CONFIDENTIAL NOT FOR CIRCULATION

MEMORANDUM

TO: DR. SAEB ERAKAT

FROM: NSU SETTLEMENTS FILE SUBJECT: PRE-PERMANENT STATUS SETTLEMENT EVACUATIONS (PART I): AN ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING PROPOSALS DATE: 30 APRIL 2006

The purpose of this paper is to assess various unilateral evacuation proposals put forth thus far, including Kadima’s “convergence” plan, and their implications for Palestinian interests.

I. BACKGROUND Since the evacuation of some 8,500 Israeli settlers from Gaza and four small West Bank settlements as part of Sharon’s unilateral “disengagement” plan, there are growing indications that Israel may seek to carry out further settlement evacuations (as distinct from military withdrawals or redeployments) on a unilateral basis. While a negotiated settlement evacuation remains the preferred strategic option for Palestinians, the growing acceptability of Israeli unilateralism in Israel and abroad suggests that Palestinians may be forced to prepare for the possibility of further disengagement-type evacuations prior to (or instead of) permanent status negotiations, most likely in the context of a “state with provisional borders”. Many in Israel and elsewhere appear to view further unilateral settlement evacuations with increasing favor, particularly if Israeli and/or international confidence in the PA continues to wane. A recent poll shows that a slight majority of Israelis (51%) would favor further unilateral ‘disengagement-type’ evacuations by Israel in the event of the Palestinian leadership’s inability to negotiate or deliver a permanent status deal.1 Indeed, Israeli and international support for unilateralism may now be even higher following Hamas’s recent election victory. A number of unilateral evacuation proposals have already been put forward since the Gaza evacuation, by both the Israeli “left” and “center”. The newly-elected Kadima Party, whose platform is ostensibly based on the Roadmap, has made a second disengagement, which it now calls “convergence”, a mainstay of its political program and is reportedly considering various evacuation scenarios.2 Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has said that Israel would determine its borders unilaterally by 2010 (or possibly as soon as 2008) if no negotiating partner emerged, and intends to seek U.S. backing for his “convergence” plan during his upcoming visit to Washington next month. Israel’s Labor Party, which is slated to join the new government, has also expressed support for unilateral “separation” from Palestinians, including the possibility of unilateral evacuation or voluntary re-location of some Israeli settlers, if it is deemed that no negotiating partner exists.3

1 REUTERS, “Most Israelis back unilateral W. Bank pullout-poll,” 20 January 2006. 2 See Ha’aretz, “Sources: PM sought deal with PA on evacuating 20 settlements,” 16 January 2006. 3 Ha’aretz, “Peretz: Settlers who leave West Bank will be fairly compensated,” 23 January 2006. See also Reuters, “Israeli Labour chief supports evacuating settlements,” 12 November 2005.

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II. EXISTING PLANS & PROPOSALS To date, a number of proposals for evacuating a limited number of settlements prior to permanent status negotiations have been put forth. Most of these are Israeli-driven proposals, which to varying degrees are designed to reinforce Israeli control over areas west of the Wall, an expanded “Greater Jerusalem” corridor and the Jordan Valley. Five different proposals are considered below, four of which are Israeli, including Kadima’s “convergence” plan.

A. Shikaki Proposal In December 2003, Dr. Khalil Shikaki of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) published a detailed plan for implementing the Quartet Roadmap within a three-year period. As part of his five-step “work plan”, Shikaki called for the immediate evacuation of 34 West Bank settlements, along with all 21 Gaza settlements, in order to pave the way for a “state with provisional borders”, followed by permanent status negotiations.4 Though the concept of a “state with provisional borders” is only mentioned as an optional scenario in Phase II of the Roadmap, Shikaki believes that “[e]arly Palestinian statehood is the means to kickstart the peace process; it is not the end of the process.” For Shikaki, the notion of Palestinian “viability” depends upon the realization of certain territorial, economic and security requirements, as well as on sovereignty and overall governance, prior to permanent status negotiations. The proposal lists 34 West Bank settlements, at the time housing some 14,742 settlers, for immediate evacuation, four of which (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, Homesh) have already been evacuated as part of the “disengagement” plan. According to Shikaki, these settlements, most of which are located along the West Bank’s heavily populated central ridge, pose the greatest threat to the “minimum short-term contiguity” required by a future Palestinian state. Evacuating the remaining 30 settlements, which now contain at least 16,674 settlers,5 would leave Palestinians in control over some 68% of the West Bank. (See Map 1 and Table 1) There are significant problems with Shikaki’s proposal, not least of which relate to the risk of reinforcing the major settlement blocs, along with Israeli control over Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley. Regarding Jerusalem, Shikaki states only that “the Palestinian state will declare its intention to have its capital in Arab East Jerusalem.” While Shikaki recognizes that “Israeli annexation of three Israeli settlement blocs around Jerusalem would completely cut off Arab East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank,” he fails to propose any tangible safeguards to prevent this from happening and relegates the city’s fate to future permanent status negotiations. In addition, the plan seems to adopt a rather loose definition of “contiguity”, whereby the West Bank would be divided into two distinct cantons, as well as numerous small “islands” of Palestinian control in the midst of Israeli settlement blocs. In fairness, however, it should be noted that the Shikaki proposal was conceived at a time when the overall route of the Wall was not yet known,6 and prior to the implementation of Israel’s segregated road scheme (“transportation contiguity”) and other aspects of its “unilateral separation” policy. At the same time, Shikaki is not oblivious to the potentially serious drawbacks entailed in a “state with provisional borders,” which, in addition to “geographic contiguity”, he says must also have “genuine sovereign attributes (such as control over resources and international crossings)”, including “a detailed description of security arrangements, provisional borders, and the exact attributes of sovereignty,” for it to

