An Undiplomatic Diary
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AN UNDIPLOMATIC DIARY BY THE AMERICAN MEMBER OF THE INTER-ALLIED MILITARY MISSION TO HUNGARY · 1919-1920 MAJ. GEN. HARRY HILL BANDHOLTZ, U. S. A. EDITED BY FRITZ-KONRAD KRUGER PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE WITTENBERG COLLEGE NEW YORK MCMXXXIII COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS Copyright 1933 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS Published 1933 2 Editor’s Preface This Diary of the late Maj. Gen. Harry Hill Bandholtz was not written for publication. However, when I happened to see it, I recognized its importance as a historical document of the World War period and was happy to secure from the widow of General Bandholtz, Mrs. Inez Clair Bandholtz, permission to make the contents of the Diary available to students of history and diplomacy. I believe that the Diary is a monument to an upright, fair-minded and humane American, who has represented the best type of his countrymen in an unfortunate land. The attitude and activity of General Bandholtz in Hungary may, mutatis mutandis, be compared to that of Gen. H. T. Allen in Germany. I wish to express my appreciation to Mrs. Inez Clair Bandholtz, whose support in editing this Diary was valuable to me. Special credit is due to Miss Georgia W. Read, of the Columbia University Press, for many helpful suggestions and for her fine coöperation in the editing of this book. FRITZ-KONRAD KRÜGER WITTENBERG COLLEGE, SPRINGFIELD, OHIO November, 1932 3 Contents Introduction by Fritz-Konrad Krüger A List of the Principal Persons Mentioned in the Diary The Diary of General Bandholtz Appendices I. Chronology of Events Affecting Hungary II. Supreme Council’s Instructions to the Inter-Allied Military Mission to Hungary III. Appointment of General Bandholtz to the Inter-Allied Military Mission IV. General Bandholtz, by Emil Zerkowitz V. Confidential Memorandum from Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon, Followed by a Critique on the Same by General Bandholtz Index 4 Illustrations General Harry Hill Bandholtz, U. S. A., Head of the American Military Mission (Frontispiece) Map of Hungary The changing boundaries in the postwar period are based on those of a map in H. W. V. Temperley’s History of the Peace Conference of Paris (Volume IV, page 135), by permission of the author, the Royal Institute of International Affairs of Great Britain, and the Oxford University Press. Admiral Horthy, Hungarian Commander in Chief One of the Three Seals Placed Upon the Storeroom Doors of the Hungarian National Museum by General Bandholtz, October 5, 1919- Removed November 14, 1919, when the Roumanians Evacuated Budapest. For this service General Bandholtz later received a bronze medal dedicated to him “From the Grateful National Museum.” American Military Mission, Grouped before the Royal Palace in Budapest 5 Introduction As an integral part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Hungary participated in the World War on the side of the Central European Powers. It is now a well-established fact that her Prime Minister, Count Stephan Tisza, was the only leading statesman of the Dual Empire who opposed the fateful ultimatum to Serbia, the rejection of which led to the outbreak of the World War.1 In March, 1914, Tisza wrote a memorandum in which he advocated a peaceful policy of readjustment in the Balkans. In this document he proposed the strengthening of Bulgaria against Serbia in order to attach the former country to Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, he advised a careful treatment of Roumania for the purpose of winning back, if possible, this country which had lately been alienated from the Central Powers, or, in the event of the failure of this attempt, to threaten her from two sides. In procedure he favored a “politique de longue main.” Immediate war with Serbia he considered a “fatal mistake,” one which might provoke a world war.2 This memoir was laid before Count Berchtold and Emperor Franz Joseph. Both approved it. Later on - at the time of his visit to Vienna (October 26, 1913) - Emperor William II accepted in general the proposed Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary. Before any action could be taken in conformity with this memorandum, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand took place at Serajevo on June 28. Three days later Count Tisza wrote a letter to Franz Joseph recommending the maintenance of peace and, in the council of the Austro-Hungarian ministers on the seventh of July, he again advi- sed moderation and strong diplomatic, rather than military, action. This position he again stated the next day in a letter to Franz Joseph, and he maintained it throughout the fateful month of July. 1 Proof of this statement is, above all, found in the collection of official Austro-Hungarian diplomatic documents, Östreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise, 1908, bis zum Kriegsausbruch, 1914; Diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreich-Ungarischen