k o No. 1 • January 2012 o l Esmail Qaani: The Next Revolutionary Guards t Quds Force Commander? u O By Ali Alfoneh This is the fourth in a series of Middle Eastern Outlooks about the IRGC QF.1 n r Should Major General Qassem Suleimani, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) e commander, pursue a political career ahead of Iran’s 2013 presidential election, he may be replaced by Brigadier t General Esmail Qaani, IRGC QF deputy. Qaani is uncharismatic and a less distinguished military commander than Suleimani, but his operational battlefield experience, network within the IRGC, and long history of acquaintance s with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei qualify him for such an appointment. a The Iranian media’s coverage of Major General Eastern Outlook, the fourth in a series about the E Qassem Suleimani, IRGC QF commander, reached IRGC QF, presents data on Qaani extracted new heights after calls for his assassination in two from Persian-language open-source material and e expert testimonies presented at the October 26, discusses Qaani’s relationship with Suleimani. l 2011, session of the US House Committee on d Homeland Security.2 The media attention was followed by the Iranian parliament’s November 2, d Key points in this Outlook: i 2011, declaration of support for the IRGC QF.3 The intense media exposure of Suleimani in • A rift among ruling elites, harsher sanc- Iran may be a sign that he is the choice of the tions, and the threat of strikes against its M Iranian political leadership’s for the next head nuclear facilities means the Tehran regime is looking for a leader like Islamic Revolu- of the executive branch. He may not be a great tionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) statesman, but in the face of increased military Commander Qassem Suleimani to unify threats against Iran’s nuclear program and a height- the nation. ened level of friction between the civilian leaders of the Islamic Republic, Suleimani, the hero from • Should Suleimani pursue politics, he the war with Iraq, could serve as a unifying figure. may be replaced by his deputy, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, who is believed to There is no information available about succes- be directing the IRGC QF’s activities in sion patterns in the IRGC QF command, but Afghanistan. should Suleimani leave his position as IRGC QF commander and pursue a political career, he may • While Qaani has the battlefield-hardened be replaced by Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, credibility to command the Quds Force, IRGC QF deputy, about whom little is written in his focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and central Asia raises important questions as English-language open-source material. This Middle the United States is planning its military Ali Alfoneh ([email protected]) is a resident fellow withdrawal from Afghanistan. at AEI. 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org - 2- Esmail Qaani: A Biography The earliest documented reference to Qaani as an IRGC QF commander appears in Mohammad Mohad- According to Green Movement opposition sources, Qaani dessin’s 1993 edition of Islamic Fundamentalism—The was born in Bojnord in North Khorasan province,4 which New Global Threat, in which Qaani is identified as Fourth corresponds with his military career in various IRGC units Ansar Corps of the IRGC QF commander.16 According from the province and his frequent presence in the Razavi to Mohaddessin, the Fourth Ansar Corps is “responsible Khorasan and North Khorasan provinces.5 (See appen- for Guards Corps’ activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, dix.) Qaani’s date of birth is unknown, but he appears and Asian republics,”17 which supports the hypothesis slightly older than the fifty-four-year-old Suleimani. on Qaani’s engagements with the Northern Alliance in Qaani has at least one son, Ali Qaani, who is suppos- the 1990s. edly a student of electrical engineering at the Mashhad branch of Azad University.6 This source also writes that the son was allegedly arrested for participating in anti- The intense media exposure of Suleimani government rallies in 2009 at university campuses in in Iran may be a sign that he is the choice 7 Mashhad. Qaani has dismissed this claim. The open- of the Iranian political leadership’s for the source materials also refer to a certain “Dr. Ghaani”—the alternative Latin transliteration of Qaani—who is the next head of the executive branch. principal of the Shi’a Islamic College in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and may be related to the IRGC QF deputy.8 It would make sense that a relative of Qaani is engaged in A second reference to Qaani—this time as IRGC QF religious missionary work of the Intelligence Ministry. deputy commander—appears in an Iraqi intelligence The earliest record of Qaani’s activities in the IRGC dates schematic of the QF organization, dated 2000,18 which back to December 1982, when then IRGC Commander has a striking resemblance to Mohaddessin’s IRGC QF Mohsen Rezai