4 See Khalil Shikaki, Building a State: How to Make a Roadmap that Works for Palestinians and Israelis, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution (No. 1, December 2003) 5 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2004). 6 The first official route of the Wall was published by the Israeli Ministry of Defense in October 2003.

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be acceptable to Palestinians.7 In some respects, the Shikaki proposal was actually somewhat visionary. In addition to being among the first to propose a comprehensive and detailed plan for restarting the peace process and, in effect, for “operationalizing” the Roadmap, Shikaki was the first to recognize the need to go beyond the Oslo framework by proposing settlement evacuations alongside the redeployment of Israeli forces.

B. Tafnit Plan The Tafnit Plan was proposed in September 2005, almost immediately after the Gaza evacuation. It is currently being marketed by former National Security Adviser Uzi Dayan and others in the security establishment as a “realistic and responsible” proposal put forth by Israelis purporting to be “centrists”. The plan outlines three primary goals, which are to:  Reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians;  Strengthen the security of Israel and the foundations of its society; and  Enable the resumption of permanent status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians with the aim of ending the conflict on the basis of two states. To this end, the plan calls for the “re-deployment” of Israeli forces behind a “temporary disengagement line”—corresponding roughly to the Wall in the west and the Allon Road in the east—over a three-year period. (See Map 2) During that time, Israel would evacuate an additional 20,000 settlers from 32 West Bank settlements. However, the redeployment/evacuation would begin only after completion of the “security fence”. Though it purports to be a “novel and necessary conceptual plan”, the Tafnit Plan is in reality quite similar to any number of proposals put forth over the years, including the Allon Plan of 1968. In fact, it is nearly identical to the original Wall route of October 2003, which excludes the Palestinian corridor south of Route 443 stretching from Beit Surik to the Latrun, the enclaves of Birnabala and Azzun ‘Itma, the entire Jordan Valley and the Judean Desert (eastern Bethlehem and Hebron governorates). In addition, the plan simultaneously calls for “strengthening… Jerusalem and a number of [other] designated settlement areas in the West Bank” over the long-term.8 Thus, the 32 settlements proposed to be evacuated are mostly isolated and non-viable settlements that are, from Israel’s point of view, relatively expendable and which, in any final status scenario, would have to be evacuated anyway. (See Table 2) The Tafnit Plan is driven almost exclusively by Israeli demographic concerns and other Israeli interests rather than on any Palestinian economic, territorial, or political needs. It also conforms neatly to the current Israeli strategy of unilateralism, for instance, by claiming that the Land for Peace formula, which has served as the basis for all Arab-Israeli negotiations and peace plans, including the Roadmap, for several decades has now “lost substantial weight” as a result of the Gaza evacuation. Indeed, Tafnit’s authors go even further by threatening: “If it is not possible to reach an agreement with the Palestinians within a designated time, Israel will treat the disengagement line as if it was a border line.” As such, Tafnit is highly compatible with—and could well become the basis for— Kadima’s “convergence” plan. Indeed, some speculate that the Tafnit Plan was in fact a “trial balloon” put forth by Sharon himself following the Gaza evacuation to begin laying the groundwork for a Palestinian “state with provisional borders”. Regardless of its political origins or motivations, it is clear that the Tafnit Plan offers few, if any, tangible benefits to

7 Shikaki, Building a State, pp. 18-19. 8 “The Tafnit Plan: A New National Security Agenda for Israel,” September 2005, (available at: http://tafnit.org/apage/162.php).

