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Biden, Congress Should Defend Missile Sanctions Imposed on Iran
Research memo Biden, Congress Should Defend Missile Sanctions Imposed on Iran By Richard Goldberg, Matthew Zweig, Behnam Ben Taleblu, and Saeed Ghasseminejad April 27, 2021 Introduction During a March 2021 appearance before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Antony Blinken pledged not to make any concessions to Iran regarding its missile program while persuading Tehran to return to compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).1 Less than one month later, however, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price refused to rule out missile-sanctions relief as an inducement for the regime to rejoin the deal.2 Offering Iran missile-sanctions relief without first addressing the Islamic Republic’s robust missile program should be alarming to Congress. The JCPOA imposes no limits on Iran’s missile development and proliferation; instead, the deal schedules UN restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missiles to expire in 2023.3 During the years the United States participated in the JCPOA (2015 to 2018), Iran launched at least 27 ballistic missiles as part of tests or military operations.4 Last year, the clerical regime fired ballistic missiles at military bases in Iraq housing American personnel.5 Iran’s terrorist proxies use Iranian-supplied ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to target and harass U.S. forces and allies across the Middle East. Between all of this and Tehran’s ambitions 1. Rachel Oswald, “Blinken tells House panel to expect firmness toward Iran, China,” MSN, March 10, 2021. (https://www.msn.com/ en-us/news/politics/blinken-tells-house-panel-to-expect-firmness-toward-iran-china/ar-BB1esGEX); U.S. -
July 12, 2019
Iran Sanctions Updated July 12, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RS20871 SUMMARY RS20871 Iran Sanctions July 12, 2019 Successive Administrations have used sanctions extensively to try to change Iran’s behavior. Sanctions have had a substantial effect on Iran’s economy but little, if any, Kenneth Katzman observable effect on Iran’s conventional defense programs or regional malign activities. Specialist in Middle During 2012-2015, when the global community was relatively united in pressuring Iran, Eastern Affairs Iran’s economy shrank as its crude oil exports fell by more than 50%, and Iran had limited ability to utilize its $120 billion in assets held abroad. The 2015 multilateral nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) provided Iran broad relief through the waiving of relevant sanctions, revocation of relevant executive orders (E.O.s), and the lifting of U.N. and EU sanctions. Remaining in place were a general ban on U.S. trade with Iran and U.S. sanctions on Iran’s support for regional governments and armed factions, its human rights abuses, its efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons capabilities, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which enshrined the JCPOA, nonbinding U.N. restrictions on Iran’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and a binding ban on its importation or exportation of arms remain in place for several years. JCPOA sanctions relief enabled Iran to increase its oil exports to nearly pre-sanctions levels, regain access to foreign exchange reserve funds and reintegrate into the international financial system, achieve about 7% yearly economic growth (2016-17), attract foreign investment, and buy new passenger aircraft. -
The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’S Revolutionary Guard
The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard SAEID GOLKAR AUGUST 2021 KASRA AARABI Contents Executive Summary 4 The Raisi Administration, the IRGC and the Creation of a New Islamic Government 6 The IRGC as the Foundation of Raisi’s Islamic Government The Clergy and the Guard: An Inseparable Bond 16 No Coup in Sight Upholding Clerical Superiority and Preserving Religious Legitimacy The Importance of Understanding the Guard 21 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches to the IRGC A New Model for Understanding the IRGC’s Intra-elite Factionalism 25 The Economic Vertex The Political Vertex The Security-Intelligence Vertex Charting IRGC Commanders’ Positions on the New Model Shades of Islamism: The Ideological Spectrum in the IRGC Conclusion 32 About the Authors 33 Saeid Golkar Kasra Aarabi Endnotes 34 4 The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi Executive Summary “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] has excelled in every field it has entered both internationally and domestically, including security, defence, service provision and construction,” declared Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, then chief justice of Iran, in a speech to IRGC commanders on 17 March 2021.1 Four months on, Raisi, who assumes Iran’s presidency on 5 August after the country’s June 2021 election, has set his eyes on further empowering the IRGC with key ministerial and bureaucratic positions likely to be awarded to guardsmen under his new government. There is a clear reason for this ambition. Expanding the power of the IRGC serves the interests of both Raisi and his 82-year-old mentor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. -
