ORGANISING NATIONAL RAIL IN LONDON
A statement of evidence from the London Transport Users Committee to the Greater London Assembly’s scrutiny of Mainline Rail Services in London
Published by the London Transport Users Committee Clements House 14-18 Gresham Street London EC2V 7PR
Phone : 020 7505 9000 Fax : 020 7505 9003
January 2002 This submission has been prepared before publication of the Strategic Rail Authority’s Strategic Plan on 14th January 2002
Introduction
1. The Greater London Assembly’s Transport Operations Scrutiny Committee is conducting a scrutiny entitled “Mainline Rail Services in London”, to which the London Transport Users Committee has been invited to make a submission of evidence.
2. The issues being examined by the scrutiny include:
• The current arrangements for rail service and infrastructure provision in London, and the arrangements that are being put in place by the Mayor, Transport for London and the Strategic Rail Authority
• The implications for London of Railtrack being placed in railway receivership
• The desirability and practicality of the Mayor’s proposal for a London transit authority, and of other proposals put forward by Transport for London
• Other models that could be considered, drawing on experience of models elsewhere in Britain, and overseas
3. In looking at the London transit authority idea, the scrutiny wishes to consider:
• What such an authority might do (whether it should cover infrastructure, franchising, integration etc.)
• The implications setting up such an authority might have for planning and implementation of major infrastructure projects
• How a new authority might be organised, managed and held to account
• The area a new authority might serve, and the relationship with the wider South East region and its local and regional authorities
• Implications for long distance, international and freight services
• Implications for organisation of rail services in the rest of the country.
4. The scrutiny is to start by analysing the nature of the problems currently facing National Rail services. We have therefore been requested to begin this submission by identifying what we consider are the main issues, and what their implications might be for any new structure for rail services, before moving on to identifying a preferred option and the steps that would have to be taken to put it in place.
A list of the documents referred to in preparing this submission appears as Annex C to his submission, and a glossary of abbreviations as Annex D.
1 The main issues
What do passengers want?
5. Our starting point must be to identify what passengers – and potential passengers – want and then briefly consider how successful (or otherwise) the national railways are at delivering this.
6. The basics of what passengers want from their railways are well stated in our Chair’s foreword to LTUC’s Annual Report 2000 – 2001, paras 1.17 – 1.19 & 1.21 - 1.25.
There are three key factors which would improve the public transport system for its users – reliability, simplicity and raising the quality.
In terms of reliability we want services we can rely on, that turn up on time and arrive without delay at our destination.
For the railways we need enough drivers and enough trained staff to maintain track, signalling, trains and other crucial electronic equipment such as information boards and escalators. And, why can’t we have sufficient rolling stock to avoid short trains and the subsequent overcrowding?
To make travelling simpler we need clear understandable information to enable us to plan our journeys, affordable user friendly and flexible tickets that can be used on all modes, well-lit pedestrian routes and areas to wait with accessible staff or monitored CCTV and help points.
For the traveller information is a vital part of the journey and real time information should be available at all stations and bus stops. Very importantly, when things go wrong we need helpful, well-trained staff able to take responsibility – able to provide timely information about what is happening and what alternative services are available.
To make it happen will require more co-operation between operators. They will also need to promote public transport as an understandable network.
To raise the quality will require more investment in new trains and buses. At a minimum all facilities, trains and buses should be clean and litter free and in working order. Graffiti and damage caused by vandalism must be removed promptly, weeds and bushes removed from railway tracks, walls and bridges. Only by doing these basic tasks can you reassure us that you are back in control of the whole system.
So my maxim for the future is to: - MAKE IT RELIABLE, MAKE IT SIMPLE, RAISE THE QUALITY.
7. These simple ‘traveller in the street’ observations embrace most of the basics to which all public transport professionals would subscribe, but it is appropriate to supplement them by referring also to integration and service frequencies.
8. The importance of integration has long been recognised, particularly in London where the London Passenger Transport Board was set up to integrate bus and Underground as long ago as 1933. Today, with the mass ownership of cars, the low perceived cost of using them and their comfort and convenience for any journey, the need to achieve easy and seamless transfer between street and train or bus, between train and bus or Underground, and then back to street again means that integration is more important than ever if people are to be encouraged to use public transport.
2 9. At the same time, with the rightful emphasis on accessibility for all and the scarcity of space in heavily built up streets, the physical elements of integration are difficult to achieve – not least because of the number of public and private bodies which have to be brought into agreement before transport interchanges can be improved.
10. Good service frequencies are no less important if the convenience of the car – available instantly at the turn of a key – is to be matched by public transport. For services within the GLA area LTUC is a leading advocate of ‘turn up and go’ – trains to run at least every 10 minutes (6 trains per hour [tph]) so that no-one needs to know the timetable – all day every day, and with the minimum possible interruption at night for maintenance of the tracks as already obtains on LUL and the Docklands Light Railway (DLR).
11. Beyond the GLA boundary as far as such important regional towns as Dartford, Swanley, Sevenoaks, Redhill, Caterham, Epsom, Woking, Staines, Slough, High Wycombe, Watford, Luton, Stevenage, Hertford and Bishops Stortford, LTUC looks for at least a train every fifteen minutes (4 tph). No station in the LTUC area – see map below – should have less than a train every half-hour (2 tph).
How well does National Rail deliver?
12. There are any number of statistics used to demonstrate how the railways are performing. To interpret them in any detail is often difficult because of the number of caveats regarding precisely what they are measuring and what they mean. Nationally they are produced by the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) (e.g. ‘On Track - Rail Performance Trends’ and ‘National Rail Trends’), and we at LTUC compile the quarterly ‘National Rail Passenger Services in the London Area’ which is submitted to the GLA Transport Operations and Scrutiny Committee.
13. However, two messages are clear. The first is that measures which relate to the basics of reliable service and quality of service show a clear downward trend for both London commuter and inter-city routes. This trend pre-dates the Hatfield accident, so it cannot be excused as a one-off blip arising from Railtrack’s mismanagement in the aftermath of that event. The second message is that (despite everything) rail traffic is increasing. Therefore in the absence of a clear strategy and sufficient committed funding to address the
3 consequences, the well publicised discontent of which we read and hear daily in the media and see in LTUC’s postbag will get worse.
14. Perhaps LTUC’s postbag provides a pointer to the basic truth. If we compare National Rail with LUL, we find that the latter – operating only in London (apart from small cross- boundary working to Watford, Amersham and Epping) carries as many passengers each day as the entire National Rail network spread across the whole of Great Britain. Put another way, the London commuter operators carry roundly two-thirds the number of passengers compared with the Underground. Despite this they generate around five times the volume of appeals. Even if we allow for the possibility that LUL is better at handling complaints than National Rail, this is a very large discrepancy. Add to this the fact that LUL is not short of critics and that its own performance (measured by much more comprehensive statistics than National Rail but not on a directly comparable basis) is in overall decline, and one can only conclude that the weaknesses of National Rail are serious indeed.
15. Looking at the main issues we have identified, let us point up some examples.
16. In terms of reliability, i.e. trains which arrive without delay at destination, ‘National Rail Trends’ (page 15) reports a latest figure of 79.3% of London & South East operators’ trains arriving at the terminus on time (only 77.5% in the peaks). These figures show that on average a daily commuter will arrive late on at least 2 out of 10 journeys per week. Worse, the figures are very misleading because a train is defined as being ‘on time’ if it arrives within 5 minutes of the scheduled time, and because many trains (we suspect the great majority) have artificial extra minutes inserted in their schedules between their last calling point and the terminus; so for example if you are going home from Paddington to Southall your train could be as much as 6 minutes late on a 12 minute journey and still be recorded officially as running on time.
17. On the need to provide enough drivers, it is reasonably well known that South Central has revised its timetable because it does not have enough drivers – amounting to some 120 cancellations per day. However only the passengers directly affected know about ad hoc cancellations recently affecting Thames Trains, South West Trains (SWT) and West Anglia Great Northern (WAGN). What makes it worse is that a senior industry manager warned LTUC of forthcoming problems in this area some 18 months ago, but when we raised it with the SRA we were told that there was nothing to worry about. Cancellations occur on LUL as well – indeed its recent record on this is none too good – but the general service frequency even in the outer suburbs is such that the delay to passengers is generally kept within reasonable bounds. On the mainline, where services are often half- hourly or worse, just one cancellation can cause substantial inconvenience.
