CONFIDENTIAL NOT FOR CIRCULATION MEMORANDUM TO: DR. SAEB ERAKAT FROM: NSU SETTLEMENTS FILE SUBJECT: PRE-PERMANENT STATUS SETTLEMENT EVACUATIONS (PART I): AN ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING PROPOSALS DATE: 30 APRIL 2006 The purpose of this paper is to assess various unilateral evacuation proposals put forth thus far, including Kadima’s “convergence” plan, and their implications for Palestinian interests. I. BACKGROUND Since the evacuation of some 8,500 Israeli settlers from Gaza and four small West Bank settlements as part of Sharon’s unilateral “disengagement” plan, there are growing indications that Israel may seek to carry out further settlement evacuations (as distinct from military withdrawals or redeployments) on a unilateral basis. While a negotiated settlement evacuation remains the preferred strategic option for Palestinians, the growing acceptability of Israeli unilateralism in Israel and abroad suggests that Palestinians may be forced to prepare for the possibility of further disengagement-type evacuations prior to (or instead of) permanent status negotiations, most likely in the context of a “state with provisional borders”. Many in Israel and elsewhere appear to view further unilateral settlement evacuations with increasing favor, particularly if Israeli and/or international confidence in the PA continues to wane. A recent poll shows that a slight majority of Israelis (51%) would favor further unilateral ‘disengagement-type’ evacuations by Israel in the event of the Palestinian leadership’s inability to negotiate or deliver a permanent status deal.1 Indeed, Israeli and international support for unilateralism may now be even higher following Hamas’s recent election victory. A number of unilateral evacuation proposals have already been put forward since the Gaza evacuation, by both the Israeli “left” and “center”. The newly-elected Kadima Party, whose platform is ostensibly based on the Roadmap, has made a second disengagement, which it now calls “convergence”, a mainstay of its political program and is reportedly considering various evacuation scenarios.2 Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has said that Israel would determine its borders unilaterally by 2010 (or possibly as soon as 2008) if no negotiating partner emerged, and intends to seek U.S. backing for his “convergence” plan during his upcoming visit to Washington next month. Israel’s Labor Party, which is slated to join the new government, has also expressed support for unilateral “separation” from Palestinians, including the possibility of unilateral evacuation or voluntary re-location of 3 some Israeli settlers, if it is deemed that no negotiating partner exists. 1 REUTERS, “Most Israelis back unilateral W. Bank pullout-poll,” 20 January 2006. 2 See Ha’aretz, “Sources: PM sought deal with PA on evacuating 20 settlements,” 16 January 2006. 3 Ha’aretz, “Peretz: Settlers who leave West Bank will be fairly compensated,” 23 January 2006. See also Reuters, “Israeli Labour chief supports evacuating settlements,” 12 November 2005. PREPARED BY THE NSU SETTLEMENTS FILE 1 April 2006 CONFIDENTIAL NOT FOR CIRCULATION II. EXISTING PLANS & PROPOSALS To date, a number of proposals for evacuating a limited number of settlements prior to permanent status negotiations have been put forth. Most of these are Israeli-driven proposals, which to varying degrees are designed to reinforce Israeli control over areas west of the Wall, an expanded “Greater Jerusalem” corridor and the Jordan Valley. Five different proposals are considered below, four of which are Israeli, including Kadima’s “convergence” plan. A. Shikaki Proposal In December 2003, Dr. Khalil Shikaki of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) published a detailed plan for implementing the Quartet Roadmap within a three-year period. As part of his five-step “work plan”, Shikaki called for the immediate evacuation of 34 West Bank settlements, along with all 21 Gaza settlements, in order to pave the way for a “state with provisional borders”, followed by permanent status negotiations.4 Though the concept of a “state with provisional borders” is only mentioned as an optional scenario in Phase II of the Roadmap, Shikaki believes that “[e]arly Palestinian statehood is the means to kickstart the peace process; it is not the end of the process.” For Shikaki, the notion of Palestinian “viability” depends upon the realization of certain territorial, economic and security requirements, as well as on sovereignty and overall governance, prior to permanent status negotiations. The proposal lists 34 West Bank settlements, at the time housing some 14,742 settlers, for immediate evacuation, four of which (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, Homesh) have already been evacuated as part of the “disengagement” plan. According