(CUWS) Outreach Journal # 1219

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(CUWS) Outreach Journal # 1219 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal CUWS Outreach Journal 1219 10 June 2016 Feature Item: “China’s Nuclear Threat Perceptions.” Authored by Susan Turner Haynes; Published by the Air Force Strategic Studies Quarterly; Volume: 10, Issue: 2, Summer 2016; pages 25-62. http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/Summer16/Haynes.pdf Since the end of the Cold War, China is believed to have doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal, while the other nuclear powers under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have cut their forces in half. Many analysts explain China’s buildup as a direct response to US missile defense. This article takes a broader view, looking at the threat China perceives from the United States as well as from other nuclear players under the penumbra of US hegemony. A state-by-state analysis provides a multidimensional look at China’s nuclear security environment, allowing deeper insight into the motivations behind China’s modernization. U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1. US Senate Votes to Keep Stealth Bomber Cost Top-Secret 2. Missile Envy: Modernizing the US ICBM Force U.S. Counter-WMD 1. China Openly Opposes THAAD 2. US, S. Korea Moving Forward in THAAD Talks: Pentagon 3. US Missile Defense System Aimed only at N. Korea, Iran: White House 4. Moscow Dismisses US Accusations of Severing Missile Defense Dialogue — Diplomat U.S. Arms Control 1. Obama to Continue Nonproliferation Agenda Through Next Seven Months 2. Russians Violating New START Arms Treaty Homeland Security/The Americas 1. Ships with Plutonium from Japan Arrive in U.S. Asia/Pacific 1. Russian Defense Official Warns Against Provocations Next to North Korean Borders 2. North Korea Reactivates Nuclear Weapons Plant, UN Says Citing Satellite Imagery 3. THAAD to 'Dramatically' Enhance Capacity to Counter NK Threat: Defense Chief 4. North Korea Restarts Plutonium Production for Nuclear Bombs: U.S. Official 5. China Tells N. Korea it Wants Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula Issue No.1219, 10 June 2016 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama 6. N. Korea Does Not Stipulate Itself as Nuclear Power in Ruling Party Bylaws 7. N. Korea Sending Soldiers to Middle East Disguised as Civilian Workers Europe/Russia 1. UK Running 'Secret' Program to Develop Nuclear Weapons 2. Isis Nuclear Attack in Europe Is a Real Threat, Say Experts Middle East 1. Nuclear Chief: Iran Starts to Supply Heavy Water to US in Coming Weeks 2. Leader Urges ‘Strong Answer’ to US Hostility 3. Russian Envoy: Basic Agreements Made to Purchase Heavy Water from Iran 4. Amano: Iran Fully Committed to JCPOA 5. Commander: IRGC Navy Plans to Develop New Types of Submarines 6. Surplus of Heavy Water Could Stay in Iran: Atomic Energy Organization 7. ISIS Trains 'Scores' of Suicide Bombers for Global Chemical Weapons Attacks – Report 8. No Secrecy in Developing Iran’s Missile Program: IRGC Official 9. FM: General Soleimani in Iraq at Baghdad's Demand India/Pakistan 1. US Backs India's Bid for Nuclear Group Membership 2. China Leads Resistance to India Joining NSG Commentary 1. Russia vs. America: A Nuclear Bomber Showdown 2. US-China Strategic Nuclear Terminology: A Primer 3. America’s Nuclear-Deterrence Challenge in Asia 4. Is a Nuclear-Armed Japan Inconceivable? Return to Top Issue No.1219, 10 June 2016 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal The Diplomat – Tokyo, Japan US Senate Votes to Keep Stealth Bomber Cost Top-Secret U.S. Senators voted behind closed doors to keep the costs of the U.S. Air Force’s B-21 from the public. By Franz-Stefan Gady June 08, 2016 In May, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee voted against public disclosure of the contract cost to design and build the U.S. Air Force’s new long-range B-21 stealth bomber due to the fear that revealing the bid value would provide U.S. adversaries with too much information about the aircraft’s capabilities, CQ Roll Call reports. As a result, the contract cost figures can now only be disclosed during classified briefings to the congressional committees dealing with defense issues. “I don’t want to give our enemies information by which they can figure out” details of the bomber’s construction, Senator Bill Nelson told CQ Roll Call. Another senator who voted against public disclosure said that the Pentagon “asserted that disclosure as requested would provide information to our adversaries about the capabilities of the aircraft.” The vote against