18. Overcrowding on short trains is not a new problem but as traffic rises it is getting worse. It is common on the shoulders of the peaks (broadly trains arriving in London before 0800 and after 0900). An example well known to us is the 0709 Hampton Court - Waterloo, a 4 car train which SWT admit needs to be 8 cars but for which it has no spare stock. Suggestions from LTUC during summer 2000 on how to obtain extra stock were rebuffed by SWT, which preferred to await the delivery of new trains. Eighteen months later we – and more importantly the passengers – are still waiting. Now the problem even affects reverse commuting out of London, with SWT agreeing (for example) that the 0742 Waterloo – Windsor needs to be 8 cars.
19. Information to make travel simpler is required for many facets of the journey, but for the key question of can I get from A to B? (and how), the Tube map can be taken as the exemplar of good practice. National Rail in London is much more complex than LUL, but in the days of Network South-East (NSE) the London Connections map was developed as a start towards making the system easier to understand. This map is still produced but availability in leaflet form is very restricted in comparison with the Tube map, and its display as a poster at stations seems less prominent and consistent than in the days of NSE. In any case, because service frequencies vary widely across the system, and service patterns are often different on Sundays (and in some cases in the peaks and on
4 weekday evenings) possession of the map is only the start of the information process whereas the Tube map often tells you everything you need to know.
20. Real time information about the running of trains has improved substantially on parts of the mainline network, with Thames Trains, Connex, South Central and South West Trains having invested in platform indicators which match those of LUL. However this still leaves many parts of the system with no real time information and no plans for it to be provided. Both National Rail and LUL fall down on information when services are badly disrupted, but at least on LUL there is a much greater chance of locating staff who can try to get the information you want. Try finding anyone to help you at Peckham Rye – a major 7 day shopping centre – after 1400 on a Sunday afternoon.
21. On the topic of staff, search in vain for anyone at St. Helier (or at other local stations on the Wimbledon loop) at any time of the week – neither in the peak hours when passenger numbers are at their highest, nor in the evening when infrequent services contribute to a vicious circle of low usage and congregating youths who know they won’t be moved on and whose presence creates a threatening environment.
22. Turning now to integration and interchange, several examples of difficulty come to mind. The Croxley link, a major scheme but hardly a blockbuster, made slow but just about discernible progress when the main players were British Rail, London Transport and Hertfordshire County Council. It ground to a total halt once Railtrack, SRA and train operators replaced British Rail, and is only now beginning to stir into life again due to dogged perseverance by Hertfordshire.
23. West Hampstead interchange, a middle-ranking proposal to connect three separate stations (LUL, Silverlink and Thameslink) into a unified station which would open up a wide range of journey opportunities, never found much favour under the pre-privatisation regime. Ironically it has been left to Chiltern (which currently has no station there) to take the initiative, but it is but one player in a situation where there has been no lead organisation with both the interest and the locus to get a grip and run with it. Only in the last few weeks has Transport for London (TfL) stepped into this vacuum and taken the lead.
24. At the more mundane level of getting existing interchanges properly managed we can cite Clapham Junction as a station owned by Railtrack, managed by SWT, staffed by both SWT and South Central and served also by Silverlink and Wales & Borders, where the seemingly simple task of getting all operators’ timetables displayed in a coherent manner has proved inordinately difficult.
25. Add what should be the benefit of brand new facilities, but also add other players to the pot in the shape of LUL and DLR and we have the sorry saga of Stratford. Here the older platforms range from Victorian ruins, through 1940s dilapidation to 1990s minimalist (National Rail) and new splendour (Jubilee Line). National Rail timetable displays and signage are woeful, Railtrack lines under the splendid new LUL roof are weed and rubbish strewn, new toilets aren’t open, lifts don’t work, the booking office is too small (and the glass wall above it has not been cleaned since it was built) and the route to London Buses’ award winning bus station is across a wind and rain swept ‘plaza’.
26. Even at the new National Rail platforms at little West Brompton – one of the few integration successes of recent years – the most basic of passenger facilities are only kept up to a reasonable standard thanks to the pressure of an exceptionally persistent local users group, and South Central tells us of the difficulty it has in getting Silverlink (as the manager) to display their up to date timetable posters.
27. No less important than physical integration is the question of integrated fares. The Mayor sets fares for all TfL operators and for LUL and does so on the basis of criteria which take account of costs, capacity and certain wider policy objectives. Fares are set on a zonal basis which supports the aim of affordable user friendly and flexible tickets.
5 28. On National Rail fares are set by the individual operators but within rules of Byzantine complexity which pay no regard to the Mayor’s criteria and which few people in the industry (let alone political representatives, passengers or even most LTUC members) fully understand. Whilst National Rail stations within the GLA area are part of the zonal system and Travelcards are accepted, most daily fares and all fares where the passenger does not require TfL or LUL services are on a point-to-point basis. Daily tickets can be more expensive while cheap day returns can be cheaper than for the equivalent LUL journey.
29. Season ticket rates are used, inter alia, to compensate passengers for poor performance so at present they are generally falling in both real and cash terms. This is fine for those particular passengers who benefit, but the rules are capricious so some who should benefit don’t and others who shouldn’t benefit do. In policy terms, and to the longer term disadvantage of passengers, the system is perverse. Falling season ticket rates will increase demand at times and on routes which are already overcrowded, and as the reductions at the end of the day are publicly funded they divert resources away from the investment in new capacity which is needed to improve conditions both for existing users and for the new users which the reduced fares generate.
30. A related problem with National Rail fares policy is that longer distance tickets have traditionally been much cheaper per mile than suburban ones, thus encouraging long distance commuting. The effect of this on many routes is that there is competition for scarce capacity between outer and inner area trains on the approaches to London, and this can only be intensified if season ticket rates continue to fall.
31. Finally, when we look at service frequencies we find an astonishing array from good (but often with weaknesses which significantly detract from their usefulness) to awful. To take just a few examples:
32. First Great Eastern runs 6 tph from Shenfield to Liverpool Street, but spoils it by having two of them omit Manor Park, Forest Gate and Maryland so these stations have 20 minute gaps in service.
33. SWT’s Raynes Park to Waterloo section has 10 tph, but in one direction they are so irregular as to provide a succession of trains every 3 – 4 mins. followed by a 15 min. gap.
34. Much of South Central’s inner suburban network has trains every 5 mins (12 tph), but Wandsworth Road and Clapham High Street have only 2 tph. South Bermondsey is one of several examples of stations which have fewer trains in the peaks than in the off-peak (8 tph off-peak, 5 tph peak with gaps of up to 20 mins.)
35. WAGN runs 4 tph between Liverpool Street and Edmonton Green, but only 2 of them call at Cambridge Heath and London Fields (admittedly a great improvement on British Rail) and only 2 reach the important town of Enfield.
36. Moving from services which are good or tolerable, we find many which are seriously flawed:
37. Thames Trains operates 8 tph on its suburban service into Paddington, yet manages to provide only 2 tph at Langley, Iver, West Drayton, Hanwell and Acton.
38. Whole stretches of potentially busy suburban lines have no more than 2 tph, e.g. Thameslink around the Wimbledon loop from Tooting to Sutton, SWT’s Hounslow loop, and Connex on the Victoria – Herne Hill - Bromley South - Orpington and Blackfriars - Catford - Bromley South – Swanley routes.
39. The depths are reached with Chiltern which provides Northolt Park with just 1 tph and trumps this at its two Sudbury stations with just 8 trains per day from Sudbury Hill (9 from Sudbury & Harrow Road) to Marylebone and a newly introduced 90 min. gap in these stations’ evening peak service.
6 40. Looking specifically at non-Central London journeys, try travelling from Woking to Clapham Junction. A seemingly excellent 7 tph off-peak – but with the gloss taken off by having most of them bunched together and then a gap of 23 mins. But try doing it in the morning peak – nothing for 90 mins. between 0726 and 0856, and the connections provided during this period are so bad that it is almost always quicker to go in to Waterloo and out again (at extra expense) than to try the obvious solution of changing at Surbiton or Wimbledon.
41. All these examples relate to daytime on weekdays. Look at evenings and you will find services whose frequencies are slashed to 1 or 2 tph or which finish by 2300 hrs. or earlier. On Sundays services of this nature are all too common.
Is dissatisfaction justified?
42. The scrutiny specifically asks that the existence of problems should not be taken for granted – that the assumption of problems should be tested.
43. LTUC submits that the examples we have quoted provide ample proof. At best, National Rail services in the London area can only be likened to the curate’s egg. They are nconsistent across the area and with no obvious justification for the differences. At worst they are downright inadequate in what they offer and shoddy in what they deliver.
Analysing proposals for change
44. Our discussion of the performance of National Rail in London has highlighted a wide range of shortcomings. Some relate to what is planned, and some are a matter of competence in delivery. In considering proposals for change, it is important to distinguish between changes which can affect the plan and those which affect delivery.
