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The Koreas and the Policy/Culture Nexus

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The Koreas and the Policy/Culture Nexus Two States, One Nation: The Koreas and the Policy/Culture Nexus Jacqueline Willis Institute for Culture and Society University of Western Sydney A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. © 2013 Acknowledgements I would like to especially thank my principal supervisor Professor James Arvanitakis for the unfailing guidance, encouragement and support he has given me throughout my candidature. His academic expertise, enthusiasm and assuring presence have provided the motivation, confidence and direction needed to complete this intellectually stimulating, though sometimes daunting task. I gratefully acknowledge and extend immeasurable thanks for his mentorship, editorship and invaluable feedback, without which this thesis could not have been written. I would also like to acknowledge the input of my co-supervisor Professor Brett Neilson, whose expert knowledge and recommendations have proven invaluable to the development and completion of this thesis. Special thanks and acknowledgement must also be given to Shin Yoon Ju for providing Korean-English translations, as well as to Brian J. McMorrow, Grete Howard, Eric Testroete, Chris Wood, Raymond Cunningham and fellow Korea researcher, Christopher Richardson, for generously allowing me to use and reproduce their personal photographs. Thanks too to those affiliated with the Institute for Culture and Society at the University of Western Sydney, for their committed nurturing of my academic development and ambitions over the course of my doctoral enrolment. Finally, I would like to extend gratitude to my family, friends and colleagues for always encouraging me in my academic endeavours. Their patience, unwavering support and steadfast faith in my ability have been powerful incentives, driving and sustaining me in my scholarly pursuits. Statement of Authentication The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution. ............................................................................... (Signature) Table of Contents LIST OF TABLES ..............................................................................................................................III LIST OF FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS................................................................................... IV ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................................................. VI ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................................VIII NOTE ON ROMANISATION ..............................................................................................................X INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 1 RESEARCH FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES .................................................................................................. 4 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................... 15 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS ........................................................................................................ 28 1. IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL ARTEFACTS ..................................................................... 37 1.1 THE SCHOLARLY VALUE OF CULTURAL ARTEFACTS......................................................... 38 1.2 THE MUSEUM EXHIBITION AND THE CASE OF KOREA........................................................ 42 1.3 MUSIC AND PERFORMANCE AND THE CASE OF KOREA ...................................................... 51 1.4 GLOBALISATION: A DETERMINISTIC OR APPROPRIABLE PROCESS? ................................... 60 1.4.1 Understanding the ‘Deterministic’ Argument .............................................................. 62 1.4.2 Hybridity....................................................................................................................... 66 2. JUCHE VERSUS SEGYEHWA: DIVERGENT VIEWS ON GLOBALISATION................. 73 2.1 DECONSTRUCTING JUCHE AND SEGYEHWA ....................................................................... 75 2.1.1 Understanding Juche.................................................................................................... 75 2.1.2 Scrutinising Segyehwa.................................................................................................. 85 2.2 THE INS AND OUTS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................. 90 2.2.1 Enforcing Juche: Social Control, Rewards, Punishment and Performed Belief .......... 90 2.2.2 Implementing Segyehwa: Fostering Hybridity ........................................................... 101 2.3 POLICY AS ARTEFACT: CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF JUCHE AND SEGYEHWA ........... 110 2.3.1 Juche in Propaganda Poster Art ................................................................................ 110 2.3.2 Segyehwa and fusion ‘Gugak’.................................................................................... 125 3. HISTORICITY OF THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT ...................................................... 138 3.1 INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND ACCORDS ...................................................................... 139 3.2 SKIRMISHES, TERRORISM AND FOILED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS................................. 148 3.3 ENGAGING THE NORTH: SUMMITS AND SUNSHINE........................................................... 159 3.4 THE SUNSHINE FADES….................................................................................................. 167 4. KOREA’S REGIONAL RELATIONS: INFLUENCE AND IMPACT ................................. 173 4.1 HISTORICAL IMPERIALISM: REAL AND POTENTIAL!......................................................... 175 4.2 US TROOP PRESENCE AND ITS IMPACT ............................................................................ 193 4.3 THE INFLUENCE OF CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION ........................................................ 204 5. NEGOTIATING THE NUCLEAR ISSUE............................................................................. 221 5.1 NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR AMBITION AND JUCHE .......................................................... 232 5.2 POST 9/11 AND GEORGE W. BUSH ................................................................................... 237 5.3 SIX PARTY TALKS: A REFLECTION OF JUCHEIST CULTURE.............................................. 249 6. MUSEUMS AND EXHIBITIONS.......................................................................................... 257 6.1 MUSEUMS AND EXHIBITIONS IN NORTH KOREA .............................................................. 258 6.1.1 Museums of the Revolutionary Merit of the Great Leader and the Dear Leader....... 258 6.1.2 Conventional Museums in North Korea ..................................................................... 265 6.2 MUSEUMS AND EXHIBITIONS IN SOUTH KOREA............................................................... 285 i 7. MUSIC AND PERFORMANCE............................................................................................. 303 7.1.1 Music in North Korea................................................................................................. 304 7.1.2 Juche Gymnastics: North Korea and Mass Games .................................................... 315 7.2 MUSIC IN SOUTH KOREA: K-POP AND THE SEGYEHWA POLICY....................................... 330 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 343 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 364 APPENDICES................................................................................................................................... 396 APPENDIX 1: MAP OF KOREA ......................................................................................................... 397 APPENDIX 2: TIMELINE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN KOREA’S HISTORY.......................................... 398 APPENDIX 3: NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT............................................................................ 412 APPENDIX 4: AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NONAGGRESSION AND EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH .................................................................. 413 APPENDIX 5: ROK-DPRK JOINT DECLARATION OF THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA..................................................................................................................................... 417 APPENDIX 6: NORTH-SOUTH JOINT DECLARATION ........................................................................ 418 APPENDIX 7: DECLARATION ON THE ADVANCEMENT OF SOUTH-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS, PEACE AND PROSPERITY............................................................................................................................ 419 APPENDIX 8: MUTUAL DEFENCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ........................................................................................................................................... 422 APPENDIX 9: AGREED FRAMEWORK
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