revealing the bomber costs defeats an effort by the Armed Services Committee Chairman, Senator John McCain, to require the public disclosure of the contract value. “You’re not serving the nation and the taxpayers if they don’t know how much of their taxpayer dollars are being spent,” McCain said during a hearing in March. As I reported previously, McCain also said in February that he would not authorize the new bomber as long as it was procured using a cost-plus contract. “My biggest concern is the cost-plus provision in the contract. I will not stand for cost-plus contracts,” the senator noted. “Somehow the commercial side can do this without a cost-plus contract. It is an evil that has grown and grown and grown over the years, and I will not stand for it on any weapon system.” The contract awarded to U.S. defense contractor Northrup Grumman in October 2015 is divided into two parts: one cost-plus and one firm fixed price. I explained previously (See: “Confirmed: Work on the Pentagon’s Top Secret Bomber to Continue”): The contract awarded [in October] was for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase, a “cost reimbursable type contract with cost and performance incentives,” (…) at an estimated worth of $21.4 billion in 2010 dollars. The second part of the contract consists of options for the first five production lots to cover the production of the first 21 bombers. The USAF is expected to buy 80 to 100 bombers overall. In current dollars, the price tag for each bomber is estimated at $564 million. (Since few defense analysts expect the Pentagon to buy all 100 aircraft, the per unit cost is very likely to increase.) Fixed-cost contracts, however, have also not succeeded in reducing overall program costs, as a RAND study recently found. The crux of the matter is that at this stage in the process neither Northrup Grumman nor the U.S. Air Force genuinely know how much it will cost to design and build the B-21 stealth bomber, an aircraft with a completely new design that also will incorporate some existing technologies. http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/us-senate-votes-to-keep-stealth-bomber-cost-top-secret/ Return to Top Issue No.1219, 10 June 2016 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Defense Industry Daily.com Missile Envy: Modernizing the US ICBM Force By Defense Industry Daily Staff June 08, 2016 June 8/16: The USAF has claimed it is not looking at a road-mobile option for its next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Under the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program the aging Minuteman III ICBM fleet will be replaced. Speaking about the mobile option, a service official said “We want to make sure that as we look at GBSD, we’re building it modular so if changes need to be made in the weapon system you don’t have to open up, let’s say, the software to redo the entire software.” For 50 years, land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) have been part of the US primary strategic deterrence capability, the nuclear-armed triad that also includes submarine- launched ballistic missiles and long range heavy bombers. Although the main target for the US deterrent – the Soviet Union – imploded in 1991, other threats – such as nuclear-armed rogue states and non-state actors – have emerged. To address these new threats, the US Air Force undertook a major ICBM modernization program. To carry out this program, the USAF awarded a 15-year ICBM Prime Integration Contract (F42610- 98-C-0001) in 1997 to a team led by Northrop Grumman. Since then, the team, which includes Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and ATK, has been carrying out a major modernization of the ICBM system to ensure its readiness. ICBM Prime The ICBM Prime Integration Contract covers modernization of thousands of missile propulsion, guidance, re-entry, and ground system components. The goal is to extend the US Minuteman III ICBM’s life to 2030. Some of the larger programs covered by the contract include: ICBM Security Modernization Program, which is implementing steps to keep nuclear-tipped ICBMs securely in their silos; Safety Enhanced Re-entry Vehicle (SERV) Program, which is fitting Minuteman III ICBMs with the Mk 21 re-entry vehicle from the decommissioned Peacekeeper missile force – a change that will provide US Strategic Command planners with increased targeting flexibility and enhanced safety; Propulsion Replacement Program, which is remanufacturing motors to replace Minuteman III’s aging propellant to maintain booster reliability; Guidance Replacement Program, which
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