The implications for London of Railtrack being placed in railway administration
45. For the purposes of physically planning the future of London’s National railways, the fallout from Hatfield meant that Railtrack’s role as a leader in developing the infrastructure was effectively transferred to the SRA during the early part of 2001. In this respect, therefore, Railtrack’s receivership does not really change anything. Some commentators argue that the ability to raise investment funds from the private sector has been compromised, but the pros and cons of this argument are a matter of speculation.
46. There are matters of concern in that work which is of importance for London is being delayed because of Railtrack’s position – or Railtrack’s position is being used as a cover for lack of action. A particularly vexing example is the delay in developing plans for new stations on the West London Line at Shepherds Bush and Chelsea Harbour for which private funding is in place. The SRA say the work cannot be progressed because Railtrack cannot allocate timetable planning resources to assess whether the existing Silverlink trains on this route can have their timings adjusted to enable them to make the extra calls.
47. Regarding delivery, much is now being said about low morale having an adverse effect on day to day performance. We have no doubt that performance has got worse in recent months, but identifying the true causes is very difficult, both because many of the statistics are not yet available (and in any case their true meaning is often opaque) and because any statements made by industry officials – however honourable they may be as individuals - must inevitably reflect the commercial or political interests of their particular employer.
7 48. What does seem self evident is that it is undesirable for Railtrack to be in the ultimate control, for any longer than is absolutely necessary, of accountants who know nothing of railway operations or engineering, whose training and experience is focussed on control of cash as the priority above all else, and whose costs are a drain on public finds,.
49. Having said that, however, there is nothing to be gained by hastily creating a new organisation – be it a plc, a company limited by guarantee or a public authority, without ensuring that it is properly structured to ensure that it operates in the public interest and does so in a cost-effective way. Failure to get these matters right would only reproduce the circumstances which led to Railtrack’s downfall and risk perpetuating the unsatisfactory manner in which the national railway network is maintained and operated.
The desirability and practicality of the Mayor’s proposal for a London transit authority, and of other proposals put forward by Transport for London
Background
50. The idea of an authority for London modelled on the Passenger Transport Authority (PTA) / Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) arrangements in the major provincial conurbations is not a new one.
51. The London Regional Transport Act of 1984, which removed London’s buses and Underground from the control of the GLC, included reserve powers for London Regional Transport (LRT) to exercise powers of direction and funding over London regional services of the then British Rail. The geographical boundaries for such powers were not specified but were left to be determined by the Secretary of State after consultation with both LRT and BR, so there was implicit recognition that such boundaries might not the same as those which LRT inherited from its predecessors. In the event these powers were not activated, but the fact that they were included in an Act of Parliament demonstrates that the concept was regarded as potentially useful.
52. A PTA / PTE was also advocated by the London Regional Passengers Committee (LRPC -LTUC’s predecessor) when responding to the Government’s consultation paper which led ultimately to the creation of the Mayor, the GLA and TfL. LROC made these proposals precisely to address the fact that National Rail services in and around London have never been adequately co-ordinated with the Underground nor with more general London-wide transport goals. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced at Annex A.
53. LTUC believes that the broad thrust of the LRPC response of roundly three years ago remains valid, but we also have to recognise that circumstances have changed. Back in 1998, although there was some disappointment that the privatised railway was not delivering significant improvements compared with BR, taken overall there was no great concern that standards were actually falling. The focus was therefore on planning more than delivery – seizing an opportunity to make organisational changes to address the long-standing inconsistencies between what the national railways tried to do and what the rest of London’s public transport services were doing. It is planning, timetable and standard setting which is the main raison d’etre of a PTA or – as TfL are now calling it – a transit authority.
The present position
54. Today, whilst planning is no less important than three years ago, delivery is the issue which concerns the general public – the nuts and bolts of getting National Rail to run the trains reliably and punctually and with useful information on the (hopefully rare) occasion
8 when things go wrong. Passengers want to see results in terms of the basic quality of their daily journeys. At the moment they know that things are bad, that industrial relations problems seem to be mounting and therefore threaten that things will get worse. As a result, railways in general (and in London in particular) are rising up the political agenda to a degree not known for at least a generation.
55. To address this question of delivery it is necessary to take a clear view regarding the overall structure of the industry. For the GLA to demonstrate that its work is relevant to passengers’ immediate concerns it would be well advised to give some consideration to this issue.
56. From the welter of current discussion on this topic, one can discern three broad views.
57. The first is that the contractualised railway is a fundamentally sound concept which can be made to work by relatively minor tweaking – re-constituting Railtrack, removing perverse incentives, extending and renewing the franchises. To date this appears to be the SRA view – although with the caveat that this submission is being written before the publication of its strategic plan on 14th January. A more radical variant of this view is that expressed in varying forms by some of the TOCs, that they should lease the infrastructure from Railtrack and be responsible for its maintenance and operation – the vertical integration option.
58. The second view is that the present structure has major weaknesses, but it is unrealistic to expect to be able to change it and deliver results within the timeframe which the public and politicians demand. This is effectively the stance taken by Chris Green (Chief Executive of Virgin Rail and architect under British Rail of Network South-East) who in a recent interview1 says that the existing structure has to be made to work and that it can be made to work if government agencies and politicians provide the stability in which professional railway staff can get on with the job. This stance is not unlike the view aired a year or so ago which said that the industry is governed by contracts, but let’s put them in the bottom drawer and get on with it. It’s an attractive proposition – but it is only sustainable if it generates adequate profits to keep the shareholders off the managers’ backs. Where franchises have declining subsidy profiles but fares revenue is static or even declining because of falling real fares, operators may be forced to work to contract and the fault lines in the structure will once again come to the fore.
59. The third position is that argued vigorously by the rail journalist Christian Wolmar2, namely that the fragmented railway with private ownership of the infrastructure is inherently unworkable, that Railtrack should be brought into public ownership and that operations and maintenance should be re-organised onto common regional boundaries. An essential immediate measure – to avoid the present structure being perpetuated for 20 years – would be to call a halt to the letting of long-term train operating franchises.
60. In considering the merits of these analyses and policy prescriptions, the GLA would be well advised to bear in mind the need to balance the immediate need for improved delivery with the requirement to establish a longer term structure which meets London’s needs for services which are both better planned and better delivered. If, as the SRA appears to believe, one looks to completion of the 20 year franchises for Chiltern, South West Trains (SWT) and South Central as an important step towards both the short and longer term goals, then LTUC must strongly caution that for London the first two of these are both seriously deficient.
61. In the case of Chiltern, its agreement with the SRA almost totally ignores the needs of stations within the GLA area. Both Chiltern and the SRA have relegated LTUC’s proposals for a proper turn up and go metro service between Marylebone and West Ruislip3 into the never - never land of what they call a ‘secondary aspiration’ - i.e. they
1 Rail Professional – January 2002 2 Broken Rails – How Privatisation Wrecked Britain’s Railways. Aurum Press 2001 3 There’s More to Chiltern than the Chilterns – the Case for a Chiltern Metro. LTUC 2000
9 will look at it at some future date to see if it might to be included in a list of projects which might be taken forward. Worse, they have no plans to give this route even a basic 2 tph service, nor even to provide the two Sudbury stations with a daily and daylong service.
62. The problem with the new SWT franchise is more subtle. This offers improvements to services on the ‘Windsor’ line routes (i.e. the lines from Waterloo to Staines via Richmond and Hounslow) but not up to our 6 tph standard, and increased capacity on the ‘main line suburban services (i.e. Waterloo – Epsom, Chessington, Hampton Court and Shepperton). However the manner in which this increased capacity is to be provided – longer platforms and longer trains – is such that the number of peak trains will actually have to be reduced. This means that some stations will have less frequent services than now – on a line which anyway offers fewer trains than many other routes into London.
63. LTUC’s concerns about these new franchises are shared by TfL, but it has been no more successful than we have in persuading Chiltern, SWT or the SRA to address these issues – a point which conveniently leads back to the question of a transit authority.
TfL’s proposals
64. It is unfortunate that TfL’s first public statement about what it now calls a transit authority came in a brief press release from Bob Kiley in response to the collapse of Railtrack, and that (rightly or wrongly) it came across as a knee-jerk response and as a threat to the position of the SRA. It seemed particularly inappropriate because we understand Mr. Kiley had delayed issue of the Mayor’s formal ‘Directions and Guidance’ to the SRA, despite the fact that the (then) integration department of TfL had put considerable work (including consultation with LTUC) into preparation of such a document. It could reasonably be argued, therefore, that if National Rail was neither planning nor delivering what London requires this was at least partly because the responsible London authority had not told the SRA what it wanted.
