre), among them Christian Michelsen, who later became Prime Minister, broke away frorn their old party and joined the Conservatives. This resulted in a victory for the Conservative coalition and the leader of the Conservative Party, Francis Hagerup, was able to form a government on the basis of continued negotiations with Sweden. The other main strategy of change was more confl:ct-oriented. lt was held that controversies about the Union should be settled by unilateral Norwegian decisions. This line was launched by the radical Liberal politi- cian \Tollert Konow in a speech made in 1891. It is sometimes called >>the Skarnes line>> (Skarneslinien), after the small town where Konow made his speech. This policy guided the Liberal Party in its many attempts to establish an independent consular authority in the nineties. It also manifested itself in the building of fortifications on the frontier with Sweden in 1901. Up to 1901 the adherents of the two strategies were almost equally strong. But in the winter of 1901 this situation changed. \7hen in February the negotiations with Sweden on the question of the division of the consular authority broke down, the Conservatives lost their confidence in the politics of negotiation. \[ith the exception of the small Hagerup group, they reached, on the 6th of March, an agreement with the Liberals and the Social Democrats about unilateral action on this question. It was decided that Norway - independently of Swedish desires - should establish its own consular authority by passing a law in Parliament. On this programme a new coalition government under the leadership of Christian Michelsen was appointed. The programme of unilateral action contained two alternative possibilities of development. If the King gave his sanction to the consular law, the next step would be to appoint a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs and to establish a Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs together with a foreign represeotation. The final goal of this line of unilateral action was either the dissolution of the Union or its transformation into a personal

441 union, coupled with a loose defence alliance. Those Conservatives who had accepted the policy of unilateral action, the Moderates and some of the Liberals hoped that this goal would be achieved. The other possibility was based on the assumption that the King would refuse to sanctioo the consular law. However, such an act would leave him unable to form a new government. It would io fact be equivalent to abdication. According to this theory, the King was the only uniting link between Norway and Sweden. Abdication would thus eo ipso mean the dissolution of the Union. This was the line of development that the radical wing of the Liberal Party and the Social Democrats hoped would come about. The King's refusal at the 27th of May to give his sanction to the consular law and the declaration of the Norwegian Parliament on the 7th of June that as a consequence of the King's de facto abdication the Union had ceased to function implied a great success for the most extreme defenders of the strategy of unilateral action. But in the subsequent offer to the former King, that a prince of his dynasty should become King of Norway, the policy of negotiation again gained supremacy. This was confirmed by the address sent by the Norwegian Parliament to its Swedish counterpart on the 19th of June and by the decision on the 28th of July, following a request from the Swedish Parlia- ment and Government to arrange for a referendum on the dissolution of the Union. It was also confirmed by the decision on the 22nd of August to get into touch with the Swedish authorities to start negotiations on the question of dissolution. Finally, it led to the negotiations at Kadstad in September. To a certain extent, the Norwegian Government had thus adopted a policy similar to that which its main opponents within the Hage- rup group had recommended before the events of the 7th of June. This group had maintained that a Union crisis should not be combined with a dynastic crisis and that the people should be given a chance to vote on the dissolution of the Union in an election. They had also claimed that the dissolution should come as a result of negotiations with Sweden. The coalition government certainly tried ardently to show that this policy was in line with the declaration of the 7th of June. But in fact the pure policy of unilateral action was abandoned. The leading politicians concentrated upon reaching a settlement with Sweden through negotiation. There was opposition to the politics of the coalition government, al- though it did not gain any strength. It came especially from the radical wing of the Liberal Party. It was more conflict-oriented to Sweden and demanded that Norway should carry out the programme of direct action

442 decided on on the 6th of March and the 7th of June. Independently of Sweden's reaction, Norway should try to obtain recognition from the Great Powers. It may be said that this group continued "the Skarnes line" in Norwegian policy towards the Union. But it was not successful. In the voting on the Karlstad agreement in the Norwegian Padiament on the 9th of October, this group was finally defeated.

