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Collection: Sigur, Gaston J.: Files Folder Title: Korea (South) 1984 (1) Box: RAC Box 10 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: Sigur, Gaston J.: Files Folder Title: Korea (South) 1984 (1) Box: RAC Box 10 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection: Sigur, Gaston: Files Archivist: dlb File Folder: forea (South) 1.984 (1 of 6) Date: 2/4/99 Bor906o~- v(:'.4.- «:, f>-,_f;) '1'0 · I u 1:i:111111111111111;::11! 1. Report 5. Cable 1/17/84 P-J.FI 6. Cable 1/23/84 7. Note 1/31/84 8. Report 1/31/84 I l ,, - RESTRICTION CODES Presidential Records Act • (44 U.S.C. 2204{a)) Freedom of lnfonnatlon Act • (5 U.S.C. 552(b)] P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]. F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIAJ. P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of lhe PRA]. F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency ((b)(2) of P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of lhe PRA]. lhe FOIAJ. P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIAJ. · information [(a)(4) of lhe PRA]. F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between lhe President and his advisors, or information [(b)(4) of lhe FOIA]. between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]. F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of P-6 Release would constttute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of lhe FOIA]. lhe PRA]. F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes ((b)(7) of lhe FOIAJ. C. Closed in accordance wilh reslridions contained in donor's deed of gift. F-8 Release would disclose information concerning lhe regulation offinancial instttutions [(b)(8) of lhe FOIAJ. F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of lhe FOIAJ. --------;;,7 l"' r- background , mCDJ1~ [South] Korea United States Department of State October 1983 Bure.au of Public Affairs Geography Natural resources: Limited coal, tungsten, iron ore, limestone, kaolinite, and Area: 98,500 sq. km. (38,000 sq. mi.); about graphite. the size of Indiana. Cities: Capital-Seoul Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries: (1980 pop. over 8 million). Other major 18.1 % of 1982 GNP. Products-rice, barley, cities-Pusan (over 3 million), Taegu (1.7 vegetables, fish. Arable land-22% of land million), Inchon (1 million), Kwangju area. (727,000), Taejon (651,000). Terrain: Partial­ Manufacturing and mining: 35.3% of ly forested mountain ranges, separated by 1982 GNP. Products-Textiles, footwear, deep, narrow valleys; cultivated plains along electronics, shipbuilding, motor vehicles, the coasts, particularly in the west and south. petrochemicals, industrial machinery. 0 Climate: Temperate. Social overhead capital and other serv­ East ices: 46.5% of GNP. C/rina Government Trade (1982): Exports-$23.5 billion: tex­ See tiles ($5.4 billion); transportation equipment Type: Republic, with power centralized in a ($3.4 billion), base metals and articles ($3.1 strong executive. Independence: August 15, billion), electrical products ($2.1 billion), 1948. Constitution: July 17, 1948; revised footwear ($1.2 billion), fish and fish products Official Name: 1962, 1972, 1980. Branches: Executive­ ($0.8 billion). Major markets-US, Japan, Republic of Korea president (chief of state). Legislative­ European Community, Middle East. Imr unicameral National Assembly. Judicial­ ports-$24.3 billion: crude oil ($6 billion), Supreme Court and appellate courts, Con­ grains ($0.9 billion), machinery ($4.4 billion), stitutional Court. Subdivisions: Nine prov­ chemicals and chemical products ($1.8 billion), inces, four administratively separate cities base metals and articles ($1. 7 billion), (Seoul, Pusan, Inchon, Taegu). transportation equipment ($1.4 billion). Major Political parties: Government party­ suppliers-Middle East, Japan, US. PROFILE Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Opposi­ Official exchange rate (October 1983): tion parties-Democratic Korea Party About 780 won= US$1. People (DKP), Korean National Citizens Party Fiscal year: Calendar year. (KNCP). Suffrage: Universal over age 20. Noun and adjective: Korean(s). Population Central government budget (1983 pro­ (1983): 40 million. Annual growth rate: jected): Expenditures, $13.9 billion. Membership in International 1.6%. Ethnic groups: Korean; small Chinese Defense (1983 est.): 6% of GNP; about Organizations minority. Religions: Buddhism, Christianity, one-third of national budget. Armed forces Official observer status at UN; active in Shamanism, Confucianism. Language: (1982): About 600,000 active. many UN specialized agencies (FAO, GATT, Korean. Education: Years compulsory-6. Flag: Centered on a white field is the an­ IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFC, ICO, IMF, Number