65. Sadly the SRA’s reaction to Mr. Kiley’s proposal was no less knee-jerk. Instead of pointing out the powers available to TfL and suggesting that he might care to try using them, and offering to work together in a co-operative manner, the SRA dismissed the idea virtually out of hand with the assertion that to be effective it would have to embrace an area wider than that of the GLA and that it would require legislation (which in any case it claimed the Government would not countenance) which would delay the task of solving the Railtrack problem. Indeed the SRA appeared so hostile that LTUC felt obliged to issue its own press statement saying that the proposal deserved careful consideration and should not be dismissed out of hand.
66. Now that TfL has fleshed out its ideas in more detail4 it can be seen that the proposal is supported by a reasoned analysis and – most important – does not require immediate legislation. The proposal is to adopt a co-operative role of active participation with the SRA as the initial stage of a five year plan to work towards a transit authority – the precise form of which is open to discussion. This puts the argument on a wholly different plane because it means that the many issues which would need to be resolved can be the subject of measured debate in the light of developing experience
The way forward
67. It is clear to us, as already described, that the present performance of National Rail in London is deficient in terms of both planning and delivery. As the ultimate responsibility for both rests with the SRA, it seems sensible that the influence and experience of TfL (including funding where appropriate) in both areas should be brought more firmly into its work. If this can be achieved through the co-operative approach, underpinned by formal
4 Rail Services – Improving Commuter Railways in London. TfL 2001
10 Directions and Guidance, then it may be that the transit authority would prove to be unnecessary.
68. The ball would very much be in the SRA’s court. If it doesn’t want a transit authority, then it should work effectively with TfL to plan and deliver what London needs, and the threat, - if that is how it sees it, should disappear.
69. We are encouraged towards supporting this co-operative approach as the way forward for delivering an integrated transport policy because, despite the short time that Richard Bowker has been at the SRA, we can already see the first signs of a better approach to both national and London problems. However we cannot just rely on good intentions. It is vital that the new approach is seen to deliver early and continuous improvements starting now, not promises of jam tomorrow and then nothing materialising for three years.
70. At the same time, preparations must be made for the possibility that the co-operative approach fails to deliver, which could be the outcome for any number of reasons, not least if Mr. Bowker falls victim to the proverbial number 11 bus – the risk of which is rather high as it runs right outside his office and there will be more of them as TfL’s bus improvements gather pace! Work should therefore be carried out in parallel with the co- operative approach to develop workable proposals for a transit authority. This would include addressing all the questions asked by the present scrutiny, i.e.
• What such an authority might do (whether it should cover infrastructure, franchising, integration etc.)
• The implications setting up such an authority might have for planning and implementation of major infrastructure projects
• How a new authority might be organised, managed and held to account
• The area a new authority might serve, and the relationship with the wider South East region and its local and regional authorities
• Implications for long distance, international and freight services
• Implications for organisation of rail services in the rest of the country.
71. Other models to be looked at could include the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens and the Berlin – Brandenburg Verkehrsverbund.
72. Given that this proposed way forward potentially allows several years for these questions to be addressed, we see no purpose in trying to answer them now. However we would make the following observations.
73. The issues are complex, but we have no doubt that workable solutions can be found. Throughout railway history and throughout the world methods have been found of organising sensible train services on a network which has to be shared between local, regional, national and international services and between passengers and freight. In London’s case it will not be easy, but to consign the problems to the ‘too difficult’ box is not an option.
74. Perhaps the most difficult issue will be to define the boundaries. The strict GLA boundary would make no sense in terms of railway operations or commuting patterns. The LTUC area, which has its roots in the 1933 London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) area and has been adjusted over the years in a rather ad hoc fashion to align more closely with railway operating realities, would provide a better starting point.
11 75. In truth it would probably be better to start with a clean sheet of paper by looking at up to date railway operating and travel pattern information. To help with the former, LTUC has commissioned research into the scale of National Rail operations across the GLA boundary and various wider potential boundary lines, the results of which we will be pleased to make available to all interested parties when it is completed. For the latter, both the SRA and LUL conduct origin and destination surveys which identify travel patterns and this information should be valuable in seeing whether proposed boundaries make sense in terms of the numbers of passengers who would be travelling across them.
76. What is absolutely vital is that the final decision on boundaries and the management of cross-boundary services avoids nonsense such as occurred for many years in the West Midlands PTA, where a frequent train service was operated from Birmingham to the boundary village at Blake Street but with only infrequent extensions over the boundary to the important town of Lichfield, or the type of difficulties identified in our own report on cross-boundary bus services5
77. Above all, it is essential to remember that:
• It is what is delivered, not who delivers it, which is important
• The industry can only deliver what is needed if what is planned corresponds with what people want
• What is planned can only be delivered if the relationships within the industry (whether contractual, hierarchical or co-operative) are harmonised to achieve the common aim
• What is planned can only be delivered if the necessary resources are provided.
LTUC’s input
78. LTUC’s role as the passengers’ statutory watchdog is to inform the planning process, to monitor the delivery of the service and to call to account the organisations responsible for both planning and delivery.
79. Having said that delivery depends on the plan being correct, in concluding our evidence to this scrutiny we feel it would be helpful to summarise what we believe passengers want from National Rail in London, highlight some particular aspects and give some more examples of problems which we believe that TfL and the SRA together should be seeking to solve.
80. It is convenient that, in response to the GLA’s current scrutiny of public transport in outer London, LTUC produced a submission which provides an effective strategic summary of what National Rail in London should plan to provide. That submission is therefore attached to this one as Annex B. To ensure that its multi-modal context is not lost we have reproduced it in full, but for ease of reference those sections which are particularly pertinent to National Rail have been highlighted.
81. As GLA members will be aware, LTUC conducts research and produces reports in pursuit of its task of informing the planning process, and a list of these is included in Annex C.
5 Crossing the Border – A Study of Cross-boundary Bus Services LTUC 2000
12 Establishing consistent standards
82. At a more detailed level of planning we would commend for attention LUL’s recently issued statement of Customer Service Delivery Standards6. This is the first attempt we have seen by any UK transport organisation to state publicly what it is trying to do in such detail. Whilst some of the detail could be the subject of legitimate debate, its contents are substantially consistent with LTUC’s views. In almost all respects the standards described are higher than those achieved on National Rail and we would commend this document for TfL and the SRA to set similar standards for National Rail services in the London area. Despite the many valid criticisms of LUL’s performance we believe that many who use both services would feel that if, in five years time, National Rail could consistently match LUL’s standards then those responsible could take credit for a significant success.
83. Whilst the LUL standards rightly embrace the full spectrum of what a rail service needs to offer, LTUC would wish to highlight the crucial importance of the timetable. Put simply, if travel by train is to be encouraged in today’s 24 hour 7 day society then the most comfortable and reliable trains, the most accessible stations, the best information and the most helpful staff count for nothing if the services are infrequent, irregular, close down too early in the evening or don’t operate on Sundays.
84. At present there is nowhere on National Rail which matches LUL’s provision of at least 6 tph all day every day at almost every station within the travelcard zones. LTUC recognises the problems of mixed use where suburban trains have to share tracks with inter city trains or freight, but considers that even in these cases there should be a minimum target of 4 tph.
85. Other matters on which TfL and the SRA need to establish consistent London wide standards are late night and Sunday services (both of which need to be considered in conjunction with realistic policies for track maintenance).
86. A particular area of concern relates to the need for better local rail services to and from airports, which are major employment hubs, to encourage workers who travel most days to use public transport. The TOCs have preferred to concentrate their services on journeys to London. At Gatwick there are 12 fast train per hour to London by three operators yet a number of local stations have only an hourly service, whilst Heathrow Express, with its costly tunnels carrying only 4 tph, makes no contribution at all to the needs of airport staff7.
Timetables and contracts
87. Timetables – being the basis of what the railway offer - are so important that it is worthwhile looking at how the existing ones have come about (we deliberately do not say ‘planned’) and how we believe they should be developed in the future.
88. Present National Rail timetables have evolved from those operated by BR in the early 1990s. These in turn had their roots in BR’s old regional organisation, which is probably the underlying reason why there is a lack of consistency in such matters as last train times8.
6 London Underground’s Commitment to Customer Service – Customer Service Delivery Standards LUL 2001
7 Reaching the Skies – Policies for surface access to London’s airports LTUC 2001
8 Who Goes Home? A study of last trains from London LTUC (LRPC) 2000
13 89. When the railways were privatised, a Passenger Service Requirement (PSR) was created for each franchise to give legal protection to a basic level of service. The PSR was deliberately set at or below the BR service level. In general terms most train operating companies (TOCs) have continued to provide at least the BR service, although there are exceptions in particular localities.