Swedith policy towards the Union was also characterized by the striking contrast between a more conflict-oriented strategy, aiming at unilateral action, and a more consensus-oriented strategy, directed towards negotiations with Norway. But there was a remarkable difference between Sweden and Norway in this resPect. In Sweden it was the extreme Conservatives who were most conflict-oriented and inclined to recommend unilateral action. whereas the radical Liberals and Social Democrats advocated more consensus-oriented solutions to the problems of the Union. The conflict orientation of the Swedish extreme Conservatives was expressed in 1891 in the abrogation of the trade treaty between Sweden and Norway (Mellan- rihslagen) and the strengthening of the state of financial preparedness for war. The Conservatives were also very critical of the negotiations on the possible division of consular authority between 1902 and 1901' The consensus of the Liberals and Social Democrats could be seen in their strong support of these negotiations. In the spring of t9O, the extreme Conserva- tives, the moderate Conservatives, and the national Liberals were against the King giving his sanction to the consular law. However, they were aware that a refusal to sanction this law would lead to the dissolution of the Union- The events of the 27th of May and the 7th of June meant victory for the extreme Conservatives especially and a defeat for the radical Liberals and Social Democrats. It is true that the Conservatives were unable to achieve the first goal on their programme: a revision of the constitution of the Union in an anti-democratic, anti-parliamentary and Pro-mon- archical direction. But they were able to achieve their second point, the dissolution of the Union rather than the accePtance of a loose personal union. That would have reduced the power of the King and might have led to a radical breakthrough in Swedish domestic poliry. My point is that the King's refusal to give his sanction to the consular law and the following dissolution of the Union was a victory for the grouPs most inclined to unilateral action and most hostile to the Union in the two countries - the extreme Swedish Right and the extreme Norwegian Left.

443 But, like the Norwegian extreme Left the Swedish extreme Right could not fully control the subsequent developments. It is true that there were demands for a compulsory Union and Norwegian cessions of land. But in the Swedish Parliament the negotiation policy gained the victory. Through the influence of the Liberals, members of the Agrarian Party (Lantmanna- partiet) and certain moderate Conservatives, the Swedish conditions for dissolution were made so relatively moderate that they became acceptable to the Norwegians. The negotiations in Kadstad were a success for the more negotiation-oriented and consensus-oriented groups in both countries. They meant a definite defeat for the extreme Right in Sweden and the extreme Left in Norway.

5. The mdin traits ot' the int'ormal alliances between the Szaedisb Rigbt and the Norwegian Left and tbe Swedisb Let't and tbe Norwegian Right. Thus, in Union politics the Swedish Right and the Norwegian Left formed an informal alliance against the Swedish Left and the Norwegian Right. The Swedish extreme Right and the Norwegian Left were both opponents of the existing Union. Both were conflict-oriented in their Union policy and inclined to resort to unilateral action. They were anxious to improve the national defences in their respective countries. I[V'hile the Norwegian Liberal Government decided to build fortifications on the Swedish frontier, the Swedish Conservative Government built the fortification at Boden in the northern part of the country. Both groups venerated the great historical and military histories of their countries. There were also other similarities. Some members at the extreme Left in Norway felt a desire for a strong man, a leader who could seize power and act. Then the people would follow him. The Swedish extreme Conservatives had the same expectations of the King and the Crown Prince immediately after the 7th of June. But the Swedish Left and a group belonging to the Norwegian Right thought that the peoples of the two countries had too little influence on Union policy. Furthermore, both the Swedish Right and the Norwegian Left were nationalistic. Both of them seem to have used nationalistic and expressive slogans to win victories at the general elections. I shall take the Swedish Right as an example of this functional aspect of the Union question. In June and July 1905 the members of the extreme Right in Sweden argued for a postponement of the ultimate decision on the Union until after the elections to the Lower House in Parliament. The