of students-9,951,000. Attend­ cient Chinese symbol of yin and yang, a divid­ ITU, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO) ance-of those eligible 91.65% attend middle ed circle of interpenetrating red (top) and and other international organizations (Asian­ school, 56.8% high school, and 13.9% blue (bottom), representing the union of op­ African Legal Consultative Committee, Asian college (1980). Literacy-over 90%. Health: posites. At each corner of the white field is a People's Anti-Communist League, World 1 doctor/1,554 persons (1979). Infant mortali­ different trigram of black bars, symbols of Anti-Communist League, Colombo Plan, (1982). ty rate-32/1,000 Life expectancy-68 the elements from the ancient pan-East Economic and Social Commission for Asia yrs. (1979). Work force (14,722,000, 1982): Asian I Ching or "Book of Changes." and the Pacific, Geneva Conventions of 1949 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing-30.6%. Together, the yin-yang and the four trigrams for the Protection of War Victims, Asian Mining and manufacturing-22.4%. represent eternal unity. Development Bank, INTELSAT, Interna­ Services-4 7%. tional Whaling Commission, Interparliamen­ Economy tary Union, INTERPOL); official observer status in African Development Bank and GNP (1982): $65.944 billion. Annual growth Organization of American States. rate (1961-81): 8%. Per capita GNP (1982): $1,680. Consumer price index (1982 avg. in­ crease): 7.3%. 130 South Korea * National capital ~· ·- Railroad _ -- Expressway -··· Road + International airport 25 50 Kilometers 25 ----- 50 M1les ····---- Ulliing·do Q SEA OF YELLOW JAPAN SEA 36 0 ,o 34 - - '> ------ J____ _ i i I I I ~o ~/ ) )l.--·h eju·do I 126 128 2 GEOGRAPHY more than 2 million Koreans moved vention of the Korean Hangul alphabet from the north to the south following in the 15th century. These characters The Republic of Korea (South Korea) oc­ the division of the peninsula into U.S. are still in limited use in South Korea; cupies the southern portion of a moun­ and Soviet military zones of adminstra­ North Korea uses Hangul exclusively. tainous peninsula, about 966 kilometers tion. This southward migration con­ Many older people retain some (600 mi.) long and 217 kilometers (135 tinued after the establishment of the knowledge of Japanese from the colonial mi.) wide, projecting southeast from Republic of Korea in 1948 and during period (1910-45), and most educated China and separating the Sea of Japan the Korean war (1950-53). About 10% Koreans can at least read English, from the Yell ow Sea (known in Korea of the people in the Republic of Korea which is taught in all secondary schools. as, respectively, the East Sea and are of northern origin. With about 40 West Sea ). Japan lies about 193 kilo­ million people, South Korea has one of meters (120 mi.) east of Pusan across the world's highest population den­ Religion the Sea of Japan. The most rugged sities-much higher, for example, than Korea's traditional religions are Bud­ areas are the mountainous east coast India or Japan. North Korea has about dhism and Shamanism. Buddhism has and central interior. Good harbors are 19 million people and a substantially declined in influence from the heights it found only on the western and southern lower population density. Expatriate reached in the Koryo dynasty (A.D. coasts. Koreans live mostly in China (1.2 935-1292) but still commands the South Korea's only land boundary is million), Japan (600,000), the United greatest number of adherents of any with North Korea, formed by the States (500 ,000), and the Soviet Union. faith-about 16% of the population. Military Demarcation Line (MDL) mark­ Shamanism, the traditional spirit ing the line of separation between the Language worship, is still widely practiced in rural belligerent sides at the close of the areas. Although Confucianism remains Korean war. The Demilitarized Zone Korean is a Uralic language, remotely the dominant cultural influence, its (DMZ) extends for 2,000 meters (just related to Japanese, Mongolian, religious adherents are few and mostly over 1 mi.) on either side of the MDL. Hungarian, and Finnish. Although there elderly. Christian missionaries arrived in The North and South Korean Govern­ are dialects, the Korean spoken Korea in the 19th century and founded ments both hold that the MDL is not a throughout the peninsula is mutually schools, hospitals, and other modern in­ permanent border but a temporary ad­ comprehensible. Chinese characters stitutions throughout Korea. Today ministrntive line. were used to write Korean before the in- about 4 million Koreans, or 10% of the Seoul, the capital, is less than 48 kilometers (30 mi.) from th~ DMZ, near the west coast.
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