90. Most TOCs have increased their services above the BR level (albeit with most tending to favour longer distance services rather than London suburban routes). In some cases these are purely commercial decisions by the TOCs which are free to reduce or withdraw the increases at any time. In other instances the increases are a franchise commitment (i.e. they are a contractual obligation between the TOC and the SRA) so have some degree of protection.
91. All the franchise commitments for increased services have now been implemented, so any further improvements within the present franchises can only come about if a TOC thinks they will be directly profitable9. Overall responsibility for timetabling rests with Railtrack which applies tests before deciding whether or not to accept a TOCs application for new services.
92. The first test is whether the paths are available, i.e. whether the extra trains can run without conflicting with existing trains. If an application passes this test, Railtrack has recently introduced a new factor – a presumption that the network is already operating at (or over) capacity and therefore any extra trains are undesirable10.
93. If the TOC can jump both these hurdles it may get its extra trains – but only if no other TOCs (including freight operators) have put in competing applications. If there are competing applications, Railtrack has to chose a winner. Their criteria for this (laid down by the terms of their licence) is to be fair as between one operator and another – which does not include any requirement to weigh up the respective interests of passengers. In some cases the matter may fall to be considered by the Rail Regulator, but again his decision criteria largely centre around weighing the operators’ interests rather than passengers’ interests.
94. Another aspect is the possibility that a new service might offer greater passenger benefits than an existing service – but if the latter is operated by a different TOC it is very difficult to make it surrender its service.
95. It can be seen from this (necessarily simplified) account that there is no coherent process for planning timetables which takes a holistic view of the interests of passengers. Existing timetables have grown like Topsy and their continued development is driven by an uncoordinated mixture of what TOCs perceive as profitable, what Railtrack decides suits its interests and its licence requirement to behave equitably as between the private interests of private companies.
96. From experience of trying to persuade the industry to move towards its aspirations for timetables in the London area11 LTUC has no confidence that this system of timetable development will be able to deliver the necessary service levels and patterns, i.e. based
9 This works to the disadvantage of London because some TOCs claim that the Travelcard system prevents them obtaining the extra revenue due to them for the extra services. They claim that they lose revenue because for each Travelcard they sell they have to share the money with TfL, LUL and other TOCs and this makes them reluctant to stop trains in the London area. However TOCs that argue this forget to mention that they also receive a proportion of Travelcard sales by the other parties to the agreement..
10 This is an important and controversial topic on which there is no consensus within the industry. LTUC will shortly be considering its position on the matter, which is particularly significant for London. 11 Requirements for Train Services LTUC (to be published February 2002)
14 on passengers’ needs – in consistent advocacy for which LTUC (and its predecessor LRPC) has long been a lone voice.
97. In its place, we believe that railway timetabling should be planned under the overall control of the SRA with, in the case of London, detailed input from TfL. The timetable, based on passengers’ needs as put forward by LTUC and other interested bodies, would then form the centrepiece of each franchise with TOCs bidding to operate them12. Where infrastructure limitations prevent the desired timetables from being introduced, it would be for the SRA and TfL working together to specify and procure the necessary infrastructure improvements.
98. Franchise contracts would also specify the other essential outputs which would be standardised to achieve consistency across the region – for which as already indicated we believe the LUL Customer Service Delivery Standards provide a good starting point.
99. The technical specification and monitoring of such new franchise contracts would doubtless benefit from TfL / London Buses experience with the development and management of bus contracting in London. In commending the use of this know-how we recognise that there are many differences between bus and railway operations, but we also believe that there must be sufficient common factors for the experience to be beneficial.
100. Unless this new approach to timetabling and franchise contracting is adopted, LTUC is fearful that the defects of the proposed new Chiltern and SWT franchises will be repeated elsewhere. We look to the SRA and TfL both to address these specific issues and to give full consideration to our proposals before letting any new franchises.
12 This method of timetable planning would also resolve another problem of the existing arrangements. The system by which ticket revenues are shared out between the TOCs (known as ORCATS – Operational Research Computer Allocation of Ticket Sales) is based not only on the number of trains serving a station, but also their timing and speed. This often makes TOCs reluctant to insert extra stations stops if this makes their service to a larger station served by other TOCs slower, as this may result in the proportion of revenue to the other operator going up. However, stopping their trains at stations served by another TOC will allow them a share of the revenue that would have previously gone wholly to the other TOC. This often results in larger stations having a multitude of competing services, yet smaller but often well used stations having less than desirable number of services.
15 Some concluding comments
101. Nonsenses which need to be avoided include:
• Timetable changes by different operators of the sort experienced in the Redhill area which have resulted in off-peak services being drastically reduced and arbitrarily diverted away from passengers’ preferred London terminal
• 36 different ticket options for travellers between London and Gatwick Airport
• Publicity material which wrongly leads people to believe that there are no night-time trains between Gatwick and London
• The crazy situation on the Barking – Gospel Oak line where replacement buses are provided to cover engineering works on Saturdays but not on Sundays because the Sunday service is not included in the Passenger Service Requirement
• A joint industry / local authority steering group, mandated to develop the South London Metro concept13, which designed a trial map two years ago, which everybody agreed should be published but has so far managed to get it posted at just one station [LTUC will offer a small prize to any scrutiny committee member who can tell us which one].
102. If it appears that we are concluding our submission with what seem like trivia, we make no apology. Whilst it is vital to get the strategic issues right, for the individual traveller it is the details which matter, and it is as much in the detail as in the big picture that the fragmentation of the national railway network has let London down. Whatever structure is chosen as the means for effectively integrating National Rail into the rest of London’s public transport system, it must attend to both.
103. At the end of day:
• It is what is provided, not who provides it, which is important
• Whoever provides it can only do so if they have the resources to deliver
11th January 2002
This submission has been prepared before publication of the Strategic Rail Authority’s Strategic Plan on 14th January 2002
13 The South London Overground – The case for enhanced suburban rail services LTUC (LRPC) 1998
16 ANNEX A
Extract from “London Regional Passengers Committee – Response to the Government’s consultation paper “New Leadership for London”
3. The role of the London Transport Authority (now TfL)
3.1 The Committee warmly endorses the Government's commitment to an integrated transport strategy and to the amalgamation of the assortment of agencies between which responsibility for the planning, funding and operation of transport infrastructure and systems is currently fragmented. This is essential if greater headway is to be made towards equipping London with the efficient, reliable and environment-friendly network of services which are a pre-condition for the more civilised city the Committee wishes to see in the 21st century.
3.2 Of great concern to the Committee, therefore, is the remit of the proposed London Transport Authority (LTA). Whilst the Committee is pleased to note that the Government proposes to give the LTA a wider role than that presently accorded the Board of London Regional Transport, it is disturbed and astonished that a body which is supposed to be the strategic transport authority for London is only to be given undefined opportunities to 'influence' decisions in respect of the 'commuter rail network', much of which is, by dint only of historical and geological accident, part of the national railway, rather than London Underground. Frankly this is unacceptable to London and it flies in the face of the Government's declared belief in, and support of, integration and intermodality . The former Greater London Council was hampered throughout its life by the lack of any formal means to ensure that British Rail pursued policies consistent with its transport goals, and to recreate such a deficiency now should be unthinkable.
3.3 The Committee recognises the difficulties in creating a new organisation with some powers in respect of part of the national rail network, which is now the subject of a myriad of contractual arrangements. It does not, however, accept that the existing organisational framework should, therefore, be allowed to undermine the legitimate requirement to give the new Greater London Authority (GLA) and, through it the LTA, real power in determining the role to be played by the national rail network in and around London, which is an integral part of London's public transport network. It cannot be right for the new GLA/LTA to have a lesser role in respect of the railways in London, than do the local authorities in the Metropolitan Boroughs via their respective Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs).
3.4 It is essential that the area over which the LTA's powers are to be exercised should be that which generates the main transport demands and patterns within the more narrowly defined area of the GLA favoured by the Government. The Committee believes that there is great merit in adopting the model of the PTAs in the London scenario. That model provides an existing, working example of local authorities effectively influencing the national railway provision, performance and fares levels in their respective areas. The PTA. model would also enable the LTA to extend beyond the existing boundary of Greater London, which the Government appears unwilling even to consider, let alone alter as part of this exercise. The consultation paper itself sets a clear precedent for such an arrangement in that the proposed Police Authority would cover the existing Metropolitan Police District, which extends outside Greater London and the proposed Police Authority would include representatives from the District Councils covered. The Committee proposes that the LTA should also extend beyond Greater London and that it too should include representatives from the relevant neighbouring authorities. [Note: in the event, the police boundary was adjusted to be co-terminus with that of Greater London, so that the issue of “out-county” representation no longer arose.]
