SOUTH KOREA BETWEEN EAGLE AND DRAGON Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma Jae Ho Chung The decade of the 1990s began with the demise of the Soviet empire and the subsequent retreat of Russia from the center stage of Northeast Asia, leaving the United States in a search to adjust its policies in the region. The “rise of China,” escalating cross-strait tension since 1995, North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship and missile challenges, latent irreden- tism, and the pivotal economic importance of Northeast Asia have all led the United States to re-emphasize its role and involvement in the region.1 This redefinition of the American mission has in turn led to the consolidation of the U.S.-Japan alliance, exemplified by the 1997 Defense Guideline revision, as well as to the establishment of trilateral consultative organizations such as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. The increasingly proactive posture by the U.S. has, however, generated grave strategic concerns on the part of China and Russia, which have sought to circumscribe America’s hegemonic parameters in Asia both bilaterally and multilaterally (i.e., the formation of the “Shanghai Six” and the Boao Asia Forum, as well as China’s call for an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Jae Ho Chung is Associate Professor of International Relations, Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea. The author wishes to thank Bruce J. Dickson and Wu Xinbo for their helpful comments on an earlier version. Asian Survey, 41:5, pp. 777–796. ISSN: 0004–4687 Ó 2001 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223. 1. A series of documents– East Asia Strategic Report, Quadrennial Defense Review, Joint Vision 2020, and Asia 2025–well demonstrate the expanding commitment and interests of the U.S. in the Asian region. 777 778 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001 (ASEAN)-China free-trade area).2 The U.S. bombing of the Chinese em- bassy in Belgrade in 1999, the missile-defense controversies (both Theater Missile Defense [TMD] and National Missile Defense [NMD]), and the re- connaissance plane incident in 2001 have further added to concerns over America’s unilateral actions and their strategic implications. Other political events have also raised concerns in the region: the election of Chen Shui-bian as president in Taiwan, Japan’s increasingly rightist drift, and, most impor- tant, the new administration of George W. Bush, who described China as America’s strategic competitor, in sharp contrast with Bill Clinton’s efforts to build a strategic partnership with China. All of these developments have combined to paint a rather grim picture of this crucial part of the world at the dawn of the new millennium. Most alarmed by all of these confrontational signals and the changed at- mosphere in the area is perhaps the South Korean government. Just as Ger- man unification was made possible by the tacit acceptance of the Soviet Union and active persuasion by the U.S., as well as the sincere efforts of the two German states, so too may Korean reunification require consensus-build- ing among the four major powers in Northeast Asia.3 Consensus is best reached when all parties concerned maintain good relationships among them- selves. Unfortunately, menage´ a` six is a remote possibility in Northeast Asia, thus posing a dilemma for Seoul, which has to elicit support from the four major powers, and the U.S. and China in particular. Given that South Korea is structurally tied to the U.S. through the alliance framework, equating the “rise of China” with a China threat will undoubtedly constrain the strategic options available to Seoul. The main thrust of this article is that China is increasingly important in South Korea’s strategic calculations. At the same time, Seoul has to maintain a friendly and mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S., not only for economic interests but also to serve strategic and reunification goals. Sus- taining amicable relationships with both powers, however, will become in- creasingly difficult if the overall capability gap between the two, in real or perceptual terms, gets smaller and smaller and eventually produces a typical case of power transition, a clash of civilizations, or both. Four factors con- 2. The “Shanghai Six” is a multilateral summit mechanism initiated in 1996. Originally, it consisted of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2001. The Boao Asia Forum was established in Hainan, China, in 2001, with 25 Asian countries and Australia as its member states. 3. For such a process in the German case, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Ger- many Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). Despite the willingness of Russia and Japan to play active roles in the Korean process, the U.S. and China assumed much more important functions as the signatories of the 1953 Armistice Agreement as well as participants in the four-party talks. JAE HO CHUNG 779 tribute to Seoul’s dilemma. First, Korea is more tightly tied to the U.S. than it wishes to be. Second, Korea’s perceptions of China are highly favorable even though the genuine intentions of the latter remain unclear. Third, much of the Washington-Beijing relationship evolves independently of Seoul. Fi- nally, regardless of the above issues, Seoul somehow has to find a suitable middle ground between Washington and Beijing. This study relies largely on three different sources of data and information for its empirical analysis. First, both primary materials and secondary analy- ses in English, Chinese, and Korean have been used to offer a balanced view of Korea’s perceptual ambivalence and strategic dilemmas in dealing with the U.S. and China. Second, a dozen nationwide opinion surveys conducted in South Korea during 1988-2000 have been utilized in depicting the public’s perceptions of the U.S. and China. Third, the article uses both structured and unstructured interviews that the author conducted with 20 foreign-policy ex- perts in Seoul in the late 1990s. These interviews help delineate the policy elite’s perceptions and prescriptions. The “Rise of China”: Beyond a Simple Dichotomy A few years ago, many foreign observers were alarmed by the prospect of China’s disintegration. Now, China is being portrayed as a rapidly emerging great power with the potential to challenge regional and, to a certain extent, global stability.4 However, all discussions concerning what China will be- come in the future are inconclusive at best, irrespective of their lists of statis- tical data and trend projections. Statistics of the past, while useful, can never suffice to offer accurate predictions of the future. Given that “telescoped growth” may accelerate, or, alternatively, economic crises may interpose themselves at any time, any future projection is invariably a conjecture. Undoubtedly, China’s track record has been impressive, showing average real gross domestic product growth per annum since 1979 of nearly 10%, three times the world average. Furthermore, various Western and Chinese forecasts have suggested that the size of China’s economy will either super- sede or, at a minimum, approach that of the U.S. by 2020 at the earliest and by 2050 at the latest.5 What, then, will China do with its abundant economic 4. While China denies any intention of becoming a hegemon, it is nevertheless willing to assign itself great-power (daguo) status. See Tao Wenzhao (ed.), Jujue baquan–yu 2049nian zhongguo duihua [Rejecting hegemony –communicating with China in 2049] (Beijing: Zhong- guo jingji chubanshe, 1998); and Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shi zai bixing” [It is inevitable that China conduct great-power diplomacy], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World economy and politics], no. 1 (2000), p. 10. 5. See the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries (Washing- ton, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994); Development Research Center of the State Council, Diaocha 780 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001 resources? Obviously, its strategic intentions are likely to matter more than its economic or military capabilities alone. More important, how China will be viewed by its regional neighbors will also be a very crucial policy determi- nant.6 In this sense, much of the debate on what China will become through its ongoing reform, and how its success should be treated by others, has been overly dichotomized. The “us” (West) versus “them” (China) discourses predominate, and “they” have always been the object for engagement, con- tainment, “congagement,” “constrainment,” and so on from the “we” per- spective, without considering China’s perceptions and preferences. 7 It seems that, perhaps, the issue is not how to predict China’s future but whose point of view to take. Certainly, there is more to the world than a simple juxtaposition of the West and China (or the “rest”). In the context of East Asia, while China is generally regarded as the subject for engagement, significant variations have also been found in specific responses by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia.8 It is in this vein that exploring how the “rise of China” is viewed and assessed by an impor- tant regional actor–South Korea–is deemed a timely and worthwhile en- deavor. While Seoul has been highly successful in engaging China, its success has not yet been closely scrutinized as the core source of the strategic dilemma that it has begun to face.9 The dilemma centers around the blend- ing–if not the choice–between the self-complacent status quo within the U.S.-aligned system and the hopeful but risky journey to a Sinocentric stance, yanjiu baogao [Research and study report: Internal material], no.