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Iran and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ L 88, 24.3.2012, P
02012R0267 — EN — 09.07.2019 — 026.002 — 1 This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document ►B COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ L 88, 24.3.2012, p. 1) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 350/2012 of 23 April 2012 L 110 17 24.4.2012 ►M2 Council Regulation (EU) No 708/2012 of 2 August 2012 L 208 1 3.8.2012 ►M3 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 709/2012 of 2 August 2012 L 208 2 3.8.2012 ►M4 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October L 282 16 16.10.2012 2012 ►M5 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1016/2012 of 6 November L 307 5 7.11.2012 2012 ►M6 Council Regulation (EU) No 1067/2012 of 14 November 2012 L 318 1 15.11.2012 ►M7 Council Regulation (EU) No 1263/2012 of 21 December 2012 L 356 34 22.12.2012 ►M8 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1264/2012 of 21 December L 356 55 22.12.2012 2012 ►M9 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 522/2013 of 6 June 2013 L 156 3 8.6.2013 ►M10 Council Regulation (EU) No 517/2013 of 13 May 2013 L 158 1 10.6.2013 ►M11 Council Regulation (EU) No 971/2013 of 10 October 2013 -
PROTESTS and REGIME SUPPRESSION in POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN Saeid Golkar
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY n OCTOBER 2020 n PN85 PROTESTS AND REGIME SUPPRESSION IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN Saeid Golkar Green Movement members tangle with Basij and police forces, 2009. he nationwide protests that engulfed Iran in late 2019 were ostensibly a response to a 50 percent gasoline price hike enacted by the administration of President Hassan Rouhani.1 But in little time, complaints Textended to a broader critique of the leadership. Moreover, beyond the specific reasons for the protests, they appeared to reveal a deeper reality about Iran, both before and since the 1979 emergence of the Islamic Republic: its character as an inherently “revolutionary country” and a “movement society.”2 Since its formation, the Islamic Republic has seen multiple cycles of protest and revolt, ranging from ethnic movements in the early 1980s to urban riots in the early 1990s, student unrest spanning 1999–2003, the Green Movement response to the 2009 election, and upheaval in December 2017–January 2018. The last of these instances, like the current round, began with a focus on economic dissatisfaction and then spread to broader issues. All these movements were put down by the regime with characteristic brutality. © 2020 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. SAEID GOLKAR In tracking and comparing protest dynamics and market deregulation, currency devaluation, and the regime responses since 1979, this study reveals that cutting of subsidies. These policies, however, spurred unrest has become more significant in scale, as well massive inflation, greater inequality, and a spate of as more secularized and violent. -
Research Article Measuring Sustainability Levels of Rural Development (Case Study: Karaj County)
Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology 6(19): 3638-3641, 2013 DOI:10.19026/rjaset.6.3571 ISSN: 2040-7459; e-ISSN: 2040-7467 © 2013 Maxwell Scientific Publication Corp. Submitted: January 03, 2013 Accepted: February 01, 2013 Published: October 20, 2013 Research Article Measuring Sustainability Levels of Rural Development (Case Study: Karaj County) 1F. Paseban and 2B.H. Kaboudvand 1Planning Research Institute, Agriculture Economy and Rural Development, Ministry of Jihad 2Rural Development Department, Tehran, Iran Abstract: The concept of sustainability has been considered as a framework for understanding the development process and environment resource management as well as delicate a balance between economy, environment and health sociality around the world in the recent decades. This research tries to determine the level of sustainability of Karaj rural development in order to identify and investigate the possibilities of Karaj County. For this purpose, 30 indicators of social, economic and environmental and structural-infrastructural are applied, using factor analysis and cluster analysis techniques for grading and evaluating the sustainability of the 82 villages were used in Karaj County. Thus, the 30 variables were reduced to 4 factors. According to the result of the principal component analysis with rotation, 65.32% of total variance among the 30 variables was explained by these 4 factors. Results indicate undesirable present condition in the studied region which Farokh Abad and Ghezel Hesar villages are sustainable, while Morad Abad and Ahmad Abad villages are unsustainable comparison with other settlements. Finally, the strategy policies are presented in different dimension in order to enhance and improve of the sustainability of Karaj County. -