17 3.5 The Committee's own boundary has gone through a number of changes over the years. The original boundary was defined as being that drawn up in the London Passenger Transport Act of 1933 (slightly amended to include the area around Aylesbury), but this has been amended over time to the one it has today as an irrefutable case for such change was established. The Committee's present boundary, although not ideal, particularly in the east where it is too tightly drawn to London itself, nonetheless in general reflects the coverage of the majority of the London commuter rail network. It is defined, as required by the Railways Act 1993, by named national railway stations which are: Stevenage, Stansted Airport, Gidea Park [Note: now Harold Wood], Upminster, Ockendon [Note: now transferred to Rail Passengers Committee for Eastern England], Purfleet, Dartford, Swanley, Sevenoaks, Oxted, Gatwick Airport, Dorking, London Road Guildford, Worplesdon, Woking, Virginia Water, Windsor, Slough, Bicester North, Aylesbury, Tring and Bedford. The Committee believes that there is a strong case for considering this as the starting point for a boundary of the LTA.
3.6 In the scenario of the LTA effectively becoming the PTA for the London Region, it would make sense to create a Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) which would subsume and have substantially wider powers than the existing Board of London Transport. It would not, in the Committee's view, be sensible for the LTA itself to have the management responsibilities currently vested in London Transport and the other agencies which currently exist.
18 ANNEX B
This annex reproduces LTUC’s note to the GLA scrutiny of public transport in outer London. Sections relevant (in whole or in part) to the National Railways are highlighted, and these provide an effective strategic summary of LTUC’s view of what the National Railways in London should plan to provide
What do passengers want from public transport in outer London?
A note from the London Transport Users Committee to the Greater London Authority’s scrutiny of public transport in outer London.
This paper is concerned with conventional rail, bus and tram services. It does not deal with specialised facilities such as dial-a-ride, mobility bus and Taxicard.
1. Why is the car the predominant mode of transport in outer London?
1.1 Use of the private car is much greater in outer London than in the inner and central areas of the city for a variety of reasons. These include :
• Development is less dense, so journeys are more likely to be too long to make conveniently on foot or by cycle • There is higher car ownership • Many streets (especially away from major arteries) are less congested • Journey origins and destinations are more diffuse, so trips are less likely to be limited to defined corridors of concentrated demand which can be served cost- effectively by public transport • The rail network largely caters for radial journeys to/from the centre, and is not aligned with the complex pattern of intra-suburban travel • Bus frequencies are lower and the network is more sparse • On the outermost fringe of London, there is easy access to the motorway network • Car journeys are much less likely to be “trip end restrained” than in inner areas – i.e. those making them can do so because there will be legal and affordable parking space at their destinations.
2. What are the particular transport needs of people living and/or working in outer London?
2.1 To promote the use of public transport in outer London, it is necessary to begin by identifying the reasonable requirements of potential users and to assess the extent to which these are met by the services currently provided.
2.2 LTUC considers that the following are reasonable requirements, at both peak and off- peak periods and throughout the week :
• Frequent direct services to central London. • Frequent direct services to outer (or out-of-) London interchange points, so that journeys to and from the suburbs can be made without travelling via the centre • The ability to make cross-London journeys with a minimum number of changes • Direct services to the major strategic centres, local hospitals, colleges and places of entertainment and recreation within each borough • Direct services to major strategic centres in adjacent boroughs and/or neighbouring counties • Local (hopper-style) services providing connections to local stations and smaller district centres
19 • Good orbital as well as radial links • Adequate services to schools • Attractive and secure interchange facilities • Frequent services along strategic arteries throughout the night.
2.3 Examining each of these requirements in turn, it is evident that at present the level and pattern of provision is, at best, decidedly uneven.
3. Frequent direct services to central London
3.1 This need is primarily met by rail (including both the National Rail services, the Underground and the Docklands Light Railway – though the DLR does not currently penetrate outer London). But there are some localities where such a link is necessarily made in part by bus because of the absence of an adequate direct rail service, e.g. Collier Row, South Hornchurch, St Paul’s Cray, Farnborough, Upper Norwood, Mitcham, Hanworth, Yeading, Harefield and Arkley. And there are locations on existing rail routes where additional stations are needed to serve developments which have come into being since the railway was constructed, e.g. Eastfields (in Merton), which is also close to Mitcham town centre, and Broadfields (in Barnet).
3.2 LTUC believes that, wherever practicable, there should be a metro-style service level (i.e. at least six trains per hour) throughout London and to contiguous towns around the Greater London border. These include Cheshunt, Epping, Brentwood, Dartford, Sevenoaks, Redhill, Epsom, Sunbury, Staines, Slough, Gerrards Cross, Rickmansworth, Watford, Boreham Wood and Potters Bar.
3.3 LTUC accepts, however, that in the case of the National Rail network there are capacity limitations on certain routes, e.g. where track is shared with longer distance passenger trains and with freight services. In such cases, the minimum level of service should be six trains per hour to stations within Travelcard zones 1 to 4, and four trains per hour beyond these. Exceptionally, a service of two trains per hour may be acceptable on routes with particularly low demand, e.g. the Epsom Downs branch.
3.4 In the case of the Underground and the Docklands Light Railway, this standard is now broadly met. But on National Rail lines it is commonly met, if at all, only during peak hours. Off-peak and weekend services to/from many destinations are relatively sparse. Examples include Palmers Green, Enfield Town, Ponders End, Rainham, Bickley, Coulsdon South, St Helier, Chessington, Isleworth, West Drayton, Northolt Park and Hadley Wood.
3.5 In the case of corridors with no direct rail service, alternative bus links may not reach further than the edge of central London. For example, from Upper Norwood route 468 terminates at Elephant & Castle, and from Hayes End routes 207 and 607 terminate at Shepherds Bush.
For further details, please see LTUC Requirements for Train Services (to be published February 2002)
4. Frequent direct services to outer (or out-of-) London interchange points, so that journeys to and from the suburbs can be made without travelling via the centre
4.1 This requires adequate levels of service to such locations as Harlow, Romford, Shenfield, Bromley South, East Croydon, Gatwick Airport, Woking, Slough, Reading, South/West Ruislip, Watford Junction, Luton and Stevenage.
20 4.2 The current situation is broadly similar to that described in paragraph 3.4. There is a marked reluctance on the part of some longer-distance train operators to observe edge-of-London stops, notably at Slough, South/West Ruislip and Stratford (an inner London station, but with a similar function). And the Croxley Link project, which would facilitate such connections between north west London and places served by the West Coast main line has been stalled in administrative and funding limbo for a decade.
5. The ability to make cross-London journeys with a minimum number of changes
5.1 Except in corridors served by the Underground, such facilities are sparse. Of the three cross-London routes provided by National Rail which reach the outer boroughs, only Thameslink has an acceptable frequency. The South Central service via the West London line and the Anglia Crosslink service via the North London line are both sparse – especially the latter.
5.2 A number of major schemes have been proposed which would address this deficiency - i.e. Thameslink 2000, CrossRail, the Hackney-Merton route, and the East London line extensions. But only the last of these has the necessary legal powers to proceed, and none has fully-committed funding from either Transport for London or the Strategic Rail Authority.
6. Direct services to the major strategic centres, local hospitals, colleges and places of entertainment and recreation within each borough
6.1 In the past two decades, there has been a progressive concentration of medical, education and entertainment facilities on fewer and larger sites, with more extended catchment areas. At the same time, new styles of retailing have emerged, often at locations remote from traditional town centres and established public transport networks (found in their most extreme form at Lakeside and Bluewater).
6.2 Although there are examples of good practice (e.g. the University of East London’s new campus sited adjacent to the Beckton branch of the Docklands Light Railway), the planners of such facilities appear too often to have assumed that access would be primarily by car, and little or no regard has been paid to the adequacy and viability of public transport connections with their catchment areas. This can create particular difficulties for people who are public transport dependent, many of whom may already suffer other forms of social exclusion.
6.3 Some journeys of this kind are made by rail, but for the vast majority the bus is more appropriate transport mode. In recent years, frequencies have gradually increased and new routes have been added to improve the connectivity of the network. But poor reliability (officially attributed to traffic congestion and staff shortages, but compounded by a lack of adequate supervision and systematic control) has undermined public confidence in the network. For some passengers, concerns about their personal security are an added deterrent – not only after dark but also when required to travel in the company of large groups of school pupils, whose unruly behaviour is a source of real discomfiture.