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Palestinians and would actually pose considerable harm to Palestinian interests, both as an “interim” arrangement and in terms of our permanent status goals.

C. Peace Now Plan Not to be outdone, Israel’s far left has proposed its own settlement evacuation plan. In October 2005, Peace Now unveiled a three-part “peace initiative”, which calls for the evacuation of 43 West Bank settlements. (See Map 3) According to its authors, the Peace Now plan is aimed at achieving the following three objectives:  Renewing dialogue, coordination and negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians on three levels: political (i.e., negotiations), security, and administrative;  Evacuating settlement outposts and freezing settlement construction (“all construction beyond the Green Line”);  Phased evacuation of remaining settlements in coordination with the PA and within the framework of negotiations for a final agreement.9 The proposed evacuations would take place in three phases, the first two of which are to be carried out by Israel unilaterally. Peace Now identifies five criteria for determining which settlements should be evacuated by Israel prior to permanent status negotiations: (1) proximity to Palestinian population centers, (2) distance from the 1967 Border, (3) settlement size and accessibility, (4) desire of settlers to leave, and (5) likelihood of being annexed by Israel (as part of PS agreement on land swaps). Phase 1: Immediate evacuation of 26 “isolated settlements surrounded by Palestinian communities”: Hermesh, Mevo Dotan, Elon Moreh, Yitzhar, Itamar, Bracha, Kfar Tapuach, Talmon, Dolev, Halamish, Nahaliel, Ateret, Hebron (old city), Telem, Adora, Negohot, Asfar, Ma‘ale Amos, Nokdim, Tekoa‘, Kfar Eldad, Otniel, Haggai, Pnei Hever, Karmel, Ma‘on. (Settler Pop: 13,635) Phase 2: Evacuation of 17 additional settlements: Shavei Shomron, Qedumim, Eli, Shiloh, Ma'ale Levona, Bet El, ‘Ofra, Pesagot, Kochav Ya‘akov, Geva‘ Binyamin (Adam), ‘Enav, Avnei Hefetz, Ma‘ale Michmash, Almon (Anatot), Qedar, Karmei Tzur, Migdalim. (Settler Pop: 27,806) Phase 3: Further evacuations determined through permanent status negotiations, but with the goal of “removing the smallest number of settlers possible from their homes and giving the Palestinians alternative land as part of a land swap deal.” The total number of Israeli settlers to be evacuated by Israel unilaterally during the first two phases is 41,441, or approximately 10% of the total settler population. On its face, the Peace Now plan seems very similar to the Tafnit Plan, which should come as no surprise since both plans are motivated principally by Israeli interests. Many of the settlements to be evacuated, particularly in Phase 1, are identical to those in the Tafnit plan. Like Tafnit, Peace Now identifies mainly small, isolated, and ultimately unsustainable settlements for immediate evacuation, or in other words, settlements that are relatively low priority for Israel in terms of annexation. (See B.2 below) The Peace Now plan goes much further than Tafnit however, both in terms of the scope/selection of the settlements to be evacuated and its overall political message. The number of settlers evacuated under Peace Now’s plan is nearly 2½ times that of the Tafnit plan. Furthermore, many of the settlements identified by Peace Now are not necessarily easy

9 Peace Now, “The Peace Now Plan: After the Disengagement” (available at: http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=69&docid=1508)

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candidates for evacuation. (See Table 3) Several Phase 2 settlements, like Bet El and Ofra for example, have been previously identified by Sharon and others as remaining under Israeli sovereignty, while others are targets of ongoing expansion efforts, such as Geva‘ Binyamin. Moreover, some of its settlements appear to be strategically targeted, for example by violating the Wall (Qedumim, Almon, Qedar). Similarly, removal of the Binyamin East bloc (Ofra, Bet El, Pesagot, Kochav Ya‘akov) would undermine Israeli settlement contiguity in Metropolitan East Jerusalem and re-open Palestinian access to Route #60. Lastly, unlike Tafnit, the Peace Now plan stresses the need to restart the political process and that the fate of all remaining settlements, as well as final borders, are to be determined only through negotiations. For instance, the plan states that the “Green line” (1967 border) will serve as the “guideline to determine fixed boundaries between the Israeli and Palestinian states.”

