WINNING IN AFGHANISTAN: CREATING EFFECTIVE AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES Publication Draft: Revised March 11, 2008 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, With the assistance of David Kasten and Adam Mausner [email protected] Cordesman, WinninG in AfGhanistan: CreatinG an Effective Partner 3/11/09 PaGe ii Executive Summary: There is no one solution to winning the AfGhan­Pakistan War. The war is an ideological, civil, military and economic conflict that now affects two very different nations: AfGhanistan and Pakistan. Success requires a broad strateGy that inteGrates the civil and military dimensions of the war into sustainable efforts that take account of the real world conditions in both countries. No mix of military victories at the tactical level can by themselves defeat an ideological enemy, or brinG AfGhanistan and Pakistan security and stability. The Taliban, Hekmatyer, and Haqqani networks, and Al Qa’ida, must be defeated at the local, regional, and national level by a combination of ideological, political, economic, and military means. No victory can come without improved Governance and Government services, or active successful aid and development efforts in the areas where the war is being fouGht. There is a critical need for better and more honest AfGhan and Pakistani Governance, for a meaningful rule of law, for economic security and development, for more civilian aid workers and funds, and far more coherence in international efforts to make this possible. At the same time, the AfGhan Government, US, and NATO/ISAF, and Paksitani Government face a steadily GrowinG and more effective security threat. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to Congress on September 10th, 2008 that, “I’m not convinced we’re winning it in Afghanistan.”i Other military experts, like General Jim Jones, the new National Security Advisor have been more blunt: “Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.” The steady deterioration of the situation is now clear from US, NATO/ISAF, and UN reportinG. It has been marked by a steady increase in insurgent influence and control in both AfGhanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchi areas in Pakistan since 2003. This rise in influence beGan to reach the crisis point in 2005, and continues to rise sharply over time. DurinG 2008 alone: • There was a 33% increase in military clashes. Insurgent initiated attacks also increased 33% percent. • Direct fire incidents increased 40 percent and indirect fire incidents increased 27 percent. • Insurgent violence increased by 40% in the sprinG and summer of 2008. • IED attacks increased by 27% over the course of the year ­­ althouGh so did the number discovered and pre­detonated. • Attacks along the major highway in Afghanistan, the Ring Road rose 37 percent from 2007 to 2008. • Surface­to­air fire increased 67 percent. The scale of this deterioration in the security situation in AfGhanistan alone is further indicated by the fact that the US now plans to­ nearly double the 34,000 troops it now has in country in the course of 2009. It is also indicated by the fact that the AfGhan Government nearly doubled the planned end strength of the AfGhan Army in 2008/ One can only shape the future if one can survive the present. No mid to long­term strateGy in AfGhanistan can succeed if AfGhan, NATO/ISAF, and US forces cannot meet Cordesman, WinninG in AfGhanistan: CreatinG an Effective Partner 3/11/09 PaGe iii critical, and immediate warfiGhtinG needs. No, improvement in other areas can succeed without more security, and efforts at political and economic development will become unsustainable if the threat and levels of violence continue to grow. At the same time, there is no prospect that US and NATO/ISAF forces can become strong and effective enouGh to win on their own. US commanders have called for 20,000­35,000 more US and NATO/ISAF troops, but this is the number needed to buy time, not the number needed to win. Afghan Force Development: The Requirement and the Reality This means that any effective counterinsurGency strateGy in AfGhanistan must build up strong AfGhan security forces. They are the only way to build up the level of military strength necessary to defeat the enemy and create the level of security that is a critical prerequisite for Governance and development. So far, however, this effort laGs badly behind the need. No real effort was made to fund the war in FY2002 and FY2003. Total US aid activity remained at levels under $1 billion a year. They only rose to $2.5 billion in FY2004 and remained under $4 billion a year in FY2005 and FY2006. As result, every aspect of the war was