tasked a leading IRGC commander from Isfa- organizational chart. It is, therefore, likely that Qaani was han, Morteza Qorbani, to identify competent guardsmen to appointed QF deputy commander during the escalation of form a division from Khorasan province.9 Qorbani presented Iran and the Taliban sometime between 1993 and 2000. three individuals to Rezai who would compose the nucleus Later reports on Qaani’s military career appear contra- of the newly established division, which was later called the dictory. On May 6, 2006, Major General Yahya Rahim Fifth Nasr Division: Nour-Ali Shoushtari, a key IRGC Safavi appointed Qaani IRGC counterintelligence commander who was assassinated on October 18, 2009, in deputy, serving under Hojjat al-Eslam Gholam-Hossein Pishin in Sistan va Baluchestan province;10 Mohammad- Ramezani,19 but in press reports since May 6, 2006, Qaani Baqer Qalibaf, currently mayor of Tehran; and Qaani.11 is presented as IRGC QF deputy. (See appendix.) The dual Toward the end of the war with Iraq, Rezai appointed Qaani function of Qaani as both IRGC QF deputy and IRGC Fifth Nasr Division commander, replacing Qalibaf.12 counterintelligence deputy is unusual, but not implausible. In the immediate aftermath of the war, on August 17, 1988, Rezai appointed Qaani division deputy of the IRGC Qaani’s War-Era Experiences and Leadership Ground Forces’ eighth operational zone, headquartered in Mashhad.13 The Persian-language open-source material In the course of the war against Iraq, Qaani and the Fifth does not provide any information about Qaani’s activities Nasr Division participated in successful operations such as from August 1988 to the late 1990s, but one can safely Ashura (October 18–22, 1984),20 liberating the Fasil and assume that Qaani was involved in suppressing the June Garkoni heights in the north of Meimak;21 the Valfajr 1992 social unrest in Mashhad.14 It is equally likely that VIII operation (February 9–April 29, 1986),22 capturing Qaani was involved in the IRGC’s operations against drug al-Faw Peninsula;23 Karbala I (June 30–July 10, 1986),24 cartels infiltrating Khorasan province from Afghanistan15 liberating Mehran;25 Nasr VIII (November 20–21, 1987),26 and in the IRGC’s support to the Jebhe-ye Mouttahid-i stabilizing the Iranian positions around Maoot;27 and Islami-yi Milli Bara-yi Nijat-i Afghanistan [United Islamic Karbala V (January 9–March 3, 1987),28 capturing Shalam- National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan], also cheh.29 However, Qaani also participated in the disastrous known as the Northern Alliance, against the Taliban in Beit al-Moqaddas VII operation (June 25, 1988),30 which the late 1990s. resulted in the Iranian debacle at Majnoun peninsula.31 - 3- Qaani is at least partially to blame for the defeat at with Iraq and make only passing remarks to internal Iran- Majnoun, since he served as Fifth Nasr Division ian affairs. More recently, both men have started com- commander during the operation. menting on the Arab Spring, or “the Islamic awakening” in the Islamic Republic’s official parlance. Decision makers planning US military However, their styles are also remarkably different. withdrawal from Afghanistan can safely While the charismatic Suleimani, particularly in his youth, managed to move men with his simple vocabulary assume that an IRGC QF led by Qaani and deeply personal and humble style, Qaani’s speeches would engage much more aggressively in seem completely impersonal and rehearsed and do not reveal much about him. Afghanistan and central Asia. While Suleimani is usually more direct in his speeches, Qaani hides behind official rhetoric. This is particularly Qaani seems to share Suleimani’s ability for improvisa- true of Qaani’s few remarks on internal affairs in Iran.40 tion in military operations. While planning the Nasr Also, Qaani’s statements on regional developments closely VIII operation, for example, Qaani suggested alternative echo the platitudes of the political level: “The Islamic ways of transporting automobiles to the other side of the Republic is the safe haven of all [world revolutionary] Qal’e-Cholan River even before the bridge had been movements,” Qaani said on one occasion.41 The same goes built.32 Another characteristic Suleimani and Qaani share for Qaani’s statements about martyrs,42 and standard is their participation in high-risk reconnaissance missions mantra on the Arab spring as continuity of “the path of prior to military operations.33 Like Suleimani, Qaani Iran’s Islamic revolution.”43 He has even claimed that “the stresses the importance of the IRGC commanders acting sacred defense” (the Iran/Iraq War) is the “role model of the as the vanguards of the forces during attacks rather than current Islamic awakening [Arab Spring] in the region.”44 leading from behind.34 Qaani’s war-era record does not display the same Qaani’s Network degree of distinction as Suleimani’s, but at times Qaani has displayed the courage to question the wisdom of Qaani and Suleimani belong to the same network,45 but decisions made by his superiors.