D. Ayalon / One Home Plans In December 2005, former Shin Bet chief and Labor Party member Ami Ayalon proposed that Israel evacuate all settlements situated east of the Wall by 2010, which includes approximately 70 settlements and a settler population of roughly 60,000. Ayalon also called for applying the Evacuation Compensation Law, which was enacted in the context of the Gaza evacuation, to current settlers. According to Ayalon, “It is unethical to build houses, knowing that they will be destroyed, and it is immoral to send soldiers to kill and be killed over land that will not be controlled by Israel.”10 A recent Israeli poll showed that approximately 25% of Israeli settlers (not including those in East Jerusalem) are prepared to leave their settlements immediately in exchange for compensation.11 The poll was commissioned by One Home (Bayit Ahad), an organization established in the wake of the Gaze evacuation and dedicated to promoting voluntary evacuation of Israeli settlers from parts of the OPT. However, the problem with such “voluntary” evacuations, which are aimed mainly at economic or quality-of-life settlers, is that the more ideological and radical settlers may simply come and take their places. In order to be meaningful, even on a piecemeal basis, such evacuations would have to be coupled with Israeli military redeployments and arrangements for the hand-over of evacuated areas to permanent Palestinian control.12

E. Kadima’s “Convergence” Plan Since the election of his Kadima Party in April, Israeli and international attention has focused on Olmert’s plan to unilaterally evacuate small, isolated settlements east of the Wall. Olmert has not yet offered details of the plan, only that “most of the settlements that would have to be removed” will be “converged” into the larger settlement blocs. Indeed, the “convergence” plan is explicitly aimed at consolidating Israeli control over the main settlement blocs, identified as Ma‘aleh Adumim, ‘Etzion, Ariel, Shomron-Qedumim, Ofra- Beit El, and Qiryat Arba-Hebron, along with settlements in Israel’s self-proclaimed municipality of Jerusalem. “The rest of the territories,” says Olmert, “will not have any Israeli presence and will allow territorial contiguity for a future Palestinian state.”13

10 Ha’aretz, “Ayalon: Evacuate all settlements beyond the fence by 2010,” 6 December 2005. 11 Ha’aretz, “Poll: 25% of settlers east of fence prepared to leave homes,” 20 November 2005 12 The term “permanent” here is not necessarily intended to imply a permanent end of occupation, but rather that, by evacuating certain settlements, Israel is relinquishing any permanent claim to the area. 13 Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Olmert seeks to boost settlement blocs,” 11 April 2006.

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Olmert appears ready to sell his plan to the Bush Administration during his upcoming visit to Washington, which has already said it could support further unilateral evacuations but not a unilateral determination of Israel’s borders.14 According to former Shin Bet director and Kadima member Avi Dichter however, unlike in Gaza, a “second disengagement” would only be “from the settlements but not from the land.” In other words, Israel would maintain its military presence and control over the whole West Bank, including any evacuated areas.15 Under the Kadima plan, anywhere from 16,000 to 60,000 West Bank settlers would be unilaterally evacuated, depending on whether or not Jordan Valley settlements and other blocs were included. While the exact shape of what Olmert intends to propose to the Bush Administration in May is not yet known, we can identify three broad scenarios for what a second disengagement by Kadima might look like.

Scenario 1: The minimalist scenario was outlined by Dichter in March. Dichter called for the evacuation of several settlements, including Elon Moreh, Yitzhar, Itamar, Kfar Tapuah, Bracha, Eli, Shilo, Ateret, Halamish, Pesagot, Noqdim, Teqoa, Ma‘ale Amos, Metzad, Pnei Hever, Maon, Karmel, and Otniel. In all, just over 15,000 settlers in 21 settlements,16 most of which are small, isolated and ultimately unsustainable, would be “folded into” the seven main blocs. (See Map and Table 4.1) This scenario offers little or no benefit to Palestinians, and could possibly even produce more restrictions on Palestinians, as was the case in the northern West Bank after the first disengagement, particularly if the Israeli army remains in the evacuated areas. Scenario 2: Another possibility would be for Israel to evacuate most of the remaining settlements east of the Wall and west of the Jordan Valley, which would entail removing about 33,300 settlers from some 47 settlements. (See Map and Table 4.2) Under this scenario, Palestinians would be left with three semi-contiguous cantons that are disconnected from each other on approximately 60% of the West Bank. This is probably the most preferable scenario for the current Israeli government, particularly if it remains intent on avoiding PS negotiations for the foreseeable future. Scenario 3: The most far-reaching option would be for Israel to evacuate all of its settlements east of the Wall, including the Jordan Valley. (See Map and Table 4.3) This scenario is reportedly favored by Olmert, who says Israel is prepared to evacuate up to 70,000 settlers from 68 settlements. The proposal, which would entail a withdrawal from 90% of the West Bank in exchange for U.S. recognition of Israel’s fulfillment of the territorial requirements of UNSC 242, was recently floated by Eival Giladi and Giora Eiland at last week’s Saban Center conference in Washington. Both Europe and the U.S. have indicated a willingness to accept a unilateral evacuation that includes the Jordan Valley, though this does not necessarily preclude Israel’s retention of some kind of “security zone” along the Jordanian border. However, while such a proposal may seem attractive on its face, it is unlikely that either Israel or the international community would be willing to “reward” a Hamas-led government with 90% of the West Bank and an evacuation of tens of thousand of settlers, while asking nothing in return. Furthermore, the logistical implications of such a large-scale withdrawal, which could require such intensive coordination with Palestinians and third-party involvement as to negate its unilateral nature, not to mention the prospect of confronting thousands of hard-core settlers, make such a scenario highly unlikely.