Page 1 of 73 CONSOLIDATED LIST of FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Page 1 of 73 CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Last Updated:24/03/2014 Status: Asset Freeze Targets REGIME: Afghanistan INDIVIDUALS 1. Name 6: ABBASIN 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: --/--/1969. POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan a.k.a: MAHSUD, Abdul Aziz Other Information: UN Ref TI.A.155.11. Key commander in the Haqqani Network under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani. Taliban Shadow Governor of Orgun District, Paktika Province, as of early 2010. Listed on: 21/10/2011 Last Updated: 17/05/2013 Group ID: 12156. 2. Name 6: ABDUL AHAD 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: --/--/1972. POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Nationality: Afghan National Identification no: 44323 (Afghan) (tazkira) Position: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Other Information: UN Ref TI.A.121.01. Listed on: 23/02/2001 Last Updated: 29/03/2012 Group ID: 7055. 3. Name 6: ABDUL AHMAD TURK 1: ABDUL GHANI 2: BARADAR 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. Title: Mullah DOB: --/--/1968. POB: Yatimak village, Dehrawood District, Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan a.k.a: (1) AKHUND, Baradar (2) BARADAR, Abdul, Ghani Nationality: Afghan Position: Deputy Minister of Defence under the Taliban regime Other Information: UN Ref TI.B.24.01. Arrested in Feb 2010 and in custody in Pakistan. Extradition request to Afghanistan pending in Lahore High Court, Pakistan as of June 2011. -
To:$M.R$Ahmad$Shahid$ Special$Rapporteur$On$The
To:$M.r$Ahmad$Shahid$ Special$Rapporteur$on$the$human$rights$situation$in$Iran$ $ Dear%Sir,% % such%as%equal%rights%to%education%for%everyone,%preventing%the%dismissal%and%forced%retirements%of% dissident%university%professors,%right%of%research%without%limitations%in%universities%and%to%sum%up% expansion%of%academic%liberties.%Student%activists%have%also%been%pursuing%basic%rights%of%the%people% such%as%freedom%of%speech,%press,%and%rallies,%free%formation%and%function%of%parties,%syndicates,%civil% associations%and%also%regard%of%democratic%principles%in%the%political%structure%for%many%years.% % But%unfortunately%the%regime%has%rarely%been%friendly%towards%students.%They%have%always%tried%to%force% from%education,%banishments%to%universities%in%remote%cities,%arrests,%prosecutions%and%heavy%sentences% of%lashing,%prison%and%even%incarceration%in%banishment,%all%for%peaceful%and%lawful%pursuit%of%the% previously%mentioned%demands.%Demands%which%according%to%the%human%rights%charter%are%considered% the%most%basic%rights%of%every%human%being%and%Islamic%Republic%of%Iran%as%a%subscriber%is%bound%to% uphold.% % The%government%also%attempts%to%shut%down%any%student%associations%which%are%active%in%peaceful%and% lawful%criticism,%and%their%members%are%subjected%to%all%sorts%of%pressures%and%restrictions%to%stop%them.% Islamic%Associations%for%example%which%have%over%60%years%of%history%almost%twice%as%of%the%Islamic% republic%regimeE%and%in%recent%years%have%been%the%only%official%criticizing%student%associations%in% universities,%despite%their%massive%number%of%student%members,%have%been%shut%down%by%the% -
Analysis of Geographical Accessibility to Rural Health Houses Using the Geospatial Information System, a Case Study: Khuzestan Province, South-West Iran
Acta Medica Mediterranea, 2015, 31: 1447 ANALYSIS OF GEOGRAPHICAL ACCESSIBILITY TO RURAL HEALTH HOUSES USING THE GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM, A CASE STUDY: KHUZESTAN PROVINCE, SOUTH-WEST IRAN FARAHNAZ SADOUGHI1, 2, JAVAD ZAREI1, ALI MOHAMMADI3, HOJAT HATAMINEJAD 4, SARA SAKIPOUR5 1Department of Health Information Management, School of Health Management and Information Science, Iran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, I.R. Iran - 2Health Management and Economics Research Center, School of Health Management and Information Sciences, Iran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, I.R. Iran - 3Assistant professor of Health Information Management, Department of Health Information Technology, Paramedical School, Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences, Kermanshah I.R. Iran - 4PhD candidate, Geography and Urban Planning, University of Tehran, Tehran - 5Office of Medical Record and Statistics, Vice-Chancellor for Treatment, Ahvaz Jundishapur University of Medical Sciences, Ahvaz, I.R. Iran ABSTRACT Background: The use of rural health houses is one of the important approaches for delivering health services but, inappro- priate infrastructures and limited resources make it difficult to design and implement plans to enhance and improve health services in rural areas. The aim of this study was to analyze the accessibility to rural health care services in the province of Khuzestan Materials and methods: This applied research was conducted in Khuzestan Province, south-west Iran with a cross-sectional approach in 2014. The population of the study was the villages and rural health houses. All the villages and rural health houses were included in the study without sampling. Descriptive data collected with a checklist from the Statistical Centre of Iran, IT Department of the Management Deputy of the Governor’s Office and Ahvaz Jundishapur and Dezful University of Medical Sciences and spatial data obtained from the national Cartographic Center. -