6.4 The popularity of Tramlink has demonstrated the ability of the public transport system to win additional patronage, including travellers switching from their cars, but only because vehicle design, speed, frequency, reliability, waiting facilities and ease of access to stops are all of the necessary quality. Tramlink only came into being because of the sustained, cross-party commitment of its promoters in Croydon council, including a willingness to contribute significantly to the capital cost of creating it, and to give it their support throughout the long drawn-out and sometimes contentious process of obtaining the necessary legal powers. London Transport (now TfL) has canvassed widely amongst other London boroughs to determine the true
21 level of support for similar schemes elsewhere. But although there is widespread in- principle sympathy for such projects, there is little evidence of active commitment at the level necessary to overcome the financial and procedural obstacles. As a result, only three further schemes in outer London are still on TfL’s active agenda (in Barking, Greenwich and along the Uxbridge Road), plus some possible Tramlink extensions, and all of these are at best several years from becoming a reality.
For details of these “intermediate mode” proposals, see New Ideas for Public Transport in outer London – Development of Case Studies, published by London Transport Planning (1996).
7. Direct services to major strategic centres in adjacent boroughs and/or neighbouring counties
7.1 Administrative boundaries are of no relevance to the users of private transport modes, and should be of none to public transport users either. Happily, within London, network planning is undertaken on a city-wide basis, and rail and bus operation is largely unaffected by borough boundaries (though there may be corridors in which bus service patterns were slow to respond to the effects of the Greenwich judgement on school catchment areas). Similarly, the Freedom Pass is valid throughout Greater London, though individual boroughs apply their own rules regarding the eligibility of people with disabilities. London boroughs’ power to buy in additional services to augment London Buses’ network could be a potential source of difficulty, but in practice they have made very little use of this except in special niche markets such as park-and-ride operations to town centres during the Christmas shopping period.
7.2 But the situation with respect to travel across the outer boundary of London is more complex, especially for bus travel. London Buses has not, in the past, had a clearly articulated policy for giving effect to its statutory duty to meet the needs of passengers travelling to and from Greater London as well as within it. Neighbouring authorities have more limited powers (both with respect to frequencies and fares), and vary in the level of their interest in and support for public transport. Cross- boundary routes are operated under a number of different legal regimes (i.e. either under contract to London Buses, or by agreement with it, or under contract to a neighbouring authority, or wholly commercially), resulting in complex local variations in fares, Travelcard validity, and Freedom Pass acceptance. There are still examples of routes terminating at points which appear to be determined more by administrative convenience than passenger need.
7.3 LTUC welcomes the more positive approach to such services evidenced by London Buses’ recent adoption of such routes as the 405 from Croydon to Redhill and the 406 from Kingston to Epsom. A comprehensive review of all cross-boundary links is now under way, in response to an LTUC report on this issue, and we await the outcome with keen interest.
For further details, please see LTUC report on Crossing the Border.
8. Local (hopper-style) services providing connections to local stations and smaller district centres
8.1 At one time, such local links were often combined with longer-distance trunk services within a single route. This theoretically maximised schedule efficiency, measured in crew and vehicle productivity. But delays caused by traffic congestion or for other reasons, at any point along the route, could result in poor reliability experienced over its whole length (exacerbated when buses were turned short of their planned destinations in an attempt to restore them to their scheduled slots).
22 8.2 In recent years, London Buses has sought to address this problem by shortening trunk routes and creating localised networks, often running mainly off main arteries. These are commonly operated with smaller and more manoeuvrable vehicles which can penetrate residential districts more easily, providing local connections with stations and smaller district centres. Such networks are relatively insulated from the effects of sources of delay elsewhere. Examples include the H network in Harrow, the E network in Ealing, the U Network in Uxbridge, the W network in Walthamstow, the R network in Orpington and the K network in Kingston.
8.3 One disadvantage of such route-splitting is that some through journeys which could previously have been made on one bus now entail a change, and for passengers travelling on ordinary tickets the cost of the journey is doubled. The former problem can be mitigated by designing-in a reasonable length of shared route, as most bus journeys are comparatively short. The latter problem would be solved if London Buses can be persuaded to introduce a time-limited transfer ticket of the type which is the norm in many other urban transport undertakings (using ticketing technology which is no more complex than that already fitted to London’s buses).
9. Good orbital as well as radial links
9.1 Most journeys in London begin and end outside the central area. If public transport is to win a larger share of the total travel market, it must cater adequately for these.
9.2 The rail network is overwhelmingly focussed on catering for radial trips. There are few orbital lines, and on those which exist, service frequencies are low. The North London, South London, West London and Gospel Oak-Barking lines only have two or three trains per hour (and run principally in inner London). In outer London, apart from the short and distinctly unglamorous Romford-Upminster shuttle, only the Croydon-Sutton-Wimbledon-Kingston-Richmond-Hounslow corridor is linked by conventional rail – and even this involves no less than three changes en route if travelled end-to-end. But Tramlink has demonstrated the latent demand for a frequent, high-quality orbital rail connection.
9.3 On the bus network, the 726 (from Heathrow to Bromley) is the only extended orbital route remaining in outer London, following the curtailment of others such as the 107 (which once ran from Queensbury to Ponders End) and the 140 (which once ran from Heathrow to Mil Hill). Even the 726 has been truncated, as it no longer extends to Dartford. Its frequency is low and its reliability performance has often been lamentable. London Buses appears largely to have abandoned any attempt to cater for orbital movement other than over very short distances. And even here, the picture is patchy. In the case of Croydon, for example, the south and east of the borough have a number of orbitally-aligned routes connecting district centres, but the north of the borough has none at all.
10. Adequate services to schools
10.1 The proportion of pupils travelling to school by car has risen steadily in recent years, creating localised congestion which gives rise to widespread traffic delays as well as ill-feeling between schools and occupiers of neighbouring premises. The problem has grown as a result of the widening of school catchment areas and the rise in two- car households, as it is commonly the second vehicle which is used (sometimes exclusively) for the school run and similar escort trips.
10.2 Public transport services are needed to provide for journeys to schools that are not adequately catered for by the mainstream network, and/or to separate school children from other passengers on crowded routes. London Buses has sought to meet this need by providing 51 special schooldays-only routes (mainly numbered in the 6XX series), plus special schoolday variations on 17 other routes. Much publicity has
23 been given to the initiative by FirstGroup, a transport conglomerate, to introduce yellow school buses into Britain on the model familiar in north America. But in their countries of origin, such buses are primarily used in rural areas where there are few if any orthodox public transport services. There is a continuing debate in Britain over the desirability of treating school travel as a separate market for which special provision must be made, independently of the conventional network – and over whether, if this was done, it would reduce or would worsen the behavioural problems which generate intense ill-feeling on the part of other passengers.
10.3 The problem of rowdiness and vandalism by school children is not confined to the bus network. Rail operators in several parts of outer London (Bromley, Merton, Barnet) have faced similar difficulties. Ordinary rail staff are unwilling to subject themselves to the abuse and defiance they commonly encounter. The behaviour of pupils in public places is outside the schools’ formal jurisdiction, and teachers are in any case unwilling to be required to act in a policing role out of school hours. The transport providers are confronted with a societal issue with which they are ill-equipped to deal, and if some would prefer not to carry these passengers at all, their attitude is understandable. But if pupils are actively discouraged from using public transport, it sends an unfortunate message at a time when – quite rightly - public policy is to promote travel by train and bus in preference to the car.
11. Attractive and secure interchange facilities
11.1 Provision for interchange is widely regarded as an Achilles’ heel of London’s public transport system. Cars offer flexible routeing (and timing), and door-to-door travel. Public transport not only imposes the burden of accessing a stop or station at each end of the trip, and (often) of travelling at a predetermined time, but also frequently requires a change en route. Where this can be made within the confines of a single station, with adequate information, reasonable service frequencies, and acceptable waiting conditions, the burden may not be unduly heavy. But this is commonly not the case – and if the change is to or between buses, it is almost invariably not.
11.2 At a seminar held in the course of a recent liaison meeting between LTUC and representatives of local transport user groups drawn from all parts of London, nobody present was able to volunteer an example of a good public transport interchange in London. If pushed, Hammersmith and Canning Town might be so regarded, but neither of these is in outer London. Very unfavourable comparisons were drawn with systems in cities overseas, which offer timed cross-platform connections as part of a “seamless” journey experience. Transport for London has itself recently acknowledged that “poor co-operation and differing priorities between [transport providers] can often result in barriers to interchange, and the creation of physical and organisational ‘tidemarks’ where passengers perceive a change in the level of service they receive as they pass between areas controlled by different organisations. This can make the journey fell difficult, complex and disjointed …”
11.3 LTUC’s views on the requirements for improved facilities for interchanging to and from buses and the Underground have been developed in more detail in its submissions to the GLA’s scrutinies specific to these modes. Transport for London has set out its policies in policy document issued jointly with the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC), Railtrack and London Underground. In this, the sponsors of the document have jointly committed themselves “to work together in partnership to identify and implement opportunities to reduce the physical effort and uncertainty that passengers may experience when making an interchange in London. Our aim is to ensure that by minimising the barriers experienced by a passenger transferring between services and modes, the transport network is perceived as a coherent and integrated system.”
