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Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2011 JmkkaYfEadalYjq;YhYZadalqafYL]f%Q]YjH]jkh][lan]º*()) Russia intends to increase its conventional military capability and correspondingly plans to increase its defence budget in both relative and absolute terms. If the Russian political and military leadership is successful in this ambition, the overall military capability of Russia could increase significantly as early as in 2020. The Armed Forces that emerge at the other end of this process will look radically different compared to the military that Russia sent to war in Georgia in 2008. Russia has started to abandon an army based on mobilisation in favour of a military organisation that is smaller but better able to respond quickly to the military challenges that Russia might expect. Russia’s development of its military capability will, however, not be dependent only on the military reform process and goals set by the military leadership. Economic, political, demographic and industry-related factors will decide how quickly and how successfully Russia can push forward towards creating a stronger and more modern military. In a ten-year perspective, Russia will remain dependent on nuclear arms – both strategic and tactical – for its military security. During the next two to five years, the Armed Forces will be undergoing restructuring and reorganisation in order to develop new capabilities. Their conventional capability could decline somewhat during this process, but this will be a temporary set-back in order to build a more effective organisation and greater military capability. JmkkaYfEadalYjq;YhYZadalqafY L`akj]hgjlYf\gl`]j>GAhmZda[YlagfkgfJmkkaYYj]YnYadYZd]gfl`]JmkkaYhjg_jYee]¿ko]Zkal] L]f%Q]YjH]jkh][lan]º*()) ooo&^ga&k]'jmkkaY ;YjgdafYN]f\adHYddaf ]\&! FOI-R--3474--SE ISSN 1650-1942 www.foi.se August 2012 Carolina Vendil Pallin (ed.) Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2011 FOI-R--3474--SE Titel Rysk militär förmåga i ett tioårsperspektiv – 2011 Title Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2011 Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--3474--SE Månad/Month Augusti/August Utgivningsår/Year 2012 Antal sidor/Pages 186 p ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet/Ministry of Defence Projektnr/Project no A18001 Godkänd av/Approved by Maria Lignell Jakobsson Ansvarig avdelning Försvarsanalys Cover photo: Russian conscripts lining up in Moscow, 26 November 2010, AP Photo/Mikhail Metzel. Scanpix. Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk. All form av kopiering, översättning eller bearbetning utan medgivande är förbjuden. This work is protected under the Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (SFS 1960:729). Any form of reproduction, translation or modification without permission is prohibited. 2 3 FOI-R--3474--SE Sammanfattning Ryssland avser att öka sin försvarsbudget även i relativa termer och det finns en tydlig intention att öka den konventionella förmågan. Om den ryska politiska och militära ledningen lyckas driva denna process framåt kan landets sammantagna militära förmåga komma att höjas avsevärt redan fram mot år 2020. De Väpnade Styrkor som då kommer ut på andra sidan processen kommer att se annorlunda ut jämfört med dem Ryssland förfogade över i Georgienkriget 2008. Ryssland har inlett en process där förmågan till massmobilisering gradvis minskas till förmån för att skapa ett försvar som är mindre, men som snabbare kan reagera på de militära utmaningar som Ryssland förutser, ett snabbinsatsförsvar. Rysslands militära förmågeutveckling kommer dock att vara beroende av ekonomiska, inrikespolitiska, demografiska och industriella faktorer, utöver de rent militära. Ryssland kommer i ett tioårsperspektiv att vara fortsatt beroende av kärnvapen – såväl strategiska som taktiska – för sin militära säkerhet. Under de närmaste två till fem åren kommer Rysslands konventionella Väpnade Styrkor fortsatt att befinna sig i ett tillstånd där omstrukturering av organisationen och utveckling av ny förmåga står i fokus. Därmed kan Rysslands konventionella militära förmåga komma att gå ned under en övergångsperiod då man ändrar de strukturella förutsättningarna för att på sikt bygga en effektivare organisation och därmed en större militär förmåga. Nyckelord: Ryssland, OSS, militär förmåga, de Väpnade Styrkorna, demokrati, säkerhetspolitik, ekonomi, försvarsekonomi, energi, FoU, massförstörelsevapen, utrikespolitik, inrikespolitik, kärnvapen, kemiska vapen, biologiska vapen, doktrin, försvarsindustri, materielanskaffning, vapenexport, Putin, Medvedev 2 3 FOI-R--3474--SE Abstract Russia intends to increase its conventional military capability and correspondingly plans to increase its defence budget in both relative and absolute terms. If the Russian political and military leadership