Sheikh Qassim, the Bahraini Shi'a, and Iran
k o No. 4 • July 2012 o l Between Reform and Revolution: Sheikh Qassim, t the Bahraini Shi’a, and Iran u O By Ali Alfoneh The political stability of the small island state of Bahrain—home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet—matters to the n United States. And Sheikh Qassim, who simultaneously leads the Bahraini Shi’a majority’s just struggle for a more r democratic society and acts as an agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran, matters to the future of Bahrain. A survey e of the history of Shi’a activism in Bahrain, including Sheikh Qassim’s political life, shows two tendencies: reform and t revolution. Regardless of Sheikh Qassim’s dual roles and the Shi’a protest movement’s periodic ties to the regime in Tehran, the United States should do its utmost to reconcile the rulers and the ruled in Bahrain by defending the s civil rights of the Bahraini Shi’a. This action would not only conform to the United States’ principle of promoting a democracy and human rights abroad, but also help stabilize Bahrain and the broader Persian Gulf region and under- mine the ability of the regime in Tehran to continue to exploit the sectarian conflict in Bahrain in a way that broadens E its sphere of influence and foments anti-Americanism. e Every Friday, the elderly Ayatollah Isa Ahmad The Sunni ruling elites of Bahrain, however, l Qassim al-Dirazi al-Bahrani, more commonly see Sheikh Qassim not as a reformer but as d known as Sheikh Qassim, climbs the stairs to the a zealous revolutionary serving the Islamic pulpit at the Imam al-Sadiq mosque in Diraz, d Bahrain, to deliver his sermon. -
Clinical Laboratory Doctors
Laboratory & Diagnosis Official Journal of Iranian Association of Clinical Laboratory Doctors Editorial Manager: Dr. Mohammad Sahebalzamani, DCLS Editor in Chief: Dr. S. Mahdi Bolourchi, DCLS Editorial Board Members: Dr. Mohammad Reza Bakhtiari, DCLS, PhD Dr. Davood Behravan, DCLS Dr. S. Mahdi Bolourchi, DCLS Dr. Behzad Poopak, DCLS, PhD Dr. Majid Jalilzadeh Khoei, DCLS Dr. S. Mohammad Hasan Hashemimadani, DCLS Dr. Ali Sadeghitabar, DCLS Dr. Mohammad Sahebalzamani, DCLS Dr. Mohammad Javad Soltanpour, DCLS Executive Board Members: S. Farzaneh Bathaei Sara Tondro Abolfazl Yousefian Navid Ghahremani Tahereh Komasi Circulation: 3000 Copies Address: No.29, Ardeshir Alley, Hashtbehesht St., Golha Square, Fatemi Ave, Tehran 1414734711 – Iran. Telefax: (+98 21) 88970700 Laboratory & Diagnosis Vol.3, No14, Suplememt Issue Massage of Congress Chairman After several months passed over the 4th international and 9th national congress on quality improvement in clinical laboratories, also gaining valuable experiences and reviewing over benefits and disadvantaging points, now there is a new chance to pro- vide The 5th international & 10th national congress, and all these opportunities are available now because of GODs grace. Congress efforts are done to improve quality of laboratory services by providing appropriate environment for intellectual agreement, information exchange, presenting the results of different researches and sharing updated scientific information of Iranian and abroad professors, elites, colleagues. Extending and optimizing laboratory services in different branches of clinical laboratory sciences as desired of society requirement are the main objectives of congress. We hope all those who are involved in various fields of laboratory sciences either in Iran or abroad consider to take part in this splendid scientifically stage and give us this chance to take advantage of their knowledge and experiences. -
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IN THE NAME OF GOD IRAN NAMA RAILWAY TOURISM GUIDE OF IRAN List of Content Preamble ....................................................................... 6 History ............................................................................. 7 Tehran Station ................................................................ 8 Tehran - Mashhad Route .............................................. 12 IRAN NRAILWAYAMA TOURISM GUIDE OF IRAN Tehran - Jolfa Route ..................................................... 32 Collection and Edition: Public Relations (RAI) Tourism Content Collection: Abdollah Abbaszadeh Design and Graphics: Reza Hozzar Moghaddam Photos: Siamak Iman Pour, Benyamin Tehran - Bandarabbas Route 48 Khodadadi, Hatef Homaei, Saeed Mahmoodi Aznaveh, javad Najaf ...................................... Alizadeh, Caspian Makak, Ocean Zakarian, Davood Vakilzadeh, Arash Simaei, Abbas Jafari, Mohammadreza Baharnaz, Homayoun Amir yeganeh, Kianush Jafari Producer: Public Relations (RAI) Tehran - Goragn Route 64 Translation: Seyed Ebrahim Fazli Zenooz - ................................................ International Affairs Bureau (RAI) Address: Public Relations, Central Building of Railways, Africa Blvd., Argentina Sq., Tehran- Iran. www.rai.ir Tehran - Shiraz Route................................................... 80 First Edition January 2016 All rights reserved. Tehran - Khorramshahr Route .................................... 96 Tehran - Kerman Route .............................................114 Islamic Republic of Iran The Railways