444 Conservatives wanted to make the Union question the crucial issue at the elections. By an appeal to national unity in support of the claim for com- pensation for the Norwegian violation of Sweden's right to be consulated when the Union was to be dissolved, they hoped to win a great victory. They seem to have planned to exploit the Union question in three ways. They hoped to be able to mobilize non-voters to vote for >>patriotio> candidates. They hoped to win voters from other parties. They also hoped that the Union question would divide their most dangerous political adversary, the Liberal Party, into a national Liberal and a radical Liberal group. In certain electoral districts, the national Liberals might, for instance, nominate a candidate of their own. The votes of the Left would then be split between several candidates, with the result that the Conservative candidate might gain the seat in the one-man, majority-vote, electoral districts of that time. The overall result of a Conservative victory would be a more conflict- oriented Union policy. But it would also lead to a Conservative domestic policy. The tactics which the extreme Conservatives hoped to benefit from were nationalistic. The Conservatives' own recommendations to action in the Union crisis were said to be based on patriotism alone. Their adversaries were unpatriotic and treacherous. Furthermore their own domestic policy was labelled patriotic, whereas the domestic policy of their adversaries was said to be unpatriotic. The extreme Conservatives used a series of persuasive definitions to achieve their party-strategical purpose. \What might be called "expressive" arguments had the same functions. By an expressiae argument, I mean an argument which says that one must defend one's honour and achieve moral rehabilitation. These arguments seems to have been used to build up public excitement, which might later operate in favour of the Conservatives in the electoral arena. As I see it, the Swedish extreme Conservatives used the Union question to build up a position before the election in two ways: by a nationalistic appeal and by expressive propaganda. All this had also a domestic purpose. The Conservatives wanted to prevent the Liberals form seizing power and passing a law on universal suffrage with the system of one-man, majority-vote, electoral districts preserved. This would then operate very much in their favour. If the Liberals came to power, the national defences would be reduced and all legislation against trade unions would be discontinued. But, above all, the Left would gain control over the joint voting in Parliament, as the Lower House had 230 seats, as against 150 in the Upper House. The Left would then be able

44> to introduce a tax system, which would be a threat to the foundations of society, i. e. the right to private ownership of the means of productions. But a Conservative victory might have even more far-reaching con- sequences. It might change the main borderline in Swedish politics. If the Conservatives got the opportunty to carry through universal suffrage in combination with a proportional system of representation, they could win two things. The system of proportional representation would be a guarantee against radical domination in the Lower House. The reform would also deprive the Liberals of their best topic for agitation. The problems of social reform and the organization of the means of production would come to the forefront. This wolud strain the electoral co-operation between the Liberals and the Social Democrats. The Liberals might ioin the Conserva- tives and form a bourgeois bloc against socialism. This, and no less, was the functional context in which the Swedish extreme Conservatives placed the Union question. And the radical Liberals in Norway placed it in a similar, but radical context. How can these informal alliances between the Swedish Conservatives and the Norwegian Radicals and the Swedish Radicals and the Norwegian Conservatives be explained? The explantation lies to a certain extent in the different social and political characters of the two countries and also in the structure of the Union. The alliance between the Swedish Right and the Norwegian Left may be used as an example. The Swedish Right regarded Norway with dismay' Norway had a rather egalitariao social structure, the King was almost powerless, the parliamentary system of government had been generally accepted, and suffrage for the single-chamber Parliament was universal. The radical movements in the country were stronS. The Liberal Party had formed Soveroments several times. It had carried through various social reforms and had introduced a system of progressive income tax. All this aroused disgust in the Swedish Right. This feeling was strengthened by the structure of the Union. The main common link between Sweden and Nor- way was the monarch. But his weak position in democatic Norway might undermine his strong position in Sweden. This might aid the radicals in Sweden. The Swedish Conservatives looked upon Norway as a focus of democratic infection. In order to maintain the health of Sweden, it was best to have as few contacts as possible with Norway. The most drastic way of doing this was to break up the Union in such a way that a certain animosity was aroused between the two countries.

446 The parties of the Left in Norway looked upon Sweden with fear and suspicion. Sweden was a class society, with conservative political institutions. The personal power of the King was still strong, parliamentarism was not yet a reality, and suffrage was still very restricted. The political power lay in the hands of the landed gentry, the higher bureaucracy and the rising bourgeoisie. There was a risk that Sweden might exert a conservative influence in Norway through the monarchy. For these reasons the Norwegian Left wanted to change the legislative Union into a mere personal union or to dissolve it completely. This example of an informal alliance may illustrate the value of the comparative method of analysis, which may have a critical function with regard to ideologies. \7hen one has demonstrated that both the Swedish Right and the Norwegian Left were conflict-oriented in their foreign policy, strongly in favour of military defence, venerated their great historical and military histories, and were inclined to place their confidence in a great leader, then all these political phenomena have in a way been relativized. One has shown that they were nothing essentially radical or essentially conservative. The relative difference between radicalism and conservatism must be sought elsewhere.

447 Kristianstads Boktryckeri AB 1971