German Historical Institute London Bulletin
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German Historical Institute London Bulletin Bd. 25 2003 Nr. 1 Copyright Das Digitalisat wird Ihnen von perspectivia.net, der Online-Publikationsplattform der Max Weber Stiftung – Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland, zur Verfügung gestellt. Bitte beachten Sie, dass das Digitalisat urheberrechtlich geschützt ist. Erlaubt ist aber das Lesen, das Ausdrucken des Textes, das Herunterladen, das Speichern der Daten auf einem eigenen Datenträger soweit die vorgenannten Handlungen ausschließlich zu privaten und nicht- kommerziellen Zwecken erfolgen. Eine darüber hinausgehende unerlaubte Verwendung, Reproduktion oder Weitergabe einzelner Inhalte oder Bilder können sowohl zivil- als auch strafrechtlich verfolgt werden. IDEAS, CONTEXTS, AND THE PURSUIT OF GENOCIDE by Mark Roseman PETER LONGERICH, The Unwritten Order: Hitlers Role in the Final Solution (Stroud: Tempus Publishing, 2001), 160 pp. ISBN 0 7524 1977 3. £17.00 US $21.99 IRMTRUD WOJAK, Eichmanns Memoiren: Ein kritischer Essay, Wis- senschaftliche Reihe des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Sonderband (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2001), 279 pp. ISBN 3 593 36381 X. EUR 25.50 MICHAEL WILDT, Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichsicherheitshauptamtes (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002), 964 pp. ISBN 3 930908 75 1. EUR 35.00 CHRISTIAN GERLACH and GÖTZ ALY, Das letzte Kapitel: Realpoli- tik, Ideologie und der Mord an den ungarischen Juden 1944/45 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2002), 481 pp. ISBN 3 421 05505 X. EUR 35.00 For a long time, debate about the Holocausts origins was dominated by the intentionalists and the functionalists. According to the clas- sic intentionalist view, the decision-making process leading to Auschwitz was single-minded and single-handed. Hitler, with a firm grip on power, was hell-bent on murder. The descent into genocide occurred because the master of Germany progressively implemented his plan. By contrast, the functionalists believed that Hitler merely supplied the rhetoric. Nazi Germanys internal structure was so anarchic that no one was in control. The murderous escalation of anti-Jewish measures was the result of untrammelled competition between Nazi leaders, pushing the envelope in a policy-area known to enjoy Hitlers particular regard. The interchange between these two schools was enormously productive, but over the last ten to fif- teen years an explosion of new research on the Holocaust has so recast the interpretative landscape as to render them almost irrele- vant. For one thing, central leadership and widespread participation no longer look so opposed to one another. It is possible to acknowledge 64 The Pursuit of Genocide Hitlers very powerful role without losing sight of his lieutenants energy, initiative, and drive. Moreover, it is now evident that inten- tionalists and functionalists shared a number of hidden assumptions that have since been called into question. Both schools concurred in seeing the Holocaust as a thoroughly irrational enterprise. Neither believed the Holocaust was the product of widespread desireit did not seem possible or plausible that a broad cohort of educated poli- cy-makers should have aspired to such an irrational and murderous ideal. Both sides were thus agreed in ascribing the specific murder- ousness of the vision to Hitlerin the form of a plan, said the inten- tionalists, in the form of vague, catalytic rhetoric, said the structural- ists. Both sides argued that it took the Third Reichs peculiar power structure (though they disagreed about what this was) to galvanize Hitlers army of helpers into action. What drove the subordinates to fulfil the plan, according to the intentionalists was loyalty, obedience, or fear in a totalitarian dictatorship; what led them to give reality to murderous fantasies, said the structuralists, was competition for pri- macy in a chaotic power structure. All these assumptionsabout rationality, power, and motivehave now been challenged. In particular, the desk-murderers and field-murderers have recently been put under the spotlight. After all, if the Third Reichs policy environment was characterized neither by absolute dictator- ship nor by anarchy, the question arises as to how Hitler managed to find so many energetic and able racial warriors. Those warriors have come to seem far more willing and motivated than they once did; the intention, to follow the language of the older debate, was dispersed far more widely than historians once thought. Yet there is no new consensus among historians to account for the willingness to em- brace genocide. Some analysts emphasize particular mentalities, oth- ers particular situations and contexts. These contrasting approaches raise questions about the relationship between ideas, language, and action that extend far beyond the Holocaust. I Alongside Saul Friedländer and Ian Kershaw,1 Peter Longerich has been one of the most influential scholars redefining the relationship 1 Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution 19331939 (London, 1997) and Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 19361945, vol. 1: Hubris; vol. 2: Nemesis (Harmondsworth, 2000). 