is successful in this ambition, the overall military capability of Russia could increase significantly as early as in 2020. The Armed Forces that emerge at the other end of this process will look radically different compared to the military that Russia sent to war in Georgia in 2008. Russia has started to abandon an army based on mobilisation in favour of a military organisation that is smaller but better able to respond quickly to the military challenges that Russia might expect. Russia’s development of its military capability will, however, not be dependent only on the military reform process and goals set by the military leadership. Economic, political, demographic and industry-related factors will decide how quickly and how successfully Russia can push forward towards creating a stronger and more modern military. In a ten-year perspective, Russia will remain dependent on nuclear arms – both strategic and tactical – for its military security. During the next two to five years, the Armed Forces will be undergoing restructuring and reorganisation in order to develop new capabilities. Their conventional capability could decline somewhat during this process, but this will be a temporary set-back in order to build a more effective organisation and greater military capability. Keywords: Russia, CIS, military capability, Armed Forces, democracy, security policy, economy, defence economy, energy, R&D, weapons of mass destruction, foreign policy, domestic policy, nuclear arms, chemical weapons, biological weapons, doctrine, defence industry, procurement, defence exports, Putin, Medvedev 4 5 FOI-R--3474--SE Preface Since 1998, the Russia Programme at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) has produced six reports on Russian military capability in a ten-year perspective in Swedish. Furthermore, these reports have been accompanied by a summary. This time, the Russia Programme has put together an English report based on the Swedish one that is considerably more than a summary but slightly less than the Swedish version. Compared to the Swedish report, the English study is more focused on military affairs. Therefore the chapters on domestic politics, economy, energy as well as research and development have been excluded in the English report. The study is based on open sources as was the Swedish original study. A number of experts have generously contributed with their knowledge by reading the chapters and comment upon them. Johan Tunberger provided advice on how the conclusions could be trimmed and made more pertinent to the overall question; Bertil Nygren and Ingmar Oldberg read the chapter on foreign policy; Jan Leijonhielm, who previously headed the Russia Programme read the chapter on defence economics, as did Julian Cooper; Pär Blid read the chapter on the Armed Forces; Tor Bukkvoll and Paul Holtom read both the chapter on the defence industry and that on the Armed Forces; and Daniel Nord as well as Lena Norlander together with her colleagues at FOI in Umeå read the chapter on weapons of mass destruction. Their comments greatly enhanced the quality of the report and all the authors are deeply indebted to them. Any remaining errors are, of course, entirely the responsibility of the authors and editor of this study. The personnel at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow both helped with logistics and generously shared their expertise during a research trip that the project as a whole undertook in May 2011. Not least, Defence Attaché Johan Huovinen was instrumental in coordinating the programme for the visit and providing both practical advice and important expertise on Russian military affairs. The Russia Programme would also like to thank Pavel Podvig for the data for he provided for the diagrams on nuclear warheads as well as Per Wikström at FOI in Umeå, who was instrumental in providing maps for the study. Sanna Aronsson helped with practicalities during the entire research process, but even more importantly, did the final proof editing with a firm, expert hand. Finally, all the authors would like to express their gratitude to Vitaly Shlykov, whom we met in Moscow in May 2011. As always, he was an invaluable source of expertise and new perspectives. We received the news that he had passed away in November the same year and his incisive comments will be greatly missed in the Russian debate on defence affairs. Stockholm, June 2012 Carolina Vendil Pallin 4 5 FOI-R--3474--SE 6 7 FOI-R--3474--SE Acronyms and Abbreviations Note AFADC Air Force and Air Defence Commands ALCM air-launched cruise missile ASM air-to-surface missile ASW anti-submarine weapon AWAC airborne warning and control system BMD infantry combat vehicle Ru. boevaia mashina desanty BMP infantry combat vehicle Ru. boevaia mashina pekhoty BRIC Brazil, Russia, India
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