to Shikaki, these settlements, most of which are located along the West Bank’s heavily populated central ridge, pose the greatest threat to the “minimum short-term contiguity” required by a future Palestinian state. Evacuating the remaining 30 settlements, which now contain at least 16,674 settlers,5 would leave Palestinians in control over some 68% of the West Bank. (See Map 1 and Table 1) There are significant problems with Shikaki’s proposal, not least of which relate to the risk of reinforcing the major settlement blocs, along with Israeli control over Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley. Regarding Jerusalem, Shikaki states only that “the Palestinian state will declare its intention to have its capital in Arab East Jerusalem.” While Shikaki recognizes that “Israeli annexation of three Israeli settlement blocs around Jerusalem would completely cut off Arab East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank,” he fails to propose any tangible safeguards to prevent this from happening and relegates the city’s fate to future permanent status negotiations. In addition, the plan seems to adopt a rather loose definition of “contiguity”, whereby the West Bank would be divided into two distinct cantons, as well as numerous small “islands” of Palestinian control in the midst of Israeli settlement blocs. In fairness, however, it should be noted that the Shikaki proposal was conceived at a time when the overall route of the Wall was not yet known,6 and prior to the implementation of Israel’s segregated road scheme (“transportation contiguity”) and other aspects of its “unilateral separation” policy. At the same time, Shikaki is not oblivious to the potentially serious drawbacks entailed in a “state with provisional borders,” which, in addition to “geographic contiguity”, he says must also have “genuine sovereign attributes (such as control over resources and international crossings)”, including “a detailed description of security arrangements, provisional borders, and the exact attributes of sovereignty,” for it to 4 See Khalil Shikaki, Building a State: How to Make a Roadmap that Works for Palestinians and Israelis, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution (No. 1, December 2003) 5 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2004). 6 The first official route of the Wall was published by the Israeli Ministry of Defense in October 2003. PREPARED BY THE NSU SETTLEMENTS FILE 2 April 2006 CONFIDENTIAL NOT FOR CIRCULATION be acceptable to Palestinians.7 In some respects, the Shikaki proposal was actually somewhat visionary. In addition to being among the first to propose a comprehensive and detailed plan for restarting the peace process and, in effect, for “operationalizing” the Roadmap, Shikaki was the first to recognize the need to go beyond the Oslo framework by proposing settlement evacuations alongside the redeployment of Israeli forces. B. Tafnit Plan The Tafnit Plan was proposed in September 2005, almost immediately after the Gaza evacuation. It is currently being marketed by former National Security Adviser Uzi Dayan and others in the security establishment as a “realistic and responsible” proposal put forth by Israelis purporting to be “centrists”. The plan outlines three primary goals, which are to: Reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians; Strengthen the security of Israel and the foundations of its society; and Enable the resumption of permanent status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians with the aim of ending the conflict on the basis of two states. To this end, the plan calls for the “re-deployment” of Israeli forces behind a “temporary disengagement line”—corresponding roughly to the Wall in the west and the Allon Road in the east—over a three-year period. (See Map 2) During that time, Israel would evacuate an additional 20,000 settlers from 32 West Bank settlements. However, the redeployment/evacuation would begin only after completion of the “security fence”. Though it purports to be a “novel and necessary conceptual plan”, the Tafnit Plan is in reality quite similar to any number of proposals put forth over the years, including the Allon Plan of 1968. In fact, it is nearly identical to the original Wall route of October 2003, which excludes the Palestinian corridor south of Route 443 stretching from Beit Surik to the Latrun, the enclaves of Birnabala and Azzun ‘Itma, the entire Jordan Valley and the Judean Desert (eastern Bethlehem and Hebron governorates). In addition, the plan simultaneously calls for “strengthening… Jerusalem and a number of [other] designated settlement areas in the West Bank” over the long-term.8 Thus, the 32 settlements proposed to be evacuated are mostly isolated and non-viable settlements that are, from Israel’s point of view, relatively expendable and which,