65 Review Articles between Hitler and his followers. His giant study Politik der Vernich- tung, published in 1998 and reviewed in the Bulletin of the GHIL, 22/2 (Nov. 2000), pp. 735, constitutes one of the best modern syntheses of the evolution of Nazi murder policy towards not only the Jews, but also the gypsies and the handicapped.2 In that work he expertly tran- scended the polarization of the older debates, showing that Hitler repeatedly intervened in Jewish policy but at the same time depend- ed on a large cohort of enthusiastic followers, who shared and devel- oped many of his goals and ideas. Given the studys importance and the interest the Holocaust commands, it is very surprising that Politik der Vernichtung is still not available in English. However, non- German-speaking readers can now gain a flavour of Longerichs ideas with The Unwritten Order, a shorter work completed in the wake of Longerichs activity as expert witness in the David Irving libel trial. In preparing his expert testimony, Longerich discovered to his surprise that despite more than fifty years of intense historical interest in the Holocaust, the key primary sources remained widely dispersed and often hard to track down. And thus Longerich resolv- ed to produce a short volume, identifying when and where Hitlers activities are documented, and locating Hitlers role in relation to the wider process of the Holocaust. The books coverage of the 1930s is particularly effective, though the general tenor will be familiar to readers of Saul Friedländers magnificent Nazi Germany and the Jews. In short readable chapters, Longerich demolishes the structuralist view that the 1933 pogroms or the Kristallnacht of November 1938 occurred somehow outside Hitlers control, or that he was bounced into producing the Nurem- berg Laws in September 1935. A telling comment was Reich Chan- cellor Hitlers statement to the Reichstatthalter in September 1933 in the context of explaining why he had deferred some of his proposed laws on Jews. As far as the Jewish question is concerned, there could be no going back. In the Reich Chancellors view, it would have been better if increasingly tough measures against the Jews could have been introduced step by step, beginning with a change in the citizen- ship laws and from there gradually tightening the grip on the Jews (my translation from the German edition). What was here uttered in 2 Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: Eine Gesamtdarstellung der national- sozialistischen Judenverfolgung (Munich, 1998). 66 The Pursuit of Genocide the subjunctive could hardly have been a more accurate prediction of later developments from 1935 to 1939. And yet for all the clarity of Hitlers intention, as Longerich argues, there was no blueprint for Auschwitz waiting in the wings. On the contrary, the aim through- out the 1930s was to get the Jews out of Germany, the further away, the better. When we look at the transition to genocide after 1939, Hitlers role is more elusive. His interventions, though no less significant, took place less frequently and less publicly, and in some cases his position was almost completely and deliberately obscured. It is understand- able, therefore, that Longerich should widen his brief to explore the process as much as the man, and thus the reader gains a pithy sum- mary of the arguments offered in more detail in Politik der Vernichtung. One of Longerichs most distinctive contributions lies in the timeframe he ascribes to the transition to murder in Nazi policy. Whereas other authors have tended to focus on the summer and autumn of 1941 as the point at which the idea of a Jewish reservation gave way to the killing fields and gas chambers, Longerich identifies a gestation period extending from the outbreak of war (when in the euthanasia institutes and in Poland murder first emerged as a tool of social engineering) through to the summer of 1942 (when, in Longerichs view, the Nazis finally introduced pan-European geno- cide against the Jews). Although not everyone will agree with all of this, and many authors still see a critical watershed sometime between July and December 1941, there is certainly now a much greater consensus both that the outbreak of war marked a decisive caesura, and that in the late spring or early summer of 1942 one or several decisions (Himmlers role is clear, Hitlers deducible) led to an expansion of the killing programme.3 The weakness of the current volume is that in pursuing his par- ticular interpretation Longerich loses sight of the aim of clarifying exactly what we know and do not know about Hitlers role. The read- 3 See on this point also Peter Witte, Two decisions concerning the Final Solution to the Jewish Question: Deportations to Lódz and Mass murder in Chelmno, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 9/3 (1995), pp. 31845 and Christopher Browning, A final Hitler decision for the Final Solution? The Riegner Telegram Reconsidered, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 10/1 (1996), pp.