11.4 Some small but welcome steps forward have recently been taken, e.g. the much- improved area maps and bus information now appearing at Underground stations –
24 though there is seldom anything comparable at National Rail stations. Physical integration of bus stopping arrangements with station entrances and exits, and the provision of real-time service information, leave much to be desired. Even where such integration exists, the ambience can be truly unappealing. What implied statement about the value attached by the operators to their users is made by the bus/rail interchange facilities at Mill Hill Broadway? Unfortunately, there appears to be no ring-fenced budget allocation for enhancing such arrangements, and the recent dissolution of TfL’s Integration Directorate is scarcely an encouraging sign.
For further details see All Aboard? (LTUC’s submission to the GLA scrutiny of Priority Bus Issues for London), and Going Underground (LTUC’s submission to the GLA scrutiny of The Tube – Moving On). For TFL’s aspirations regarding interchange improvements, see Intermodal transport interchange for London – Best practice guidelines (January 2001).
12. Frequent services along strategic arteries throughout the night
12.1 We are increasingly living in a “24/7” society. Private transport knows no time limitations, and public transport must adjust to match if it is to be relevant to those who need (or choose) to travel outside traditional operating hours.
12.2 Most rail and bus services run from around 0600 to around midnight, though frequencies can be low at the start and end of the operating day. But there are considerable discrepancies between individual rail routes, with stations on the Underground being generally better served in the late evening than those on the National Rail network. Only a handful of suburban stations have an all-night service, notably East Croydon and Ealing Broadway. This appears to be the random result of past tradition in different parts of the railway, as the Strategic Rail Authority has (so far) adopted no coherent policy towards the matter. LTUC’s predecessor, the London Regional Passengers Committee, has charted these discrepancies in a recent report.
12.3 The night bus service, in contrast, has grown remarkably in coverage and frequency in recent years. The majority of Londoners now live within a mile of an all-night service, and only a few substantial suburbs (notably Ruislip and Dagenham) are not yet served directly. Most services are radial from central London, but some orbital routes (the N140 and N285 from Heathrow) have started to appear. Growth in the usage of night services has been substantially faster than that of the daytime routes, and the night bus network now has the same fares as its daytime counterpart. The night bus network is one of the undoubted success stories of London’s public transport, and one for which its champions within London Buses deserve full credit.
For further details of the pattern of late evening rail services, please see LRPC’s report Who goes home?
13. Fares, ticketing, personal security and information
13.1 All of these are critical factors affecting potential passengers’ propensity to use public transport, though none are unique to outer London in their effects. They have been covered in detail in LTUC’s submissions to the GLA’s scrutinies of buses and of the Underground, and it is not necessary to revisit them in detail here.
13.2 It is worth mentioning the particular value of the multi-modal Travelcard in this connection, though, because this is valid for a through journey, e.g. from an outer suburb to central London, involving both local access to a station by bus, a trunk section by rail, and an onward connection by Underground. For one-off trips, the forthcoming one-day all-day Travelcards will provide this benefit additionally to those who must travel before or during the morning peak period (though the incremental cost of such a ticket for zones 1-6 relative to zones 1-4 will be particularly high, and
25 will probably result in the use of ordinary return tickets for the part of each journey made in zones 5 and 6).
13.3 LTUC has also welcomed the 70p flat fare for all suburban bus journeys, and the introduction of prepaid packs of single tickets sold at a discount. It has taken a cautious view of TfL’s desire to move to “cashless buses” because there are parts of outer London in which local travel ticket outlets are sparse and the local rail stations are unstaffed and/or are operated by National Rail companies (which do not sell bus passes). The extension of London fares to cross-boundary routes adopted by TfL has generally resulted in a reduction in the cost of travel, which is welcomed by their users, although fares anomalies result where the cost of travel on parallel non- London Buses routes is set commercially.
14. Overview
14.1 The coverage and frequency of bus services in outer London have improved substantially over the past decade. TfL’s “BusPlus” programme of new bus priority measures, coupled with enhanced enforcement effort, should bring improvements in reliability, provided that the operators’ difficulty in recruiting and retaining sufficient staff of the requisite quality can be overcome. The current review of cross-boundary services is a welcome initiative.
14.2 The network can be strengthened further by adding additional local services penetrating more deeply into residential areas, and the support of the Assembly in resisting “nimbyist” objections from some householders (too often supported by borough councillors whose commitment to improved public transport is proved to be disappointingly shallow, when put to the test) would be welcome. There is scope for additional orbital connections, and better frequencies on Sundays.
14.3 The Underground provides relatively frequent services throughout the week to those parts of outer London which it penetrates. There are five outer boroughs with no Underground service. Parts of four of these are now linked by Tramlink, which provides a frequent high-quality service throughout the week (except to Beckenham in the evenings and on Sundays).
14.4 The quality of the National Rail network is very much more variable. There are some lines with modern trains, well-maintained stations and frequent services. But there are others of which no such claim could credibly be made. The privatised train operators appear, for the most part, to be very much more interested in providing longer-distance services between central London and places beyond than in meeting the needs of London itself. Even the “Connex Metro” development, welcome in itself, has had only limited impact on the outer boroughs. There needs to be an acceptance by these operators (with the active encouragement of the Strategic Rail Authority, as part of the refranchising process) that they are an integral and important component of London’s internal transport system, and not merely carriers to and from the capital. LTUC’s proposals for standard minimum frequencies offer a basis for starting to redress the deficiencies.
14.5 Orbital connections remain the public transport networks’ greatest weakness. Tramlink demonstrates the potential demand for such services, but there are few other rail links. Long orbital bus routes have been hampered by poor reliability, and have tended to be shortened, but some local services have enjoyed more success.
14.6 As everywhere in London, there is scope for considerably improved co-ordination. Some progress has been made in the field of ticketing (though so far primarily for period rather than ordinary tickets), but interchange facilities are too often inconvenient and unappealing. The comfort, reliability and economy of private cars are steadily improving. Public transport must match these improvements if it is to have any chance of winning back market share and fulfilling its potential.
26 ANNEX C : Key Documents a) LTUC (and LRPC) documents
All Aboard (submission to GLA scrutiny of Priority Bus Issues for London)
Annual Report 2000 – 2001
Crossing the Border – A study of Cross-boundary Bus Services
Easing the Trip – Addressing the needs of disabled rail users
Going Underground (submission to GLA scrutiny of The Tube – Moving On)
National Rail Passenger Services in the London Area (quarterly performance monitoring reports)
Reaching the Skies – Policies for surface access to London’s airports
Requirements for Train Services (to be published February 2002)
The South London Overground – The case for enhanced suburban rail services
There’s More to Chiltern than the Chilterns – the case for a Chiltern Metro
What do passengers want from public transport in outer London (submission to GLA scrutiny of public transport in outer London – appended to this submission as Annex B)
Who Goes Home? A study of last trains from London
b) Other documents
London Underground Ltd : London Underground’s Commitment to Customer Service 2001
National Rail: London Connections – Rail and Underground Services (also Rail Services Around London & the South East) map
Rail Professional: January 2002 issue
Strategic Rail Authority: On Track - Rail Performance Trends
Strategic Rail Authority: National Rail Trends
Transport for London : Public transport in London : Market report 2000
Transport for London : Rail Services – Improving Commuter Railways in London 2001
Wolmar, C : Broken Rails – How Privatisation Wrecked Britain’s Railways
27 ANNEX D : Glossary of abbreviations used
ATOC Association of Train Operating Companies BR British Rail CCTV Closed circuit television DLR Docklands Light Railway GLA Greater London Authority GLC Greater London Council LPTB London Passenger Transport Board LRPC London Regional Passengers Committee LRT London Regional Transport LTA London Transport Authority (ultimately created as TfL) LTUC London Transport Users Committee LUL London Underground Ltd NSE Network South-East OPRAF Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (now replaced by SRA) PTA Passenger Transport Authority PTE Passenger Transport Executive PSR Passenger Service Requirement SRA Strategic Rail Authority SWT South West Trains TfL Transport for London TOC Train Operating Company tph trains per hour WAGN West Anglia Great Northern Railway
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