Ministeriums des Äusseren; Ausgewählt von Ludwig Bittner, Alfred Francis Pribram, Heinrich Srbik und Hans Uebersberger, Wien und Leipzig, 1930, Vol. VIII. Of special importance is the report of Tisza to Kaiser Franz Joseph on July 8, 1914 (pp. 371-73). In addition, see statements on pages 343-51 and 448. Count Ottokar Czernin says in his Im Weltkriege, Berlin, 1919 (p. 16}: “Ich habe mehrere Monate nach dem Kriegsausbruch eine Lange Unterredung mit dem ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten Grafen Tisza über alle diese Fragen gehabt. Er selbst, Tisza, war entschieden gegen das scharfe Ultimatum gewesen, weil er einen Krieg voraussah und denselben nicht wollte. Es ist einer der verbreitetsten Irrtümer, wenn Tisza heute als einer der ‘Kriegshetzer’ bezeichnet wird.” Compare with Czernin’s opinion that of Oscar Jászi in his Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy, Chicago, 1929, p. 408: “It must be noted that his [Tisza’s] resistance to the catastrophe-policy of Vienna was very platonic and lukewarm”; and p. 409, “He helped to make the ultimatum unacceptable to Serbia.” Jonescu’s opinion, as expressed in Some Personal Impressions, New York, 1920 (p. 183), that “Count Tisza was the prime mover in unchaining the conflict,” and that “he provoked the universal carnage.” is unwarranted by the facts. Likewise E. Beneš was mistaken when he wrote in 1917: When the Crown Council in July, 1914, decided on the declaration of war against Serbia, Tisza and the Magyar nobility gave the decisive vote.” See, on the other hand, Sidney Bradshaw Fay’s Origins of the World War, New York, 1918, Vol. II, p. 188 passim; and the symposium of Harry Elmer Barnes, Count Berchtold, Count Hoyos, von Wiesner, von Jagow, and Zimmermann in Current History, July, 1928, pp. 619-36, on the question: Did Germany Incite Austria? Also Harry Elmer Barnes’ Genesis of the World War, New York, 1917, pp. 178-80 and 147; A. Weber’s “Graf Tisza und die Kriegserklärung an Serbien.” in Die Kriegsschuldfrage, Berlin, 3. Jahrgang, Nov. 12, 1925, pp. 818-26; and Rodolfo Mosca’s Problemi politici l’Ungheria contemporanea, Bologna, 1927, pp. 27 ff. 2 The German text of this memorandum may be found in Wilhelm Fraknói’s Die ungarische Regierung und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges, Vienna, 1919. An English translation of the original Hungarian, as given by Professor Henrik Marczali, is contained in the American Historical Review, Jan., 1924, XXIX, 303-10, in an article entitled “Papers of Count Tisza, 1914-1918,” pp. 301-15. See also Pierre Renouvin’s Immediate Origins of the War, translated from the French by T. C. Hume, New Haven, 1928, pp. 37 and 55-56. 6 However, on the twenty-eighth of July, when war against Serbia broke out, Tisza immediately and unreservedly supported the cause of Austria-Hungary and her ally.3 His ultimate support of the cause of Austria-Hungary and the Central Powers may be explained in various ways. He was not a friend of the assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand or of his policies, for it was well known that the Archduke was quite sympathetic to the desire for more extensive rights for the Transylvanian Roumanians and that he had certain plans for the federalization of Austria-Hungary at the expense of Hungary. However, when the un- fortunate Archduke fell by the hand of a fanatic assassin, Tisza, always chivalrous and noble in thought, was greatly shocked and incensed at the complicity of the Serbian government, whose hands were obviously not clean. The whole Hungarian nation, which has throughout its history been distinguished by a somewhat feudal fealty to its legally recognized leaders, shared Tisza’s feelings. It was indignant over this outrage, the last of a chain of political assassinations which had characterized the history of Serbia, in marked contrast with Hungary’s record, which in this respect, was absolutely clean. Of course, Tisza realized that the aspirations of the Serbian “Black Hand,” which was back of the crime at Serajevo, were directed towards the creation of a Greater Serbia, which meant the severance of Croatia from Hungary and probably the complete dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy. He also regarded the semi-official Serbian conspiracy and the official policy of Serbia, encouraged as it was by Russia, as merely links in the policy of encirclement, directed by the Entente against the Central Powers. In a letter to his niece, written on August 26, 1914, he expressed this opinion in the following words: My conscience is clear. Already the noose with which they would have strangled us at a favorable moment, unless we cut it now, had been thrown around our necks. We could not do otherwise; but it agonized me, that we had to do as we did.4 When Tisza, therefore, was assured that an ultimatum to Serbia was unavoidable and that Germany was supporting the policy of the Ballplatz, he acquiesced in the majority decision and from then on fulfilled his duty in a most loyal way.