under funded, when aid spending suddenly leaped to $10.2 billion, only to drop back to $6.0 billion in FY2008 and $2.9 billion in FY2009 – as the war worsened to the crisis point. ii The war and has been mismanaged and underfunded in the past, and many of the lessons of IraQ and other recent wars were iGnored or could not be implemented. Total US aid funding for the AfGhan National Army (ANA) or Police (ANP) force was $110 million in FY2002, $361 million in FY2003, $879 million in FY2004, $986 million in FY2005, and $1,954 million in FY2006. It then leaped to $7,937 million in FY2007, to drop back to $2,745 million in FY2008 and $2,000 million in FY2009. iii The development of Afgan forces is now makinG real proGress, but far too late. Seven years after the invasion of AfGhanistan, neither the ANA or ANP is capable of standing on its own. AfGhan military forces are still reliant upon NATO forces for leadership, logistics, and air support in combat. The development of the ANA and ANP continues to be severely under­resourced both in terms of advisors and funds. While the ANA is more capable than the ANP, both must improve dramatically before they can take the lead in AfGhan security and it is far from clear that such progress can be made in time to avoid a major further deterioration in the security situation. It was only in late 2008 that the AfGhan Government, NATO/ISAF, and the US set force Goals for the ANA that increased its size from 70,000 to 134,000 men in an effort to Give it the needed end strenGth. These Goals were set, however at a time when the Department of Defense reported that ANA had only 30­40% of the US and NATO/ISAF trainers and embeds it needed, and many of these trainers had little or no real qualification or competence. There were far too few partner units in the field, and AfGhan units were often committed to combat without adequate levels of support. Reporting from experts in the US and NATO/ISAF teams in AfGhanistan is more reassurinG. It indicates that when the JCMB approved the increase of the ANA to 134,000 there were 37 OMLTs and 55 ETTs for a total of 92 traininG teams for 95 ANA units. The ETTs and OMLTs were trained specifically for the mission of training the ANA. Cordesman, WinninG in AfGhanistan: CreatinG an Effective Partner 3/11/09 PaGe iv The NATO/ISAF model is the concept of both mentoring and partnerinG to exponentially increase the capability of the ANA. At that time the ANA was leading 68% of the combat operations, meaning they would be in the leader with coalition support. iv Nevertheless, it is clear that the near doubling of the ANA force makes providing adequate assets and trainers ieven more urGent. Equipment for the ANA is limited, and efforts to Give it sustainability will require sustained aid. The ANA is still being trained largely in terms of battalion­equivalents, rather than an inteGrated army, and the AfGhan Air Corps is only beGinning to be revived as an active force. ANA units are relatively capable, but after five years, ANA has 34 units rated CM1, including 1 Corps HQs, 9 BDE HQs, and 24 kandaks out of some 95 units.v The Challenge of the Afghan National Police The situation is more challenginG in the case of the AfGhan police. The police take most of the casualties in the fiGhtinG in AfGhanistan, and many have their courage and bravery. Yet, they have not beGun to bring day­to­­day security to most districts in AfGhanistan, particularly in key cities and those rural districts where the Taliban and similar movement have the most power and influence. The problems in developing the ANP have led some experts to question whether the trainers and resources are available to create both an effective ANA and ANP at the same time. Moreover, the Goals set for shapinG the ANP have also continued to chanGe and some still seem more suitable to post conflict construction than active war fighting. Until 2007, police and judicial training were led by countries that focused on creating conventional police rather than the paramilitary forces that are actually needed to deal with orGanized crime and narco­traffickers and provide local security in high risk areas. The Police force Goals were far too low, insufficient resources were available to meet them, and far too little advisory support was available in the field. Manpower and pay policies encouraged corruption and desertions, and while those ANP members who did their duty took hiGher casualties than the ANP. Some 1,165 ANP willed killed in action between January 2007 and September 2008, versus 420 members of the ANA. vi Until 2008, the overall effort to shape the ANP was largely a matter of Good intentions unsupported by Good actions.