14 Ha’aretz, “Sources: U.S. won’t view pullout line as final border,” 26 April 2006. 15 Ynet News, “Dichter presents: Next disengagement,” 6 March 2006. 16 These include the settlements of Rehelim and Shvut Rahel, officially parts of Kfar Tapuah and Shilo, respectively. In addition, though not specifically mentioned by Dichter, Ma’ale Levona is included in this scenario since it is unlikely to remain if nearby settlements are removed.

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III. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS Most of the above plans fall somewhere between re-packaged versions of the Allon Plan (July 1967) and the original Israeli proposal at Camp David (July 2000). With the notable exception of the Peace Now plan, most are intended to reinforce the Wall, as well as Israeli control over Metropolitan Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley, while evacuating only those settlements that are either unsustainable over the medium- or long-term, or that would inevitably have to be removed as part any final status scenario. Kadima’s “convergence” plan is particularly dangerous in that it calls not just for evacuating settlements but “converging” them into the major settlement blocs behind the Wall. In short, beyond the “trauma” of evacuation, these proposals entail very little cost for Israel while providing very little benefit to Palestinians. In the meantime, the current Israeli government has not shown a willingness to resume negotiations, either before or after it was elected. On the contrary, there is every indication that a Kadima-led government intends to continue on the path of unilateralism based on the “no partner” pretext. Having made promises to carry out further West Bank evacuations and establish Israel’s borders unilaterally central components of his campaign, Olmert is now preparing to sell his plan to Washington. According to one official described as being “at the heart of policymaking” in Israel, “There will be no negotiations with the Palestinians… There are two choices after elections, doing nothing and a second disengagement from parts of the West Bank.”17 The logic behind current Israeli thinking is simple and undeniable: why should Israel seek to negotiate, and therefore compromise, when it can simply take what it wants unilaterally? Unfortunately, despite the Gaza evacuation’s failure to provide any tangible benefits for Palestinians, the United States and other Quartet members may have their own incentives for supporting—or at least acquiescing to—Israeli unilateralism, particularly since Hamas’s election victory.18 Both the U.S. and the EU, who thus far have shown little enthusiasm for an immediate resumption of negotiations, may find it more convenient to offer qualified support for Olmert’s “convergence” plan than to invest in a genuine attempt at reviving the Roadmap or address inconsistencies in their own policies. Thus, while President Abbas and the PLO leadership remain committed to a negotiated settlement, absent some kind Palestinian initiative that would dramatically shift the current political dynamic, this is not likely to happen anytime soon.19 In conclusion, NSU strongly advises the Leadership against engaging Kadima’s or any other unilateral evacuation plan. However, as a rhetorical point perhaps, if pressed to comment on Olmert’s proposal, it may be worthwhile to point out that the threats posed to Palestinian interests by Israeli settlements are not just related to how many settlers or settlements are evacuated, but which settlements and where. Indeed, the evacuation of just 30,000 settlers from a single settlement like Ma‘ale Adumim, which closes off Palestinian East Jerusalem and severs the West Bank in half, would be far more meaningful than even evacuating twice as many settlers under the “convergence” plan.

17 Quoted in Matthew Tostevin, “Israel's unilateral moves gather momentum,” REUTERS, 15 March 2006. 18 See Washington Post, “Israel's West Bank Choice” (editorial), 15 March 2006. 19 One such initiative, the possibility of pursuing strategically-targeted settlement evacuations on the basis of Palestinian interests, is discussed in a follow-on (Part II) to this paper.

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